JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

[Sathish_A]

For a moment, I thought this was real

[Philip]

Pentagon's chief weapons tester ,Michael Gilmore says JSF's software "unacceptable".

Exclusive: Pentagon report faults F-35 on software, reliability
By Andrea Shalal-Esa
WASHINGTON Fri Jan 24, 2014

(Reuters) - A new U.S. Defense Department report warns that ongoing software, maintenance and reliability problems with Lockheed Martin Corp's F-35 stealth fighter could delay the Marine Corps' plans to start using its F-35 jets by mid-2015.

The latest report by the Pentagon's chief weapons tester, Michael Gilmore, provides a detailed critique of the F-35's technical challenges, and focuses heavily on what it calls the "unacceptable" performance of the plane's software, according to a 25-page draft obtained by Reuters.

The report forecast a possible 13-month delay in completing testing of the Block 2B software needed for the Marine Corps to clear the jets for initial combat use next year, a priority given the high cost of maintaining current aging warplanes.

Gilmore, director of operational test and evaluation for the U.S. Defense Department, has long been critical of the $392 billion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Pentagon's costliest weapons program, and the latest report is no exception.

The report, due to be sent to Congress this week, said the aircraft is proving less reliable and harder to maintain than expected, and remains vulnerable to propellant fires sparked by missile strikes.

Air Force Lieutenant General Chris Bogdan, the Pentagon's F-35 program chief, said in a statement to Reuters that Gilmore's report was factually accurate but did not reflect concerted efforts under way by his office and industry to address software, reliability and maintenance issues.

"The basic design of the F-35 is sound, and test results underscore our confidence in the ultimate performance that the United States and its international partners and allies value so highly," Bogdan said. "Of course, we recognize risks still exist in the program, but they are understood and manageable."

Bogdan said he remained confident that the F-35's initial combat capability would be ready in time for the U.S. Marine Corps next year, and cited a series of successful weapons tests done late last year. He said the program was about halfway through developmental testing after completing 1,153 flights and accomplishing more than 9,000 test objectives in 2013.

Lockheed is developing the F-35 for the Marines, Air Force and Navy, and eight countries that helped fund its development: Britain, Canada, Australia, Norway, Italy, Turkey, Denmark and the Netherlands. Israel and Japan have also ordered the jet.

An official at South Korea's arms procurement agency, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration said any delays beyond an intended 2018 delivery date would be "problematic". Seoul has said it would buy 40 of the F-35s, though still has to finalize this order

A senior Japan Defense Ministry official said: "We can do nothing but ask the JPO (Joint Program Office) to speed up the program." Tokyo plans to buy 42 of the stealth fighters, with the first four due for delivery by March 2017.

The Australian Defence Force declined to comment. Australia is one of the largest international buyers with plans for up to 100 F-35s.

The F-35 program, which began in 2001, is 70 percent over initial cost estimates, and years behind schedule, but top U.S. officials say it is now making progress. They have vowed to safeguard funding for the program to keep it on track.

OTHER CRITIQUES

Earlier this week, the nonprofit Center for International Policy said Lockheed had greatly exaggerated its estimate that the F-35 program sustained 125,000 U.S. jobs to shore up support for the program.

Both reports could provide fresh fodder for critics of the F-35 program, including backers of Boeing Co, which is hoping to sell the U.S. Navy more of its F/A-18 fighter jets.

But Lockheed Chief Executive Marillyn Hewson told reporters on Thursday that she saw continued support for the F-35 from the U.S. government, Congress and foreign allies.

"There's no question ... that we need the F-35. It brings a very important, unique capability for our nation," she said.

Lockheed spokesman Michael Rein said Gilmore's report confirmed the F-35 was meeting or exceeding flight test goals, and the company would continue to tackle issues as they arose.

"The challenges identified are known items and the normal discoveries found in a test program of this size and complexity," he said.

Gilmore's report acknowledged the F-35's progress in 2013 on flight testing, despite government furloughs and two fleet-wide groundings. But it said the program was still struggling to integrate the plane's "mission systems," or sensors, weapons and other equipment needed for use in military operations.

The current software generated too many nuisance warnings and resulted in poor sensor performance. Further work on software had been slowed by testing required to validate earlier fixes, the report said.

It said Lockheed had delivered F-35 jets with 50 percent or less of the software capabilities required by its production contracts with the Pentagon.

The computer-based logistics system known as ALIS was fielded with "serious deficiencies" and remained behind schedule, which affected servicing of existing jets needed for flight testing, the report said. It said the ALIS diagnostic system failed to meet even basic requirements.

But the most immediate concern involved the Block 2B version of the software that must be completed in order for the Marines to start using the jets from July 2015.

"Initial results with the new increment of Block 2B software indicate deficiencies still exist in fusion, radar, electronic warfare, navigation, electro-optical target system, distributed aperture system, helmet-mounted display system, and datalink," the report said, noting the problems could delay efforts to complete Block 2B development and flight test.

The report cited projections that the 2B software would not be completed until November 2015, 13 months later than planned. This would delay release to the F-35 fleet until July 2016, a year after the Marines want to start using the jets.

It said there is also little margin for any weight growth, and the airplane's increased use of electrical systems makes it vulnerable to lightning and missile strikes.

Bogdan said extensive studies had showed the plane's radar-evading capabilities, advanced sensors, ability to fuse data, advanced countermeasures and electronic attack equipment greatly reduced the chance that it would be hit by enemy fire.

The numerous reports posted from AWST,statements from US top generals ,Pentagon evaluation,outside analysts,etc., continue to show that the JSF programme is plagued with serious developmental problems which appear to be increasing ,reduction in performance criteria to help the aircraft pass its testing regime,component failures increasing rather than reducing,slipping in deadlines,increasing in costs of acquisition and maintenance,making prospective buyers and those already committed nervous about the state of the programme and the ultimate costs and capability of the aircraft.

[Viv S]

Pentagon's chief weapons tester ,Michael Gilmore says JSF's software "unacceptable".

Exclusive: Pentagon report faults F-35 on software, reliability
By Andrea Shalal-Esa
WASHINGTON Fri Jan 24, 2014

(Reuters) - A new U.S. Defense Department report warns that ongoing software, maintenance and reliability problems with Lockheed Martin Corp's F-35 stealth fighter could delay the Marine Corps' plans to start using its F-35 jets by mid-2015.

The numerous reports posted from AWST,statements from US top generals ,Pentagon evaluation,outside analysts,etc., continue to show that the JSF programme is plagued with serious developmental problems which appear to be increasing ,reduction in performance criteria to help the aircraft pass its testing regime,component failures increasing rather than reducing,slipping in deadlines,increasing in costs of acquisition and maintenance,making prospective buyers and those already committed nervous about the state of the programme and the ultimate costs and capability of the aircraft.

The bottom-line is that the F-35 might be delayed as they work to complete software development and improve reliability. So be it. It'll still be combat capable long before the PAK FA or even a Rafale delivered by HAL.

As far as 'nervous' export customers are concerned, the program wrangled four new ones over the last year and Australia just formally ordered 58 units this week. Orders from UK & Singapore are also expected before the end of the year.

[Philip]

CDI: Pentagon’s Joint Strike Fighter Drops Another Load
picard578 / 2 weeks ago

This week some Pentagon officials morphed into street cleaners as the Defense Department’s F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter” left yet another load of unpleasantness on the street for all to see. It came in the form of major new revelations from Jason Sherman at InsideDefense.com with an article titled “DOD Warns Congress JSF Costs Could Skyrocket To $388 Billion.” The new, higher cost estimate intensified the sticker shock for the already unaffordable F-35. The word went out from the “E” ring of the Pentagon; reporters and others – including myself – were told it was all “shaky math,” “garbage,” “totally wrong.”

It was also directly from a DOD report, sent to Congress, obtained by InsideDefense.com and other reporters, and released to subscribers at the InsideDefense.com website.

The “Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) F-35 As of December 31, 2009″ repeated some earlier information about F-35 costs, but it also dropped a new load of unwelcome new data. Previously, Congress had been told that the average price for each F-35 would be $79 million to $95 million, with primary emphasis on the lower figure.

But the F-35 SAR report made painfully obvious two devices used to understate the cost.

First, as some aware observers – none of them present at recent congressional hearings – already knew, the $79 to $95 million band of unit cost did not include all expenses, specifically, about $50 billion in research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures.

Second, that band of cost was stated in “base year” dollars. “Base year” dollars are normalized to an early date in the program’s history and, therefore, understate the amount of dollars that actually must be appropriated. “Then Year” dollars are the ones you want to know. They are the amounts that Congress actually appropriates.

The Pentagon likes both “base year” dollars and cost estimates that ignore huge portions of program outlays; they help to get the camel’s nose under the tent with low ball price estimates.

Careful reading of the SAR report (for example, on pp. 36) reveals that including the RDT&E expenses yields a total program unit cost of $97.1 million for each F-35. But, it’s still in those worse than useless “base year” dollars, specifically fiscal year 2002 dollars. (If you can find BMW car dealership that sells cars in 2002 dollars, buy one; it won’t cost you more than a Volkswagen.)

The F-35 SAR reveals that $97.1 million in base year dollars translates into $133.6 million in actual future appropriations (“then year” dollars).

But, there’s more in a well buried passage, on page 37. There, we are told that a new “complete Independent Cost Estimate is in process. The Department expects this analysis will result in increases to the stated [unit cost] estimates. The projected range of estimates are $97 – $115 million … in Base Year 2002 dollars.”

So it looks like the $97 million, or rather the more honest $134 million, unit cost estimate is about to be overtaken by events. We’ve got the new, higher estimate ($115 million), but it is only in those worse than useless “base year” 2002 dollars. Nowhere do we find in the report the more straightforward “then year” dollar cost for the $115 million. Luckily, however, eight grade math and ever-helpful inside the Pentagon sources both provide the same answer: $158 million per aircraft. So, it’s not $79 million per aircraft; it’s not $134 million; it’s $158 million. That’s twice what the Pentagon was pretending last month.

Those same sources, and the same math, enable us to convert the old – soon to be over taken by events – cost for the entire program to what insiders in the Pentagon now expect: $388 billion, or what Sherman reported in his April 6 article. It was this figure that caused the major E ring eruption. However, on April 8, officials in the Pentagon admitted to Sherman, and the public, he was basically right – “in the ballpark.”

Even more unfortunate for the after-parade Pentagon street cleaners, there’s a lot more in the F-35 SAR report.

As Sherman also reported in another article on April 7 (See “DOD: JSF Combat Radius Shrinks, Logistic Footprint Grows As Design Matures”), the F-35 is beginning to go south on some of its performance specs. Specifically, the projected performance for range, payload, logistics requirements, and sortie rate of the various F-35 models are beginning to deteriorate from the originally stated “baseline” performance estimates and program objectives. It is a process that will continue as the original F-35 performance promises meet reality in the form of flight testing, now only 3 percent complete.

Finally, pages 25 and 28 of the SAR report show what Pentagon mythmakers are pretending they will pay for future F-35 production. For the next Pentagon budget proposal for fiscal year 2012, the unit cost – counting only production, not RDT&E, costs – appears painfully reasonable: the Navy will produce 21 copies of its F-35 versions for $5.1 billion. That calculates to $243 million each. That is what Navy F-35s are actually costing these days.

But the so-called “learning curve” promises to make Navy F-35s much more affordable.

For 2013, the Navy plans to pay $188 million for each of its F-35s.

In 2014, it plans to pay $173 million.

In 2015, it will be $156 million

$118 million in 2016.

Tables on Air Force production show the same trends.

Nirvana! The learning curve permits the advocates to pretend that the average unit price can be lowered to rescue the program from even higher costs than those now projected: As we get deeper into production, optimization of production processes will result in cheaper and cheaper aircraft. That’s what happens in mass production, they argue.

There is only one problem: modern combat aircraft are not Chevrolets. For them, the learning curve barely exists. As Franklin “Chuck” Spinney has shown us for aircraft like the F-14, F-15, F-18, Apache Helicopter, V-22 Tilt Rotor, B-1 bomber, and even the less complex F-16 and relatively simple A-10 in the 1980s and 1990s, the projected “learning curves” were always vastly overstated. In fact, Spinney’s analysis, which was based on official data in the Pentagon’s budget planning and execution documents, showed that the Pentagon could not even use learning curves to predict the costs of runway cleaners and pickup trucks bought on the commercial market.

Once you look at the details, this denial of the prevailing conventional wisdom becomes perfectly obvious. A major reason is that there never exists a stable design to mass produce. Engineering change proposals, upgrades in the form of new production blocks, product improvements, and new requirements from the user never end. Modern tactical aircraft procurement programs never really allow a design to stabilize to enable “mass production” or any meaningful optimization of production and of the resulting cost. For this and several other reasons, the learning curve is mostly illusion.

In the case of the F-22, the closest design and fabrication cousin to the F-35, the learning curve actually went backwards late in production; the unit costs went up. That is by no means new — the same thing happened with the F-14 and the F-15. For the late models of the “mass produced” F-16, the block 50 model, unit costs were about twice the amount of early production models.

When the non-learning curve starts to become obvious in the F-35, the latest total program cost, $388 billion, will be a thing of the past, a long gone whisper of what never could have been.

Costing more and doing less is the standard profile for failing Pentagon programs. The F-35 is becoming today’s poster for what in the 1980s Washington Post cartoonist Herblock depicted as a $600 toilet seat hanging around the neck of then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. The modern day cartoonist for the Post, Tom Toles, would be entirely correct to give us a depiction of new millstone for Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the F-35.

Perhaps, if we are lucky at some future date, when still more F-35 cost growth is first extracted from a user-unfriendly DOD document by an enterprising journalist, the E ring of the Pentagon will not lunge for invective, but will appreciate that it is being told something it didn’t know and that others in the building didn’t want them to know.

Alas, perhaps someday.

Even TIME magazine takes potshots at the JSF!

How Not to Buy The Most Costly Weapon System in the History of the World

New study says Pentagon used wrong strategy to buy the $400 billion F-35 fighter
By Mark Thompson @MarkThompson_DCDec. 18, 2013

The good news is that someone finally did a study to see if one-size-fits-all-services warplanes actually save the taxpayers money.

The bad news is that the answer is no.

The even badder news is that the Pentagon’s most costly weapons system ever—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which last week delivered the 100th of an expected run of 2,457 fighters for $400 billion—is precisely that kind of fighter. You, your children, and grandkids will apparently be paying more for it than they should for decades to come.

But despite such grim tidings this holiday season, that’s actually not the worst news in that new report from the Rand Corp. That would be this:

Although there have been many analyses of the potential savings from joint aircraft programs, there have been no comprehensive analyses of actual outcomes based on cost data from historical joint aircraft programs.

In other words, the Pentagon (with congressional help) has routinely been saying “trust us” when it comes to such procurements, but never following up to see if that trust is warranted.

For the past 50 years, the study says, such programs were “thought to save significant Life Cycle Cost (LCC) by eliminating duplicate efforts and realizing economies of scale.”

Turns out not to be true.

Granted, comparing complicated machines built decades apart is challenging. But before launching the F-35 program, the Pentagon had already developed such multi-service aircraft (or tried to) including the F-111, the A-7 and the F-4. You might think that proving the key reason for developing a joint warplane—to save money—would be elementary due diligence before launching a $400 billion program to develop a joint warplane.

The Rand study—Do Joint Fighter Programs Save Money?—finds that promise unfulfilled. “Although joint aircraft programs do, in theory, save costs by sharing RDT&E [research, development, test, and evaluation] resources, increasing production runs, and utilizing economies of scale in O&S [operations and support], these savings are too small to offset the substantial additional average cost growth historically observed in the acquisition phase,” Rand concludes. “Historical joint aircraft programs have not yielded overall LCC savings compared with single-service programs.”
rand-lcc chart

Rand Corp.

The two bars on the left show cost estimates at the start of the programs, with the joint warplane cheaper. The two bars on the right show how nine years later, the joint program has become more costly than single-service warplanes.

In the several programs surveyed, Rand reports that the cost of buying a joint airplane grew by 65%, compared to 24% for single-service aircraft, in the nine years following the beginning of full-scale development (known as “Milestone B” inside the Pentagon, and selected to help make comparisons among different aircraft uniform). The F-35, Rand estimates, will cost about $800 billion by that point; three separate aircraft would have cost less than $600 billion, a savings of roughly 25%.

But that’s only the money. The real danger of relying on a single aircraft is that it could endanger its pilots. “During the Korean War, the U.S. Air Force was able to rapidly upgrade one of its four jet fighters, the F-86 Sabre, to meet the surprise introduction of the Russian Mikoyan-Gurevich (MiG)-15, a Soviet-designed fighter that was more capable than any other U.S. fighter in the Air Force or Navy inventory,” Rand says. “Had the Air Force and Navy relied exclusively on a single joint fighter other than the F-86, it might not have been able to respond quickly to the unanticipated new threat posed by the MiG-15.”

