Managing Chinese Threat

[Prem Kumar]

Slightly OT, but it would be well worth refreshing our memory with this photograph of Naxal Ram of Chindu receiving a memento from the Chinese Ambassador in 2009. The latter traveled from Delhi all the way to Mount Road, Chennai to assess the return on their investment

Zhang Yan, Chinese Ambassador to India, and his wife Chen Wangxia, present a memento to N. Ram, Editor-in-Chief, The Hindu, at the newspaper's office in Chennai on Tuesday. N. Ravi, Editor, is at right.

[Pranav]

Pot calling the kettle black -

Chinese scientists slammed for creating new ‘deadly’ influenza strains - http://rt.com/news/chinese-scientists-bird-flu-751/

[SSridhar]

May be, but that does not in any way lessen the Chinese crime.

[Pranav]

May be, but that does not in any way lessen the Chinese crime.

What to do, on this planet there is no mercy for the weak.

[vic]

When there is suspicion that top leadership of our nation is being bribed by Chinese Telecom and Power Companies, then their inaction in face of such provocation is easily understandable.

I wonder if people know that Billions of dollars of consumer goods imported from China are under invoiced by 5 to 10 times every year, killing Indian industry, reducing Tax revenue but lining pockets of bigwigs.

The family is worse than East India Company, they are restricting budgets of indigenous R&D, budget for modernization of Indian defense production but encouraging imports from all and sundry.

[JE Menon]

Vic, this thread is about "managing Chinese threat" - not managing the threat from bribed politicians and "the family". Go to the appropriate thread for that.

This is a warning.

[rajrang]

The planned visit of China's PM Li to India will be his first foreign visit after he assumed his office. This latter fact appears to have severely blindsided India's political leadership causing them to adopt an initial pacifist response to the ongoing Chinese intrusion into India, which is perhaps the deepest into India since the 1962 war. To further confuse the matter, India in the last few months had avoided joining the US in an explicit alliance to contain China (remember Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's visit to India a few months back when India rebuffed him). This should have pleased China. India might have assumed that Mr. Li choosing India for his first foreign visit was a reward for India not supporting the US. The Indian leadership which is always driven more by reason, is honestly confused and unable to comprehend the meaning of the depth of the present intrusion (compounded by the establishment of camps) in light of the fact that China is also usually a country driven by reason (relative to jihadi countries of this world). I am also making this assessment because, the meek Indian response to this intrusion thus far is in sharp contrast to the efforts of India's Defense Minister AKA whose tireless efforts over the last few years has enhanced India's military strength in the Eastern Sector.

Is there a chance that India has provoked this incident? Perhaps, if India had been transgressing into Chinese perception of LAC aggressively - in other words extensively intruding into "Chinese territory." This is unlikely, since China has not complained about something of similar magnitude.

Given time Indian leadership will recover from their confusion and respond. Perhaps Western intelligence will share information with India, to help it better understand the meaning of the present events. The French President was there recently. Perhaps they can share any relevant comments that the Chinese leaders may have made about India. But the loss of time can be costly and irreversible loss of territory may be a consequence for India.

Looking back, India's response in 1986 (Sumdorung Chu) was vigorous. Is this why China left India alone for a quarter century - barring thousands of relatively smaller border transgressions? Since then, China's economic output is perhaps 10 times greater and has significantly greater infrastructure in Tibet. Their arrogance has also grown in similar measure as evidenced by their problems with several other countries. The gap between Indian and Chinese economies has also widened. The latest intrusion also shows that they can embarrass India with only 50 soldiers instead moving thousands of men to India's border to do so.

At a minimum India has to give China CONSEQUENCE(S) for their mis-behavior. In this context, noting that India appears to have no more than a couple of divisions in the Western sector to counter PLA versus the 9 or so mountain divisions with the Eastern Command, perhaps, India should immediately start making noises (and actual plans) about raising more divisions in the Western sector. Agreed this will take years, but it will still be a CONSEQUENCE given to China. This is not enough by itself. Some IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE will be necessary. Ideas that come to mind include (a) local military responses without initially firing bullets if possible, (b) swallowing a little pride and getting into a closer alliance with the US immediately similar to PM Nehru's appeal to the West for help during 1962, (c) calling off Salman Kurshid's visit to China which will also cancel Mr. Li's India visit, (d) provide increased military aid (nuclear and missile) to SE Asian countries, (e) ??. Of these item (a) seems most appealing so long as India has enough relative military strength in Ladakh.

By the way, in case my thoughts annoy the "anti dhoti shivering" group in BR which fervently believes that China cannot (will not?) threaten India militarily, then, I hope we can agree to disagree without abuse.

[Singha]

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-SRdGOd1qliI/U ... rfield.JPG

take a look at the paltry number of fighter revetments in Leh, the few spots for transport helis and the small apron. and this is our biggest base in the area, thoise is much much smaller.

does it look like we have any preparation or INTENT to fight a all-out air war in that sector?

the place should have been built up to have fighters crawling out from under every rock like in jodhpur, pune or tezpur yet there is the look for you....no permanent fighter sqdns even. there is no lack of space, only lack of intent and funding for infra.

[RSoami]

There are `n` number of responses which will unsettle the chinese. Send warships in Chinese waters. Closer relations with Taiwan. Start supporting Japanese, Vietnamese and Philippines claims. In fact, these do not even have to be immediate. The government can take its time reacting to this intrusion.
Unfortunately the Indian public and we at BR know better. The government is only waiting for the temperature to go a little lower. It will whimper a little and then keep quite.
So what have we achieved on 26/11 after many many years. If we have failed to take political/military/diplomatic steps against a puny state like Pakistan, one can guess what the government will do against China.
This lack in trust is frustrating. Otherwise wouldn't we be happy to wait for the Indian reaction.3 months, 6 months may be.
But will it ever come?!
Is only an Acne.. Remember.

[Yagnasri]

GOI suffers from its failure to inspire confidence in general public and lack of direction and guts. So if it does not do anthing drastic or do some thing in a long term manner then it will face allegations of not doing anything when our land is being illegally stolen. So it has to do something immediately. Cancelling the Salman visit may be one option which they are seriously looking into now and later cancelling Phina president visit to India.

[Altair]

There are `n` number of responses which will unsettle the chinese. Send warships in Chinese waters. Closer relations with Taiwan. Start supporting Japanese, Vietnamese and Philippines claims. In fact, these do not even have to be immediate. The government can take its time reacting to this intrusion.
Unfortunately the Indian public and we at BR know better. The government is only waiting for the temperature to go a little lower. It will whimper a little and then keep quite.
So what have we achieved on 26/11 after many many years. If we have failed to take political/military/diplomatic steps against a puny state like Pakistan, one can guess what the government will do against China.
This lack in trust is frustrating. Otherwise wouldn't we be happy to wait for the Indian reaction.3 months, 6 months may be.
But will it ever come?!
Is only an Acne.. Remember.

Or just enter coordinates of camps in Brahmos missile launch pad and fire!!

[archan]

There is a separate thread on the current events (http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... f=1&t=6580). Please do not post regarding that on this thread.

