LCA News and Discussions, 22-Oct-2013

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 16 Jan 2014 15:38

Dear Maitya,many thanks for the very informative details.However,I am not so sure that the 404 was envisaged as interim engine for prototypes at the inception of the project,as at that time,we were not able to obtain US mil. eqpt. Here is a CAG report with historical notes which indicates that Kaveri GTX-35 was the engine planned for the prototype and the GTX-37 for production series. Is there any info that is to the contrary? I would be happy to have details.

There is also a table which shows achievements and delays in timeframe."Production clearance" delay 13 years. The report is lengthy and worth reading in full as it has some excellent information on the history of the Kaveri engine's development,time schedules,etc.

All in all, only two out of six milestones prescribed could be achieved and
those too, with delays ranging from 3 to 15 years. Over all, the project has
been already delayed by over 12 years.

http://www.cag.gov.in/html/reports/defe ... /chap5.pdf

Report No. 16 of 2010 -11 (Air Force and Navy)
______________________________________________________________
76
CHAPTER V: RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT
ORGANISATION
5.1 Inordinate delay in fruition of Kaveri engine .Despite almost two decades of development effort with an expenditure of Rs 1,892 crore, GTREis yet to fully develop an aero-engine which meets the specific needs of the LCA. The successful culmination of the project to develop an aero-engine through ndigenous efforts is now dependent upon a Joint Venture with a foreign vendor.

Introduction.

In order to overcome the attrition of combat aircraft in the Indian Air Force (IAF) during the 1990s and beyond, the Government sanctioned in August 1983 the development of a multi-role Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), at an estimated cost of Rs 560 crore. Accordingly, there was a corresponding demand for a suitable engine for powering the LCA. Feasibility studies carried out in India and abroad revealed that there was no suitable engine available anywhere in the world, though Rolls Royce RB-1989 stage D and
GEF404-F2J engines, by and large, met the requirement, provided certain concessions were granted in the Air Staff Requirements (ASR). At this point of time, the Gas Turbine Research Laboratory was already working upon anaero-engine project, the GTX 37
1 engine, since 1982.
In August 1986, a feasibility study was carried out jointly by Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) for evaluating the GTX-37 engine. The feasibility study indicated that the GTX-37 engine would, after certain rescheduling, meet the requirements of the LCA. GTRE accordingly,

December 1986, submitted a project proposal for the development of the Kaveri engine. GTRE further proposed that it would be desirable to prove the newly designed airframe of the LCA with a proven engine first. Subsequently,
the prototypes would be flown with the GTX-35 engine, as soon as this engine was type certified and cleared for the flight. Based on the above proposal, Government sanctioned a project in March 1989 at a cost of Rs 382.81 crore with the probable date
of completion (PDC) as December1996, for the design and development of Kaveri engine.
The Kaveri Engine Project was sanctioned with the following basic objectives: Designing and developing the GTX-35 engine to meet the specific needs of the LCA. To create a full fledged indigenous base to design and develop any advanced technology engine for future military aviation programmes.

The engine so developed was to establish its performance integrity in various categories of tests prescribed by the aero-engine industry world over. Given that the development of the Kaveri engine is critical to the establishment of indigenous expertise in the field of aerospace engineering, audit examined the Kaveri Engine Development Project (KEDP) from the
initiation of the project till date (with emphasis on the period 2002-08), and the achievement of the goals and objectives set in the project, with reference to economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The audit findings were forwarded to
the Ministry in November 2008; their reply was received in January 2009 and has been taken into account while finalising the audit findings. Findings of the audit study follow

Report No. 16 of 2010 -11 (Air Force and Navy)
______________________________________________________________
III Shortcomings in the engine developed
Despite incurring an expenditure of Rs1,892 crore (Annexure-III) as of March 2010, the engine developed has many problems.
The weight of Kaveri engine required to fly the LCA should not exceed 1100 Kg. The first assembled Kaveri K1 engine weighed
around 1423.78 Kg. Therefore, GTRE embarked on a weight reduction plan as early as July 1993. However, due to delay in
development of the component assemblies/modules, polymer composites, design and freezing, GTRE has not been able to achieve
the derived weight in the engine and, as of January 2009, the engine weighs 1235 Kg. Certain critical and crucial activities for successful development of Kaveri, viz. development of Compressor, Turbine and Engine Control System, have been lagging behind despite increase in cost by Rs 186.61 crore. GTRE has been unable to freeze the design of the turbine blades, the
compressor has witnessed mechanial failure in performance and the engine control system is not flight-worthy

Ministry stated, in January 2009, that the target of reducing engine weight by 135 Kg is expected to fructify only around production phase. Testing of the existing engines has also indicated short-comings. Various tests have to be undertaken at stages in order to test the different modules of the Kaveri engine for quality, efficiency an d endurance. Audit found that critical
tests for components have not been carried out owing to the absence of facilities. More significantly, tests carried out to evaluate the engine itself have revealed the following deficiencies:

(table given in report)

Conclusion
he Kaveri Engine Development Project is an ambitious project aimed at indigenisation of the propulsion system for LCA. However, the prime objective of the project has not been achieved and GTRE has been unable to deliver an engine that could power the LCA despite a cost overrun of 642 per cent and delay of about 13 years. The project is now faced with the alternative
of entering into a joint venture with a foreign house for further development of the engine. Even after about two decades, since its sanction, the probable outcome of the project vis-à-vis its objectives in near future cannot be foreseen clearl

LakshO · Post by **LakshO** » 16 Jan 2014 16:53

Could lack of success on Kaveri/Kabini be a prime reason why India will not resume nuclear testing anytime soon? The last time we tested in May 1998, US stopped collaboration on LCA and we had to pick up the pieces and redo all over again. This caused some delay in the LCA program.