The fundamental challenge of building a multi-service fighter is that one size doesn’t fit all in the war-fighting business. “They are separate airplanes,” Thomas Christie, the Pentagon’s chief weapons tester from 2001 to 2005, told Time earlier this year of the F-35′s three variants. “We would have been better off if we’d let the services go off and do their own thing.” A bonus would have been multiple plane builders—instead of a single contractor—to keep the companies on their toes, he added.

In the case of the Lockheed-built F-35, the Air Force placed a premium on stealth and speed, the Navy needed an airframe that could handle punishing carrier operations, and the Marines demanded a plane that could land vertically on its amphibious ships. What began more or less as a single blueprint for all three versions has turned into three ever-changing sets of drawings for three very different fighters.

“The idea that we could produce a committee design that is good for everybody is fundamentally wrong,” said Merrill McPeak, the Air Force chief of staff from 1990 to 1994. ” “If the services can all use the same piece of major combat equipment, then you have to wonder why the services are separate.”

The Rand report confirms Christie’s and McPeak’s gut feelings. “From the Tactical Fighter, Experimental (TFX)/F‑111 program in the 1960s through the [F-35] JSF program today, the attempt to accommodate multiple operating environments, service-specific missions, and differing performance and technology requirements in common joint fighter designs has increased programmatic and technical complexity and risk, thus prolonging RDT&E and driving up joint acquisition costs,” it says. “At the same time, service-specific requirements and demands tend to produce less commonality and lead to more variants, thus reducing the main source of joint cost savings anticipated in procurement and O&S.”

Rand’s bottom line—a day late, and $400 billion short—is that the Pentagon should “avoid future joint fighter and other complex joint aircraft programs.”
by Taboola

"Aircraft coming off the production line are incomplete and incapable of flight"(!)
CDI: Pentagon reports continuing Lockheed Martin failures
picard578 / April 12, 2014

Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the CDI Straus Military Reform Project has obtained almost two years of monthly reports from the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) on Lockheed Martin’s production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The documents do not paint a pretty picture, explains Straus Military Reform Project Director Winslow Wheeler.

The Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) most recent reports cover the months July through November 2009. The full reports are available below. Their major points, as summarized by Winslow Wheeler, are as follows:

The F-35 assembly line at Forth Worth, Texas is being cannibalized for parts to support flight testing. This may be the first time an assembly line has been cannibalized for parts. See the summary of the August report below.

The continuing and sometimes deteriorating nature of the delays at Lockheed-Martin’s (L-M) Fort Worth plant refutes the L-M contention that things are getting better, and that the F-35 program learned from the past and with new design techniques is avoiding the kinds of problems experienced by “legacy” aircraft programs.

The cause, nature and implications of the “stand-down” mentioned in the November report could well be important, but are unreported by the press and are a matter looking for explanation.

July Report: Page 4 talks about a new DCMA estimate to complete System Design and Development, but the numbers are redacted. DCMA calls the L-M estimate “inadequate.” This DCMA estimate is before the Pentagon’s second independent Joint Estimating Team (JET II) estimate was finished and available, and is presumably independent. Most importantly, it clearly was available for Defense Secretary Gates’ Forth Worth visit in August. Was it briefed to him? If so, why was Gates so positive about the program at that visit; if it was not, is this the reason why the F-35 program manager, General Heinz was fired due to troubling information not getting to Gates on this high visibility program.
Page 4 also mentions without further discussion a “BF-4 STOVL Upper Lift Fan Door incident.” The context is the rising costs of the overall system, but there are no details. Given that the Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) F-35 B is on a short schedule to deployment, is this a problem that will further complicate the schedule for the F-35 B?

Page 4 identifies a “Corrective Action Plan” to address “EVMS,” the “Earned Value Management system,” or the system that L-M uses to measure and report execution of the program and its budget. I understand it to be the core method DOD uses to monitor and manage the program. Results of the plan are due to DCMA in August. (The October report states that the plan was submitted, but no specifics are reported. It is only stated that “a more focused Review will occur in three to five months by the DCMA….” [Page 4 of October report.]) There has been some reporting on the failure to meet EVMS criteria in the press. The threat to L-M is that it will have to maintain its “certification” to perform EVMS calculations – if it is lost, L-M could end up not legally eligible to be a contractor to the federal government.

August Report: L-M is cannibalizing the production line to provide spare parts for the flight test program (pp. 3 – 4). These cannibalizations are “causing significant workload to supply chain personnel and are disrupting the production line.” There is no further discussion or explanation. This may be the first time a development aircraft’s production line was cannibalized for spares.

September Report: “Execution of the Flight Test Schedule continues to be a significant Program concern.” (Page 3.)

“The volume of major CR’s [Change Requests] is projected to continue.” “…the number of major changes has exceeded projections. Additionally, the impact of timing these changes and the disruption to the floor were not anticipated.” (Page 3.) This would seem to be exactly the kind of thing that L-M promised would not happen: i.e. that they had learned from previous programs and with the benefits of advanced computer design, the F-35 would not have the kinds of design disruptions so common with “legacy” aircraft.
Page 4 addresses another delay issue: ”Wing-at-Mate” problems. These, I understand, have to do with the decision to mate the wing to the fuselage before the wing is “stuffed.” The plan was to mate the completed wing to the fuselage. But, because of delays, L-M decided to add wing components after mating, which – being inefficient — slows things down more.

“Composite production is not meeting the demands of the production operations – composites for the AFT and Empennage assemblies are paced by the availability and quality of composites.” (Page 4.) Again, the modern design feature of composites, said to not just reduce weight (of the overweight aircraft) but to facilitate design and fabrication is proving to be a source of delay and complication.

October Report: Flight test schedule still “a significant Program concern.” “AF-1 continues to be in a maintenance period as of this report, progressing towards taxi tests and first flight.” (Page 3.) This is an example of a problem addressed in earlier DCMA reports: aircraft coming off the production line incomplete and incapable of flight. They are sent to adjacent hangars for post-production production. This pre-first flight “maintenance” would seem to be a misleading misnomer.

Report also mentions that the program is about to get its “sixth schedule revision.” (Page 3.)

More details on the “Wing-at-Mate overlap” which appears to be improving. (Page 3.)

November Report: Due to the need for the sixth schedule revision – coming in early 2010 – “Recent Program summary charts, scorecards and management briefings do not consistently depict performance to the master schedule baseline.” (Page 3.)

The graph on page 6 shows Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft delivery rate is on average 80 days late. The rate significantly deteriorated in April and stayed at that deteriorated rate. Individual aircraft deliveries are significantly above that: AF-6 will be 92 days late; AF-7 will be 142 days late. A sentence presumably explaining the increased delay was redacted. (Page 6.) This category is rated “red” by DCMA. On the other hand, DCMA confirms public reports that while LRIP 1 and 2 aircraft are months late, the “risk” that LRIP 3 aircraft will be late is rated as “low.”

Suppliers’ Delivery Rate (Page 8.) is also getting worse, now down to about 75 percent on-time. This category is also rated “red” by DCMA.

The Management Reserve of money is gone, “further straining the financial management of the Program.” Amounts are redacted. Given DOD Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Ashton Carter’s decision to use LRIP production money for SDD, how much of that will go to L-M’s management reserve slush fund, rather than directly to SDD activities?

A section is titled “Maintenance and Quality Verification Stand-Down,” immediately followed by several redacted lines. Later the section states “This incident triggered a maintenance and quality verification stand-down to determine systemic root causes for increasing aircraft impoundment and suspension of operations incidents to date.” And later, “The focus areas are Software, Rework/Repairs, System Check Out Procedures (SCOPs) and Aerospace Equipment Instructions (AEIs).” (Page 4.) The discussion in the section titled “Improve Software Productivity” refers to “F-35 stand-down events” and explains that a “Joint Process Review” effort to address software issues was “postponed until further notice as it was overcome by F-35 stand down events that took precedence.” (Page 18.)

This “stand-down” would appear to have some significance, but has not been reported to the public by L-M or DOD. It has also not been addressed by the press as far as I am aware.

USN reduces numbers of JSF buy by approx. 50%.USN's CNO,Am.Greenert quoted. Wny Growlers are required to fight the EW battle ,apart from F-22s otherwise the JSF would be "irrelevant" as psoetd earlier.

http://defensetech.org/2014/04/25/f-35- ... -memories/

Plenty of questions were asked about the Navy’s commitment to the program when the service cut its F-35C five-year acquisition plan from 69 to 36 aircraft. More questions were asked when Greenert added the Growlers to the unfunded priority list.

Greenert has repeatedly said the Navy is committed to the F-35 program, but he did hedge in regards to the value of stealth in his recent Congressional testimony.

“[Stealth] is needed for what we have in the future for at least 10 years out there and there is nothing magic about that decade,” Greenert told Congress. “But I think we need to look beyond that. So to me, I think it’s a combination of having aircraft that have stealth but also aircraft that can suppress other forms of radio frequency electromagnetic emissions so that we can get in.”

Read more: http://defensetech.org/2014/04/25/f-35- ... z30VJhg4Yo
Defense.org

[Viv S]

Just to clarify though, for BRFites -

While I think its going end up as a fairly successful aircraft, I'm NOT proposing India look to acquire F-35s. We need to focus on the Tejas over the short term and AMCA over the long term.

In the interim, we need to something to hold the line till the AMCA arrives in strength - ideally a simple off-the-shelf acquisition. Let the IAF/MoD run a PAK FA vs F-35 competition, with the better offer winning.

[Philip]

We've already committed ourselves to the FGFA.There is no alternative for us in the next 10-15 years as we cannot develop/build/produce the AMCA before that timeframe.The unanswered Q is what do we bring to the table in unique tech development-meeting our requirements,and at what cost which will determine the number of aircraft that we can afford.The JSF from the wealth of info simply does not measure up to what we need,to counter PLAAF stealth birds and maintain our qualitative superiority which we now possess with the MKIs.

One crucial difference between the FGFA/T-50 programme and the JSF,that emerges from the various info,is that the US made a strategic mistake clubbing the USMC requirement for a STOVL aircraft as a JSF variant.Instead of one aircraft satisfying the 3 services,what emerged was 3 mutants of a basic design,with much reduced commonality.This has crippled the aircraft's performance and costs,as pointed out in a few reports/analyses.They would've been better off with 3 separate birds at 25% of the cost.

[NRao]

I think India (and perhaps Japan too) should hire Sweetman as a technical adviser to the Rashtrapathi. What better person than him?

[NRao]

Data points.

The F-35 JSF: What Is a Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft?

As well as collecting information from onboard and remote sources – and fusing it gives the pilot broad battlespace awareness – the JSF can automatically collect vast amounts of data on enemy forces, including targeting information, and transmit it to other friendly forces in the air and on the ground.

[Viv S]

We've already committed ourselves to the FGFA.

Frightening prospect - $6 billion down the drain, but fortunately all we've signed so far is a Preliminary Design Contract worth $295 million, of which about $150 million would be India's share. And since we're sticking to the PAK FA's design, most of that is probably unspent.

The unanswered Q is what do we bring to the table in unique tech development-meeting our requirements,and at what cost which will determine the number of aircraft that we can afford.

Well.. was kind of hoping you'd answer that question.

The JSF from the wealth of info simply does not measure up to what we need,to counter PLAAF stealth birds and maintain our qualitative superiority which we now possess with the MKIs.

The fact that the US closed down the F-22 production and cancelled the NATF would suggest that the USAF & USN believe the F-35 is up to the challenge of countering the Chinese birds. However the missing aspect to the debate is - 'Is the PAK FA capable of countering the SEAD/DEAD threats that the IAF faces (unlike the RuAF) and providing comparable strike & CAS support'? No internal LDP for starters.

One crucial difference between the FGFA/T-50 programme and the JSF,that emerges from the various info,is that the US made a strategic mistake clubbing the USMC requirement for a STOVL aircraft as a JSF variant.Instead of one aircraft satisfying the 3 services,what emerged was 3 mutants of a basic design,with much reduced commonality.This has crippled the aircraft's performance and costs,as pointed out in a few reports/analyses.

The USMC, RAF/RN, Italian & Spanish navies will between them, order over 500 aircraft. The cost of developing a separate Harrier replacement aside, that's a big enough number to have a critical impact on the cost of the CTOL variants. Its also being ordered by Singapore and is an fighter option for the Australian, Korean & Japanese helicopter carriers.

For the record, the JSF program evolved from the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF), a joint USAF-USMC program to deliver a F-16/Harrier replacement. The USN was the later entry owing to the NATF's cancellation.

In all the brouhaha over 'reduced commonality' the purpose of commonality in the first place gets forgotten. Its to produce greater economies of scale (and easier support). Divert 500 orders into a different program and out goes the baby with bathwater.

They would've been better off with 3 separate birds at 25% of the cost.

Stealth fighter for $25 million fly away? :whistle:

[Philip]

The FGFA is being equipped with long range missiles both strike and AAMs in the region of 200+KM,anti-radar strike even more,as in earlier posts.So the problem of dealing with enemy air defences has already been factored in .

‘Absolute killer’ air-to-air missile readied for Russian 5G fighter jet

Published time: December 03, 2013
Russia is finalizing an advanced air engagement system combining “fire-and-forget” guidance and “single-shot kill” ability within a single air-to-air missile. The system aims to frustrate any missile evasion maneuvers enabling a target to escape.

The K-77M air-to-air missile with this advanced guidance system will be fitted on to the fifth-generation fighter jet PAK-FA (advanced frontline aircraft system, also codenamed T-50) and it will start to be delivered to the Russian Air Force by 2017.

The major innovation of the K-77M air-to-air missile is its guidance system, based on an active phased array antenna (APAA) of its own, Izvestia daily reports. With APAA onboard, the missile has zero reaction time to unexpected evolutions of the target, which means that once it locks on an aircraft, it would hit it no matter what aerial acrobatics the target would perform to shake off the inbound killer missile.

The APAA guidance system for K-77M missiles has been elaborated by the Detal design bureau, based in the town of Kamensk-Uralsky in Russia’s Urals. The enterprise is a subdivision of Russia’s state-owned Tactical Missile Munitions Corporation.

Mikhail Vershinin, chief engineer of the Detal design bureau, told Izvestia that the enterprise is currently looking for a contractor which would install a state-of-the-art production line at the facility so that the system could start to be manufactured as soon as 2015.

Photo from militaryrussia.ru

An active phased array antenna consists of a large number of cone-shaped cells installed under a transparent-to-radio-waves cap on the nose of the missile. Each cell receives only a part of the signal, but once digitally processed, the information from all cells is summarized into a “full picture,” enabling the K-77M missile to immediately respond to sharp turns of the target, making interception practically inevitable.

A similar technology is used in widely known Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, manufactured by Raytheon in the United States.

But the K-77M missile is much smaller, because it is supposed to fit into the interior bays of the PAK-FA fighter jet to ensure its stealth capabilities. Yet for the K-77M missile itself, a stealth aircraft or a UAV is a legitimate target it would track and destroy ordinarily.

The advanced missile system is fully compatible with the digital communication system of the fifth generation fighter jet, but also could be used on modernized fighter jets of the previous generation.

The Active Phased Array Antenna is the most modern radar technology today, and every such device is extremely expensive to produce. Yet the price of the target a missile equipped with APAA can destroy is much higher, so if the K-77M missile can guarantee hitting the target, it is worth the cost, Aleksandr Khramchikhin, an expert from the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, told Izvestia.

http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/new-russ ... -accuracy/
New Russian Air-to-Air Missiles Will Field Almost Perfect Accuracy
The new missiles may never miss their targets by solving a years-old problem in radar technology.
By Ankit Panda
December 07, 2013

http://aviationweek.com/awin/sukhoi-t-5 ... nnovations
Aug 2013 report.Xcpt.

....including the existing Kh-35UE anti-ship missile, Kh-38ME air-to-surface weapon and the RVV-MD, an improved version of the R-73E short-range air-to-air missile with an enlarged seeker field of view and a claimed 30% range increase. A significant development is the new Kh-58UShKE, a long-range (up to 245 km), Mach 4-capable anti-radar missile originally produced for the MiG-25BM Foxbat-E, fitted with folding wings for internal carriage.

The point has been missed,not that there will be not enough orders for the STOVL JSF version-the USMC needs a few hundreds to equip its amphib ships,but that the "one design/configuration fits all" has resulted in inherent design drawbacks affecting the other versions in capability because of the lift-fan requirement of the B version.As one analyst put it,the extra space available unfortunately could not be used for additional weaponry,only an extra fuel tank.The performance stats have been posted showing the poor acceleration,climb rate,service ceiling,G-force reduction,etc.,and lower speed to,just M 1.6 when compared to the M-2.0 to 2-4 of other fighters.These are serious drawbacks when engaged in a dogfight inevitable if it cannot win the BVR battle being equipped with only 2 BVR missiles and "without the F-22 is irrelevant".
Studies made in the US showed that 3 different aircraft for each requirement would've cost 25% less in development and the aircraft would've been tailor made to each service's requirements.

