CT & COIN Operations in India: News, Images and Discussion

Roperia · Post by **Roperia** » 20 Jan 2014 11:44

Hizb militant Javed Salfi trapped in J&K encounter | The Hindu

... A former counter-insurgency informant of the Army and Police, Salfi has been inducted into Hizbul Mujahideen by its jailed commander Fayaz Talak, official sourced said.

Salfi, according to these sources, had fired upon a Constable near Janglat Mandi in Anantnag town last year. He ran away with the injured constable's service trifle.

Official sources told The Hindu that troops of Rashtriya Rifles 9th battalion along with Special Operations Group of Anantnag and Kulgam district police launched the cordon-and-search operation at Sempora after receiving specific information of Salfi's presence at the house of Ghulam Mohammad Parray...

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 22 Jan 2014 06:52

IA and RR has developed phenomenal HUMINT along with organic ELINT and SIGINT, this is paying rich dividends in many an operation... For this, the people of Kashmir have paid with heir blood to the Pigs.

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 22 Jan 2014 06:53

Roperia wrote:Hizb militant Javed Salfi trapped in J&K encounter | The Hindu

... A former counter-insurgency informant of the Army and Police, Salfi has been inducted into Hizbul Mujahideen by its jailed commander Fayaz Talak, official sourced said.

Salfi, according to these sources, had fired upon a Constable near Janglat Mandi in Anantnag town last year. He ran away with the injured constable's service trifle.

Official sources told The Hindu that troops of Rashtriya Rifles 9th battalion along with Special Operations Group of Anantnag and Kulgam district police launched the cordon-and-search operation at Sempora after receiving specific information of Salfi's presence at the house of Ghulam Mohammad Parray...

. Removed my rather insensitive comment, sorry

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 22 Jan 2014 07:24

^^^Why are you assuming some constable's cowardice? Were you witness to the incident? For all we know, he might be fighting for his life right now.

Roperia · Post by **Roperia** » 22 Jan 2014 11:47

Army Chief lauds Rashtriya Rifles' efforts

member_28443 · Post by **member_28443** » 17 Feb 2014 16:58

Dear all,

I'm a U.K. postgraduate student currently working on a thesis on Indian COIN, specifically how COIN is adapted across different campaigns in India and how this then relates back to the conventional COIN doctrine.

I found that the Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (2006) is (or, has been at some stage) available online on http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm . However, the file is sadly corrupted. The same goes for the Joint Doctrine also available on the website.

Considering the range of expertise on the forum, the scope of my enquiry is to ask if anyone knows if and where I might be able to access Indian COIN doctrine, short of a very expensive trip to India? Responses would be much appreciated.

Many thanks.

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 17 Feb 2014 20:31

Alex-> Given past experience I hope your thesis is not for proganda purposes against India by Western nations and Pakistan against India. Why has this subject been chossen?

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 17 Feb 2014 21:03

Aditya_V wrote:Alex-> Given past experience I hope your thesis is not for proganda purposes against India by Western nations and Pakistan against India. Why has this subject been chossen?

Why start pointing fingers already? If he was writing 'anti-India propaganda', BRF would be curious place to come consulting. This hyper-sensitivity to scrutiny is as bad as any 'propaganda' cooked up anywhere.

Why shouldn't he choose the subject? COIN is an important topic given the numerous insurgencies that have raged across the world in the last decade and half. The Indian military is one of the most experienced in the world when it comes to COIN operations, and has hosted foreign delegations at various levels. Its neither surprising nor unprecedented for someone in a foreign establishment to want to carry out an academic study on how Indian forces have adapted their operations to fit regional COIN requirements.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 18 Feb 2014 02:32

Hi Alex,

You are right, we have had a lot of experience in CI Ops in varied terrain and a lot of armies learn CI Ops from us. If its not an intrusion may I ask - what is your PHD in ?

I think the definition of 'doctrine' needs to be carefully considered. Doctrine in the sense of a clearly enunciated and agreed national security perspective and strategies on the political level unfortunately does not exist. This applies to overall doctrine as much as CI OPs. The army does have a large body of evolved thought, experience and tactics and SOPs but I would not call it doctrine in the traditional sense. The reason is obvious - at a political level national security has always been firefighting rather than a considered evolved strategy. The decision makers - politicians and bureaucrats do not get national security.