Now, Tejas has progressed much further but GE engines still give a lot of leverage to Washington, no? If we resume nuclear testing, I am sure US will embargo any further sales and/or support of GE engines and we will have a deeply impaired Tejas in our service.

Hindsight 20/20 and all that, I wish that ADA/HAL/IAF did not go with an US engine. A French or a Russian engine would have been much better.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 16 Jan 2014 17:19

the french have nothing in the GE404 category. the M53 engine of M2K is old tech and they moved to twin engine rafale thereafter..did not pursue large single engine.
Russia - RD93 was an option but not really - it has come to a modern level only lately not back then.

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 16 Jan 2014 19:16

Plus reliability, given our Mig-29, Mig-21, Mig-23, Mig 27 experience could we rely on a Russian engine in a single engine aircraft. 1 crash due to Engine failure and media,MOD, Politico arms agent lobby would have killed the program me.

Its only recently Russian engine tech has good reliability and High MTBO's

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 16 Jan 2014 20:30

Here is another report on the futile exercise we had trying to get SNECMA to assist in the Kaveri/engine tech. Apologies if posted earlier elsewhere.

http://centreright.in/2013/03/the-faile ... tewM84tmSo

The Failed Negotiations with Snecma for Engine Technology
Appu K. Soman/ March 13, 2013

n the midst of sundry scams relating to defence procurement, the cut in the 2012-13 defence budget, and the usual handwringing over delays in various defence projects, an announcement with huge implications for India’s search for self-reliance in defence production went unnoticed. Early this year, AjaiShukla, the Business Standard’s defence correspondent, reported that the negotiation with the French company Snecma (the maker of the engine for the Dassault Rafale aircraft) for collaboration on India’s Kaveri engine had collapsed. Perhaps because nobody has(so far)leveled allegations of corruption, the media and even defence analysts took no notice. But even a cursory look at this negotiation raises the suspicion that all was not above board.

The Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), a unit of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), has been working on the Kaveri turbofan engine for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) since the 1980s. The LCA first flew in January 2001, powered by a US engine as an interim measure. DRDO did manage to build the Kaveri engine. Unfortunately, the engine failed its high altitude tests in 2005. Even if the Kaveri had performed well, it still would have been inadequate for its original purpose of powering the LCA. What the GTRE had succeeded was in developing an engine using 1970s technology according to specifications fixed in the early 1980s. In the meanwhile, the LCA had become heavier than anticipated, necessitating a more powerful engine. To enhance its power without increasing its size and weight, GTRE needed new technologies that advanced countries had developed in the intervening years for its “hot section”—mainly single crystal turbine blades, “blisk” (integrated rotor disk and blades) and thermal barrier coating for the blades.

In 2006, MoD decided to seek foreign collaboration from reputed foreign engine manufacturers to produce an improved Kaveri. The problem is that countries do not part with such technologies easily. But India had an ace up its sleeve: its proposed medium multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) deal.Back in 2008, it was reported that DRDO had presented MoD a technology wish list, to be obtained in the form of offsets for defence acquisitions. MoD, however, preferred to buy these technologies as part of the contracts for the import of weapons systems. Accordingly, the RfP for the MMRCA deal reportedly prescribed the technologies the winning vendor must part with. Aero engine technology was surely the military technology India needed the most. As it has been widely reported, losing the MMRCA deal would have made the survival of several of the bidders as combat aircraft manufacturers doubtful. Considering these stakes, the MMRCA bid offered India the best leverage to obtain advanced aero-engine technology from the winner.

But the government of India does not believe in using its leverage in bargaining for what it needs most. It issued a stand-alone RfP for collaboration for developing an improved Kaveri in 2006. A separate RfP for the MMRCA deal followed a year later. The US General Electric (GE) and Britain’s Rolls Royce refused any form of participation. America’s Pratt&Whitney is on record having expressed its willingness to aid the Kaveri project. But later reports said it was willing to participate only as a consultant. In 2008, MoD selected Snecma over Russia’s NPO Saturn as the collaborator for the Kaveri. It was reported that it would take 4 years to develop and certify a new engine, after which the technology would be transferred to GTRE. MoD entered into separate negotiations with Snecma on this deal even as it was processing the MMRCA proposals. These negotiations dragged on for more than three years. Meanwhile, the Dassault Rafale, powered by a Snecma engine, emerged as the lowest bidder among those shortlisted for the MMRCA and MoD began contract negotiations with it. Was Snecma playing a game, waiting for the finalization of the Rafale deal? It would seem so. It appeared that in a bizarre twist, at this stage India had allowed France to make the Rafale deal an offset for the engine technology deal.

As what was thought to be price negotiations with Snecma progressed, it also appeared that Snecma was really offering the “ECO” core it had already developed and that it would pass on the technology to the DRDO only after 15 years. Considering the pace at which engine technology progresses, the know-how, by the time Snecma transferred it to GTRE, would have become obsolete. MoD rejected this proposal. Evaluation of the MMRCA contenders was then going on. Snecma quickly climbed down, agreeing to ToT as soon as GTRE could absorb it.

