Discussion on Indian Special Forces

[Lalmohan]

maquis
rather than marquis

[Singha]

>> we send them to play with some infantry battalion

ah the famous "cambria march" .. only the closest bosom buddies in NATO seem to send a few men on deputation to each others units. "rogue warrior" loh purush marcinko said his team only worked with and trusted the KSK and didnt like anyone else incl the brits

[Viv S]

I apologize in advance for not quoting your post in order.

Then clearly you dont understand. One shot one kill -or ek goli ek dushman is nothing unique to the NSG. It has been the motto of the Indian Army from time immemorial and has been used ever since the days of the Enfields to the SLRs and then the INSAS. At the same time, the Army employs Brens and more for support fire. The NSG has slogans saying "every man an emperor, a breed apart", same as the Paras, then the SF. So you think the NSG struts around behaving like emperors?

The NSG did all it could to protect its most critical assets - its operators - which means suppressing fire. The fact that you dont even understand what suppressing fire means, and think that it means a "distraction to the main assault", just shows your idea of infantry tactics is something out of a movie, where the NSG has sharpshooters only trying to take out their targets with single aimed shots.

I'm well aware what suppressing fire is and at no point did I imply that 'it means a "distraction to the main assault"'. What I said was the tactics seen the various videos would have been understandable had the objective been to distract the militants, while say an assault party breached the doors. But a CT unit carrying on employing 'suppressive fire' for hours at an end throughout the night, especially once a secure perimeter has been established, is 'unusual' to say the least.

The NSG started the Nariman ops in full earnest after learning the hostages were dead. This is revealed in the Channel 4 documentary which mentions the Indian intel agencies were running intercepts.

Given the complete chaos that reigned through most of the period, that is a judgement that cannot and should not have been made by the commander on ground. The assumption should always have been there were live hostages within the complex.

The NSG are infantry. COIN or no COIN, infantry tactics remain infantry tactics. Suppress/support, cover - the other group moves to engage. In many cases, it is the suppressing fire which ends up winning the fight, because of which it is vital that the correct weapons be provided. One big reason, the AKs are so favoured in COIN in India because of their high rate of fire!

'The NSG are infantry'. If we agree on that, we're broadly on the same page, but probably differ in its implications.

Again irrelevant! The Arjun T-90 debate benefits from the vast amount of documented data on the lack of proper organizational decision making from the Army side, supported by parliamentary audit records, supported by reams of technical literature about the items in question & also assessments of the equipment by insiders like Niranjan Malik, VCOAS who led the Arjun program.
Nobody here is sitting and cribbing about how worthless IA armoured tactics here, how their formations cannot work with each other, how they as an organization lack the ability to tactically use the T-90s.

My point is not that they are worthless or don't mesh as a team. My point is that the NSG by virtue of its organisation, is not one of the special forces.

The issue is whether the evidence presented so far justified the kind of asinine comments made.
A) NSG trooper is firing from one hand - thats idiotic. Zilch evidence provided of why its idiotic
NSG trooper uses SLR and ditches SIG- thats tactical acumen. Zilch evidence provided of why its acumen,

If this is the sort of evidence that floats your boat, you are welcome to it. Dont expect the rest of us to buy it.

But to pick on two random pictures and claim that they represent bad or good tactics respectively, is to be honest, not credible. Especially when the argument is not supported by actual information and hands on experience with regards to that sort of activity. Both need to be available to make this sort of sweeping generalization.

I haven't used the word 'idiotic' to describe anybody involved, certainly not for a serving man who's volunteered to put his life on the line, and I said as much in my post.

MP Chaudhary is an ex commander of the NSG, and wants IPS control of the NSG rescinded. Suffice to say, that his views are not based on the media & are based on what he feels could be done and also have an organizational aspect to them. His comments on time to response are worthwhile.

Having said that, did he ever lead the NSG into a situation of this sort? No.
Did he face an event of this magnitude? No.
Who were the tactical leaders of the NSG during this event?
People like Sandeep Unnikrishan at the squad level (seconded from the Army), people like Col Sunil Sheoran of the SF at the command level, reporting to Sitapathy.
If MP Chaudhary thinks Sandeep Unnikrishnan and Sheoran are "untrained infantry", then its not a view likely to be shared by those people who fought that day.

I don't believe the comment was meant to be taken literally, just an indication of extreme disappointment. Perhaps he felt his unit would have handled things differently, maybe employing sharpshooters instead of small calibre weapons to suppress enemy fire. But, if you feel that he, despite being a former commander of the Special Group & NSG, and a war veteran, did not have the credentials to comment... alright.

Motivation, resources and leadership are a different set of unrelated characteristics. Increasing the selectivity at induction doesn't not negatively impinge upon those factors.

What the??? They are all related! A proper unit has a winning combination of all three. Creating selectivity at induction does not guarantee that the remaining three aspects - motivation, resources and leadership - are available to make raw talent into a battle winning force!!

The point that was made, which you deliberately chose to ignore, was that merely harping on selection, does not ensure combat performance!!

The best units on paper, in the Indian & international context, have flopped when the other aspects did not click!!

Again... I did not say that mere high selectivity would ensure 'combat performance'. My point was that they're a different (though still essential) set of qualities. The average Indian infantry unit is well led and well motivated, but that doesn't not make it the equivalent of an SF unit. What distinguishes the SF is its training as well as a stringent selection process. Good leadership and motivation, I'm taking as a given.

Lets not bring COIN into this.

Why? Because you feel so? Because it contradicts your belief system?
Combat experience is critical.

Period.

Its because CT is a far more specialized trade than COIN. And more importantly numbers can substitute training and selection only to a point, during CT/HRT operations. The availability of manpower on the other hand, more often than not, is the factor than determines success against an insurgency.

I have spoken to multiple soldiers, who all reiterate that the one big difference they have versus others is that they ahve seen combat & it makes ALL teh difference to them not freezing up in combat!

Indian soldiers in COIN end up fighting in crowded urban areas, with conditions very similar to CQB!

I can assure you, I'm not basing my ideas on regular perusals of ToI, Wikipedia or BR. I've spent some time interacting with NSG officers both from Army and paramilitary backgrounds, and recently had the opportunity of a spending a truly enlightening evening with a fairly senior officer in the SPG (who incidently got a slot in the NSG as well). The overarching impression was that the NSG, while a 'good stint' for a young officer, did not ... lets say, recruit the same lot as the SF, and wasn't at par with the sheer professionalism inculcated by the SPG's (almost total) autonomy (especially at the NCO level).

Whether SF or infantry, combat experience is critical. It cannot be denied! India or for that matter, the world do not have enough supermen from the SF to depute/fill up every other organization!!
The SF trooper comes with more training & a better pedigree for the NSG, but there is no evidence to suggest that a highly motivated infantry man cannot do what is needed of him for the NSG.

A highly motivated Ghatak commando can perform most unconventional missions that are the SF's bread and butter, and do it well (as they did during Kargil). That does not negate the SF's raison d'etre. World-over CT tasks are performed by the SF, and often enough by specialized SF units. The need for the best available individual manning and commanding India' premier CT unit remains unchanged and unfulfilled, even more so now that SF deputations to the NSG are waning.

What I am getting at, was very obvious to those who read my post. If you did not get what I meant, read it again. What it means is simply this, battle hardened troopers perform better than callow troopers who may pass the grind on paper but do not have the experience! Nobody so far when harping on how the NSG standards had to be blah blah, mentioned this very aspect, that battle hardened troopers who go to the NSG bring a vast body of knowledge and ability with them - most important being they think on their feet!! They dont have to be SF supermen but perform even so!

I am not suggesting the NSG identify and recruit 'callow troopers' to fill its ranks. What I am suggesting is that it be manned and organised in manner corresponding to a true SF unit, not a well trained infantry organisation.

Many Indian RR/Infantry commanders confidently state that they have troops/sections that can equal the SF operators overall, because of the pure experience they have across a variety of roles/combat. As elite infantry, they can match the SF.

The officers and men of the SF would disagree. Without exception. Vehemently.

Where the SF excels is in their ability to undertake non conventional infantry roles - intel/strat reccon/beyond the TBA - ironically, also the very roles, Indian SF often dont have the political mandate to pursue.

Any junior infantry leader worth his salt will tell you he can do the job just as well. But the first call still goes to the SF, which by design excels in nearly all roles, including bland conventional soldiering. And while high risk missions are right in its wheelhouse, the primary response to a high priority threat (like the 26/11 attack) ought to be centred around the SF as well.

How do you know whom Indian forces have trained with or not? Have you been part of the Army? If not, your surprise is worth little. Heck, in previous Army SF level exercises, they have publicly trained with US SF operators from the Green Berets and others. And spare me the semantic nitpicking of who is Tier 1 or otherwise.

I'm well aware that they've publicly trained with the Green Berets. (Refer post).

And no Tier I units are not a product of mere semantics. They're the cream of their respective SFs with exceptionally stringent selection standards and have had massive resources poured into both equipping and training them.

And yes, for your kind information, the average cross section in the SAG of the NSG would probably match (and they actually note they'd outperform) their peers in the GSG-9 or GIGN, based purely on their mix of combat experience, intensive physical ragad & ability to take real time decisions without caring about the political impact of casualties.

So the 15,000 strong NSG is on average better trained than the 200 man GSG-9 or the 100 man FBI-HRT. I'll defer to your opinion.

IA's SF standards have come for criticism because they are diluted versus own internal prior standards. They have little to do with international standards which vary country by country & are often apples to oranges. Russian airborne troopers in the past have shown higher upper body strength when compared to wiry IA SF troops, which the IA noted & changed its training. Put those same guys in the tropics over several days, and their effectiveness rapidly dropped. Same as IA observed when training with "certain" western SF who even expected mineral water to be made available during training ops. Lord alone would testify to their effectiveness when the logistical chain was broken or during ops like Kargil when IA infantrymen subsisted on gur and ice!!

