Urgent need for a Pakistan desk/Pakistan chair in India

[shiv]

Having spent over a decade along with BRF scholars and experts on Pakistan it pains me to see the level of ignorance there is about Pakistan and a complete absence of coherent ideas about dealing with a deeply dysfunctional, failing state like Pakistan.

India really needs a special Pakistan desk to to be chaired by a group of experts. (In fact this should be done for all significant countries including the US and China, but that is OT)

The reason for starting this thread is simply to throw the idea out into the public domain via this forum and use this thread as a repository of "essential reading" about Pakistan which every member of a Pakistan desk should read in order to understand and deal with Pakistan.

I do realize that we have a "first post" of every Paki thread that serves as just such a repository, but I believe the time has come to have a separate dedicated thread that can be called up at any time as a reference point to look up books and material on Pakistan that many of us have read and that should be essential reading for anyone who belongs to a Pakistan desk that helps make policy on Pakistan. I would like to add the names of books and refercne material one by one - ie. perhaps one or two per post with a short review of content. Without intending this to be a self advertisement and acknowledging that both the books I star with are a bit dated, i will make the first two posts about books I have been involved with - one of my own and that of Uneven Cohen. Please add to the list - with a link if need be and a short review.

[shiv]

Apologies but I will start with my own e-book - which was one of the early efforts courtesy help from many BRFites. Many better books have followed - my ebook went online when Pakistan's population was about 140 million
Pakistan - Failed State

Pakistan is a huge, populous and diverse nation that has the curious distinction of having been suddenly born in 1947, and it has been an aggressive and implacable neighbor of India.

Most Indians do not understand Pakistan or Pakistanis. Many tend to look at the similarities and remark, "Pakistanis are just like us". That may appear true but it is important to understand that Pakistanis do not feel like Indians and do not like to say "Indians are just like us". In fact Pakistanis have spent all those decades since independence trying to show how Pakistan is not like India. And in the intervening years Pakistan, Pakistani institutions and Pakistanis have developed certain unique and recognizable defining features. While these features have been noted time and again by innumerable people in a large number of books, newspaper reports and magazines, no effort been made to collect this information and put it all together between the covers of a single book.

More that anything else, this book can be considered a Review of the literature on Pakistan. In the field of medical research, a Review of the literature is often used to collect and collate information about a disease from various sources. Such a review collects up all the available information about a given disease from all the medical papers available on the subject and consolidates the information in one document. That document then serves as a comprehensive reference point for information about the subject.

[shiv]

The Idea of Pakistan by Stephen Cohen

Here is my review of the book:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/Volume14/sastry.html

Like Robert Bruce's spider, repeated effort seems to be going into writing the definitive book on Pakistan. Stephen Cohen's book, "The Idea of Pakistan" comes closest to describing the real Pakistan, but loses its way somewhat towards the end. While the descriptive part is excellent, the analytical part at the end is debatable.

The book starts with a brief history of Pakistan. Subsequent chapters deal with Pakistan seen from various lenses, indicated by chapter names like "The Army's Pakistan", "Political Pakistan", "Islamic Pakistan", "Regionalism and Separatism" and a chapter on the demography, education and economy of Pakistan. Cohen devotes the penultimate chapter to predict and describe what he feels might be the various "futures" of Pakistan given its history and dynamics. The final chapter is on American options in Pakistan where Cohen writes out a prescription of “American” medicine for Pakistan based on his diagnosis.

Chapter Seven of the book, entitled "Demographic, Educational and Economic Prospects" is a must read for educated Pakistanis, because it contains information that is well known outside Pakistan, but its ruling elite are either ignorant or are suicidally choosing to ignore the information.

Compared to earlier works on Pakistan, Cohen's work is notable in that he charts out new territory in three areas.

First, Cohen defines the "establishment" or the ruling elite of Pakistan as an oligarchy of about 500 individuals "whose membership depends on adherence to a broad set of values and norms, including a particular understanding of the idea of Pakistan" (Page 69). Members can include Army officers, businessmen, journalists, media experts and others who are loyal to a core set of principles. The establishment also has an important subset of Islamic nationalists (Page 70). Cohen believes that the Pakistani establishment borrows heavily from the ideology of the British Raj, creating a "paternalistic government" which would not share power unless required. The establishment is said to share the idea that India is the chief threat Pakistan, and must be countered militarily, thereby giving the military a primary role in Pakistan. Tied up with this idea is the need to keep the Kashmir issue burning and to make alliances to "borrow power" as needed for these requirements. The armed forces are considered a "model" and democracy is seen as good only as long as it does not interfere with the governance of the elite. The media need to be on a tight leash, and radical Islamic extremists could be a useful tool for state policy. Cohen also points out the Pakistani establishment's thinking that "something or someone will always come to Pakistan's rescue because of its location" (Page 270)

Second, Cohen is the first Western author to recognize a specific Pakistani psyche or mindset. He speaks of confusion in the minds of Pakistanis as to whether Pakistan is a moderate state created for Muslims, or whether it is an Islamic state where Islamic law will hold sway over everything else. Cohen defines the Pakistani Punjabi, whose dominance in numbers and influence in Pakistan are critical to this psyche. He writes: Punjabis can best be described as a cross between Texans and New Yorkers. They exude a brashness and zest for life (reflected through their rich stock of "Punjabi" jokes) and also include some of Pakistan's best educated and cultured elites, all of which can be irritating to non-Punjabis. For Punjabis, only the Pashtuns can compare in martial qualities and valor; attitudes toward Baluchis are dismissive, and toward Sindhis, contemptuous. (Page 224)

Third, Cohen has documented the role of Islam in the Pakistani mindset - Pakistan's "Islamic psyche" as it were. He writes "As some Muslims argued at the time of separation, if they could not rule over Hindus, then they had to be shielded from Hindu influence, not by becoming a separate but equal society, but a separate and superior one" (Page 35). Many elite Pakistanis characterized the "Hindu mind" as "scheming and devious" (Page 36). Another characteristic that Cohen recognizes is the deep need for "izzat" or honor, particularly in the Pakistani army, whose personnel are taught to seek revenge for real or perceived slights to maintain honor. Cohen characterizes the Islamic nationalist world view as being driven by a "notion of grievance" (Page 70) that Muslims everywhere (the ummah) are mistreated. The use of terrorism as an end in itself and not as a tool to achieve an end is based on analysis by Pakistani Islamists, as is the need to wage jihad or war which is a "religious duty inculcated in the Quran on the followers of Mohammed to wage war upon those who do not adopt the doctrines of Islam" (Page 120). The Islamists in Pakistan's establishment believe that Pakistan economic and military backwardness is because of its superior Islamic social greatness and a "worldwide conspiracy to prevent it from acquiring modern technology and weapons" (Page 174).