DID http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the ... rsy-05089/

Meanwhile, key radar advances are already deployed in the most advanced Russian surface-to-air missile systems, and existing IRST (infra-red scan and track) systems deployed on advanced Russian and European fighters are extending enemy detection ranges against radar-stealthy aircraft. Fighter radar pick-up capability of up to 25 nautical miles by 2020 is proposed against even ultra-stealthy aircraft like the F-22, coupled with IRST ability to identify AMRAAM missile firings and less infrared-stealthy aircraft at 50 nautical miles or more.

The F-35′s lower infrared and radar stealth levels mean that these advances will affect it more than they’ll affect the F-22. Especially if one assumes a fighter aircraft whose prime in-service period stretches to 2050.

The clear implication of the RAND study is that the F-35 is very likely to wind up facing many more “up close and personal” opponents than its proponents suggest, while dealing with effective beyond-visual-range infrared-guided missiles as an added complication. Unlike the F-22, the F-35 is described as “double inferior” to modern SU-30 family fighters within visual range combat; thrust and wing loading issues are summed up in one RAND background slide as “can’t [out]turn, can’t [out]climb, can’t [out]run.”

The "commonality" factor to bring down costs is actually a big joke with the JSF.Just see the % of commonality of the 3 versions from the official figures.Just 25% in the report posted below.

http://www.wired.com/2010/05/joint-stri ... agon-says/
‘Joint Strike Fighter’ Really 3 Different Jets, Pentagon Says

‘Joint Strike Fighter’ Really 3 Different Jets, Pentagon Says
By Noah Shachtman

The idea was to build a single jet that could take off from a runway, roar from an aircraft carrier — or just lift straight up into the sky. Sure, there’d be small differences in the three “variants” of the Joint Strike Fighter. But the common parts would far, far outweigh them — allowing the Defense Department to buy thousands of the planes at tag-sale prices.

At least, that was the plan. And that was what JSF-maker Lockheed Martin promised: three planes sharing 80 percent of their parts. But the Defense Department no longer believes it. An influential Pentagon team now says that the aircraft “being developed by the F-35 program [may] have as little as 25 percent in common,” Inside Defense reports. Production costs once estimated at $59 million per plane today are looking more like $112 million. R&D costs have gone up another 40 percent, lifting the total price to $323 or so billion for 2,443 fighters.

In April, the Pentagon told Congress that “the total price could swell to as much as $388 billion this summer,” Inside Defense notes. A central explanation for the cost hike: ”less airframe commonality than originally envisioned.”

The bad news keeps coming for the F-35 program, the biggest and costliest in Pentagon history. Last week, the House Armed Services Committee said it would only provide the cash for 30 of the 43 jets planned for next fiscal year under certain conditions – some reasonable, others less so. First, the panel wants the Defense Department to speed up the JSF’s slo-mo schedule of test-flights. According to the committee, “Only 3 of the 14 test aircraft planned for the F-35 program have been delivered. Only 10% of the planned test flights last year were flown.” But the panel also wants the Pentagon spend $485 million on an alternate engine for the JSF that no one in the military seems to want or need. As if this program wasn’t complicated and pricey enough already.

This is a point that our designers should also keep in mind,trying to do too much within v.tight constraints.Perhaps if the LCA had been designed to have been prioritised for the primary role of a lightweight fighter MIG-21 style,leaving the strike role to larger medium sized aircraft,it could've been developed faster. However,the Gripen has certainly been a very cost-effective light multi-role success and the orders speak for themselves.

http://www.pogo.org/about/press-room/re ... n-f35.html
Air Force’s Rush to Station Unproven F-35A Joint Strike Fighter in Burlington is Irresponsible and Potentially Dangerous

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is still unproven and has too many safety and budgetary concerns for the Air Force to move forward with plans to locate the jet at an Air National Guard base in a densely populated area within the next two years.

A preliminary decision to place the F-35A Lightning II with the Vermont Air National Guard at the Burlington International Airport is irresponsible, Project On Government Oversight Executive Director Danielle Brian said in a letter to Acting Air Force Secretary Eric K. Fanning and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III. The pending decision, which is expected any day, should be delayed, Brian wrote.

Air Force reassurances that the F-35A is safe to fly out of residential areas is based on a misleading claim that the jet will have logged 750,000 flying hours by the time it begins to “beddown” in Burlington in 2015. That estimate includes total flying time of all three F-35 variants, despite the fact that the variants share only 25 percent “commonality,” meaning they are three very different types of aircraft.

The actual amount of flying time that the F-35A is projected to have logged is likely much lower than the Air Force claims. An internal Air Force email obtained by POGO states that the F-35A will have logged only 28,000 hours of testing and only about 300,000 hours of training and operational flying by 2020. Pierre Sprey, a POGO founding adviser and one of the architects of the A-10 and F-16 aircraft, puts the number of flying hours likely logged by 2020 closer to 100,000.

The Air Force and Navy typically station new fighter aircraft in desert locations or near the ocean away from residential communities. Yet, Burlington Airport is surrounded by several residential communities. Placing the F-35A in a residential area so early in its development puts lives at risk, Brian said.

POGO is also concerned that budget constraints will delay the F-35A’s testing schedule.

“It is irresponsible for the Air Force to rush the beddown of the still unproven Joint Strike Fighter in a residential community,” Brian said.

Fact borne out in the earlier post:

"Aircraft coming off the production line are incomplete and incapable of flight"(!)
CDI: Pentagon reports continuing Lockheed Martin failures
picard578 / April 12, 2014

PS:Latest estimates as posted in an earlier post ,with news just a few weeks old,shows the cost per unit s actually over $150M.

[NRao]

Slow day, sorry.................................. Found this to be very interesting.

The FGFA is being equipped with long range missiles both strike and AAMs in the region of 200+KM,anti-radar strike even more,as in earlier posts.So the problem of dealing with enemy air defences has already been factored in .

‘Absolute killer’ air-to-air missile readied for Russian 5G fighter jet

Published time: December 03, 2013

..................................................


A similar technology is used in widely known Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, manufactured by Raytheon in the United States.

A few observations:

1) The logic should be the other way around. This 'Absolute killer' Russian missile uses technologies from the US Patriot
2) This data point adds to my concern that the Russians are behind the curve. As I have said, this "5th Gen" techs are not some thing that one can convert to, it has to be thought of and designed ground up. No mix-n-match stuff here


3) IF the argument is that the JSF needs Growler, then what would the PAK-FA and J-20 need?
4) No matter what, IF the IAF uses a "5th Gen" plane, then they too would need a "Growler". Good time to invest in this tech too?

[NRao]

Mar 22, 2014 :: Fighter pilots are ecstatic about the RAAF’s next generation Joint Strike Fighter

BACK in the late 1960s the aircraft chosen as the nation’s key strike weapon into the new millennium — the F-111 swing-wing fighter/bomber — was derided as the “flying Opera House’’ or the “widow maker” due to cost blowouts, delivery delays and serious technical problems that caused several fatal crashes.

When it finally retired from service with the Royal Australian Air Force in December 2010 the much-loved American-built “pig”, as it was affectionately known due to its long snout and ability to operate down low in the weeds, had become a national icon with a reputation as a peacemaker par excellence.

The aircraft did not fire a single shot in anger during four decades, but its mere presence kept the neighbours on their best behaviour. For example when tensions started to rise during the 1999 East Timor crisis, the mere mention of the word “F-111’’ was enough to guarantee that cool heads prevailed in Jakarta.

Fast forward to 2013 and the RAAF’s next generation strike jet, the F-35 Lightning 2 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was suffering from an almost identical image problem due to cost blowouts, delivery delays and serious technical problems.

According to the man charged with overseeing the massive $500 billion project for the Pentagon, United States air force (USAF) Lieutenant General Chris Bogdan, the F-35 will now be delivered to the RAAF on-time in 2018 for the “bargain” price of about $90 million per jet.

The Abbott Government is expected to approve the purchase of up to 86 of the so-called fifth generation “stealth” aircraft for up to $16 billion (lifetime cost) before June this year.

To put Australia’s order into perspective the US military will buy 2443 including 1763 conventional ‘A’ models for the air force, 360 ‘B’ or vertical landing versions for the US Marine Corps and 360 ‘C’ or carrier models for the US Navy. The total production run with foreign sales will exceed 3100 planes.

The fact the US Congress did not take one cent from the program during the budget sequestration crisis indicates that the Americans are fully committed to the JSF as the mainstay of its national defence for the next 30 years or more. {For those that *keep* complaining about budget cuts} {Boom}

Put simply there is only one other aircraft on the planet with the capabilities of the JSF — its big brother the F-22 Raptor. {See below for ref to the PAK-FA and the J-20}

General Bogdan is a straight shooter who has made some powerful enemies within the American military/industrial complex following his blunt criticism last year of their performance and profiteering.

His job also involves arguing the merits of the F-35 against vocal critics both here and in the US and his task is frustrated by the highly-classified nature of the aircraft’s true capabilities. He would love to tell the world what a great capability the JSF is, but he would be locked up for treason because the plane’s most lethal capabilities are well guarded national secrets.

Many critics focus on the jet’s air-to-air combat or “dog fighting” capabilities and the fact that it cannot turn as fast as either a Raptor or a Russian Sukhoi F-27, but that misses the point.

As Bogdan told News Corp Australia, if an F-35 JSF found itself in a dogfight then the pilot has done something very, very wrong.

“He (the enemy) should never see you, he should never hear you and he should be killed long before he knows you are there,” he said.

According to Bogdan the critics simply did not know what the aircraft was capable of or what it brought to modern-day air combat.

“Unfortunately much of that is classified or secret,” he said.

That means we have to take much of what he and the aircraft maker Lockheed Martin’s vast public relations machine say about its capabilities on faith. But that faith is supported by $500 billion of US taxpayer funds.

Even the most vocal critics acknowledge that the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter is the world’s premier air warfare asset and much of the technology on board the F-35 JSF comes straight from the F-22.

Why the JSF ... to keep Australia at the top of the regional air combat pecking order and

Why the JSF ... to keep Australia at the top of the regional air combat pecking order and to allow our fighter pilots like Matt Harper, pictured, to guard our northern sea-air approaches. Source: News Limited

“The aeroplane is doing very well. War fighters love flying it, technical challenges are being overcome and we are just starting to see the real capability of the aircraft,” Bogdan said. {From the horses mouth}

US Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Chip Berke is the only pilot to fly both the F-22 and F-35 stealth jets.

Speaking at a Williams Foundation seminar in Canberra this month he said the F-35 had no peer when it came to the new generation buzz words used by the modern-day fighter pilot — “information dominance”. {So much for TW ratio, turning radius and fat plane with small wings}

He said the old Top Gun fighter pilot mantra that “speed is life, more is better” had been replaced by “information is life, more is better”.

“Information is far more valuable than speed,” he said.

“The F-35 has no peer in terms of information dominance and the sharing of that information.” [Bar none}

RAAF Squadron Leader Matt Harper described himself as the luckiest fighter pilot in Australia after he was selected to spend four years on exchange with the USAF flying the F-22 Raptor out of Alaska.

He said the ground-up stealth capability of the F-22 and the JSF made the aircraft and their pilots virtually “unstoppable”.

“It reduces the adversaries situational awareness to almost zero and provides an exponential increase in survivability,” he said.

Squadron Leader Harper, who is one of two pilots chosen to become the RAAF’s first JSF instructors, said he had flown countless Raptor missions against conventional aircraft and ground threats where the adversary had no idea he was even in their airspace let alone about to destroy them.

Russia (Sukhoi PAK FA) and China (Chengdu J-20) are both building stealth combat aircraft but they are years behind the Americans and are unlikely to be able to match the sensor and information fusion capability of the US any time soon. The remarkable similarities between the Chengdu J-20 and F-35 JSF are not surprising given a Chinese cyber-spying operation several years ago targeted the jet.

As of end of 2013, 50 per cent of the F-35’s flight testing had been completed, 12,000 hours had been flown, and more than 8000 flights had been completed in the 59 operational and 20 test aircraft in the air.

Last year 36 aeroplanes came off Lockheed’s Fort Worth production line with another 36, including Australia’s first two training jets, due to be built this year.

Australia’s first batch of JSF’s are due to arrive at RAAF base Williamtown near Newcastle in NSW by 2018 with the first operational and training squadrons in place at the base during 2020.

General Bogdan said it was entirely reasonable for customers such as Australia to expect the aircraft builder Lockheed Martin and the engine maker Pratt and Whitney to meet an agreed production and cost schedule despite the huge complexity involved.

For example, when it began the three versions of the JSF (air force, Marine and Navy) were expected to share about 70 per cent of their components. That figure has dropped to just 20 per cent.

Then there is the decision making processes involving the three American services plus the eight initial partner countries and several others who have signed up to buy the jet.

“When you put all that together and ... the fact that it is the biggest and most expensive program in US history there is a level of complexity ... that folks don’t appreciate sometimes,” General Bogdan said.

His relationship with Lockheed Martin and Pratt and Whitney reached a deep low in 2013 when he publicly berated the firms for price gouging and refusing to take responsibility for the parlous state of the program.

Since then he has renegotiated key aspects so the companies have some “skin in the game” and will pay a large price if they do not meet production and technical schedules.

“The leadership of Lockheed Martin is doing a much better job of listening to the customer, which is us,” General Bogdan said.

“Allowing the contractor to have control does not work. I have tried to rebalance the risk so that we can get better behaviour.”

Australian firms are also benefiting from the program with more than $300 million worth of work already allocated with the potential for more than $1.5 billion during the production phase.

For example Sydney composites firm Quickstep is supplying carbon fibre composite skins and subassemblies and will manufacture 21 different F-35 parts at its Bankstown Airport facility. The overall agreement to manufacture F-35 parts for several different Original Equipment Manufacturers is valued at up to $700 million to the company over two decades.

Melbourne-based Marand Precision Engineering is building 722 sets of vertical tailfins for the jet even though Australia is buying fewer than 100. The first set will be sent to Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth plant at the end of this month.

If Australia buys 72 aircraft the purchase price will be about $6 billion with another $6 billion required for through life support.

News Corp Australia understands that the Abbott Government might even increase the initial purchase to 86 aircraft for about $7.3 billion or between $14-16 billion all up for their 30-year service life.

[brar_w]

Certain points and observations:

*David Axe and his articles represent a very heavy “tabloid’esqe” side of the JSF debate that we often see from the many jokers in the desi press. Even those that oppose the program would not hesitate to claim that he is biased. Take his articles with a pinch of salt, and do spend some time to do background research on a lot of the points they make, especially since credible rebuttals are often available in print and on the World Wide Web. Searching for negative articles on the JSF does not really help explain the bigger picture, for if one just looked at the negative press that surrounded the F-16 development, one would think it’s the biggest waste of money and not a NATO backbone that it now has become (and a benchmark for all affordable multi role fighters after it), nor does it give one a proper understanding with the capability and challenges that remain in the program. Even the F-22 program had its fair share of haters that claimed that a fast big fighter is useless and a Light fighter is needed.

His claim that the PAKFA will have X Band and L band radar drives home the point. He just does not understand what an integrated Radar and EW suite is and how it works. Imbedded L band sensors are not something that s unknown to the rest of the world. The F-22 has had L band sensors embedded in its wing and fuselage as part of its Electronic warfare, IFF, RWR suite that is integrated since it first flew in the nineties (pick up any half decent book on the f-22). The F-35 also has such sensors embedded in its wings, and fuselage, just as the T-50. Lockheed has always proposed integrated sensors for the Avionics for both fighters. In the F-22 and even more so in the F-35, the radar, Electronic warfare suite, avionics, IFF, RWR, EODAS all work synergistically and billions have been spent on software development to get this level of integration. X band, L band and other sensors that cover other bands are a part of the F-22 suite; they have been since the nineties when the fighter first flew with a full avionics suite. F-16.net forum had posted a picture graphic of the suite some years ago which resulted in the member being banned, but the graphic stayed long enough for folks to save it.

https://www.google.com/search?q=F-22+El ... nd+sensors

http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2005/ ... -into.html

For all those that want to expand their knowledge in the F-22's integrated avionics suite and how it is designed to detect and deal with the threat in an integrated fashion - this would be a good article to start. It does not go into full details of how the active elements in the radar, and the passive embedded antennas around the frame work seamlessly but it does provide enough info to form a basic background on how things were done by the program in the nineties.

http://www.davi.ws/avionics/TheAvionics ... Cap_32.pdf

Folks are quick to jump to the conclusion that since the f-22 intended to but never received side arrays it some how lacks what the proposed T-50 features vis-a-vis L band etc. This is simply untrue. While the F-22 was supposed to get side arrays to expands its primary emitting sensor's FOV those arrays much like the main FCR would operate in the X band. As the program developed, and as lockheed and its partner (primarily Honeywell and Northrop grumman) worked on the JSF program (before and after the contract award) they realized that a wider FOV need not be achieved from active sensors that are expensive, difficult to maintain and degrading to the Low observability. They did not bother with such active sensors on the F-35, and chose to develop high speed, Low probability of intercept datalinks that were short ranged (for formations that fly a few miles apart at most) but fast and LPI that had the same effect. Because F-22 tacticians realized that legacy formations are useless for stealth fighters a 4 ship can build vast amount of SA being spaced outside of VR. That concept led to the MADL ( Multifunction Advanced Data Link: http://www.defensenews.com/article/2013 ... lthy-Comms ) for the F-35, and as soon as it was being validated the F-22 program chose it instead of the side arrays as a means to add more SA to the f-22 team. The F-22 should get it by 2025 or so as the program kicked it into the future as they would rather the F-35 funds mature and validate it rather then spend precious f-22 program money.