I singled out the IA's SF as an example of an elite unit fostering quality through stringent selection. The NSG's selection doesn't compare to the Para-SF, let alone the original Para-Cdo units, wherein you had to be in the top lot at IMA/OTA or exceptionally fortunate (through the bracketed merit list), to even be accepted into the probation. A national CT unit needs to be manned and driven by career SF personnel, not by men (albeit tough motivated professional soldiers) coming over from regular infantry battalions on 2.5 year deputations.

Who cares about the SSG and why are you bringing in them to the discussion? This is a perfect example of an irrelevant side track. You have some mental concept that the "western SF" are superior and Indian NSG are inferior based on some arbitrary KPIs you have employed, size etc, without even understanding the other side of the equation, that numbers matter and that to this date, propaganda apart, the average Indian infantry man goes through a gruelling regimen that would have most western troopers and their advocates up in arms.

My core 'concept' as you put it, is that the NSG is not SF. Everything else flows from there.

You might want to know what a certain Marine colonel remarked to his wider unit after exercising with Indian troops - they have an incredibly taxing physical regimen..

Well, if Richard Marcinko and Chuck Pfarrer are to be believed, Seal Team 6's allowance for training ammunition, at least in its initial years, was larger than the entire US Marine Corps.

[ArmenT]

Lets see, one picture of a NSG man, firing a MP5 single handed at the Chabad House op, when it was pretty well known thanks to signal intercepts that the terrorists had killed the people inside, and the NSG team was focused on just neutralizing the terrorists....is an example of blithering stupidity or similar brash verbiage?

If so, I would like the specifics of what exactly the NSG trooper did wrong, and why his method is not considered a valid method of suppressing fire. He is not exposing himself, aiming with one hand & firing. How is that stupidity?

If that is your idea of "suppressive fire", I'm a monkey's uncle . Suppressive fire needs aiming and shooting at the enemy's last known location, not spraying-and-praying from a position like that. Doesn't matter if intel says that the people inside are dead -- intel could be wrong and there could be other innocent people hiding inside who were not found. And since you want specifics: it doesn't matter if the guy is some super-duper commando type, he's still violating rules II, III and IV of basic firearm handling (google for "jeff cooper rules of firearm safety" for details).

All it needs is a sideways tilt and it would be what is known as super modified gangster grip.

[Raja Bose]

"rogue warrior" loh purush marcinko said his team only worked with and trusted the KSK and didnt like anyone else incl the brits

It was the GSG9 not KSK. Loh purush Marcinko babu claimed to be Ulrich Wegener's bosom buddy. Ofcourse loh purush is also a shameless self promoter and a known braggart so whatever he spouts these days should be taken with super iodized salt.

Then 1984 happened - the spearhead of the assault was a team from 1 Para Cdo along with troops from SFF. Led by a gentleman by the name of Major PC Katoch (and who retired as Lt. General PC Katoch - the author of the book on SF listed on this thread earlier).

SFF assaulted and failed before 1 Para Cdo was sent in to the parikrama (followed by Guards under Israr Khan). A 1000 stribes

MARCOS came about because you need dedicated SF to operate in maritime environment and in support of maritime interest(s).

The plan for formation of MARCOS was made and approved at the same time as the NSG - they were not an afterthought and specific areas where each unit would intervene were chalked out quite carefully. And not to mention cross-training between both units to enhance interoperability. This last part probably was allowed to lapse becoz during 26/11 each claimed they couldn't operate with the other. A typical SDRE situation where things start off in real earnest with all the right training/facilities/equipment/planning and a decade later all execution is gone to hell becoz it doesn't earn our politicians votes or our babooze bribes.

in my limited understanding - sas's primary mission is behind the lines recon and targetting, not hostage rescue - they have dedicated squads for that

Actually what made SAS unique back in the days was they didn't have a dedicated HRT. All of their squadrons rotated thru HRT duty which itself was a subset of their Counter Revolutionary Warfare wing (CRW) to ensure everybody got that experience. That beign said I would not put SAS as a benchmark for what an SF should be whether from a manpower quality perspective or skills. Gone are the days of David Stirling and Jock Lewes and there seems to be an over-reliance on the glamour from the "Iranian Embassy raid" which frankly was a pretty regular hostage rescue operation done many dozens of times by any experienced SF unit in the world. The only thing was the raid was shown on live TV. In terms of quality of manpower the SAS are pretty bad when compared to any army's SF (whether massa or India) and have been rife with incidents of indiscipline amongst ranks - what makes it more worrisome is their small size. In terms of equipment, they are not exactly overflowing with the latest and greatest and pretty much all of their kit is now coming from US. During Gulf War I the SAS allegedly didn't even have enough claymore mines and had to improvise from ice cream containers.

Say what you will about massa but when it comes to logistics and equipment they are second to none. That ensures that their men don't have to take heroic risks all the time to get a job done - so where a IA guy would be asked to charge a bunker, the massa guy would call in an airstrike.

That being said, the SLR toting NSG trooper's mismatched socks are still very bothersome.

[Singha]

its unclear to me with what knowledge the chabad house raid was launched
- if it was known from signal intercept that all hostages were dead, there was no need for a 2 day affair after all people in locality were already evacuated by the police cordon....heavy demolition charges could have ended the siege in a couple hrs...they could have brought in a BMP and smacked the front door in, and used its cannon to shred the place from top to bottom.
- if it was felt there could be other people trapped inside, what was the intent of a 2 day siege...wouldnt it make more sense to launch a HRT immediately from top and bottom of the house?

maybe it was diplomatic sensitivity wrt israel protesting if a raid resulted in casualties, a lack of clear info on if anyone was still alive ...it seemed to be a wait n watch kind of op.....perhaps it took time to convince israel their people were all killed and clear the ground for entry.

the helidrop was likely made with the intent of a immediate HRT raid, but I suspect after seeing it live on TV the israeli consulate made a frantic call to the PMO and got it stopped

[Lalmohan]

if we are to believe the channel 4 doc, then from the phone intercepts it was known that the hostages had been killed the night before. it is not certain that the phone intercepts were being treated as authentic or that they were understood at the time rather than some time afterwards. given that the terrorists were in an upper floor, you couldn't blast your way in with a BMP, etc. the topography of the building and the floor/stair layout may have restricted access - we don't know
certainly the terrorists had good field of fire and protection of their own positions

[jayaaren]

I have some queries on the whole MP Chowdhary thing:

our planners probably got it muddled when they set up the NSG in the first place. They culled men to form a unit based on the SAS, GSCG9 and GIGN but failed to realise that there is a world of difference between what the SAS was being use for and what the GIGN/GSG9 were being used for. These planners then set up the ParaCommmando Bns as SF now meaning that NSG and Para (SF) began doing much the same things. They also added MARCOS to the muddle. Now you had 3 units all doing the same thing. Now what is AOR of the NSG, Para(SF) and MARCOS. Are they still stepping on each other's toes

If the SAS, GIGN & GSG9 were the model, why was all this deputing done. To the best of my knowledge, the SAS retains their file while the ranks are temporary, meaning the NCOs & JCOs remain till they quit while the Officers can only return after a "tour" if they are asked. As for the GIGN & GSG9 once they are in, they remain. The same is the case in the FBI's HRT. So now you have a highly experienced group of operators.

This regional hub business is as correctly pointed out a knee-jerk reaction. If we cannot get a unit to the incident scene pronto, then no amount of hubs are going to make a difference. Dedicated Lift Assets are what is required. Case in point, FBI-HRT has access to a dedicated C-17 for cross country transport. The same with the SAS's CT unit alhtough i suspect this is by a C-130. This means that manpower, equipment, weapons, ammo, clothing, vehicles and copters get to the incident spot at the same. Responding to a CT incident is time critical. We cannot affford the luxury of a staggered mobilization. Once you get behind the time cycle you are done for. Terrorists understand this better. I'll get into details of this later.

You need to read-up a bit before doing such critical analysis and trying to prove how we got this wrong. And western countries got all things right.

First things first - The Para-Commandos predate NSG by a wide margin. The first battalion (9 Para Commando) came about after 1965 war and then came 10 and 1 Para Commando. 21 Para Commando came about in mid 90s. These are the original 04 Para Commando Battalions. As I said before, there was an experiment to convert 1 Para Commando into SF on lines of SAS with organization centered around Squadrons and stuff.

From what I understand, the unit to be set-up in early 80s was to be our main Special Force which was to be deployed for strategic requirement. Indian SAS, if you will. For whatever reason, Para Commando Battalions existing at that time (1/9/10) were not considered for scaling up for this requirement. They were primarily geared for cross-border raids and other tasks more in line with larger war-like conflicts.

There is a reason Commando was dropped and Para (SF) was used - the word Commando was by some strange logic considered as symptomatic of more direct-action raids and blowing up stuff. IMO, the word Commando is more cool and PARA (Commando) reads just right.

Then 1984 happened - the spearhead of the assault was a team from 1 Para Cdo along with troops from SFF. Led by a gentleman by the name of Major PC Katoch (and who retired as Lt. General PC Katoch - the author of the book on SF listed on this thread earlier). Post 1984, NSG came into being and from what one can discern, the plan and blueprint prepared by Colonel MP Chowdhary morphed into NSG.

So, while India gained a dedicated CT/HRT formation, it lost out of a dedicated SF which could be used in line with Delta or ST6 or SAS.

And BTW - the true counter part of SAS in France and Germany are SF units of the armies of these countries. German law explicitly prohibits use of German Army for internal duties and hence, GSG9 was created from Border Police; German Army personnel desirous of joining GSG9 have to resign their commission in German Army. GIGN is part of the armed police and not the French Army.

Our Para (SF) are true counterparts of SAS/Green Berets/French SAS. It is just that unlike other countries, SAS also undertakes CT/HRT operations and maintains a squadron for such eventualities.

The Para (SF) battalions continued to evolve to respond to changing requirements - from IPKF in 1987 to North-East to Kashmir. MARCOS came about because you need dedicated SF to operate in maritime environment and in support of maritime interest(s). Every country worth its salt has SF dedicated for maritime operations. From SEAL in US Navy to SBS in UK to Shayetet 13 in Israel - they have a specific role in maritime environment. The fact that most of their operations are land based does not take away from their raison d'etre.

