Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion

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Surya
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Surya »

but strangely there seems to be a singular lack of vision in the IA reg. indigenisation
Amen to that
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by chackojoseph »

Thakur_B wrote:
Philip wrote: If IU recollect ,a 130mm catapult has been developed for the IA using the Arjun;s
It's a makeshift arrangement with some electronics slapped on because the older Vijayanta chassis was beyond service life.
Why the makeshift arrangement?
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Thakur_B »

chackojoseph wrote:
Thakur_B wrote:
It's a makeshift arrangement with some electronics slapped on because the older Vijayanta chassis was beyond service life.
Why the makeshift arrangement?
Because Bhim got canned and tracked howitzer procurement is nowhere to be seen?
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by ritesh »

The dilly dally that is being done by IA & IAF is astounding!
While the chinese are inducting home grown maal in droves, while the uber quality (read that as russie maal) is only in a small batches, we are hell bent on destroying our nascent defence industries and feed the foreign ones.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by chackojoseph »

Thakur_B wrote: Because Bhim got canned and tracked howitzer procurement is nowhere to be seen?
Arjun catapult is same as Bhim concept but with 130 mm gun. Army wants this type. This is not a make shift arrangement. Bhim was a different project.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Pratyush »

Chacko, you are mistaken about the Arjun Catapult. Though it may be a better solution as compared to the original Catapult. As it has been reported that the original solution difficulty in handling the recoil of the M 46.

The concept of Bhim or a modern SPH is several generations ahead of the Catapult. With automation and crew protection and in and out of action times.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by chackojoseph »

Bhim concept is to place a 155mm on Arjun chassis, which is same as Arjun catapult.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by ravip »

Heard some officers say arjun is a beast, but I think it is the DGMF or hard Russian lobby at MoD that is preventing arjun in numbers.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Jaeger »

chackojoseph wrote:Bhim concept is to place a 155mm on Arjun chassis, which is same as Arjun catapult.
:shock:
A turreted, 360 degree capable highly-automated and integrated SPH with full MRSI capabilities etc. is the same as a bolt-on solution where a weapon is placed with minimum protection, traverse and automation on the chassis?

No doubt THIS is the same as THIS.

EDIT: I mean conceptually, of course. :P
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by deejay »

ravip wrote:Heard some officers say arjun is a beast, but I think it is the DGMF or hard Russian lobby at MoD that is preventing arjun in numbers.
I had a chance meeting with some one in the Army procurement scheme of things a few days ago. Suffice to say he is not a decision maker but knows the happenings. I asked him why we have ordered T 90's and not Arjun Mk 2's? He said, while Arjun is slightly better, it is more expensive and hence the T 90 order. He refused to elaborate further and I was too dumbstruck to persist.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by d_berwal »

@ Jaeger

there is a reason why the term DDM(*)'itis was coined.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Karan M »

deejay wrote:
ravip wrote:Heard some officers say arjun is a beast, but I think it is the DGMF or hard Russian lobby at MoD that is preventing arjun in numbers.
I had a chance meeting with some one in the Army procurement scheme of things a few days ago. Suffice to say he is not a decision maker but knows the happenings. I asked him why we have ordered T 90's and not Arjun Mk 2's? He said, while Arjun is slightly better, it is more expensive and hence the T 90 order. He refused to elaborate further and I was too dumbstruck to persist.
welcome to the real world of indian procurement. we purchase overpriced rubbish from people abroad which cant be rectified no matter what and will lie rotting or be used at a fraction of the capability. meanwhile local stuff will go unsung or dismissed because it does not meet brochure specs of the latest and greatest vaporware.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by SanjayC »

deejay wrote:I had a chance meeting with some one in the Army procurement scheme of things a few days ago. Suffice to say he is not a decision maker but knows the happenings. I asked him why we have ordered T 90's and not Arjun Mk 2's? He said, while Arjun is slightly better, it is more expensive and hence the T 90 order. He refused to elaborate further and I was too dumbstruck to persist.
Somebody tell these guys that even if Arjun is a bit overpriced, the entire money would stay in India and circulate in the Indian economy. Money spent on T-90 purchases goes straight into Russian economy, leaving a huge hole in our economy. Which of the two scenarios is better for Indian national interest? It's obvious that bribes are a big part of the equation to keep rejecting Arjun and preferring imports. It's a traitorous act. In Israel or China, these people would have been shot.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Surya »

