Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 18 May 2015 21:48

^The LTIPP exercise is fairly elaborate that encompass the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), National Security Agency (NSA), Ministry of Defence (MOD), Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Intelligence agencies, HQ IDS, Army HQ, Naval HQ, IAF HQ, DRDO, and Industry including both Public Sector Units and private sector. It is a 15 year plan that is laid out at the high level and such major structures such as an MSC would probably (not open source) be determined at this level.

A major change in such a plan, brings into question either the plan or the variables of the planning process. Either way, it does not look good on our policy planners. I would rather that these long term defense plans which are focused on capacity building after due considerations to all factors, be adhered to or it brings into question the process itself. The DAC had no business to approve these plans, without a plan to fund them. India cannot do it all is obvious - something the planners would know? The whole plan then looks like pie in the sky projections! The whole process looks completely disjointed. It seems to be at the mercy of the FM and PM of the day, and how they feel that day of the week! (OK, maybe a bit harsh).

RoyG · Post by **RoyG** » 18 May 2015 23:00

Rahulji, do you honestly believe that the jihadi-military complex has the will or capability to dismantle the terror infra? Even if they were to hand over a few jihadis, dismantle 50-100 camps in POK, etc. they will just crank it up as soon as we hand some or all the land back to them. The jihadi factories (madrassas) will be largely intact.

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 18 May 2015 23:15

Couple of points;

The idea with Cold Start is to achieve political and military gains in the shortest possible time, before Pakistan can bring foreign actor into play. The difference between our previous doctrines and Cold Start essentially is to attack first and mobilize later. The Pivot Corps deployed close to the borders can be launched along multiple axes within 48 hours. IIRC, the deployment time for the Strike Corps own Vanguard has been brought down to 96 hours. These battle groups provide rapid thrusts at the same time as India’s defenses are still being organized. The IBG's are planned to be day/night high-tempo operations as neither country has the ability to sustain operations beyond 2 weeks.

In the light of the above it becomes even more crucial for own Strike Corps to be mechanised, as only then would the formations be able to deliver pain in any small measure.

In short, Cold Start envisages quickly moving forces into unpredictable locations and making decisions faster than opponents can plan. Thus forcing the enemy to loose the initiative throughout the campaign and force a smaller military to spread thinner. In effect violating the principal rule of warfare, concentration of forces and counter their riposte.

The Pivot Corp's IBG should be launching their break-in operations even as the holding divisions are completing their deployment on the forward obstacles. Only such simultaneity of operations will unhinge the enemy, break his cohesion and paralyze him into making mistakes from which he will not be able to recover.

^^If we take a look at the map and notice how many of their major population centers reside along the Sutlej River corridor.

National Population densities can be viewed here.

Now take a look at their barrage and headworks, some of which like Marala/Suleimanke/Sukkur are crucial for us to control as the canal defence lines originate from here Pakistan Canal Plan

Operational objectives relate to shallow thrusts to breach the operational depths of holding formations of the adversary and pose a direct threat to its hinterland. Some analysts also look at this doctrinal thinking in terms of quickly massing firepower, together with deep air and naval strikes to deliver a punishing blow to the adversary, degrading its war-waging potential, without any serious damage to population and other civilian centres. The Indian Army's emphasis is on speed of both deployment and operational execution to overcome the disadvantage of operating from exterior lines, and achieve early break-in.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 18 May 2015 23:19

RoyG, do they need to ? discounting the optics, any concessions we get from a talk would be cherry on the cake.
a conflict like the one I described would be an enormous jhapad to the paki warfighting ability and their psyche. think of it as a punitive expedition. TSPA would be set back by years.

of course, muridke is one of the towns I mentioned. surely, its significance does not escape you ?

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 18 May 2015 23:29

I don't want to discuss military tactics in this thread. No matter what Indian Army does w.r.t Pakistan it would be crossing the "ever-changing" nuclear threshold.

Indian army sitting in its own barracks itself is not good for Pakistan.

1998 proved that all Indian army can do is to protect its territory as and when Pakistan sneaks in, even then by not crossing the LxC.

India going into Pakistan proper is a definite nuclear scenario, as far as Pakistan is concerned. It doesn't matter if Pakistan nukes an Indian city or uses a tactical-nuke in its own territory. Either way India will have to respond in kind.

In such a scenario, Indian Army can't limit itself to setting up toll gates in Pakistan and collecting tolls. Indian army will be expected to hold on to territory & (nuked) cities as well until the other governing structures gets established.

Even in after a nuclear scenario Pakistan will remain in a JK state for a while, so Indian Army will be called in to calm down these "disturbed" areas.