[Prem]

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/world ... .html?_r=0

Where China Meets India in a High-Altitude Desert, Push Comes to Shove

NEW DELHI — The disputed border region between India and China attracts troops from both countries, but two weeks ago the Chinese sent an unusual number of military patrols into the mountains of Ladakh, a remote high-altitude desert at the northern tip of India. Two Chinese patrols came on foot, two more arrived in military vehicles and a Chinese helicopter flew overhead. With all the activity, the Indian authorities failed to notice until the next morning that about 30 Chinese soldiers had pitched three tents in an area both countries claim. Indian military officials protested. The Chinese stayed put. India protested again. The Chinese, who had with them a few high-altitude guard dogs, responded by erecting two more tents and raising a sign saying, in English, “You are in Chinese side.” As the dispute enters its third week, alarm in the Indian capital is growing. At a Thursday news briefing, Syed Akbaruddin, the spokesman for India’s Ministry of External Affairs, said, “There is no doubt that in the entire country this is a matter of concern.” But the prime minister has sought to play down the dispute.
“It is a localized problem,” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said Saturday. “We do believe it can be solved. We have a plan. We do not want to accentuate the situation.” Still, jingoistic comments are growing by politicians linked to both the opposition and the government.

“This government is cowardly, incompetent and good for nothing,” said Mulayam Singh Yadav, an important regional leader allied with the governing coalition. Arun Jaitley, a leading opposition politician, said in Parliament on Thursday, “You may have some security options, you may have some diplomatic options, but being clueless is not an option.” In China, a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman denied that Chinese troops had crossed into Indian territory and said the dispute would be resolved peacefully and through appropriate channels. “I would also like to point out that China and India are neighbors and their borders haven’t been demarcated,” said the spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, at a news conference last week in Beijing. “As such, it is difficult to avoid this or that kind of problem.” On Thursday, the online edition of People’s Daily ran an editorial that urged China to continue friendly relations with India, but said China should not “indulge” India’s “bad habits,” and in particular the “lies” of the Indian news media. Though Indian and Chinese politicians have not described the reasons for the dispute, Indian news reports have stated that Chinese officials have demanded that Indian authorities demolish some newly constructed bunkers and reduce patrols in the area.

As its economic might has grown, China has become increasingly assertive in its territorial claims across Asia. In disputes with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, among others, China’s claims revolve around islands or sea lanes that are potentially rich in oil and gas deposits. What puzzles Indian analysts is that China has chosen to squabble over a barren moonscape frequented only by nomadic cattle herders.
“It’s an inexplicable provocation,” said Gen. Vasantha R. Raghavan, a former top Indian military commander who once commanded the region in dispute. “There is something happening inside China which is making the military act in an irrational manner.”
Trade between China and India is growing rapidly. Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid of India is expected to visit Beijing next week, and Prime Minister Li Keqiang of China is scheduled to visit India three weeks later on his first official trip abroad since taking office in March. Indian and Chinese officials have emphasized that relations remain friendly, and Indian officials say that Mr. Khurshid still intends to go to Beijing as planned. But there are growing calls in India for both trips to be canceled. General Raghavan said the dispute was likely to accelerate improving military ties between India and the United States — a development that is not likely to be welcomed by China. M. Taylor Fravel, a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an expert on China’s border issues, said that China might be responding to local concerns about Indian military construction in the disputed area. But he said information about the incursion was sketchy. The latest spat between India and China is bound to resolve itself this year, one way or another. In six months, snow and bitterly cold weather will make the Chinese encampment very difficult, if not impossible, to maintain.

[Prem]

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/world ... -says.html
China Is Seen Nearing U.S.’s Military Power in Region

TOKYO — China’s growing industrial might is likely to allow it to mount an increasingly formidable challenge to the military supremacy of the United States in the waters around China that include Japan and Taiwan, though it will probably seek to avoid an outright armed conflict, according to a detailed new report by a group of American researchers. The report by the nine researchers, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the most likely outcome for the next two decades showed China narrowing the gap with the United States in military abilities, in areas including building aircraft carriers and stealth fighter jets. At the same time, the report, to be released Friday, said China’s economic interdependence with the United States and the rest of Asia would probably prevent it from becoming a full-blown, cold-war-style foe, or from using military force to try to drive the United States from the region. One of the authors, Michael D. Swaine, an expert on Chinese defense policy, called the report one of the first attempts to predict the longer-term consequences of China’s rise for a region whose growing economic prosperity has been largely a result of the peace and stability brought by American military hegemony. He said one conclusion was that the appearance of a new rival meant that, for better or for worse, the current American-dominated status quo might not last much longer.
“We wanted to ask, how should the United States deal with this possibility?” said Mr. Swaine, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment, based in Washington. “Can the United States continue with business as usual in the western Pacific, or must it start thinking of alternative ways to reassure the region about security?” The other authors included scholars, former government officials and other Carnegie analysts. The report, an advance copy of which was seen by The New York Times, said the consequences of the region’s shifting strategic balance might be felt most strongly by Japan, an Asian economic power that has long relied for its security on its alliance with the United States. The report found that in most projections, Japan would probably respond to China’s growing power by clinging more closely to the United States, as it has done recently during a heated argument with China over islands in the East China Sea that both countries claim. At the same time, despite the stance of its hawkish new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, Japan’s fiscal troubles and political paralysis will probably prevent it from significantly bolstering military spending, as some in Washington have hoped it will do to help offset China’s increasing capabilities, the report said.
In the most extreme instances, the report predicted, doubts about the ability or commitment of the United States to remain the region’s dominant military power could one day grow strong enough to drive Japan to more drastic measures, like either embracing China or building its own independent deterrent, including nuclear weapons. For the whole region, the report found the most likely outcome to be what it called an “eroding balance” — essentially, a continuation of the current situation, in which American hegemony is slowly undermined by China’s increasing military abilities and growing willingness to assert its interests. The report said the biggest risk in this environment would be an accidental escalation of a limited dispute, like the current clash with Japan over the disputed islands. At the same time, the report said that for the foreseeable future, China would not follow the former Soviet Union in becoming a global rival to the United States. Rather, it said, China would remain a regional power with a narrow strategic focus on territorial disputes with its immediate neighbors. Even so, the report warned, that would still make it a serious challenge to the United States, which has vowed to increase its military presence in Asia despite budget cuts. “Can the United States maintain its primacy of the past 60 years?” asked Mr. Swaine. “The United States says so, but whether it actually can is not entirely clear.”

[svinayak]

All kind of fake article are appearing

When PRC is buying $2T US treasury and has a large trade with US and its allies in the west including Japan how can it be a threat to US interest. PRC will be formidable challenge to the military supremacy of the United States in the waters around China is a false one

[Prem]

All kind of fake article are appearing

When PRC is buying $2T US treasury and has a large trade with US and its allies in the west including Japan how can it be a threat to US interest. PRC will be formidable challenge to the military supremacy of the United States in the waters around China is a false one

Report shamelessly explain that they hoped Japan to cling closely to Massa for protection but Abe suspecting something no good and with usual independent streak has initiated different response. Japan will like to become independent power and pivot and not to be relegated to the status of Ajlaf.

[ramana]

Acharya, What if internal pressures inside PRC are driving the need for aquick easy winnable conflict and India is not giving them a chance? What will be the fallout inside PRC?

[svinayak]

This is time of internal adjustment with new PRC leaders testing their influence and also how they will be perceived in the global capitols.