Deejay
be glad you did nto get the "DRDO has not been able to deliver even a pin " from some of these senior service members
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Karan M »

ha! heard that one as well.. even as said service member is talking about "those new BEL radars are good" , "those people are doing something".....all of which happened to be DRDO origin.

after agni et al were public though, new refrain was..only missile program is good (never mind akash came along as a Rs 23k crore order with spinoff radars and what not).

funniest was another gent praising a completely locally developed radio (drdo/bel) and saying 'this israeli stuff made locally is good'. was in two minds whether to counter or let impressions remain. :lol:

not so funny part is some of these guys, once rtd. constantly running a propaganda campaign running down all indian products and services while taking up nice hobby horse positions as consultants in foreign firms seeking to sell rival goods and services to the indian services.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by rajsunder »

Thakur_B wrote:
chackojoseph wrote:[

Why the makeshift arrangement?
Because Bhim got canned and tracked howitzer procurement is nowhere to be seen?
@sjha1618 quoted that BHIM is back into consideration, now that denel is taken of black list.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by rajsunder »

deejay wrote:
ravip wrote:Heard some officers say arjun is a beast, but I think it is the DGMF or hard Russian lobby at MoD that is preventing arjun in numbers.
I had a chance meeting with some one in the Army procurement scheme of things a few days ago. Suffice to say he is not a decision maker but knows the happenings. I asked him why we have ordered T 90's and not Arjun Mk 2's? He said, while Arjun is slightly better, it is more expensive and hence the T 90 order. He refused to elaborate further and I was too dumbstruck to persist.
please read the previous pages, the cost factor was made up. the arms lobby fooled GOI, when reporting tin cans price they tend to report lower number.
But they fail to understand that Arjun if built completely in India would bring the price very low, but that can only be done if ordered in substantial numbers.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Vivek K »

Arjun is a shameless, sordid affair. The bad guys won! End of story.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by deejay »

rajsunder wrote:
deejay wrote:
I had a chance meeting with some one in the Army procurement scheme of things a few days ago. Suffice to say he is not a decision maker but knows the happenings. I asked him why we have ordered T 90's and not Arjun Mk 2's? He said, while Arjun is slightly better, it is more expensive and hence the T 90 order. He refused to elaborate further and I was too dumbstruck to persist.
please read the previous pages, the cost factor was made up. the arms lobby fooled GOI, when reporting tin cans price they tend to report lower number.
But they fail to understand that Arjun if built completely in India would bring the price very low, but that can only be done if ordered in substantial numbers.
I have read the previous pages. I wrote, I was dumbstruck.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by P Chitkara »

Slightly better :shock: Wow..what can one say after this? As someone mentioned, the bad guys won. :| :evil:
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by member_26622 »

At the minimum - can we stop rolling T-90 on republic day parades. And this will be a good wake up call for the dear old Russia is our friend lobby. Not promoting America as our friend either.

The $ bill is the only friend in international matters after end of the cold war.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Khalsa »

I look forward to the tanks leading the parade this year especially as Obama Bhaji is coming
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by pankajs »

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 819490.cms

Critical review of Army recovery vehicle next month
CHENNAI: The critical design review of Armoured Repair and Recovery Vehicle, which is presently being developed by a DRDO lab here, is scheduled for next month, signaling the completion of design of the vehicle for the Indian Army.

"We have already completed the preliminary design review and the critical design review will take place next month," P Sivakumar, Director of Combat Vehicle Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) told PTI.

The vehicle, which is a variant of the Arjun Main Battle Tank, is jointly being designed by CVRDE and Bengaluru-based Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML).

CVRDE would develop two prototypes, which would look similar to the main battle tank Arjun but a crane and a winch in the place of a gun, he said.

The Army is expected to order 30 units, if the Chennai-based DRDO lab satisfied its specifications in the first two units.

The vehicle would weigh around 65 tonne and function as a recovery vehicle for the Army in tough terrain as well as in extreme climatic conditions.

Once the design was finalised, the production would commence in two years, he added.

As for Arjun Mk II, he said all the trials by the user Indian Army were complete and the vehicle was awaiting evaluation by the Director General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) and an evaluation for maintenance.

When asked about the anti-tank missile to be fitted on the vehicle, he said it has been decided to go for an Indian anti tank missile instead of an Israeli missile.

