JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

[brar_w]

Only the f22 horizontal tail fins changed some from proto..rest of it did not change much

There were various changes -

http://media.defenceindustrydaily.com/i ... son_lg.jpg

Much of the requirement change was incorporated by Lockheed in the PAV unlike Northrop. Furthermore, a classified requirement pertaining to high altitude maneuverability was relaxed. Both designs met that requirement by holding a higher amount of fuel to achieve it for the KPP. Once relaxed it led to a design-weight reduction (design weight , not vehicle weight) that along with enhancements in the final versions of the F-119 allowed Lockheed to go form a Mach 1.48 demonstrates supercruise with the prototype engine and vehicle to a mach 1.72 super cruise with the final completed article (F-22A). Northrop would have had to trim the rear since the huge engine housing took into account the thrust reverser requirement which was relaxed around the time the prototypes went into construction. This was a specific requirement to reduce landing runway requirement so that runway repairs could speed up the process and the total sortie rate through repairs would jump by 33%. This was relaxed given the cost and future projection of threat. Northrop shortened the setup overall in their design submission but they did not incorporate those changes in the prototypes (lockheed did). To Lockheed's benefit they had to over-design the control surfaces because they thought/felt that the USAF would not take TVC that well and would penalize them for relying on TV controls to achieve KPP's. Lockheed therefore design the surfaces t meet full AOA and maneuverability requirements without TV and TV enhanced the capability which stood out compared to the YF23 which met the KPPs as well. The best performance was achieved by Northrop and YF-120 combination that went slightly ahead of Mach 1.6 in super cruise. Northrop never tried to go for max speed so they kept the top speed demonstration at mach 1.8. The design with the YF-120 could have easily topped mach 2 which Lockheed demonstrated (mach 2). The YF-23/YF-120 combination was the fastest combination by far a full .1 mach faster than Lockheed's best performance, but it also was the most troublesome. There were at least 2 significant engine incidents in flight in that combination whereas no such incidents were recorded in either the YF119/YF23 or YF119/YF22 combination.

[brar_w]

[NRao]

Only the f22 horizontal tail fins changed some from proto..rest of it did not change much

Other stuff also underwent modest modifications - wing design, cockpit position, wing sweep angle etc. Nothing quite as radical as the YF-23 EMD though.

These, first-effort, changes took some 10 years or so.

Since the US is just about the first one out there, I really do not like comparing other efforts to those from the US. And, I am convinced that others, program wise, are not even close to the US.

[brar_w]

The entire point of having a DemVal phase is to evaluate the ongoing design work all the way till a point where each design is mature enough so that one could be dropped in favor of the other. The design work is not intended to be completed by DemVal and this is why nearly 80% of the R&D dollars are spent post it into the EMD/SDD phase. The decision to pick a team (down select) is taken by the services concerned but the evaluation is conducted by the Program office. The usual practice of the program office is to pick one team that has a higher risk product and another that is relatively lesser risk. This presents the service an option to manage risk/cost/timelines as per their own internal budgets that are usually undergoing constant change. Here the YF-120 and YF-119 are examples. One was a cutting edge, Variable Cycle engine (first one if its kind in the world) while the latter a more conventional 5th generation engine. The YF-119 was more reliable, lower development cost, lower cost to procure and had been given a higher score in development risk. The YF-120 was more technically promising, more expensive, had better performance with the prototype but also had issues during the demval process. The last program that the USAF ran for fighters was the F-16 and the Engine development issues there most likely influenced the decision to go for a more mature, less-risky and lower cost option (a safer bet) in the P&W F119.

Ideally any change in the DemVal process post completion is signed off on by the Program office, so in the case of the YF-23 or even the X-32 (Boeing) it was deemed 'manageable' by those evaluating it. However, when the services make a decision they are usually risk averse as they have fleet replacement in mind. This hurt Northrop significantly in the ATF because even though the Program Office deemed their design worthy, and their changes manageable the USAF was not willing to bet on a more risky EMD program that would have struggled on technical issues and cost/time-lines. As the hardships in getting the F-22A out of the door showed, it was a rather wise decision in the end.

In the JSF, Boeing was very much the underdog (tough to consider them that given the size of their corporation). Lockheed and Northrop weren't shy of saying that the last fighter competition Boeing won with their own in-house design was in 1969, and in some ways that showed during the competition. The JSF competition also showed how you manage a competition. Lockheed took a more risky road from a technical stand-point with the Lift-Fan setup but de-risked the $hit out of it over time and formed very capable working groups with Allison (Later RR), P&W, GE and Northrop to make sure that they set themselves up to do well despite the fact that they had the higher risk with their STOVL design. The clutch system which was considered the most technically challenging was evaluated very thoroughly during the X-35 campaign and the fact that they had done so rubbed off because their design was miles ahead of Boeing's when it came to absorbing weight gain during SDD. The ' Mission X' sealed the deal especially when Boeing failed at trying to do that with their design.

[Austin]

via mp.net

http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2 ... f35jsf.pdf
http://www.pogo.org/our-work/straus-mil ... -time.html

Conclusion: Exquisitely Limited Capability


Overall, DOT&E’s report reveals:

The Joint Program Office, led by Lt. Gen. Bogdan, is re-categorizing or failing to count aircraft failures to try to boost maintainability and reliability statistics;

Testing is continuing to reveal the need for more tests, but the majority of the fixes and for capability deficiencies being discovered are being deferred to later blocks rather than being resolved;

The F-35 has a significant risk of fire due to extensive fuel tank vulnerability, lightning vulnerability and an OBIGGS system unable to sufficiently reduce fire-sustaining oxygen, despite redesigns;

Wing drop concerns are still not resolved after six years, and may only be mitigated or solved at the expense of combat maneuverability and stealth;

The June engine problems are seriously impeding or preventing the completion of key test points, including ensuring that the F-35B delivered to the Marine Corps for IOC meets critical safety requirements; no redesign, schedule, or cost estimate for a long-term fix has been defined yet, thereby further impeding g testing;

Even in its third iteration, the F-35’s helmet continues to show high false-alarm rates and computer stability concerns, seriously reducing pilots’ situational awareness and endangering their lives in combat;

The number of Block 2B’s already limited combat capabilities being deferred to later blocks means that the Marine Corps’ FY2015 IOC squadron will be even less combat capable than originally planned;

ALIS software failures continue to impede operation, mission planning, and maintenance of the F-35, forcing the Services to be overly reliant on contractors and “unacceptable workarounds”;

Deficiencies in Block 2B software, and deferring those capabilities to later blocks, is undermining combat suitability for all three variants of the F-35;

The program’s attempts to save money now by reducing test points and deferring crucial combat capabilities will result in costly retrofits and fixes later down the line, creating a future unaffordable bow wave that, based on F-22 experience, will add at least an additional $67 billion in acquisition costs; and

Low availability and reliability of the F-35 is driven by inherent design problems that are only becoming more obvious and difficult to fix.


The F-35 is years away from being ready for initial operational capability. To send this airplane on a combat deployment, or to declare it ready to be sent, as early as the Marines’ 2015 or the Air Force’s 2016 IOC dates, is a politically driven and irresponsible mistake. DOT&E's report shows that the current IOC plans for the F-35A and B should be rejected as unrealistic. Without meaningful oversight from the Department of Defense or Congress, however, these IOC declarations will go unchallenged.
The F-35 program is designed so that there is no requirement to prove its combat capability before approving an annual production rate of 57 aircraft, a rate unprecedented for any fighter with so little operational testing accomplished and so many unresolved problems. Further production of the F-35 at this point, let alone an increase in already high and unwarranted production rates, is unsupported by the DOT&E data. But that data is being ignored to continue funding a politically driven acquisition program.

The F-35’s unrealistic production and IOC schedule is divorcing the declaration of initial operating capability from operational reality. Deferring combat capabilities, increasing future costs, and increasing the risk of delivering seriously deficient combat effectiveness mandates revising the current schedules for IOC and for production ramp-up. Further accelerating a program with this many major design, safety, and reliability problems is a disservice to our people in uniform who have to fly, maintain, and go to war with this weapons system.

Despite Congress's rhetoric regarding reform and accountability, they are rewarding the cooking of data, reckless program concurrency, and disasterous acquisition management by aproving and funding the F-35's current path. Their accession and approval will ensure that future acquisition programs have even worse outcomes.

[brar_w]

There is yet to be a program of record in the Department of Defense that POGO likes, even the ones that have successfully overcome challenges, been proven in conflict and are loved by the users. No one expects this left-wing "defense hitting" organization to fall in love with the F-35. The links of POGO to the anti-defense spending, establishment have been established by quite a few that have peeped inside the organization and there is a reason POGO's 'alarmist' reports aren't taken very seriously in either the DOD or the Congress - Basically those that decide or are in a position of authority.

Note- If links don't work go through this

http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/search?q=POGO

Now coming tot he DOTE report that was published in January (Odd time for POGO to bring it up in march (when every other defense reporter has published it, reported on it, reported counters to it and filed it away) but I guess the closer the jet gets to IOC, the more desperate the new boss @ Pogo is getting). As mentioned on multiple earlier occasions in this thread DOTE reports (and GAO reports) are transitionary in nature. They are published in Q1 of a year, and are written in Q4 of the prior year and involve assessment of activity in Q2 and Q3 of previous year for most part. By the time these reports are discussed its often March-April of the next year and a lot of the red flags the report raises are usually addressed or are well on their way to being addressed. Same happened with prior software issues, tail hook issues, engine issues or SWAT on the Beach.

Now in any acquisition program there are multiple stakeholders. IN this case as well there are the testers and evaluators, the customers and the program managers and overseers. The customers are the individual services, the testers are the DOTE folks and the program managers are the boys at the JPO. Post this report the JPO point man has been on record as describing this report and its findings and claiming " No show stoppers are expected prior to IOC". On top of that both the USAF Boss (Gen Mark Welsh and SecAF) are also on record of saying that no show stoppers are likely to effect that service's IOC next year. On top of that you had the JPO boss just a few weeks ago say that there are some delays but they are now measured in days and weeks. Basically nothing substantial is going to hold the program back from achieving its IOC goals with 2b and 3I (USAF). There is a 4-6 month delay being projected in delivering 3F, but even that is within the IOC window the USN and international customers have built in post rebalance.

Conclusion: Exquisitely Limited Capability

Starting in May the USMC (the first to IOC) will evaluate the entire weapons system to the targets agreed upon in 2010 for their IOC with software 2B. As of two weeks ago, the 2b software testing had "single digit" test points left. That testing should have concluded now and most likely the certification would follow in the next 30-60 days. The capability like I said is exactly the one which is expected or was required to be present on software 2B. There is no indication that that capability will fall short of what was expected or would be delayed.

Secondly this is an IOC. I in IOC stands for Initial and this is exactly what the capability is. The real SDD capability that was required of the F-35 program will be delivered with Block 3F. Block 3F is now in flight testing and the software would be delivered to the fleet starting early 2017. It would take 12-18 months post delivery for it to be completely tested, certified and cleared for operational use. Having said that, you could potentially take the Software 3F to war in 2017 if for some reason you need to. The JSTARS was taken to war while it was undergoing operational trials. The Global Hawk was taken out from testing and sent to the battlefield. There is however no need to do so but if they want to they can since there would be 200+ jets flying around with the new software starting early 2017.

Since the DOTE report we have heard from -

Christopher Bogdan
Mark A Welsh III
SecAF
SecNav
Admiral Jonathan Greenert
USMC Boss Gen Dunford

But don't take my word for it, the program office (JPO) and F-35 customers/operators (USMC, USN and USAF) would be up before congress in a couple of weeks (it was delayed last week due to bad weather in Washington DC) and they would give updates on the program and how the problems mentioned in the 2014 DOTE report have been addressed As happens every year, the Congress would be satisfied given that there are no show stoppers and the slippages or testing issues (this is still testing so no surprise to find shortcomings that require addressing - that is the entire point of testing) are well known and under control for the IOC configuration. The World would continue to spin and POGO would most likely call for a complete declassification of the Long Range Bomber because they can't access reports on it to shred that program in order to advance its agenda.

None have indicated any show stoppers. For the capability and what it offers at IOC - That picture has been known for 4 years, and the capability is up to the individual services. The Navy is choosing to wait for a full SDD for they have limited space on their carriers. The USAF and USMC are taking an interim IOC capability because they know its going to take a couple of years for them to integrated the jet into their fleet - something that is painstakingly expensive, and hard to do if you are still shackled to the JPO and all the constraints in basing and deployment associated with a jet that has yet to clear certification prior to IOC.

Despite of what POGO or anyone else says the pentagon requires that each IOC occur after and only after receiving an evaluation clearance from proper authorities. The USMC will seek that before they IOC around July of this year. If they do IOC they will have the legal clearance required to do so. Any organization can then claim whatever it wants, it would mean little. Its not the first fighter project that they have done, nor the first weapons system to be sent through evaluation and IOC. If it were left to POGO there would be no air-force since I doubt there is any equipment that is to "pogo spec" there.

There are very few legitimate hard hitters on the program. They (one famous aviation/aerospace editor among them) most likely have some personal issues (as was evident when one senior editor resorted to attacking the OEM publicly in a late night Facebook rant - which got him suspended for a time) with the OEM or have their own interests given they are international editors for their publication. POGO stands on the extreme left and their agenda is to be laser-focused in drawing unreasonable conclusions based on transitionary reports such as GAO or DOTE. They are a known entity and do this with every system so they end up causing minimal disruption even at times when you have liberals in the Congress or the White House. On top of that you have certain European journalists that are hard-F-35-hitters. They have been ever since the program was launched with a massive EU nation partnership. These guys are also well known to those of us that have followed their writings that have fallen to such lows of having taken a blogger with no "verifiable credentials such as NAME, or experience/expertise" and giving them editorial level articles on the front pages of their websites. Their reporting is fairly easy and straight forward to pick up when they sitting in europe are passing judgments on the US Football Rose Bowl fly-overs (what the F?).