MoD then began negotiations with Snecma for a joint venture for the development of the Kaveri. Minister of State for Defence Pallam Raju told Business Standard: “(Snecma) is willing to co-develop an engine with us; they are willing to go beyond just transfer of technology. It is a value-added offer that gives us better technology than what we would get from ToT from Eurojet(the maker of the Typhoon’s engine) or GE.” This was misleading. GE and Eurojet were not contenders for the collaboration with GTRE. The technology they were offering was part of a deal for the import of 99 engines for the LCA Mark II. The kind of technologies sought for the collaboration on the Kaveri engine were not sought for this deal. Officially, no specifics of what technologies Snecma would offer have been disclosed. A senior DRDO official said two years ago that the work share between GTRE and Snecma would be 50:50; that price negotiations would be completed “within a month”; and that GTRE would gain the intellectual property rights for the new engine. Aviation Week reported in March 2012 that an agreement on the joint venture to develop and build a 20,230-lb-thrust engine would be reached by June that year. Snecma would provide “exhaustive know-how” on the technologies and manufacturing processes GTRE lacked, the sources for the report claimed.

In early January this year came the news that MoD has dropped the proposed deal with Snecma. No reason has been reported for this unexpected development. Quite likely Snecma raised the cost of its technologies or refused to pass on the intellectual property rights for the new engine to GTRE as it seems to have promised earlier. At this point, it looks like a classic case of bait and switch. It is hard not to conclude that Snecma was stringing India along with promises it had no intention of keeping, until almost the end of the Rafale price negotiations, and revealed its hands when it could no longer put MoD off. Snecma, by bidding for the collaboration, prolonging the negotiations for several years, and finally hardening its position, has made India’s engine development programme lose precious time.

The decision to build a 20,230-lb-thrust engine is also questionable. Such an engine would be inadequate for India’s future needs. The 22,000lb thrust GE engine is being procured for the initial batch of the LCA Mark II ordered by the IAF. The improved Kaveri, with a 10 per cent less thrust, would not be adequate for later batches of the LCA, should the IAF decide to order more of them. It is also doubtful if it would be suitable for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) which India is planning. The AMCA, a stealth aircraft, would need to have an internal weapons bay, fairly high internal fuel capacity, and supercruise capability. If the LCA program imparted any lesson to Indian military planners, it is that the AMCA is going to turn out to be heavier than now planned. Developing a 20,000lb class engine now for it makes no sense. Presumably, it is the maximum level to which Snecma’s ECO core can be developed. As Air Marshall Philip Rajkumar (rtd.) recounts in his book The Tejas Story, the DRDO and the IAF had a falling out in the 1980s over the choice of partners for developing the LCA’s flight control system. The IAF wanted to go with Dassault, while the DRDO preferred Lockheed Martin. This disagreement had caused the IAF to wage a decades-long cold war against the DRDO and the LCA project in particular. Quite possibly,DRDO bought peace with the IAF by accepting the latter’s preference for Snecma.

In the wake of the VVIP chopper scam, Defence Minister A. K. Antony has promised corrective action. He cannot act until he finds out what really happens behind the scenes in the procurement process. The complete lack of transparency in all matters relating to defence makes it easy for unscrupulous elements to manipulate the system. Antony must order a thorough inquiry into the whole Kaveri-Snecma saga. Several questions relating to this affair need answers. Who was pushing for delinking the Kaveri collaboration from the MMRCA tender? What specifically did Snecma offer in its response to the RfP, and at what price? Why did the negotiations drag on for so many years, and on what basis were predictions of imminent agreement fed to the media on a regular basis (see here and here)? What were the reasons for the termination of the negotiations? This charade could not have gone on for so long unless senior levels of the GTRE, MoD, and the IAF were involved. A top-to-bottom shakeup in the MoD, DRDO, and the services would inspire some confidence that it is not going to be, once again, business as usual.

About the author:

Appu Kuttan Soman is a diplomatic historian, and was a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University from 2007-2009. His research interests include arms control, nuclear history, and South Asian security. He is the author of Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950-1958 (Praeger, 2000), and Through the Looking Glass: Diplomacy, Indian Style. He holds a PhD in US diplomatic history from Vanderbilt University and master’s in Psychology and bachelor’s in History and Psychology from Andhra University in India. He was an Associate of the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History at Harvard University from 1995-1997.

If the allegations are right,it is the French who have been shafting us the most in defence deals.List them out.

1.Scorpene subs,price renegotiated thrice,subs years behind schedule.Just look at how Russia has delivered two Kilo subs out of 6 in a deal with Vietnam signed only in 2009,all to arrive by 2015.The Scorpene deal is a decade old and one Scorpene costs 75% of that of an Akula-2! One can buy 2-3 Kilos for the price of one Scorpene.

2.M-2000 upgrade costs,$2.5B for upgrading just 48 aircraft,about $50M per upgrade.Cost of 45 brand new MIG-29Ks? Around $1.25B $!B! About $32M per aircraft.Cost of upgrading 60+ IAF MIG-29s,under $!B !

3.SNECMA/Rafale allegations.