Pune-based Armament Research and Development Establishment was developing the Indian missile, he said.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by jamwal »

Who decided to go for an Indian missile ? :lol:
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by aditp »

Would that be the CLGM? Probably the readiness status of the CLGM would be used as another pretext for delaying acceptance and ordering of Mk 2.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by member_28802 »

Arjun MBT Push by Parrikar ?

Respected RM,
Please also take the folks to task who rigged the benchmark to 'defeat' Arjun and sold out the country to the exporters. Acche Din Aa gaye !!

Regards,
Jingo
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Yagnasri »

We may have to start twitter etc for Arjun, and Tejas.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Philip »

The only reason that I can visualize why has a lingering Q mark about the Arjun,vs the T-90,is that the Russian MBT is smaller,with a 3-man crew,has an auto-loader, and if I remember some cost stats posted some time ago,cheaper. Arjun would also require an extra crew member,is much larger at 65T and more expensive.Since the IA already has the bulk of its armour T-72/T-90s,it would first prefer standardization,than inducting another type in reduced numbers. Perhaps what the IA should contemplate is using both tanks complementing each other as the Soviets did using both T-72s and T-80s,the heavier tank as the fist to smash through defences while the swifter smaller T-72s would swarm into the breaches made.Here is an excellent feature on the same. Both T-90s and Arjuns can provide the IA's armoured corps an excellent combination with which to dominate the battlefield.

What America Can Learn From Russia's Cheap But Deadly T90 Tank


TylerRogoway

The Russian T-90, a hybrid evolution of the T-72 and T-80, weighs in at almost 48 tons, and would lead Russia into battle if a major land conflict erupted today — not a crazy idea anymore. Here's what the Pentagon should learn something from the thrifty, simple and dangerously effective tank?

The T-90, nicknamed "Vladimir" in its later iterations, came about from post Cold War Russia's initiative to keep only one main battle tank in production, the simpler and more reliable T-72 or the more complex T-80. The resulting T-90 is an effective warrior that balances capabilities and complexity against cost.

THE NUTS AND BOLTS

The Russian T-80 main battle tank takes the American A1 Abrams route when it comes to a power-plant, packing a gas turbine engine capable of putting out 1000 hp (versus the Arbams 1500hp). The use of a turbine over a tradtional diesel engine left the tank with decent power but with dismal range. Additionally, this configuration was prohibitively maintenance intensive. In effect, the T-80's logistical demands on the battlefield were a severe hindrance to the effectiveness of the type. In fact, Russia's "turbine tank" was so unpopular that the Russian Armor Ministry apparently swore that they would never support going the turbine route ever again. In later variants, the T-80's thirsty and finicky turbine was replaced with a more traditional diesel engine.

Where the T-80 shined when compared to the simpler T-72 was in its targeting system and self-protection systems. Still, the T-80 design was vulnerable when it came to high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rockets that were fired at it from the side. This, along with sub-par training, chaotic logistical support and less than optimal tactics, led to the loss of an unacceptable percentage of T-80s during the First Chechen War of the 1990's. Still, the tank soldiered on in Russian inventory until just last year. As part of Vladimir Putin's initiative to rearm and modernize Russia's military, Russia now relies on upgraded and battle-tested T-72s and the newer T-90 exclusively.

The T-90 is one logically mean machine. She cuts a low profile and is a marriage of classic soviet simplistic reliability and high tech features. In fact a good, way to explain the T-90 is that it is somewhat of a hybrid concept, combining the reliable and proven chassis of the T-72 with the more advanced turret of the T-80, including its more modern fire control capabilities and support sub-systems. The T-90 is lighter and more nimble than her American counterpart, with the A1 Abrams weighting in at 68 tons compared to the T-90's 48 tons. You read that right, the T-90 is a whopping 40,000lbs lighter than the M1A1 Abrams! The T-90's lower mass results in a smaller, less expensive package, that can do some fairly spectacular maneuvers, whether it be on the open range or in tight urban environments.

The T-90 is propelled by a supercharged, liquid cooled, four-cycle, 12-cylinder diesel engine with horsepower ratings ranging from around 850 to 1250 depending on the variant. By choosing not to design a gas turbine engine into the T-90, the Russians allowed for a simplified, smaller, cheaper and more reliable design, which makes total sense after their less than satisfactory experiences with the T-80. This power-plant choice also allowed for the tank to have close to double the range of the T-80 under ideal conditions, or close to 400 miles on a single tank of fuel.