So what is the army's strategy ? I think there are a few pillars to it

1. Clear understanding that they are creating the space for a political resolution and creating security for the public
2. Very strong commitment to the local population - their comfort, security, low collateral damage, keeping them central in all ways
3. Active support for civil administration , creating infrastructure, schools, integrating the population with the rest of the country, providing electricity, water and communications to far flung areas. This goes far beyond the winning hearts and minds of western armies. Read up on Op Sadbhavana
4. Intelligence based, ambushes, infantry centric, officer led, no use of heavy weapons, definitely not arty or choppers, a lot of hand to hand and close combat to reduce collateral damage
5. Unified command - work closely with police , CPOs and local administration (this had led to suboptimal results many times but needs to be done)

Specific tactics in J&K - try to destroy the terrorists at cross over points from the border , dominate the hinterland, go after the leadership

Each of these can be elaborated upon a lot.

I would suggest you read up a bit on all of this - a lot of internet resources, video clips on news channels etc. Check out CIJWS - perhaps the best counter insurgency school in the world.

Any questions after you do your research please feel free to ask.

Viv S, Aditya is right to be cautious. As they say in the fauj josh and hosh should always go together. The choice of the thesis is of course obviou. All that Aditya is suggesting is to establish (as far as possible) the intentions so that info from BRF is not misused. Nothing wrong with that.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 18 Feb 2014 02:51

Aditya_V wrote:Alex-> Given past experience I hope your thesis is not for proganda purposes against India by Western nations and Pakistan against India. Why has this subject been chossen?

just FWIW, one of the best overview I read on Indian experience in J&K was an article by a US expert, a thesis at NDU IIRC.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 18 Feb 2014 05:46

Jammu & Kashmir: State Response to Insurgency - The Case of Jammu - Thomas A. Marks

AN ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT’S COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR by MJ Van Wagenen

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 18 Feb 2014 12:20

Svinayak, while no doubt the USarmy is better equiped there are quite a few wfallacies there, especially Insas and M-4 comparision- single round and semi automatic, same thing worded differently.

While not denying our soldiers need to be better equipped, but we are fighting at home not in some country 10000 miles away. Our Army is with its people, not someone where the locla population feels its unwelcome.

And in COIN most of the Indian soldiers use AKM, futher I don't think headgear is not Bulletproof in thee feild unlike the Pic.

Avarachan · Post by **Avarachan** » 19 Feb 2014 00:56

Alex wrote:Dear all,

I'm a U.K. postgraduate student currently working on a thesis on Indian COIN, specifically how COIN is adapted across different campaigns in India and how this then relates back to the conventional COIN doctrine ....

Considering the range of expertise on the forum, the scope of my enquiry is to ask if anyone knows if and where I might be able to access Indian COIN doctrine, short of a very expensive trip to India? Responses would be much appreciated.

Alex, I recommend that you contact Dr. Prem Mahadevan. He's now at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich. http://www.css.ethz.ch/people/CSS/premm/index_EN

His work on how India defeated the Khalistani insurgency is excellent.

By the way, please be aware that the UK has collaborated extensively with jihadist groups against India ... You are likely to encounter a great deal of wariness and hostility from Indians in the course of your work. Don't take it personally. If you want to know more about this, I recommend reading Mark Curtis's Secret Affairs: Britain's Collusion with Radical Islam. LINK

member_28443 · Post by **member_28443** » 19 Feb 2014 04:36

Akshay Kapoor

Thank you for your response.

Considering that India has not actually ‘lost’ an internal COIN campaign in its vast experience with the form of warfare, I was surprised to find that Indian COIN hasn’t been written about more in Western academic circles, since there is clearly much to be learnt from India’s experiences. It is this literature gap that has encouraged my pursuit of the topic.

My Master’s thesis intends to look at the trade-off between doctrine and practice, which is why I am trying (to no avail thus far) to find an available copy of the 2006 Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations. I have developed an understanding of Indian COIN doctrine through the works of scholar-practitioners (Sumit Ganguly and David Fidler’s edited volume, ‘India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned’ has several such inputs, though the editors often seem to overemphasise ‘confirming’ Western assumptions of COIN, which I find problematic in some cases) and academics such as Rajesh Rajagopalan. I plan to compare the core principles to two key case studies; the COIN campaign against the Khalistani insurgents, and the multiplicity of COIN campaigns in the Northeast (forgive the monolithic term ‘Northeast’ to draw together so many insurgencies; there is simply not a large amount of literature here in the U.K. to justify Master’s level focus on one Northeastern campaign), drawing out some of the tensions with and linkages back to the doctrine.