PLA has a larger influence in the border policies and will have to see the faultlines inside. But the Deng and Jiang faction are the key to India policy since they have deep relationship with the western countries including the uncle establishment GOP. If their influence is receding then we may see a new change in their policy towards India. But smaller groups may sabotage the new policy. This incursion could be one manifestation

[svinayak]

Report shamelessly explain that they hoped Japan to cling closely to Massa for protection but Abe suspecting something no good and with usual independent streak has initiated different response. Japan will like to become independent power and pivot and not to be relegated to the status of Ajlaf.

It may be likely that if PRC is attacked by the asian countries together then Europe and US may sell arms to PLA to help them to defend!

[Pranav]

This is time of internal adjustment with new PRC leaders testing their influence and also how they will be perceived in the global capitols.

PLA has a larger influence in the border policies and will have to see the faultlines inside. But the Deng and Jiang faction are the key to India policy since they have deep relationship with the western countries including the uncle establishment GOP. If their influence is receding then we may see a new change in their policy towards India. But smaller groups may sabotage the new policy. This incursion could be one manifestation

That is Nalapat's theory but it seems that Xi Jinping leads the military in a very hands-on manner.

[svinayak]

What you read about them may be completely different from what is the reality
Watch their relatoinship with Russia and US

They think in Chinese
They talk/speak in Chinese
They have a chinese culture
But what they do geo politically is like the western countries!

[svinayak]

1962

Chronology of Key Events
March 14, 1899 - Sir Claude McDonald proposed an Aksai Chin
boundary
1914 - McMahon Line declared as boundary in NEFA
1947 - India becomes a republic separate from Great Britain
1949 - Communists form new government, People's Republic of
China
October, 1950 - Chinese assert authority over Tibet
April, 1954 - India and China sign "Five Principles of Peace-
ful Coexistence"
December, 1954 - Tribesmen discontent in Tibet leads to in-
creased Chinese military presence in Tibet
March, 1956 - China begins construction of a military high-
way to link Sinkiang and Tibet
September 1957 - India first learns of the Chinese highway
in "India's territory"
March, 1959 - rebel fighting in Tibet heightens, with rebels
crossing into NEFA to get supplies and weapons
August, 1959 - first clashes between Chinese and Indian bor-
der guards
1960 - unproductive diplomatic exchanges, but no clashes
1961 - Nehru sends troops and border patrols into disputed
frontier areas to establish outposts; skirmishes
increased in late 1961
December, 1961 - India invades and takes Portugese Goa
July, 1962 - Skirmishes in Aksai Chin
August 4, 1962 - China accuses India of advancing even north
of the McMahon Line
August, 1962 - Chinese logistic and manpower buildup along
the frontier
September, 1962 - isolated skirmishes along the disputed bor-
der
October 5, 1962 - India forms special Border Command under
General Kaul
October 10, 1962 - first heavy fighting, at Tseng-Jong in NEFA
October 20, 1962 - Chinese launch a massive assault across the
Namka Chu River in NEFA
October 20-21, 1962 - Chinese launch simultaneous attacks in
Aksai Chin, successful against Galwan Valley and Chip
Chap Valley posts
October 23, 1962 - Chinese overrun all posts down to Tawang in
NEFA
October 24-25, 1962 - Chinese probing attacks at Walong, in
eastern NEFA
Late October, 1962 - lull in fighting; unproductive diplomatic
efforts at compromise fail; numerous changes in command
in NEFA Indian units
November 14, 1962 - Nehru's birthday - Indians launch an attack
on Chinese north of Walong
November 15, 1962 - the Indian offensive fails
November 16, 1962 - Chinese troops overrun Walong
November 17, 1962 - Chinese attack Indians on Bailey Trail in
NEFA; a Chinese attack at Se La, NEFA, is repulsed;
Chinese begin a simultaneous attack on Chushul in Aksai
Chin
November 18, 1962 - Chinese successful at Chushul; no Indian
force remains in Aksai Chin; Indian forces are forced to
withdraw from Se La; Chinese forces attack Bomdi La
November 19, 1962 - Chinese attack Chaku, last Indian forces
in NEFA, successfully; Chou En-Lai gives ceasefire dictum
to Indian official in Peking
November 20, 1962 - Chou publicly announces ceasefire; India
requesting U. S. military aid, but ceasefire ends need
for U. S. intervention
November 21, 1962 - Ceasefire goes into effect
December 1, 1962 - both sides' troops withdraw 20 kilometers
from new boundary lines; repatriation of prisoners starts

[RajeshA]

Continuing from the "India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India" Thread

The long term ones should include new China specific mountain divisions, artillery, new aircraft squadrons for the western and middle sectors as well as start making noises (and actual plans) for teaming up with the US and Japan to develop an "Asian NATO." Unfortunately, India has a super power neighbor whose intentions appear sinister. It will be difficult for India to handle this task alone. Such a build-up can somehow include guarantees to the neighbor to the West that these new capabilities will not be used against them - perhaps underwritten by the US for credibility.

In the past India has sometimes failed to give consequences. A glaring example is China giving nuclear and missile capabilities to the western neighbor so they can kill millions of Indians within hours. India should have responded in kind and enhanced similar capabilities for Vietnam, Taiwan et al.

The latest may be the most serious since 1962. Both in 1967 (Sikkim) and 1986 (Tawang), India's army and leaders (Mrs. Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi) responded with alacrity. Relative peace ensued for a generation after each such incident. This time China's economic might and infrastructure in Tibet are much stronger. However, this should be offset by increased Indian military strength (thanks to AKA), global opinion (US, pacific countries, Europe) should be on India's side and importantly, the US has enough influence in Pakistan to dissuade them from explicitly joining China in the short term.

Why would it not be in the interests of USA to see a serious defeat of India at the hands of China?

• It pushes India much closer into the embrace of USA
• India loses its independence, and takes up a position like Japan or South Korea, a dependent, protected country whereas China and USA hold their dialogues as G2, carving up the Indo-Pacific among themselves
• Global opinion has zero worth. In Feb 2013, China owns $1.223 trillion whereas Japan owns $1.097 trillion of US Treasury holdings. China is increasing, while Japan is decreasing. Where is the global opinion? USA decides, and they would give a few platitudes in favor of India, and a few would be neutral. We don't want to going around the world begging for pats on the back.

So no we don't want to be pushed into US embrace due to this Chinese aggression!

Also we don't want an Asian NATO. In NATO, US has the last word. We cannot allow that in Asia. That too would be pushing the world into a G2 - USA & China.

The core of Asian security should be formed around a partnership between India and Japan. Other countries too would be a part of it. This partnership I call Āryāvarta Union.

USA can be an external security partner to Āryāvarta Union, but not a part of the core!

[shyamd]

At the moment the partnership slowly forming is - India Singapore Japan Aus - with Indonesia Vietnam Thailand pretty much bilaterally joining into the union. Still things are at a very initial stage though. Much work to be done.

This problem with PRC provides us with an opportunity to - (a) move forward with the Aryavarta Union (b) Test our Nuc's. So I think we should take advantage of the prevailing situation. If PRC was smart they would sue for peace.