One of the my first blog articles I had planned, I had prepared is an extensive comparison of the Media reporting on the F-16 and F-35 program. I am tempted to give a sneak peak of that here if someone wishes but it essentially compares reporting on the early days and particularly how certain members of the European Media began attacking General dynamics almost instantly the Norwegians, Belgians and others picked it over the 2 European competitors. There was a clear Politican-OEM effort (this is to be expected but fascinating none the less) that was underway that went to such an extent as to raise political opposition and call for the leaders of a few of these countries to be sacked. Also the comparison is very interesting to look at. Anyone care to guess what the cost-overrun on the first batch (600 fighters) was for the F-16 compared to the NTE price? One of the biggest sticking points that many F-35 bashers in Europe bring up is the very high cost of acquisition for the F-35 as a percentage of the total budgets for some of its EU customers. They have absolutely no idea what these nations at the time paid for a WVR fighter (or most likely the know what the cost was but reporting it would not fit their agenda) that had ' engine issues' among other distinctions such as a very 'serious' incident at its first flight/taxi run. The European competitors particularly the one from France was fairly aggressive in its PR blitz claiming the F-16A would basically destroy European defense preparedness because it would bankrupt the air-forces procuring it. I have a comprehensive collection of some of this and how similar some of the reporting rhetoric is now. Industry is industry and the Industry-political nexus exists on both sides of the pond. Its just funny that the tactics are almost always recycled.

[brar_w]

NEXT STEPS IN THE F-35 GLOBAL ENTERPRISE: CAMERI’S FIRST F-35A AND NORWEGIAN-AUSTRALIAN COLLABORATION ON THE JOINT STRIKE MISSILE

[Philip]

USN wants more F-18SHs /Growlers since the JSF is delayed.
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defens ... /70243170/

World Events, F-35 Delays Drive Hornet Push
By Christopher P. Cavas 2:22 p.m. EDT March 15, 2015

WASHINGTON — The US Navy's case for requesting more Boeing-made F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighters rests with two issues: requirements and replacements.

It's been only two years since the US Navy quit buying F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighters — part of a long-planned transition to the F-35C joint strike fighter — but a confluence of events has led to the new possibility that more attack aircraft could be ordered from Boeing.

When the US Navy submitted its fiscal 2015 request a year ago, it was the first budget since the 1970s that did not include some version of the F/A-18 Hornet strike fighter. Procurement of F/A-18 E and F Super Hornets ended in 2013, and the last of 138 EA-18G Growler electronic warfare versions was included in the 2014 budget.

Congress, however, added an unplanned-for 15 Growlers in the 2015 budget, responding to a Navy unfunded priority list request to meet a joint tactical need. The move keeps open Boeing's St. Louis production line an extra year, through 2017.

Now, a strike fighter shortfall the Navy thought it could manage by a variety of methods is being further exacerbated, and it seems highly likely that when the new unfunded requirements list is submitted to Congress by mid-March, it will include a request for new Super Hornets

"We have a shortfall in Super Hornets, we do," Adm. Jon Greenert, chief of naval operations, told Congress on March 4. "And we're going to have to work our way through here in order to manage it."

The shortfall is not a new situation — it's been developing for years, and was something the Navy's leadership thought it could manage its way through. But in recent weeks, sources said, the emphasis has shifted from using current resources to deal with the problem to including the purchase of new aircraft as part of an overall solution.

Simply put, the situation breaks down like this:

•The fleet has about 600 F/A-18C Hornet "legacy" aircraft — pre-Super Hornet strike fighters — in its current inventory, with something over half scheduled to be replaced by 340 new F-35Cs. About 300 of the 18Cs are out of service, according to the Navy.
•Budget constraints and software development issues have pushed out F-35C procurement to the right — delayed by several years — and the first "35 Charlies" aren't scheduled to reach initial operating capability until 2018. Full rate production of 20 aircraft per year isn't planned until 2020, and it will be another two years before those aircraft enter service.
•Increased operating tempos due to combat operations against the Islamic State in northern Iraq and western Syria meant that the Navy did not realize reduced flying hours from the drawdown in Afghanistan.
•Thus the legacy Hornets need to keep flying longer. While they were rated up to a lifespan of 6,000 flying hours, the Navy figures it needs a service life extension program (SLEP) to get 150 of those planes out to 10,000 hours.
•With fewer F/A-18Cs flying, newer E and F Super Hornets are being used up at higher rates than planned.
•Budget reductions in recent years reduced money for depot maintenance, creating something of a backlog that, a year ago, reached 65 F/A-18Cs. Technicians, however, discovered much higher levels of corrosion when those aircraft were opened up, leading to growth in the number of aircraft that needed work, and a longer work period to deal with them. While the Navy has restored the depot funding, the backlog has expanded from 65 to 100 aircraft, and the service is struggling to hire more skilled labor to work on the planes.
•The growth in the backlog of 35 aircraft over the past year led Greenert to estimate the need was for "two or three squadrons" of new strike fighters to plug the gap. F/A-18 E and F Super Hornets are organized into 12-plane squadrons, while 18Cs fly in squadrons of 10 aircraft. Two squadrons of new planes works out to 24 aircraft, 36 for three squadrons.

The Navy in 2012 surveyed its strike fighter inventory to assess the problem. "We looked at the inventory challenges," said Rear Adm. Mike Manazir, the Navy's director of air warfare. "SLEP 150 F/A-18Cs and buy 41 Es and Fs."

"As we pushed JSF outside to the right — this latest budget moved 16 outside the FYDP [future years defense plan] — I'm not making up those aircraft." Over the past three years, Manazir said, a total of 159 F-35C carrier variant and F-35B Marine jump jets have been moved out of the FYDP.

Assuming the air fleet keeps flying at about 330 hours a year per airplane, he said, "from 2020 to 2035, I need to be buying about 30 to 39 aircraft per year to replace" older, worn-out aircraft. "It's a product of supply and demand."

Another key factor, Manazir noted, is the Super Hornet mid-life refit program expected a decade from now.

"I have to get 563 Super Hornets out to 9,000 hours," he noted. "Ten years from now I'm going to be in the middle of SLEP'ping 563 airplanes. Do I have enough depot capacity? If I can do that successfully, I can manage that risk. Procurement [of new aircraft] reduces that risk."

Some observers look at a Navy effort to keep buying Boeing F/A-18s as an indication the service is soft on support for the Lockheed Martin F-35. Manazir insists there is no truth to that.

"There is no move here to not buy something," he declared. "In order for me to win in 2024 I have to have F-35Cs flying with F-18Es and Fs. I have to. And I have to be able to fill my air wings out.

"I am trying to get rid of the myth that all the Navy wants to do is continue F-18 Es and Fs. If I only have F-18 Es and Fs in 2024 I can't win. I have to have a number of F-35C squadrons."

"What I try to do is avoid — because it's not true — the F-18 Boeing versus the Lockheed Martin F-35" story line, he said. "Because for the United States Navy, it's not all about getting the F-35, it's about getting the integrated capabilities of the high-end war fight, which takes the F-18 E/F and the F-35C. It takes them both."

The number of aircraft Greenert is talking about, Manazir said, is the right number.

"So two to three squadrons in 2016 — 36 airplanes — helps me reduce my risk of extension for that.

"If I reduce my risk through that procurement that he testified to, and I can extend my 18Es and Fs to the plan that I'm going to now, and I'm going to procure F-35Cs to the tune of 20 per year starting in 2020, I've reduced my risk to a manageable level. And that's my entire cohesive plan going forward."

[brar_w]

USN wants more F-18SHs /Growlers since the JSF is delayed

This has been a long established time-line. Read this article and then go through the one posted by me in on the last page. In fact this article (yours) is practically a recycle of that one. The F-35C procurement has been set. The chokepoint in supply is block 3F and block 4 cert. The USN has been performing at war like tempo for over a decade. The F-18's are getting old, and are taking longer to be serviced. The Super Hornets are taking place and are therefore seeing higher then predicted usage. This in turn causes a capacity shortfall in both numbers and depot capability in the next decade. The current depot capacity has been impacted by sequestration and it would take them years to build it up. If if they could, I seriously doubt they would want to operate in a "war like" fashion with the depots because that would mean a high ramp up followed by a high closure rate which as a combination is not financially advisable. Ideally they want to buy a few squadrons to mitigate the risk and let the depot work take longer. They may or may not be able to do this but do remember that the USN maintains both Sea and Concrete squadrons.

Even if the F-35C was available now in 3F the Navy does not have the funds to buy higher amount now before the USAF subsidizes production with its 80 a year order. There is simply no money with the USN over and above the current F-35 spending amount.

The biggest admission was from the USN leadership when they said that the F-35C is required in the post-2020 time to WIN and this is practically a slap in the face of all those in the media that claimed that the Navy wanted F-18's instead of F-35's.

"I have to get 563 Super Hornets out to 9,000 hours," he noted. "Ten years from now I'm going to be in the middle of SLEP'ping 563 airplanes. Do I have enough depot capacity? If I can do that successfully, I can manage that risk. Procurement [of new aircraft] reduces that risk."

Some observers look at a Navy effort to keep buying Boeing F/A-18s as an indication the service is soft on support for the Lockheed Martin F-35. Manazir insists there is no truth to that.

"There is no move here to not buy something," he declared. "In order for me to win in 2024 I have to have F-35Cs flying with F-18Es and Fs. I have to. And I have to be able to fill my air wings out.

The Increase Growler production is an unfunded demand on part of the USN. They wanted to move to 5 a carrier and consider 7 a carrier if possible. They have intentionally kept the EA mission out of the F-35C so as to not risk the FA-XX. Therefore the growler has absolutely no substitute in the F-35 family. Even with more growlers (An excellent weapons system piled on a poor poor platform for this role) they won't change F-35C procurement for the very reasons mentioned above. The VAQ can do with more EW assets. What the VAQ buys would also realize is how the 'tron' picture changes with the arrival of the F-35C. While the F-35 conducts its own EA, its strong suite lies in its EW capability thanks to the one huge AESA aperture that can basically act in Passive mode coupled with the AN/ASQ-239 - something similar to a 'Silent Growler' where emitter information is fed in from inside the FEB so that the Growlers are more effective in jamming comms, receivers and radars. Such synergy is built into the aircraft from the start given it can operate L16 from the start and that the new USN TTNT waveform in support of NIFC-CA is an expected capability @ block 4.

Also keep in mind that the Growlers go through 1000 airframe hours in a little less than 3 years. The heavy loads also means they undergo a lot more stress.

[Philip]

USN on a diet,Turkey orders reduced!

AWST Feb16/15
USN " reduces" by one-third F-35C orders for the years between FYDP 2016-2020,instead spending more money ($800M) on stand-off PGMs."This is the first move by a US service to slow down its JSF procurements."
Major reason for cutback is costs.The USN will spend in 2020 $4.7B for 32 F-35Cs. Unit cost for just 12 is now pegged at $144M,F-35B at $147M.

AWST reports that this is due to the USN's CNO Adm.Greenert,who has been skeptical about the invincibility of stealth ever since he took over in 2012,downplaying stealth in favour of "payloads".Speaking on Feb 4th he said," any future fighter will not be super-fast because you can't outrun missiles,and not super-stealthy because you can't be invisible,Stealth may be overrated",he said. "If you move fast through the air,that puts out heat and you are going to be detected".

[brar_w]

The USN’s plan to reduce the number of F-35C’s has been known for some time. Each year their budget has reflected this reality. There is a sequester budget that is presented every year. Last year’s reduction got funded back in the budget by the Congress. Expect the same thing to happen a few more times before sequester is ultimately lifted. The USAF and the USN through the USMC are standing firm on the F-35A and F-35B thereby stabilizing the program. The USN has other shipbuilding proprieties.

Your conclusion is also a twisted interpretation of the actual reality, which is cost. The same reason that has made the USN drop 14 F-35C’s from now to 2020 (1/3 sounds so much more dramatic but in reality the number is 14 or by 3 a year) has also made them drop ALL SUPER HORNET PROCUREMENT including the GROWLER purchase form FY2016 onwards. They are saying they would need more SH’s for the reasons I mentioned above but those are currently not accounted for in the FY16 budget. Therefore unless they change the budget or the Congress steps in like last year and adds F-18E/F’s or EA-18G’s to the FY16 budget that is currently being negotiated, the Super Hornet line would close around the end of 2017 after the last jets ordered in FY15 are delivered. Even those ordered in FY15 are Growlers, a jet that has no substitute in the F-35 program.

As the USN leadership said, they need the F-35C to win in a post 2024 environment. You have to understand what the F-35C’s will be doing between now and 2020. They won’t be on the carrier because the IOC is 2018 and then another full year of Concrete ops before they deploy on the newest CVN. The Navy will not have a deployable capability with the F-35 on the CVN before 2020 at the earliest (of course the ‘rushing to war’ option is always on the table) . It makes sense for the USN to reduce the number by 3 a year, an overall total number that they can make up in less then 9 months of USN’s full scale production post 2020.

Coming to the stealth issue, the CNO said nothing of this sort. He said that a future platform would have to focus on a lot of things besides stealth. This is 100% in line with what the USAF, and all other designing stealth fighters either for current generations or for future generations are saying or doing. The F-35 has the most comprehensive EA/EW suite designed for a stealthy-aircraft along with the VLO configuration and IR suppression measures. Expect this trend to continue as they go towards ELO stealth on 6th generation figthers or even the next B-3 bomber.

For a detailed rebuttal of that article and the completely wrong conclusion that may be derived form the CNO’s remarks, you can refer to a few pages back where this was discussed.