However,this is a clear swipe at the French,coming from a US source which could have an element of bias .There are also strong allegations emanating from Delhi that the Rafale deal is being sabotaged by the US,which wants US arms deals to be signed first before the UPA and MMS are dumped.The IMR has in a report said that the "top brass of the IAF and IA expressed shock at the decision to award a $1B contract on Dec. 27th for additional Hercules C-130Js"

"Out top priority is to have fighters as soon as possible.,but we are surprised by the MOD move on why the Govt. is not signing the $12B MMRCA (contract with Dassault of France) and instead buying transport aircraft for us,said a "senior IAF official".

IA officials said that it has no combat worthy arty,hoping for the 145 ultra-light howitzer deal to go through,and that more than $40B worth of procurement items were in the pipeline but "no significant purchases are being made".

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 Jan 2014 20:39

Appu Kuttan Soman is a diplomatic historian, and was a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University from 2007-2009. His research interests include arms control, nuclear history, and South Asian security. He is the author of Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950-1958 (Praeger, 2000), and Through the Looking Glass: Diplomacy, Indian Style. He holds a PhD in US diplomatic history from Vanderbilt University and master’s in Psychology and bachelor’s in History and Psychology from Andhra University in India. He was an Associate of the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History at Harvard University from 1995-1997.

Ah yes, an impeccable source regarding the eebil French.

As versus the virtuous Americans and reliable Russians.

Sagar G · Post by **Sagar G** » 16 Jan 2014 20:46

LCA mk.2 is keeping me tense nowadays I think we are in deep shit regarding that due to our choice of sanction able engine. Wonder why DRDO played brain dead.

UPA signing deals on his deathbed means nothing the next government can and should cancel the recent deal.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 16 Jan 2014 21:59

Ah yes, an impeccable source regarding the eebil French.

As versus the virtuous Americans and reliable Russians.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 16 Jan 2014 22:58

Jan 16, 2014 :: India to Display Air Defence Systems at Bahrain Show

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 16 Jan 2014 23:47

I am sure we can demonstrate LCA flypast as well during RD parade, why just display?

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Jan 2014 00:23

Sagar G wrote:LCA mk.2 is keeping me tense nowadays I think we are in deep shit regarding that due to our choice of sanction able engine. Wonder why DRDO played brain dead.

UPA signing deals on his deathbed means nothing the next government can and should cancel the recent deal.

Sanctions are unlikely thanks to our good friend the PRC throwing its weight around. Even so, I hope AMCA flies on our own engine.

Yogi_G · Post by **Yogi_G** » 17 Jan 2014 01:07

Kaveri integration with LCA is an absolute must. Never mind that it will not be of thrust levels which will keep the IAF folks happy but when the $hit does hit the fan of say a long drawn battle with a great power of severe attrition we will definitely need a fighter plus engine which we can source immediately. A long drawn battle is unlikely I know, we also do have indigenous manufacturing under license of foreign fighters I know but being able to churn out numbers in war time is best ensured when everything is in house.

An export order for LCA will be a boon in terms of the assembly line progress but then again its a chicken egg problem. Foreign air forces will look to see if the LCA is churned in enough numbers before they can confidently place an order.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 17 Jan 2014 03:24

Put a policy driver, that no exports are allowed with foreign engine.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 17 Jan 2014 06:14

deleted.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 17 Jan 2014 06:38

clearly OT philip.. it does not add any good to the thread, and it does only adds value to the dork media. what a person does in private, lgbt, polgammy, solo life, sanyas, or practice anything our legal system enables, is clearly out of context.

please come over to burkha forum, and i shall prove to you massage parlour is a nice to have thing.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 17 Jan 2014 07:33

Sorry,should've posted it in the humour td.Mea Culpa.The lingo of our keystone cops in the FIR is simply exquisite!

Another gem for the humour td.

Syria crisis: Obama considering 'narrow' action

He was unable to shoot even one "arrow"!

srai · Post by **srai** » 17 Jan 2014 09:29

Philip wrote:Here is another report on the futile exercise we had trying to get SNECMA to assist in the Kaveri/engine tech. Apologies if posted earlier elsewhere.

http://centreright.in/2013/03/the-faile ... tewM84tmSo

The Failed Negotiations with Snecma for Engine Technology
Appu K. Soman/ March 13, 2013

...

As what was thought to be price negotiations with Snecma progressed, it also appeared that Snecma was really offering the “ECO” core it had already developed and that it would pass on the technology to the DRDO only after 15 years. Considering the pace at which engine technology progresses, the know-how, by the time Snecma transferred it to GTRE, would have become obsolete. MoD rejected this proposal.Evaluation of the MMRCA contenders was then going on. Snecma quickly climbed down, agreeing to ToT as soon as GTRE could absorb it.

...

Nobody is going to give away their hard-earned industry leading know-hows to a future competitor. The two bolded parts mean one in the same really - "pass on the technology after 15 years" or "ToT as soon as GTRE could absorb it". What they want is India's cash to fund their R&D of next generation engines and only when they have it will they part ways, albeit slowly, with an older-generation engine tech. In effect, they will continue to remain industry leaders while Indian industries remains a generation or two behind, and at the same time hamper India's own R&D efforts.

srin · Post by **srin** » 17 Jan 2014 09:34

I don't know about fitting it onto LCA just yet.