But beyond this, Cohen's understanding of the role of Islam in Pakistan seems to break down. This may be due in part to biases in Cohen's own perceptions that emerge as "Freudian slips" in the book. In two places (Pages 39 & 298) he states that Indians wanted Pakistan to fail but no references are provided to support this claim. Cohen seems to indicate that even terrorism directed at Indian groups and entities do not amount to extremism on the part of Pakistan. Cohen suggests that Pakistan's support of Sikh extremism in India was a "legitimate response" to India's support to the genocide triggered independence struggle in East Pakistan (Page 228). Cohen describes General Musharraf as moderate and "one of the most secular officers in the Army" (Page 113), despite General Musharraf's background in supporting Islamist terrorism and initiating a war against India. Such views may indicate a misreading of the role of Islam in Pakistan by Cohen. He contradicts himself by declaring the Pakistan army as a secular army, and that young officer recruits have political and cultural, but not ideological passions. In the same paragraph, Cohen says that for Pakistani officer recruits "India is a "Hindu" threat, abetted by the Christian and Zionist powers of the world" (Page 116). Cohen belongs to a genre of "South Asia experts" who believe that Islamic extremism used against India is compatible with a "moderate and secular" Pakistan, and it becomes Islamic terrorism only when directed against the US or its Western allies.

This deeply flawed viewpoint provides the leeway needed by the Pakistani establishment to maintain armies of Islamic extremists ostensibly for attacking India alone. When these armies turn against the West, the establishment claims to be secular and pro -Western and asks for more aid under the pretence that the "moderate establishment" will be overrun by Islamists. Cohen is unable to see the symbiotic relationship between the Pakistani establishment and the Islamists, and this blind spot has a great bearing on the prescriptions and solutions he has suggested.

In the chapter on Pakistan's "futures" Cohen writes of various possibilities that lie ahead for Pakistan, ranging from "more of same", to "Normal" democracy, and Islamic state or break-up. In all scenarios Cohen appears to be pessimistic about Pakistan, although he feels it is unlikely that Pakistan will break up, become an Islamic state or a normal democracy.

Cohen's prescription for Pakistan regarding what America should do can be summarized under five headings, namely: support the economy; nurture the Army; try to encourage democracy; revitalize secular education so that it replaces madrassas; and "shape" Pakistan's environment. This last point will be of particular interest to Indians.

Cohen believes that Pakistanis are paranoid about India and that they view "Indian society as the cause of their insecurity" (Page 319). As a result Cohen feels that India has a substantial role in the direction that Pakistan takes. Cohen then makes recommendations that would in all probability have just the wrong effect on Indian political and public opinion. He suggests that the US adopt a carrot and stick policy with Pakistan in which the Pakistan Army is awarded with military aid if it seen as being faithful in implementing American suggestions about education reform in Pakistan (Page 315). He believes that India should "make the kind of concessions that Musharraf can use to get the military and others to "bite the bitter pill" of a status quo settlement for Kashmir" (Page 323). Given that there is a wide gulf between Cohen's view of Musharraf and the Indian perspective, Cohen's disingenuous suggestion would be rejected outright by any self respecting Indian. For all Cohen's concern about South Asia he fails to make a clear analysis as to why it might not be to India's long term advantage to merely sit back and allow Pakistan to stew in its dysfunctional juices without making any concessions whatsoever.

A review would be incomplete without some brilliant "quotable quotes" that could themselves summarize Pakistan.

"Pakistan is a state hopping on one strong leg" (Page 128).

"About the only exportable human asset that Pakistan has in abundance is "boots on the ground"" (Page 235).

"The bomb confirmed the sought-for image of Pakistan as combining Islam and technology, never mind that most of the technology was either stolen from a European nuclear facility or provided by China" (Page 80).

"Pakistan's army is strong enough to prevent state failure, but not imaginative enough to impose the changes that might transform the state" (Page 274).

"Pakistani officials like Pakistani beggars, become alert when they see Americans approaching" (Page 327).

"Pakistan now negotiates with its allies and friends by pointing a gun to its own head" (Page 270).

In summary this book, despite its analytical shortcomings, is the single best reference work on Pakistan available today. It will surely find a place in the library of every Pakistan watcher.

[shiv]

Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War - Christine Fair

The following video with the author talking about the book is probably the best summary of information
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3DIOjTmX0M

[UlanBatori]

Proper term may not be desk or chair, but Commode.

[A_Gupta]

Shiv, we had the following also about the Christine Fair book & talk (BRF material which I took the liberty of putting on my blog:
http://arunsmusings.blogspot.com/2014/0 ... about.html
)

JE Menon on BRF commented:

C.Fair's interview is so refreshingly honest that given her background I suspect she is on some kind of medication. It is that blunt. Rare from an American.

SSridhar on BRF has summarized the talk:

This is a summary [with some annotation] of Ms. C. Fair's talk at the Hudson Institute while introducing her new book, "Fighting to the End: Pakistan Army's Way to War". The video has been posted earlier here. Ms. Fair claims to have written the book by analyzing the Green Books (published since the 1970s), studying the military journals and extensive field study.

* Pakistani military journals are not like normal military journals that one sees in the US or India. They do not discuss battles, military issues etc.

* A reading of these journals indicates that Pakistan claims to be the only source of resistance to the rise of India and its hegemony. It has launched an asymmetric warfare against India since 1947 and though this has only brought it increasingly diminishing returns, it is persisting with its revisionism. It has been decisively defeated in 1971 and even in 1965 India could have decisively defeated it. Yet, it is not revising its policy.

* Most people see Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) as a Pashtun problem, but its backbone lies in Punjab with the Punjabi jihadi terrorist groups of HuJI (Harkat-ul-Jihadi-Islami), JeM (Jaish-e-Muhammad), HuA (Harkat-ul-Ansar) and HuM (Harkat-ul-Mujahideen).

* The conventional wisdom about Pakistan has been that it is a 'security-seeking state'. It would discard its Islamist proxies and the concept of 'strategic depth' if Kashmir is solved to its 'satisfaction'. Since c. 2008, another thesis was also floated that if Kashmir issue is resolved, the Afghanistan problem would also disappear. These are false.

There is no legitimacy to Pakistan's claims on Kashmir because the Maharajah acceded to India through an Instrument [of Accession]. Pakistan's claim on Kashmir is ideological and this does not square with a 'security-seeking' Pakistan because within Pakistani defense literature, Kashmir was never claimed as a buffer-state between itself and India, except for a recent Kayani article.

The US has mistakenly treated Pakistan for six decades as a 'security-seeking' state and tried to buttress their military so that they felt more secure against India etc. This has failed because fundamentally Pakistan is *NOT* a security-seeking state; it is an ideological and 'greedy' state. Pakistan's goals vis-a-vis India are primarily, not exclusively, ideological. So, appeasement strategies, such as those by the US, are dangerous. 'Greedy states' are revisionist in nature and appeasement only encourages more greediness and 'further appeasement'. Glasser, U of Chicago, defines a 'greedy state' as one which is fundamentally dis-satisfied with status quo and desirous of additional territory even when it is not required for its security. This definition describes Pakistan accurately for its designs on India (Kashmir) and Afghanistan. Its 'strategic depth' concept is not a later-day invention attributed to Gen. Zia or Gen. Aslam Beg. Pakistan inherited this from the British.