[eklavya]

The Economist:

High Stakes

India and China square off
High stakes
Apr 30th 2013, 13:22 by A.R. | DELHI

SO FAR it is a matter of a few military tents, a handful of shivering soldiers and a disagreement over a remote and never-demarcated line in the Himalayas. Yet a lengthening stand-off between Chinese and Indian soldiers in a disputed part of Ladakh reflects a profound problem: already it ranks as the most serious confrontation between the Asian giants since the late 1980s.

India accuses its neighbour to the north-east of sending troops some 19km past a line of actual control (LAC), in the Despang area of Ladakh, a part of Jammu & Kashmir state that is wedged between Tibet proper and the vale of Kashmir. They have reportedly been there for more than two weeks. Now a small number of Indian soldiers have set up camp within a stone’s throw of their Chinese counterparts. Though there is no sign yet of escalation—and would seem to be little prospect of it—nor have the sides found a way to walk back.

The confrontation is taking place in an unpopulated district, but one that matters symbolically. Some 4,000km of the boundary between China and India remains unsettled, so tests in any particular spot along its course carry immense significance. Speculative reports suggest the area may also be rich in uranium. It is also, from the Chinese perspective, close to the Tibetan Autonomous Region and so significant for the government in Beijing as it tries to assert full political and military control over a troubled patch of its sovereign territory.

Inside India the predominant explanation for the stand-off—among bloggers, retired generals, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), television commentators and newspaper columnists—is that China is entirely to blame. The incursion is seen simply as China putting pressure on militarily weaker India, presumably to extract concessions such as a freeze on the number of troops it deploys along the border, or some block on India’s development of bunkers, roads or other structures on its own side of the frontier. Any such freeze would leave Chinese forces, which are established on a plateau, in a much stronger position. They already enjoy the benefit of all-weather roads, railway lines and other structures that connect them to the rest of China.

Some in this predominant Indian camp speculate that the cross-border incursion could have been led initially by an adventurous, lowish-ranking member of the People’s Liberation Army, to which China’s new political leadership subsequently acquiesced. Others in the commentariat prefer to emphasise that Indian weakness, including the feebleness of its road and military infrastructure in the Himalayas, practically invite regular Chinese assertiveness.

It has been widely noted that leaks about the incursion came from India’s defence forces, while its diplomats appeared to try to hush it all up. One reliably hawkish Indian commentator, Brahma Chellaney, lashes out at India’s mild-mannered leaders as being unable to speak up themselves with any strength. Hawks, by and large, want India to retaliate by making remarks about China’s behaviour inside Tibet, essentially raising questions about the legitimacy of Chinese rule there. By contrast the prime minister, Manmohan Singh, and his foreign minister, Salman Khurshid, are playing down the dispute in Ladakh (and stay entirely mum on Tibet). Mr Khurshid has compared the Chinese incursion to a pimple on an otherwise unblemished face.

A related but subtler response sees the current confrontation as being only partly about India’s relative weakness and partly as a Chinese reaction to India’s trying (even if in a limited way) to assert itself. One military analyst, Ajai Shukla, sees China behaving just as it did during two previous episodes of tension on the border, when India pushed forward. First in the 1950s, then again in the 1980s, India attempted to increase its military capacity along the disputed border. China reacted the first time by invading, which resulted in a brief border war in 1962 and the humiliation of India, as well as the destruction of what had been cordial relations. That war also cost China: marking it out as an aggressive power on the rise. The second time, in the 1980s, a confrontation on the border led eventually to a visit to China by Rajiv Gandhi, then India’s prime minister—and an improvement in ties.

This time around, says Mr Shukla,

China has clearly signalled its discomfort with India’s troop build-up, submitting a draft proposal for a freeze on troop levels that will solidify and make permanent India’s disadvantage along the LAC.
He argues that India should respond by offering to keep talking; refusing such a freeze; and getting on meanwhile with building roads and other military infrastructure, as fast as it can.

It is hard, in fact, to see what China actually hopes to achieve with the incursion. Its foreign-ministry spokesmen continue to deny any wrongdoing. They deny, too, accusations that Chinese helicopters crossed into Indian-controlled airspace in an attempt to resupply their soldiers. A series of proposed diplomatic meetings are set to go ahead, with Mr Khurshid due in China and China’s prime minister, Li Keqiang, in India, both next month. (Though India’s opposition parties are growing increasingly vocal against these trips.)

Just what is going on is far from clear. China has so many other difficulties elsewhere around its perimeter—relations with Japan and the Philippines souring, for example; violent tension in its far-western province of Xinjing—it seems odd timing to choose to add another clash. Nor is it obvious that China could welcome the most likely domestic outcome in India: a stronger call for more spending on military capacity along the border. India’s reliance on a nuclear deterrent may now look insufficient: there are already calls for it to spend more on conventional forces, too, and they are likely to grow louder.

Last, worsening bilateral relations would be at odds with broader gains between the countries in other fields. The value of bilateral trade, skewed heavily in China’s favour, has grown from just $2.9 billion a year at the start of the millennium to some $66 billion annually. China and India appear to co-operate as members of the BRICS group of countries, for example sharing a proposal to establish a new global development bank. And even along the disputed border, the two countries have established limited mechanisms for managing their disagreements peacefully. It looks unlikely that China’s new leaders wish to jeopardise all this. Thus its soldiers and tents will presumably be withdrawn before too long. The stakes, if they should not, look as high and dangerous as Himalayan peaks.

[eklavya]

Chinese incursion: PLA tents must go from Ladakh for Khurshid to visit China, govt says - ToI

NEW DELHI: Prospects of external affairs minister Salman Khurshid visiting Beijing next week seem to be receding, with the government veering round the view that the engagement should not take place if Chinese soldiers, squatting 19km inside Indian territory, don't go back.

Sources said the Centre, now fully aligned with Congress's sensitivities about popular resentment against the Chinese muscle-flexing in eastern Ladakh, feels that Khurshid should drop his travel plan for Beijing, scheduled to begin on May 9, even if doing so casts a shadow on the New Delhi visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang from May 20.

This means it will require a dramatic de-escalation on the part of the Chinese, the prospect of which looks unlikely, at least now. For, the Chinese have dug in their heels and are defiantly denying that their troops have pitched tents on what India considers its territory.

The growing feeling in New Delhi that Khurshid should not go to China marks a dramatic shift from India's initial efforts to play down the Chinese provocation as a "localized and isolated phenomenon", an "acne" in the minister's colourful language, which should not be allowed to come in the way of the upward trajectory of bilateral ties.

Congress behind govt's rethink?

Sources attributed the change of mood to Congress's estimate that going ahead with the visit without the Chinese retreating from Ladakh will be politically damaging for the government. As it is, the UPA regime has been accused by BJP and SP of timidity vis-a-vis the tough Chinese, so any perceived indulgence of Beijing's aggressive intent will be fodder for UPA's political opponents.

The party's views, it is learnt, has been conveyed to the government in an intervention reminiscent of the "caution, danger ahead" sign party hoisted after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had acquiesced into Pakistan's pressure to put its complaint against alleged Indian meddling in Balochistan on the bilateral agenda at the 2009 NAM summit in Sharm-al-Sheikh. At that time, a peeved Congress had signaled its opposition to the PM's perceived blunder by leaving the government to fend for itself in the face of an opposition charge of a sell-out.