Kaveri needs to do more high-altitude tests. We need to buy that Il-76 testbed or create one of our own. Kaveri (hopefully) won't be the last engine that we will design. And all the engines need to be tested.

Then test it on a Mig-29 or comparable twin-engined aircraft with one engine replaced by Kaveri. I'm worried about the effect on the LCA programme if the Kaveri engine failure causes a crash.

andy B · Post by **andy B** » 17 Jan 2014 09:46

NRao wrote:Jan 16, 2014 :: India to Display Air Defence Systems at Bahrain Show

Thanks for the link NRao....the link says they are going to have flying demos of the emb145 aew&c...???

I didnt realise we had enough to fly demos nice indeed!

Kartik · Post by **Kartik** » 17 Jan 2014 10:10

The EMB-145I was ferried to Bahrain staging via Jamnagar..have asked a source to clarify if the Tejas was also taken to that airshow.

maitya · Post by **maitya** » 17 Jan 2014 11:18

Philipji, first of all thanks a lot for finding such an excellent link - as you know "goberment" links have this addn aura of authenticity but are extremely difficult to find (and have a propensity of vanishing every now and then).

But I'm very confused with your deductions from that link - as that link actually substantiates my previous post on all the historical chronology of the Kaveri program (and it's impact/non-impact on the LCA program). But more that point a little later ...

====================================
First the correction bit ...

Philip wrote: ...
Here is a CAG report with historical notes which indicates that Kaveri GTX-35 was the engine planned for the prototype and the GTX-37 for production series. Is there any info that is to the contrary? I would be happy to have details.
...

I think quite a large part of your confusion stems from the fact that most probably you have got the GTX-37 and GTX-35 sequencing wrong (as indicated in bold above).

Pls note GTX-37U (turbojet) (and GTX-37UB, it’s turbofan version), are predecessor of GTX-35 (and GTX-35VS, which got called as Kaveri). I've detailed this part out almost a year or more back in my Kaveri History - Part 2 post.
Excerpts ...

maitya wrote:[Part 2]

Kaveri History: Well first-of-all, it’s erroneous to assume Kaveri (or GTX-35 VS) is the absolute first turbojet/turbofan to be designed/developed from the ground up (from scratch) by GTRE – it’s not. In fact Kaveri is not at all a “from the scratch” development in the first place – it more of an upgrade.

It’s predecessors were GTX-37 U (turbojet) -> GTX-37 UB (it’s turbofan version) -> GTX-35 (enhanced turbojet based on 37U tech). And Kaveri (or GTX-35 VS) is more of an upgrade of GTX-35 (same core etc.). The following schematic depicts the Kaveri lineage:

Note: How the reduction of HPC stages were carried out to reduce weight, while increasing the turbine efficiency by increasing TET (and OPR) simultaneously – all of these required advances in materials tech as well. Also note, the mass-flow drop during graduating from a turbojet to turbofan necessitating further efficiencies in turbine and compressor technologies (or increase in the number of corresponding stages).
Pls note the 37 series is from 70s and early 80s while the 35 series from late 80s to early-mid 90s.

So GTX-37 (of the 70s) is merely the test engine based on which GTX-35 were planned to be developed - plus GTX-37 series was never fligth tested, so no question of it making it to the unproven (then) LCA TD/PV airframes.

====================================
Now, regarding your point on 404 availability for the prototypes due to sanctions etc,

Philip wrote: ...
However,I am not so sure that the 404 was envisaged as interim engine for prototypes at the inception of the project,as at that time,we were not able to obtain US mil. eqpt.
...

there are innumerable links available on GE F404-GE-F2J3 engines being used on LCA TD1/2 and PV1/2 (and I'm sure you'd have yourself seen/read them).

But that still leaves out the confusion about sanctions etc and availability of GE F404 engines. Well, it so happens, right after the LCA program was sanctioned (in 1983), the engine feasibility study (of 1986) and Kaveri program sanction (of 1989), GTRE (actually HAL then) went ahead and bought the GE F404 engines required for the FSED-I phases (and some more).

This is corroborated in this 1989 NY Times article (By SANJOY HAZARIKA, Special to the New York Times Published: February 05, 1989) India Plans to Increase Arms Imports and Exports.
Excerpts

…
Officials also are discussing purchase of technology from France and the United States for components of a futuristic light combat aircraft planned by 1996. New Delhi already has bought several General Electric 404 engines for use on prototypes of this aircraft, opening the door to greater military cooperation more than 20 years after Washington ended arms sales to India.
…

Plus 1998 sanctions didn’t have much of an impact either, as these engines were already integrated into TD1 and TD2 – plus the LCA internal design was a perfect match for the dimensions of F404 (refer to my previous post on dimensional similarity aspect between Kaveri and F404), so future integrations were also not much of an issue.

====================================
Now wrt the confirmation of the points that I’d posted before - pls note the following:

1) from the CAG link CAG: Report No. 16 of 2010 -11 (Air Force and Navy) that you’d posted,

the Government sanctioned in August 1983 the development of a multi-role Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), at an estimated cost of Rs 560 crore. Accordingly, there was a corresponding demand for a suitable engine for powering the LCA. Feasibility studies carried out in India and abroad revealed that there was no suitable engine available anywhere in the world, though Rolls Royce RB-1989 stage D and GEF404-F2J engines, by and large, met the requirement, provided certain concessions were granted in the Air Staff Requirements (ASR).