FIREPOWER
The T-90 packs a gyro stabilized 125MM smooth bore cannon, but unlike her American counter part, she is not relegated to "just" firing armored piercing discarded sabot (APDS), high explosive anti-tank and high explosive fragmentation rounds. The T-90's 125mm can also fire the 9M119 "Refleks" anti-tank guided missile. This laser guided missile can strike ground based and low flying aerial targets at close to double range of the T-90's main gun. Yes, you read that right, the T-90 can shoot guided missiles out of its main gun and can even take down helicopters with those missiles under certain conditions. The T-90's predecessors also had similar capabilities as well, although the system is said to be better refined in the T-90, especially the latest versions. Unlike the hand-loaded Abrams, the T-90 uses an auto loading system for its main gun. Russian tankers have been heard saying that the Abrams is a bolt action while the Russian T-90 is a semiautomatic.

In addition to the T-90's big cannon, like the Abrams she packs a .50 cal and a 7.62 cal machine gun, but these are both externally mounted, whereas the M1 packs one of its 7.62 caliber machine guns in an internal coaxial mount right next to her main gun. The T-90's .50 cal can be remotely operated from within the tank, a feature that has only recently been added to the Abrams' capability via the Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS) upgrade.

The T-90, in its original form, acquired its target using a day/night sighting system which originally lacked range and fidelity in comparison to its western counterparts. Inferior nighttime targeting capabilities have handicapped Russian main battle tanks for decades. With this in mind, Russia finally looked outside of its borders for a sighting system that could match the versatility and range of their tanks' main guns.

This came to fruition with the inclusion of the French-built Thales "CATHERINE" target sight installed on later T-90 models. This site, when paired with the T-90's upgraded fire control system and laser rangefinder/designator, gives gunners and commanders the ability to detect targets beyond the range of their weapons, allowing them to have increased situational awareness and the ability for enhanced "fire and maneuver" capability which is crucial for winning on the modern battlefield.

SURVIVABILITY

Although the Russia's main battle tank of choice is much lighter than its American counterpart, it does have good armor and a fairly robust self defensive suite. Different configurations of the T-90 exist, but generally the tank relies on a triad of defense measures to stay alive in combat.

First, there is the T-90's basic armor, made up of varying composite and metal materials sandwiched together. The current mix of materials Russia is using in its armor is said to be very effective and relatively light, albeit not as effective of the incredibly robust armor the Abrams. Seeing as the T-90 weighs almost a third less, this is hardly a surprise. Russia has learned that "layering" a tank's survivalability measures is more cost effective, and in some cases more operationally effective, than relying almost entirely on one single concept of exotic, expensive and heavy armor plating alone.

GIF What America Can Learn From Russia's Cheap But Deadly T90 TankR

The T-90's second tier of defenses relies on explosive reactive armor (ERA). ERA consists of two armor plates with an explosive charge core sandwiched in-between. This type of armor works against a multitude of attack weaponry, including missiles and rockets that carry high explosive anti-tank warheads, as well as the dreaded sabot round. Sabot rounds are basically cannon shells that separate after leaving the tank's smoothbore barrel, what remains is a thin fin stabilized rod made of dense material like depleted uranium, flying through the air at high speed and into its target. Once the sabot round penetrates a tank's turret, the kinetic force of the dense sabot dart dumping its energy into a small point creates a stream of lava-like molten metal that pours into the tank's cabin. This instantaneously increases the tank's cabin pressure via heating the inside of the sealed turret, thus killing, or should I say cooking, everything inside.

The idea behind ERA armor is that it explodes outward destroying an incoming munition, or at least greatly depleting its killing potential, just as it is hitting the tank. The whole string of events happens in a fraction of a second. It may sound extremely violent, setting off a bomb on the outside of your own vehicle, but it works, and the charge is designed to fire outward, away from the hull or turret of the tank.

The T-90's ERA "bricks" give the tank a distinctive, and intimidating look. Additionally, these units have also been added to the roof of the T-90. This is a good thing seeing as modern anti-tank missiles often work in an "indirect attack" mode, where they pop up high just before reaching their target, then dive back down, or detonate while cruising overhead, striking the tank where its armor is usually the thinnest, on its top side.

Finally, the T-90 packs a robust countermeasure system that is oriented at defeating western style attacks shortly before or as they happen. Known as "Shatora" or "Curtain" in English, this system has a series of laser warning receivers positioned around the tank. Laser range finders and/or laser target designators are key targeting components of modern tanks and attack aircraft. These lasers supply a tank's fire control system the info it need to produce a firing solution during combat. In the air, and even on the ground in some cases, laser designators provide a point in space for a missile or bomb to fly towards and hit.