Calling the USN’s decision to reduce by 14 their 5 year F-35C procurement (4 out of those 5 years would see no operational deployment btw) as a lack of “enthusiasm” for the fighter is akin to calling their decision to no longer procure the F-18E/F or EA-18G from FY16 as a sign of them not needing any new fighters between FY16 and FY2020 when they ramp up their F-35C purchase”.

BTW, the SDD production even for the USAF got pushed to the right by a huge margin (some 300 aircraft). Does this also mean the USAF doesn’t want the F-35? Do keep in mind that the USN’s requirement for F-35C’s has remain unchanged. They are simply swapping production slots in the SDD phase for production slots in the Full rate of production time-frame, a tactic they had been exploring for some time as long as export customers are willing to pick up the slots vacated by it so as to not effect the critical ramp up in production. With 2 new FMS customers in the last few years they have pretty much done that given that 50% of the F-35’s produced between FY15 and FY20 are meant for export.

USN on a diet,Turkey orders reduced!

NO. USN pushes back its delivery on just over a dozen F-35's and does not fund even a single F-18E/F (the only other fighter it has access to) beyond FY16. Thats the hard reality as explained above. Now reconcile this with the article you posted yesterday. You'll realize that in their own budget they have not ordered any super hornet yet the CNO along with SecNav have said they ideally want 3-4 more squadrons of legacy/proven rhinos before they transition into the F-35C's beyond 2020. Not sure you understand the logistical challenges confronting the combined USN and USMC but do some background research on what chokepoints exist at what time-frame and try to factor in a more then decade of combat-tempo deployments. If you do this you'll realize the importance of what the USN bosses are saying. The F-18's are down for longer then they had planned because sequester has impacted the size of the depot's. This has in turn caused a higher utilization of the Super Hornet fleet disrupting their modeling for when and how they need SLEP's and depot runs in the 2020's. What the Navy's calculations are showing is that they would need to start sending in F-18E/F's to the depot around the middle of the next decade. The next step the USN did was look at their projected depot capacity and whether it could sustain those overhauls. If not then they have to choose between A) Adding depot level capacity which is not easy given sequestration and the long term planing required to achieve the same. Or They could simply order 3-4 more Super Hornet squadrons and let the existing depots take longer to turn the rhinos around in the mid 2020's. Despite of this not only are they pushing out the 14 F-35C's, they are also not funding any more F-18E/F's even though the latter are the best bet to avoid the logistical nightmare that awaits the next CNO.

Get it yet? Its budget season. Expect half a dozen to all of the F-35C's that they have pushed back to make their way back through the Congress (as happened last year). Also expect the USN to secure a few more squadrons of F-18E/F's if there is no new export order for the Rhino this year. This game is played in the Pentagon/Cognress/White House every year.

[Philip]

Adm.Greenert has been quoted correctly. He said what he said which I've highlighted."Stealth may be overrated". You "cannot be invisible". His focus is on equipping the USN with more stand-off PGMs ,for "bomb trucks" in an earlier quote where he said the equiv of "why buy an expensive sports car when a bomb truck can do the business". The advantage that the US has over everyone else is that it already has the F-22 in service which gives it a huge advantage along with its huge NCW assets from sats,specialised aircraft,EW,etc. The vulnerability of it against the PRC was envisaged in the event of the PRC attempting to "take away" Taiwan,with the US intervening on the side of Taiwan, and that given its huge numbers of modern aircraft it could bring to bear against USN carriers and island based F-22s,the US would find the going v.hard and lose. If the Chinese are the aggressor attempting to dominate the oceans,littoral nations of the Indo-China Sea,the opposite is most likely to happen as it does not possess he required expeditionary power projection /amphib forces necessary. This is why it is building/expanding the footprint of islands/atolls to improve the infrastructure and plant troops and mil eqpt. on them.

More recent AWST issues also have reports on new anti-stealth radars being developed by Russian and China and the US's growing interest in IRST sensors common on Russian aircraft. UCAVs will be pressed into service increasingly as a consequence.

[NRao]

He said what he said which I've highlighted."Stealth may be overrated". You "cannot be invisible".

ALL such things (as I am discovering) are relative.

The US envisions conflicts far from their home land mass, therefore design a lot of independence in their architecture.

Russia and China have to rely on their land mass and therefore are more reliant on support from other means - less independence.

So, IMHO, their philosophies are very different, which reflects on the what they fund. So "stealth" has totally different meaning to each of them. I would not compare one with the other. What is key, is if "stealth" fits into their philosophies/doctrines.

[brar_w]

Adm.Greenert has been quoted correctly. He said what he said which I've highlighted."Stealth may be overrated". You "cannot be invisible". His focus is on equipping the USN with more stand-off PGMs ,for "bomb trucks" in an earlier quote where he said the equiv of "why buy an expensive sports car when a bomb truck can do the business". The advantage that the US has over everyone else is that it already has the F-22 in service which gives it a huge advantage along with its huge NCW assets from sats,specialised aircraft,EW,etc. The vulnerability of it against the PRC was envisaged in the event of the PRC attempting to "take away" Taiwan,with the US intervening on the side of Taiwan, and that given its huge numbers of modern aircraft it could bring to bear against USN carriers and island based F-22s,the US would find the going v.hard and lose. If the Chinese are the aggressor attempting to dominate the oceans,littoral nations of the Indo-China Sea,the opposite is most likely to happen as it does not possess he required expeditionary power projection /amphib forces necessary. This is why it is building/expanding the footprint of islands/atolls to improve the infrastructure and plant troops and mil eqpt. on them.

More recent AWST issues also have reports on new anti-stealth radars being developed by Russian and China and the US's growing interest in IRST sensors common on Russian aircraft. UCAVs will be pressed into service increasingly as a consequence.

The CNO said that stealth does not = invisibility. No conflict there. The USAF has said the same. He said that you cannot completely hide passively using stealth. Again, this has been known for a long time. Why do you think Billions are being spent on the DAIDS on the B-2? Or the EW package on the F-22 and F-35? Stealth is a means of breaking kill chains, just as EA and EW are means of breaking a missile lock etc. If you can get in and get out and present 1/5 of the reaction time to the opponent because you are A) Extremely hard to find, or track and B ) You have altitude, speed and Electronic warfare systems on board - then you increase your survivability and mission-effectivness. This has been the solution ever since the SR-71. That aircraft used speed and some modest RCS reduction. Subsequent aircraft were able to use very high degree of RCS reduction. Then the B-2 brought in large mission systems, high SA, Defensive suites and VLO. The F-22A, speed, stealth and even higher data processing. The F-35 brings Stealth, supersonic speed, EA/EW and the most comprehensive SA setup the US has ever developed. Add to that you have the recipe for cooperative target engagement built into the concept from the start (MADL).

Now coming to the second parts on BOMB TRUCKS and Payloads. The F-35C is perfect for that. It can easily be configured in any form or shape be it for the first strike configuration or fully laden with bombs and pods. It has 2X the loiter and range compared to the Hornet family that needs a high degree of tanker support. Furthermore it has all the sensor packages embedded. Want to integrate NiFCCA? It can be done..Want stealthy data sharing? Already possible with MADL..Want EW somewhat of a mini-growler like thing , possible since there are 2 EW avionics racks that are currently vacant. Its the perfect platform for that mission because it does everything thanks to its stealth, open architecture and a computing system that can sustain growth - something that the F-18 family cannot.

Now coming to the "stealth" is useless claim. Again, the context was - stealth by itself is useless. Which is pretty much how every stealthy aircraft has been designed since the F-117.

Now there is a publicly available RFI for the USN's F-18E/F replacement. Take some time and read it. If not, then look at what the OEM's responding to that document proposed. I'll make it easy for you : -



See a similarity? These are aircrafts proposed as per USN issued RFI's. Both designs very heavily use stealth as a design objective in order to ensure the survivability requirements asked for by the USN in the RFI.

As the CNO later clarified, the F-35C has stealth but on top of that it has a whole lot more. It has a very comprehensive sensor suite, a computing and data fusion that is 4 times as large as the F-22A and the ability to share information like no other aircraft before it. On top if it, unlike the Rhino it has the ability to provide its own EA/EW component for all its missions.

Once you have read the FA-XX RI you can perhaps research into the history of the JSF program. If you dig deep enough you will realize that it was the USN that wanted greater stealth claiming the F-35 would be the only stealth fighter in its inventory. The USAF wanted a slightly reduced survivability in order to keep costs down, it was the USN that wanted greater stealth, greater payload and greater sensor coverage (They wanted EOTS on every aircraft as compared to the USAF's every other aircraft requirement).

His focus is on equipping the USN with more stand-off PGMs ,for "bomb trucks" in an earlier quote where he said the equiv of "why buy an expensive sports car when a bomb truck can do the business"

Which means absolutely nothing in this context. The F-35C is an ultimate aircraft if ^^ is what you are looking for. It has the best stand off PGM capability that the navy could possibly seek (Thanks to Block 4 UAI integration), it has the sensors both onboard and through CNI to go deep and provide the sort of targeting cues for stand off weapons. It also has the non-kinetic options in the cyber and EA/EW domains. BTW it along with the P-8 are the only 2 platforms that can provide seamless cues to the Growlers for EA mission. The Super Hornet cannot without upgrades.

The advantage that the US has over everyone else is that it already has the F-22 in service which gives it a huge advantage along with its huge NCW assets from sats,specialised aircraft,EW,etc.

The Navy does not have F-22A's and if it deploys out at a moment's notice it cannot count of F-22's for some time. Thats why they wanted 'better than F-22' stealth on the JSF. Its there main penetrating aircraft and would be until the FA-XX comes online in the 2030's.

More recent AWST issues also have reports on new anti-stealth radars being developed by Russian and China and the US's growing interest in IRST sensors common on Russian aircraft. UCAVs will be pressed into service increasingly as a consequence.

The most recent article is nothing more than a collection of older articles into one essay. The author's are reporters and not analysts. They present little as far as analytical ability or technical competence to mean much other than just taking known facts and rehashing them into a new article. The USN has decades of experience with IRST's. They are nothing new. The computing available however is something very new and that is what the larger investment is focusing on. The sensor is useless if you cannot compute "out" the false alarms. Otherwise it would be at best a short range choice.

Regardless all stealthy aircraft have strict IR signatures they are supposed to meet and the growing interest in stealth seems to speak volumes. Even the IAF seems to want a stealthy design for the AMCA. The Koreans for the F-X, the Japanese for their aircraft and the europeans want the same for their UCAV's. Heck even the russians want that.

UCAVs will be pressed into service increasingly as a consequence.

Only once they figure out "survivability" in a denied environment. Until then they won't contribute much in the penetrating mission. There was no interest for the J-UCAS from the USAF, the UCLASS had the Navy resist the Mini-B-2 mission because of survivability challenges in contested or denied environments. The Avenger has a limited acquisition that too through the CIA and not the USAF directly. There is a huge problem in keeping the comms and data link pipelines required to operate successfully with high cost UCAV's in an environment that has Data links contested and GPS/SATCOM denied. That basically limits the complexity of the mission systems. Without highly capable mission systems you cannot design a UCAV to go out and perform very complex strike missions.

The solution most likely lies in the RQ-180, LRS-B combo but that is being designed completely in secrecy most likely because this has been a very hard to develop and field capability and is hardly going to trickle down to Predator like tactical systems anytime soon.

So, IMHO, their philosophies are very different, which reflects on the what they fund. So "stealth" has totally different meaning to each of them. I would not compare one with the other. What is key, is if "stealth" fits into their philosophies/doctrines.

The meaning has to be properly understood. Some find that hard.

Lets look at what the USN has been wanting over the last 10-20 years -

- NATF - The stealthiest option at the time
- A-12 - Stealthiest option, way ahead of its time
- F-35 - As has been claimed ' stealthier than the F-22A '
- FA-XX - Look at the pictures above - the terminology being thrown around by the OEM's is ELO or extreme Low observability

What else has happened since then?

- J-UCAS - Signature suppression , UCLASS - signature supression , RQ-180 - Signature suppression, LRS-B - Signature supression.

See any trends?

Bottom Line - The next generation fighters, whether it is the USN FA-XX or the US NGAD/FX will see a quantum jump in low observability, data fusion, processing power and sensor capability. This is what they are working on at the moment and what these designs would reflect. You would need this because everything would have become better from a threat perspective. Stealth would continue to be at the forefront of cutting edge designs as long as there is no alternative to deny a combat or mission kill as comprehensively. If you can find an alternative, you would shift towards that. Hypersonic speed aircraft could be that but that technology is not going to be ready by the 2030's. Perhaps 2050-2060 is a better time to introduce that into an aircraft.

[brar_w]

Pentagon to build new variable-cycle engine for F-35 and other aircraft

The Pentagon's developmental sixth-generation jet engine featuring greater fuel efficiency and thrust than existing military engines is initially being built for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a senior agency official said on 17 March.
"There are a number of threshold platforms," Alan Shaffer, the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense, research, and engineering, told IHS Jane's at the Precision Strike Association's annual conference in Springfield, Virginia. "[This is] the one that we're going to build it around because we'll have the extra orange airplanes is JSF," he added, referring to test aircraft.
"But it would work for Long-Range Bomber (LRS-B), it would work for the [Boeing] F/A-18 [Super Hornet], it would work for basically anything that requires a tactical, high-end turbine," he said regarding the Adaptive Engine Technology Program (AETP).