Here is a point-by-point rebuttal of most of the stuff David axe uses against the JSF (do check the links within the article and take some time going through it).

http://op-for.com/2014/02/punk-journali ... -f-35.html

Here’s the author’s blog that does go through many of the challenges and criticism leveled at the program and tries to provide a counter, even to many of the stuff that the Canadian media has published, and more of the biased and “mischievous” reporting that we see from others like him.

http://elementsofpower.blogspot.in/

The JSF program has been a remarkably transparent (even by uncle’s standards) program from the start, and much like the F-16 Viper program before it has had its fair share of reporting that is negative. Because the pentagon releases hundreds of pages every year one can easily pick and choose the points to suite one’s view on the program. A case in point is the constant fluctuations in the overall 1 trillion dollar amount. At first it seems too high, but the task of estimating the cost to develop, procure, and maintain the JSF for more than 50 years is no easy task. Especially when we are talking of 2000+ fighters, their infrastructure and inflation within the defense complex over 50 years. The F-35’s rise a few years ago was so much publicized while folks like David Axe take little note of the number, which is significantly lower now than even before the rise. Similarly, the reports that the Typhoons for Germany will have a “significant” ( Double the cost for lesser than planned fighters) cost of ownership rise makes little news on these sites/blogs whereas every little report of the same on the JSF gets blown out of context.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/ ... 6C20140430

It was funny to read much of the criticism about the program from the GAO reports that folks like Axe reprinted, and when the program chief was hammered on this, he said that the issues were cleared by the time the final report was published and released to the public. Helmet issues are a perfect example. While David axe and co were busy hating the helmet, the program stopped funding on the alternate helmet as the main one was back on track and had corrected or was on the road to correct most of its shortcomings. While the folks like axe were making a point about the tail hook being faulty and the f-35 not ever being able to trap on a carrier, the re-designed tail hook scored a 90+% success rate and is now undergoing preparation testing for its first carrier trial in a few months. The JSF program is unlike the F-16 program where all the air force wanted initially was a light fighter that could launch heat seeking missiles. The level of integration, sensor suite, performance and air vehicle capability demanded from the start (block 3F capability) is unlike any program the US has ever run. Why did they ask for such a capability upfront? Because they had spent billions to get all of this on the F-16, and were going to loose this capability once those fighters began to retire, in addition to this such an integrated capability is a must upfront if the F-35 is to take over complex a2g missions such as that of Close air support from the A-10/F16 combo. They also did not trust the US congress when it came to future upgrades, as the f-22 program had shown them where the upgrade path was constantly reduced and slimmed down each increment to a point where the air force would be lucky to get MALD on the F-22 (MALD will exist on the F-35 from day 1) by 2025 at best.

Sprey is another joker when it comes to fighter development and the F-35.He disliked the F-22 even more and given that, he would probably dislike the Su-30MKI and T-50 quite a bit. His idea is for a fighter to be light, cheap and without many gizmos. If you take his view on the f35 seriously, then you must also take his view on other matters seriously and believe that the f-22 is not really good for air combat (to hell with what foreign pilots, red flag, and air chiefs have to say) and that the T-50 is worthless.


@Viv

I also do not agree with the PAKFA stealth rationale. That the PAKFA may not have stealthy features that equal or better the F-22 raptor that have been flying since the late nineties is not by itself a failure for the program. Russian concept of operation and missions are quite a bit different. While the US has to conduct expeditionary warfare with little ground support in the form of radars, Russia’s first mission is to defend the huge country. The PAKFA will almost always operate in the presence of heavy, expensive X band, S Band, L Band and VHF sensors (S300, 400 , 500). It does not have to have stealth at the levels of the F-22 or F35 which need all that stealth for the singular purpose of penetrating the above mentioned air defenses to conduct air dominance and ground attack missions. This is also the reason why the US is not interested in the hyper long intercept missiles that the PAKFA is designing. For them its get close, take control of the airspace and pick off fighters if the initial “Kick_down the door” does not take them out of the battle while still on the ground. Russia on the other hand has to contend with NATO Awacs, UAV’s, Tankers, Bombers and what not. Those can be easily picked off from 200+ km with a long range air to air missile provided enough targeting info (Which it will have access to through its air and ground network). What we have to see is whether our goals align with those of Russia’s. Do we need the PAKFA to protect and intercept India from invading J20’s, J30’s , Chinese AWACS or bombers or do we need PAKFA’s to penetrate Chinese air defenses in the case of war and conduct counter-strike missions in addition to those missions? The PAKFA has the legs, has the speeds; it lacks the stealth to penetrate S400 level defenses and its clones that china will generate soon enough. I am also not sure whether the Russians regard passive targeting and emissions control as high as the yanks, especially since they seem to put active sensors everywhere. It defeats the purpose of stealth if you are emitting both from the front and the back, and Russia has no problems in selling the latest ANTI-stealth technology to cheen (S400 being a case in point). Unlike the Russians we do not have the luxury of falling back on tactical and strategic bombers (to pick off enemy air defenses in an offensive mission), which soon enough will get a stealthy big brother in the form of PAKDA.

It’s a simple question, would our most sophisticated and expensive fighter be used as a defensive weapon or to counter attack deep into enemy territory to pick off its high value targets and for Suppression of its air defenses. If it’s the former we better have some sort of debate regarding the overall larger integrated air defense picture and how the air component's investments compare to the land component's investment and what is the correct/optimum balance, and what benefits we get from the 6 billion dollars we are pouring into the FGFA program (benefits to the Indian Integrated air defences as opposed to acquiring off the shelf T-50 from Russia at a desired time). We should also then, develop the AMCA to have long legs and be stealthier so that the AMCA strike package can penetrate deep into enemy territory. I would rather we go the longer route and develop the AMCA as a premium mid-long range strike platform. From the long term strategic perspective, in the absence of dedicated bombers, we need a stealthy medium capacity (can't get too heavy for then the propulsion options shrink and FAST) strike fighter that has the legs. It need not be as crazy and sensor-laden as the f-35, but incorporate enough LO features and have enough range to make it clear that its an offensive "option"

Stealth is best used for strike, especially when its penetrative strike as the amount of support required without stealth is huge (tankers (as your non-stealthy jets would need to go low and fast) , jammers etc. ). Remember reading somewhere that on simulated high threat missions the f-22 on internal fuel was able to be positioned/housed farther away from the base then even the F-15E’s, which carry more fuel and have a greater range. Stealth allows you to fly an efficient profile over enemy territory, not only does that save fuel it gives you the extra bit of survivability when required (if detected for example) and allows you to complete the mission without massive support which often involves non-stealth aircraft such as tankers that can give away your position and surprise. An AMCA for example could fly at mid altitude due to its stealth, a mig-29 or Su30 on the other hand would have to face a S300 or 400 system by keeping low and having some fuel to make a dash, and hope that there is support form tankers or jammers.

There is also no real point in comparing the T-50’s stealth to the F-22 because the f-22 is no longer in production. T-50 is a much better interceptor than the F-35 (just as the F-22 is). The f-35 on the other hand is a strike/multi role fighter with stealth and a level of avionics integration that is unprecedented (28 million lines of software code for the first fully operation block 3) even by f22’s integrated avionics standards. The f22 is only superior to the F-35 in the A2A (pure) mission; in everything else the F-35 is much ahead. The sensors, situational awareness, the level of the avionics integration are much ahead of the f-22 fighter. In a pure air-to-air environment testing the F-35 radar has already jammed the radar on the f-22, and the level of work on the program makes the F-35 a much better team-player than the F-22. The USAF will look upon the F-35’s impressive 360 degree passive suite (EW warfare sensors embedded in the airframe, EOTS that has very high resolution (Check YouTube videos of it at long ranges) and EODAS that is fully around the frame) to provide a lot of the bigger Situational awareness picture to even the F-22 raptor.

http://aviationweek.com/awin/china-s-st ... d-defenses

https://www.flickr.com/photos/northropg ... Qk-dR7Y1k/

http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2 ... rcise.html

• The most recent reports point to a APUC (average per unit cost) of 77 million US Dollars plus the engine (Engine is around 15 million APUC). You can read them through the SAR report. This is the average per unit cost of the entire production once everything is said and done. The Head of the program (not a Lockheed martin employee) expects the cost to be around 85 million a piece with the engine as the jet enters full rate of production. The latest US report (released on April 29th of this year) on the JSF cites a reasonably high confidence in meeting the software goals for the USMC and USAF IOC dates with the block 2b and 3i software loads. Even with the software delays the program does not expect a more than 4-6 month delay for the final block 3F software with which the US Navy and the foreign customers will declare their Initial operational capability. For new customers coming into the program, these delays do not mean much since no new customer will have a chance to (unless that customer is foolish and/or desperate for some new jets asap) acquire fighters from the LRIP batch or the first year or so of Full scale production which is slated for 2018. For any new potential customer, the only software to worry about is block 4, which enhances capability and to get its own weapons into the jet in the mid block 4 early block 5 phases. Anyhow, the software effort on the F-35 AIMS much higher than any fighter before in terms of system integration, the vast number of sensors and the way everything is presented. One can read the testimony of the Australian air chief for some indication.

http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/sea ... %2F0002%22

Latest Congressional report

http://www.scribd.com/doc/221394802/Rl-30563


The JSF scale back for the United States Navy is a matter of "budget". France has also scaled back its purchase for the rafale for the next 5 years, does that mean something is wrong with that fighter? And should we be worried, for this clearly points to a lack of confidence in the fighter from the developer and the operator? Most western budgets are shrinking; in the pentagon’s budget the goal is to shave a trillion dollars in a decade. That’s the reason why the navy is cutting back on the Charlie variant for the first 5 years (they are not changing the total no of C variants acquired, only re-adjusting the pace of that acquisition) The USAF has also cut back somewhat, by 4, and is planning to retire the A-10 CAS platform and may even look to mothball some B-1 bombers. The Navy is also seriously considering cutting back a dozen or more LCS ships, and shrinking the carrier fleet by 1.

The USN navy is running a SLEP program on the F-18 classics. With this they can get a few more years out of them so that the F-35C purchase can be delayed somewhat. They will still IOC with 10-15 jets in 2018 but would not ramp up as fast, because the fighters the F-35C will replace will serve longer.


The EW and F-22 debate is rather moot. No air force in today’s day would stop investing in Electronic attack capability even if they had or planned stealth fighters. Russia is not stopping upgrading that end despite of the T-50. Regarding the F-22/F35 mix, you are correct, the F-22 does do the intercept mission better. But is the F-35 inadequate for that mission? The USN dos not think so, The RAAF does not think so, the South Koreans do not think so, and the Japanese do not think so (BTW all the forces mentioned will be facing the J20’s and 31’s and the chinese carrier air wing of the future). The JSF approach to air combat is different, its not your one on one , two on two or 3 on three brawl, it’s the entire aerial campaign that it focuses on and tries to bring home an advantage; Its networked warfare with deep force integration. What it enables, the likes of the F-22 cannot, both in terms of battle space Situational awareness and the integration of avionics. It’s a multi role fighter and bulk of the fighters in the last 50 years have been used as multi-role fighters, and as such need to be good at a lot of things. The F-35 is an offensive weapon in the purest sense. It’s not an optimum frame if you are looking to defend a territory (T-50, F-22, Mig-31 are far better for who so ever that can afford to buy such specialized fighters for such roles), but if you are planning on conducting an aerial campaign that involves CAS, SEAD, DEAD, air to air, air to ground, BDA, ISR etc., there is nothing in the pipeline that can do what it can, as far as capability or the range of weapons it can carry (and the ability to effectively target those weapons). Unkle have spent far too much time fighting around the world not to realize that your aerial campaign goes nowhere if you cannot provide effective SEAD/DEAD, CAS and switch from a2a to a2g as per requirement, one can see their extensive list of weapons already developed for such a mission or in the pipeline for some indication of how serious they are. A 250 Km anti radiation weapon is alright for your traditional air defences, but modern integrated air defences have emitting and non emitting components, and your emitting components are net-enabled therefore scattered and have multiple backups. This is the main reason why the United states air force is decreasing its reliance on the HARM for a the SEAD mission and using its high quality, long range Infra-red sensors to pin point targets to nail them down with a SDB or an LGB. Your S400/500 and their knockoffs will not be easy to target with a 250km anti radiation weapon, the entire world is re-looking such weapons and the way they are operated in the modern battlefield for SEAD/DEAD missions. In fact the USAF that counts the f-22/b-2 as a SEAD one-two punch does not even have the HARM ability on the f-22, and don’t want it. For them it’s the passive EW suite (over a dozen L band X band, antennas embedded into the wings and airframe) that geolocated ground based emitters with enough accuracy to lob a SDB or JDAM from high altitude at supercruise (to get distance). The F-35 adds a Electro optical element with its 360 degrees DAS and EOTS integrated in the frame in a stealthy fashion. Not only will this ensure a healthy 360 degree mix of active and passive Situational awareness (letting the active elements of this be steared for LO reasons) but also allow the jet to be a situational-awareness hub for the fleet downstream from everything for BM early warning to rocket launches in a land campaign.

Watch: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qF29GBSpRF4

and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vgx-fePSuvo

No longer would you need powerful JSTARs to be everywhere. scores of F-35's can do this passively or using radar in combination with passive sensors. MALD, Link-16 and future data links in the work can get this downstream to where it is required.

As far as minimum commonality vs 25% of cost etc, its simply absurd. Could 3 stealth jets be developed for less? Nope. As far as commonality, the engine is common, the avionics are 100% common, the weapon integration is 100% common and the basic design is common. All future upgrades would be common (Look at the integration costs of the F-15 and F-16 family, and then add the integration costs of the F-18 onto them), and most importantly with the JSF approach one is not tasked with running 3 parallel software programs, or plan 3 different upgrade programs 20 years out. The analysis that 3 separate programs would have been cheaper is a fantasy, one for the fan boys. The USN estimates a 20-30 billion development cost for its Rhino replacement, and that’s just one development program. The USAF would probably need double that to come up with a NGAD fighter for its F-22 replacement. The Marine core would not have been able to afford a new fighter on its own. The last time the USN embarked on a development program for tactical air wing, they burnt a “double digit” billion-dollar hole in the budget, and then the program was cancelled for it was going out of control. What the commonality enabled the US and its partners to achieve is to advance the basic war fighting capability for cheap. If Norway wants to develop a new weapon for anti ship ops, they do so based on the codes they have for the JSF, that weapon automatically works for the entire F-35 customer base. In the US it’s the Navy that spends more on A2A weapons (Aim-9x Blk 2 and blk 3 are navy run projects), the Air force, the Marine core and the partners can piggy back on these programs with ZERO integration costs as far as getting the weapon on the fighter is concerned.

One last point on the Program as a tri-service effort. As noted in previous posts the genesis started when the USMC looked at the USAF for direction for a joint program. The navy never wanted to join in as they had the A-12 program, and a demand for the NATF. The NATF proved to be too cost prohibitive and its stealth not fit for carrier operations (which lockheed Martin and co. worked hard at for the JSF program as their patent activity and other announcements regarding Fiber-mat show: http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php ... 3&start=15) . In the meantime the american navy continued to develop the hornet into the super hornet and retire the tomcats as soviet bomber threat to the Carriers went away. Then came the best way to replace the conventional/classic F-18 hornets. The navy had little credibility left post the A-12 program, and also had plenty of ship-building ambitions to feed on fiven shrinking budgets. They hopped on to the JSF program as this was the cheapest way to field 5th gen capability on the carrier deck. As far as the argument that it was the B version that limited weapons carriage, it is only partially true. The Air force wanted a 2 MRAAM (protection) plus 2 x 1000 lb bomb capability from the bays. In a pure air to air configuration they wanted a 4 x MRAAM (short term) capability that would eventually be expanded as newer versions of existing MRAAM's or newer MRAAMS developed. The plan still remains the same, just delayed due to budget constraints. The F-35 got a bigger weapons bay, not because the Air force wanted it, but because the navy was unwilling to give up on a 2 x 2000lb bomb internal_carriage, which the Air force reluctantly agreed to. The STOVL variant has a 2 x 1000 lb plus 2x MRAAM capability.