Once the T-90's threat warning system detects that it is being "painted," or was "squirted" by a laser, a series of countermeasures aimed to defeat an enemy's targeting process get activated either automatically or manually. First, infra-red and optical dazzlers, located on the front of the tank's turret, are slewed in the direction that the laser energy originated from, in an attempt to blind the enemy tank's targeting sensors. These dazzlers appear red during combat operations and make the tank seem like it has sinister red "eyes" on either side of its main gun. Smoke grenades with a very specific chemical makeup can also be fired off from the turret in an attempt to conceal the T-90's exact location and thus break or keep an enemy from maintaining a weapons lock.

The T-90 also sports a magnetic mine detection system that uses an electromagnetic pulse to disable mines before the tank runs them over. Additionally, at least some of Russia's T-90s are fielded with the "Nakidka" signature reduction application. This surface treatment is said to greatly reduce the tank's radar and infra-red signature via the use of radar absorbent material (RAM) and infra-red reducing paint and insulation. Seeing as tank detection is more and more reliant on radar, both of a standoff (E-8 J-STARS) and a tactical (AH-64D/E Longbow Radar) variety, applying RAM to the outer surface of Russian main battle tanks could make some sense. Nakidka's infra-red reduction properties are of high value as well seeing as the majority of tactical targeting is done via IR sensors these days. Multi-spectral imagine sensors are slowly eliminating this reliance on strictly IR target systems, as these sensors offer greater resistance to IR suppression and masking.

CAN THE T-90 TEACH AMERICA A LESSON IN FRUGALITY?

When you look at the T-90's unique mix of capabilities and adherence to a clear and conservative design philosophy, the weapon system really does makes great sense. By taking the best attributes of two "legacy" systems, roughly the turret of the T-80 and hull and drivetrain concept of the T-72, and combining that mix with more modern technology, the T-90 represents a truly well rounded solution to the main battle tank equation. It packs reliability, relative simplicity, a comparatively light footprint, a capable main gun and guided missile system, relevant speed, and layered defenses, all at a price that is roughly less than half that of an M1 Abrams.

Does the T-90 standup to the latest M1A2 Abrams model? No, but dogfighting one-on-one with America's super-tank was not what it was designed to do. In many ways the T-90 is a textbook 80% solution at less than 50% of the price, a concept that has become incredibly relevant in a time when shrinking defense budgets are begrudgingly dictating force structures around the globe.

Instead of trying to "beat the US" by poorly copying our extremely high cost "100% solution," Russia decided to take what it already had and make it better so that its return on investment actually made sense. For instance, the deletion of a turbine engine lowered the T-90's cost and complexity, and in doing so it kept its design weight down and thus drastically increasing its range and logistical independence, a key operational factor for Russia, a country with the most land-area in the world.

When you look at the T-90, and what came before it, the T-80, it is intriguing how Russia was able to control the propensity to "grow" their tank's design, not adding weight, unneeded complexity and cost over time, as so many weapon systems tend to do. Instead, they looked at what mattered most and took a balanced approach to offensive capabilities and survivability in relation to cost. This is precisely what so many in America's defense lexicon are pleading for these days, including your author. It is sad that we have continued to produce Abrams tanks when the military already had too many, and a cheaper, lighter, and more rationalized tank concept could better benefit our forces and augment the "Gucci" Abrams already in widespread service.

It seems that America's weapons buyers have an incredibly short attention span and a spastic, if not bipolar vision of what our force structure should look like. It is either a fast, wheeled and comparatively lightly armored APC with a tank's cannon, the Army's Stryker Mobile Gun System, or an ultra-heavy and turbine powered A-1 Abrams.

Where has the common-sense middle ground gone? Not to say that the Stryker is a bad weapon system, but it represents a "collect the whole set" proposition, as Stryker's speed dictates it will have to operate with only other Strykers in order for its value to potentially pay off. Hence it needs its own big gun, although being in a lightly armored Stryker when that big gun is needed in order to shoot at other big guns is less than an ideal situation!

Maybe the Stryker's speed would be worth sacrificing for a more survivable set of platforms, one where commonality is not the main goal. In the end, the big gun version of the Stryker approaches the price of a T-90, so one has to ask themselves, was investing billions into a "concept" like the Stryker really worth it considering the dollars, and thus the other procurement opportunities, we blew on it?