As you rightly say, doctrine in itself varies both institutionally and regionally, and of course I need to take this into account. The CIJWS appears frequently in the literature, as do innovations such as the RR and AR.

At PhD level, all being well, I intend to study the negotiation of settlements in COIN, and the emergence of forms of political order (or indeed, disorder), with regard to Indian COIN. I hope to be able to look at the Northeast in more detail at this stage. This is currently, however in proposal stage.

Aditya, I completely understand your caution. I have no propaganda or ulterior motives; I’m simply keen to look at Indian COIN from the counterinsurgent perspective. I hope that the above helps to alleviate any concerns as much as possible.

Avarachan, thank you for the advice. I have read Mahadevan’s article on the Maoist insurgency in the ‘Small Wars & Insurgencies’ journal, which I found to be an excellent read. I’ll be sure to read his work on the Khalistani insurgency. I will also be sure to give 'Secret Affairs' a read.

Many thanks for all your responses.

member_28352 · Post by **member_28352** » 19 Feb 2014 06:55

Mr Alex, I'd appreciate if you'd point out Khalistan on a map for me.

member_28443 · Post by **member_28443** » 19 Feb 2014 18:19

ShankarCag wrote:Mr Alex, I'd appreciate if you'd point out Khalistan on a map for me.

My apologies; edited to read 'Khalistani,' as in reference to the insurgent movement, rather than intend any politically-motivated description of the Punjab region itself.

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 19 Feb 2014 21:42

Alex, India not losing a COin campaign might be due to we are fighting at home as oppossed to a foreign land. Whatever, be the propognda in some circles, a signficant portion of the locales identify with the soldiers and the army. Whereas it was different in Sri Lanka, where there was no clear political direction

Ashokk · Post by **Ashokk** » 20 Feb 2014 02:13

Alex wrote:...which is why I am trying (to no avail thus far) to find an available copy of the 2006 Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations.....

Here you go Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations

member_28443 · Post by **member_28443** » 22 Feb 2014 05:10

Aditya_V wrote:Alex, India not losing a COin campaign might be due to we are fighting at home as oppossed to a foreign land. Whatever, be the propognda in some circles, a signficant portion of the locales identify with the soldiers and the army. Whereas it was different in Sri Lanka, where there was no clear political direction

I agree completely. One of the main limitations in comparing Western COIN (i.e. ISAF) with the Indian experience is the primarily internal environment you mention. Do you think that this internal environment, given that the people are citizens of India, allows more space for insurgents to be marginalised, allowing strategies such as Sadbhavana to be implemented?

member_28443 · Post by **member_28443** » 22 Feb 2014 05:12

ashokk wrote:
Alex wrote:...which is why I am trying (to no avail thus far) to find an available copy of the 2006 Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations.....
Here you go Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations

This is excellent. Much appreciated, I can't thank you enough!

Prem Kumar · Post by **Prem Kumar** » 27 Feb 2014 04:00

7 terrorists killed by IA & SOG in Kupwara district a couple of days back. Kashmiri Muslims show gratitude by trying to burn down police station

http://www.firstpost.com/india/thousand ... =hp-footer

sum · Post by **sum** » 27 Feb 2014 11:33

6 soldiers lost in fratricide ( saw in rediff) ?

Court of inquiry ordered into killing of five army jawans : Update on the army jawan who went on a shooting spree story: An army soldier today shot five colleagues dead at point blank range when they were sleeping before committing suicide in Kashmir's Ganderbal district. "A soldier of a Rashtriya Rifles unit ran amok in the early hours, killing five soldiers before killing himself," an army spokesman said. A court of inquiry has been ordered into the incident.

The incident took place inside the army camp of 13 Rashtriya Rifles at Safapora.

A court of inquiry has been ordered into the incident, he said. According to sources, the soldier, who was posted on sentry duty at the camp, entered one of the barracks at around 2 am and opened indiscriminate firing on his sleeping colleagues.

They said five soldiers were killed and another injured in the firing before the jawan went on to shoot himself.

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 27 Feb 2014 16:05

Alex, Yes one of the main differences between Indian COIN India and US, Western Armies in Iraq, Afganistan is that most of the foot soldiers don't identify with the locals, understand their culture and most probably when fighting thousands of miles from home they are not necessary convinced that they are defending thier nation.

merlin · Post by **merlin** » 27 Feb 2014 17:27

Aditya_V wrote:Alex, Yes one of the main differences between Indian COIN India and US, Western Armies in Iraq, Afganistan is that most of the foot soldiers don't identify with the locals, understand their culture and most probably when fighting thousands of miles from home they are not necessary convinced that they are defending thier nation.