And please stop comparing with western countries and their special forces. The size and number of special forces required is contingent on the threat scenarios faced by the nation. And forces and responses are tailored for this threat requirement. A nation like India needs SF of varying types and number to meet the threat scenarios.

As for the size of SF of NSG type - India is a vast country which faces unique threats. When was the last time an SF unit came up against 1984 or 26/11? GIGN has grand total of ~500 operatives; good luck trying to tackle 26/11 situation with such manpower w/o calling in the SF from Army and even the regular infantry.

IA is million strong and much larger pool to draw men from - heck, jawans belonging to NCR/Western UP/Haryana/Rajasthan opt for NSG for a simple reason that it gives them a chance to be close to their homes. And SAG - the sword arm of NSG - would be around 2500 strong. Men serve time in the unit and go back - this creates a larger pool in the army of trained operators and helps to disseminate knowledge to a wider base.

Coming to lament of Colonel Chowdhary - he raises question on much wider, and serious, problem. That is - the use of SF in our strategic decision making. I wrote earlier in this post that India gained NSG but lost on a strategic SF. Something SAS does for Britain or Delta and SEAL Team 6 for US- fighting dirty wars within and without the country silently and then fading into black.

US follows a two-tier SF model - Green Beret and Rangers Regiment are prime US Army AF units while SEALS are US Navy SF. Men are selected from Army SF units and other infantry regiments to form part of Delta Force and from SEALS Teams to form SEAL TEAM 6 in case of Navy. So, these forces actually have men who are elite of the elite. From what I can deduce, Colonel Chowdhary wanted such a force for India which could undertake CT/HRT also. Men could be drawn from Para Commando Battalions and other infantry regiments.

We do have the Special Group AKA 22 SF which draws men from Para (SF) and other infantry units but not much is known in public domain about it.....(hides for cover)

Long story short - the heart is in the right place but the fvcking mind is not when it comes to raising/maintaining/utilizing an elite formation like NSG.

Op Blue Star exposed our lack of a unit specialized in CQB. 1 & 10 ParaCommando were at that time the only specialized unit that we had albeight a DP & DA unit. SFF was to be used in the same way but along the NE borders. So we threw in the best we had. And we bled. Then the NSG came about. I do not know what AOR for the proposed SF was.

SAS-CRW and SP Team came about post Munich as did GSG9 and GIGN when these countries realised that their respective SF (except Germany whose KSK came about a lot later) not able to carry out CT or HRT ops. As opposed to British of SAS within UK, German and French laws prohibit use of military units within the country aka US Posse Comitatus, thus units under Ministry of Interior control.

As for comparisons, i would ask why not? You say that we need SF of varying type and numbers. Granted, but we have MARCOS, Garud & Para(SF). Add to this CRPF Cobra. Now the case is even more stronger to have the NSG as a pure CT/HRT unit. Same as GIGN, GSG9, FBI-HRT. For a unit on the lines of Delta or Seal Team 6, you need a new unit maybe what MP Chowdhary had in mind.

As for your statement on GIGN & 26/11, do you really mean that 500 CQB/CT/HRT specialists would not be able to handle a 26/11. As i have previously said, NSG had too many areas of focus rather a well-defined one. Why is God's name is such a unit being used for CP for Tom, Dick & Harry. You may say SRG and not SAG but again why. SRG is to support SAG and only for that. Not CP or such other rubbish.

This whole thing of deputation and going back to parent units does not work. Once you revert back to regular infantry or other units or even SF units after NSG, your training is then according to what these units do. One in always in should be the norm. Pray what can be achieved by a dispered body of men. You have 10 men in NSG now and then they go back to 10 different units. They then train for what these units do. How are they going to function in the former NSG role after 1 year. Point is a standing dedicated unit is required.

[vaibhav.n]

Very few Counter Terror Units come co-located with airfield access for large body aircrafts for swift deployment across the board. While this may be less important for smaller European countries like UK or Switzerland, larger countries like the US, Canada, India, Russia, France and Germany will suffer from such inherent capacities to deploy forces at a moment's notice, which will take time to be deployed from their central op bases. The deployment timelines for such an force to adequately respond can stretch from a couple of hours to 5 Hours at worst.

Thus, governments worldwide instead of going in for expensive dedicated military aviation assets, what we are seeing now is an increased militarization of police forces. Eg: Scotland Yard, NYPD. There are some very compelling reasons to do so actually.

If we conduct an analysis to the casualties in a 26/11 like event, 80% of the casualties actually happened within the first 60-80 minutes. This raises concerns to have localized first response units, which can contain at the very least. A problem in a country like India, where there are some very serious challenges for these to be manned by local police units for reasons which are well understood by all. It will be a very high burden on most state governments which don’t have the inclination both budget and manpower wise to address such issues.

Thus, the problem falls on the shoulders of the Union Government which had to rescind to a NSG backed Regional Centres Solution to maintain a credible response force at a local level for vulnerable cities. While these units might not be top-notch in every way possible, that in itself is not the aim within the SRG mandate and represent a fairly serious solution within the confined limits of how they could respond to future potential scenarios.

Nariman House was a completely different ballgame altogether, the goalposts continually differed on how the top brass wanted to respond, the fluid situation did not help at all.

[Surya]

f we conduct an analysis to the casualties in a 26/11 like event, 80% of the casualties actually happened within the first 60-80 minutes. This raises concerns to have localized first response units, which can contain at the very least. A problem in a country like India, where there are some very serious challenges for these to be manned by local police units for reasons which are well understood by all. It will be a very high burden on most state governments which don’t have the inclination both budget and manpower wise to address such issues

even if the optimum forces exist - try getting to any site in a city like mumbai within 60 minutes

Those who live in Mumbai will know - imagine having to get Force 1 from colaba to lets say interior Dadar\Parel or mahim at 11.30 am or 6.30 pm

How quick can you do it??

thats a problem which has no easy soln.

[Lalmohan]

previously we'd discussed "fixing" or "pinning" forces - people with sufficient armaments and training to engage and hold the terrorists and buy time for the full team to arrive. this can be done relatively easily with having 6-10 properly armed and trained police in almost all busy/potential target areas to be on patrol and able to engage quickly. they might be backed up by local police teams. as it is in mumbai now, you see significant armed police presence in a lot of 'high value target' areas

big cities should all have their own dedicated police swat teams (leave aside politics for the time being) and then NSG can focus on proper HRT etc. you could argue that marcos and garuds could provide this capability in areas where they are based - but clear rules need to be established - and in most cases, a proper dedicated comms network and protocols...

[Singha]

imo cities like delhi and mumbai are just too wide open and big for even localized swat teams to be cost effective. you could throw in 50 swat teams and they will disappear with no trace due to vast areas to be covered and slow movements on road.

I thinks thats why nobody much cares about NSG reform beyond a point - they are a relatively simple and cheap solution to a problem whose scale and complexity has no cut n dry khanish solution in indian env.

given any situation, the indian state is confident it can throw in enough of local armed police to contain and localize the "swarm" and eventually the NSG will arrive from somewhere and kill them all one way or another. sure there will be casualties but 100s die here everyday from road accidents. the calculation has probably been made that a 10X jump in spending will not result in a 10X reduction in casualties or a 10X reduction in resolution time.

there are also substantial army presence in many cities like pune, blr, delhi, guwahati etc and a few armed coys can be put together in a couple hrs and rushed to the scene as backup. this was what happened after the parliament attack when army units setup sandbagged positions with LMGs at key places in the lutyens delhi area.

these seem to be regular IA troops from the cantonment probably
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/photo/18424158.cms
http://s1.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/ ... E9180GRD00

[Surya]

this can be done relatively easily with having 6-10 properly armed and trained police in almost all busy/potential target areas to be on patrol and able to engage quickly. they might be backed up by local police teams. as it is in mumbai now, you see significant armed police presence in a lot of 'high value target' areas

too many targets to have police nearby

and for those who may be armed and trained - its a question of mobility

I liked the old motorcycle borne guys but how many can you have

[Singha]

so far the munnas seem unable unlike the south russian border or moscow theater siege to push in a really strong 30-40 platoon of jihadis a mix of shooters and suicide jacket types. now that could cause huge casualties and be a real headache if they split up and moved around rather than going to ground in a single location.

[jai]

Not sure if someone's already mentioned this - Nat Geo HD is showing a series called Close Quarter Battles - CQB, and another one called Helicopter wars - forum members may like to check these out.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>
Op Blue Star exposed our lack of a unit specialized in CQB. 1 & 10 ParaCommando were at that time the only specialized unit that we had albeight a DP & DA unit. SFF was to be used in the same way but along the NE borders. So we threw in the best we had. And we bled. Then the NSG came about. I do not know what AOR for the proposed SF was.

SAS-CRW and SP Team came about post Munich as did GSG9 and GIGN when these countries realised that their respective SF (except Germany whose KSK came about a lot later) not able to carry out CT or HRT ops. As opposed to British of SAS within UK, German and French laws prohibit use of military units within the country aka US Posse Comitatus, thus units under Ministry of Interior control.

As for comparisons, i would ask why not? You say that we need SF of varying type and numbers. Granted, but we have MARCOS, Garud & Para(SF). Add to this CRPF Cobra. Now the case is even more stronger to have the NSG as a pure CT/HRT unit. Same as GIGN, GSG9, FBI-HRT. For a unit on the lines of Delta or Seal Team 6, you need a new unit maybe what MP Chowdhary had in mind.

As for your statement on GIGN & 26/11, do you really mean that 500 CQB/CT/HRT specialists would not be able to handle a 26/11. As i have previously said, NSG had too many areas of focus rather a well-defined one. Why is God's name is such a unit being used for CP for Tom, Dick & Harry. You may say SRG and not SAG but again why. SRG is to support SAG and only for that. Not CP or such other rubbish.