We have seen precisely this same issue with the US Navy, fielding the Littoral Combat Ship, a fast, very lightly armored and fairly toothless surface combatant with an identity crisis. The LCS came at the cost of procuring a proper multi-role frigate, a ship that at the very least would have been capable of defending itself. Sadly, it seems that the DoD now only thinks in two modes when it comes to procurement, even though doing so has been highly detrimental to the total force as a whole:
·One-size fits all, innovative low-cost concept turned compromised high-cost reality, with questionable offensive and/or survivability capability, usually with "commonality," "affordability" and "multi-role" at the heart of the weapon system's business model. Examples: LCS, Stryker, F-35A & C
·100% capability at all costs, regardless of the fact that 80% of the missions the weapon system will execute will have little use for that extra 20% of capability and that extra 20% of capability made the weapon system at least twice as expensive than the "80%" alternative. Examples: MV-22, F-35B, M1, DDG-1000

The great thing about being the wealthiest nation in the world is that, unlike Russia, we don't need an all "rational" fleet of military vehicles. In other words, we don't need to procure "only" a T-90. We can afford to also field some extremely high-end concepts as well, but we cannot afford to only field high-end and very-high weapons systems alone.

With this in mind, why can't we return to a true high-low capability mix, as we fielded successfully for so many years? And why in the last two decades does the supposed low end of the spectrum have to always be a "risky but innovative new concept" instead of an evolution of a "proven workhorse?" We can have a true high-low capability mix and afford it with ease under the current budgetary circumstances, but we cannot afford to take huge developmental risks with the "low-end" side of that spectrum.

This means no LCS, no Stryker, and no F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. None of these systems turned out to be affordable and usually their "commonality" business case ends up being a total myth if not actually deeply detrimental to our force's overall capabilities.

Just take the F-35 for instance, an aircraft who's two major variants, the A and C models, which represent over 85% of America's predicted F-35 force, have paid a huge performance and capability penalty inflicted by the F-35B's Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing requirement. How on earth was such a tradeoff considered a worthwhile concept to invest a massive portion of the services' procurement budget into?

What is worse, is that the F-35 was supposed to be the "low end" of America's high-low fighter capability equation. Seeing how these jets will cost nearly as much as the F-22s that were mocked for their high-cost by both the Bush and Obama Administrations, this whole "complimentary force" idea has proven to be totally false. Now, instead of a high-low capability mix, we have a high and super high capability mix.

The impact of such a horrendously expensive force structure has resulted in a rapidly shrinking fleet of tactical fighters in the DoD's inventory. In fact our aerial force posture is just a shadow of what it was in 2003, and that force was a shadow of what it was during the Gulf War. Sure, every decade the equipment becomes more effective, which could provide some fleet shrinking savings, but one aircraft can only be in one place at one time, and usually that is on the ground.

The Pentagon's goal of fielding almost 2,500 of the stealthy fighters spread across all three services will be shattered once the operational costs of flying an all high-end 5th generation force (best independent estimates are double the per flight hour cost of the F-16s and F/A-18s the F-35 aims to replace) move from a paper prediction to a startling piggybank busting reality.

Even if we could afford to buy 2500 of these machines, would it be smart to do so seeing as we probably won't be able to afford to fly them? Hell, we can't even afford to fly the force we have now! This is not to mention that the manned "first day of war" stealth fighter concept is rapidly becoming dated seeing a unmanned technology is rapidly advancing. More on that in a coming post.

Instead of continuing to buy into these wasteful "commonality" concepts, we can go buy a proper frigate that has offensive punch and is capable of air defense. We can buy new armored personell carriers and a traditional medium tank to go along with them. We can go buy rational numbers of upgraded F-22s that feature the F-35's avionics and construction techniques amongst other enhancements.

Or even better, a stretched and tailless F/B-22, as well as heaping load of stealthy UCAV drones and even a new bomber, all of which can be used to kick down the enemy's door during the opening stages of a conflict. But this means you cannot have 2500 F-35s, thus you will have to upgrade our existing F-16s and keep our beloved A-10s flying for the majority of lower end "bread and butter missions."

We can have a much more capable and flexible force if we get away from buying huge quantities of extremely expensive "one-size-fits-all" platforms, and really there is no need to in the first place. We simply cannot have it both ways, where the high end of the mix still exists, and the low end is really just another form of high-end once the final bill arrives. This absurd situation is the primary reason why our incredible shrinking military's hardware and procurement situation is in such shambles.