AETP is developing a military aircraft engine in the 20,000 lbf (89 kN) thrust class. Shaffer said the Pentagon wants the new power plant to achieve 35% better fuel efficiency than existing engines. This improvement in fuel efficiency over the F135 engine would provide the F-35A and the F-35C a range of over 1,600 miles and the F-35B a range of over 1,200 miles compared to the current 1,200 miles and 900 miles, respectively.
In contrast to fixed-cycle engines, sixth-generation technology features variable cycles, which alter the airflow and pressure ratios in the engine, enabling transition between fuel-efficient cruise modes and high thrust for high-speed and even supersonic flight during the same flight. Shaffer likened variable geometries to the changes in torgue created by a figure skater as she pulls her arms toward her body while spinning.
Shaffer said the Pentagon plans to "develop engines with two vendors, and by 2019 or maybe 2020 have the capability to enter directly into [engineering and manufacturing development]".
About a year ago, the Pentagon signaled a push toward completion of the AETP effort with a surprise request for an additional USD1.5 billion in funding for the work in its fiscal year 2015 budget request. This is the first time the Pentagon has acknowledged which aircraft it has in mind for the new power plant.
Shaffer said the DoD is aiming for a 35% improvement in fuel consumption efficiency over fifth-generation engines with AETP. He said that this metric is largely aimed at providing greater range to its aircraft as the US turns its attention toward the vastness of the Pacific Ocean.

COMMENT

It is widely expected that General Electric (GE) Aviation and Pratt & Whitney (P&W) will continue to be the two major players in the Pentagon's propulsion technology push. GE Aviation's projected timeline for developing its variable-cycle design to completion coincides well with the DoD's plans. Company officials have said that their engine could be production-ready in the 2022-24 timeframe. They have acknowledged spending upwards of USD1 billion on the effort in the decade since they offered the variable-cycle F120 to the Pentagon for the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor. They have claimed that variable-cycle technology alone cannot achieve the 35% fuel-burn improvement desired by the DoD. To achieve that metric, GE Aviation has invested in ceramic matrix composites (CMCs) for the engine's hot section, advanced aero designs in the compressor, and lightweight 3D-printed components, a list of components they claim is unique to GE Aviation's design.
Meanwhile, P&W has been building on its variable-cycle experience under a separate AETP contract. The company built the J58 engine that powered the USAF's Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird strategic reconnaissance aircraft in the 1960s, so it also has a long history of effort with the technology. The J58 was the first engine designed to operate for extended periods using its afterburner, and the first flight qualified at Mach 3 for the USAF.
P&W acknowledged that integration work for the F-35A is already part of the AETP programme but that it is also working on an F135 block upgrade strategy separately. "The AETP programme as currently laid out by the government includes significant work to integrate the engine on an F-35A," company spokesman Matthew Bates told IHS Jane's on 17 March. "In addition to that effort, P&W is uniquely positioned to leverage that technology into future upgrades of the F135 at lower risk and cost. We'll continue to assess opportunities to provide additional options to the government to provide greater flexibility, which is important in the current budget environment."

[brar_w]

Meet The F-35 Developmental Test Fleet At Edwards AFB


http://aviationweek.com/F35Edwards




F-35 programme begins developing cyber-attack capability

The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter programme is developing a pod-mounted cyber-attack system as it continues kinetic weapons integration, the deputy programme executive officer said on 17 March.

"Industry is developing a pod that would not degrade the signature of the airplane," said Rear Admiral Randy Mahr at the Precision Strike Association conference in Springfield, Virginia. He told IHS Jane's that the offensive system was in the "prototyping phase" and was not being designed by F-35 prime contractor Lockheed Martin, but declined to name the developer.

Meanwhile, Rear Adm Mahr said, the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) B-model of the aircraft would be able to accommodate the Raytheon GBU-53/B Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II).
Some media reports have suggested that the weapon cannot be carried in the weapons bay of the F-35B - the smallest of the three variants - because the aircraft body contains a liftfan.
"SDB II will fit in the F-35B," Rear Adm Mahr said. "We have to move one hydraulic line and one wire bundle about a half-inch each to make it fit".

He noted that SDB II was still in development and would not even be ready for integration until Block IV of the F-35 programme was complete.

Analysis

As the military becomes fully networked, cyberspace operations at the tactical level become more critical and will continue to evolve, writes Dennis Murphy.
Individual soldiers and marines are networked as are aircraft, ships, and submarine formations. So are their enemies.
While the likely purpose of the pod is to attack enemy networks, it is probably a traditional electronic warfare system or possibly a related system that will produce a waveform for attack.
Research has been ongoing to develop cyber-attack systems using waveforms with the US Army publicly acknowledging such efforts. Initial analysis indicated that such attacks were constrained by effective stand-off distance.
Money continues to flow into this research. As an example, the recently-released US five-year defence plan budgets USD22.8 million in Fiscal Year 2016 under the Navy's Electronic Warfare Readiness Support Program to continue to "develop specific waveforms to attack adversary systems" and to "prototype and test emergent waveforms".

The F-35 already has an inherent Cyber capability thanks to its Apg-81, the much classified EW suite and the embedded antenna farm it houses in its fuselage and wings. The capability is further enhanced through a 2 ship or 4 ship profile that builds SA and allows for the sort of spoofing and 'signal return' tactics not possible with a lone aircraft. General Mike Hostage mentioned Cyber and the F-35 in an interview with Colin Clark last year and it seems that that aspect of the capability is being finally enhanced through addition of more equipment. From the report it seems that they'll design a solution based on the Terma developed gun pod.

Much of the EW or Cyber debate has revolved around the EA-18G. The F-35 is no substitute for it because of the nature of the mission the Prowler or Growler performs. Having said that the unique capability of the F-35 would allow it to do things the Growler cannot and therefore the capability they will most likely develop is going to be something complementary to the capability that currently exists with the VAQ's. The DDD mission tactics would get much stronger if there were an asset available that could penetrate into areas where the Growler would be denied and perform the sort of trickery possible with its mission computing and stand-in features. The F-35C has been designed from the start to be the only supersonic platform (the other being the P-8) that can send passive RF data on threat emitters to the EA-18G's stationed behind enemy lines and allow them to direct there energy on jamming the emitter (radar) or the receiver (comms). Even the SH cannot do this mission without costly upgrades to hardware and software.





This is a strong candidate. A pod designed for the F-35, certified on the F-35 and tested fully to comply with RCS reduction. If I am to guess this is a Northrop or BaE (or both) designed pod. It was hinted a couple of years ago by a Northrop Grumman official that they could offer a unique solution to cyber and enhanced EW capabilities of the F-35 by incorporating Gallium Nitride based solutions. The story got a brief mention but was not followed up and program officials at the time decided not to comment. Northrop grumman is also the industry leader in testing advanced electronic warfare pods with multiple waveforms. In fact, Raytheon that is developing the Next Generation Jammer is relying on that company to test out its pods every step of the development process.

[brar_w]

This program may or may not live up to everyone's expectations but it could get the pentagon to question the way it reports costing data. For years they have released to the public data on cost that is all inclusive. They throw in every possible thing ranging from military construction, fuel cost, expected rise in price of fuel, projected flight hours decades into the future, projected labor cost decades into the future, inflation, projected salaries decades into the future etc. The number thus derived has always been large and it wouldn't be unreasonable to claim somewhat ' subjective ' as much of this is ' educated guesswork' at best. However given the size of this program, the impact of the success of this program on the financial bottom line of military aircraft makers around the world (US and Europe mostly) the number has been projected in the ' popular media' as if it is the cost of the F-35. Many punchlines, headlines and click-bait titles have included it as the ' trillion dollar fighter' and have done the bare minimum to actually educate the viewership on the fact that the ' trillion dollar title' includes everything that one could think off over a 55 year period.

Official Numbers: Costs Down on F-35

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program will cost $7.5 billion—or half a percent—less than expected in “then-year” dollars, mostly due to lower labor and inflation costs, the Pentagon announced Thursday.

In its annual Selected Acquisition Reports, the Pentagon said the F-35 will cost $1.4076 trillion by the time the program is done in 53 years, counting anticipated future inflation and all costs, including military construction, training, flying hours, sustainment, and manpower.

The change in cost is as measured from Fiscal 2013 to 2014. In base year Fiscal 2012 dollars, the reduction was .03 percent. In a breakout of the Pentagon’s then-year numbers, the JSF program office said research and development costs were unchanged, at $54.9 billion. Procurement decreased by $7.7 billion, due to lower labor and subcontractor costs, meaning the aircraft themselves are getting cheaper to buy. That was offset by a jump of $4.4 billion in military construction, however, driven by a “service revised estimate on remaining work.” Because FY ’14 isn’t a “milestone” year for the program, an adjusted operating and sustainment cost isn’t reported in the SARs. The JSF office said, however, that it shows a reduction of $57.8 billion in O&S over the program’s lifetime. “The current F-35A price is $108 million [with engine] and is $4 million lower than Lot 7 prices,” in program unit costs, which don’t count R&D, the program office said.

A 57 Billion development cost for 3 versions including one very complex STOVL, stealth and supersonic requirement. On top of that 333 billion for pure procurement of full on systems (Not just fly-away cost) for 2400+ aircrafts including hundreds of the more expensive STOVL and CV fighters.

How does this compare? Lets take the Typhoon as an example as it is the largest 4.5 generation project with somewhat similar goals (multi-nation)..

UK Cost - 30 Billion US Dollars to develop (UK's share of development) and procure 160 aircraft.

German cost - 23 Billion Dollars in combined Development and Procurement costs for a grand total of 143 aircraft.

Spanish Cost - 10 Billion dollars for development (spanish share) and procurement of around 70 aircraft

I'm not factoring Italy's contribution but the number comes to around 63 Billion dollars for 373 aircraft. Of course the Typhoon would still continue to be developed into something that can compete with its peers so adding the cost of say an AESA radar, and improved systems wouldn't be wrong.

Note - Partner contribution of the JSF is not reflected in the cost, but that share of development is fairly insignificant. Some of the development dollars being contributed by the partner nations is for their specific components but you can add around 5 billion to the overall R&D cost. No procurement cost needs to be added as that is associated with a numerical increase over and above the 2400 figure.

Current SAR Cost - 108 Million for the CTOL Variant as of LRIP-8. This figure includes the fighter, all systems, sub-systems, mission systems, and the engine. Basically its as close you are going to get to a ' fly-away' cost. Its the Unit-recurring fly-away cost on the SAR.


Update - From an article published March 20th, 2015

By the end of last week, the USMC has 12 test points remaining and one additional weapons accuracy test to complete before finishing testing for IOC.

The Marines seem on track for July. I don't think they'll push IOC into August.

[brar_w]

This is for those who were going crazy over the apparently 1/3 reduction in USN F-35's. 1/3 in this case translated to 13 jets in the 5 year period. Since then, the unfunded list has leaked and 8 of those 13 may come back as happened last year -

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/ ... 9P20150320

More recent AWST issues also have reports on new anti-stealth radars being developed by Russian and China and the US's growing interest in IRST sensors common on Russian aircraft. UCAVs will be pressed into service increasingly as a consequence.

Here is the first fighter aircraft with an IRST -



This sensor was operational about 5 decades back

There has also been this -



and this



and this



This is in no way an exhaustive list of US aircraft with IRST sensors but i think you get the point.

There were two giants in the IRST domain that competed in the 50's for the first IRST production contract in the world. They were General Electric and Texas Instrument. As future aircraft concepts were developed both companies secured work. The F-4 system was developed by Texas Instrument while the AN/AAS-42 was a joint project between the USAF and USN that was secured by General Electric by using its 8-12µm solution. The -42 was meant for two aircraft - F-14 and F-15. The F-15 was cleared as a concept but the sensor was never retrofitted owing to a cost cutting measure. The navy went on with the sensor and the F-14 and it served them well. The production of the sensor or its development was never halted as General Electric sold its interest in the capability (spun of a division) to Lockheed Martin following the dropping of IRST sensor from the Advanced Tactical Fighter. GE's solution for the ATF on board the F-22 was one of the most challenging and complex integration efforts. The concept called for two fairly large sensors in each wing for fast scanning, and tracking multiple targets. Once Lockheed took over GE's interests they dropped that idea in favor of a more traditional installation in the nose. Here is it in graphics. The sensor was developed and they even tested it both in the lab and on the flying test bed.





Once the ATF dropped the IRST requirement due to cost and complexity, Lockheed still kept all the wiring and space provisions for such a system in place even in the final EMD design (where it still exists today). Meanwhile Lockheed continued R&D and kept on supplying sensors to the USAF and USN through the aggressors, export customers (Singapore etc) and for future projects. The current IRST-21 sensor system is basically a NG version of the AN/AAS-42 developed for the F-14D. It itself has undergone a couple of major upgrades and is due for another. The USN has selected it for the Super Hornet while the USAF has it on its aggressor squadrons.





The ATF had 2 competing systems fully funded in the R&D phase. The effort/program was known as EOSS (Electro Optical Sensor System). The goal of the EOSS effort was to develop novel IRST systems that would leapfrog current available systems (Such as the AN/AAS-42) and provide effective targeting with high reliability against WVR and BVR threats. Despite of the vast advancements made in computing, hardware and software the program office saw great advances in WVR but plenty of headaches and false alarms in BVR tracking even against non-stealth legacy like targets. The complexity of developing a system for IRST-BVR was dropped even from such an expensive and cutting edge project.

This was against legacy aircraft. Now compare how modern systems which themselves have their origins in the 80's and 90's would perform at BVR ranges against stealthy fighters that have IR suppression as a requirement (more on this later if required).

Then there is the big program in the EOTS - that is expected to produce over 3000 sensors. Perhapse the EOTS when combined with EODAS and the vastly superior computing and processing power of the F-35 solves to some extent the Mid to BVR targeting (IR) using these sensors. Perhaps the 4x the code and better systems and computers solves some of those problems encountered on the F-22A but again it is highly unlikely that IR sensor technology is maturing in a vacuum that has caught the attention of an Aviation Week editor but has not caught the attention of the USAF, USN or USMC..organizaitons that have invested in it for over 5 decades and continue to invest in it even now. Perhaps its the educated user/readership that should look at a reporter and realize that he/she is a reporter and not an analyst the latter involves years of technical education, and/or experience and peer review of literature.