This whole thing of deputation and going back to parent units does not work. Once you revert back to regular infantry or other units or even SF units after NSG, your training is then according to what these units do. One in always in should be the norm. Pray what can be achieved by a dispered body of men. You have 10 men in NSG now and then they go back to 10 different units. They then train for what these units do. How are they going to function in the former NSG role after 1 year. Point is a standing dedicated unit is required.

Dude, I have no idea what you're trying to say here.

First of all, please don't compare the Indian response and casualties in Operation Bluestar with ANYTHING you can think of. If you have time, buy the book by General Brar and read up the extremely restricted terms of engagement with which Indian Army was faced. No country has ever faced what we did in 1984. The whole set-up on the behalf of militants was done by a decorated ex-IA Major General who was a paratrooper to boot.

Yes, we did realize that we need a softer image and that is why NSG was kept under MHA. And that we require dedicated force for CT/HRT with expertise in real close CQB in built-up areas with hostage situation.

NSG is a dedicated CT/HRT unit...where is the debate in that? Using SRG for protection duties is part of mandate of NSG. The fact that this mandate has been violated for pure ego-massaging is a different matter all-together.

Coming to comment on the strength of GIGN - ~500 is the TOTAL STRENGTH of GIGN. This would include every person on two legs. Not all of them are operatives on the ground. That would be around 50% of the total strength assuming there is some additional (And external) structure to support GIGN. The ratio is otherwise 1:3 for combatant and support personnel. Try managing three different targets of the scale and complexity as Taj/Trident/Chabad house with such a force.

And there is no specific benefit with respect to permanent cadre - Indian Para SF uses the permanent cadre structure while SAS does not. Neither does Special Group/22 SF of the IA or Delta or Seal Team 6. Are these lesser capable because of their structure? How does rotation of men impede the effectiveness of the an organization like NSG?

[Karan M]

Hardiness. Does it make for a better infantryman? Is equipment to be factored into the equation at all, when comparing units across armies. I would think so. And thus I would think that some western SFs with their superior equipment and their being used to that equipment, would outfight Indian SF in general.

And what happens when that technology is not available or the ROE ensure that technology cannot be used?
What would have happened (say) to the SF western types when they were fighting their peers in house to house combat and could not rely on 1000 lb bombs dropped to suppress the opponent as they routinely utilize when fighting in the non urban areas in Afghanistan?
There may come a day when the US SF use Predator style cammo tech bending light, have invisible laser weapons etc - but till that day, hardiness matters.
Western SF rely on technology a great deal, because they have to. It comes from being more casualty averse & also very attuned to the political realities of home perception when things go belly up. What happened to the US involvement in Mogadishu after the images of the bodies of the Rangers being dragged through by the crowds..
In India, face it, we are much more attuned and blase (and we shouldnt be to be honest) about these things. The other day, our security forces & politicos got massacred by the Maoists. It was running side by side with the IPL rubbish..

Mano a Mano, sure, I agree that you would say that an Indian SF would be tougher than the average western SF operative.

But, I would also think that that would be true when you compare an jihadi or an LeT operative high on hashish, ready to go to jannat vs the Indian army.

Here, you are just making arguments for the sake of argument. What logic is there in saying a man hopped up on drugs is at the same level as somebody who has trained, and consistently so, to be able to cope with adverse circumstances?
What happens when the drugs wear off? That was the same thing that occurred in 26/11. Day 1, they were exchanging fire with the NSG, all juiced up & motivated by their handlers. Ultimately, they ended up holed in a room & waiting for the NSG to get them.

Toughness is a circumstance of both one's own makeup plus training. If the logistical system to keep you in place is substantially different, even if the average Joe sixpack from Idaho is the same mentally as Ram Swaroop from Bihar, the fact is the training systems on both sides are different. One will breed soldiers more used to living off the land, or used to more privation.

But both are superior to the juiced up deluded warrior, whose system is going to crash when he is off drugs (and the high wears off) or ends up crashing because of the drugs (when his system cannot handle the abuse). What of his behavior when on the drugs, his aim, his general tactical acumen (may just end up being rash and getting killed faster).

It IS absolutely the combination of the equipment AND the training that is the difference between a war winning and a war losing combination.

In the past, people with better morale & good tactics, have consistently outfought the side with better equipment. The point is this discussion was veering totally towards 1. numbers are bad (as a person said, the one man cannot be in two places at the same time) 2. western SF are better because they are more equipped etc

My point is that while training & equipment are the ideal combination, Indian SF have long managed to address many aspects of the latter with the former. This is much the same across all our services. Its something which has to be taken into account, and the reason why "on paper", significantly inferior equipped Indian units give a tough run for their money to their western peers.

So comparing men to men is probably not the fairest comparison (or is it?)

I would compare western SF vs. a specific situation and how they dealt with it, with the Indian SF, in a similar situation and how they dealt with it.

Which is another issue, because they haven't faced anything like what we or the Russians have faced. Where they have faced something far less in scope (Boston shooters), their response has been overwhelmingly drastic (shut down the city) and ended up somewhat suboptimal.

And in comparing the ultimate outcomes, I would venture to say, that the westerners may come out on top.

Again - you are going purely with your subjective belief that the westerners have something magical in their sleeve, which allows them to be superior, namely their technology.

As things stand, in small infantry tactics - they dont! This is the reason why they are leaving Afghanistan and left Iraq. Winning a conventional war is one thing, sticking on in a COIN environment, another.

If anything, the Indian Army's successes in NE & Kashmir, show what the combination of numbers and training can do. Its something the west simply does not have access to anymore, and which is why they came to India for Afghan help. The British ran their empire on the back of their Indian troops.

In J&K we have dedicated Army units which keep roads open & monitor 24/7. For all the technology at their disposal, ranging from fighters with high resolution optics, to bomb sniffing robots, the US/west have kept getting hammered by IEDs & cannot cope. Similarly, when they have faced well entrenched dedicated opposition, they have had significant casualties. Its clearly the case that even the Pakistanis dont send in too much of an opposition in Afghanistan that the issue rises to a full scale conflict from being a boiling frog one.

And its not like we are immune either. For all the lessons learnt by our Army and implemented, the CPMF are unable to do so, and are paying the price in the Maoist belt.

Point is there may come a day when Predators stalk humans on the battlefield. That day has not come yet. A well drilled motivated unit from the great war fighting in Stalingrad is not that different from the units of today, both have access to small arms, light munitions and human ingenuity plus staying power. One side may win through attrition (better meds, communications) but its going to a brutal fight nonetheless.

[Karan M]

I'm well aware what suppressing fire is and at no point did I imply that 'it means a "distraction to the main assault"'. What I said was the tactics seen the various videos would have been understandable had the objective been to distract the militants, while say an assault party breached the doors. But a CT unit carrying on employing 'suppressive fire' for hours at an end throughout the night, especially once a secure perimeter has been established, is 'unusual' to say the least.

What makes you so sure that as to what is unusual or not? This is what amazes me. On the one hand, you have your book knowledge (correct me if I am wrong). On the other hand, there is the NSG at the situation, with their Army deputed folks from the SAG & their choices to make. What makes you so sure that your opinion is a fact?
As matter of fact, there are many CQB encounters in Kashmir, which have stretched to firefights for hours together, because the Indian side chose, smartly, to limit their casualties and wear down the opponent, as versus a flashy all or nothing assault at the beginning itself.
Lets see here - from the C4 reveal, we know the NSG knows from intercepts the hostages are dead, they have to go in, decide to wait for a perfect time to attack, and decide that they will keep the opponents awake till that time & not give them a moment's rest, knowing from prior experience fighting these sorts, that they rely on drugs & external motivation to keep them going...I'd consider it good tactics!

This could have been well the case here, given the NSG has folks deputed from the Army. They made the choice to do so.

Your concept of what is "usual" or "unusual" is not based on first hand information, nor is it based on your own experience, what then makes you think that it is correct, when logical explanations exist for the method of choice adopted by the NSG?

Given the complete chaos that reigned through most of the period, that is a judgement that cannot and should not have been made by the commander on ground. The assumption should always have been there were live hostages within the complex.

Says who? Again, where is your first hand information or your own experience in combat to state this so confidently, and second, are you privy to who made the decision to do what the NSG did?

Again - check out how quickly your speculation twists into categorical assumptions.

A) There was complete chaos during the period (assumption 1- that the Indian side did not have any info to proceed logically with, whereas we do know the C4 documentary specifically and repeatedly mentions the Indian side was monitoring the Nariman House comms)
That this judgement should not have been made (On what basis - since you have not made such judgements in the past, nor have you been trained to make such judgements)
C) That this judgement was made by the "commander on the ground".. and it was hence incorrect.

And if the NSG had taken their own sweet time to persecute this op, I am sure we'd have been told, that elite CT units dont take so much time etc etc..
Classic case of damned if they do, damned if they dont and armchair quarterbacking at its finest.

'The NSG are infantry'. If we agree on that, we're broadly on the same page, but probably differ in its implications.

Irrelevant sidetrack from your side. The issue was of suppressing fire & tht infantry use it, elite or normal or otherwise..

My point is not that they are worthless or don't mesh as a team. My point is that the NSG by virtue of its organisation, is not one of the special forces.

Irrelevant. Whether the NSG is SF or not is not germaine! The debate was & is about their effectiveness, and the dodgy behaviour of one poster in using pictures of NSG personnel to make glib remarks on their tactical acumen!

I haven't used the word 'idiotic' to describe anybody involved, certainly not for a serving man who's volunteered to put his life on the line, and I said as much in my post.

You may not have made it, another person did, and you replied to my response to his post & made yours. Go back up & read what he said, its a perfect example of "analysis", to say the least.

I don't believe the comment was meant to be taken literally, just an indication of extreme disappointment. Perhaps he felt his unit would have handled things differently, maybe employing sharpshooters instead of small calibre weapons to suppress enemy fire. But, if you feel that he, despite being a former commander of the Special Group & NSG, and a war veteran, did not have the credentials to comment... alright.