So going back to my first post, it's in the national interests to slowly work towards a 2million army at current-gen technology level while transforimg 1m of them to future-gen soldiers.

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 19 May 2015 00:07

RamaY wrote:I don't want to discuss military tactics in this thread. No matter what Indian Army does w.r.t Pakistan it would be crossing the "ever-changing" nuclear threshold. Indian army sitting in its own barracks itself is not good for Pakistan. 1998 proved that all Indian army can do is to protect its territory as and when Pakistan sneaks in, even then by not crossing the LxC.

You need to understand the difference between limited conflict and full scale war. The former is specifically designed to counter against an ambiguous/low threshold. Actually, Kargil war was the perfect example to show how even under a nuclear overhang an limited conflict is still possible.

Even under a full scale conflict, a pure counter-force strike is being minimized by multiple independent mechanised groups and not by large unweildy foot infantry which is more susceptible to tactical nuclear strikes.

RamaY wrote:India going into Pakistan proper is a definite nuclear scenario, as far as Pakistan is concerned. It doesn't matter if Pakistan nukes an Indian city or uses a tactical-nuke in its own territory. Either way India will have to respond in kind. In such a scenario, Indian Army can't limit itself to setting up toll gates in Pakistan and collecting tolls. Indian army will be expected to hold on to territory & (nuked) cities as well until the other governing structures gets established. Even in after a nuclear scenario Pakistan will remain in a JK state for a while, so Indian Army will be called in to calm down these "disturbed" areas.

I mean i am at a loss with this land grab/good governance obsession of yours across delineated international borders.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 19 May 2015 00:28

^
We aren't talking about invading Africa, Europe or South America.

Per one worldview even Kashmir, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa etc are also land grab. Indian Army can't be a defensive force forever when it comes to Indian sub-continent. This is natural extent of India.

An Indian army thinking in short-term, defensive lines is at odds with national interests.

RoyG · Post by **RoyG** » 19 May 2015 01:30

Rahul M wrote:RoyG, do they need to ? discounting the optics, any concessions we get from a talk would be cherry on the cake.
a conflict like the one I described would be an enormous jhapad to the paki warfighting ability and their psyche. think of it as a punitive expedition. TSPA would be set back by years.

of course, muridke is one of the towns I mentioned. surely, its significance does not escape you ?

Those were your words, not mine [dismantling terror camps]. I haven't forgotten Muridke, but they'll be long gone by then, unless we grind them with some LGBs or cruise missiles before our land forces begin their engagements after crossing the IB. The point is, in order to be punitive, we have to ensure that it acts as a catalyst for the destruction of the PA and the idea of Pakistan itself. I don't think that Cold Start in itself will do that unless there are multiple fires that are started within.

Cold Start if ever used has a medium to high chance of success but the PA will dust itself off and resume its nonsense. The Saudis and Chinese won't let them balkanize unless there is a complete breakdown in the state machinery.

Also, what kind of attrition figures are we looking at from our side? Nothing less than 25-30% especially if we are going to be kicking the door down in Punjab. If we're going to give them a thapad, it had better be one which they can never recover from.

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 19 May 2015 01:35

RamaY is right about this. If we have to deliver a full jhappad across the border and that is all that we do and leave, then the vacuum will soon be filled with other powers or even elements from the ME. We will have to administer the after effects of any jhappad.

Best outcome of such an event, is if the local civil admin were to be co-opted before a strike like in Bangladesh to fill the vaccum, if the idea is to let the state stand on its own. What are the chances of that happening ?

RoyG · Post by **RoyG** » 19 May 2015 01:45

Bade wrote:RamaY is right about this. If we have to deliver a full jhappad across the border and that is all that we do and leave, then the vacuum will soon be filled with other powers or even elements from the ME. We will have to administer the after effects of any jhappad.

Best outcome of such an event, is if the local civil admin were to be co-opted before a strike like in Bangladesh to fill the vaccum, if the idea is to let the state stand on its own. What are the chances of that happening ?

IMO, the timing has to be right. If the Balochis and Sindhis march against Punjab, we will be in good shape. Right now the PA will try to slowly edge out the Shias, Amadiyas, etc. while trucking jihadis from everywhere to settle them in Sindh and Balochistan. It's almost like offensive buffering. The PA knows it will have to deal with them, but they would rather decrease the sting when the time comes. What's the guarantee that the Chinese won't send in troops either to help put out the fire?

Moreover, if we unleash cold start on the Pakistani's, the Chinese won't sit by and watch. They will try to grab some territory of ours to offset the pressure. This can't be looked at in isolation.

Y I Patel · Post by **Y I Patel** » 19 May 2015 06:32

Cold Start came about from the lessons learned in Parakram.