Long story short the USAF, USN has a very good understanding of how IRST's work. They have had a very long history of using this system, developing them and understanding how they perform against stealth.

How do they do this?

Many ways are used..The brute way is to develop a sensor like this -



and fly it at tactical ranges (BVR and WVR) against stealth aircraft in order to measure how that stealth aircraft performs against the required IR signature. Something like this -

[brar_w]

Australia’s First F-35A Pilot Takes Flight

Australia first F-35A pilot, Squadron Leader Andrew Jackson, yesterday [AEST] took his first flight in an F-35A aircraft at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, United States.

The flight was on the morning of Wednesday 17 March (US CST) in a United States Air Force F-35A aircraft, as the Australian F-35A aircraft are currently located at Luke Air Force Base, in anticipation of the opening of the international pilot training centre in mid 2015. SQNLDR Jackson will continue his intensive training program over the coming months.

The F-35A (commonly known as the Joint Strike Fighter) will meet Australia’s future air combat and strike needs, providing a networked force-multiplier effect in terms of situational awareness and combat effectiveness.

The F-35A’s combination of stealth, advanced sensors, networking and data fusion capabilities, when integrated with other defence systems, will enable the RAAF to maintain an air combat edge.

The first F-35A aircraft will arrive in Australia at the end of 2018 with the first operational squadron to be established by 2020. The F-35A will replace the aging F/A-18A/B Hornets at RAAF Bases Williamtown (NSW) and Tindal (NT).

F-35 jump jet gears up for crucial at-sea tests

[Philip]

http://www.janes.com/article/50036/f-35 ... capability
F-35 programme begins developing cyber-attack capability

Marina Malenic, Washington, DC - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
18 March 2015

An F-35A, at Edwards AFB, California, is pictured with the F-35 Systems Development and Demonstration Weapons Suite the aircraft is designed to carry. The F-35 can carry more than 1,600 kg of ordnance in low observable mode and over 8,200 kg uncontested. The programme is now preparing to add non-kinetic weapons such as an offensive cyber pod. Source: Edwards AFB

Key Points
•The F-35 programme is developing a pod-mounted cyber-attack system
•The offensive system is in the "prototyping phase", according to the deputy programme manager

The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter programme is developing a pod-mounted cyber-attack system as it continues kinetic weapons integration, the deputy programme executive officer said on 17 March.

"Industry is developing a pod that would not degrade the signature of the airplane," said Rear Admiral Randy Mahr at the Precision Strike Association conference in Springfield, Virginia. He told IHS Jane's that the offensive system was in the "prototyping phase" and was not being designed by F-35 prime contractor Lockheed Martin, but declined to name the developer.

Meanwhile, Rear Adm Mahr said, the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) B-model of the aircraft would be able to accommodate the Raytheon GBU-53/B Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II).

Some media reports have suggested that the weapon cannot be carried in the weapons bay of the F-35B - the smallest of the three variants - because the aircraft body contains a liftfan.

"SDB II will fit in the F-35B," Rear Adm Mahr said. "We have to move one hydraulic line and one wire bundle about a half-inch each to make it fit".

He noted that SDB II was still in development and would not even be ready for integration until Block IV of the F-35 programme was complete.

[brar_w]

^^the full article along with the Janes analysis is posted a couple of posts above.

[Philip]

Many tx.

[brar_w]

Many tx.

No problem!

The EW and Cyber role of the F-35 has been less spoken about but we did get a glimpse from General Mike Hostage's interview and the subsequent reporting of its nascent cyber capability by Colin Clark. While it is not a proper VAQ asset the F-35 has an inherent capability to use EW as a component of its survivability much like the F-22A before it (Only more advanced given the developments in electronics and the fact that the same OEM's (Northrop Grumman and Bae) have had experience of developing components for the F-22A). The VAQ boys have boatloads of experience at tactics and overcoming EM threats, controlling and maneuvering in the EM domain and throwing wrench after wrench in the adversaries denial tactics. Expect them to be all over this new capability especially because with the F-35C, they'll get an asset that can get very close to emitter threats and provide cues for the Growlers (non LPI DL's at the moment but the USN is working on putting MADL terminals on legacy through pods and TTNT spots on the F-35's) as well confuse and jam threats.

The growth in this capability has been something that has been mentioned off and on over the last 6-8 years. It seems that an enhancement is in the works as Janes is reporting but there have been plans drawn in to incorporate all or majority of the Next generation Jammers capability into the F-35 family by the early 2030's.



The problem with that deal is/was that the cost was high as you had to use the F-35 open architecture and do an SI program for the NGJ. The cost was also high because you wold have required development and developmental and operational testing of stealth jamming pods for the various bands. The only way such an aircraft is possible is if the USN or the uSAF backs it. The Marines cannot afford such a development project on their own. The USN is not going to spend the money because this is a requirement they have placed on the FA-XX. Moving it over to the F-35C/B is only going to make the case for the FA-XX weaker. The USAF is not interested in using a tactical platform with a lousy TOS (Such as the Growler) for stand-off or even stand-in jamming. They are going to give it a cyber capability and an additional EW capability over certain frequencies for some very specific missions and leave the other EW stuff to the P-AEA UAV that Aviation Week claims is in development.

While the Growler is great its strength lies in the Sensors particularly the high jammers that are newer (The 99's are 3-4 decades old if not older) and the RF Receivers and the future Next Generation jammer. The Growler absolutely sucks as a standby platform because it is limited by the carrier deck and supersonic requirements. It for example can only manage 90 minutes of flying before needing tanker support. Thats the impact of all the external carriage. The USAF is unlikely to favor such a tanker_hog for a stand-off mission given they aren't concerned about landing on a carrier deck. The new cyber pod in my opinion would be a tactical stand-in spoofing/jamming addition covering 360 degrees and would be multi-band. The fact that they are going for an external setup instead of utilizing the internal space (2 avionics slots for EW payload) seems to suggest that the size and scope of the kit is large and the capability it would provide most likely reflects that. Given that the support role for such an F-35 setup would most likely be say 1 in every 4-5 attack packages (F-35's or F-22's and F-35's) one can see that the Jamming power requirements aren't going to be very high given the overall strike package RCS even with VHF or UHF jamming which requires higher power. It is therefore fairly obvious that the higher power and size will be used to conduct some of the more challenging cyber element of the mission as opposed to simple jamming of certain emitters of interest.

The receiver and passive sensors are already baked into the F-35A/B/C so you do not need to do anything else unlike the Rhino.

The PAEA mission, and now the additional cyber capability on the F-35 is most likely one reason why the USAF has not adopted an alarmist attitude unlike one particular AvWeek editor, when it comes to all the whizzbang VHF radars which incidentally already exist with Iran and have been on the LO/CLO agenda for close to 2 decades.

Terma of Denmark was contracted in 2004 to develop the Marine and USN gun pod and ended up making a multi-mission-pod that was RCS compliant and suitable for various missions from housing the gun to EW and ISR payloads. According to their own release from a couple of years ago -

The F-35 Pod is a full monocoque composite structure in carbon fiber. It passed engineering test and qualification and has flown on the F-35 in February 2012 and is currently in the LRIP production phase.

The F-35 Pod Enclosure will provide real estate on the F-35, which can be used to expand the F-35 Special Mission functionality, by allowing the F-35 to fly Next Generation EW and ISR systems, such as Jammers and EO sensors.

From what we have been told through the media there are major advances being developed in EW capability, and propulsion. The AETP offshoot promises 35% gains in performance and would basically move the F-35A on internal fuel to a category the F-16 family cannot touch even with the maximum fuel possible (CFT's + all wet EFT stations). The increased thrust will also provide performance enhancements. We were given glimpses of the next generation family of weapons through the Triple Target Terminator and SACM (CUDA) programs. By the end of the decade a much clearer picture should emerge on the advanced version of the F-35 that is going to be pursued post SDD build post 2018.

[brar_w]

New report shows slow, steady unit cost drop for F-35

The overall cost of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II programme will come in at about $7.5 billion less than previously expected, according to the 2015 selected acquisition report (SAR).
Released on 18 March, the report indicates that research, development, test and evaluation cost remains unchanged at $54.9 billion, but that procurement costs declined by $7.7 billion, to $331 billion. The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) says the reduction was primarily due to decreased labour costs.

While the SAR reports that the operating and support (O&S) costs of the F-35 over its service life remain nearly $1 trillion – the cost assessment programme evaluation that authors the SAR does not adjust O&S figures until a major milestone is reached – the JPO claims its revised cost estimate for this metric showed a $57.8 billion reduction from 2014, bringing the overall figure to $859 billion.

Lockheed's F-35 programme general manager, Lorraine Martin, says the company has reduced O&S costs for the F-35 by $60 billion in the past year alone.

“This is a result of a laser focus by the entire government and contractor team on reducing costs across the board, whether it’s improving quality in manufacturing, increasing supply chain delivery speed, and dramatically reducing concurrency items," Martin says. "We have numerous initiatives in place, including the Blueprint for Affordability, that will drive programme costs even lower, allowing us to provide our warfighters a fifth-generation F-35 jet at a fourth-generation price by the end of the decade.”

Lockheed is aiming for price tag of around $80 million per jet, with a Pratt & Whitney F135 engine, by 2019, when the F-35 will enter full-rate production. Another recent report by the US Department of Defense inspector general (IG) brings into question whether Lockheed's production line will be able to meet a one-jet-per-day peak production rate.

The SAR puts the unit recurring flyaway (URF) cost of an air force F-35A at $108 million in the eighth lot of low-rate initial production (LRIP , which was finalised in late 2014 – $4 million less per aircraft than the US government paid in LRIP 7.

"The actual contract negotiated cost of aircraft and engine with fee continues to come down, and remains well below the SAR lot yearly URF estimates," the JPO says.

The IG recently said that the JPO was not ensuring that Lockheed was meeting the 90% reduction in the rate of assembly defects per aircraft "to meet the full-rate production goal of completing one aircraft per day", and was also not tracking its progress using the correct data for LRIP deliveries.

Lockheed was tracking the number of non-conforming material records rather than the number of assembly defects, the IG says. The company showed just a 23% reduction in non-conforming material records, compared to the 60% defect rate reduction that should have occurred in LRIP 5.

Lockheed says the report indicates a 98% drop in findings compared with 2013. It adds that 25% of the resolutions to the new findings have already been validated by the US Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), which tracks adherence to government acquisition deals.

DCMA approval is required for every failure resolution before a finding is considered closed. Lockheed says all corrective action plans should be in place by mid-2016.

"Producing quality products is a top priority for the F-35 Lightning II programme. Lockheed Martin, our partners, and our supply base strive every day to deliver the best possible aircraft to our customers. When discoveries occur, we take decisive and thorough action to correct the situation," the company says.

Pic courtesy Jamie Hunter, Twitter

[brar_w]

Shiv,this is the point that many analysts make,that remove BVR from the equation,for whatever reason,the enemy gets into your "armpit space" and it then becomes a dogfight.Why many air forces insist on guns,SRAAMs and dogfighting abilities fundamental requirements and why the JSF is going to find the going tough when it loses loses virtues of stealth.

Why so? It has all the modern virtues of a close in fighter..WVR HOBS weapons, HMD, IRST and the EODAS is icing providing opportunities and cues that other sensors do not. The slow and turn capability and 'pointability' of the F-35A nose closely mimics that of the Super Hornet that is well known to be better than the F-16C in that arena (50 degrees AOA For the F-35 vs 26 for the F-16) and a pretty tough nut to crack when it comes to those sort of maneuvers. The F-35 will most likely have better acceleration in the subsonic arena compared to a modestly fueled F-16C at its operational altitude with the Viper most likely enjoying better performance at lower altitudes (The F-16 scores slightly better in the transonic regime but only under very light and unrealistic scenarios) as this is what was alluded to by Spanky (link in the international forum) and Kloos..

The problem that many have is when they begin comparing combat loads to non-combat loads.

See this picture -



The aircraft in the back (F-35) has 16% more fuel (physical) than both the aircrafts in the front combined (with the centerline tanks) and that number rises to 30% if one is to factor in the "Usable fuel" given 50% of EFT fuel is used to overcome the drag of the EFT. Also keep in mind that despite of having 30% less usable fuel the combined F-16's can't do much other than enter into a gun fight . Here is the impact on performance with EFT's and pods from the flight manual -



and then



While the F-16 is unlikely to be dogfighting in such a profile, this is the load out it flies with most of the time. Even in a complex aerial campaign the F-16 would fly in such a load and then ditch and fight as desired. Therefore all the way till the time to enter the engagement the F-16 would carry the burden. The F-35 on the other hand enjoys for all practical purposes the same drag index with 4 BVR Missiles (Block 3B) and perhaps 6 BVR or 4+2 BVR/WVR in future blocks in any flight profile. Its a basic trade-off that you design a medium-large sized fighter as opposed to "upsizing an F-16". For a dogfight expect the F-35 to carry a few missiles, a gun and a very modest amount of fuel as most other aircraft would do.

The F-35 is designed around mission sets that are an overlap between a very heavily loaded F-16 Block 50/52 and F-15E. Thats the difference. However, you do not need that volume of fuel if you are doing some of the missions in the air-to air domain. Lets say a 300 nm air defense mission. The F-35 will likely fly with 10K pounds of fuel instead of 18500 pounds. You can do the thrust to weight ratio and see the difference. The performance comparisons between an F-16 (Flight Manual) and an F-35 are done using 50% fuel (still 9000+ pounds) for the F-35 along with 2 bombs and 2 missiles vs a 50% fuel for the F-16C which is abysmal and not representative of any state the F-16's take off with. You also have to factor in optimum flight profiles. As BVR fight emerges the merge due to non-enagegemnt (shiv's scenario) a stealth fighter enjoys a detection_advantage and therefore need not maneuver as heavily as a non-stealthy. Fighter pilots refer to this as "freedom to maneuver" i.e. you can do whatever you want without a counter maneuver because the bad guy cannot see you from far. The point where you actually have to maneuver hard to counter his counter is much closer because you (the stealth fighter) enjoy an enormous radar detection advantage (radar range equation).