On the one hand you claim that he didnt mean his comment literally, after quoting them ......then on the other hand, you attempt to justify them by playing telepath...would have employed sharpshooters to suppress enemy fire )- really! Where would these magical sharpshooters have come from and how were they different from all those firing at Nariman house from everything from single action bolt rifles with scopes to Sigs with scopes?) .. they weren't sharpshooters per your standards I see?

I assume he is a blunt shooter.
http://dnasyndication.com/pictures/larg ... 281108.jpg
What of this gentleman then? Not a sharpshooter either I presume..
http://cdn.c.photoshelter.com/img-get/I ... 535IND.jpg

How many of these sharpshooters were around to cover Nariman house from all angles for suppressive fire? Could it be the aim of the people firing with MP5s was to provoke a terrorist into showing his face so that the carefully sited sharpshooters could take him out..

No, those make sense, so NSG may not have done any of those.

Let us proceed.

And then you attempt to throw in a pretty ridiculous comment about me feeling that he doesn't have the credentials to comment (care to point out where I said that?)

I merely pointed out that MP Chaudhary did NOT face events like what were faced in 26/11. And second, his comments about the NSG behaving like untrained infantry do not pass the logic test because other SF Army men with combat experience like Sheoran led the NSG.

Answer these two points with facts, not rhetoric playing to both sides (he wasn't being literal/ you are attacking MP C etc).

Again... I did not say that mere high selectivity would ensure 'combat performance'. My point was that they're a different (though still essential) set of qualities. The average Indian infantry unit is well led and well motivated, but that doesn't not make it the equivalent of an SF unit. What distinguishes the SF is its training as well as a stringent selection process. Good leadership and motivation, I'm taking as a given.

Why are you so fixed upon SF? What exactly is the relevance of the NSG being SF or not being SF?
The question that should be asked is the NSG suitable for its mandate! Which is to address issues like Mumbai. Not whether they can do all the missions SF can, including operating deep behind enemy lines or deep recce or other specialized skills that are unique to the SF!!

Clearly, you seem to be engaged in refuting an argument where the NSG has to be == to the SF to be the best, whereas I am pointing out that the NSG has criteria which suit its job role, and as such SF and even regular army jawans may be suitable for it!!

A jawan from the regular Army unit may be equal to his peer from the SF in many of the physical tasks and with NSG training even approach SF levels of marksmanship or equal them. He may end up their equivalent in specific tasks which both share. He will not be the equal of the SF guy in many other areas. But he does NOT have to be either!!

On the other hand, a SF operator in his late 30's, is arguably wasted in the NSG when the job calls for constantly running up (and down) flights of stairs and facing combat at a moments notice, wasting his skills obtained in picking up NE dialects and learning all sorts of other skills. A regular soldier in his early 20's may be better for this & trained appropriately to a more restricted set of skills whereas the SF operator is more of use in planning and deciphering what is going on!

Its because CT is a far more specialized trade than COIN. And more importantly numbers can substitute training and selection only to a point, during CT/HRT operations. The availability of manpower on the other hand, more often than not, is the factor than determines success against an insurgency.

Again, on what basis do you say this, with how many gazillion ops of combat experience? Here I am afraid, you are being obtuse for the sake of being obtuse, because the point I made is simple, that there are soldiers gaining invaluable experience in the Indian Army, having fought in crowded streets in Kashmir, NE etc & who end up finding their way to organizations like the NSG. A soldier with combat experience in the jungles, having fought at the LOC, will still find what happened in 26/11 a jarring experience, but that combat experience also means he goes into the fight with an extra edge, having seen combat to begin with! Compare & contrast to many highly equipped "western" HRT units etc whose 90% of combat means enforcing civil peace & not having to take part in extended, brutal firefights!

I can assure you, I'm not basing my ideas on regular perusals of ToI, Wikipedia or BR. I've spent some time interacting with NSG officers both from Army and paramilitary backgrounds, and recently had the opportunity of a spending a truly enlightening evening with a fairly senior officer in the SPG (who incidently got a slot in the NSG as well). The overarching impression was that the NSG, while a 'good stint' for a young officer, did not ... lets say, recruit the same lot as the SF, and wasn't at par with the sheer professionalism inculcated by the SPG's (almost total) autonomy (especially at the NCO level).

And that is his opinion, while I can also state, having interacted with a wide cross section of folks that per some folks
1. SF is nothing great (hyped up infantry per a colonel in the RR; people we got rid of as versus people i didnt let go- a flag officer )
2. NSG should be disbanded and rolled up into the Army (because the IPS cant lead squat)
3. Regular line units in Kargil contributed far more in adverse circumstances, than our SF units who were too few to make the difference. (Several folks)

Re: the SPG - I am sure, officers who have chosen to dedicate their career to combat ops, will have their own views on what "worth" the SPG, SRG/NSG, ITBP and other persona guarding roles have versus their own choices..

Realize one thing about the above? They all are true to some extent, and all are wrong to some extent. At this point in life, I take what these gentlemen say with my own discernment, and also alternative viewpoints from their peers who contest their views. It generally works out more balanced that way.

A highly motivated Ghatak commando can perform most unconventional missions that are the SF's bread and butter, and do it well (as they did during Kargil). That does not negate the SF's raison d'etre. World-over CT tasks are performed by the SF, and often enough by specialized SF units. The need for the best available individual manning and commanding India' premier CT unit remains unchanged and unfulfilled, even more so now that SF deputations to the NSG are waning.

Now you are getting to the point! If the NSG has a set of tasks which can be done by the Ghatak commando, then that is sufficient. It need not have the super SF guy who also knows seven languages, can infiltrate organizations and has been trained to do so etc, apart from his regular combat skills. The SF guy is wasted in this role.

The world over SF example does not hold, because these folks dont face the scale of our challenges. Its easy for them to be running multiple conflicts, getting stuck with a bunch of overqualified SF folks who need to go someplace as the militaries downsize and if not BlackWater, there always these ops..
In contrast, we have to optimize with what we have. If the NSG is trained to a sufficient level and then some, that it can do the specific subset of activiites that it expects to face during an urban terror attack - that is good enough!!
They can keep getting SF, police & other folks to teach/train them modules that are necessary. They don't have to be the equivalent of the SF that are created for an entirely different mandate which is a far more comprehensive spectrum of non conventional war!

I am not suggesting the NSG identify and recruit 'callow troopers' to fill its ranks. What I am suggesting is that it be manned and organised in manner corresponding to a true SF unit, not a well trained infantry organisation.

And how do you propose that happens? This is a perfect example of chasing significant effort for gains, that may be marginal at best. A true SF organization will have skills that require months of specific training, that a NSG man may never utilize. He is better served in developing skills, that he may use!! Is the NSG man going to be required to do modules on long range recce, advanced ambush techniques with high intensity explosives etc - these are all part & parcel of what a SF team may learn in order to inflict unacceptable attrition or get high grade intel. In contrast, the NSG guy may be better served in focusing more & more on the kind of things that he needs to specialize in. Different kinds of CQB conditions, different kinds of tactics to neutralize folks in Indian cities etc. Of course, they can embed specialists from more forces with diverse skillsets, but to try and create a mini SF equivalent in the NSG is doomed to failure, because India neither has the militarized state that can turn out such manpower, nor the infrastructure (human especially) to train at such a scale, and finally, it will result in a set of folks who may not even need the vast majority of items the SF has their folks look at.

Scenario1

NSG guy 1 we have trained you in widespread use of IEDs as a weapons expert. Please use them. Sir, we are fighing in a hotel, I will bring i down if I use these items. Oops, why do you have them then? I am attached to the unit learning long range infiltration, and need to protect ourselves while we extricate ourselves.. ok....so what do you know...sir, i learned basic tactics in my parent regiment and fought in Kashmir...ok, take that gun and follow me..go to that room and kill anyone who fires back...but sir, i havent done my room clearing exercises...dont worry, this is your first one..

The officers and men of the SF would disagree. Without exception. Vehemently.

Let them. The infantry guys would still point out that it was they who retook the peaks of Kargil, sometimes barefooted, that it was a regular infantry unit which took Bana post. The SF guys will say they are more autonomous, they too could do these tasks if they had to etc.. and the debate will go on.
In fact this is the crux of the issue, the entire myth of the SF has been created to be that they are some super infantry, whereas their strategic tasking invariably gets ignored in such matters!! That is where the SF score, that you can drop a stick of these folks into uncharted territory and they have the acumen to survive and return. On the other hand, they are wasted in direct assaults.. having said that, in the direct assault role, there is no guarantee that a Ghatak guy may not be as good as the SF guy, simply because the Ghatak guy may have been through that situation several times before..

Any junior infantry leader worth his salt will tell you he can do the job just as well. But the first call still goes to the SF, which by design excels in nearly all roles, including bland conventional soldiering.

And that is quoted as a problem by several seasoned officers because they point out that risk averse and play it safe commanders routinely use the SF to take out any tasks that they wish to avoid, lest it show up badly in their ACR. And that is a fundamental problem, not just with India but in the west as well, where even routine soldiering by some commanders gets delegated to the fancier units to avoid risk ..

And while high risk missions are right in its wheelhouse, the primary response to a high priority threat (like the 26/11 attack) ought to be centred around the SF as well.

Again, "ought to be" based on what. Please quote specific tactical attributes, methods employed by the opponent that made the NSG suitable for the task as versus the SF. And the answer is you can't, because you weren't there and nor have you faced these issues yourself to determine whether better options would be available. Right now, you have opinion which opines that SF is generally better.. I disagree, because all I care is about the job getting done, designations apart, and practicality means you do it with a force optimized for that specific task & not a bunch of "supermen", who by the very nature of their grind & training will take far more time to produce & are best left for more esoteric tasks (as versus doing regular infantry roles in COIN either).

'm well aware that they've publicly trained with the Green Berets. (Refer post).

So per you Green Berets are not Tier 1?

And no Tier I units are not a product of mere semantics. They're the cream of their respective SFs with exceptionally stringent selection standards and have had massive resources poured into both equipping and training them.