* Pakistan's revisionism dictates that even a rising and dominating India is in itself a defeat for Pakistan, even if there were to be no military defeat. The primary tool to defeat India is through an ever-increasing jihadi terrorism on it under a nuclear umbrella and a set of alliances with nations. Pakistan has a unique way to define 'victory' and 'defeat'. An example is its take on the humiliating 1971 defeat. Pakistani military journals do not describe that as a defeat because they had survived to fight another day. A Pakistani COAS told me, in the light of the Kargil defeat, "For us, doing nothing against India is in itself a defeat because that would tantamount to accepting Indian hegemony". The idea within the Pakistani military is that even if there was a very low probability of winning, Pakistan *must be seen trying* against India. While India would want to defeat the Pakistani military in an engagement, Pakistan simply wants to survive a fight. Anybody who opposes the military has to pay a heavy price. Within Pakistan itself, the Pakistani Army has not only threatened violence against political dispensations through coercion, but also has actually committed violence against anyone impeding them.

* Partition really looms large in Pakistani defence literature. There is a heart-burn that the division of India was unfair in 1947 not only because of the 'moth-eaten' Pakistan that resulted ultimately but also because India got most of the infrastructure and institutions. Those parts which became part of India had experienced more democratic traditions and experience in running institutions etc. However, even here, East Pakistan had many of these but the elites of West Pakistan chose to treat the East Pakistanis as second-class citizens. The Pakistani military also claims that, apart from these, it also got the 'restive portions' of India, namely the NWFP. It was thus not only an 'unfair' Partition but also an 'unfinished' Partition, because of Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh. The Pakistani military also claims that India is implacably opposed to Pakistan, to its very existence as exemplified by the 1971 war. Its problems with Afghanistan, its perceived fear of India, its alliances with the US, and increasing proximity between India and the USSR on the one hand and that between Afghanistan & USSR on the other, all wrapped into a dogged pursuit of 'strategic depth'. Though some authors, these days, are talking in terms of Pakistan going up its 'strategic depth', it is nonsense because there are different forms of pursuing the same. This was the same approach of the British too. It only changes forms.

* Is the past a prologue? Jihad is an instrument that was started by Pakistan in c. 1947, not as usually believed by many in c. 1990. The evolution of this 'jihad doctrine' is very evident in Pakistani military literature. While the Americans were training the Pakistani Army in the 1950s in counter insurgency [against a Communist invasion], the PA was secretively reverse engineering this into 'how to start an insurgency'. This slowly transformed into 'jihad' [as local situation within Pakistan also became conducive with Mawdudi et al]. By the turn of the 1970s, Pakistani military writers were already talking about what happens when, not if, Pakistan gets nuclear weapons. ZAB, as early as 1964, understood the need for nuclear weapons. Though ZAB went to Ayub with this request, he shrugged it off but said Pakistan could buy one off-the-shelf if needed. It was in the 1970s, when ZAB came to power, that the writers began saying that Kashmir should be re-opened after Pakistan acquired nuclear capability. So, Pakistan developed the concept of asymmetrical warfare as early as the 1970s, not 1990s.

* What are the 'endogenous game changers' for a better Pakistan? Democratic transition could be one as many think. But, recent democratic changes offer only a limited optimism as the Army keeps important portfolios. The Pakistani Army knows how to get its bidding done without directly intervening. Unless the civilians have a complete control over the Army and unless the civilians show a different strategic culture and appreciation and handling of threat perceptions, which are significantly different from what the Army has been doing hitherto, democratic transition is not going to change matters. The 'Ideology of Pakistan' started with Gen. Ayub Khan when he re-aligned the school curriculum in line with this ideology. He has devoted an entire chapter to the Ideology in his book, "Friends, not Masters". The Pakistani Army diffused this idea by inculcating young minds. Some people talk of the Pakistani civil society as a game changer. The Pakistani civil society has a lot of uncivil elements. The small decent civil society members are no match to the uncivil elements at large in the society, as the followers of Jama'at-ud-Dawah on the Twitter prove. The present civil society is more conservative than their parents. So, the civil society cannot be an impetus for change. Others talk of the 'youth bulge'. This is a non-starter. Economics can be a game-changer too, but IMF is going to pay-off Pakistan each time.

* The PA has been recruiting officers from more and more areas of Pakistan as part of their 'nation-building' goal, and these recruits do not share the views of the Punjabis. Punjabis in the Punjab are much more supportive of 'militarized jihad' than Punjabis elsewhere outside the Punjab. Non-Punjabis living in the Punjab think in the same way as the Punjabis. Ethnicity matters less than where you are born in Pakistan [or, more correctly, where you live]. If the PA continues to recruit from other parts of Pakistan because of its national goals, they are not going to share the 'core values' of the PA.

PS: And this is some stuff I gathered:

The last book, by C. Christine Fair, was discussed at the Hudson Institute, the hour-and-a-half session should be watched. Some C.C. Fair-isms:

1. "...I argue in the book that Pakistan's issues with India are ideological, they are philosophical, they are basically - its a civilizational conflict that Pakistan has set up, and therefore how can you resolve a civilizational conflict by resolving a contentious border?"

2. "I see the Pakistan Army more as international insurgents".

3. "To the Pakistan Army absolute acquiescence is real defeat".

4. "When the Indians think about taking on Pakistan, they think about defeating Pakistan. What Pakistan's military needs to survive an engagement is just the ability to mount another confrontation."

[ramana]

From first post of every TSP News and Discussion thread...

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________________________________________________________
The following links are background material on Pakistan.

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN:

Jinnah's Pakistan: An Interview with MA Jinnah, and how the Pakistan of Yesterday is the Pakistan of Today
http://iref.homestead.com/Messiah.html

http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/012809Tellis.pdf

The above is the testimony of Ashley Tellis on Jan 28th 2009, to the US Senate Homeland Security Committee on LeT's global role. It is a good articulation of LeT's past and future trends.