(Regardless of that the performance is still comparable in WVR when you factor in a knife fight that is unlikely to last beyond a few minutes).

What you also fail to account for is that aircraft like the F-22, F-35, PAKFA and the Chinese stealth fighters have the Very Low RCS and high Situational awareness to dictate the terms (if the Russians and Chinese match or exceed fusion of the F-22 or F-35). The F-35 has the vast sensor fusion, a very comprehensive active and passive sensor suite and CNI capability to passively track threats over a wide area. This provides stealth aircraft the opportunity to enter WVR conditions at a much higher level of tactical advantage then a fighter that can be seen from 100 miles out by these powerful sensors. This is a big tactical advantage. One could also talk about 'sniper' like cooperative engagements with LPI waveforms providing targeting cues to other F-35's waiting farther out but this should suffice.

On the part of a "tactical advantage" obtained form higher SA on the enemy (because you have comprehensive sensor suite and you have stealth) you can see pictures of older aircraft littered around the world wide web spotting kill markings of much more advanced aircraft. BFM and DACT are conducted at various scenarios that are not always symmetrical. At times the older RED force aircraft are given a huge tactical advantage or given more SA while the attacking Blue force is kept in the dark. Thats just how you train. Google " German F-4 Rafale Eater markings" or search for SuperHornet, Typhoon and Rafale spotting F-22 gun kills. You can also see an F-22 in the HUD of a T-38 on youtube. All this goes to show that the advantage of having better training, and being in a tactically advantageous position (granted that not all of these kills can be attributed to them) even when confronted against an aircraft that is much superior in performance. Sensors and a comprehensive weapons suite also helps big time.

For a more in-depth analysis of the F-16C vs F-35A acceleration (the much maligned area that few actually understand) see this

The F-35 and the Infamous Transonic Acceleration ‘Spec’ Change:


Part 1 - http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/201 ... sonic.html

Part 2 - http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/201 ... ic_22.html

Part 3 - http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/201 ... sonic.html

Also keep in mind that the KPP fell short by 8 seconds. As the author points out, if you were to reach Mach 1.2 at X seconds, what would be your speed at X-8 seconds? and how would that 8 seconds contribute tactically. Would it be significant? Interesting question that you can work some math around.

Do keep in mind that most WVR combat takes place in the subsonic regime where the F-35A performs to spec. Also keep in mind that KPP are just that. They are broader areas which are measured and used to develop complex assessment equations (algorithms) to compare fighter performance (or any other aircraft's performance) to desirable metrics. They are looked at in toto..Each aspect contributes but overall effectiveness is looked at as a total. Aircrafts before the F-35 and aircrafts after it will continue to miss some KPP's, and achieve better than "desired" performance in others and at the end int he evaluation phase the entire set is tallied up. You then enter the world of actually having a team of analysts sitting around the ACC and other such organization (Nellis, Eglin etc) that do the data analytics on how all this actually shapes up 5 years, 10 years and 20 years from now. You look at "regains" and how they stack up in terms of cost, time-line and systems. The link provided above are from a person who did this sort of work full time for aircrafts like the Long Range Bomber, A-10 etc. Your "regains" determine how well you perform in areas where there is X amount of cost associated to recover the lost spec. You then take the call whether to go back and bear that cost "now" or leave it out for the regain. They can come from propulsion improvements or other weight cutting measures that are bound to crop up in future iterations of the aircraft (The biggest thing in that area is to go ahead and do the 50,000 test point validation of CarbonNano Tubes for critical components - something that Lockheed is doing at the moment almost at war footing).

The bottom line is that NONE will take the F-35 lightly in the WVR arena. IN fact it would be a serious threat to most aircraft due to its low RCS, sensor fusion, the sheer amount of data through organic and cooperative engagements and its physical performance. Wait a couple of years until the F-35 shows up at Red Flag or similar exercises and we will begin to get pilot_accounts of how it performs with the current crop of fighters all equipped with JHMCS/JHMCSII and HOBS missiles. Any opponent that thinks they can achieve 'significantly' better than parity in WVR with the same level of training, weapons and sensors is going to be in for a very rude awakening when $hit actually hits the fan. WVR combat is increasingly becoming a barter system for combat losses. HOBS, HMD have ensured that. Things may change with Multi-Mode weapons in the future.

Here the IAF enjoys a huge tactical advantage over the PAF and the Chinese. The IAF now trains on multiple systems and trains regularly with different kinds of aircraft all around the world. The skills and knowledge acquired would surely be incorporated into the training process. The Chinese do not have that flexibility and the PAF is also going to lag behind the IAF in that area. Training and having better WVR tactics can give you some advantage and in my opinion that is significantly more than any one spec in fighter performance. We often compare aircrafts by assuming " SIMILAR LEVEL OF TRAINING AND TACTICS" however that is rarely the case in actual combat. The winner usually finds a way to develop or refine the tactics to gain an advantage. Experience and small but important things like Organizational culture contribute big time here.

[brar_w]

A few updates.

- It was reported that 12 test-points remained for the Block 2(B) software build testing. Lt. General Bogdan reported that all but one would be accomplished by May (ship trials) and be ready for clearance. The area that is seeing delay is sensor-fusion sharing or what commonly is referred to as "Cooperative engagement". In the CE scenario a 4 ship is tasked with collaborating in geolocating various threats. Because the 4 ship is spread out the data sometimes collected is different and that needs to be reconciled by the fusion engine into one comprehensive picture. What appears to be happening is that there is some problem with that function especially when it comes to the number of threats being reconciled. When its done in 2 groups of 2 ships the system is much more accurate. The Lt. General does not expect this to be solved by the July IOC of the USMC. The USMC is however satisfied with the "workaround" and they will happily IOC by July. In "BACK UP" mode the F-35 performs its data sharing and cooperative engagement just like all 4th and 4.5 gen aircraft do i.e. use Link-16.

LT. General Bogdan expects this to be settled by October of this year, so unless WW3 breaks out in the 2-3 months post IOC it really won't be a very big issue. IOC for the Marines is basically an unshackling from the JPO controlled program and that allows them to train and control the enterprise as per their own free will.

Lockheed had little trouble in sharing 4-ship information using the IFDL waveform on the F-22A (although they had delays in software development which we can discuss as to why they occurred) so one is left wondering what exactly are they trying to achieve with the F-35 that is making it this complex. Clearly this isn't a simple "strapping on the F-22's work" on the F-35. MADL and the Cooperative engagement plans for the F-35 are quite a bit more comprehensive, technically challenging and labor intensive to develop

Another bit here on the price/cost -

Bogdan: F-35 Costs Down, Despite Worries

WASHINGTON — The F-35 joint strike fighter has been branded a trillion-dollar black hole of a program, a boondoggle for contractors, and "The Plane That Ate the Pentagon."

Hogwash, says the man in charge of the program, despite a series of design challenges, including cracks on the Marine's F-35B model and software issues, that remain for the stealthy fighter.

Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan, the head of the F-35 joint program office, came out forcefully Tuesday in a press event with reporters in defense of his program, citing constant drops in the cost of the jet and schedule certainty since a major rebaselining of the jet.

"It is a fact this program is over budget from 2001's baseline. It's just true," Bogdan said. "We will never underrun that number. We will never save that money. It's gone. What matters is since that time, what's happened to the cost on the program? It's gone down, not gone up.

"Judge the program today, not where it's been, but where it is and where it's going."

Bogdan pointed out that this year's selected acquisition report (SAR) found no change in RDT&E funding, while noting it drove procurement costs down by $3 billion, something he attributed to both not pushing planes out to the right and driving down the per unit cost.

According to figures provided by Bogdan, the average cost-per-unit in low-rate initial production lots six, seven and eight, the last three lots on contract, have fallen like this:

F-35A conventional takeoff and landing model: $117 million, $112 million, $108 million.
F-35B "jump-jet" model: $145 million, $137 million, $134 million.
F-35C carrier variant: $134 million, $130 million, $129 million.
Those figures Include engines, profit for contractors and adjusts for inflation.

The one area the SAR did not show good news for the program was operations and sustainment (O&S), something Bogdan blamed on them not adjusting for inflation.

"Inflation could potentially mask any true cost reduction and that's exactly what happened this year," Bogdan said. "We had a bigger cost reduction, a true cost reduction, than what was shown in the SAR because of inflation rates, because they readjusted them. The estimate has gone down, from last year to this year, $540b to $535b in base-year dollars."

While the program is trending in the right direction, Bogdan did admit to having some concerns over the jet.

The biggest concern, he said, is keeping software development on track. With around 8 million lines of code on the plane itself, software has always been a challenge for Bogdan's team. In particular, getting the sensor fusion algorithms on the plane to work correctly remains a focus.

Bogdan's second concern revolves around keeping the jet on projected growth curves for reliability and maintainability. While the F-35A and F-35C models are "very close" to those curves, the F-35B model is lagging behind.

The F-35B is also the focus of Bogdan's other major concern, one which is less nebulous than software or cost.

During repeated testing of the F-35B, program officials have discovered cracks in the jump-jet model after about 4,000 hours of flight time. (Each F-35 is projected to operate for 8,000 hours over its career.) In particular, bulkhead 496 — a major load-bearing part of the fuselage — has shown a propensity for cracking, Bogdan said.

The cause? The structural changes that were made in 2005 when officials decided the F-35B model was too heavy to be operational and began to pull 3,000 pounds out of the design. That was achieved, in part, by switching material from titanium to aluminum and thinning out sections of the structure.

"Some of that, unfortunately, is coming back to bite us now," Bogdan said.

Because the damage is showing up at about half the life of the jet, it is not something that should impact the Marines for years, and will not impact the initial operating capability coming up this year. But, Bogdan conceded, it is a problem that needs to be addressed.

Bogdan noted that the F-35A/C models have shown no major findings that would require significant structural changes, even after 10,000 hours of testing. The JPO plans to test up to three lifetimes, or 24,000 hours, on each jet.


The program head also listed a series of smaller concerns, including the redesign of tires on the B model and making sure the fixes to last year's engine mishap are implemented fully. But on the whole, he said, the program is moving beyond the mistakes of the past.

With 109 jets on the ramp, Bogdan said, "we have flown 28,500 hours of flying time. We've done it fairly safely, and we've done it in a way that is providing at least some level of capability, training and learning to the warfighter."

The Bulkhead issue is also something known and was discovered years earlier in fatigue testing, and as fatigue testing has continued it may become more of a concern as the Lt. General claims. The solution of this should and will involve the Marines and will be a Depot fix as has been the case for 4th generation jets that have suffered from similar issues. The Bulkhead issue is related to the first 50 F-35B's that would have been produced by Lot 1 to Lot 8. The plan is to introduce the re-design by Lot9 and so you have to send the first 50 jets to the depot before they reach 4000 hours to fix that issue. They had extensive depot mods on the F-22 as well although not this extensive.

The biggest deal for Me personally having followed this thing since its inception is ALIS. The software delays are now measured in months and basically require no extra cost but will no doubt garner a lot of media attention and reporting . Keep in mind that the R&D budget is capped and there are "not to exceed" limits built in post baseline. Therefore, the JPO cannot " THROW MONEY AT" the problem and solve it the brute way. If they decide to do so then they would have to make cuts elsewhere because there isn't any new R&D money over and above what is budgeted that will come the JSF way. The Marines plan a July 1 IOC, the CE thing is expected to be cleared by October and the entire 2B with the 3I mission computers are expected to be 100% online by July of 2016. The main thing is 3F as General Welsh has said. 2b can be 90% or 100% ready at IOC - it really makes little difference. The main difference would come if there is no more than a 6 month delay in fielding a 100% capability in 3F. Thats when the Marines and the USAF will be 100% ready from an enterprise pov to deploy globally. At IOC they will just get a chance to begin that process. It takes time !

ALIS is a revolutionary concept and is in my opinion the BEST way to sustain, maintain and enhance the enterprise consisting of thousands of fighters globally deployed - in the 21st century. You cannot do it the way the legacy systems do it. The world has moved on into the digital age and IT and electronics have advanced allowing them to do these.

I first encountered the JSF plan on the Prognostic and Health management systems at a conference I attended and the presentation was given by a BAE engineer. Being a person that has a lot to do with data analytics and incorporating that in non-traditional industries I was nearly taken aback by the scope of what they were planning to do. It is amazingly complex, cutting edge and if they pull it off, there is really no way the " OLD way" of doing things is coming back for any program - big or small. Its "FIRST IN CLASS" concept/system and even though many claim that the corner has been turned I still think they'll be lucky to get ALIS to work as advertised before 2017-2019 timeframe. Thats still pretty good in my opinion given that still leaves nearly 4+ decades of operations, not to mention the fact that once you sort out the concept you can just pull it out and use it for the Bomber, future fighters and even ships.

ALIS is in my opinion the standard and give a couple of decades it would be something that every modern program be it in Europe, Asia or Russia would emulate. The concept is that good imho.

[brar_w]

DUTCH SIGN DEAL TO BUY EIGHT JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER JETS

The Netherlands has confirmed its decision to purchase eight F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters that will arrive in the country in 2019, the Ministry of Defense announced today. The deal was signed in Washington DC last night.