Yes, and they usually fail before the tide of mass manufactured "good enough" opponents, who ultimately outnumber them, outfight them..whether it be JW7 with all its aces & Me262s in WW2, or Red Wings in Afghanistan or the disaster that was Mogadishu, the point is that the myth attached to the combat capabilities of these so called Tier 1, Tier 2 or whatever types ends up becoming a casualty in sausage grinder conflicts.

Here is a thought for you, you go into combat with 30 soldiers at 80% accuracy, with 100 bullets each. They will end up having 2400 bullets on target.
Or you go into combat with your ten super special SF. They have 100 bullets, and 100% accuracy. They will have 1000 bullets on target.

Those 30 soldiers can be split into 3 squads, with one in reserve and still take two positions manned by 3 ppl each (1:3 assault force combination). Can be in two places at one, with 1 in reserve.
The SF guys, well they need all ten for the one assault based on 1:3 thumbrule, and if they ignore that, the risks go up.

Bottomline, if standards are reasonably high - and the NSGs are quite there, their physical standards, their constant stress on marksmanship, their constant search for increasing the tactical skills of their operators - then the combination of these competent operators & numbers are what are required.

Their business model, ergo, is not flawed. What is flawed is the issue they have of having to face combat ops, with a head of the organization who is not exposed to all out combat and operates on a slower-consult-bureacractic-permission etc model. In which case, the IPS head does need to go, and internal NSG alignment may need to change more and more to combat orientation as versus their earlier focus on force as a last resort (warn first, fire later stuff like that) which reflected earlier times, when they had the advantage of numbers and terrain knowledge which the opponent did not.

So the 15,000 strong NSG is on average better trained than the 200 man GSG-9 or the 100 man FBI-HRT. I'll defer to your opinion.

I'd definitely take the physical standards & overall combat performance of the NSG SAG versus the GSG-9 or the FBH-HRT, given the fact that the NSG has deliberately modelled its classified physical regimen to be more gruelling than its peers worldwide, since they stress more on endurance & staying power (another reference to both our tech limitations & our own unique requirements). If you are taking of who is better in handling ELINT intercepts, mapping VOIP calls etc or what these organizations can access via their support networks or inhouse, pretty sure they'll have the edge.

I singled out the IA's SF as an example of an elite unit fostering quality through stringent selection. The NSG's selection doesn't compare to the Para-SF, let alone the original Para-Cdo units, wherein you had to be in the top lot at IMA/OTA or exceptionally fortunate (through the bracketed merit list), to even be accepted into the probation. A national CT unit needs to be manned and driven by career SF personnel, not by men (albeit tough motivated professional soldiers) coming over from regular infantry battalions on 2.5 year deputations.

Again, enough examples have been given above to show why the NSG may not need career SF personnel. By all means train SF personnel in CT units/modules, but making the NSG into a mini SF is a mugs game.

My core 'concept' as you put it, is that the NSG is not SF. Everything else flows from there.

Which is irrelevant.

If an attack had the GSG-9 or FBI HRT intervene and take up the ops, would you be bellyaching about that they are not true SF, but civilian owned organizations operating under a different mandate?

You might want to know what a certain Marine colonel remarked to his wider unit after exercising with Indian troops - they have an incredibly taxing physical regimen..

Well, if Richard Marcinko and Chuck Pfarrer are to be believed, Seal Team 6's allowance for training ammunition, at least in its initial years, was larger than the entire US Marine Corps.

Again irrelevant, because the Marine colonel made that remark about his peers in the Maratha Light Infantry...apples to apples! The point was simple, one of the better US military units with a very famous record (generally accepted to be more professional or gung ho than their Army peers per public perception) ends up coming to India, goes to a regular unit, and realizes their physical standards are very taxing.
Just a point regarding how much India tends to stress on moulding soldiers physically & that its still possible because of our demographics and cultural profile.

And as regards training ammunition - there are folks in the NSG, in the initial years, who said they saw more firing practise in a short period of time, then they did within the overall organization. So again, nothing special per se there..
The Seal Team 6 quote seems hyperbole though, because its comparing against the entire org and not the allotted amount per soldier.

[Raja Bose]

One reason why physical requirements in IA SF units specifically and IA in general is consistently much more stringent and taxing than equivalent US units is simply becoz IA is not a mechanized/airborne army like the US, due to shortage of such assets and moreover the terrain it regularly fights in (Kashmir/Siachen/NE) precludes use of such assets except in some special cases plus unlike US, IA does not have such a soup-e-rear logistics train which can build a Sarvanna Bhavan in the middle of nowhere at 15,000ft ASL.

[Singha]

US army SF has very demanding pt requirements too , for getting high scores to enter
http://www.military.com/military-fitnes ... t-training

I recommend that you work toward these goals in your Army PFT:

- Complete the 2-mile run in at least 12 to 14 minutes
- 100 sit-ups in 2 minutes.
- 100 push-ups in 2 minutes.

Accomplishing these goals will bring you close to a perfect score of 300 and increase your chances of being selected for SFAS.

[Raja Bose]

^^They all do. However, in IA a lot more importance is given to stuff like endurance marches etc not just during the initial training but even during periodic continuation training.

[jayaaren]

<SNIP>
Op Blue Star exposed our lack of a unit specialized in CQB. 1 & 10 ParaCommando were at that time the only specialized unit that we had albeight a DP & DA unit. SFF was to be used in the same way but along the NE borders. So we threw in the best we had. And we bled. Then the NSG came about. I do not know what AOR for the proposed SF was.

SAS-CRW and SP Team came about post Munich as did GSG9 and GIGN when these countries realised that their respective SF (except Germany whose KSK came about a lot later) not able to carry out CT or HRT ops. As opposed to British of SAS within UK, German and French laws prohibit use of military units within the country aka US Posse Comitatus, thus units under Ministry of Interior control.

As for comparisons, i would ask why not? You say that we need SF of varying type and numbers. Granted, but we have MARCOS, Garud & Para(SF). Add to this CRPF Cobra. Now the case is even more stronger to have the NSG as a pure CT/HRT unit. Same as GIGN, GSG9, FBI-HRT. For a unit on the lines of Delta or Seal Team 6, you need a new unit maybe what MP Chowdhary had in mind.

As for your statement on GIGN & 26/11, do you really mean that 500 CQB/CT/HRT specialists would not be able to handle a 26/11. As i have previously said, NSG had too many areas of focus rather a well-defined one. Why is God's name is such a unit being used for CP for Tom, Dick & Harry. You may say SRG and not SAG but again why. SRG is to support SAG and only for that. Not CP or such other rubbish.

This whole thing of deputation and going back to parent units does not work. Once you revert back to regular infantry or other units or even SF units after NSG, your training is then according to what these units do. One in always in should be the norm. Pray what can be achieved by a dispered body of men. You have 10 men in NSG now and then they go back to 10 different units. They then train for what these units do. How are they going to function in the former NSG role after 1 year. Point is a standing dedicated unit is required.

Dude, I have no idea what you're trying to say here.

First of all, please don't compare the Indian response and casualties in Operation Bluestar with ANYTHING you can think of. If you have time, buy the book by General Brar and read up the extremely restricted terms of engagement with which Indian Army was faced. No country has ever faced what we did in 1984. The whole set-up on the behalf of militants was done by a decorated ex-IA Major General who was a paratrooper to boot.

Yes, we did realize that we need a softer image and that is why NSG was kept under MHA. And that we require dedicated force for CT/HRT with expertise in real close CQB in built-up areas with hostage situation.

NSG is a dedicated CT/HRT unit...where is the debate in that? Using SRG for protection duties is part of mandate of NSG. The fact that this mandate has been violated for pure ego-massaging is a different matter all-together.

Coming to comment on the strength of GIGN - ~500 is the TOTAL STRENGTH of GIGN. This would include every person on two legs. Not all of them are operatives on the ground. That would be around 50% of the total strength assuming there is some additional (And external) structure to support GIGN. The ratio is otherwise 1:3 for combatant and support personnel. Try managing three different targets of the scale and complexity as Taj/Trident/Chabad house with such a force.

And there is no specific benefit with respect to permanent cadre - Indian Para SF uses the permanent cadre structure while SAS does not. Neither does Special Group/22 SF of the IA or Delta or Seal Team 6. Are these lesser capable because of their structure? How does rotation of men impede the effectiveness of the an organization like NSG?

I thougt SRG was to support SAG. As for GIGN, note that EPIGN has now been folded into it. Also for large scale ops, GIPN & RAID are used to back them up.
On the SAS, note that only officers have short terms while all other ranks have fairly longer terms.
To answer how rotation impedes effectiveness "Once you revert back to regular infantry or other units or even SF units after NSG, your training is then according to what these units do. One in always in should be the norm. Pray what can be achieved by a dispered body of men. You have 10 men in NSG now and then they go back to 10 different units. They then train for what these units do. How are they going to function in the former NSG role after 1 year."

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>I thought SRG was to support SAG. As for GIGN, note that EPIGN has now been folded into it. Also for large scale ops, GIPN & RAID are used to back them up.

So, you've been reading about the GIGN on the net? Should have done before you started talking about NSG and what should be and what should not be. Having said that, did you forget to read this part:

The total man power was expected to increase to about 420 soldiers in 2010. The reorganization goal was to enable the deployment of a 200 strong unit, trained together, for large-scale interventions, such as a Beslan-type mass hostage-taking - in French they're called POM (Prise d'Otage Massive).

So, the much vaunted GIGN can manage 200 strong team at any time. And this has been done with the objective to manage Beslan type of assault in France. Now, ask yourself this - how will the same GIGN tackle assault on three targets like Taj/Trident/Chabad House simultaneously?

Another important point - is the training level of GIGN/EPIGN/RAID similar? May be, GIGN & EPIGN have somewhat similar levels, but will all of them be trained to GIGN level and accordingly qualified?

On the SAS, note that only officers have short terms while all other ranks have fairly longer terms.

So, will the rotation of the officer cadre not have negative impact on the organization? And that too, a true-blue SF of SAS type?