[eklavya]

Manmohan extends Japan trip, sends a strong message to China - ToI

NEW DELHI: Under fire from the opposition for its "soft" foreign policy in the face of Chinese incursion in eastern Ladakh, India has finally started to show some teeth to Beijing. The initiative has come from PM Manmohan Singh himself who, in a not so subtle message to Beijing, has decided to extend his visit to Japan later this month by a day.

Confirming the development, top government sources said Singh will stay put in Tokyo for two days, instead of one as decided earlier, and use the extra day to interact with Japanese leaders cutting across party lines.

Not denying that the decision by India was a reaction to the developments in Ladakh, where Chinese troops remain stationed 19 km into Indian territory since April 15, they admitted that it is rare for the PM to spend an entire day in a country without any official engagement with the host government.

Japan and China are witnessing deep hostility over the Senkaku islands (called Diaoyu by the Chinese) with its nationalist PM Shinzo Abe, often also described as a hawk, threatening to respond physically should the Chinese try to land in the contested islands. Tokyo controls the islands and strongly believes that these are an inherent territory of Japan "in light of historical facts and based upon international law".

The visit to Japan is scheduled for the last week of this month. Singh was earlier supposed to have a bilateral meeting with his counterpart Abe — after arriving in Tokyo the previous evening — and fly back the next day. Now, Singh will remain in Tokyo the next day too to meet senior political leaders.

For China, which has serious reservations even about India-Japan-US trilateral talks, an extended Japan visit by Singh will be irksome at the least also because of how it perceives the Japanese PM to be. Its state-run media recently criticized Abe's trip to Russia even arguing that this posed a threat to Beijing.

Abe has for long been advocating further expansion of ties with India and had surprised many in his previous tenure as the PM in 2006 when he predicted that Japan-India relations had the potential to overtake Japan-US and Japan-China ties. His deputy PM, Taro Aso, recalled at a public gathering here on Saturday Abe's speech in Indian Parliament then in which he had said that a strong Japan was in the best interest of India and a strong India was in the best interest of Japan.

Interestingly, several Indian foreign policy experts maintain that Singh should, in fact, have had a telephonic conversation with Abe by now over the development at Daulat Beg Oldi in eastern Ladakh.

In his speech on Saturday, Aso also called for more contact between the navies of the two countries to take maritime cooperation to a much higher level. He said as China continues to augment its naval power, Japan is committed to defend its territory.

[eklavya]

Thunder out of China - The Economist

Around China’s periphery, the heat keeps rising
May 4th 2013 |From the print edition

FOR an emerging power that makes much of the peacefulness of its rise, China is engaged in what looks suspiciously like aggression on an alarming number of fronts. India says Chinese soldiers have set up camp 19km (12 miles) on its side of the “line of actual control” (LAC) that separates Ladakh in its state of Jammu & Kashmir from China, in the absence of an agreed border. Japan reports that Chinese maritime surveillance vessels are every day circling the disputed Senkaku or Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. And on April 26th China demanded that the Philippines “withdraw all its nationals and facilities” from a number of islands and reefs in the South China Sea, where they have been, in some cases, for decades. In all these cases China can with some justification claim it is responding to provocation. That, however, is scant comfort to its increasingly anxious neighbours.

Of the three territorial disputes it is the rekindling of the one with India that comes most as a surprise. Two long sectors of the border are contested. In the east, China briefly occupied part of what is now the state of Arunachal Pradesh, south of Tibet, in a bloody punitive war in 1962. In the west, the Aksai Chin, a high plateau the size of Switzerland, is occupied by China but claimed by India as part of Ladakh. In both sectors, patrols from each side often stray into what the other sees as its territory. They do not, however, pitch tents, as China’s soldiers have in this incursion. It is the most serious confrontation on either end of the border since 1986. After that stand-off, the two countries agreed to set the quarrel to one side, in an endless negotiation on the demarcation of the LAC, as they concentrated on building trade and other ties. A drive a decade ago to reach a political settlement soon ran into the sand. But neither side has an interest in forcing the issue.

Now above all, when China is embroiled in the other disputes, and the region is tense because of North Korea’s erratic bellicosity, it seems incomprehensible that China should want to resurrect yet another squabble. China of course denies it has done anything of the kind, insisting its soldiers are on its side of the LAC. It may, however, feel provoked. Ajai Shukla, an Indian defence analyst, has pointed out that the Indian army has been undertaking what he calls its “third surge towards the Sino-Indian border”. The previous two were in the late 1950s—leading to the 1962 war—and in 1986, leading to the present stalemate. Now, once again, says Mr Shukla, India has been “thickening” its presence in Arunachal Pradesh and in Aksai Chin, with more soldiers, weaponry and infrastructure.

So China may feel India is exploiting both the inexperience of its new leaders who took over last November, and the pressure China is under on other fronts. It may harbour similar suspicions about Japan and its “provocations” over what China calls the Diaoyu islands. Its patrols near the islands were prompted by Japan’s ignoring its warnings not to “nationalise” three of the islands by buying them from their private owner last September.

More recently—in late April—ten Japanese boats carrying about 80 right-wing activists sailed towards the islands. And members of the cabinet of Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, angered China by visiting the Yasukuni shrine—where high-ranking war criminals are among the enshrined war-dead. Part of China’s response was to reiterate that the Diaoyus are one of its “core interests”—the issues, like Taiwan and Tibet, over which it might go to war. In a joint communiqué signed by Barack Obama in 2009, America and China promised to respect each other’s core interests.

The demand directed at the Philippines, that it withdraw from disputed islands, was also a reaction—to the Philippines’ taking its dispute with China to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. China rightly points out that, although the law of the sea sets rules about the waters and exclusive economic zones around islands, it says nothing about sovereignty over them.

On that question, China seems intent on imposing its own view. In addition to verbal attacks on the Philippines, it this week started tourist cruises around the Paracel archipelago (Xisha in Chinese). This is still claimed by Vietnam, which was evicted by China from the islands in 1974. China’s rows with the Philippines and Vietnam have been the most active of its many disputes in the sea. But in late March it also antagonised Brunei and Malaysia, by sending a naval flotilla where those two nations have claims, at the southern tip of China’s expansive “nine-dashed line”, a vague cartographic claim dating from the 1930s.

Individually, China’s actions can be seen as pragmatic reactions to different pressures. But, taken together, they bring two dangers. First, they make China seem embarked on a concerted campaign to establish new “facts on the ground” (or water) to strengthen its position in future negotiations or conflicts. More likely, they show almost the opposite: that China’s foreign-policy chiefs lack the clout to impose a co-ordinated, calibrated response to coincidental provocations. Rather than picking off its adversaries one by one, China is taking them all on at once. The impression of an aggressive rising power is hard to shake off.

Accidents do happen

The second danger is of accidental conflict. Neither China nor any of the other countries involved wants these arguments to lead to violence. But there is always the risk of a miscalculation by a local commander leading to unpredictable escalation. In the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands especially, American officials worry about whether overstretched and tense ship captains and fighter pilots can avoid mistakes. America has a treaty obligation to defend Japan, and has repeatedly said that, although it takes no position on who has sovereignty over the Senkakus, its guarantee covers them. It would just take one firebrand pilot, sacrificing himself to defend the motherland’s sacred territory, to test that commitment, with entirely unforeseeable consequences.