Know Your Pakistan
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... /Shiv.html

The Monkey Trap: A synopsis of Indo-Pak relations
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... ayyam.html

PAKISTAN-FAILED STATE: an ebook that owes its origin and existence to BRF.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/EBOOKS/pfs.pdf

Whither Pakistan ? Growing Instability and Implications for India: an IDSA e-Book, July 2010
http://idsa.in/book/WhitherPakistan

A landmark article that demolishes myths built up about Pakistan
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers8/paper710.html

Pakistani Role in Terrorism Against the U.S.A
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... yanan.html

Pakistani Education, or how Pakistan became what it is: Curricula and textbooks in Pakistan
http://www.sdpi.org/publications/public ... 86-34.html#

Making Enemies, Creating Conflict: Pakistan's Crises of State and Society. A book written by Pakistanis on Pakistan.
http://members.tripod.com/~no_nukes_sa/Contents.html

Should Pakistan Be Broken Up? by Gul Agha
http://pakistan70.tripod.com/gul.html

Alden Pyle in Pakistan, Part I
http://pundita.blogspot.com/2009/12/ald ... art-1.html

Prof. Walter Russell Mead, "Pakistan's Failed National Strategy"
http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/ ... -strategy/

"Pakistan Is", by Barry Bearak in New York Times Magazine, December 7, 2003.
Brings out succinctly various facets of Pakistani perfidy, obsession, fundamentalism etc.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.h ... nted=print

Religion as the Foundation of a Nation: The Making and Unmaking of Pakistan - P.K. Upadhyay, IDSA
It probes the religious and sectarian fault-lines in Pakistan in depth to determine their impact on the future of Pakistan.
http://idsa.in/system/files/monograph36.pdf

Ms. Christine Fair's exposition on Pakistan military, society et al. A Must see.
Fighting to the End: Pakistan Army's Way of War

PAKISTAN & TERRORISM:

The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups (Laskar-e-Taiba)
By Hussein Haqqani (journalist and Pak ambassador to US)
http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/rese ... detail.asp

Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects, Stephen Tankel, April 2011
New America Foundation
http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica. ... _LeT_0.pdf


Pakistani sponsoring of Terrorism
http://www.geocities.com/charcha_2000/
http://pak-terror.freeservers.com/Terro ... y_Tool.htm

Terror Map: The Pakistani Hand
http://sify.com/news/specials/terrormap/?vsv=TopHP1

Ethnic cleansing in Pakistan - a statistical analysis
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... idhar.html

A chronicle of genocide by the Pakistan army
http://www.gendercide.org/case_bangladesh.html

Documentary video evidence of Pakistani genocide in Bangladesh
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0x-94U1bVUQ
http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=EBKlIUbpc ... re=related
http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=sMg9Ly9nK0g
http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=xwwPbkyZV ... re=related

Inside Jihad - How Pakistan sponsors terrorists in India
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/ ... r_sb1.html

Pakistan's Role in the Kashmir Insurgency - Op-ed by Rand's Peter Chalk
http://www.rand.org/hot/op-eds/090101JIR.html

Alden Pyle in Pakistan, Part II
http://pundita.blogspot.com/2009/12/ald ... -upon.html

BEYOND MADRASAS: ASSESSING THE LINKS BETWEEN EDUCATION AND MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/ ... nthrop.pdf

Pakistani Military Officers' Links with Jihadist Organizations
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5587.htm

Putting Our Children in Line of Fire - The Nation, January 27, 2013
The above is an admission by Pakistan Army's Top General that it was the Pakistani Army at Kargil, not the mujahideen, and Musharraf was the Culprit

Debate between a Taliban Scholar and a Paki Army Officer

PAKISTAN TODAY:

On the Frontier of Apocalypse: Christopher Hitchens seminal article on Pakistan today
http://newsstuff.0catch.com/article5.htm

http://meaindia.nic.in/bestoftheweb/2002/10/14bow2.htm

A Slender Reed in Pakistan - Editorial in the Christian Science Monitor
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1229/p08s03-comv.html

Seymour Hersh Interview
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript_hersh.html

Pakistan's Nuclear Crimes (Wash. Post editorial)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dy ... 2-2004Feb4

http://www.indiadefence.com/LOA07Aug04.htm

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Pakistan's Tribal Regions
http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/ ... r_pakistan

BOOK REVIEW Fulcrum of Evil: ISI-CIA-Al Qaeda Nexus
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpap ... r1844.html

Article from Vinni Capelli - Foreign Policy Research Institute:
Containing Pakistan: Engaging the Raja-Mandala in South-Central Asia
http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5101/cappelli ... kistan.pdf

The videos are from this documentary: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/

A bomb at all cost By Ahmad Faruqui - a candid admission of the wars that Pakistan started against India.

Popular support for suicide bombings in pakistan.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.as ... 008_pg12_1
Survey by university students in karachi say 50% of respondents support suicide bombings in kashmir.

http://youtube.com/watch?v=OWsmJIwe9Q4
"Descent into Chaos"
UC Berkeley Conversations with History, host Harry Kreisler talking with Pakistani Journalist Ahmed Rashid. 59 minutes 120 MB. It sums up Pakistan and lays bare all Pakistan's terrorist support and proliferation activities. **Note - he wants the US to solve Pakistan's Kashmir problem.

Pakistan on the brink: Video Link (must download)

MISCELLANEOUS

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto telling Bangladeshis to "Go to Hell": http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Dsxfyxa ... re=related

IDSA's weekly summary of Pak Urdu Press:

http://www.idsa.in/pup


Christine Fair :Ten fictions that pakistani defense officials love to peddle

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Five installment series by Kapil Komireddi published in Frum Forum

Part I. Nov 16, 2009. “Pakistan In Crisis”.

Part II. Nov 18. 2009. “Pakistan: Origins of A Failed State”.

Part III. Nov 18, 2009. “Pakistan: It Could Not Succeed Unless India Failed”.

Part IV. Dec 06, 2009. “Pakistan: A Mecca for Radical Islam”.

Part V. Dec. 07, 2009. “Pakistan’s Army: Building a Nation for Jihad”

A perceptive blog on Pakistan: http://pak-watch.blogspot.com/

Declassified documents from US National Archives on Pakistan:

http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/pakistan.htm
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Admission of state sponsored terrorism by Pakistani authorities

see this Der Spigel Interview where Musharraf admits to that.

On 7th Nov in TimesNow Channel, Tasneem Noorani, a former Secretary of the Pakistani Interior Ministry, openly said that.

Kiyani called the Haqqanis as strategic assets.

In Dec. 2008, President Zardari himself admitted to ISI helping LeT. He said,"The links between the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency and the LeT were developed in the old days when dictators used to run the country. After the 9/11 terror attacks in the US, things have changed to a great extent"

In an address to bureaucrats in July 2009, President Zardari said: "Militants and extremists were deliberately created and nurtured as a policy to achieve some short-term tactical objectives. Let us be truthful to ourselves and make a candid admission of the realities. The terrorists of today were the heroes of yesteryears until 9/11 occurred and they began to haunt us as well"

In Nov. 2009, Prime Minister Gilani admitted to the support for terrorism by Musharraf as "running with the hares and hunting with the hounds".

When Bush warned the Pakistanis in August 2008 of their support to Al Qaeda, Afrasiab Khattak, President of Awami National Party (ANP) said this: "The question is why it has taken the Americans so long to see what the ISI is doing. We’ve been telling them for years but they wouldn’t buy it.". See here.

In an interview to the BBC as far back as on Feb. 13, 1994, Benazir Bhutto admitted how she handed over to Rajiv Gandhi the complete list of Sikh activists colluding with the ISI in terrorism in the Punjab. Later, Nawaz Sharif described this interview as a faux pas.