At the time of Parakram, our Strike Corps followed the standard European doctrine of slipping into the space created between (or within) the AOR of holding corps. Then it would use its heavy hitting power and engineer brigades to create a breach and pour through it while the base of the stem was protected by the holding corps. Going by this doctrine, space was created in December of 2002 for Kapil Vij's 2 Corps. In war plans, the assumption would be that a strike corps would never halt once it was launched - think back for example all the way back to Brass Tacks when the exercise was to be converted into an operation by having the exercising corps not stop at Indira Nahar. Unfortunately, war was not declared by the time 2 Corps reached its staging areas (it's induction was anything but slow - Pak General Kamal Matinuddin admitted that the deployment time was a surprise). So 2 corps had to halt a few kilometers shy of the border and all surprise was lost. Worse, having it there gave away India's strategic targets in the event of a full scale war.

In the subcontinental context the doctrine of breaking through with a strike corps has certain limitations due to increasing population density and urbanization all the way up to Rajasthan. Here the European concept runs up against the reality that there are no open plains for massing and maneuvering. The breakthrough frontages have to be limited due to thickness of linear defenses, and a huge beast like 2 corps needs a lot of space. For example, if a brigade frontage breakthrough is achieved with say 3 breaches, it would take days for the units of the strike corps to funnel through that opening, and all that time they would be vulnerable to all types of attacks including from PAF. So Parakram revealed the limitations of the Sundarji doctrine as implemented through the strike corps. Note that in past Indo-Pak wars most land engagements have been merely within 10s of kilometers from the border on the western front. Now imagine the crowding that will occur with today's geography and size of opposing forces. Another disadvantage is that Pak corps and reserve corps are based close enough to the border so inherently the process of deploying a bulky strike corps gives them clear choices for focusing their ripostes.

So Cold Start is a long running evolution to surmount the operational imperatives exposed by Parakram. I am going to stick out my neck and say there are going to be no IBGs. Such small units will not be able to withstand by themselves the magnitude of counter attacks that can be mounted by Pak in practically any part of the border. The solution to this dilemma is to transfer the breakthrough duties of the strike corps to the pivot corps as discussed in some posts above by Vaibhav. In other words, now the pivot corps creates the breaches and establishes a bridgehead in Pak territory. Then a lighter, more mobile strike corps filters through only if indicted by the dynamics of the conflict and where a big enough bridgehead is available. Another provocative thought may be that the armoured divs could be transferred to pivot corps from strike corps to give them extra punch. Note that the newly raised arty divs have unprecedented reach, and maneuver by fire really means protecting the arty div assets as they deploy forward. With their reach, they can take care of the entire command frontage and provide support in depth to penetrating units even from our side of border.

So things are in a flux. Modern warfare is no longer about numbers or the numerically smaller American forces would not have routed the numerically massive Iraqi forces arrayed against them in Desert Strom 1. It is all about local correlation of forces as the sovs used to emphasize. With creative deployment of arty divs and reorganized (and beefed up) pivot corps we can get a much greater flexibility in setting operational and strategic objectives. This does not mean the Pak facing strike corps will go away; it just means that they would be converted into lighter or more agile formations with transformed doctrine to support a similar set of strategic and political objectives. But all of this is based on straws in the wind, and even if it does happen it will take an indeterminate amount of time. So I wouldn't hold my breath on any of this materializing anytime soon, if at all.

And that is also where the MSC fell short in its original avatar of 80-90k troops. A much smaller but highly mobile entity can be a lot more agile and can by provisioned to meet a substantial set of operational needs. So rightsizing it is a welcome development.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 19 May 2015 07:17

I don't understand the fear to absorb Pakistan. We should get rid of this inherent bias against Muslims & the fear of safety for Hindus in a Muslim majority India because our secular democratic constitution cannot be taken down by even a Muslim (2/3) majority govt for our judiciary will ensure that no constitutional amendments can touch our secularism, democracy & equality of all citizens.

India has proved that Muslims & Hindus can live together. We already have 177+m Muslims in India who accepted & following the secular & democratic constitution as good as Hindus & Christians. Another 178+m Pakistani Muslims also can be accommodated under our secular & democratic constitution when Pakistan's army & administration is completely destroyed.

Indian Army can build bridges of peace in Pakistan as it has done in Kashmir.

Even in a worse case Muslims can't simply genocide 600+ Hindus (after conversions) with the world community watching helplessly.

Or can they?

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 19 May 2015 07:25

RoyG and Bade sahab, nukes. cold start is the best you can do under nukes. anything more is not possible.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 19 May 2015 07:27

Rahul M wrote:RoyG and Bade sahab, nukes. cold start is the best you can do under nukes. anything more is not possible.