[eklavya]

India pins hope on tactics that helped end past Chinese incursions - IE

New Delhi, Sun May 05 2013, 10:02 hrs

As it looks to resolve the military face-off with China on the Depsang plains in Ladakh, the government is banking on the fact that such a confrontation is not the first of its kind and neither is it the worst yet.
In 2008, a battalion of troops from each side were face-to-face for at least two months in Sikkim's Finger Area, leading to a point where the Army wanted authorisation to open fire if provoked or thwarted. Such was the tension, that a team of top secretary-level officials led by then National Security Advisor M K Narayanan visited the inhospitable heights to get a first hand assessment.

The area, which is essentially the northern tip of Sikkim, has a hill feature called the Finger Area that was always considered to be on the Indian side until Chinese forces started making incursions and then began building a road across the small tract. The feature overlooks an important valley called the "Sora Funnel", which makes it tactically important for the Army.

But the Chinese side claimed that according to the watershed principle, which is what the two sides follow in the Middle Sector, the area fell in their control. India produced old maps to reinforce its claim, but none of that could end the stand-off which became serious by the day.

At one point, sources said, the Chinese troops came so close to the Indian forces that the local commanders feared a flare-up and relayed messages for authority to retaliate if provoked. They were told to hold their nerves and the matter was immediately considered by the Cabinet Committee on Security.

While agreeing to look at the Chinese claim, the government decided to push for a diplomatic solution and stepped up efforts to that end. Gradually, the Chinese troops stepped back as quiet parleys started at the diplomatic level. However, both sides brought in reinforcements, raising troop numbers to about 800-1,000 on each side.

It took close to eight months for matters to return to normal with the Indian side deciding not to budge even though stone cairns and bunkers put up in the area were being constantly destroyed.

In Ladakh's Demchok sector last year, a Chinese road engineering party had come into an area on the Indian side and camped there in a bid to construct a road. While both sides are agreeable to patrolling by either sides according to respective perceptions of the Line of Actual Control, road construction in areas under Indian control was unacceptable, sources said.

This stand-off lasted a few weeks and was eventually resolved at the local commanders' level.

A year before that, China objected to India constructing a road on the west bank of the Pangong Tso lake. Chinese troops on boats would come closer to the west bank and demand stopping of construction. India, on the other hand, decided to press on with the work, leading to some tension.

The Indian side contended that China had built a road on the eastern bank, which is under Chinese control, and by that logic should let India do the same on the Indian-controlled western bank. It again took a few weeks before the Chinese side allowed the road construction to resume with the Indian side even saying Chinese troops were allowed to use the road during their routine patrols.

In most situations, sources said, China has eventually agreed to weigh in favour of maintaining peace and that is the hope at the highest levels even this time.

[vic]

My list possible leverages we can exercise against China:-


1. Reduce non-essential Chinese imports like toys, consumer durables. Impose duties, harass them at customs.

2. Ask Indian banks to refuse loans and LC facilities for Chinese imports.

3. Ban further/future import of Telecom and power plant imports.

4. Increase interaction with Taiwan

5. Increase military interaction with South East Asia and Japan

6. increase moral and diplomatic support in Tibet and XinXiang through Burma, CIS, Nepal and Bhutan

7. Prepare to re-start nuclear testing

8. Switch nuclear power projects for weapon grade Pu production

9. Intrude in Chinese areas

10. Change position on Tibet, as part of China

11. Reduce imports of defense goods and invest massively in better infrastructure.

12. Double indigenous R&D budget.

13. PM should visit Arunachal Pradesh.

[harbans]

The Indian side contended that China had built a road on the eastern bank, which is under Chinese control, and by that logic should let India do the same on the Indian-controlled western bank. It again took a few weeks before the Chinese side allowed the road construction to resume with the Indian side even saying Chinese troops were allowed to use the road during their routine patrols.

WTF!

[Varoon Shekhar]

From the latest "Economic and Political Weekly", Mumbai, by Neville Maxwell( who else). Someone has to refute this character. Better, rebuke him!


What Is Behind The Chinese "Incursion" At Daulet Beg Oldi?
Vol - XLVIII No. 19, May 11, 2013 | Neville Maxwell

Web Exclusives

Behind the nationalist hysteria which has been whipped up over the Chinese army setting up camp in territory claimed by India in Ladakh, lies a long history of self-delusion and aggressive posturing on the border. This article throws a contrary, and sobering, light on India’s latest border scrap.

Neville Maxwell ([email protected]) is a British journalist, best known for his work India’s China War (1971)