I do not in any way endorse the F-35 for the Indian air force. I merely wish to drive home the point that the stealthy multi role strike fighter concept is a great one, and much needed for us. I wish to see the AMCA transform into a medium-long ranged strike fighter that can go deep into defended area. I also did want to clear a few things about the F-35 program. I do however strongly feel that the level of indian involvement in the design of the T-50 is exaggerated by the Russians and therefore we could have saved the R&D money and bought off the shelf T-50’s. I would have spent that R&D money in creating a better AMCA and towards indigenous capability in other areas. If the T-50 is a good enough interceptor for Russia to replace its flankers, it should be fine for us. We are not paying billions to transform it into a fully stealthy multi role strike fighter like the F-35 or the FB-22 proposed by Lockheed years ago. I see china reinforcing its air defenses with the highest quality and cutting edge Russian AD and Missile defense systems, and they are spending a huge amount on their own in house systems. Its not going to take china a long time to come up with S400 clones at a fraction of the cost (a clone that is 60% as capable at a third of the cost is a WIN WIN for china). When they do have such heavy defensive systems I am fairly certain that they will begin to assert themselves even more when it comes to their neighborhood. We need an effective way of combating china’s rapid development of an extensive Air and missile defense network, and I see the T-50 not being sufficient given that the same authors are claiming that the F-22 and F-35 with their stealth and the extensive level of integration won’t be (we cannot believe one aspect f the claim and disregard the other implication). Russia will not hesitate to arm china to the teeth and make it into a credible threat for the US and its partners in the Pacific. And china will not be foolish enough not to take advantage of its added capability to bully its rivals. We should also take some note of what china is doing with its own programs and with their high tech acquisitions from the russians. Su-35's and S400's acquired outright, while work costing a ton of money goes on on the J-20 and J-31, and other indigenous efforts. They will have to pay a large price to get those 2 fighters to work and it will be painful and time consuming and the end result may well be much inferior to their russian or western counterparts, but then one must start somewhere.

[Austin]

F-16 and F-35 Flying Together

[TSJones]

Welcome to the forum brar-warrior. Any background you care to share with us?

I was in the US Marine Corps as an avionics man primary, and jet engine mechanic secondary on A-4E, A-4F and A-4Ms. I wished I had stuck with it after I got out and got my licenses and certifications but unfortunately there was a glut in the industry because the vietnam war was ending. So I got into computers.

[brar_w]

Welcome to the forum brar-warrior. Any background you care to share with us?

I was in the US Marine Corps as an avionics man primary, and jet engine mechanic secondary on A-4E, A-4F and A-4Ms. I wished I had stuck with it after I got out and got my licenses and certifications but unfortunately there was a glut in the industry because the vietnam war was ending. So I got into computers.

Hi,

My background is academic/scientific. I am a keen student of western weapon system development, history and operational doctrine, and strategy. My areas of interest are of course strategic changes in Asia, europe and the the transformation of the Indian (and other including the US, Japan, South Korea and Australia) armed forces as these forces witness the massive change in the Indian Ocean, asia-pacific region due to the rise of China. I do not subscribe to the popular tradition of a point by point comparison of weapons systems from one source or another. I like to dig deep into the genesis of a particular performance requirement and the concept of operation for the hardware concerned to figure out "why such and such capability was demanded in the first place" etc. I do not see the T-50 as something that requires a head to head , spec for spec comparison to the F-22 or to any other fighter (those sort of comparisons are best left for sports cars and not complex weapons systems). I see the T-50 through the lense of " how it fits into the russian force structure" and " how russia wishes to use its capability". Answers to some of these questions can not only yield remarkable discussions but also expand one's knowledge far beyond the weapons system into the broader strategic implications of fielding a capability by a certain date against a projected threat.

[member_20292]

some very good writing you got there brar warrior.

good job.

[Philip]

Nice analysis Brar-W.The rationale behind the diff. aircraft specific to each country's needs well spelt out.

NR,come on you know too well that the Patriot is a SAM,the Russian missile is an AAM.No US aircraft carries a Patriot equiv ! The explanation/description was just indicating a comparison,never mentioning that the missile's seeker was derived/stolen /copied from the Patriot's.The two FGFA and JSF are totally different.The JSF needs both the F-22 and Growler because of its inherent drawbacks,"can't turn,run,etc.." It was also explained that it is vulnerable to L Band radars which are on the FGFA.While EW will certainly be conducted in ample measure on both sides,the FGFA needs no Growlers or other aircraft to protect it,unlike the JSF which needs protection by a "big brother" the F-22,otherwise it will be "irrelevant",and is most vulnerable in the WVR dogfight.

The commonality "25%" factor in practical terms does not exist for the JSF,which is why,setting right the faults being experienced now requires individual solutions for each variant,complicating matters in meeting deadlines.You cannot simply replace a component from one aircraft variant to another,though reports posted indicate that some cannibalisation has taken place to force the pace of testing way behind schedule.The innards are virtually custom designed for each.As the Pentagon's own studies have shown,they are virtually 3 different aircraft even though they might look the same exteriorwise.Even if the "25%" fig is doubled,to say "50%" in course of time,it still is a huge drawback.

It is absolutely true that the Russian and US doctrine and philosophies are different as to how they will use their 5th-gen aircraft.The IAF too has a hard task too in sanitising its airspace which will face large numbers of Sino-Pak assets,stretching all the way from ArP/Tibet to Pak/Arabian Sea,with their AWACS,tankers,etc.,all being acquired in significant number being prime targets. If one studies the IAF's acquisition plan thus far,it is clear that the bulk of the strike role was/is to be delivered by the MMRCA/Rafale-why the IAF (ex-ACM Browne) said that it had no "PLan B".The FGFA is meant to protect and dominate the Indian airspace and support offensive ops of other assets.However,it too has been planned for the strike role with the ability of carrying of 200KM+ stand-off anti-radar ASMs and a variety of other ASMs.The absence of a dedicated LR bomber has been pointed out on BR for many years.We have nothing that can hit deep into China.Most of China's key cities and industrial zones are located on its eastern seaboard.The need exists-pointed out by many Indian analysts and thinktanks is essential for our strategic deterrent and tactical strike too,and wonder why the IAF is so myopic .Such an aircraft could also make a huge difference in IOR ops carrying BMos and Nirbhay influencing the maritime scenario.A sqd. or two of of SU-34s ,if not Backfires would be very welcome.
Our classified UCAV perhaps is being tasked for some aspect of the requirement,but from available info,it is too small for the job at hand with a very limited payload for its internal weapons bay.

[brar_w]

The emphasis/stress on the fact that the F-35 needs so and so support while the other fighter does not means very little when no context whatsoever is provided for a force-structure threat comparison. Where would a hypothetical F-35 need a growler support? Wide area, multi band jamming? If so against what threat, at what distance and for what mission? You have a basic EW suite on the F-35, it has classified elements and unclassified elements. It is a comprehensive suite that seeks to balance out radiation with signature requirements/ Low observability built into the design requirement. Hope the FGFA does so as well, otherwise the stealth point is rather moot and a waste of investment if you will be emitting (active jammers do just that - EMIT), as even the late 90's f-22 was able to gather enough information from its AN/ALQ94's to bring weapons to bear.

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=9268

The ALQ-94 and the developments leading up to it was probably the reason the US put a stop to active jamming on its stealth jets. While active jamming is a part of both the F-22 and F-35 it is restricted to the X band FCR due to their LPI nature and controllability . The performance of the -94 is largely classified but its been claimed to pick up emitting threats from 200 nm or so with enough accuracy to launch a missile. This was in the 90's. Coming back to the claim that the Growler is required by the F-35. I suppose the F-35 would also need the F-15E if the joint mission is to launch a micro satellite from a forward deployed position, But does that mean anything? The F-35 could do such a mission if required, but what about its LO characteristic? It will go down the toilet. Much like the F-35 can also be made into a stand off, long range jammer but then you will be emitting so much noise that your stealth is going to be a waste of money and effort and you'll be a ripe target for "home-on-jam" missiles.

The US approach has been well thought out as they have had access to both cutting edge Active jamming both integrated to fighters or larger-more sophisticated-long-ranged-wide-band pods that require external power supply and cutting edge threat detectors on stealth aircraft. That they have gone in for reduced_active jamming component on their stealth fleet speaks volumes of what their trade studies found when pitting active jammers against their own high end detection systems. The F-35 is not their first stealth jet, and their stealth/LO tactics and CONOPS is a constant work in progress for a few decades, and that capability is presently unmatched and time-consuming and costly to acquire. And in case any customer wants an active jamming solution for the F-35, Lockheed itself has solutions that it has provided to its previous customers such as the UAE ( http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=3538). Or if one can pony up the cash to procure a system that the Israelis are developing for their own F-35's where the F-35 is a part of a larger legacy fleet that it must bring_up_along with it (hence the IDF can compromise on stealth for the sake of jamming as that jamming enables them to bring other bigger players into the picture). The IDF's EW component for the F-35 most likely includes the active jamming component that they have on their F-16 fleet.

Air defense threat is made up of multiple layers and elements. You have the primary Fire control radar threat, and secondary emitting and non emitting threats. Where is the F-35 inferior to the FGFA (kindly do share an example) in the VLO threat detection and counter realm? Design compromises are a must when putting stealth on a fighter, this holds true for the F-22, for the F-35 or for the T-50. Perhaps 6th gen designs will break that mould, but if it is wide band stealth that you seek, then as far as current technology is concerned a fighter is not your best canvas to paint that picture (The B-2 decades older design for example has better wide band stealth than the F-35 or anything else currently flying that is known). The US military has been using escort jammers even with stealthy and semi stealthy weapons systems as a matter of tactics. No fighter can hope to provide a long range, wide bandwidth jamming as a dedicated jammer for payload/performance constraints and the big POWER issues. You can try to be a jack of all trades with jamming but then at best you can achieve tactical jamming and not support jamming. For a stealth aircraft that values LO, jamming at all frequencies is counter- to the basics of a stealthy design, where the two elements i.e. Low radar signature and Emissions control go hand in hand.

If you refer to the article from the UK tabloid, then i must humbly submit that it is riddled with contradictions. It says that the F-35 due to its stealth is not optimum for a stealthy attack on a target that includes VHF elements. Is this surprising? Please do explain how the FGFA is inherently more stealthy to the VHF threat? Every stealth fighter aircraft is optimised for a certain emitting threat, while being very survivable for some bandwidths and being moderately survivable for others. How best then should the designers counter such threats? For one, the fighter must have the Situational awareness to identify such threats from long ranges, avoid them if possible or have the networking and integration to mount a counterattack. The F-35's approach is much similar to the F22 but more refined and technologically superior. It helps geolocate the emitting threats for weapons onboard or down range (much like the f-22) and has an organic EW suite to jam if required. For threats that are still more complex, the F-35 chooses to use support, as any other aircraft would (B-2 does too). Having said that the baseline threat presented by the DOD to the vendors calls for a capability to "go it alone". The F-35 as per the requirements has met that Survivability requirements that would require it to "go it alone". The threat index mentioned in the RFP's are obviously classified, but one would expect the higher end of double digit sams and IADS to be the case. Integrated avionics, and a robust mix of active/passive sensors is an enabler of survivability on top of any LO/VLO designs that the fighter carries. What that article misses is that in the "radar-game" the winner often understands the "game" better than the looser. The US experience in stealth that extends through decades of operational use has given them TONS (quite literally) of data on both the advantages and shortcomings. More importantly by operating stealth jets since the 80's they have some idea of TACTICS and CONOPS. That the fact that X band stealth is the primary concern for fighter stealth is not a secret, as most of the FCR threat from the ground is also X band. The higher end AD (IADS) will make the next chess move by acquiring VHF support to their existing X band sensors. The Counter to that is to "UP" the noise in the VHF domain so as to render those sensors impotent. Unkle is doing that.

I have tried my best to put across the inherent disadvantages of an anti radiation weapon for SEAD/DEAD missions in modern times (and for the future). For years russian air defense companies have been making it a point at air shows to highlight how survivable their integrated air defense solutions are to anti radiation weapons. Chinese have surely built survivability from an anti radiation threat into their air defenses. Modern Integrated air defenses have both active and passive elements (PCL etc) and are net-centric/enabled. Your radars are spread out and cover varying bandwidths and have backups. Attacking them with anti radiation missiles will be a crap shoot much like what happened to the US ir where majority of HARM shots were "in the wild" without a proper lock. The Americans learnt a harsh lesson that the SEAD mission is evolving. They have since made it a point to spread out SEAD tactics and munitions. The F-22 for example the "most survivable" US tactical aircraft in its arsenal uses SDB's for its main SEAD mission, because it has those powerful threat locators on board. Your basic range for a SDB type weapon can get to 150+ km when it is launched from an f-22 using its CONOPS, and with the Tri Mode SDB II coming up the ability to attack mobile-air defenses would also be provided at a fraction of the cost of expensive missiles, with the flexibility of a saturated attack. (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ray ... ion-06510/). The F-35 will take it a step higher with the EOTS and EODAS where a proper land_threat_picture can be built up and targets destroyed regardless of the fact that they are emitting or not. Stand off IADS destruction is a pipe dream even for the yanks, and they have been constantly saying this from the days when their chief of the air force was Gen J Jumper who coined the term "f22, B-2 one two punch". The F-35 uses the huge arsenal for that. The MADL on stealth in addition to the Son-of-Link 16 ensures that a passive/non-emitting IADS threat indexed by the JSF while on a routine Sweep can be targeted through the net-enabled JASSM_ER from hundreds of miles away. The trend with unkle's kit is clearly that towards passive geolocation using such sensors as the AN/ALR-94 (F-22) and its equivalent on the f-35 (AN/ASQ-239 (Barracuda) ) from SO ranges using PGMs that are cheap, and that can saturate the IADS. What was earlier possible only through specialized "listening" aircrafts such as a rivet joint is now possible due to embedded sensors in the f-22 and f-35. Not to say that there is no room for an anti-radiation weapon in the US, but they are likely to lessen_their reliance on it going forward (as they already have) but will probably seek that capability from a future AMRAAM replacement, that should give you similar range (if not more) to the Russian weapon.

The AN/ALR-94 has the ability to geo-locate threats. The AN/ALR-94 has 30 or so apertures for antennas spotted around the airframe. This will allow the F-22 to detect VHF radars with the SDB at significant range. With greater range (250+ nmi) than the radar, it enables the F-22 to limit its own radar emission which might otherwise compromise its stealth. As the target approaches, AN/ALR-94 can cue the AN/APG-77 radar to keep track of its motion with a narrow beam, which can be as focused as 2° by 2° in azimuth and elevation.

BAE Systems’ AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda system is derived from the F-22 Raptor’s AN/ALR-94 EW suite and provides Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and high sensitivity electronic surveillance capabilities, full-spectrum situational awareness and multi-spectral missile countermeasures. According to certain sources, the Barracuda offers precise geo-location and targeting of potential hostile emitters, without the need for triangulation and thus other networked aircraft. The Barracuda is also integrated with Northrop Grumman’s Communications, Navigation and Intelligence (CNI) suite data links for real-time data sharing as well as the APG-81 AESA radar, which is reported to have RF surveillance and jamming, in addition to cyberwarfare capabilities.

http://wiki.scramble.nl/index.php/BAE_Systems_AN/ALR-94
http://www.armada.ch/aircraft-self-prot ... stication/

http://www.janes.com/article/36548/usaf ... g-jassm-er

Read, Passive Geolocation: (This article is 7 years old)

http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/militar ... 2dpda3qclM

So if the S400/500 operator is dumb enough to be "advertising" his position well before a ground attack then I am sure one of these systems will pick its emission with enough accuracy to send a weapon down. You may as well use a PGM or a 200km russian made weapon like the one Russia is developing. The radar operator is not going to be so "dumb" however, and is most likely to rely on passive detection himself over a wide area of land, and use the active elements of his system sparingly or when the critical point has been reached in an engagement. This is the primary tactic of Non-cooperative Integrated Air Defense Systems and was demonstrated in the balkan conflict (I can elaborate on the tactics if anyone so desires). In such a case relying solely on an anti radiation weapon is going to be costly (literally). There is a reason why the US has built SATCOM's into its fighter/bomber fleets, why they have put extensive SAR modes into the F-35 and the f-22, and why systems such as EODAS and EOTS linked through MADL and Link 16 (Son_of_link 16 at a later date) come into the picture, and why the level of integration demanded from 5th gen fighters is so extensive, time consuming, and costly. The object being to cover a huge portion of land with these sensors in a coordinated fashion so as to pick these systems off before they "advertise" themselves. Even with the massive electronics at their disposals, the US Air force still thinks it may need to go "dirty" while hunting for IAD elements. Like I said SO targeting for IAD is a pipe dream against any peer-adversary no matter what the "brochures" say about the range of their anti-radiation weapon.In their arsenal the US lists JSOW, JASSM, JASSMER, HARM, JDAM, SDB, and SLAMER as legitimate SEAD weapons to fall back on (in addition to jamming from either growlers, EC130's, MALD_J etc). They are reducing their reliance on ARM's. This evolution in tactics and weapons has not been drawn up in a lab based on targets, but has been forced upon them by hard lessons learnt from actual conflict involving SEAD halfway across the world.