Check – confirmation that F404 dimensions (and basic performance parameters like Thrust, SFC, Weight etc.) roughly matched that of Kaveri requirements. So it’s good a risk-mitigation path as well.

2) from the CAG link CAG: Report No. 16 of 2010 -11 (Air Force and Navy) that you’d posted,

GTRE further proposed that it would be desirable to prove the newly designed airframe of the LCA with a proven engine first.

Check – confirmation Pt 1 of my previous post (that F404, or any other suitable proven engine, would be required for FSED-I phase)

3) from the CAG link CAG: Report No. 16 of 2010 -11 (Air Force and Navy) that you’d posted,

Subsequently, the prototypes would be flown with the GTX-35 engine, as soon as this engine was type certified and cleared for the flight. Based on the above proposal, Government sanctioned a project in March 1989 at a cost of Rs 382.81 crore with the probable date of completion (PDC) as December 1996, for the design and development of Kaveri engine.

Check – conformation of Pt2 of my previous post (that Kaveri, if it succeeded, would be used from FSED-II phase onwards).

4) from the CAG link CAG: Report No. 16 of 2010 -11 (Air Force and Navy) that you’d posted,

At this point of time, the Gas Turbine Research Laboratory was already working upon an aero-engine project, the GTX 37 engine, since 1982.
In August 1986, a feasibility study was carried out jointly by Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) for evaluating the GTX-37 engine.
The feasibility study indicated that the GTX-37 engine would, after certain rescheduling, meet the requirements of the LCA. GTRE accordingly, in December 1986, submitted a project proposal for the development of the Kaveri engine.

Check - Another confirmation of the Kaveri lineage (via the GTX-37 program of the 70s).

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 17 Jan 2014 11:37

OT.

Maitya sahab,

I have a humble request. Please create a thread on Kaveri and catalogue all your posts there. It is too important to be lost in the noise. I will work with the other mods on modalities of "gyan" threads where only very selected posts go in. We should have threads for engines, radar and airframes for aero products. These threads will be strictly moderated and all unworthy posts would be moved to general discussion threads without intimation. Probably that is how we can get the gyanis back in the folds as well.

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 17 Jan 2014 15:06

Philip wrote: 1.Scorpene subs,price renegotiated thrice,subs years behind schedule.Just look at how Russia has delivered two Kilo subs out of 6 in a deal with Vietnam signed only in 2009,all to arrive by 2015.The Scorpene deal is a decade old and one Scorpene costs 75% of that of an Akula-2! One can buy 2-3 Kilos for the price of one Scorpene.

2.M-2000 upgrade costs,$2.5B for upgrading just 48 aircraft,about $50M per upgrade.Cost of 45 brand new MIG-29Ks? Around $1.25B $!B! About $32M per aircraft.Cost of upgrading 60+ IAF MIG-29s,under $!B !
[/b].

1. Were these 2 kilo subs manufactured in Vietnam? Like our own Scorpenes?

Well if the french were building first 2 scorpenes they also would have delivered dot on time.

The difference is our workers are learning skills with new tools and also as some say that Arihant may have benefitted too in small ways from the french tech.

2. Yes M2K deal so expensive without even getting a new engine is such a mystery, that too the whole 49 jets will get upgraded in 9 years. Too long - too expensive.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Jan 2014 18:30

indranilroy wrote:OT.

Maitya sahab,

I have a humble request. Please create a thread on Kaveri and catalogue all your posts there. It is too important to be lost in the noise. I will work with the other mods on modalities of "gyan" threads where only very selected posts go in. We should have threads for engines, radar and airframes for aero products. These threads will be strictly moderated and all unworthy posts would be moved to general discussion threads without intimation. Probably that is how we can get the gyanis back in the folds as well.

++1.

Suggestion:

That thread with no discussion - discussions happen in other threads. His thread is a pure collection of info about engines/Kaveri. (we have one similar thread for the MMRCA.)

vic · Post by **vic** » 17 Jan 2014 19:10

France allocated USD 2 Billion for M-88 and in the same period we allocated only USD 200 Million dollars for Kaveri. We gave a contract of USD 450 million for Al-55 development but HAL allocated only USD 70 million for equivalent indigenous engine. We were ready to pay USD 2Billion for Kaveri JV to Snecma but GTRE has still not been allocated USD 90 million for UCAV engine.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Jan 2014 22:13

maitya ji,

If I may.

Shorten the title of your thread and include "No Discussions" in it. Make it clear from the git-go (from my experience with the MMRCA thread, once the thread grows no one will read the first post - at least we cannot expect that of them).

Something like:
"Kaveri tech details - no discussions"

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 18 Jan 2014 01:23

Tx Maitya,the history of Kaveri and its influence on the LCA project is becoming clearer.So 404 engines,not IN20s,were bought by HAL (on their own or through the ADA?) after US eqpt. became available (RG era).There are some IAF brass reports hat HAL was a bit lukewarm initially because the design/dev was being done by the ADA which had headhunted at HAL.

Air Cmde.Muthanna,Dir LCA (flight test),Xcpts from his paper at Aero-India,2013.I think that some of this has been posted some time ago,apols. if so .

