INS Vikramaditya: News and Discussion

[Hitesh]

What is the combat weapons load-out of the MIg-29s when taking off from a ski-ramp on INS Vikramaditya? How much weaponry can she carry while taking off from the ship?

You have to take in consideration of the fuel requirements as well.

[NRao]

I thought the Russians said that there assets could not even "see" the Vicky. What gives?

[Peregrine]

Looking at the funnel exhaust in the pic..that certainly is not LSHSD being burnt.

harbans Ji :

The Funnel Exhaust looks more "White" than Black.

Cheers

[Eric Leiderman]

The exhaust could be darker due to a change in load on the boiler , it could be momentary.

[SaiK]

this is the paki stupidity of ToIlet services (who is paying them? russians? or 3rd party sub components and nato members or their clans?).. first announce the warship is without escort, now second with no air-defence system installed, and then snooped by nato allies, and subsequently by the time it arrives to our shores, it will become useless machine for these no-brainers. so, that it can go back to russia or incur more expenses where it shows loop holes. there are so many thousands of ships and carriers floating, and some do not even know where it is even to spying flying objects from space.

huh!

[Austin]

Nato ally ‘snoop’ on navy’s latest buy

New Delhi, Nov. 19: An aircraft from a Nato member or partner-country spied on aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya in a throwback to Cold War-era practices.

The carrier, handed over to the Indian Navy in Russia on Saturday and originally known as Admiral Gorshkov, was still flying the Russian flag when a US-made P3C surveillance aircraft circled over it during trials in international waters north of the Russian coast last year, navy sources have confirmed.

But an official in the Indian Navy said it was not necessarily disturbing — “it might even be a good thing” — that the aircraft was probably recording the “signatures” of the carrier.

The aircraft was said to be from a Scandinavian country. The carrier, which India contracted for $2.33 billion (Rs 14,500cr), was sailing under a Russian flag but also had Indian crew onboard witnessing the trials.

“It is typical of navies to record signatures for IFF (Identification Friend or Foe)…even we have done it,” the officer said. The signatures are also recorded for detection of enemy platforms in times of hostilities.

The Gorshkov was due for delivery to the Indian Navy last year. It was during the trials that the crew detected technical faults in the boilers. That delayed the commissioning of the INS Vikramaditya (VKD in short) to November 16 this year since when it has been under the Indian flag and its first Indian commanding officer, Captain Suraj Berry.

“We have nothing to do with the suspected spying but we believe the Russians have lodged a complaint with Nato,” the officer said.

Indian Navy officials figure that the aircraft, which was also reported to have dropped sonobuoys to record the noise emitted from the vessel’s engines and propellers, could have transferred the data collected to US submarines and vessels that operate in the Indian Ocean Region. Sonobuoys are devices equipped to detect underwater sounds and transmit them by radio.

Indian Navy surveillance aircraft are also used to record signatures of Pakistani and Chinese vessels — as well as vessels from other countries — when they transit close to Indian shores. Such activity is generally carried out in international waters.

The official made a distinction between the Vikramaditya being “buzzed” and “being circled”. “Buzzing”, he said, could be construed as an aggressive manoeuvre that could be interpreted as a threat to the vessel and even possibly an “act of war”.

The Indian Navy expects the Vikramaditya to attract much curiosity as it starts sailing for Indian waters later this month. When it reaches the Arabian Sea, the other carrier in the Indian fleet, the INS Viraat, is also expected to escort it.

The route is still not being disclosed but it is fairly certain that the carrier will come through the Atlantic. It will also be escorted by at least three other Indian warships.

Once the carrier is integrated into the western fleet, the Indian Navy will be able to claim that it is the only one in Asia to operate two carriers.

An aircraft carrier — or any warship — is regarded as sovereign territory of the flag it flies.

The Vikramaditya with its 24 MiG29K combat jets and helicopters onboard will also give the Indian Navy a maritime reach it never had.

Now, however, the ship will be sailing without its air complement.

The Vikramaditya is also yet to be armed with its full air defence and close-in weapons systems. The Indian Navy is expected to integrate Israeli-origin Barak missiles to the carrier after it is homeported in Karwar on the north Karnataka coast. It will be dependent for anti-submarine warfare on its Kamov helicopters and escorts in its battlegroup. Carriers rarely sail single.

[member_23455]

What is the combat weapons load-out of the MIg-29s when taking off from a ski-ramp on INS Vikramaditya? How much weaponry can she carry while taking off from the ship?

You have to take in consideration of the fuel requirements as well.

Good question. Advertised combat load is 5500 kgs. What that does to the operational range of the Mig-29k however will mean that typical loads might be lower.

The other thing to keep in mind in carrier ops is "bringback". In order to be able to land back on the ship, ordnance and stores have to be jettisoned into the sea frequently by the aircraft (one major negative with the Harrier family). So taking off with a combat load that you can bringback is what normal missions do.