I agree that the FGFA and the F-35 are different in mission, but the entire point that the F-35 needs the f-22 is quite absurd especially when no mission or threat environment is provided and contradictory to the evaluations made by air forces of Australia, South Korea, Japan that have a 5th gen fighter threat + Integrated Air defense threat from the sea to tackle. The IDF known for its Air to Air prowess also has its faith firmly in the F-35. The escort argument starting showing up due to the way people looked at the entire F-22, F-35 mix in the USAF. The F-22 indeed will escort the F-35, but those F-35's will be concentrating on the A2G ops. Its a matter of tactics. Plenty of A2A F-35's will also be escorting A2G kitted F-35's along with other F-22's in a mixed role as well so its disingenuous to claim that the F-35 needs the F-22. A more correct way of putting it is that the F-35 and F22 share a synergistic relationship and are tactically joint at the hip for the USAF. Yet for others they are not. The F-35 has a different approach to WVR combat. It takes advances in EODAS and integrated avionics and attempts at new tactics and capabilities. The enabler comes with the fact that the current blk 2 Aim-9x is a LOAL weapon with a dedicated 2 way data-link that is from the AMRAAM. The block 2 is already approaching MRAAM category and the block 3 missile will have a significant overlap with Aim-120C/D range. Add DIRCM in blk 4/5 and you have a fighter that is extremely tough in both WVR offensive ability or WVR survivability.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fm5vfGW5RY
http://aviationweek.com/defense/northro ... ammer-f-35

Aim-9x Block 3, http://defense-update.com/20130722_aim- ... 2epAa3qclM

L band sensors exist on the F-22 and also the F-35, its a basic lockheed embedded antenna philosophy that was first published in the early nineties and executed on the f-22 and the f-35. The F-22 is stated to have close to 30 embedded sensors, while the F-35 has been able to shrink the components down to around a dozen or so.

https://www.google.com/#q=F-22+L+band+sensors

[NRao]

India needs to revisit:

* Her strategic thinking, with emphasis on the IOR+
* How to build her squadron strengths, with meaningful air crafts, and
* How to close the technology gaps: engines, sensors, networks, etc

India's game plan:

* In the long run plan on going it alone
* Cannot rely - any longer - on Russia
* The IAFs PoV that Russia cannot deliver on the FGFA - is more a reality, and
* IF France wants to help then she needs to pony up a lot more

[Philip]

Yes,India must be more self reliant,but where is the advanced ,bleedin' edge tech going to come from? We are struggling to perfect an LCA MK-1 which has a lower performance parameters than originally intended,supposed to arrive on the Mk-2 version.But when that bird arrives,The JSF,FGFA and Chinese stealth birds would've already entered service. We haven't been able to perfect a single engine for a military aircraft,right from basic trainer to the LCA.It is therefore incomprehensible to imagine us catching up with either west or east unless we involve ourselves in a JV ,which we have done,taking tentative steps with the FGFA. We may be able to develop some aspects of a programme,contribute towards composites,etc.,but our strength lies in software,increasingly the key component of mil. aircraft today.It is the hardware store where we are sorely deficient.

For NR.Just one point about the current concept for the AMCA. Does it have a large enough internal weapons bay for its envisaged role? .How many PGMs and missiless will it be able to carry in stealth mode? How does it compare with the JSF which is its equivalent opposite.Have there been any studies /comparisons thus far of how it fares with other stealth birds?

Coming back to the JSF,there has been a concerted PR campaign to keep the aircraft aloft.Here is a report.

http://f35baddeal.com/2014/05/01/jet-fi ... f-35-sold/
May 1, 2014
Jet Fighter Influence: How Lockheed’s Public Relations Efforts Keep the F-35 Sold

http://f35baddeal.com/2014/05/01/the-f- ... ernatives/
May 1, 2014
The F-35 Is Unaffordable, And There Are Alternatives

At least $8 billion of the Pentagon’s budget for fiscal year 2015 is devoted to a single aircraft

program: the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Already on track to be the most expensive weapon system

in history, the F-35 is becoming a black hole in the Pentagon budget. In the face of continuing

budget cuts, it is worth considering more conservative investments the military could be making.

By the dollars:

• $39.1 billion - amount spent on RDT&E that was never in the Pentagon’s original program costs

for the F-35. In large part, that money went to contractors for additional research and several

rounds of redevelopment when the contractors failed to meet the F-35 goals set by the Pentagon.

It doesn’t appear that the Pentagon ever penalized the contractors for those failures.

• $27 billion – how much the Department of the Navy will spend between now and fiscal year

(FY) 2019 on the F-35, roughly the same as the cost to complete the purchase of the entire

remaining identified requirements for the V-22 and the P-8.

• $6.3 billion – amount being spent on FY15 procurement for a single aircraft program. Of the

total Pentagon FY15 procurement request of $90.6 billion, this accounts for just under seven

percent of the entire Pentagon unclassified procurement request.

• $4.2 billion – cost of all currently planned modernization for the F-22, the F-15 and the F-16

over many years. This is well within the more than $4.6 billion the Air Force is asking Congress

to devote to procurement and research and development of the F-35 in just the coming

fiscal year.

• $564 million - Total cost for 8 Super Hornets. The Department of the Navy FY15 request is for 2

F-35Cs for the Navy and 6 F-35Bs for the Marines. The Department could save a lot of money

by purchasing Super Hornets rather than either variant of the F-35.

By the percentages:

• 110% – How much of its future tactical aircraft modernization plan the Air Force could pur

chase with just this year’s F-35A procurement line.

• 100% – How much of the Air Force’s FY15 Combat Aircraft request is devoted to the F-35A.

• 80% – A new F-16 is at least 80% cheaper than the Air Force’s stated list price for an F-35A and

the F-15 won’t require additional infrastructure training.

• 60% – A new F-15E is roughly 60% of the stated list price for an F-35A.

• 23% – How much of the Department of the Navy’s Combat Aircraft request is devoted

to the F-35B and F-35C.

By the airframes:

• 26 – How many F-35As are requested for the Air Force.

• 6 – How many F-35Bs are requested for the Marine Corps.

• 2

– How many F-35Cs are requested for the Navy.

The United States enjoys by far the greatest air superiority in the world. The wide range of aircraft

employed by the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines performs at least nine different missions:

(1)air-to-surface, (2)air-to-air, (3)Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), (4)Command

and Control, (5)Electronic Attack, (6)Tanking, (7)Airlift, (8)Combat Search and Rescue

and (9)Global Strike. The F-35 is proposed to fulfill all of those except tanking, airlift, combat

search and rescue and some aspects of global strike.

This costly aircraft puts too many of the air mission eggs in one expensive basket, a jack of all

trades fighter that is a platinum plated spork. Policymakers should pause and consider what is

the most cost-effective means of retaining America’s overwhelming air superiority.
Read the full report here
http://www.taxpayer.net/images/uploads/ ... he_F35.pdf

Excellent history of the programme,too long to post,fascinating read.
http://f35baddeal.com/2014/03/19/fd-how ... -warplane/

March 19, 2014
F’d: How the U.S. and Its Allies Got Stuck with the World’s Worst New Warplane Reply
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was meant to improve the U.S. air arsenal but has made it more vulnerable instead

[brar_w]

The website's name suggests that it is a product out there to lobby against the F-35 and therefore a special interest project. Heck it even has a coalition to serve its common interest. Going to this website for a fair and balanced "excellent background" is akin to going to this website ( http://www.americansagainstobama.com/) for an appraisal on the Obama Administration. Surely it cannot be claimed to be fair and balanced as you are doing. Whats next? F-22notsogood.com , Boeingsuperhornetbetterthanf-35.com? superhornetbetterdealthanlightning2.com? Your F-35 research seems to be concentrating on just one side of the F-35 reporting, and you seem to be pulling a new website every day to reinforce that idea. Its f-35baddeal one day, war is boring blog the other. POGO has a track record of hitting out against cutting edge technology. Had they had it their way the F-22 would been cancelled along with the B-2 and the F-117 projects. Virginia class sub (which is now cheaper than we can licence produce diesel subs) was on their target list a few years ago. Special interests and lobbying is common in the US, its a part and parcel of an open and transparent procedure of weapons system development, and its very much the way things work in Washington. Heck there are hypocrite senators and congressmen in washington that are seeking to reprimand the air force for retiring the U2 spy plane, and the A-10, after first forcing the air force to make those decisions by introducing sequestration and a trillion dollar savings target.

Had they (F-35 program office) run a closed program like the T-50, I am sure you would been confusing NO REPORTING with "everything is going smooth". A closed/opaque program it seems for you that has not had a full system/sub-system + avionics mission system and software control flying can IOC earlier than a system that has mission software in the air coupled with full sensor suite undergoing testing while the latter has only prototypes flying. I wonder why the same confidence/optimism does not trickle into the F-35 program, or the same pessimism trickle into the T-50 program.

Most of the claims in the articles do not even warrant a rebuttal as points that one would make to do so have already been made quite well around the internet by people from different backgrounds (military, industry and academia). Any one can try looking for them if they so desire. Unfortunately for these "special" interest blogs (some with a clear motive to lobby against, others that do so just because it makes them popular) the critical mass for pilot training has reached a point where plenty of combat coded pilots are talking about the f-35 and are impressed with its capabilities. Not only US pilots but foreign pilots and experienced warfighters. I wonder what these blogs have to say when the Marine core IOC's in the summer of next year (in the range they have provided) and deploys the aircraft to japan in 2016. They will likely move on to atacking other future blocks, and may even concentrate their "special" interests on other programs.



Here it is from the horse's mouth. Lieutenant Colonel SE Gillette. He is the point man for the MC as far as flying the fighter is concerned. He is confident of the IOC in the expected time frame. Unfortunately he does not run a blog titled f35Bwilliocin2015.com or thereisno13monthdelayforthemarines.com because he is too busy doing other things such as testing the aircraft and geting it ready for the marines to IOC and deploy to Japan.

http://www.sldinfo.com/declaring-ioc-fo ... -approach/

More of him and the other drivers

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=461ug8Jjn-0

[NRao]

Just one point about the current concept for the AMCA. Does it have a large enough internal weapons bay for its envisaged role? .How many PGMs and missiless will it be able to carry in stealth mode? How does it compare with the JSF which is its equivalent opposite.Have there been any studies /comparisons thus far of how it fares with other stealth birds?

Have the specs been released? I have not seen anything besides comments.

So, I have no idea - as I type.

___________________________________________

As an aside:

Start with the "network".

The rest needs to be designed around the network. Plane, ships, tanks, soldier with cam + health monitors, UAV, smart bombs, dumb bombs, etc. *All* comes after the "network".

This thinking about what will fit into the belly of a "stealth" plane is so passe. Silly. Who cares what it carries if it does not mesh with the rest?

[Philip]

Wonderful logic.You will then have a $100M+ flying "walkie-talkie" ,which the JSF will be once it has exhausted its 4 toys.

NCW."A chain is a strong as its weakest link" Lovely to have a huge hole in the NCW "network".Especially if it is the JSF for the US,as it is meant to replace so many aircraft types,being a "jack of all trades and master of none",as it has been described!

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-23/a ... rs/5405236

Deal includes opt-out clause if costs continue to rise

Defence Minister David Johnston has told AM that there is a way out for Australia if the costs climb too high.

"If Australia decides that the costs have blown out to such an extent, we are not bound to continue," he said.
How the F-35s compare

Here is how Australia's F-35s - billed as the smartest fighter jets on the planet - will stack up against our regional neighbours' air forces.

"We are committed to the program. Every indicator at the moment indicates that the costs are headed in the right direction for us so I'm not anticipating any drama, but should there be a major turnaround in cost then, you know, the option is available for us to leave the program.

"Now, I don't want to do that because this aircraft is simply the best thing happening in air combat at the moment. I think, given the 11 countries that are committed to it, all of whom are our friends, I think the costs will continue to come down."

Opposition Leader Bill Shorten has backed the purchase.

"It was Labor who believed that the Joint Strike Fighter was an appropriate addition to our air power," he told Radio National.

"There had been some problems in terms of aspects of the aircraft but it appears that they have been ironed out."
Expert says jet may not be best option for Australia's current campaigns

But a specialist in US defence strategy has questioned whether Australia's purchase is good value for money.

The Brookings Institution's Michael O'Hanlon says the aircraft may not be best suited for the military options Australia has found itself undertaking in recent years.

"If you want to be in the high-end combat aircraft business, the F-35 is frankly about as good of a deal as you're ever going to find," he told NewsRadio.

"If Australia wants to be able to have aircraft that can go up against what China might deploy - in way of not only its own fighters but advanced air defences in years and decades [to come] - then I think you want something... like the F-35."

"[But] if you think more about your military needs being the Afghanistan-style operations, the troubled waters of the South China Sea, counter-piracy, peace operations, keeping some degree of regional calm with some turbulence in the ASEAN region but not necessarily China, then frankly it's a debatable proposition whether the F-35 is the best bang for your buck.

"If you think that that kind of high-end threat is not realistically where you're headed with your military requirements, then it's more of a debatable proposition."
Listen to the full interview with Michael O'Hanlon on NewsRadio.

Canada getting cold feet over JSF cost overruns

Australia's decision to go ahead with the purchase will please Lockheed Martin, the company that makes the JSF.

The JSF project involves half a dozen countries who have sunk hundreds of millions of dollars into the development of the jet.

But at least two of those countries, Canada and Denmark, are debating whether to even buy it for their own military.

Scott Taylor, the editor-in-chief of Canadian military magazine Esprit de Corps, says the country's JSF purchase is in doubt because of a "damning" auditor-general's report into cost overruns.
Joint Strike Fighters flying together Photo: The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is on order to replace fighter jets in the Australian Air Force. (Reuters: Tom Reynolds)

"[The auditor-general found that] the jets and the in-life service support costs are going to be astronomical compared to what they were budgeting for," he told AM.

"Of course, Lockheed Martin is still saying, 'Look, until we know the numbers we can't determine the exact unit price' ... I think every partner in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is looking at that very cautiously."

Joe Katzman is the founding editor of Defence Industry Daily in the US.

While he agrees progress is now being made, he warns that cost is still a serious issue, especially since the US is likely to keep cutting back the number of planes it buys because of budget constraints.

"If you look at the Pentagon's documents, the fly-away cost for an Air Force F-35 in the fiscal year 2015 is $US133 million," he said.

"They are hoping that will eventually start reducing into the high 90s [millions of dollars], but to do that they need to get the production rate up to a certain level. That means enough exports, that means enough domestic orders.

"But domestic orders are cutting and the export countries, even the close partners, are buying fewer than expected because of what they can afford."

[Philip]

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2 ... radar.html

04.28.14
New U.S. Stealth Jet Can’t Hide From Russian Radar
America’s gazillion-dollar Joint Strike Fighter is supposed to go virtually unseen when flying over enemy turf. But that’s not how things are working out.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter—the jet that the Pentagon is counting on to be the stealthy future of its tactical aircraft—is having all sorts of shortcomings. But the most serious may be that the JSF is not, in fact, stealthy in the eyes of a growing number of Russian and Chinese radars. Nor is it particularly good at jamming enemy radar. Which means the Defense Department is committing hundreds of billions of dollars to a fighter that will need the help of specialized jamming aircraft that protect non-stealthy—“radar-shiny,” as some insiders call them—aircraft today.

These problems are not secret at all. The F-35 is susceptible to detection by radars operating in the VHF bands of the spectrum. The fighter’s jamming is mostly confined to the X-band, in the sector covered by its APG-81 radar. These are not criticisms of the program but the result of choices by the customer, the Pentagon.

To suggest that the F-35 is VHF-stealthy is like arguing that the sky is not blue—literally, because both involve the same phenomenon. The late-Victorian physicist Lord Rayleigh gave his name to the way that electromagnetic radiation is scattered by objects that are smaller than its wavelength. This applies to the particles in the air that scatter sunlight, and aircraft stabilizers and wingtips that are about the same meter-class size as VHF waves.

The counter-stealth attributes of VHF have been public knowledge for decades. They were known at the dawn of stealth, in 1983, when the MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory ordered a 150-foot-wide radar to emulate Russia’s P-14 Oborona VHF early-warning system. Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth division—makers of the F-35—should know about that radar: they built it.

Making a plane VHF-stealthy starts with removing the target’s tails, as on the B-2 bombers. But we did not know how to do that on a supersonic, agile airplane (like the F-35 is supposed to be) when the JSF specifications were written.

Neither did the technology to add broadband-active jamming to a stealth aircraft exist in 1995. Not only did stealth advocates expect jamming to fade away, but there was an obvious and (at the time) insoluble problem: To use jamming you have to be certain that the radar has detected you. Otherwise, jamming is going to reveal your presence and identify you as a stealth aircraft, since the adversary can see a signal but not a reflection.

We can be sure that onboard jamming has not been added to the F-35 since. Had the JSF requirements been tightened by one iota since the program started, its advocates would be blaming that for the delays and overruns.

“To suggest that the F-35 is stealthy is like arguing that the sky is not blue – literally, because both involve the same phenomenon.”