6. Agencies for Design, Development and Support. If the process of design itself is to be accomplished by two design houses working under two different verticals mentioned in Para 2 above, there would be a price to pay. While ADA had a single point focus, clearly HAL ARDC had multiple foci. HALs indigenous programs clearly have priority within that organization and therefore so do resource allocation. The aircraft would continue to develop during its lifetime and all round support would be necessary. The responsibility for, post deployment maintenance of documentation, software and their periodic up gradation remains open ended. Unless resolved, this story of an inconvenient marriage would be continuing saga and have adverse effects on the product during its entire lifetime.

7. Customer Involvement. During the design and development process itself, it is vital that comprehensive knowledge of aviation in general and military aviation in particular is made available to the program. Scientists and design engineers do not have that knowledge. The Indian Air Force is the only repository of comprehensive military aviation knowledge in this country. Either its expertise was not sought or it was denied. Also we probably have the only aviation companies in the world that do not have aviators embedded into design teams. As a result, while the designers concentrated on getting the technology airborne, the design necessities of turning the aircraft into a maintainable, deployable and employable weapon platform were missed to a large extent. Originally a reluctant customer, the Indian Air Force involved itself sufficiently only after contracting for supply of the aircraft in 2006. It was late in the program and hundreds of ‘Requests for Action’ had to be raised in order to retrieve the situation to some extent, but this lead to time and cost overruns.

CONCLUSION

16. Tejas is a wonderful flying machine. It deserved to be in squadron service years ago. Remedial action on many of the shortcomings commented upon, if implemented even now, will favorably impact timelines for IOC and FOC of the Tejas Mk 1 aircraft. Favorable impact on Tejas Mk 2 and other future programs will be enormous.

astal · Post by **astal** » 18 Jan 2014 03:32

Maitya,

In the Kaveri saga thread, could you also post about "flat rated"? it appears to me that this was an excuse for poor performance and of questionable practical value.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Jan 2014 08:51

maitya, When LCA was announced the US Sec Def Carlucci offered the RLG for its navigation to VS Arunachalam around 1988?

vic · Post by **vic** » 18 Jan 2014 09:18

Maitya

Kaveri aimed that F404, M88, EJ 2000 type of performance. Why did it not aim for level of PW F100 level performance which would have been perhaps easier?

Also why did they keep bypass ratio so low?

Why no growth capacity is built into Kaveri when any such engine has to normally grow around 30-50% in performance over it's lifetime?

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 18 Jan 2014 09:26

from aam speak, high bypass means lower compression and lower thrust. so if you need higher t:w, go for low bypass. most afterburner needs higher mass flow, so it kinda the best choice to go for low bypass from that perspective. significant tradeoff is fuel economy.. which we care a heck for mil missions using low bypass to an extent.

I don't know who edits the wiki GTX bypass ratio with suggestions like "it should be 0.5:1".. how is one able to suggest so precise without any analysis or data points?

compared to f135 -> an improvement from f100 is further lowering the bypass from 0.36 to 0.2. How did they achieve it?

VishalJ · Post by **VishalJ** » 18 Jan 2014 12:24

Kartik wrote:The EMB-145I was ferried to Bahrain staging via Jamnagar..have asked a source to clarify if the Tejas was also taken to that airshow.

Negative! My pal Nishant is out shooting at the show.

Our chat:

VJ: Nishant Tejas @ BAH2014 ?
Did it fly or just static?
I saw it being loaded into a VayuSena Prithviraj with its wings clipped at BLR a few days ago

Nishant: No TEJAS not there VJ
Only IAF E145 AWACS
That too only static no flight display

VJ: Wtf

Nishant: Disappointed
Aircraft closed and kept on display

Asit P · Post by **Asit P** » 18 Jan 2014 18:33

The LCA did not but the Indian AEW&C did fly at the Bahrain show:

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/sli ... 007183.cms

tushar_m · Post by **tushar_m** » 18 Jan 2014 19:13

Is there any article discussing RCS of LCA Tejas

If any article of discussion present will someone post it ???

sunilUpa · Post by **sunilUpa** » 18 Jan 2014 19:27

Vishal Jolapara wrote:
Kartik wrote:The EMB-145I was ferried to Bahrain staging via Jamnagar..have asked a source to clarify if the Tejas was also taken to that airshow.
Negative! My pal Nishant is out shooting at the show.

Our chat:

VJ: Nishant Tejas @ BAH2014 ?
Did it fly or just static?
I saw it being loaded into a VayuSena Prithviraj with its wings clipped at BLR a few days ago

Nishant: No TEJAS not there VJ
Only IAF E145 AWACS
That too only static no flight display

VJ: Wtf

Nishant: Disappointed
Aircraft closed and kept on display

I thought LCA was going to Republic day parade.

vic · Post by **vic** » 19 Jan 2014 10:51

Cross post

The last deal between India and Russia for Su-30MKI was for USD 40 million per unit. let us assume annual costs of USD 10 million per aircraft. The cost of Rafale is estimated at around USD 100 million per aircraft. If per annum costs are estimated at 5 million even then cost of ownership of Rafale is much higher is we take cost of capital to India at 10% per annum. Rafale would have longer life but Mirage upgrade shows that after around 30 years, the value of airframe is only 13%.