“It is good that after 12 years of political debate there is now clarity about the successor of the F-16″, said Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert of Defense. “This is the point of no return. The F-35 is the most modern fighter aircraft that can be used for various tasks. Several comparisons have shown that the device complies with the Dutch requirements. This unit is important for the entire armed forces. Men and women who are sent on mission, must have access to the best equipment. Air support is indispensable and the device’s good sensors will strongly improve the information position of troops on the ground.”

In 2013 the Netherlands decided to replace the F-16’s with F-35 Lightning II aircraft. The Netherlands intends to buy at least 37 of these devices. There has been a lot of controversy surrounding this deal, with questions asked about whether Defense’s plan with the JSF’s is feasible and Minister Hennis getting into trouble about price guarantees. Last month the D66 announced that they would be voting against the purchase as there are too many uncertainties surrounding the purchase. As a large majority already decided to vote for the purchase, the D66’s vote against had no affect.

Netherlands signs for initial operational F-35s

The Netherlands has officially signed for its first eight operational Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft, the country's Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced on 26 March.
In signing for the Royal Netherlands Air Force's (RNLAF's) initial aircraft, which are to be delivered by 2019, Dutch Defence Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert said that the country has now "passed the point of no return" in its commitment to the F-35 as a successor to the incumbent F-16.
The Netherlands has already invested USD800 million in the F-35's development phase, and has to date received two test aircraft, which are operated in the United States as part of a common international test and evaluation (T&E) fleet. Once T&E is complete in 2018, both of these aircraft will be utilised by the RNLAF for training and operations.
In all, the RNLAF plans to procure 37 conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) F-35A aircraft. These aircraft are due to be manufactured at the final assembly and check out (FACO) facility in Cameri in Italy, with deliveries set to run through to 2024.
Dutch MoD officials have previously stated that the total procurement contract is expected to remain within the EUR4.5 billion (USD4.9 billion) budget set for it.

COMMENT

Having the Netherlands commit to its plans with a contract signature will come as a welcome boost to the Joint Program Office (JPO) as it aims to implement its 'Blueprint for Affordability'.
Announced ahead of the Farnborough Airshow in 2014, this Blueprint for Affordability is geared at getting the F-35A model's unit cost down from the current USD100 million to USD80 million by 2019 (Lockheed Martin said it should be able to reach this target a year early).
This reduction can only be achieved through volume and economies of scale in the production process. The more aircraft Lockheed Martin produces each year, the better its supply base can address their production expectations to get economies of scale, leading ultimately to lower aircraft procurement costs.
In order to reach the economies of scale needed, the JPO has sought to incentivise those partners that already know how many aircraft they are going to buy and which already have the commitment from their government, and to lock them into a block buy that is similar to a multiyear buy in the United States.
Australia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom have all signed for their initial operational jets. With the Netherlands now following suit, the JPO must be hoping that other customers who have 'committed' to the programme will shortly begin putting their words into actions with contract signatures also.

[brar_w]

Lockheed HSSW at display






Moonshot -

[Philip]

More SH's for the USN?

Concerns about a naval ‘fighter gap’ and F-35 program failures could help extend Boeing’s fighter jet production line.
http://fortune.com/2015/03/28/us-navy-b ... hter-jets/

As the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program continues to accrue criticism over cost and schedule overruns and missed milestones, the U.S. Navy is looking to an old standby—the Boeing-built F/A-18 Super Hornet—to plug potential holes in its airborne fleet. The Navy’s unfunded “wish list,” headed to lawmakers’ desks this week, includes 12 Boeing-built F/A-18 fighter jets alongside eight Lockheed Martin F-35Cs. Each purchase would be worth roughly $1 billion for the companies—if Congress decides to fund them.

That’s great news for Boeing ( BA 0.95% ) , whose F/A-18 production line is set to cease production in 2017 if the company receives no new orders. But a decision on whether to spend the company’s own cash on long-lead production materials like titanium will have to be made this summer, before Congress finalizes its fiscal 2016 budget. A strong signal from the Navy and Congress now could play a big role in that decision.

Whether or not Congress will fund the Navy’s wish list remains entirely unclear. Such “wish lists” are often derided as unproductive opportunities for legislators to pick and choose programs and technologies that benefit their districts irrespective of Pentagon priorities. And with sequestration caps returning in 2016 (and the defense budget put forth by the White House already punching right through the Budget Control Act ceiling), funding for “wish list” items could be tight.

Then again, it may not be. Republicans in the Senate last week introduced a non-binding resolution to the budget adding an additional $38 billion to the overseas contingency operations (OCO) fund that the Senate Budget Committee had originally seeded with $58 billion. (OCO funds are those designated for ongoing military operations overseas and not subject to sequestration caps) That extra $38 billion in OCO funds dovetails conspicuously with the $561 billion base budget put forth by the Obama administration, which exceeded the defense budget’s $523 spending cap by—wait for it—$38 billion dollars.

Last night, House Republicans passed a similar budget, with $96 billion set aside in the Pentagon’s OCO fund. These budgets are not the final word on the fiscal 2016 budget, but they are the working blueprint. And though this so-called “sequester dodge” has drawn criticism even from some Republicans on Capitol Hill—Sen. John McCain called it a “gimmick”—they are a clear indicator of which way the wind is blowing. The defense hawks are beating the fiscal hawks in this round of negotiations, and the proposed “dodge”—along with a provision slipped into last week’s Senate budget that could allow for the altering of some sequestration—suggests the Pentagon could get more of what it wants.

Whether any additional cash would go specifically toward the Navy’s wish list remains uncertain. But the Navy’s vocal support for a batch of new F/A-18s coupled with the fact that the Pentagon may end up with some extra funds provides hope for the Super Hornet. And there’s good reason for the Pentagon to keep the F/A-18 production line going. Sustaining the F/A-18 would keep its cousin, the E/A-18 Growler, alive as well. The Growler, an electronic warfare variant of the Super Hornet built around the same airframe, does a very specific job that many think the F-35 isn’t necessarily well-suited to, primarily jamming enemy radars and communications to ensure safe passage for other attack aircraft.

Boeing needs to produce at least two aircraft per month to keep its St. Louis-based F/A-18 assembly line economically viable, so the additional dozen F/A-18s desired by the Navy would only sustain production for an additional six months. But it would keep it humming into mid-2018, when further U.S. orders or a foreign customer might extend production further still. Boeing is currently chasing a potential deal with Kuwait for a reported 28 aircraft. Other Gulf nations as well as Denmark and Belgium are weighing fighter jet orders at the end of the decade as well. An lifeline for the F/A-18 now could be the difference between Boeing remaining a maker of combat fighter jets or exiting the space entirely as orders for its existing products taper.

[brar_w]

Concerns about a naval ‘fighter gap’ and F-35 program failures could help extend Boeing’s fighter jet production line

Read a link posted by me a couple of posts above. The USN has asked for 8 F-35C's as a part of the unfunded priority, in addition to the Shornet. More Growlers may be asked for as well..The 25% reduction in 5 years orders is now (will be because the Congress will add these back) around 10 aircraft (or lower). Expect most of the reduction to be put back into FY16 and FY17 budgets. This is a game that the services have learnt to play i.e. reduce requirement upfront in the budget, and then add that reduction back into the priority unfunded list. [sarcasm]The F-35 fans in the media [/sarcasm] know this as well because its happened twice now, but they are going to keep on milking it until the congress funds the 'unfunded priorities' list and they find something else to report on. Its the budget season...This is normal!

The F-35C procurement post 2018 is pretty much fixed now. The USN knows exactly what they'll get from 2018 to 2030. They can always adjust the B to C ratio of the USMC as well. There has been no delay since the baseline in the capability nor the delivery. The F-35C is going to take as long to get into the carrier air wing as it was expected to take in 2010-11 at the baseline. That is pretty much a fixed time-frame.

No new news here, they need 2-3 squadrons of Shornets to avoid billions in depot investment in 2025-2030 time-period. A decade+ of high tempo utilization does that to a service! The USN has not been buying Super Hornets for a couple of years now. If they do not buy a few more squadrons of F-18E/F's they will be forced to either-

A) Have a high backlog of F-18E/F's waiting to be serviced, and overhauled in the mid 2020's because the sheet number of aircraft required to be serviced at the time.

B ) Invest in increasing the depot capacity in order to maintain airframe-availability by pushing the backlog mentioned above out earlier. or

C) Take a mission-availability hit by having a large chunk of the airframes not available for combat or training just as the USMC is doing at the moment with its F/A-18's and Harriers.

You never want large peaks in your depot capacity because that requires years of investment, training and hiring to get up and its not like you can fire those people after you are done for obvious reasons. A workaround is working with contractors but that is cost-prohibitive because they essentially have to do the same thing (hire and fire or use temporary workers). The F-35 changes all that because its a common sustainment enterprise so you can spread depot facilities and share best-practices. The Shornet, raptor..not so much.

Note -

The USN is going to buy 66 F-35's (B's for the USMC and C's for itself and USMC) in 2018 and 2019 (combined) and 40 F-35's per year (between it and the USMC) between 2020 and 2030. The USN acquisition will end in 2033 and they will buy 59 F-35's in the 2030's for a total of 680 F-35B's and C's

[brar_w]

AEROSPACETESTINGINTERNATIONAL.COM

In February this year, the Pentagon’s JSF Program Office announced that three- month-long ski jump trials had begun at US Naval Air Station Patuxent River in Maryland, kicking off the live flying element of the effort to bring the F-35 to the deck of HMS Queen Elizabeth in 2018. The trials are necessary because British and Italian aircraft carriers all have the famous ski jumps, which were originally installed in the 1970s and 1980s to improve the take-off performance of the old Harrier Jump Jets. By adding the 12° ski jumps, the Harriers could take off with more bombs and did not have to use as much thrust and fuel to get airborne.

British and Italian Harrier operations were transformed by the ski jumps and both countries want their F-35s to continue to benefit from using them. The Royal Air Force sees the ski jump as complementing its shipborne rolling vertical landing (SRVL) concept to enhance the performance of F-35s in a wide range of operating scenarios. To date, F-35 deck trials have taken place on US Navy flat-tops, which lack ski jumps. Until now, the US Navy and Marine Corps

[brar_w]

F-35 Tested Against F-16 In Basic Fighter Maneuvers

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has been flown in air-to-air combat maneuvers against F-16s for the first time and, based on the results of these and earlier flight-envelope evaluations, test pilots say the aircraft can be cleared for greater agility as a growth option.

Although the F-35 is designed primarily for attack rather than air combat, U.S. Air Force and Lockheed Martin test pilots say the availability of potential margin for additional maneuverability is a testament to the aircraft’s recently proven overall handling qualities and basic flying performance. “The door is open to provide a little more maneuverability,” says Lockheed Martin F-35 site lead test pilot David “Doc” Nelson.

The operational maneuvers were flown by Nelson in AF-2, the primary Flight Sciences loads and flutter evaluation aircraft, and one of nine F-35s used by the Edwards AFB-based 412th Test Wing for developmental testing (DT). The F-35 Integrated Test Force at Edwards has six F-35As, two F-35Bs and a single F-35C dedicated to DT work, as well as a further set of aircraft allotted to the Joint Operational Test Team. Work is underway as part of efforts to clear the final system development and demonstration (SDD) maneuvering envelopes on the way to initial operational capability (IOC). The U.S. Marine Corps F-35B IOC is targeted for later this year, the Air Force’s F-35A in 2016, and the U.S. Navy’s F-35C in 2019.
“When we did the first dogfight in January, they said, ‘you have no limits,’” says Nelson. “It was loads monitoring, so they could tell if we ever broke something. It was a confidence builder for the rest of the fleet because there is no real difference structurally between AF-2 and the rest of the airplanes.” AF-2 was the first F-35 to be flown to 9g+ and -3g, and to roll at design-load factor. The aircraft, which was also the first Joint Strike Fighter to be intentionally flown in significant airframe buffet at all angles of attack, was calibrated for inflight loads measurements prior to ferrying to Edwards in 2010.

The operational maneuver tests were conducted to see “how it would look like against an F-16 in the airspace,” says Col. Rod “Trash” Cregier, F-35 program director. “It was an early look at any control laws that may need to be tweaked to enable it to fly better in future. You can definitely tweak it—that’s the option.”

“Pilots really like maneuverability, and the fact that the aircraft recovers so well from a departure allows us to say [to the designers of the flight control system laws], ‘you don’t have to clamp down so tight,’” says Nelson. Departure resistance was proven during high angle-of-attack (AOA) testing, which began in late 2012 with the aircraft pushing the nose to its production AOA limit of 50 deg. Subsequent AOA testing has pushed the aircraft beyond both the positive and negative maximum command limits, including intentionally putting the aircraft out of control in several configurations ranging from “clean” wings to tests with open weapons-bay doors. Testing eventually pushed the F-35 to a maximum of 110 deg. AOA.

An “aggressive and unique” approach has been taken to the high AOA, or “high alpha” testing, says Nelson. “Normally, test programs will inch up on max alpha, and on the F-22 it took us 3-4 months to get to max alpha. On this jet, we did it in four days. We put a spin chute on the back, which is normal for this sort of program, and then we put the airplane out of control and took our hands off the controls to see if it came back. We actually tweaked the flight control system with an onboard flight test aid to allow it to go out of control, because it wouldn’t by itself. Then we drove the center of gravity back and made it the worst-case configuration on the outside with weapons bay doors and put the aircraft in a spin.” The aircraft has been put into spins with yaw rates up to 60 deg./sec., equal to a complete turn every 6 sec. “That’s pretty good. But we paddled off the flight-test aid and it recovered instantly,” he says.