What the JSF does have is a jamming function—also known as “electronic attack,” or EA, in militaryese—in the radar. It also has an expendable radar decoy—BAE Systems’ ALE-70. Both are last-ditch measures to disrupt a missile engagement, not to prevent tracking.

JSF’s planners, in the mid-1990s, were close to correct when they calculated that low-band stealth and limited EA, combined with passive electronic surveillance for situational awareness, would be adequate at service entry. But they expected that the F-35 would reach squadrons in 2010, and China’s military modernization was barely imaginable.

The threats of the late 2010s will be qualitatively different. Old VHF radars could be dealt with by breaking the kill chain between detection and tracking: they did not provide good enough cueing to put analog, mechanically scanned tracking radars on to the target. Active electronically scanned array (AESA), high-power VHF radars and decimeter- and centimeter-wave trackers are more tenacious foes.

Last August, at an air show near Moscow, I talked to designers of a new, highly mobile counterstealth radar system, now being delivered to the Russian armed forces. Its centerpiece was a 100-foot-wide all-digital VHF AESA, but it also incorporated powerful higher-frequency radars that can track small targets once the VHF radar has detected them. More recently, however, it has emerged that the U.S. Navy is worried because new Chinese warships carry the Type 517M VHF search radar, which its maker says is an AESA.

None of this is to say that stealth is dead, but it is not reasonable to expect that the cat-and-mouse game of detection and evasion in air combat has stopped, or that it ever will. EA and stealth still do not coexist very comfortably on the same platform, but offboard EA and stealth are synergistic: the smaller the target, the less jamming power is needed to mask it.

But the threat’s demonstrated agility drives home the lesson that there is no one winning move in the radar game. Excessive reliance on a single-point design is not a good idea, and using fictitious secrecy to quash the debate is an even worse one.

This column also appears in the April 28 issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology.

[NRao]

April 29, 2014 :: F-35 is Liaoning's worst nightmare, says Global Times

Memo ha snot reached them, yet.

[Philip]

And here's the latest Pentagon report on its "progress".

New Pentagon Report: F-35 performance problems

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl om 18:25 onder Global F35 News

Last week the Annual Report of the Pentagon about Systems Engineering was published. One paragraph is about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and gives an interesting insight in the F-35’s ability to achieve defined Operational Requirements.
In a short analysis of the report learns that the F-35 will miss several critical (KPP) and essential performance parameters.

The FY2013 Annual Report conclusion: software most significant threat

The US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering (DASD(SE)) Stephen Welby provided the FY2013 Annual Report addressing the systems engineering capabilities of the Department of Defense (DoD) and systems engineering activities relating to the Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP).

One of the FY2013 Annual Report’s conclusions is: The F-35 program completed subsystem technical reviews to address outstanding program-level technical issues and risks. Delivery of Block 3 software is the most significant threat to completion of SDD on the planned schedule.

The JSF Program Office has acknowledged the findings of the report, but didn’t want to discuss questions with the press ath this moment.

History F-35 operational requirements

The F-35 program plans to develop and field an affordable, common family of next-generation, multi-role strike aircraft for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and allies. The three variants are the Air Force Conventional Takeoff and Landing, the Navy Carrier Variant (CV), and the Marine Corps Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL).
In April 2000 the so called Milestone B Operational Requirements Document (ORD) in were incorporated in Joint StrikeFighter Contract Specification (JCS). During a CY 2013 review, the program reaffirmed that the JCS contained all the ORD requirements. But at this moment there is growing evidence that the F-35 will not be able to fullfil these contractual requirements.

Technical and Risk Assessments.

US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering reports:
DASD(SE) participated in several subsystem technical reviews including a Production Readiness Review (PRR) and a Quick Look Review (QLR) update. The QLR update confirmed that the risk was lower for the helmet, arresting hook, integrated power pack, and lightning protection, but risk remains in other areas including buffet, mission systems software, sustainment software, and tail heating. DASD(SE) also updated software analyses with the support of the JPO
and the contractor, and participated in acquisition/systems engineering planning activities.
Program risks are known and understood. The JSF program has risks in
development, sustainment, and production. Risk mitigation plans are in place, but documentation lags. The program made risk burn-down progress in FY 2013.

Sortie Generation Rate too low

Stephen Welby reveals about the performance of the F-35
The program is on track to meet seven of the eight KPPs. An issue with incorrect analysis/assumptions is hampering the attainment of the sortie generation rate (SGR) KPP. The program office is examining the sensitivity of the SGR KPP to establish more operationally realistic ground rules and assumptions. As a result, the program plans to reassess SGR.

This is remarkable, because the JORD (requirement specifications) of the F-35 the key perfmance parameters (KPP) specifies about the (minimum) sortie rate:
- Sortie rate F-35A: 3 sorties per day
- Sortie rate F-35B: 4 sorties per day
- Sortie rate F-35C: 3 sorties per day

Back in 2012, speaking at an event hosted by the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. the USAF chief of staff Gen Norton Schwartz told the public:
The US Air Force has concluded that the short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) Lockheed Martin F-35B- model aircraft cannot generate enough sorties to meet its needs; therefore the service will not consider replacing the Fairchild Republic A-10 Warthog close air support jet with that variant.

Now the Pentagon reports the SGR will be lower……….What’s next?

Other Key Performance Parameters

One could say: Key Performance Perimeters (KPP) is the basic performance requirement by the F-35. Back in February 2012 the JROC (Joint Requirements Oversight Council) ordered the JSF Program Office to reconsider KPPs that some versions of the F-35 were to miss. This resulted in:
- F-35A combat radius target (objective was 690 miles, down to 580 miles)
- F-35B longer runway allowed for short take-off’s
- F-35C higher maximum landing speed
However, at this moment DASD(SE) concluded that:
Although on track, the combat radius, STOVL performance, and CV recovery KPPs have limited margins.
The sortie generation KPP is not as contracted; the logistics footprint KPP is in danger. The mission reliability KPP (minimum 93%), at this moment, has a long way to go. The DOT&E report FY2013 (January 2014) found ”Reliability is poor and ranges from 30 to 39 percent behind the current objective. The “availability” of the existing fleet is getting worse and has never reached, is receding from, its quite modest threshold of 50 percent at this stage in the program. The amount of time needed to repair failures “has increased over the past year.

Other performance parameters

Stephen Welby has found that 16 of the 62 non-KPP ORD thresholds are not achievable by the end of the JSF-development (SDD). These capability goals also were defined in the April 2000 operational requirements document (ORD).
Another 8 of the 62 non-KPP are at risk of not achieving the threshold. These 8 non-KPP’s are not identified in the report. The JSF Program Office identified corrective actions or has way-ahead recommendations.

Already in the 2003 Selected Acquisition Report to the US Congress on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program of Record, the Pentagon warned:
“Some non-KPP Threshold Requirements will not be met for all variants.”

However, nothing happened to correct this warnings.

In 2012 the Pentagon tried to ease several parameters already, after the DOT&E chief concluded that the F-35’s sustained turn rate requirements and its transonic acceleration requirements could not be met. One example: The program announced an intention to change performance specifications for the F-35C, reducing turn performance from 5.1 to 5.0 sustained g’s and increasing the time for acceleration from 0.8 Mach to 1.2 Mach by at least 43 seconds.
Sustained turning performance for the F-35A was being reduced from 5.3G to 4.6G according to the DOT&E FY2012 report. ("can't turn" jibe)

Schedule

At this moment a Milestone C/Full Rate Production decision is planned for 2nd quarter FY 2019. The JSF development contract was signed on 16 November 1996. Joint Operational Requirements Document for the F-35 program was issued in March 2000 and revalidated by DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in October 2001. On October 24, 2001, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) held a Milestone B review for the program. This Milestone B approval would permit the program to enter the SDD phase. USD(AT&L) recertified Milestone B in February 2012 and approved an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB).

In 2012 the JSF program instituted a Block Review Board process to improve software integration with other activities and to support a more realistic SDD Integrated Master Schedule (IMS). The program maintains a technical review schedule, but many of the year’s events were delayed because the program had not met the entrance criteria. It is interesting to read that DASD(SE) plans to conduct an Integrated Master Schedule assessment in FY 2014.

Reliability

Stephen Welby reveals this:
Reliability data are below growth curves for all variants, and the program could face a risk to meeting reliability requirements without dedicated funding for a reliability growth program. Similarly, since O&S costs are based on meeting the required reliability at maturity, there are increasing risks to O&S cost and future aircraft availability. The program does not plan to complete prognostics portion of the Prognostics Health Management (PHM) requirements within SDD.

Software

Welby writes:
Software delivery for the remainder of Blocks 2/3 is a challenge because of the size and complexity (Approx. 28.9 million software lines of code (SLOC), with Approx. 2 million SLOC remaining).
DASD(SE) forecasts a schedule delay for Block 2 and a delay for Block 3. As a result, the program improved software processes but also shifted resources to Block 2 at the expense of Block 3. DASD(SE) plans to conduct a software development review in FY 2014.
However, even in the final “3F” software version, the F-35 will lack ROVER, in spite of having close air support as one of its primary missions. The Inertial navigation system does not work. There is an unknown bug with the AMRAAM. The DAS confuses the aircraft’s own flare launches with incoming missiles. Etcetera.

Manufacturing

Welby reports:
There was steady manufacturing progress in FY 2013, but quality, scrap, rework and repair, on-time part delivery, supplier execution, and reduced funding for future affordability initiatives are issues that may have an impact on costs for LRIP ramp-rate increases and FRP. In addition, there are production risks including part-interchangeability variation and fix schedule, outer-mold-line control, and maturing international capabilities.
DASD(SE) participated in two supplier reviews and the annual prime contractor PRR. There was improvement from the previous year, but there are risks remaining for all eight manufacturing areas assessed. Mitigation plans are in place or in development for all production issues, risks, and PRR findings.

Integration

Also a point of serious concerns:
Interoperability and information assurance (IA) certifications and verification and lab capacities are watch items. IA certification is on the critical path because most interoperability and full joint certifications cannot be completed until Block 3 capability is delivered and verified.
Verification and lab capacity may not support Block 2/3 demands, adding schedule pressure to capability deliveries. The program plans more efficient verification and is evaluating lab-capacity mitigation options. The program has established memoranda of agreement and Interface Control Working Groups with weapon program offices as documented in the SEP.

Source:
Department of Defense Systems Engineering FY 2013 Annual Report
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; Systems Engineering; March 2014

JSFnieuws1404

[brar_w]

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2 ... radar.html



This column also appears in the April 28 issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology.

[/quote]

Already rebuted the article.

viewtopic.php?p=1641896#p1641896

As for Australia backing out. Dream on, I'll add to the list as well. So far we have 1) Marine Core IOC will be delayed by 13 months 2) The program will abort and 3) Australia will back out

As far as Canada is concerned, they are pushing the decision out for the next government. A lack of competition is being sighted. If its competition they want, then I do not think its a bad thing at all (perhaps we should take some cue ) An advantage for Lockheed and the F-35 since it will compete on APUC as canada is a partner (All partners pay JPO negotiated APUC price per batch) while say a Boeing Super Hornet will compete through an FMS or a direct commercial sale (Totally opposite to the South Korean competition where F-35 competed as FMS and F-15SE competed as FMS+Direct commercial sale). Let the canadians do a cost/capability analysis for a cheaper 4.5 gen fighter vs a 5th gen jet.

Turkey however announced its intentions to move ahead with the first 2 F-35 for its armed forces. They have reaffirmed their commitment for 100 fighters.

The statement, from Turkey's undersecretary for state-run defence, said Turkey's commitment to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme "continues strong as ever."

"In this context, Turkey continues her forecast of the acquisition of 100 F-35A aircraft as planned and declared previously.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/ ... RZ20140506

Edit: Before someone jumps in and says "turkey is only buying 2 therefore they are leaving room to get out of the program in case XYZ happens", i'll like to clarify that they are not only reassuring their commitment to 100 fighters but also exercising their obligation as a partner nation to the LRIP jets. They need not buy more than a fixed amount of LRIP jets (That are considered to be more expensive than FCP jets). Since the FCP schedule has not been finalized by the JPO (its contingent on a lot of things, the least of which is whether sequestration continues in 2016 and beyond) turkey need not decide which batches it wishes to include the other 98 fighters just yet.

Australia (58) South Korea (40) Israel and perhaps some others (Singapore) will more than make up (and add some) to deferments for the Early FPC block deferments by the italians or canadians.

I read somewhere in your report (again a basic search on the internet will provide much required rebuttal to the things claimed in it, so i won't indulge in the pointless exercise) that the STOVL jet takes too long to take off (with a smiley)..Not an issue for the MC or the RN..They are happy with the former having taken the B varient out to sea twice and will do so again soon. But of course they'll delay IOC by 13 months .

Enjoy!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r0rqOJe7TV8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rutgogx6C-c
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rLSsLCMsCrM

[NRao]

Turkey to order first two F-35 fighter jets - statement

[brar_w]

April 29, 2014 :: F-35 is Liaoning's worst nightmare, says Global Times

Memo ha snot reached them, yet.

Quite a useless article that merits little discussion (if any). Not only does it have errors but its a pointless story.

Errors:

1) APG81 has 1000 elements: Incorrect, the author must have confused the Apg-81 with the Apg-80 (Block 60 f-16 radar) or taken the line in the vide that it has "more than 1000 TR modules" to be 1000 TR modules. The Apg-81 is the radar on the F-35, and it has 1600+ T-R Modules.


Here's on its capabilities and DISCLOSED speeds etc which the author has simply taken his information from.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzDke56vMiU

2) The aircraft will carry the Norwegian JSM anti-shipping missile;- Incorrect. While the JSM will be cleared for the F-35 and because of that all block 4 F-35's (irrespective of which country uses them) will have the capability to "plug and play" the missile (zero testing required) the USN has no plans to acquire the weapon. The USN has committed itself to acquiring 150 or so interim LRASM by 2019, with the prime capability of operating in permissive, HIGH JAMMING/RF denied environment with full net-centric capability (multi spectral, mission re programmable, two way data link, SATCOM, and other modern tomahawk like features) with a range closer to 500 km from a mid altitude launch (its a stealthy missile). All block 4 F-35's would be able to carry the weapon irrespective of which nation uses the fighter. Post the 150 or so interim missiles the US has yet to open the RFP's for competition for a new anti-ship weapon. Concepts that are looked for are 1) Same spec as the LRASM and 2) a shorter range (200Km) faster missile, perhaps even a hypersonic RATLRS like concept.

These are the errors I found at first glance and the article is too weak to warrant a second pass

The biggest capability the F-35C brings to the Navy, Marine core and the pacific is net centricity and stealth.

Originally, an Aegis ship would find enemy missiles and aircraft with its own onboard radar, then shoot them down with its own onboard weapons. Increasingly, that Aegis system can take incoming data from offboard sources — from other ships, Navy E-2D Advanced Hawkeye radar planes, Army JLENS surveillance blimps, and in the future from Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force F-35 Joint Strike Fighters — and fire at targets the ship’s own radar can’t yet see. The Navy is currently testing what’s called “launch on remote,” where the Aegis ship uses the offboard data to launch a missile towards the target but still relies on its own radar to lock on for the final approach and kill. The next step, though, will be “engage on remote,” where the missile relies entirely on offboard data and the firing ship’s own radar never sees the target at all.

http://breakingdefense.com/2013/04/navy ... ?icid=apb1

[TSJones]

Originally, an Aegis ship would find enemy missiles and aircraft with its own onboard radar, then shoot them down with its own onboard weapons. Increasingly, that Aegis system can take incoming data from offboard sources — from other ships, Navy E-2D Advanced Hawkeye radar planes, Army JLENS surveillance blimps, and in the future from Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force F-35 Joint Strike Fighters — and fire at targets the ship’s own radar can’t yet see. The Navy is currently testing what’s called “launch on remote,” where the Aegis ship uses the offboard data to launch a missile towards the target but still relies on its own radar to lock on for the final approach and kill. The next step, though, will be “engage on remote,” where the missile relies entirely on offboard data and the firing ship’s own radar never sees the target at all.

In the advent of declared war, or perhaps after the US Navy takes a first hit from an opponent this ship or others like it, will probably take over:

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/67a1bbd70102

[NRao]

Quite a useless article that merits little discussion (if any).

That is true of most of the posts in this thread, in fact starting with the title of the thread. : )

[brar_w]

Originally, an Aegis ship would find enemy missiles and aircraft with its own onboard radar, then shoot them down with its own onboard weapons. Increasingly, that Aegis system can take incoming data from offboard sources — from other ships, Navy E-2D Advanced Hawkeye radar planes, Army JLENS surveillance blimps, and in the future from Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force F-35 Joint Strike Fighters — and fire at targets the ship’s own radar can’t yet see. The Navy is currently testing what’s called “launch on remote,” where the Aegis ship uses the offboard data to launch a missile towards the target but still relies on its own radar to lock on for the final approach and kill. The next step, though, will be “engage on remote,” where the missile relies entirely on offboard data and the firing ship’s own radar never sees the target at all.