It is the classic bait-and-switch really. Terms like "affordability," "commonality," "jointness" and "multi-role" make the ill-informed and/or the hyper career driven in Washington take a gamble on what really are flawed weapons concepts to begin with. What we end up with years later, long after most of the folks who bought into these nonsensical programs in the first place are out of office or have received their last star, are a grossly over budget and behind schedule weapon systems that feature rapidly decreasing capabilities and performance goals.

Then, similar geniuses who allowed the gambling on such flawed "innovative new concepts" to continue on indefinably, end up realizing that said gambles were really much, much larger and more volatile than they were ever intended to be. What is even worse is that due to the complexity of these "affordable" new concepts, the majority of them are technologically and conceptually outdated by the time they actually enter service. The whole situation is out of control and it needs to stop. For those who say "it has always been this way," I say you are just another part of the problem not the solution.

Why can't we procure platforms that are proven to work for 80% of the tasks they will be presented with, like the T-90, then invest in smaller fleets of weapon systems that can handle the other 20% better than any one-size-fits all solution ever could? In the end we would save a ton of money, become a more resilient and adaptable force, and we would no longer have to hear the term "too big to fail" associated with fiscally obese and already antiquated weapons programs.

THOSE WHO DON'T KNOW THEIR HISTORY ARE DOOMED TO REPEAT IT

Could it be that we actually have a lot to learn from Russia's "balanced approach" to fielding the T-90 Main Battle Tank? I think so, but don't take my opinion for it, take WWII's! This conflict taught us a very valuable lesson about tank warfare and force structure in general: in a serious peer state conflict, with prolonged hostilities, the numerical advantage can triumph over technological superiority.

Just google "Panzer vs Sherman tank" to learn more about this valuable history lesson. It is amazing that Russia seems to have remembered such a hard fought lesson from what they call "The Great Patriotic War," and have factored it into their procurement strategy, but America seems to have all but forgotten it. The capable, affordable and reliable T-90 main battle tank remains direct proof of this fact.
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/what-a ... 1540829820
shaun
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by shaun »

^^^^ phillips ji a major pro kremlin article, better you should research on the Abrams performance during gulf wars. the whole article is written on assumption considering that all the boucher feature on t-90 will work perfectly in any condition. MOD is all ready enquiring into the preferential treatments t-90 got with CAG already verifying the step motherly treatment Arjun got through out. if we have to import tincans for maintaining good relations with Bear, then it's different story or else there should be no place for tin cans in our land.

ps: the farticle above is so biased it did not even mentioned the crew survivability of tincans which is worst i.e. ammunition stored in the main compartment.
uddu
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by uddu »

Bankim wrote:Arjun MBT Push by Parrikar ?

Respected RM,
Please also take the folks to task who rigged the benchmark to 'defeat' Arjun and sold out the country to the exporters. Acche Din Aa gaye !!

Regards,
Jingo
Hopefully this time an order for 500 plus Arjun MK-II will be placed.

My wish is for 1000 Arjun MK-II's if not more.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by sivab »

http://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/English/DRD ... -ebook.pdf
Improved Kanchan Armour
DMRL has designed and developed improved Kanchan Armour for MBT Arjun Mk-II for enhanced
protection against large calibre kinetic energy ammunition compared to Kanchan Armour of MBT Arjun
Mk-I. The new armour has been developed using advanced armour materials and new designs but
without increase in weight. Armour modules replicating Mk-I and Mk-II designs have been fabricated
and user trials have been carried out on these modules.
Advanced Explosive Reactive Armour
Performance demonstration to Users:
Development of ERA Mk-II has been completed. Performances of ERA Mk-II (Hull and Turret panels) and T-90 ERA against Milan warhead were demonstrated to Users at HEMRL and against 125 mm FSAPDS (AMK-340) ammunition at PXE, Balasore, during
October. Performance of ERA Mk-II was found equivalent to that of T-90 ERA.