Don't identify with the locals is to put it mildly. Judging by their shoot first, ask questions later (if at all) approach, they seem to positively despise the locals and behave like occupying forces out to crush any and all opposition by using maximum, overwhelming, brutal force.

That approach is not for us judging by our doctrine.

Prem Kumar · Post by **Prem Kumar** » 28 Feb 2014 02:08

The American equivalent of what our Army does in J&K would be to fight an insurgency in Texas, with cross-border support from Mexico - with a decent number of Texans wanting to secede. Will they call in air-strikes in such an insurgency & randomly bomb churches/funerals with bible-verses written on LGBs?

The last time they fought such an insurgency was the civil war.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 05 Mar 2014 09:28

^^^

Alex,

if you need any other info happy to have a discussion offline. Not sure if BRF rules permit but if you wish, you can give me your contact details (rules permitting).

Akshay

UlanBatori · Post by **UlanBatori** » 09 Mar 2014 22:10

AoA! It was either this thread or the BENIS dhaga to post this, but I think some will recognize the significance here.

I read in a serious publication about a robotic UAV developed by "Kashmir Robotics", an arm of Al Kareem Foundation. In South Africa. U c the significance? Is Kashmir now in South Africa, or is the R&D intended for Kashmir...

Oh! Here it is!

Bliss to cross-post wherever the right ppl may visit, to inform them of this. All out in the open, mind u..

UlanBatori · Post by **UlanBatori** » 11 Mar 2014 06:58

Kashmir Robotics

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 12 Mar 2014 21:22

another mass naxal attack....

http://www.ndtv.com/article/cheat-sheet ... te=classic

indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/timeline-naxal-attack-on-security-forces/

UlanBatori · Post by **UlanBatori** » 12 Mar 2014 22:15

Friends of our Berkeley friends, no doubt

tushar_m · Post by **tushar_m** » 13 Mar 2014 23:12

Suicide attack on Indian consulate in Kandahar foiled

A suicide bomber was shot dead before he could attack the Indian consulate in the southern Afghan province of Kandahar this afternoon. The bomber was killed by security forces and his suicide vest did not explode.

Indian and Afghan sources have confirmed to NDTV that the Indian consulate in Kandahar was the target. The would-be bomber was killed after he managed to gain entry to a street in Kandahar that houses the Indian and Iranian consulates. All Indians, sources say, are safe and accounted for.

Earlier attacks on Indian targets

The last attempt on an Indian mission in Afghanistan was in August 2013, when the consulate in Jalalabad was targeted. Three suicide attackers were killed; nine others, including Afghan security personnel, also died in that attack. Indian Ambassador Amar Sinha had visited the capital of the eastern province of Nangarhar, bordering Pakistan, and thanked the Afghan personnel for protecting Indian lives. Medical and compensatory assistance was also given.

In 2010, two guest houses in Kabul were attacked in which six Indians died. In July 2008, a car bomber attacked the Indian embassy in Kabul. Two senior diplomats - political counsellor V Venkateswara Rao, military attache Brigadier RD Mehta - and two Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) personnel at the gate, Ajay Pathania and Roop Singh, were killed. 58 Afghans, many of them queuing up for visas, also died in the attack. The ruthless Haqqani group, based in Pakistan, was linked to the attack.

There was an attack in 2009 on the embassy again, but no Indians were killed. Nearly two dozen Afghans, mostly civilians, died.

New Delhi has geared up for more attacks on Indian interests in the run-up to the complete withdrawal of coalition combat troops by the end of the year.

+ we should start a Afghanistan thread with Indian point of view (considering 2014 withdrawal ),if not already started

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 02 Apr 2014 10:04

http://idrw.org/?p=35717#more-35717

The Indian Army's Directorate of Infantry has announced its intention to procure an unspecified number of combat disposable-type flame-throwers for fighting units deployed in counter-insurgency areas. The Army has revealed the flame throwers will be used during conventional and sub conventional operations against hostile elements as well as for training purposes. The shape and size of the flame thrower should be such that it can comfortably be carried and used by a single soldier.

It should be stable for storage for the complete shelf life and should not be prone to accidents while in storage or being transported under operational conditions. The maximum and the minimum range at which Flame Thrower (Disposable) can effectively engage targets will need to be produced as information by interested suppliers. The requirement is a surprising one, given that military flamethrowers aren’t much in use anymore. For instance, the US military discontinued the use of flamethrowers for combat operations in 1978, and they do not figure in any current arsenals.