To answer how rotation impedes effectiveness "Once you revert back to regular infantry or other units or even SF units after NSG, your training is then according to what these units do. One in always in should be the norm. Pray what can be achieved by a dispersed body of men. You have 10 men in NSG now and then they go back to 10 different units. They then train for what these units do. How are they going to function in the former NSG role after 1 year."

Men can do two tours of duty in NSG (IIRC) - so when they come back, they undergo refresher courses. The body of knowledge resides with-in the organization. As I have pointed out before, many organizations do this. Given a preference, I would want the NSG to have a permanent cadre but the same is not possible given the nature of the organization. If IA had been tasked for CT/HRT of NSG type, it would have created a battalion or two under the Para SF for such a task and rotated men from SF through it.

The issue with NSG is more of Command and Control and overall orientation of the force. The dual civil-military leadership and its placement under the MHA are some of the most pressing issues. The force was to be under Cabinet Secretariat but ended up being under MHA with its own set of problems.

NSG suffers from the very same malady which afflicts every SF in this country - the strategic thought behind nurturing and utilizing Special Forces. When Indian Army has not been able to get its act right with respect to SF, it is difficult to accept anything happening anytime soon from politicians and babus.

[rohitvats]

BTW, the debate about whether NSG is Special Force or not is quite hilarious...I mean, what is a Special Force? And why is something like Para (SF) or MARCOS only considered as SF? In the US Armed Forces, the Para Rescuers and 160 Aviation Regiment are also termed as Special Operation Force.

It is quite stupid to expect NSG operators to have same skill levels as Para (SF) or MARCOS because the present mandate of NSG does not require skills required of Para SF or MARCOS. Simple. Why is this so difficult to understand? Why should I subject a NSG operator to 25 kms night march with 18 kg of back-pack? What will the ability of operator to do this give me as NSG and the task that this force is supposed to take care of? Nothing. Period.

The Delta Force or Seal Team 6 or SAS operatives need to have such skills because their anti-terrorism roles extend to much wider deployment. And these forces operate under military command and have roles and responsibilities beyond counter-terrorism. Remember, US Special Forces team ambushing and killing an African Al-Qaeda leader in middle of nowhere in Africa? Now, these guys were most probably from Delta or ST6. They could very well have been inserted into the country through HALO jump, hiked 20-30 kms to reach ambush site, camped for a day or two and then ex-filtrated to some RDZ. Is NSG ever going to be used in such a role? The only organization I think which will ever be used in such a role is SG. And it invariably consists of men from Para/Para SF who are subjected to further round of probation.

NSG is not tasked for such roles. We have seen their deployment in the country. We need men who are physically strong with stamina and can retain their wits during pressure situation. I need a person who can run-up a 35 storey building with his weapons/resupply/other stores. And one who is an excellent shooter. Heck, ask a SF guy who has done deputation to NSG and he will tell you that he had fired more rounds in couple of months than entire duration in the army. His SF credentials notwithstanding.

We're creating mountain out of a mole-hill here.

[sum]

They could very well have been inserted into the country through HALO jump, hiked 20-30 kms to reach ambush site, camped for a day or two and then ex-filtrated to some RDZ. Is NSG ever going to be used in such a role? The only organization I think which will ever be used in such a role is SG. And it invariably consists of men from Para/Para SF who are subjected to further round of probation.

Rohit-ji,
Werent there reports ( recall reading them on BRF itself) which mentioned NSG ( of SAG wing) folks were used on long range patrol type ops where they were para-dropped into forests in Kashmir and had to hunt down hideouts and then return to civilisation when done?

Found one such link on BRF NSG site:

1998: As part of the implementation of the Union Home Ministry's decision to conduct pro-active strikes against militants, commando teams supported by IAF Mi-25/35 helicopter gun-ships began striking at terrorist groups deep inside the mountains and forests of Kashmir. After helicopter recces were conducted to pinpoint the militants, the commandos - comprising NSG and Rashtriya Rifles personnel - were para-dropped, along with supplies, into the area to hunt the militants. They had to rely on these supplies and their ability to live off the land until replenishment every fortnight or so. The operations were said to be highly successful although precise details are not being released in order to maintain a low profile. These missions are reportedly still ongoing.

[rohitvats]

^^^It is difficult to assess what the author is trying to say.

For example, why would we need to para-drop personnel into Indian territory? Insertion using helicopters would have sufficed - unless, someone tells me that using helicopters was dangerous because of operational or terrain or weather reasons.

And it is quite likely that SF personnel on deputation to NSG could have been used for this living of land operation - NSG is neither trained nor equipped for such roles. Para SF is the right force for this. Also, this seems to be like one off operation...I don't think this is a regular practice.

[Aaryan]

Rohit and Gurus,
Saar I have a question… Why cant we adopt both the permanent and rotation thing.. Why it has to be always this or that.. why not this and that.. Lemme explain what I mean (on risk of being naive)
1. Permanent structure for admin, and analyst who will look at latest development in world. Try and predict what and when.. Means they will try to create a scene of future crisis and then train the operatives on basis of that model.. Personally I see we always look at what happened last time and prepare our self on basis of that.. Why can’t we try (at least try) to outsmart those piglets in their own game..
2. Operatives can be on longer deputation with age restriction and subject to their physical endurance. That can be worked out.. Longer term for officers and short for jawans or longer deputation for jawans and shorter for officers.. You are our expert for that..

So just for sake of knowing.. Is it possible to have what I proposed (Of course it can be changed and improved)

[Singha]

this is first time I am hearing of NSG used in terrorist hunting in J&K. I thought the regular SF batallions were doing that.

[sum]

^^ Yeah....its only in the BRF site that i have come across this info and wouldnt dis-regard it. Thats why i had the doubt whether NSG actually dont have any "SF" training other than HRT!

Btw, the article i linked is:
NSG

[Aditya G]

this is first time I am hearing of NSG used in terrorist hunting in J&K. I thought the regular SF batallions were doing that.

It was mentioned in the anon rediff blog from army officer in Kashmir also.

[Karan M]

NSG has been used in all sorts of roles such as search and destroy in Kashmir (presumably as part of combined army packages), CQB in Kashmir, raids and night domination patrols in Punjab during the insurgency, and the farcical search for veerappan - a NSG unit was brought in and left after seeing there was no fixed target to pursue/take out.

[Karan M]

BTW, the debate about whether NSG is Special Force or not is quite hilarious...I mean, what is a Special Force? And why is something like Para (SF) or MARCOS only considered as SF? In the US Armed Forces, the Para Rescuers and 160 Aviation Regiment are also termed as Special Operation Force.

It is quite stupid to expect NSG operators to have same skill levels as Para (SF) or MARCOS because the present mandate of NSG does not require skills required of Para SF or MARCOS. Simple. Why is this so difficult to understand? Why should I subject a NSG operator to 25 kms night march with 18 kg of back-pack? What will the ability of operator to do this give me as NSG and the task that this force is supposed to take care of? Nothing. Period.

The Delta Force or Seal Team 6 or SAS operatives need to have such skills because their anti-terrorism roles extend to much wider deployment. And these forces operate under military command and have roles and responsibilities beyond counter-terrorism. Remember, US Special Forces team ambushing and killing an African Al-Qaeda leader in middle of nowhere in Africa? Now, these guys were most probably from Delta or ST6. They could very well have been inserted into the country through HALO jump, hiked 20-30 kms to reach ambush site, camped for a day or two and then ex-filtrated to some RDZ. Is NSG ever going to be used in such a role? The only organization I think which will ever be used in such a role is SG. And it invariably consists of men from Para/Para SF who are subjected to further round of probation.

NSG is not tasked for such roles. We have seen their deployment in the country. We need men who are physically strong with stamina and can retain their wits during pressure situation. I need a person who can run-up a 35 storey building with his weapons/resupply/other stores. And one who is an excellent shooter. Heck, ask a SF guy who has done deputation to NSG and he will tell you that he had fired more rounds in couple of months than entire duration in the army. His SF credentials notwithstanding.

We're creating mountain out of a mole-hill here.

Well said and your points are exactly what I agree with. This SF business and constant hankering for being the same to same as "western" units is a joke.

We should look at what our unique requirements are and proceed accordingly.

[Raja Bose]

^^^It is difficult to assess what the author is trying to say.

For example, why would we need to para-drop personnel into Indian territory? Insertion using helicopters would have sufficed - unless, someone tells me that using helicopters was dangerous because of operational or terrain or weather reasons.

And it is quite likely that SF personnel on deputation to NSG could have been used for this living of land operation - NSG is neither trained nor equipped for such roles. Para SF is the right force for this. Also, this seems to be like one off operation...I don't think this is a regular practice.

High altitude jumps are done to prevent enemy from detecting the insertion - choppers are noisy, slow, vulnerable to small arms etc. and hiking to the encounter site may not be an option due to distance, terrain, load. NSG as a unit does not undergo parachute training so all troopers are not jump qualified (even static line).

[rohitvats]

High altitude jumps are done to prevent enemy from detecting the insertion - choppers are noisy, slow, vulnerable to small arms etc. and hiking to the encounter site may not be an option due to distance, terrain, load. NSG as a unit does not undergo parachute training so all troopers are not jump qualified (even static line).

That sir, is exactly my point.

Parachute training is not part of NSG curriculum and jumping into mountainous + jungle terrain will require hell of parachuting techniques - something not likely to be available outside of Army SF domain. So, NSG being used could very well be SF guys on deputation to NSG being used for such insertion while rest of NSG troops slug it out on land. Also, this living of land stuff is again not NSG's forte.

[vivek_ahuja]

Maybe I joined late or am not seeing the finer points of this discussion, but why is a Desi version of SWAT being compared to Army SOCOM operators?

[jai]

They could very well have been inserted into the country through HALO jump, hiked 20-30 kms to reach ambush site, camped for a day or two and then ex-filtrated to some RDZ. Is NSG ever going to be used in such a role? The only organization I think which will ever be used in such a role is SG. And it invariably consists of men from Para/Para SF who are subjected to further round of probation.

