There is a long but interesting read. Please read in full:
The evolving Taleban: Changes in the insurgency’s DNA
http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the ... gencys-dna
The movement’s command structure has seen profound change – partly in response to the US wiping out whole layers of the old, mid-level insurgent leadership through ‘capture-or-kill’ operations, but also because of direct interference by Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus. As of yet, the old Emirate command structure remains active in the Taleban’s southern heartland, but the east, Loya Paktia and the north have all seen the impact of Pakistani efforts to select and promote its own proxies within the Taleban, men who have been given special training and, frequently, Pakistani citizenship. This appears to be an attempt to change the Taleban’s DNA says new AAN analyst, Claudio Franco, who has studied the insurgency for the last decade.
There are other examples of operatives like Ahmad and Sadiq, all involving well-trained and relatively educated Taleban officials who have successfully ‘infiltrated’ civil society. Rather than individual cases, however, what matters first and foremost is the common denominator that differentiates them from most other insurgents: these operatives are all dual nationals, and Pakistani documents were provided upon completion of their training programme and seldom, if ever, as a result of a normal naturalisation process.
A Pakistani passport guarantees a future for these insurgents whatever the situation in Afghanistan in the years to come. At the same time, it alters their nature as insurgents, marking their role as agents of a foreign country active within the Afghan insurgency. As a rule of thumb, the immediate families of this class of operatives reside across the Durand Line in Pakistan; these families receive support in kind, and wages are often paid directly to the family. Needless to say, such an arrangement makes their families ‘hostages’ of that country’s security apparatus.
It also keeps the men themselves primarily linked to Pakistan’s security apparatus, rather than to the Taleban leadership or to whatever ideals or aims the insurgency might have. Moreover, with their families’ legal status and welfare depending directly on the official’s services, such a system pre-empts the possibility of reconciliation with the Afghan government – if it is not desired by Pakistan – once and for all.
What the Pakis have achieved in Afghanistan is stunning. Essentially they have taken a generation of youth, indoctrinated in madrassas, trained them to serve as parts of a militaristic administrative structure and held their families hostage in Pakistan to guarantee their compliance. They are slowly but surely conquering Afghanistan from the inside.