Flamethrowers were used in the World Wars and the Vietnam War extensively, but were subsequently found to be ineffective in most operational scenarios, given their close-combat requirement. The Indian Army will be looking to use them against bunkers, fortifications, built-up areas to flush out terrorists etc.

srai · Post by **srai** » 11 Apr 2014 07:54

The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment and Death

AUTHORS’ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper is the result of a multiyear research effort conducted by the authors.

--**--

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper is a study of over 900 biographies of the deceased militants of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistani militant group that has waged a campaign of asymmetric warfare against Indian security forces and civilians in the contested region of Kashmir for over two decades, as well as other parts of India more recently.

----

.... LeT’s recruitment of Westerners and linkages to a number of other international terror plots over the past decade, have heightened concerns that the group’s interests and operational priorities are no longer just regional, but that they are also becoming (or have already become) global.

----

.... By leveraging biographical information extracted from four Urdu language publications produced by LeT from 1994 to 2007 and statistical information released by the government of Pakistan, this study aims to provide baseline data about LeT’s local recruits, the nature of the time they spend with the group and how these dynamics have changed over time.

----

A summary of our main findings and the some of the related implications follow.

> Fighter Background

- Age: According to our data, the mean age when a recruit joins LeT is 16.95 years, while the militants’ mean age at the time of their death is 21 years. The mean number of years between an LeT militant’s entry and death is 5.14 years.

----

> Residence and Recruitment

- Location: The vast majority of LeT’s fighters are recruited from Pakistan’s Punjab province. While LeT’s recruitment is diversified across the north, central and southern parts of the Punjab, the highest concentration of LeT fighters have come (in order of frequency) from the districts of Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Kasur, Sialkot, Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Khanewal, and Multan.

----

> Training, Deployment and Death

- Location and Level of Training: LeT training has historically occurred in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan and in Afghanistan. Together these two locations have accounted for 75 percent of LeT militant training over time.

The highest level of training reported by most LeT militants (62 percent of available data) was specialized training (Daura-e-Khasa, LeT’s advanced course), the majority of which occurred in Muzaffarabad.

----

- Fighting Fronts and Location of Death: Ninety four percent of fighters list Indian Kashmir as a fighting front. Although less relevant, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Tajikistan and Bosnia are also identified in the biographies as other fronts.

According to our data, the districts of Kupwara, Baramulla and Poonch in Indian Kashmir account for almost half of all LeT militant deaths since 1989.

--**--

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 15 Apr 2014 21:35

Came across a this (paccki) channel which seems to have some footage of attacks on Indian troops in Kashmir similar to what we see the middle east.
http://www.dailymotion.com <slash> Rashedoon

muttukur · Post by **muttukur** » 26 Apr 2014 13:05

Sad news
http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014 ... ter-15.asp

Quote : According to sources, the Major received critical injuries after a militant rose from the debris of a destroyed house and opened indiscriminate fire on SOG men and Army.

High time they use technology to recce the blasted site

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 26 Apr 2014 19:22

not the first time that this has happened !! so sad.

Varoon Shekhar · Post by **Varoon Shekhar** » 26 Apr 2014 19:32

That must be at least 7 people dead in Kashmir, since the election campaign began, including the major, policemen and civilians. Someone in India should be keeping track of all these terrorist attacks, because the international/Western media sure isn't doing it. Each one of these deaths would be headline news in the US, Canada or France.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 26 Apr 2014 22:17

http://www.hindustantimes.com/news-feed ... 12571.aspx

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/e ... 950621.ece

Army personnel near the house where the three Lashkar-e-Toiba militants were hiding in Shopian on Friday.

Army personnel rush for a final assault near the house where Lashkar-e-Taiba militants were hiding during an encounter at Kellar in Shopian, Jammu and Kashmir. (PTI Photo) Right: A file photo of Major Mukund Vardharajan who died in the encounter

anand_sankar · Post by **anand_sankar** » 27 Apr 2014 15:22

Major Mukund Varadarajan is OTA 81 not 78. As usual our media gets its facts all wrong.

RIP.

A relief fund for his young family is being setup by his batchmates.

member_28108 · Post by **member_28108** » 27 Apr 2014 15:26

It is high time we start using robotic instruments to kill these terrorists or gas them etc to flush them out.