Apart from these, of course, numerous Pakistani commentators, analysts, and editors have openly admitted to terror as a state policy.

________________________________________________________________________

Why Did Pakistan's Spy Chief Make a Secret Trip to China?
Quote:

Pasha's China trip has been interpreted by some as a tacit act of defiance—a reminder to his American counterparts that the Pakistanis can always look east to their “all-weather” friend across the Himalayas rather than bend the knee to the will of the U.S.

But it also may be a sign of China's growing disquiet with Pakistan. Another top-ranking Pakistani military officer, Lt. Gen Wahid Arshad, had already conducted a considerable tour of China just weeks ago in a bid to improve ties. A few analysts have suggested that Pasha's trip — couched in vague terms about building a “broad-based strategic dialogue” — may have been less a visit and more of a summons.

Quote:

Chinese officials claimed the attacks in Kashgar were authored by the shadowy East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a jihadist organization of mostly ethnic Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority that comprises the majority in the far-western Chinese region of Xinjiang. China routinely invokes the specter of the terrorist threat when cracking down on dissent in the restive region. Yet disturbances there tend to be triggered more often by social discontent — many Uighurs chafe at state policies they deem discriminatory and marginalizing — than militant connivance. Pasha's presence in Beijing may mark Beijing's continued efforts to root out Uighur dissidents and sympathizers beyond China's borders, as it has already done in Kazakhstan.

Youtube video: Bilatakalluf with Tahif Gora: Tarek Fateh dissects with Pakjabi society and shows how its war-impotent Army loots the common Pakistani (Jan 13, 2012)

[Baikul]

For this thread to be really useful (IMHO) should we give it the same, or similar, treatment as is afforded to the "Kavery Engine Saga Thread"? I.e high value postings, analysis, facts. (See first post of http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... f=3&t=6726)

I would prefer that this thread becomes a repository of information, data and ideas, rather than a medium for opinions or reporting. The latter can always be done in the STFUP thread.

Also we may need some content classification of some sort for readers. For example post could be classified under 'Pakistan economy', 'Military', 'Punjab', 'Agriculture' etc. This way people can skip to specific posts (i.e. topics) they're interested in. However, categorization of this sort needs to be thought through, as it could get too complicated to manage. I personally have struggled with a 'where to start reading' kind of experience when confronted by so much information. But that could just be me.

Just my 2 (Pakistani) Rūpiyah.

[Rony]

Some of the books i would recommend as essential reading on Pakistan . The Book review/descriptions are in the links. Most/All of them might already been covered in TSP thread.

The Idea of Pakistan by Uneven (Shiv garu already mentioned that)

Making Sense of Pakistan by Farzana Shaikh

India- Pakistan in War and Peace by J.N.Dixit

Pakistan between Mosque and Military by Husain Haqqani

How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States by Mr & Mrs Schaffer's.

Fighting to the end - The Pakistan Army's way of War by C.Fair (Shiv garu already mentioned it)

Deception - Pakistan, the United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear weapons by Adrian levy and Catherine Scott Clark

Pakistan -Eye of the storm by Owen Bennett Jones

Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea by Faisal Devji



Below are also good but not necessarily must read ones IMO

Pakistan - Deep Inside the world's most Frightening state by Mary Anne Weaver

Playing with fire - Pakistan at war with Itself by Pamela Constable

The Most Dangerous Place - Pakistan's lawless frontier by Imtiaz Gul

Can Pakistan Survive by Tariq Ali (old book from 80s but its essence is still relevant)

Dancing Girls of Lahore (not geo strategic but sociological on lahore's heramandi)

[Harish]

Shivji - great idea. However one concern: how do you protect such a thinktank from penetration and/or takeover by Western media interests? Pretty much the entire media is in the payroll of one or the other foreign power, and shamelessly peddle their cause for money. In an atmosphere of pervasive Western, Leftist/Communist, Jihadi and EJ intereference in our media, how do we protect our Bakistan chair/desk/toilet from becoming another propaganda instrument in their hands?

We Yindoos have not learnt the art of information domination, even in areas vital to our interests. For example an asshole with a Hindu name coined "the Hindu rate of growth" and we sat around passively suffering the ignominy it brought us worldwide. For years.

It would be a great thinktank if nationalists could retain thought leadership over it and resist the inevitable attempts that will be made at infiltrating it.

[shiv]

Since we don't have Hudson institutes and Brokings institutions in India to promote works by Indian authors - they often fall by the wayside unnoticed - even when very good. here is one such paper. This is an excellent book and I advise people to please download and read.

http://idsa.in/system/files/monograph36.pdf
Religion as the Foundation of a Nation The Making and Unmaking of Pakistan
by P K Upadhyay

Religion as the Foundation of a Nation

Creation of Pakistan, a concept that flourished in the wasteland of an inferiority complex according to M.J. Akbar 1, was a unique human and political experiment. There are not many examples in the history of the mankind of attempts being made to create a nation by joining a vast multitude of people in the name of just the religion, disregarding the divisions among them due to ethnic, linguistic, regional, social and cultural factors, further accentuated by a total absence of any shared political ideology. The vision for the Islamic state of Pakistan tended to gloss over the fact that despite its fervent wish to be a strongly unitary and monolithic order, Islam had actually developed into a sharply divided philosophy under which the separating lines between the state, the society and the personal lives of the human beings were totally obliterated and sharp disagreements emerged over interpretation and implementation of socio-religious beliefs and practices. The polity of the South Asian sub-continent was entering into totally unchartered waters with the endeavour to create in such a divided society a religion-based but ‘sectarian-neutral’ state, in which the polity and the religion were supposed to coexist side-by-side and, yet, the differing sectarian identities and commitments of its subject would not seriously impact on the interaction among them.

According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, religion deeply divided the Pakistan military now. Perhaps it might be more accurate to think of it as two militaries. The first, -The Army One -headed by Gen.Kayani seeks to maintain the status quo and the Army’s pre-eminence in making national decisions. The second- The Army Two - is Allah’s army. This awaits a leader even as it launches attacks on Pakistani military installations, bases, top-level officers, soldiers, public places, mosques and police stations. Soldiers have been encouraged to turn their guns on to their colleagues, troops have been tricked into ambushes, and high-level officers have been assassinated. Allah’s army hopes to launch Religion as the Foundation of a Nation |95 its final blitzkrieg once the state of Pakistan has been sufficiently weakened by such attacks.176

What separates ‘Army-One’ and ‘ISI-One’ from ‘Army-Two’ and ‘ISI-Two’? This may not be immediately evident as both were reared on the ‘Two-Nation Theory’ and are thoroughly steeped in anti-Indianism since their early days in Army Cadet Colleges at Petaro and Hasan Abdal. They also share a deep-rooted contempt for Pakistani civilians. This attitude has resulted in roughly half of Pakistan’s history being that of direct military rule. Still, they are not the same. The One’ers are “soft Islamists” who are satisfied with a fuzzy belief that Islam provides solutions to everything, that occasional prayers and ritual fasting in Ramzan is sufficient, and that Sufis and Shias are bonafide Muslims rather than mushriks or apostates. They are not particularly interested in defending the Sunni states of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or the GCC. But should a lucrative overseas posting come the way of an individual soldier or officer, well, that may be another matter. While having a dislike of US policies, they are not militantly anti-US.