So assuming cost of capital at 10% for India on USD 40 million, linear depreciation of full airframe in 20 years at 40/20 million, annual costs at 10 million we get:-

So per annum Sukhoi cost is USD 4 + USD 2 + USD 10 million= 16 million

Similarly for Rafale cost of capital at 10% for India on USD 100 million, linear depreciation of almost full airframe in 30 years at 80/30, annual costs at 5 million, we get:-

Per annum costs of Rafale to be USD 10 million + 2.7 + 5= 17.7 million per annum as cost of ownership.

Now let's try LCA

USD 2.5+1+1= 4.5 millon per annum. So what is better 200 Rafale or 800 LCA ? which can energize indigenous aero sector and we can go for deeeeep indigenisation Or even 100 sukhoi + 400 LCA for cost of 200 Rafale.

Remember Darin III upgrade is around 4 million USD per Jaguar while Mirage upgrade is USD 40 million per aircraft.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 19 Jan 2014 11:32

I was pilloried some time ago,about a year+, for suggesting a "stealth" version of the LCA,a MK-3.But look at what is happening worldwide? The so-called "true" stealth birds,F-22,JSF,are enormously expensive ,JSF still in its development stage,and doubtts about maint. costs persist.As an alternative Boeing drew up plans for an "Advanced F-18SH",being offered to allies who were planning to buy the JSF.Now,AWST has revealed in a pic,the fuselage of a "stealth" version of the SH. under development,and says that a similar bird was developed for the F-15 which was quite successful.

US skunk works,black projects,have developed a system whereby stealth applications can be fitted ,or with modifications,onto existing no-stealth birds,vastly improving their RCS etc.Boeing reportedly stole Lockheed's chief skunk works brain now with Boeing who is developing the stealth SH. Developing a stealth LCA MK-3 may be a quick-fix project that both enhances the LCA legacy,plus saves us considerable time in developing the AMCA.It would also be a far cheaper effort.There is no lightweight stealth aircraft available anywhere in the world.Mikoyan supposedly was working on an aircraft to succeed the MIG-21 but funds was probably not available.If western majors are revealed to be doing so,why can't we do the same too? If successful,there would be huge orders from the IAF as well as from air forces worldwide with smaller defence budgets.

maitya · Post by **maitya** » 19 Jan 2014 19:41

Folks apologies for not able to respond to your posts (including one from ramanaji as well), as the 1st priority right now is to get the archival project The Kaveri Saga - India's attempt to build a modern Turbofan completed.
Pls note that the intent is not only to build an archive for ready reference etc but also to have a some sort of a flow across those posts.

Betw any feedback on it, here or on the normal Kaveri thread, is sincerely welcome.

member_28041 · Post by **member_28041** » 19 Jan 2014 20:35

Philip wrote: Developing a stealth LCA MK-3 may be a quick-fix project that both enhances the LCA legacy,plus saves us considerable time in developing the AMCA.It would also be a far cheaper effort.There is no lightweight stealth aircraft available anywhere in the world.Mikoyan supposedly was working on an aircraft to succeed the MIG-21 but funds was probably not available.If western majors are revealed to be doing so,why can't we do the same too? If successful,there would be huge orders from the IAF as well as from air forces worldwide with smaller defence budgets.

On the contrary , this would further delay the AMCA project. Firstly, we are not that famous in spending enough money on indegeneous projects.
So whatever little resource we have in terms of money/scientists etc, will be split up for two projects if we for for LCA mk3.
So let us put all our efforts into AMCA which will be a bigger aircraft as soon as possible.

koti · Post by **koti** » 19 Jan 2014 21:52

vic wrote:Cross post

The last deal between India and Russia for Su-30MKI was for USD 40 million per unit. let us assume annual costs of USD 10 million per aircraft. The cost of Rafale is estimated at around USD 100 million per aircraft. If per annum costs are estimated at 5 million even then cost of ownership of Rafale is much higher is we take cost of capital to India at 10% per annum. Rafale would have longer life but Mirage upgrade shows that after around 30 years, the value of airframe is only 13%.

So assuming cost of capital at 10% for India on USD 40 million, linear depreciation of full airframe in 20 years at 40/20 million, annual costs at 10 million we get:-

So per annum Sukhoi cost is USD 4 + USD 2 + USD 10 million= 16 million

Similarly for Rafale cost of capital at 10% for India on USD 100 million, linear depreciation of almost full airframe in 30 years at 80/30, annual costs at 5 million, we get:-

Per annum costs of Rafale to be USD 10 million + 2.7 + 5= 17.7 million per annum as cost of ownership.

Now let's try LCA

USD 2.5+1+1= 4.5 millon per annum. So what is better 200 Rafale or 800 LCA ? which can energize indigenous aero sector and we can go for deeeeep indigenisation Or even 100 sukhoi + 400 LCA for cost of 200 Rafale.

Remember Darin III upgrade is around 4 million USD per Jaguar while Mirage upgrade is USD 40 million per aircraft.

I don't think this gives a wholesome picture Vic saab. Since we are just speaking from the money and not the capability point of view, the costs also should include the cost of the 600 extra pilots and the reserves, their training expenses, the training and maintenance costs of all the support technicians. And also don't forget the infrastructure that needs to be built to support the higher number of planes. The hangers, the logistics, the additional airbases that need to come up, the extra runways that need to be built etc. And all this without bringing more overall capability IMO.

All this will add to a lot and I wont be surprised that this could even up the costs overall. I can't do the calculation as you did but if you can extend your numbers to cover this, I think we will see a more complete picture in favor of the Rafale.