That is a familiar question with an old answer: aggressive moves by the Indian army, precautionary reactions by the Chinese in case India intends to renew the “forward policy” attempt to drive them out of Indian-claimed territory. This is exactly how the 1962 border war began, with a Chinese reaction to aggressive moves by the Indian army, which reaction in turn aroused in India a clamorous press and political demand for a belligerent response, leading a deluded Indian government in effect to declare war on China.
That is how it was with Dhola Post, set up by India several miles north of the McMahon Line at its western extremity in June 1962 in implementation of Nehru’s absurd “forward policy”, with which he planned to extrude the Chinese from Indian-claimed territory in a process of semi-violent harassment. For over a year Beijing had been meeting that puny challenge passively, using its overwhelming advantages in mobility, numbers and armament merely to block the Indian army’s gallant attempts to carry out its besotted orders – Mao Zedung quipping that since the Indians rejected peaceful coexistence they would have “armed coexistence”. Accordingly an outnumbering Chinese force laid siege to Dhola Post.
The Nehru government had trapped itself years before when it began accusing China of committing “aggression” by the mere fact of being in occupation of territory India claimed. Thus Nehru put himself under increasingly fierce political pressure to unleash the army to “repel the aggression”, and when the Chinese investment of Dhola Post was mis-represented as a transgression of the McMahon Line he gave way and ordered the army to attack the Chinese at Dhola Post and drive them back, publicly announcing that decision. The operation he had sanctioned looked to driving Chinese troops, who greatly outnumbered and out-gunned the Indians, out of fortified positions on the towering Thagla Ridge, a militarily impossible task. Which attempt, never-the-less, the hapless troops of 7 Brigade launched on 9 October 1962, triggering China’s pre-emptive “counter-attack in self-defence” launched eleven days later.
What, in that historical context, is going on in the Daulet Beg Oldi region? And could something like that escalation to war occur there?
So far as the Chinese are concerned that area is not in dispute. They occupy all the territory within what they consider to be “the traditional and customary border line”, running through the Karakoram Pass, and up to a long-established – but not formally defined -- line of actual control (LAC). Daulet Beg Oldi (once a caravanserai) is recognised as being in Indian territory: it was not attacked or occupied in 1962 though the Indian army evacuated it. But in the Indian perception the entire area including and beyond the Karakorams up to the distant Kuen Lun Mountain range, encompassing the desolate Aksai Chin plateau, is Indian territory under illicit Chinese occupation. This was the main arena of the forward policy, and from mid-1961 to late October 1962 Indian troops were struggling to advance into it as far as dire logistical difficulties and the resolute Chinese impediment would allow.
Since last year there has been a significant Indian build-up at DBO. Indian newspapers have reported reinforcement of the garrison, the induction of heavy artillery, even armour, and a landing strip laid in 1962 has been re-activated to facilitate supply. What is the Indian purpose? A Chinese invasion at that point is inconceivable, so it cannot be defensive. A 1993 treaty bound both governments to reduce force levels on the LAC “to a minimum level compatible with friendly and good neighbourly relations”. From what level or element of the Indian state does the impetus for this force augmentation come? From the military? In 1987 a bellicose chief of army staff, General Sundarji, did his best to set off a “second round” in which the army could wipe away the 1962 humiliation, and nearly succeeded. From the civilian side; would India wish to make a petty gesture to align itself with the Americans’ confrontational “pivot” against the Peoples Republic of China? Surely not.
So the question, “What are the Indians up to at Daulet Beg Oldi?” hangs unanswered. But it must certainly be a pressing one for the Peoples Liberation Army commander in the area. Small wonder then, that he has set up a new post as far forward as his perception of the LAC alignment will allow. To demonstrate that its purpose is observational and inoffensive, but also not transitory, it is unfortified, merely a tented encampment. But that has been quite enough to set off cries of alarm and anger in the Indian press, to be picked up and magnified internationally.
It is most likely that in spite of that hysteria the essential pettiness of the incident will soon transpire, with calm restored – at least so far as calm can be achieved along an undefined border between two states not long ago at war. So there’s the crux of the matter: why is the Indian sector of China’s long border undefined? All China’s other neighbours, around a dozen of them, have diplomatically agreed and defined their boundaries. Why does India remain the sole exception?
No opportunity to explain that anomaly should be missed: as with so much of modern India, it all began with the British. In 1914 they attempted to induce China to cede a significant tract of territory to give India a “strategic frontier” in its north-east. They failed. In the mid-1930 they revived that attempt, this time shunning diplomatic niceties and, taking advantage of China’s impotence, simply annexing the target tract, while forging the official diplomatic record to cloak their action with spurious legitimacy. No doubt they expected that in due time China would get over its indignation and acquiesce to the facts on the ground (and they were right there, the PRC was ready to legitimize the situation).
Thus a border dispute with China was congenital to independent India – and Nehru rendered that affliction incurable by sustaining the British falsification and refusing to submit the dispute to negotiation. Then he metastasised it by laying claim to the Aksai Chin area in India’s north-west, a claim without British precedent or any basis in treaty, usage or geography, deluding the Indian public by having new official maps published falsely showing the whole of India’s northern borders as settled and internationally agreed.
No successor government of India has even attempted to free the country from its impalement on Nehru’s vaunt, “India’s borders are non-negotiable”. All have clung instead to his casuistical distinction between negotiation, which they refuse, and “talks” in which they will engage apparently forever. There is no present prospect of change.

[Philip]

First of all,as I have been saying and doing for aeons,stop calling the Indo-China Sea the South China Sea! This entire region of Asia has been historically known as Indo-China,therefore, so too must the maritime waters contiguous to the region be called .

At every opportunity,challenge the Chinese and teach it that it is in no way superior to India.Treat the Chinese with contempt and you will see a sea change in its attitude. Sending Salman-the-Cursed to Beijing would be the worst diplomatic move that India can make.Kicking out the Chinese ambassador will send a clear message that will not be misunderstood by the mandarins in the "Meddling Kingdom".

Neville Maxwell must be thanked for giving us a non-Indian perspective of the '62 debacle,Nehru's patronising attitude towards the Chinese which they resented ,but he distorts historical truths .The fundamental being that Tibet is NOT Chinese territory.The entire Maxwell theory thus falls flat on this key fact.If there is any border dispute,it must be between the Tibetan nation/govt. and India,not between (an illegally occupied Tibet ) China and India.Secondly,in the current belligerence and aggro by China,all across Asia,Maxwell ignores China's current hostility and territorial expansionism,its neo-imperialist ambitions,first in Asia and its material greed for the mineral wealth of every continent.Chinese expansionism ,which is being resisted by ASEAN nations tto and Vietnam and Japan, IS going to lead to military clashes,sooner than one thinks.

[Varoon Shekhar]

Nice one Philip. This is what I've been posting for many years in several fora. If India were really, truly in the wrong in the 1962 conflict, the Tibetans would have felt it far and away the most. There is virtually no record of any Tibetan supporting China's supposedly retaliatory actions against India. Also, even if China has really settled all its border issues with other neighbouring countries, it doesn't mean that the 1962 war, or more recent flare-ups, are India's fault. Particularly when the whole major Tibetan matter is taken into consideration, which it must be.

It's interesting that Maxwell uses the term 'nationalist hysteria' when referring to the Indian reactions to the Chinese moves. What would he think of Chinese twitterati and assorted commentary about Japan, Taiwan et al. Transcendant, progressive, internationalist humanism?

Characters like Maxwell( and Perry Anderson) abuse the freedom and openness of India to denigrate and insult India and Indians. Needless to say, there is no equivalent commentator sympathetic to India, writing even half as critically of Chinese behaviour, in Beijing or Shanghai, let alone Lhasa.

[eklavya]

From the latest "Economic and Political Weekly", Mumbai, by Neville Maxwell( who else). Someone has to refute this character. Better, rebuke him!


What Is Behind The Chinese "Incursion" At Daulet Beg Oldi?
Vol - XLVIII No. 19, May 11, 2013 | Neville Maxwell

Neville Maxwell ([email protected]) is a British journalist, best known for his work India’s China War (1971)

What, in that historical context, is going on in the Daulet Beg Oldi region? And could something like that escalation to war occur there?

So far as the Chinese are concerned that area is not in dispute. They occupy all the territory within what they consider to be “the traditional and customary border line”, running through the Karakoram Pass, and up to a long-established – but not formally defined -- line of actual control (LAC). Daulet Beg Oldi (once a caravanserai) is recognised as being in Indian territory: it was not attacked or occupied in 1962 though the Indian army evacuated it. But in the Indian perception the entire area including and beyond the Karakorams up to the distant Kuen Lun Mountain range, encompassing the desolate Aksai Chin plateau, is Indian territory under illicit Chinese occupation.

Indian newspapers have reported reinforcement of the garrison, the induction of heavy artillery, even armour, and a landing strip laid in 1962 has been re-activated to facilitate supply. What is the Indian purpose? A Chinese invasion at that point is inconceivable, so it cannot be defensive.

So the question, “What are the Indians up to at Daulet Beg Oldi?” hangs unanswered. But it must certainly be a pressing one for the Peoples Liberation Army commander in the area. Small wonder then, that he has set up a new post as far forward as his perception of the LAC alignment will allow. To demonstrate that its purpose is observational and inoffensive, but also not transitory, it is unfortified, merely a tented encampment.

What India does on our side of the LAC is nobody else's business. This article is obviously totally one-sided and worthless as it does not mention the huge Chinese military and logistical build up in Tibet, the 600+ incursions into the Indian side of the LAC in the last 3 years, and the fact that the Chinese kept lying throughout the DBO episode that their troops had not crossed the LAC.

Having mentioned clearly that DBO has never been claimed by China, this author still manages to twist his logic into blaming India and Nehru-ji (dead for 49 years) for the aggression committed in 2013 by the PLA. Basically a completely rubbish article.