Army-Two and ISI-Two, on the other hand, are soldier ideologues who have travelled further down the road of Islamism. Large numbers of them regularly travel to Raiwind, the headquarters of the Tabligh Jamaat and whose preachers are still allowed open access into the Army, despite restrictions. The Two’ers are stricter in matters of religious rituals, they insist that officers and their wives be segregated at army functions. They keep an eye out for officers who secretly drink alcohol, and how often they pray. Their political philosophy is that Islam and the state should be inseparable. Inspired by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, who preached that 7th century Arab Islam provides a complete blueprint for society and politics, they see capturing state power as a means towards creating the ideal society along the lines of the medieval Medina state. Many Two’ers are beardless, hence hard to detect. They are fundamentally anti-science but computer-savvy. For them, modern technology is a tool of battle. Like the proverbial ostrich, the One’ers fiercely defend the myth of army unity. They dismiss mutineers as isolated individuals.

[shiv]

I have an old, oudtaed and useless book on Pakistan by a moron called Owen Benett Jones.

Here is the only useful half page - FYI

[shiv]

MAGNIFICENT DELUSIONS

Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding

By Husain Haqqani

But why read it? Most Americans have made up their minds about Pakistan, and vice versa. We don’t trust them; they don’t like us. You might, however, want some answers: Where’s the payoff for that $40 billion in aid (Haqqani’s figure) we’ve showered on the country since it was formed in 1947? Why does it remain an economic basket case and a snakes’ nest of Islamic terrorism?

Having reported there, I see the problem with Pakistan — with its leaders, anyway — in simple terms. It’s like a shiftless, sort-of friend who comes around periodically for a handout, swearing that self-reliance is just around the corner. But he just might mug you if it serves his interest. So do you hand over more cash? Sure, if you don’t mind being fleeced again.

Haqqani holds essentially the same view. Yet Uncle Sam has almost always caved to Pakistani demands, the book makes clear, to pursue America’sexpedient, realpolitik ends. “Since 1947,” Haqqani writes, “dependence, deception and defiance have characterized U.S.-Pakistan relations. We sought U.S. aid in return for promises we did not keep. Although even strong allies do not have 100 percent congruent interests, in the case of Pakistan and the United States, the divergence far exceeded the similarities.”

Pakistani leaders have had to balance their appetite for greenbacks against the nation’s standing as an independent actor. Sometimes Pakistani officials must create a fiction of not cooperating with the Americans when in fact they are. For example, as recently reported by The Washington Post, as ambassador, Haqqani was briefed by U.S. intelligence officials about drone strikes while his bosses in Islamabad were denouncing them as intolerable violations of Pakistani sovereignty.

It’s fascinating to learn how little the fraught relationship has changed over the decades. “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America,” the father of the nation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, declared in 1947. Pakistani leaders were saying the same thing in 2012 after shutting down NATO supply routes through the country, forcing the U.S.-led Western powers to find expensive alternatives.

Jinnah cast Pakistan as “the pivot of the world,” in terms of geostrategy, and a bulwark against Soviet communism. But it has frequently overreached in its demands for aid because of an inflated sense of its own importance. “In 1947-48 Pakistan had yet to do anything for America, yet it still expected huge inflows of U.S. cash, commodities, and arms,” Haqqani notes. It requested a $2 billion loan; the United States responded with 0.5 percent of that — $10 million.

During the Cold War, though, Pakistan’s playing of the Soviet card proved quite lucrative. It became a favored U.S. ally, assisting in spy operations against the Russians. Gary Powers’s U-2 plane flew from a base in Pakistan’s northwest, and Pakistan permitted the installation of a National Security Agency listening post. Richard Nixon was a true believer when it came to Pakistan’s strategic value against the communists. “Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for,” he said after visiting the subcontinent as Dwight Eisenhower’s vice president. “The people have fewer complexes than the Indians.”

As president, Nixon used Pakistan to launch secret U.S. overtures to China. The reward was unquestioned financial support. Pakistan similarly prospered during the Reagan years, enlisted in the battle against the Soviet occupiers in Afghanistan, as well as under George W. Bush, who launched what turned out to be a troubled counterterrorism partnership after Sept. 11, 2001. Over the years, in generously arming Pakistan, Haqqani shows, U.S. leaders enabled it to turn those guns against India, its existential enemy, and blunder into unwise military adventures.

Pakistan’s paranoid obsession with India courses through “Magnificent Delusions.” The goal of seizing Indian-held territory in Kashmir has allowed Pakistan’s generals to keep the country on permanent war footing, the better to hog revenue, even while the majority of the populace suffers in penury. A narrative of persecution also runs through the pysche of Pakistan as a whole. The public, whipped up by the military and mullahs, is led to believe that the nation’s problems are the work of “hidden hands.” I noticed how often leaders blamed conspiracies by India, Israel and America — that is to say, Hindus, Jews and Christians — for undermining the country, rather than owning up to social and economic ills of Pakistan’s own creation.

James M. Langley, a former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, is one of the prescient figures we meet in Haqqani’s book. Langley called it “wishful thinking” to consider the Pakistanis pro-American and warned of the danger of building up Pakistan’s military to fight the communist bloc: “In Pakistan we have an unruly horse by the tail and are confronted by the dilemma of trying to tame it before we can let go safely,” he said. And, he noted, this horse that “we assumed to be so friendly has actually grown wilder of late.” He wrote that in 1957. It is still true.

[UlanBatori]

Why not write to the PM? U may be surprised.... the role of BRF as such may not be unknown in High Circles today.

The usual means for dissemination of well-done research is through Reports. See Rand reports for example. The summary report has to be short (50 pages?) and convey policy/action suggestions where appropriate. It should be backed up by thorough research and references. The prime intended customer is the lawmaker who wishes to be well-informed and wants the painstaking thinking and analysis to be done before s(he) is asked to articulate a policy.

So the question is: how will these reports be generated? By whom? The usual degeneration into entropy comes when the research is left to "professional researchers" who then immediately have to seen funding from the usual quarters (meaning they get co-opted).

Observer Research Foundation seemed to generate some decent work, and the SATP has done outstanding work. These are two extremes. The former does generate reports. The latter focuses on very succinct incident reports and collecting statistics (at least the stuff posted on the web..).

I don't know of any others. There is no respected institution along the lines of Rand in desh. I think the difference with Rand was the creator/chief of the institution who established why they are useful. FYI, they are located at the edge of Pebble Creek Golf Resort on the California coast. Lawmakers from DupliCity fly across, say on a Friday for "policy consultations", and stroll into the offices, tell researchers to come up with a report by Monday morning on XYZ topic, and then go off to the hard weekend on the Greens with periodic throughput of amber liquids.