Don't remember which video but Doval ji talked about solving nuke-threat using some "defensive offense" paradigm.

I can guess what it would be like

but can't post here...

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 19 May 2015 07:30

Rahul, I have never claimed to know more than anyone least of all you. If you feel that I advertise my ignorance, I would say that your superior attitude reeks of arrogance. You do not need to keep calling someone ignorant, you just need to argue with points.

No one is disputing the power of a well-equipped and highly mobile force, which was quite evident in the 2 Iraq wars. They are more than enough to break a less mobile, less advanced and less coordinated enemy of much greater number.

What people dispute is what comes after. You mention holding the roads and choking the cities of resources and power. How possible is this?

Is the IA going to stop food shipments and energy supplies to these cities? What of the civilians there? Wouldn't there be an international outcry over this? After all our aim is not genocide.

Even if we do go ahead with such a hard choice, how long will be able to enforce it? Will we be able to enforce it without numbers? Holding things are never as simple as sweeping the enemy away with your momentum.

And after "not grinding" our enemy into dust, what if he goes back on whatever promises he gives? Do we go through the whole drama again?

RoyG · Post by **RoyG** » 19 May 2015 08:43

RamaY wrote:I don't understand the fear to absorb Pakistan. We should get rid of this inherent bias against Muslims & the fear of safety for Hindus in a Muslim majority India because our secular democratic constitution cannot be taken down by even a Muslim (2/3) majority govt for our judiciary will ensure that no constitutional amendments can touch our secularism, democracy & equality of all citizens.

India has proved that Muslims & Hindus can live together. We already have 177+m Muslims in India who accepted & following the secular & democratic constitution as good as Hindus & Christians. Another 178+m Pakistani Muslims also can be accommodated under our secular & democratic constitution when Pakistan's army & administration is completely destroyed.

Indian Army can build bridges of peace in Pakistan as it has done in Kashmir.

Even in a worse case Muslims can't simply genocide 600+ Hindus (after conversions) with the world community watching helplessly.

Or can they?

No thanks. Keep that mutant cancer away from India. Just slowly pluck away land and drive them further towards the arab sh*thole which they look up to. I want to smoke whatever you got. Can't believe you honestly think that those idiots wont cause problems for us. Pakistan Army wasn't around during partition.

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 19 May 2015 11:05

YIP Saar,
As always superb analysis. I was unware of Kapil Vij's role in the whole affair. He was very highly regarded in the Armoured Corps circuit and is a Rimcollian to boot.

I think the Pivot's own armoured bde and RAPID now form the IBG. Rohit did mention it in passing once.

The rate of urbanisation esp in Punjab has so rapidly been effected that even a 10km advance and we could thank our stars.

Southern pakistan is where most action would take place.

Prasad · Post by **Prasad** » 19 May 2015 11:43

Not claiming to be uber mil strat-e-gist but isn't the whole "pakistan khatre me hai" built on the premise that IA tanks will roll into lahore and then isloo? Who the heck wants moth eaten pakjab? Cutoff pakjab from pok in the north and cut into porkistan belly and 'liberate' blochistan and hold. Jobs done no? porkis aren't gonna resort to nukes unless we roll tanks into pakjab (huge caveat!). Rather than stopping at RYK, head on towards quetta or zahedan. Cut porkistan into two, let pakjab be and give blochistan and sind do whatever they want.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 19 May 2015 18:41

Y I Patel wrote: And that is also where the MSC fell short in its original avatar of 80-90k troops. A much smaller but highly mobile entity can be a lot more agile and can by provisioned to meet a substantial set of operational needs. So rightsizing it is a welcome development.

As I said earlier, cannot do it all. "right sizing" is code word for abandoning certain policy objectives or approaches with the 90K MSC. MSC was always to be a highly mobile entity, all that is being done now is to reduce the numbers. It necessarily means certain policy objectives are being set aside under compulsion of capacity constraints.

The pivot corps can achieve many (not all) of the policy objectives that India may have against the PA, especially if Airland battle concepts are incorporated into the mix. Moving some assets of the strike corps to the pivot corps would be the right move and the "conversion" of at least some of the the strike corps to a swing role or maybe even the elimination of one of the strike corps to favor more capital assets for the rest, resulting in mobility and fire power would be a rational move.

But to do these tectonic sized changes in the IA, a lion is needed at the helm, with the gumption to take on the entrenched staff officers vested in the armored cores. It will take 15 years to put ANY such plans in place and hence it is critical that our policy makers take a decision and then stick to it or LTIPP is another joke!