We will not have enough destroyers and frigates by 2018 ( only 8 destroyers including Ranvijay and Ranvir and 12 Frigates not including the Godavaris) so deploying 2 CBG is unrealistic. And very few subs. Carriers will be very vulnerable without enough subs. Both will never be deployed far from our shores simultaneously till we have an adequate surface and sub fleet.

I doubt Diesel subs can be a part of CBG's anyway, even if we had enough of them. They are slow and have a limited range (even with AIP) compared to the other ships in the group. We need SSN's for that purpose.

Diesel subs are already part of the ad-hoc "CBG-lite" formations that the IN has. The planners plan around the constraints you mentioned. But yes for big boy CBG ops the SSNs are a must.

We will not have enough destroyers and frigates by 2018 ( only 8 destroyers including Ranvijay and Ranvir and 12 Frigates not including the Godavaris) so deploying 2 CBG is unrealistic.

To "deploy" 2 CBGs desi style is a bit different from deploying them US style. In our case there will be gaps in concurrent deployment - you need at least 4 carriers for that, 2 deployed, one in the yards for refit/maintenance, one working up. Even the navy does not have an IAC-3 in the design pipeline yet.

2025-2030 is when we should be peaking based on our current plans...not too far away actually in big picture terms.

[Akshay Kapoor]

2 CBG really means 1 out at sea and the other one close to the shore = 1.5 CBGs. Indian MoD has her own math.

Exactly and that makes sense for us. The carriers are the flagships of the fleets (Eastern and Western) and usually deploy with the fleets. My point is that therefore perhaps having 2 carriers given our current constraints is less important than meeting perspective plan projections for surface , sub and helicopter fleet and port infrastructure. As a peninsular country with A&N we have a huge advantage that we could have perhaps leveraged better. But then the current constraints did not surface when these plans were made. Hindsight is ....

As a serving Commodore said to me recently 'we thank god the Vikrant is delayed and our enemies thank god that Kolkatta is delayed'. But may our enemies tremble with both. Welcome Vikramaditya and when she comes Vikrant and Sha No Varunah

[morem]

2 CBG really means 1 out at sea and the other one close to the shore = 1.5 CBGs. Indian MoD has her own math.

As a serving Commodore said to me recently 'we thank god the Vikrant is delayed and our enemies thank god that Kolkatta is delayed'. But may our enemies tremble with both. Welcome Vikramaditya and when she comes Vikrant and Sha No Varunah

Akshay Ji
what does the bold part mean?

[Singha]

realistically the viraat cannot be used for a wartime mission other than a floating airbase to protect the GUJ coast or an offensive against bangladesh for whatever reason!
remains to be seen how quickly the IAC1 is IOCed and inducted. will be a good pic with 2 carriers with full deckloads, line astern...jsmdf runs these all the time.

[Lalmohan]

can the viraat carry on with helicopters only for a few more years?

[Austin]

^^ The Hull will not be a problem for Viraat to be converted into Helicopter Carrier but the issue could be it worn out machinery i.e engines and propulsion and Electronics/Sensors etc

If these are in good conditions and not spending more time on shore based maintenance then the IN might well use it as an Aircraft carrier then a Helicopter Carrier

[member_23455]

can the viraat carry on with helicopters only for a few more years?

If the INAS 300 crest on Vikramaditya is any indicator, then the question is does it have any other option?

It can contribute in a limited way but anything approaching a kinetic engagement and it's toast without its SHARs.

[Lalmohan]

given that the navy is scaling up, any more life in the viraat just to train up the large numbers of crews would be a useful asset
and sea harriers could continue to provide sufficient capability for the bay of bengal theatre for some time, particularly if backed by shore based aviation in the andamans

[kvraghavaiah]

I have some curiosity. Is it difficult for our enemies to detect position of our aircraft carriers in sea during war times? If it is easy, then is it meaningful in any way to deploy aircraft carriers by India?

[kvraghavaiah]

I think, aircraft carriers can be easily watched using imaging satellites. An aircraft carrier should be painted/designed in such a way that it has sea coloured camoflague so that it is difficult to detect. What do you say guys?

[Lalmohan]

without good satellite, elint, and submarine capability - finding a cbg on the open seas is not all that easy
only a few people have that

regarding sea camoflague - the sea changes colour and consistency all the time - that is why ships are low vis grey as a general colouring. the wake is the biggest issue - difficult to hide that

[merlin]

[quote="Akshay Kapoor"
As a serving Commodore said to me recently 'we thank god the Vikrant is delayed and our enemies thank god that Kolkatta is delayed'. But may our enemies tremble with both. Welcome Vikramaditya and when she comes Vikrant and Sha No Varunah

Akshay Ji
what does the bold part mean?[/quote]

Probably not enough escort assets yet for Vikrant. Kolkata will have a potent AAW capability and if that is an escort to Vikrant it will be good. So since both are delayed good for us. Sort of.