Rohit-ji,
Werent there reports ( recall reading them on BRF itself) which mentioned NSG ( of SAG wing) folks were used on long range patrol type ops where they were para-dropped into forests in Kashmir and had to hunt down hideouts and then return to civilisation when done?

Found one such link on BRF NSG site:

1998: As part of the implementation of the Union Home Ministry's decision to conduct pro-active strikes against militants, commando teams supported by IAF Mi-25/35 helicopter gun-ships began striking at terrorist groups deep inside the mountains and forests of Kashmir. After helicopter recces were conducted to pinpoint the militants, the commandos - comprising NSG and Rashtriya Rifles personnel - were para-dropped, along with supplies, into the area to hunt the militants. They had to rely on these supplies and their ability to live off the land until replenishment every fortnight or so. The operations were said to be highly successful although precise details are not being released in order to maintain a low profile. These missions are reportedly still ongoing.

Do you really believe the printed word ? Could the actual operators be different from those being given the credit for it ?

[jayaaren]

<SNIP>I thought SRG was to support SAG. As for GIGN, note that EPIGN has now been folded into it. Also for large scale ops, GIPN & RAID are used to back them up.

So, you've been reading about the GIGN on the net? Should have done before you started talking about NSG and what should be and what should not be. Having said that, did you forget to read this part:

The total man power was expected to increase to about 420 soldiers in 2010. The reorganization goal was to enable the deployment of a 200 strong unit, trained together, for large-scale interventions, such as a Beslan-type mass hostage-taking - in French they're called POM (Prise d'Otage Massive).

So, the much vaunted GIGN can manage 200 strong team at any time. And this has been done with the objective to manage Beslan type of assault in France. Now, ask yourself this - how will the same GIGN tackle assault on three targets like Taj/Trident/Chabad House simultaneously?

Another important point - is the training level of GIGN/EPIGN/RAID similar? May be, GIGN & EPIGN have somewhat similar levels, but will all of them be trained to GIGN level and accordingly qualified?

You're missing the point which is that GIGN which now includes EPIGN is backed up by GIPN & RAID and such would have sufficient numbers for any incident involving large numbers. This means that yes they are in place specifically for multilpe incident responses. As for the training, GIGN as the primary HRT unit is trained to the highest level while EPIGN, RAID & GIPN receive similar HRT training not to the same levels as GIGN who are created as purist HRT.

On the SAS, note that only officers have short terms while all other ranks have fairly longer terms.

So, will the rotation of the officer cadre not have negative impact on the organization? And that too, a true-blue SF of SAS type?
The SAS has always been run by its NCOs and so no officer rotation is not designed to impact unit effectiveness

To answer how rotation impedes effectiveness "Once you revert back to regular infantry or other units or even SF units after NSG, your training is then according to what these units do. One in always in should be the norm. Pray what can be achieved by a dispersed body of men. You have 10 men in NSG now and then they go back to 10 different units. They then train for what these units do. How are they going to function in the former NSG role after 1 year."

Men can do two tours of duty in NSG (IIRC) - so when they come back, they undergo refresher courses. The body of knowledge resides with-in the organization. As I have pointed out before, many organizations do this. Given a preference, I would want the NSG to have a permanent cadre but the same is not possible given the nature of the organization. If IA had been tasked for CT/HRT of NSG type, it would have created a battalion or two under the Para SF for such a task and rotated men from SF through it.

I'd rather have a team of permanent operators rather than training them, deploying them and the sending them off elsewhere only to have them come back and train again. Time factor and as you said numbers.

The issue with NSG is more of Command and Control and overall orientation of the force. The dual civil-military leadership and its placement under the MHA are some of the most pressing issues. The force was to be under Cabinet Secretariat but ended up being under MHA with its own set of problems.

NSG suffers from the very same malady which afflicts every SF in this country - the strategic thought behind nurturing and utilizing Special Forces. When Indian Army has not been able to get its act right with respect to SF, it is difficult to accept anything happening anytime soon from politicians and babus.

[Viv S]

Karan M,

The chain of long posts with dozen quotes is starting to become unwieldy. I'll structure my reply by topic, if its all the same.


First, with regard to the picture of the NSG trooper. You've suggested that it was a very valid means of firing from cover, but what volume of fire could two men have accurately put down on what must have been at least several dozen men of various security forces? And if the terrorists were exposing themselves to lay down such fire, shouldn't they have been, I wouldn't say easy prey, but at least prime opportunity for snipers/sharpshooters, who as you rightly pointed were there on scene.

Secondly, with regard to the Nariman House operation. By 'unusual', I meant I've never heard of a CT unit putting down sustained fire on a civilian complex in an urban area for over 12 hours, even when there were heavily armed hostiles within. Used to happen during COIN operation in J&K and the NE but they were usually conducted by regular infantry, not CT forces.

There is the argument that all the hostages were dead and the NSG could afford to take its time and be liberal with its fire. I have seen the Channel 4 documentary including the part where they played the phone intercepts, and from what I could tell, the particular terrorist on the phone seemed reluctant to execute the hostages, procrastinating even when given explicit orders by the handler. Eventually there was the sound of gunshots and the hostages were killed, but to someone monitoring the conversation there would still have remained a sliver of hope; maybe it was a ruse and they showed mercy and lied to their bosses in Pakistan.

Plus relying primarily on the intercepts for intelligence, meant relying on the terrorists to do a thorough job while rounding the civilians up. The nanny was able to escape with the rabbi's child, there could most certainly have been others, hiding under a bed or desk, in a closet or alcove... the assumption could not or should not have been that the hostages were all dead.




Coming to the crux of the argument i.e. the NSG organisational structure and defining characteristics - you've stated that the NSG is an infantry-centric force and fundamental change in role is unnecessary (setting aside for the moment, matters like VIP protection, IPS-IG, etc). Lets go ahead and define the job then. Most large cities in the world employ SWAT-type paramilitary teams as first responders during events that may require the use of lethal force like New York's ESU, LA's Metro/SWAT, SO19 in London, SEKs in German cities, BOPE's in Brazilian districts, OMONs in Russian ones and so on. By and large its an arrangement that works well, and the (police) officers, as you put it, get the job done. We don't have an equivalent. There are the State Armed Police Forces but they hardly compare, being analogous to the CAPFs.

In theory, the NSG is a force of 'last resort'. In practice, if it hadn't earlier, its now certainly morphing into a pan-national SWAT team. Nothing wrong with that per se. On the whole, I'm rather pleased with the development as long as the effort isn't duplicated (case in point, Force One). And just for clarity's sake, when I say that the NSG's current 'official' role needs to be performed by a genuine SF unit, I'm not advocating the NSG be dissolved or similar. If anything, I believe the NSG has been criminally underutilized, despite a variety of heachaches from the Maoists to the Gangs of Wasseypur, instead of being every strongman/don/gang-leader's worst nightmare.

Despite having a more than decent CT/HRT capacity at the local level, most countries retain a central/federal CT unit tasked with intervening in challenging/high-profile/volatile situations which the local forces could still have arguably handled. This is precisely what I'm advocating India follow as a model. And this unit should ideally operate on an SF model, trained to operate over a wide range of environments. If I may bring up your example here, about 30 soldiers being able to put down two and a half times the volume of fire on a target than 10 commandos can; over open ground this works perfectly. Which is why the large RR has had a far greater effect in quelling the insurgency in J&K than the specialists from the SF units. Fair enough.

But when a hijacked aircraft needs to be breached at four places simultaneously, the 12 men involved ought to be among the best. And if that aircraft has been landed in Afghanistan, the men on the perimeter need to be the best available (the NSG was the default option during the IC814 hijacking). Such a unit can practically be trained and equipped to world class standards, something that is simply not feasible for the NSG in its current form. That is one of the primary reasons why the US Tier I forces were raised - by coupling a stringent selection (ST6 for eg. accepts only veteran SEALs as applicants, and even among them not all qualify) with a huge investment in equipment and training, they were able to maximize the probability of a successful operation. And where a higher grade of fire support is critical, other units are available and are used in support (like the Ranger Rgt for Delta, Paras/RMs for SAS/SBS). Also the Chuck Pfarrer comment regarding the ST6's ammo budgets may have been hyperbole, but I've read and heard plenty more to suggest that their training budgets are exceptionally large. That eventually will show in the field (albeit with a diminishing rate of return).




There were two other ancillary points made -

1. With regard to physical fitness, being in first rate shape is obviously a prerequisite for an individual training in CT/HRT, but that is just the foundation. Its the training that is the truly distinguishing element, and a damned expensive one at that. The natural hardiness of the Indian soldier provides less of an edge than it would on a conventional battlefield. And in situations where physical and mental toughness is critical, the SF is naturally better suited to the task, being trained for and having specialized in it.

2. With regard to combat experience, its lower today than it has been at any time in the last three decades and is likely to continue falling. The IA has over 500 infantry battalions. Only a handful of men were in firefights in J&K last year (and what I could gather the NE is in a similar (positive) state. The number of combat veterans being deputed to the NSG is fallen and can only be expected to fall further.

There is another question that may potentially get raised here - why disperse the NSG and raise/retask a new unit, rather than the other way round. Well which one gets designation of the 'official' NSG is a matter of semantics. Now the nature of SF unit can be debated further - can be entirely civilian/paramilitary (GSG-9), entirely military (SAS), open/hybrid (NSG) or notionally civilian but military in effect like our very own SG.



As I envisage it, in the event of a Mumbai-like event, the local forces will be the first to respond, while the reserve unit gets airborne. Depending on the situation, the locals can take action independently or in the event of risk/complexity, wait for and thereafter support the central CT unit. If as in the case of Nariman House the assault is launched 48 hours after the event, it can then be spearheaded by the new unit. The result may still be the same, but at least we'll put our best foot forward.

[member_23360]

In whole 26/11 Operation, Security Agencies were looking to tiring them out by repetitive attacks. They were facing difficulties in exactly locating the terrorists.

With Due Respect to our security security forces, they did the job despite lacking many crucial technologies required for this kind of operations.

[vivek_ahuja]

GARUD of 2013