Pilots also tested the ability of the F-35 to recover from a deep-stall in which it was pushed beyond the maximum AoA command limit by activating a manual pitch limiter (MPL) override similar to the alpha limiter in the F-16. “It’s not something an operational pilot would do, but the angle of attack went back and, with the center of gravity way back aft, it would not pitch over, but it would pitch up. So it got stuck at 60 or 70 deg. alpha, and it was as happy as could be. There was no pitching moment to worry about, and as soon as I let go of the MPL, it would come out,” Nelson says.

Following consistent recoveries, the test team opted to remove the spin chute for the rest of the test program. “The airplane, with no spin chute, had demonstrated the ability to recover from the worst-case departure, so we felt very confident, and that has been proven over months of high alpha testing,” says Nelson. “It also satisfied those at the Joint Program Office who said spin chute on the back is not production-representative and produces aerodynamic qualities that are not right.” Although there are additional test points ahead where the spin chute is scheduled to be reattached for departure resistance with various weapons loads, the test team is considering running through the points without it.

With the full flight envelope now opened to an altitude of 50,000 ft., speeds of Mach 1.6/700 KCAS and loads of 9g, test pilots also say improvements to the flight control system have rendered the transonic roll-off (TRO) issue tactically irrelevant. Highlighted as a “program concern” in the Defense Department’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 2014 report, initial flight tests showed that all three F-35 variants experienced some form of wing drop in high-speed turns associated with asymmetrical movements of shock waves. However, TRO “has evolved into a non-factor,” says Nelson, who likens the effect to a momentary “tug” on one shoulder harness. “You have to pull high-g to even find it.” The roll-off phenomena exhibits itself as “less than 10 deg./sec. for a fraction of a second. We have been looking for a task it affects and we can’t find one.”

http://aviationweek.com/defense/f-35-te ... -maneuvers

[brar_w]

Cool shots of the helmet..

[TSJones]

^^^^way kewel carbon fiber shell for the helmet. my next telescope is going to have a carbon fiber tube. just as strong as steel/aluminum and a lot lighter in weight.

[Philip]

Enjoy this "April 1st" report!

http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2015/04/01/us_ ... 42309.html

US to kill F-35 fighter
April 1, 2015 Rakesh Krishnan Simha

After facing flak for years over performance and price, the American stealth fighter is finally shot down. However, its replacement seems to be just as dubious.
US to kill F-35 fighter

F-35 jets. Source: wikipedia.org

The US Defence Department announced Tuesday it would "most certainly" kill the troubled F-35 'stealth' fighter after getting final clearance from Secretary of Defence Ash Carter. With $1 trillion already sunk into development and initial production, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme is known as the aircraft that's "more expensive than Australia".

Initial reports suggest the decision to terminate the largest defence contract in history was a result of the threat from advanced versions of the Russian Su-27 Flanker series aircraft. "We just can't overlook the fact that in every wargamed scenario the Flankers have whipped the F-35," Pentagon spokesman Siphon Cash told USA Today. "Even without being stealthy, the Flankers are getting better with each new model."

The impending arrival of the T-50 Sukhoi stealth fighter could be another reason. In a worrying trend, several American fighter pilots have taken early retirement even as the Russians have started inducting early models of their fifth generation fighter. "My father, a former USAF fighter pilot in the early 1970s, was spooked by the MiG-25 Foxbat and spent years in rehab," said John Kwitter, who was an F-35 pilot at Elgin Air Force Base, Florida. "The Foxbat was a big scare word in the USAF those days and rattled many pilots of my father's generation. With the F-35 likely to be a sitting duck for the Russian fighter jocks flying the T-50, I have decided not to end up in a mental asylum."

NATO to disband next year

Not everyone agreed the F-35 was a flying lemon. According to Democratic Party Senator Andrew McLaiyyer, “I will strangle any Johnny-come-lately who cancels our most patriotic military programme," he said while putting his signature to a Congressional bill that cuts spending on education, healthcare and food stamps.

"The F-35 has some niggles which can be easily removed with further development," he told the US government mouthpiece, The Washington Post. "It's only a matter of time before they fix these issues."

Sen McLaiyyer refused to comment on speculation that his sustained enthusiasm for the F-35 was owing to his state Florida hosting the most number of F-35 bases. He quickly walked away when asked if reports claiming he was supplied female escorts in Las Vegas by a USAF subcontractor were true.

Over in Bethesda, Maryland, Lockheed-Martin, the aircraft's developer, was in firefighting mode and said it was working on a new engine that would run on water. "A water engine will cut the F-35's operating costs by two-thirds," claimed CEO Bruce Fibber.

But would it make any difference to the jet's performance? “The new engine will allow the F-35 to travel at the speed of light,” Fibber said. “You see, water has both hydrogen and oxygen. The hydrogen will burn in the presence of oxygen and give a huge boost. Since there is unlimited air, the plane will have unlimited speed.”

Asked whether this was more snake oil Lockheed was peddling, Fibber was visibly upset and threw his microphone at the reporter and demanded to know if he was working for the Russians. “How dare you doubt my words, we are Americans, we don’t lie for no good reason,” he said.

Meanwhile, there was considerable panic among America's allies such as Australia and Britain which had put all their eggs in the F-35 basket. Without fighter cover, they were left scratching their heads over how to defend their airspace.

While NATO allies refused to comment, the Australians said they had a couple of neat tricks up their sleeve. “We will hire fighter pilots who are maths geniuses with an IQ of 160 or higher," said Air Commodore Fred Rednekk of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). "It doesn’t matter if they fly outdated F-18s; they will be able to make rapid mental calculations and outfox the Indonesians and Chinese flying Russian jets.”

However, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Australia did not have a single citizen having an IQ of over 110. In fact, the only person with an IQ of 110 was a 65-year-old Chinese immigrant. Efforts to enlist him in the RAAF were futile. “I told the air force chaps that I’m not suicidal; I don’t want to face the Flankers in a dogfight,” said the Melbourne resident, whose house was later tagged with racist graffiti for his refusal to sign up.

Meanwhile, Lockheed-Martin’s chief rival Boeing claimed it had developed an invisible jet fighter. “Forget stealth aircraft, which can be seen by advanced Russian radars,” CEO Steve Skammer said. “Our plane cannot be seen by anyone, not even by Americans.”

When asked if he could show a working model of the “invisible” fighter, he said: “What did I just tell you, our plane is not visible to anyone.”

Skammer said nobody could question the capabilities of the invisible aircraft because nobody will see it. “It makes no sound while taking off so spies cannot spot it,” he said to his incredulous audience. “Just imagine, the Russians will have no idea what hit them.”

Boeing would seek to produce more than 3000 of these jets for half the price of the F-35. The planes would be flown only by Boeing pilots.

And if you are still here, I have some prime real estate for sale in Antarctica.

[brar_w]

1,000th F-35 training sortie flown at Luke AFB

LUKE AIR FORCE BASE, Ariz. (AFNS) -- The 56th Fighter Wing flew its 1,000th F-35A Lightning II training sortie March 31, making it the fastest F-35 wing to reach the 1,000-sortie milestone in the Defense Department.

This is the second historic milestone in the past two weeks. Last week, Luke’s first F-35 student sortie was flown marking a significant step forward for the Airmen at Luke in realizing its new mission -- training the world's greatest F-35 and F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter pilots. That student was the commander of the 56th Fighter Wing, Brig. Gen. Scott Pleus, who is making the transition from the F-16 to the F-35.

The first official class of student pilots is scheduled to begin in May, at the Academic Training Center, a 145,000-square-foot, two-story training center.

"I’m extremely proud of the extraordinary work our maintainers are doing to ensure our pilots have mission-ready and safe jets," Pleus said. “The F-35 is going to be the backbone of the Air Force's fighter fleet for decades to come and Luke will play a vital role in producing the world's greatest, most lethal F-35 pilots. With initial operational capability scheduled to occur late next year, it's important that we get our training program and process dialed in and as efficient and refined as our F-16 training program is, so we can help meet the Air Force's scheduled goal."

Pleus also reflected on the years of work that have gone into the F-35 program putting Luke in position to begin training in May.

“Getting to this point hasn’t just been accomplished over the past few months. It’s really been done over the last few years,” he said. “Lots of amazing Airmen who served before us here at Luke are the reason we are where we are with the F-35 program. What they did back then to set the base up is the reason why we will be so successful training the world’s greatest F-35 pilots.”

There are 20 F-35s assigned to Luke, two of which belong to the Royal Australian air force, an F-35 pilot training, partner nation.

^^ First aircraft was delivered to Luke in March 2014 and the deliveries ramped up from then onwards..1000 sorties in a year is quite impressive given that they were grounded for about 20-25 days as well.

[brar_w]

Pratt & Whitney Rolls Out Engine Fix to F-35 Fighter Fleet

Pratt & Whitney is installing a retrofit in its F135 engine to repair the problem that prevented the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from making its international debut last summer. It expects to complete the fix fleetwide by early next year.

An engine fire in an F-35A that was preparing to take off for a training mission at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., last June caused the Pentagon to ground the entire fleet, preventing the F-35’s planned international debut the following month at both the Royal International Air Tattoo and the Farnborough Airshow in the UK. The new time and place of that debut remain unannounced. Speaking with reporters in Washington, D.C., on March 24, show organizers said they do not expect the F-35 to appear at the Paris Air Show in June.

Investigators determined that the F135 fire started as a result of excessive rubbing of a polyimide plate seal between the second- and third-stage integrally bladed rotors in the engine’s compressor section. The rubbing caused excessive heating and led to the failure of the third-stage fan rotor.

Once the root cause of the engine fire was identified, Pratt & Whitney developed two fixes. The first, “controlled rub-in” procedure involves flying the F-35 in a series of planned maneuvers so that seal, which is designed to be abraded into a groove, or trench, wears in a controlled manner. The second fix was to create a “pre-trench” in the seal during the manufacturing process and retrofit the part in fighters that have been already delivered.

“We basically said, instead of rubbing it in, let’s just cut it out,” Mark Buongiorno, Pratt & Whitney’s F135 program vice president, told AIN. “We basically machined that trench in as part of the manufacturing process as opposed to letting the engine do it itself. That fix has been validated. We demonstrated that there was an insignificant loss in performance because of it and we are in the process of retrofitting the fleet to that pre-trench configuration.”

Interviewed during Pratt & Whitney’s media day in Hartford, Conn., on April 2, program officials said the retrofit has been installed on all but one of 17 system development and demonstration (SDD) fighters; the exception being an F-35 that was unavailable because it was undergoing climatic testing at Eglin AFB. The engine manufacturer is rolling out the retrofit to the remainder of the fleet using its field technicians. As of late January, F-35 manufacturer Lockheed Martin said it had delivered 131 fighters to the Department of Defense.

Buongiorno described the retrofit as “relatively minimally invasive” and accomplished in two eight-hour work shifts. He said the manufacturer is on track to complete the retrofit on the F-35Bs the Marine Corps plans to use to declare initial operational capability (IOC) this summer, and on F-35As the Air Force plans for IOC in 2016.

F-35 JPO details P&W engine block-buy

The F-35 joint programme office (JPO) has revealed the first details of a three-year, block-buy proposal for the Pratt & Whitney engine that powers the Lockheed Martin fighter.

The programme could sign contracts for 477 F135 engines over a three-year period beginning in FY2017, according to a JPO notice posted online on 25 March.

A JPO spokesman clarifies that the 477 number excludes spares, so it could be matched with an equivalent number of airframes.

The details of the block-buy proposal were not revealed previously as the US Congress has not yet authorised the approach, and some of the international partners have not made formal commitments to acquire the aircraft. Acquisition rules require the JPO to notify the industry of potential sole-source contracts.

The US Department of Defense typically buys aircraft and engines in annual lots through the end of low-rate initial production. Once production costs have stabilised during full-rate production, programmes sometimes shift to multi-year procurement, but only if the contractor agrees to deliver a minimum discount of 10%.

The timing of the three-year block buy, however, begins in the final year of low-rate initial production in FY2017, so the JPO needs specific authorisation from Congress to move forward with the deal.

The JPO is currently authorised to negotiate a block buy of nearly 150 F-35s that are expected to be ordered between FY2015 and FY2016.

F-35 programme officials have committed to reducing the flyaway cost of the F-35 by more than 25% over the next five years.

Four-fifths of that cost reduction is expected to come from increasing the production rate more than five-fold from 35 aircraft in 2014. The remainder would be the result of a cost reduction initiative by Lockheed and a “war on cost” initiated by P&W.

[brar_w]

X Post

It’s Still All About the Stealth

Despite comments from naval aviation leaders in recent months that stealth has become irrelevant, it remains the key ingredient in new combat aircraft design, Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh said Wednesday. “Stealth has not gone by the wayside. The idea that stealth is somehow dead is just wrong,” he told defense reporters at a Washington, D.C., breakfast. While he allowed that an enemy may be able to develop a radar that could detect a stealth aircraft at long-range, “stealth is about breaking kill chains.” While an acquisition radar “may be able to see you ... when they try to transition that track to a tracking radar, it fades and they can’t actually do any targeting, or they launch a weapon and somewhere during the weapon flight [it] ... loses track, because of some aspect of your stealth characteristics,” he said. “As long as we have that capability, stealth is a good thing. And, we’ll continue to develop it.” Welsh added that, “The good news is, we’re getting much better at this. We understand the technology better, ... how the pieces of stealth interact, ... how it affects threat systems, ... our own systems, ... how to communicate better, ... operate better, and maintain stealth, and ... deliver weapons ... All that stuff is getting better and better and better.” Moreover, there is “no comparison between the stealth capabilities of the F-35 and … the F-117.” The difference is like “night and day. It’s a new world. And that will continue.”

http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Pa ... ealth.aspx

[vishvak]

Can we discuss American "fundamental commandments" clauses issue here? No other thread seem to be appropriate and specific to an American product.

[tushar_m]

Are there any FOC dates for F35 set yet ???