[morem]

[quote="Akshay Kapoor"
As a serving Commodore said to me recently 'we thank god the Vikrant is delayed and our enemies thank god that Kolkatta is delayed'. But may our enemies tremble with both. Welcome Vikramaditya and when she comes Vikrant and Sha No Varunah

Akshay Ji
what does the bold part mean?

Probably not enough escort assets yet for Vikrant. Kolkata will have a potent AAW capability and if that is an escort to Vikrant it will be good. So since both are delayed good for us. Sort of.[/quote]


Thanks , now it makes sense

[Akshay Kapoor]

Yes that what it means.

[Aditya_V]

I have some curiosity. Is it difficult for our enemies to detect position of our aircraft carriers in sea during war times? If it is easy, then is it meaningful in any way to deploy aircraft carriers by India?

In port yes, doubt even khan has enough satellites to cover the entire stretch of Arabian sea, a carrier might be caught in the path of a satellite during 1 pass but monitoring and following by satellite while it moves may not be easily possible, for that even khan will need to use P-8's and Global hawk's.

Camouflage will not be of much use against SAR and IR camera satellites. For those satellites which capture images in normal colour spectrum, daylight and cloud formations across the sea will be enough impediments to track ships at sea

[member_23455]

I have some curiosity. Is it difficult for our enemies to detect position of our aircraft carriers in sea during war times? If it is easy, then is it meaningful in any way to deploy aircraft carriers by India?

Big Ships, even Bigger Seas.

At Midway in WWII, the USN despite having broken the Japanese naval codes (JN-25), had a tough time locating the approaching Imperial fleet - a combination of luck and persistence helped them spring the ambush on the fateful day.

But that's not always the case. In the constrained waters off Falkands and in the Straits of Hormuz though the carriers or any ships really have no place to hide.

A quick glance at the map will tell you that wrt Pakistan this not a concern but wrt China there are quite a few places where you don't want to find yourself but will have to run the gauntlet anyway.

EMCON and diversionary tactics help but sooner or later every carrier group commander has to plan on the basis that he will be Found. The "imaging" satellites that you talk about today use SAR and IR sensors - how does camo help?

But Find is just the first part of the kill equation. Whether the enemy can still Fix and Finish is where the answer to your last question about meaningfully deploying carriers lies. But, and one should always be careful of fighting the last battle, how many carriers have been sunk in various conflicts since WW-II?

[AdityaM]

Don't think these snooping pics have been posted here before:

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/ins- ... 25335.html

[Lalmohan]

midway hinged on quite a bit of luck indeed - right time, right place, just enough fuel, enemy fighters refuelling, bombs on deck

also i think at guadalcanal the USN caught the japanese fleet at the right time and right place, and probably also at coral sea. but then massive numerical superiority (by then) also buys you some luck

and ofcourse, after the USN took over the world, no one has dared deploy cbg's in any real strength...

[NRao]

"Snooping" could be a good or a bad thing. After all everyone is trying/attempting to build a "library" of signatures.

No matter who - good or bad guys - such a "library" is about IFF - do we target this object or not.

I would hope India - with her somewhat advertized network centric architecture - would be collecting signature for her own library, which should contain every object afloat out there - especially in the IOR.

[SaiK]

visual signature attributes are the prime, and hence snooping. regarding other electronic snooping - radar signature etc needs a close range reading.. and during war times, that is not so easy to near an A/C without serious casualty leading to big time losses. a AtoA missile range of 150kms is enough to keep visual snoopers away.

btw, there should be nothing wrong at firing at the aerial offensive target - snooping signature analyzed, and immediately countered is a possibility. the reason, i said that toilet services and msm has readied up this game ahead.

[member_28108]

Is it really difficult to track an aircraft carrier today with current satellites at least over a time rpeat of a few hours ? If the Dong Feng 21 D Aircraft carrier capability truly exists it implies trackability of the carrier in real time to enable it to hit its target.

[SaiK]

No.. many nato nations don't have satellite service or they have to piggy back on friendly nations. yes, we need to identify the snooper and objective. if they have a sat service, even friendly,, just aim at target and give a warning fire, and then follow up with shooting it down.

[Lalmohan]

a satellite has to know what its looking for and there need to be clear skies

[merlin]

a satellite has to know what its looking for and there need to be clear skies

Not to mention that the satellites will be in polar orbit hence after one pass the next one would probably be after some days unless satellite can maneuver across track or you have multiple satellites or once located you use MRA to track.

[member_23455]

I would hope India - with her somewhat advertized network centric architecture - would be collecting signature for her own library, which should contain every object afloat out there - especially in the IOR.