Think about that superlative combination of benefits and you see why Rand has survived, despite many of their reports being as far as quality ius concerned. Presumably there are other reports that are not publicized.

OTOH, Brookings is more of a Belway Bandit influence-peddling shop. They have a few types such as Uneven, but mostly it is a place that brings in PLA aphsars, PA aphsars etc for a sojourn with other agendas.

Wonder how France and Russia do their policy research.

[chetak]

There seem to be small "think tanks" slowly springing up locally in some cities, driven mostly by retired Armed Forces guys and some Academics. They have started to have public discourses, currently limited to invitations by word of mouth. The speakers are guys who have actually served in the sectors that they talk about and actually know the lay of the land and the intentions of the adversaries as well as a pretty good grasp of the strategic objectives vis a vis global developments impacting national situations.

It's also a pity that there seems to be lacking some sort of structured methodology for gathering, coordinating and leveraging such inputs into a policy making body.

These fledgling "think tanks" are slowly beginning to network with organisations with access to resources, being rebuffed more often that not.

We sorely lack the culture of strategic thought and lack even the basic infrastructure and institutional support of enabling mechanisms to encourage and foster this process.

[A_Gupta]

Here is one possible instrument: the Takshashila Institution:

http://takshashila.org.in/about/

Here is a highly relevant event from Takshashila on June 26 in Bangalore:
http://takshashila.org.in/event/tv-paul ... ary-world/

The Takshashila Institution and the Bangalore International Centre will co-host a talk by Prof TV Paul on his new book The Warrior State : Pakistan in the Contemporary World.

In an age of transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation, understanding Pakistan’s development, particularly the negative effects of foreign aid and geopolitical centrality, is more important than ever. Painstakingly researched and brilliantly argued, The Warrior State tackles what may be the world’s most dangerous powder keg and uncovers the true causes of Pakistan’s enormously consequential failure.

The talk will be moderated by Mr Anand Arni, Former Special Secretary, Cabinet secretariat, Government of India.

PS: here is more about T.V. Paul's book mentioned above:
http://events.stanford.edu/events/433/43347/

[shiv]

Here is one possible instrument: the Takshashila Institution:

http://takshashila.org.in/about/

Here is a highly relevant event from Takshashila on June 26 in Bangalore:
http://takshashila.org.in/event/tv-paul ... ary-world/

The Takshashila Institution and the Bangalore International Centre will co-host a talk by Prof TV Paul on his new book The Warrior State : Pakistan in the Contemporary World.

In an age of transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation, understanding Pakistan’s development, particularly the negative effects of foreign aid and geopolitical centrality, is more important than ever. Painstakingly researched and brilliantly argued, The Warrior State tackles what may be the world’s most dangerous powder keg and uncovers the true causes of Pakistan’s enormously consequential failure.

The talk will be moderated by Mr Anand Arni, Former Special Secretary, Cabinet secretariat, Government of India.

PS: here is more about T.V. Paul's book mentioned above:
http://events.stanford.edu/events/433/43347/

I have a close friend involved with Takshashila. Incidentally Husain Haqqani via Hudson institute is an advisor

[Comer]

My two cents. Please remove if it doesn't match the quality expected.

For lighter reading to understand Pakistan
Aatish Tasser's book: Stranger to History: A Son's Journey Through Islamic Lands (Chapters set in Pakistan)
Mohammed Hanif: Case of exploding Mangoes.

[shiv]

saravana - both the books you have named are essential reading for understanding Pakistan - even though Hanif's book is fiction. Another fictional work that could be semi fictional is Salman Rushdie's "Shame".

[UlanBatori]

As you know, the late Shri B. Raman used to provide a regular stream of analyses from Chennai. I have not seen anyone try to replace that. The key is to have a numbering system and a standard format for reports and analyses (of course along with quality control).

[Gus]

shiv - another one is V.S.Naipaul's Among the Believers. It has a Pakistan section (along with Iran, Malaysia and Indonesia). A bit dated but has sharp observations which were validated/reiterated in later works.

[Ramu]

My 2 cents :

This specific scene from Skyfall is probably the 90 seconds worth spending to understand Bakistan. I wish we could place this in the first page.



This is the best analogy I could ever explain myself about Bakistan.
They are just like barrel full of trapped, mutated, inbreeding rats and they are all eating each other.
RAPEs, Army, Mullahs, Political parties, judiciary, taliban, LeT, JuD, sunnis, barelvis, deobandis, shias etc are all different rats within the same barrel called Bakistan.

I could answer myself most of the questions real or rhetorical based on this analogy.

When you let this mutated rat escape anywhere in the world, you know what to expect - be it a RAPE or Taliban.
The western countries must have thought they are smart to let the RAPEs settle there while the terrorists go into India Afghanistan or former Soviet.
But at the end of the day, they are all share the same nature. Fortunately we get to kill the rats who sneak into our country. West can't.

Can you revert this mutation on any of them? Probably not.
Can we make peace with a section of them - like RAPEs, politicians by track 1 / track 2? Nope, you are still dealing with a mutated rat.

There is only one way of dealing with them - Isolate them and don't let them near you in ANY form.
And don't think we were bhai-bhai once up on a time and share common values. We don't.

Finally - What did quaid want? He wanted the coconut and fell for it.

Apologies to all the rats for using them in my analogy.

[svenkat]

It has been reported that a large no. of ISIS jihadis are from Briturdnia.What if the attacks in Iraq were co-ordinated by CIA/MI-6 to relieve the pressure building in Uqstan from the faithfool.Talk of multiple objectives-Iraq/Syria/Perfidious Albion.The mutated rats are a problem for UQ too.The goras,i think,have realised that.

[gunjur]

shiv - another one is V.S.Naipaul's Among the Believers. It has a Pakistan section (along with Iran, Malaysia and Indonesia). A bit dated but has sharp observations which were validated/reiterated in later works.

"Among the Believers" has a sequel written in mid-90's

Beyond Belief: Islamic Excursions among the Converted Peoples - Wiki

Naipaul draws a distinction between Arab countries and the countries of "converted peoples" where the adoption of Islam involves to some extent the adoption of Arabic culture. The book describes his five-month journey in 1995 revisiting four Muslim countries: Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan and Malaysia. It was written as a sequel to Naipaul's Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey (1979).

[shiv]

Why does India not have even one think tank or what passes for a think tank that can do something like the discussion in the following three brilliant American adademic centers?

Hudson Institute
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3DIOjTmX0M


New America Foundation
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfV2u87Gumk


Brookings' Reidel in the Dickey Center
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Svx7Wru5W6M

[A_Gupta]

On the Bharatiya thread, we're talking about the need for knowledge to be available in Indian languages; on this thread we're talking about the need for our knowledge about Pakistan to be more widely known and influential in India -- seems to me some key documents - the ones accumulated as the first post of every TSP thread - need to be translated and made widely available.