In the advent of declared war, or perhaps after the US Navy takes a first hit from an opponent this ship or others like it, will probably take over:

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/67a1bbd70102

This isnt a "go to war ship" its a sensors platform for treaty verification and with assistance perhaps for BMD etc. Anti Sat capability has existed for years (its a product of cold war investments) yet the ASB (air sea battle) actually does not advocate using missiles to shoot down satellites not only due to debris issues but also due to conflict-escalation concerns. The ASB advocates non kinetic measures to deal with potential enemy satellites. This involves tracking all enemy satellites and targeting them if required through a mix of options. Options include frying their electronics, using directed energy weapons launching miniature satellites to shadow potential threats (space) and effect a kill if required. Most of the work is classified (ASB) but one would imagine the space fense which promises to be the largest radar program on earth (Gallium nitride) would help track threats. The F-15 will soon be able to launch micro sats into space as well.

http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20 ... pace-Fence
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/Features/2 ... 27_14.page

[Viv S]

@Viv

I also do not agree with the PAKFA stealth rationale. That the PAKFA may not have stealthy features that equal or better the F-22 raptor that have been flying since the late nineties is not by itself a failure for the program

B_W, firstly... fantastic posts. Great to see some genuine original well-informed analysis.

On the issue of the PAK FA, I'm not saying its a failure, though my tone's been more mocking than perhaps was in good taste.

Truth be told, if the PAK FA was an Indian aircraft I'd be delighted and raring to see them built in volume by HAL. The issue that faces the Russians is the same as that facing us, (albeit to a lesser degree) i.e. a lower technological base and limits on funding. In light of those limitations the PAK FA is no more a failure for the Russians than the Tejas is for us.

As far as its role concerned, yes the PAK FA will serve as a long range patrol/air superiority/interception but even in that specific role the F-22 (built for opening day offensive air campaigns) will likely be more effective.

[brar_w]

The PAKFA for our context needn't be more effective than the F-22. Neither Pakistan or China are likely to acquire the F-22 anytime soon, nor are we and the US planning on going to war with each other. In the air superiority context, the PAKFA only needs to be ahead of the twin stealth fighters coming out of china.

[Viv S]

The PAKFA for our context needn't be more effective than the F-22. Neither Pakistan or China are likely to acquire the F-22 anytime soon, nor are we and the US planning on going to war with each other. In the air superiority context, the PAKFA only needs to be ahead of the twin stealth fighters coming out of china.

Agreed. But the challenge here is the Chinese ADGE. They already field a variety of Russian SAMs plus derivative Chinese equivalents. I wouldn't be surprised if we saw a new HQ-XX strongly resembling the S-400 in service before the end of the decade.

Also, like the US there's also been a huge shift towards NCW as fundamental warfighting philosophy. There will eventually be a need for an aircraft to perform the more dicey variety of EW/ISR missions (perhaps even before the balloon goes up). Same for CAS at standoff ranges - with an external LDP, (an unproven MMI) and no (disclosed) SDB equivalent, the PAK FA enters the combat zone with limitations.

There's the AMCA that we seem to be relying on to shoulder most of the strike burden but given that it'll still be a while in development and there are significant technological challenges to be overcome, over the short term (upto 2030 or so) relying upon it may not wise. Frankly, it might be worthwhile to scale it up; developing a PAK FA analogue would be faster and easier. Lesser weight issues (always a concern), more room for avionics growth, and an available super-cruise optimized engine solution from P&W/GE perhaps building upon the ADVENT/AETD programs. It would interesting to see what path the Japanese ATD-X program takes.

Anyway, in this context the question becomes, can the F-35 hold its own against the Chinese stealth fighters and operate efficiently within an IAF network. Prima facie I would say yes, but more importantly I'd like the IAF/MoD to make that call, for better or worse, after a formal evaluation.

[brar_w]

I see no point and advantage in the long term with the F-35 for the IAF. What do we want to achieve with fighters from Russia, India, France, and now on top of that we want to add American fighters? How will we ever develop a NCW concept with so many different kits, designed around different requirements etc? It would put a strain for sure and we will surely be attempting to do something that has never been done by any other service/nation before. I say PAKFA, LCA, AMCA, Rafale. Limit Rafale and Pakfa to the lowest number possible without adding risk. Bring up the LCA to rafale standard and AMCA to be the A2G version of the PAKFA. By 5.5 gen, do a PAKFA MKI with full Indian systems and eventually use it along with the AMCA to phase out rafale (we can sell used frames). Come 6th gen have the guts to break the chord with Russia and Sukhoi and aim for an ALL desi fighter fleet.

The B version may be an option for the navy down the line (I am all for it for LHD type ships that double or triple up the carrier numbers) but the AF does not need to get into the "pains" if integrating yet another fighter. Plus I personally feel that its demeaning for a nation of 1 billion to be the biggest arms buyer in the world.

Agreed. But the challenge here is the Chinese ADGE. They already field a variety of Russian SAMs plus derivative Chinese equivalents. I wouldn't be surprised if we saw a new HQ-XX strongly resembling the S-400 in service before the end of the decade.

Thats a given. The problem arises when some see Russia as a "victim" in all this. Strategically its a russian move to pit china against the US in the pacific. We can continue to live in denial that "russia sells better tech to us and only when we turn it down does that tech get handed over to china" and claim that russia is the poor victim here as it sells to china in good faith and china rips the design off etc etc etc but its better we put an end to all this as china has shown more clearly that its rising military capability also results in a bullying attitude towards its neighbors (South korea, Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, India etc). The more they rise militarily (and they surely will) the more will this attitude. Russia and China have global enemies (strategically in the US and NATO). We are a peaceful democracy that is well integrated into the social and economical bonds with the majority of free countries (democracy's) around the globe and we only have regional enemies. Because of this alone, a stronger chinese partnership is much more important for russia (strategically) than a partnership with India (although they surely will try to manage both). And change will not come easy in Russia or China. Putin and the Chinese leadership will stay well past our prime ministers/governments that will come and go.

[Viv S]

I see no point and advantage in the long term with the F-35 for the IAF. What do we want to achieve with fighters from Russia, India, France, and now on top of that we want to add American fighters? How will we ever develop a NCW concept with so many different kits, designed around different requirements etc? It would put a strain for sure and we will surely be attempting to do something that has never been done by any other service/nation before. I say PAKFA, LCA, AMCA, Rafale. Limit Rafale and Pakfa to the lowest number possible without adding risk. Bring up the LCA to rafale standard and AMCA to be the A2G version of the PAKFA. By 5.5 gen, do a PAKFA MKI with full Indian systems and eventually use it along with the AMCA to phase out rafale (we can sell used frames). Come 6th gen have the guts to break the chord with Russia and Sukhoi and aim for an ALL desi fighter fleet.

The Rafale/MMRCA numerically augments the IAF's fleet but brings relative little capability addition (what there is can be chalked up to the SPECTRA). One of the core requirements of the MMRCA IIRC was a guarantee against obsolescence for 15 years. That was one thing in 2010 but I doubt that can be delivered at the decade comes to a close (which is when HAL deliveries will start). The Rafale brings nothing new to the table, and disposing it off early may not be possible (case in point: Qatari Mirages) without a huge write-off in value.

The only upside to the MMRCA appears to have been ToT but the closer one looks at that the more flawed the prospect appears. We're paying for complete ToT (as an extra), even in areas where domestic capabilities are sufficient. That's simply wasted funding.

Besides which its debatable if even valuable ToT can be truly assimilated. We've been building the MiGs, Jags and now MKIs, but records of the struggle the ADA went through to develop the Tejas raise questions of how much ToT has contributed to domestic capabilities. In contrast, our domestic upgrade programs esp EW/ESM/protection systems directly paid off during the Tejas development. A more economical approach would be to spring for consultancy instead, which can be focused on problem areas, as and when they are identified.

We can scale up Tejas production and acquire a greater number of force multipliers - (the DRDO's ERJ-145 AEW&C costs about the same as a Rafale). Given the cost ratio between the Tejas and Rafale, that'll result in superior net capability. By 2016/17 or whenever the Russians have a 'final spec' PAK FA flying, we can run it against the F-35 and see how it does. In either case, the IAF will receive genuine capability augmentation.

Post 2030, we'll be left with a four fighter force - Tejas, Su-30MKI, an FGFA and the AMCA.

The B version may be an option for the navy down the line (I am all for it for LHD type ships that double or triple up the carrier numbers) but the AF does not need to get into the "pains" if integrating yet another fighter. Plus I personally feel that its demeaning for a nation of 1 billion to be the biggest arms buyer in the world.

Agreed.

[Philip]

There is much to chew upon in the above,given our funds constraints,establishing acquisition priorities,limiting FGFA,Rafale,etc.,esp. if there is no definite gain from the TOT that will assist us in our own efforts to leapfrog lost decades of tech.However,Bringing up the LCA to "Rafale std." may be an unattainable goal. Size-wise s it is far smaller and limits its ability to accomodate extra eqpt.Not being twin engined,etc.,gives the Rafale far greater endurance,payload,etc. Will it be able to supercruise? If we are successful in perfecting the Astra with a 100km+ range for the LCA it will be a great achievement for such a small airframe.The LCA was always intended to be a MIG-21 replacement.The problem thus far has been its extra weight and underpowered engine which has meant reduced combat capability.How that is going to be resolved with Mk-2 within an acceptable timeframe is open to Q. There perhaps is a limit as to how much we can upgrade and improve the LCA ,therefore raising the bar as much as possible before moving onto the next design is perhaps a better option.

Adm.Greenert,USN's CNO. On the decision to buy more JSFs vs legacy SHs. Decision yet to be made.
"Why buy a luxury vehicle when a bomb truck will do?" In the era of PGMs,and faced with a twin-enemy,the IAF must have adequate "bomb trucks" apart from its luxury barges.

The AMCA programme is perhaps at the right time for initiation.The 5th-gen aircraft under development now both from east and west are giving us a good idea of the capabilities and pitfalls involved. Stealth is being eroded by counter-stealth developments and the advent of stealth UCAVs add to a force's weapons of choice and survivability of ultra-expensive manned aircraft.Whether the current AMCA concept is a valid one in the light of developments is open to debate. What is its priority going to be,air superiority/dominance or strike,or are we judicously planning for an affordable inventory of 3 multi-role aircraft types (some stealthy),heavy,medium and light?

A few JSF 2014 reports.

http://www.worldtribune.com/2014/04/29/ ... sia-china/

F-35 fails stealth test: Report says JSF vulnerable to tracking by Russia, China
Special to WorldTribune.com

WASHINGTON — The Joint Strike Fighter, plagued by technical flaws and budget overruns, has now failed in achieving stealth capability.
Xcpt:

Bill Sweetman, a senior editor at Aviation Week, asserted that the Defense Department decided to reduce JSF’s stealth capability through underestimating the radar capabilities of U.S. adversaries.

“The F-35 is susceptible to detection by radars operating in the VHF bands of the spectrum,” Sweetman said. “The fighter’s jamming is mostly confined to the X-band, in the sector covered by its APG-81 radar. These are not criticisms of the program but the result of choices by the customer, the Pentagon.”

In an analysis that appeared in Aviation Week and the Daily Beast on April 28, Sweetman said the F-35 was also not “particularly good at jamming enemy radar.” He said the Pentagon would be forced to deploy special electronic warfare aircraft to protect JSF.

Lockheed Martin had long touted JSF as a stealth aircraft. But Sweetman said JSF was given an expendable radar decoy to disrupt a missile attack rather than to prevent tracking.

A few 2014 JSF reports collected from:
http://www.jsfnieuws.nl/?m=201402

Feb 22 2014
Lockheed F-35 for Marines Delayed as Test Exposes Cracks
By Tony Capaccio Feb 21, 2014

On-the-ground stress testing for the U.S. Marine Corps version of Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35 jet may be halted for as long as a year after cracks were found in the aircraft’s bulkheads, Pentagon officials said.

Will bulkhead cracks also influence the F-35A?

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Global F35 News

Fatigue tests show problems with the main bulkheads, not only the F-35B, also the F-35A (Air Force) version may be influenced.
Some problems with the main bulkheads were reported before. The problem is caused by the weight saving program 2004/2005.

The Bloomberg news reported us yesterday:
“The crack was not predicted to occur by prior analyses or modeling,” Jennifer Elzea, spokeswoman for the Pentagon test office, said in an e-mail. “We can’t know all the changes that must be made to the structures until the testing is complete, and it is not surprising when discoveries like this occur.”

However, back in the DOT&E report FY2010 reported the problem already: (see JSFnieuws January 2011)
“Results for a loading equivalent to one aircraft lifetime (8,000 hours) were expected in mid-FY11 for the STOVL aircraft and early FY12 for the [Conventional Take-off and Landing] CTOL aircraft. However, a major fatigue crack was found in the STOVL test article at approximately 1,500 hours flight hours. Failure of the bulkhead in flight would have safety of flight consequences. The program stopped fatigue testing on both the STOVL and CTOL test articles and began root cause analysis in November 2010. The STOVL bulkhead is constructed of aluminum alloy. The CTOL and CV bulkheads have a similar but not identical design and are made of aluminum. The difference in bulkhead material is due to actions taken several years ago to reduce the weight of the STOVL aircraft.

Source: Bloomberg; 21-feb-2014; F-35 fighter for Marines face year’s test delay
JSFnieuws140222-JB/jb

F-35 jet orders and industry, promises fading away……

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Global F35 News

Washington Post writes about the trimming back of the F-35 fighter jet orders in FY2015

The fiscal 2015 request, to be released 4-March-2014, will include:
- 26 F-35As (US Air Force model)
- 6 F-35Bs (US Marine Corps’ short-takeoff and vertical-landing jets)
- 2 F-35C (US Navy’s version for aircraft carriers)
This means about 8 less than planned one year ago and more than 40 in comparison with the planning of 2008. As part of the original plan (2002), USAF should have been ordering 110 F-35s this year.
In 2001 total production planning until 2019 was about 2000 jets with a production start in 2005 and 5 Low rate Initial Production Series. At this moment the are speaking about 12 or 13 Low Rate Initial Production series and in 2019 (on condition that no further trimming will take place) the production will be about 550 aircraft. A difference of 1400 aircraft in comparison to Original promises to the international industry.

In 2006 the US Air Force extended the buy timeline for all of its F-35 full-rate production per year from 110 per year to 80 per year due to cost climb. This changed the final buy time from 2027-28 to 2037….. Planned production from 2010/2011 during one decade was lowered from 230 per year to about 170 per year (including all international sales).

Still in 2007 the planning was that from 2012/2013 during one decade a continuous production rate of 170 aircraft per year would be maintained. The whole global production chain and investments in production facilities were based on this planned production rate. But in 2008 the USAF boss told “that the USAF could only afford to buy 48 F-35s per year” and full-rate production would start (again “planning” in 2014). *(That's almost a 70% reduction in production)

Therefore, return on investment will be very low and one would suppose that losses in the industry due to not used production capacity will be considerable at this moment and for years to come.

Source: Washington Post; 16-feb-2014 “Pentagon to trim plans for F-35 jet or

US FY2015 budget forecast: A-10 retired; more future F-35 cuts likely
US Secretary of Defense Speech about the Fiscal Year 2015 budget, some extracts.
As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Pentagon Press Briefing Room, Monday, February 24, 2014

If sequestration-level cuts are re-imposed in 2016 and beyond, however, the Air Force would need to make far more significant cuts to force structure and modernization. The Air Force would have to retire 80 more aircraft, including the entire KC-10 tanker fleet and the Global Hawk Block 40 fleet, as well as slow down purchases of the Joint Strike Fighter – resulting in 24 fewer F-35s purchased through Fiscal Year 2019 – and sustain ten fewer Predator and Reaper 24-hour combat air patrols. The Air Force would also have to take deep cuts to flying hours, which would prevent a return to adequate readiness levels.

[NRao]

None of these issues are show stoppers.

If one looks at the Pentagon budget they have ignored the constraints for 2016/17 (cannot recall which specific year) onwards. The rest of the nations also should see reviving economies.

The tech issues fall under two categories: one that are to be fixed and the other that have to deal with opponents that start catching up with counter technologies. So, what else is new? As can be seen the list of problems today, with a few exceptions perhaps, are not the same as they were a year ago. Certainly not when this thread was started (with the intent of proving that the US had a turkey cooking).

Today we have the Russians, yeah the Russians, comparing their 5th Gen air craft to the F-22!!!! The Chinese trying to catch up too. If the JSF was a Turkey and F-22 a useless, track-able plane, then why are these guys pouring funds into a "5th Gen" plane. On what grounds can Russia ask India for $6 billion? IF Russia and China can detect a F-35 so easily why not a FGFA? Why bother with "stealth" - a question that nations that are still not there (Russia/China/India) need to answer.

And quoting sources ad nauseam cannot change basic facts. Outside of the fact that the F-35 is expensive - that too should have been avoided - it is a marvel, but perhaps not meant for every air force. However the fact that umpteen air forces are acquiring it and three other major participants are attempting to duplicate it should say something.