India collects signatures of USN assets, why would it spare anybody else.

midway hinged on quite a bit of luck indeed - right time, right place, just enough fuel, enemy fighters refuelling, bombs on deck

also i think at guadalcanal the USN caught the japanese fleet at the right time and right place, and probably also at coral sea. but then massive numerical superiority (by then) also buys you some luck

and ofcourse, after the USN took over the world, no one has dared deploy cbg's in any real strength...

That's pretty much the history of all warfare, you make your own luck.

Not quite "USN CBG" but The Argentine Navy had the opportunity in the Falklands, but they pussied out, in contrast to both their Air Force and Naval Aviation pilots who showed great skill and bravery. As many British veterans of the Falklands have written in later years, the British flotilla was stretched to breaking point for a small window, and had the Argies grabbed it...

For the USN it's not just about the numbers, they just train to a standard (admittedly requires major $$$) that makes everyone else, including the French and British, junior league.

But the core of Vikramaditya's aviators from the LTs to Captains being US-trained is cause for great hope.

[Singha]

coral sea was a draw iirc. guadalcanal was months of night engagements I think with losses on both sides. midway the IJN had only itself to blame by not keeping up spotter planes at high level while all the zero CAPs were pulled down to sea level to engage the slow torpedo bombers. plus having 4 carriers all clumped together making it feasible for just 2 squadrons of
dive bombers to target them in single strike...they could have spread out in pairs or singles in a broad arc to minimize this. they were still living in pearl harbour mode where 6 carriers
approached with no opposition and could launch as they pleased. defeat is a harsh teacher...it teachers more than wins...the USN learnt and adapted the IJN not so much.

the biggest mistake the japanese made which they never rectified was having little means to defend their merchant shipping against balao/gato class long range USN subs and not building their sub force similarly to attack american lines of logistics.
their merchant ships simply got wiped out in the end.

[Shalav]

re: visibility of ships at sea

The surface area of the Vicky is said to be about 2 acres, which is 0.8 hectares. Say 1 hectare for easy calculations.

The NCPA in mumbai spread over an area of 32000 sq metres or 3.2 hectares.

Now put the NCPA area anywhere in Maharashtra, except Nariman Point and then try to find it without knowing exactly where to start looking. Then add the complication of trying to find it as it changes position from hour to hour and day to day. That my friends is why it is very hard to find ships at sea once they go 'silent'.

PS: The land area of Maharashtra is about 3,07,000 km^2. A search square of 550km on the side is 3,02,500 km^2 is a reasonably typical operational area for a carrier and attendants. Hence my use of MH in the example.

[Lalmohan]

coral sea was a draw iirc. guadalcanal was months of night engagements I think with losses on both sides. midway the IJN had only itself to blame by not keeping up spotter planes at high level while all the zero CAPs were pulled down to sea level to engage the slow torpedo bombers. plus having 4 carriers all clumped together making it feasible for just 2 squadrons of
dive bombers to target them in single strike...they could have spread out in pairs or singles in a broad arc to minimize this. they were still living in pearl harbour mode where 6 carriers
approached with no opposition and could launch as they pleased. defeat is a harsh teacher...it teachers more than wins...the USN learnt and adapted the IJN not so much.

the biggest mistake the japanese made which they never rectified was having little means to defend their merchant shipping against balao/gato class long range USN subs and not building their sub force similarly to attack american lines of logistics.
their merchant ships simply got wiped out in the end.

perhaps i was thinking about the marianas then... (turkey shoot)

[Singha]

yes that would be the battle of the philipine sea....khan chacha had 15 carriers (7 big ones) with a gigantic amt of AA support...with radar + veteran aircrew + superior hellcat fighters. midway japan had lost its pearl harbour veterans with the 4 fleet carriers. I think only zuikaku and shokaku were left of the initial 6 (kaga, akagi, soryu, hiryu)

[Pratyush]

Ot for the thread, but one of the major problems for the IJN was the fact that a veteran was expected to fight till he died. Whereas, the khans had a programme where the veteran would return to the training school to teach anew bunch of boys, spreading experience. The Japanese did not. So by Marianas, they were essentially a rookie force. Even though, they had a numerically larger force, compared to what they started with.
But the quality of men and machines was inferior to that of Khans. And on top of that the industrial might of the Khan was going full speed ahead.

[Singha]

to some extend the luftwaffe was also guilty of that, clustering most of their aces in elite squadrons.

[Yogi_G]

The zero fighter was far superior to any western or Ruskie fighter in the early stages of the war until it was figured out how to counter it and the western tech overtook Jap tech.

[Lalmohan]

IIRC at the peak USN had 95 odd carriers in WW2
thats shock n awe

[ramana]

LM Many were for convoy escort and sub hunting mini carriers.