120 mm FSAPDS Mk-II Ammunition for MBT Arjun Tank (Evaluation of Propellant and CCC for
120 mm FSAPDS Ammunition for MBT Arjun Tank)
117 FSAPDS MK-II rounds were assembled using resin-based CCC with strengthened cap and
NATO std. primer at OF, Chanda, and Phase-I to V user trials were conducted at PXE and (PFFR).
Debris Free combustion was achieved and toxicity level in terms of CO (26 ppm) and NO
2(0.5 ppm) was within threshold limit. Prepared resin-based CCC specifications and forwarded to all concerned
agencies.
sivab
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by sivab »

Cannon Launch Missile Development Programme
The main objective of the project is to design, develop, test, and demonstrate a semi-active Laser
homing cannon launched missile that can be launched from 120mm gun and a tripod. All sub-systems
of missile have been developed. Instrumented development flight tests were conducted from tripod
launcher.Dynamic performance of propulsion system was satisfactory. Ballistic range > 6 km was
achieved. Mid-course guidance capability has been successfully tested. Main High explosive anti-tank
(HEAT) warhead tested against rolled homogeneous armour (RHA) and a consistent penetration of
>750mm were achieved. A gimbaled laser seeker with a seeking range of ~2km has been developed
and flight tested
member_28802
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by member_28802 »

So it is our journos and few retired officers,The Chandigarh Lobby
This group got the handles during UPA rule. Let see how current RM whack them. I guess we know who the paid journos are, and so our doubt was right about those DRDO bashing articles. Lets tweet this link till this lobby gets enough highlight.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by shaun »

A case study !!

Perhaps the dodgiest case is that of the Arjun tank, which has been under development for nearly 40 years. In 2008 the DRDO had to install a black box in the indigenous battle tank following an alleged attempt to “sabotage” its engine. The instrument was installed after the Indian Army termed the winter trial of the Arjun tank a “failure”.

According to a DRDO official, “The German company Renk AG supplying the engines for the Arjun tank stumbled upon the tinkering with its engines after a complaint from the Indian Army that the tank’s gear box failed during its winter trials. Following this we have installed an instrument similar to the data recorder or black box in aircraft that would record all the information related to the engines.”

The then minister of state for defence (production) Rao Inderjit Singh also hinted at a conspiracy. “The possibility of sabotage needs to be examined,” he said. “The engines fitted in the tanks were German and were performing well for the past 15 years. I wonder what has happened to them overnight.”


The players!!

R.S.N. Singh, a former military intelligence officer who later served in the Research & Analysis Wing, writes in Canary Trap about the “Chandigarh Gang” that surfaced as the “mainstay of the international arms lobby” during the decade long UPA rule. “This gang is not necessarily in Chandigarh alone, but nevertheless is centered around it,” Singh writes. “It comprises some retired officers, politicians, journalists and prominent newspapers.”

This sums up all !!

"Indeed, it is intriguing that DRDO projects such as the Agni series intermediate range ballistic missiles (which are banned from the international export market) have been extremely successful, while others such as tanks, aircraft, helicopters and short range missiles (all of which are readily available) are rejected by the defence forces for not being up to scratch."
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by krishnan »

The last para exactly what i have been telling
member_26622
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by member_26622 »

The big question is - Will T-90 tin be paraded on Republic day?

We might send them to Chandigarh instead for showing off some fireworks.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by arshyam »

I wish we get to see the Arjun and the Pinaka in IA colours in this year's parade. Last year was a disappointment - only T-90 (or was that -72?) and Smerch. The Arjun was in the DRDO contingent.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by Khalsa »

Shaun wrote:A case study !!
This sums up all !!

"Indeed, it is intriguing that DRDO projects such as the Agni series intermediate range ballistic missiles (which are banned from the international export market) have been extremely successful, while others such as tanks, aircraft, helicopters and short range missiles (all of which are readily available) are rejected by the defence forces for not being up to scratch."
You sir have articulated and consolidated the angst really well.


The enemy lies within (facepalm)
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by nash »

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=21578
Speaking at a seminar 'Gujarat: Preferred Hub for Defence Production' during the Vibrant Gujarat summit, the minister said India cannot afford spending $20 billion on defence procurement, and for this, promoting local manufacturing is must and the country will promote private players in this field. "The government hopes to come up with a document in two or three months on a suitable model for defence manufacturing and procurement...We have listed certain items that are not going to be imported from 2016. These will increase later on. But we are coming up with the document in February-March on modified DPP."
I really hope that alteast MBT and rifles will be in this list.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - August 9 , 2014

Post by alexis »

^^

A long overdue decision. Also something that could work is to limit the forex outgo per year for any capex item. Only when we are constrained by some means, are we forced to innovate.
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