[rajrang]

Continuing from the "India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India" Thread

The long term ones should include new China specific mountain divisions, artillery, new aircraft squadrons for the western and middle sectors as well as start making noises (and actual plans) for teaming up with the US and Japan to develop an "Asian NATO." Unfortunately, India has a super power neighbor whose intentions appear sinister. It will be difficult for India to handle this task alone. Such a build-up can somehow include guarantees to the neighbor to the West that these new capabilities will not be used against them - perhaps underwritten by the US for credibility.

In the past India has sometimes failed to give consequences. A glaring example is China giving nuclear and missile capabilities to the western neighbor so they can kill millions of Indians within hours. India should have responded in kind and enhanced similar capabilities for Vietnam, Taiwan et al.

The latest may be the most serious since 1962. Both in 1967 (Sikkim) and 1986 (Tawang), India's army and leaders (Mrs. Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi) responded with alacrity. Relative peace ensued for a generation after each such incident. This time China's economic might and infrastructure in Tibet are much stronger. However, this should be offset by increased Indian military strength (thanks to AKA), global opinion (US, pacific countries, Europe) should be on India's side and importantly, the US has enough influence in Pakistan to dissuade them from explicitly joining China in the short term.

Why would it not be in the interests of USA to see a serious defeat of India at the hands of China?

• It pushes India much closer into the embrace of USA
• India loses its independence, and takes up a position like Japan or South Korea, a dependent, protected country whereas China and USA hold their dialogues as G2, carving up the Indo-Pacific among themselves
• Global opinion has zero worth. In Feb 2013, China owns $1.223 trillion whereas Japan owns $1.097 trillion of US Treasury holdings. China is increasing, while Japan is decreasing. Where is the global opinion? USA decides, and they would give a few platitudes in favor of India, and a few would be neutral. We don't want to going around the world begging for pats on the back.

So no we don't want to be pushed into US embrace due to this Chinese aggression!

Also we don't want an Asian NATO. In NATO, US has the last word. We cannot allow that in Asia. That too would be pushing the world into a G2 - USA & China.

The core of Asian security should be formed around a partnership between India and Japan. Other countries too would be a part of it. This partnership I call Āryāvarta Union.

USA can be an external security partner to Āryāvarta Union, but not a part of the core!

The logic is as follows. China is stronger than India, so they can capture Indian territory. This will be a permanent loss. Alternatively India in a stronger embrace of US, with a loss of some Indian independence. This will be a temporary loss.

Here is a possible analogy. The British rule of India for about 200 years was arguably a temporary loss. On its' plus side, invasions from the west came to an end. Alternatively, if the British had not been present, continued invasions from the west could have replaced Indian culture with an Islamic one (a permanent loss).

[rajrang]

First of all,as I have been saying and doing for aeons,stop calling the Indo-China Sea the South China Sea! This entire region of Asia has been historically known as Indo-China,therefore, so too must the maritime waters contiguous to the region be called .

At every opportunity,challenge the Chinese and teach it that it is in no way superior to India.Treat the Chinese with contempt and you will see a sea change in its attitude. Sending Salman-the-Cursed to Beijing would be the worst diplomatic move that India can make.Kicking out the Chinese ambassador will send a clear message that will not be misunderstood by the mandarins in the "Meddling Kingdom".

Neville Maxwell must be thanked for giving us a non-Indian perspective of the '62 debacle,Nehru's patronising attitude towards the Chinese which they resented ,but he distorts historical truths .The fundamental being that Tibet is NOT Chinese territory.The entire Maxwell theory thus falls flat on this key fact.If there is any border dispute,it must be between the Tibetan nation/govt. and India,not between (an illegally occupied Tibet ) China and India.Secondly,in the current belligerence and aggro by China,all across Asia,Maxwell ignores China's current hostility and territorial expansionism,its neo-imperialist ambitions,first in Asia and its material greed for the mineral wealth of every continent.Chinese expansionism ,which is being resisted by ASEAN nations tto and Vietnam and Japan, IS going to lead to military clashes,sooner than one thinks.

Changing names can cut both ways. We should avoid it. What if the Chinese and their allies start calling the Indian Ocean as Asian Ocean?

I like "Meddling Kingdom" Good one!

[RajeshA]

The logic is as follows. China is stronger than India, so they can capture Indian territory. This will be a permanent loss. Alternatively India in a stronger embrace of US, with a loss of some Indian independence. This will be a temporary loss.

Here is a possible analogy. The British rule of India for about 200 years was arguably a temporary loss. On its' plus side, invasions from the west came to an end. Alternatively, if the British had not been present, continued invasions from the west could have replaced Indian culture with an Islamic one (a permanent loss).

I do not agree with this logic.

In order to capture Indian territory, they have to have a significant advantage in troops and hardware. Some speak of 3:1 strength ratio for a successful invasion. This would not be really forthcoming. India has a demographic dividend which India can put into service as far as troop strength is concerned. Plus India can in the future through mandatory conscription mobilize many more troops at short notice. Second problem is the terrain in Tibet and Ladakh. Not the most hospitable for the Chinese either. Third their communication and supply lines may be long and can be cut. Fourthly we have the ability to buy technology from the West, Russians, Israelites as well if needed, but in the future we would be moving towards indigenous R&D and production more and more. So the myth of the Chinese being stronger is just that and they cannot capture Indian territory.

It is American embrace which can be a long term loss. Just look at Germany and Japan. Their strategic freedom is severely curtailed by their tight embrace with the Americans, and militarily they have become second rate powers without even a seat in the UNSC.

You really need to revise your opinion about British rule being responsible for curtailing the spread of Islam in the Subcontinent. In fact under them, Islam saw its most spread within the the population. Besides the Marathas and the Sikhs had severely hurt Islam and Hindus were coming together and pushing it out already. British just took advantage of a period where both sides had been weakened from the fight. That is all. If the British had not come, who knows we probably would have pushed Islam completely out of the Subcontinent by now!

What you speak of is a popular myth spread by the Brits and their chamchas in India!

[shyamd]

“The more the two coast guards and the two navies meet, the better the entire maritime areas will be served. Why? Because, both of us are well developed, seasoned democracies,” said Aso, delivering a lecture on “Japan-India Global Strategic Partnership” in New Delhi on Saturday.

[Varoon Shekhar]

"What India does on our side of the LAC is nobody else's business. This article is obviously totally one-sided and worthless as it does not mention the huge Chinese military and logistical build up in Tibet, the 600+ incursions into the Indian side of the LAC in the last 3 years, and the fact that the Chinese kept lying throughout the DBO episode that their troops had not crossed the LAC. "

Very well said! It's incredible how someone can be so oblivious to all the Chinese incursions in Ladakh, including those that have harmed the nomads and the grazing land for their animals. And no less astounding that an Indian publication could carry such an article, without reservation. At least, if you're going to be sympathetic to the Chinese( why you would want to is another matter!) position, present all the facts as they are understood by both the Indian and Chinese commentators and analysts, with specific reference to the Chinese incursions and the effect they have had on people and grazing lands. If there have been equivalent Indian incursions which have negatively affected the people and environment on the other side, by all means demonstrate it. As it stands now, the article is incredibly one sided. Really, a rubbish article as you aptly put it.