For me to begin translating into Hindi, which is the only language I could tackle, would require some significant gearing-up time & effort, before I become productive. And I have no good ideas about distribution of the results.

One might argue that Pakistan Desk will come from the Indian English-speaking elites anyway, so why bother to translate. There is some validity to that argument, but I think that some of this English-speaking class is part of the problem; and it is the vast majority of Indians that need to be made aware and the improvements in the situation will eventually come from them.

PS: we can't have think-tanks if only those who know English count as thinkers.

[RomeshT]

Oh well, our banned (at BR) native son, now living in Ameerika. Mr. Moorthy Muthuswamy's latest:

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1556

This article outlines a general approach to addressing the issue of Muslim radicalism, including what is going on in Pakistan and that of radicalization of India's own Muslim minorities.

[shiv]

We have so many people, so much talent, but still we don't seem to be able to organize and get our act together.

We really should be maintaining psychological profiles of prominent leaders - for the purpose of this thread - Pakistanis.

Just look at the news in recent weeks:

Multiple articles pointing out how child sex abuse is common among Pakistanis inside and outside Pakistan

Now put two and two together.

Reference articles about violent crimes point out that there is a connection between childhood sex and other violent abuse and people who later commit violent crimes.

It is very likely that people like Hafiz Saeed, Ilyas Kashmiri, Fazlur Rehman were all sexually abused in their childhood. Pakistan's conservative Islamic society would have prevented their fathers and uncles from having a healthy sexual relationship and hence these men would probably have been sodomized as children. Now as adults they commit terrorist acts against india. Again these criminals are protected by the state of Pakistan because criminal behaviour against non Muslims is justified as being necessary for the survival of Pakistan. Hence sexually deviant psychopaths can gain power in Pakistan

We really do need more sociologists and psychologists and chairs being funded to study and document such things.

[SSridhar]

MAGNIFICENT DELUSIONS

Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding

By Husain Haqqani

James M. Langley, a former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, is one of the prescient figures we meet in Haqqani’s book. Langley called it “wishful thinking” to consider the Pakistanis pro-American and warned of the danger of building up Pakistan’s military to fight the communist bloc: “In Pakistan we have an unruly horse by the tail and are confronted by the dilemma of trying to tame it before we can let go safely,” he said. And, he noted, this horse that “we assumed to be so friendly has actually grown wilder of late.” He wrote that in 1957.

In 1957, James Langley also said, "“The present military program [between the US and Pakistan] is a hoax, the hoax being that it is related to the Soviet threat”.

[johneeG]

[Pulikeshi]

^^^ who will fill that black-hole!

[UlanBatori]

With all due respect to the postors here, when I feel an urgent need for a pakistan Chair, I go to one ASAP, not sit around posting on PeeAref - lest My chair turn into a Pakistan Chair.

[UlanBatori]

Come to think of it, this thread needs a new title. Would YOU like to be called "Pakistan Chair in International Studies at JNU"? And walk around Dilli (full of pakis anyway) Mumbai? Might as well get a Navy Rank such as Rear Commode-Ore.

I agree that there should be studies on that region. How about Counter-Terrorism Chair? Or SaptaSindhu Chair? Or, to really rub it in, Kashmir Chair? (since that is the Core Issue).

Is there a short word in Hindi or Urdu for "slum"? Let's say it is "XX" Then, the Chair should be named the Panch-XX to be like Panch-Ab. For the Five Slums.

[shiv]

With all due respect to the postors here, when I feel an urgent need for a pakistan Chair, I go to one ASAP, not sit around posting on PeeAref - lest My chair turn into a Pakistan Chair.

In fact I am sorely tempted to start a psychology of a Paki thread - a newer, better and modern version of think like a Paki.

[Karan M]

Why does India not have even one think tank or what passes for a think tank that can do something like the discussion in the following three brilliant American adademic centers?

Hudson Institute
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3DIOjTmX0M


New America Foundation
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfV2u87Gumk


Brookings' Reidel in the Dickey Center
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Svx7Wru5W6M

Only goras can be "non secular". There is widespread dhimmitude in Indian society which means any frank discussion of Pakistan, means discussion of Islam, which is "communal."

[ramana]

KaranM, India does have equivalent if not better experts on TSP and located in India. However the policy is driven by politicians whose testimonials are in US hands. Hence the apparent aimless ennui.


Case in point. In 1991, my taxi driver from Gurgaon said :Saab Amrika thinks they can use Pakistan to destroy Dilli. Go back and tell them Dilli was destroyed many, many times and Bharat is still there."

[UlanBatori]

In fact I am sorely tempted to start a psychology of a Paki thread - a newer, better and modern version of think like a Paki.

Piskopathkology.

which means any frank discussion of Pakistan, means discussion of Islam, which is "communal."

Sorry. Pakology runs much deeper than Islam. The mistake that most desis make is to NOT be able to discuss Pakology without getting tied up in Islamaphobia and falling into the "communal" trap. It took some special form of stupidity for Hindus to get into the mode of OPPOSING the term 'secular' and allowing the most rabidly communal Conversionist/Inquisitionists and Commie-Islamic mass-murderers to take the high ground of "Secular".

The fundamental problem with Pakistanis is Pakiness. It is unique, Pure and peerless. A complete absence of trustworthiness. A total selfishness and greed. Total hatred of everyone who looks basically like them yet lives a peaceful and productive life unlike them. Etc.

Shiv mentioned the Think Like a Paki thread that existed on BRF in the Dinosaur era. It was actually quite an experience. You look at a situation, then think how one would normally react to it, then remove all sense of decency, trustworthiness, concern for others, and then add total homophobia and destructiveness, and voila! You come up with the Truly Paki approach. You should try it. Of course, remember to have someone drag you back into reality before you really slide into Pakiness and find urself in a pakistan.

For instance, during the Kargil War, some desis in Noo Yoik took out a full-page ad in the NYT (a waste of good money IMO, but a fabulous ad): It showed OUR IDEA OF FRIENDSHIP: A bus tyre rolling along the road to LaWhore. On the other side, it showed THEIR IDEA OF FRIENDSHIP: a nail placed on the road sticking up.

There u go. The essence of Pakiness.

[ramana]

X-Post...

A modest proposal from the Brigadier:

https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/i ... desman.htm

"We should fire at them and take out a few of their cities—Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta," he said. "They should fire back and take Karachi and Lahore. Kill off a hundred or two hundred million people......."

[SaiK]

Latest Khabar:

Nawaz Sharif treated on hourly basis to clean his ruptured hemorrhoids.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... s?from=mdr

[Abhay_S]

Another important book is Tinderbox: Past and Future of Pakistan. By MJ Akbar

Has anyone red 'aargh ka Darya' by Qurratulain Hyder ? I have heard Tarek Fatah quote from this book about what pakistaniyat means