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 19 May 2015 22:08

YIP, great explanation as usual. I do have one quibble though.

at the start you say that Corps sized formations are far too big nowadays to be effective and would be vulnerable at the choke points. yet, then you say the smaller IBG's wont be formed and the pivot corps would act as a maneuver element on their own, supported by the arty div's. if the nimbler strike corps are far too big then surely the (relatively) plodding pivot corps would be too ?

I understand infantry can effect faster crossings at rivers/canals etc than armoured elements (which are limited by availability of bridging equipment) but surely this advantage would be offset by the much better cross-country mobility of the armoured units ?

one would have thought that just like strike elements of the pivot corps may be drawn into an IBG (comprising of a RAPID + Armd. Bde as per one school of thought), while the rest of primarily infantry units act in support, the strike corps would also distil its core strike formations such as the armd. div's for a more devastating push into paki territory.

Y I Patel · Post by **Y I Patel** » 20 May 2015 07:30

Rahul, it's not a quibble but a fair question, especially since I introduced two speculative ideas (IBG not happening, armd div to pivot) into my post.

To put my response in a sound bite, a bulky pivot corps has major advantages over a bulky strike corps because it (the pivot corps) is already in its deployment area. So now let me expand on that, because it will cover my contention on IBG being too small as well. As I start, let me admit that no one really talks about this stuff in an exact Indian context so what I say has major elements of educated guesswork.

I'll refer back to Parakram and the role of the strike corps at that point. The three strike corps had 1 Engineer Bde each so we assume planning for a Bde level breach for the entire corps. The strike corps carried all the baggage required to (a) create and expand breach (b) protect stem of attack lines, and (c) strike deep, right up to Isloo-Karachi motorway. The line of advance would look relatively thin and would consume a lot of strike corps assets for flank protection. And as it turns out, unless unleashed directly form railheads, all that werewithal had to mass in a constrained space cleared for it from holding corps frontages, and trickle in through a brigade level breach.

Now for a pivot corps the considerations become different. One can presume that they would get an engineer brigade from the strike corps so that the Pivot Corps can create the breach anywhere along its frontage without having to do a complicated preparatory redeployment. So time and space savings right there. The function of creating a breach is the same as before, but what follows into the breach is another difference between a pivot corps and a strike corps. A pivot corps, in the Cold Start doctrine, would (a) create and expand the breach into a bridgehead with its own assets, and (b) hold the bridgehead. Again, given that it can use the already available assets on the IB, there is no need to have a complex maneuver of inserting in a new formation through the breach.Again, this requires the Pivot Corps to bulk up but still they do not have to mass like a strike corps and there are obvious gains in flexibility and agility. One can conjecture an additional task (c) for Pivot Corps in Cold Start: fight off riposte from Pak reserve corps. The reserve div of the pivot corps could be used to expand breach (i.e. task b) or help consolidate it to meet task (c) requirements. The important distinction here is that the penetration is not expected to be as deep as with the strike corps, so mobility requirements and logistics are far less onerous. I am speculating about the armd div being given to Pivot corps in connection with task C outlined above, because I feel that smashing Pak strike corps is a major political/strategic objective in itself. Alternatively, it could be a swap wherein the current strike corps get a lighter mechanized infantry div converted from one of the pivot corps assets (or maybe the armd div can become a mech inf div in remain in strike corps - the extra armd bde would then go to the Pivot Corps).

Note that all of this works for a pivot corps because it is a unified entity of at least 3 divs and other specialist bdes, and even though it would therefore become bulky some of that bulkiness is dispersed into its normal (holding role) AOR and is less of a constraint than it would be for the strike corps. The crrollary is is that it needs all of this extra wherewithal to make the pivot role work, and the effectiveness comes from it being a unified formation. An IBG can be carved out for specific tasks related to (b) or maybe (c) mentioned above, but that is really an artificial distinction because it would still need to draw from the support provided by other formations within the Pivot Corps. One cannot, for example, think of an independent IBG that can slip into a breach created by a pivot corps and defend it successfully without active backup from the pivot corps assets like corps arty bde, corps or command arty div, engr bdes, AD bdes, and so on. Hence my conjecture that an IBG is too small to carry out the doctrinal role envisaged for it. So why call it an independent entity at all? Would be more effective to have it under Pivot Corps command in the first place.

Hope this clarifies some of the positions I took earlier. Again, like I said, a lot of this is educated guesswork on my part based on what I know about developments related to Cold Start and the aftermath of Parakram. Take it for what it is worth, because as has been pointed out it will take really strong civilian and military leadership working in tandem to really make this happen. IMHO the biggest hurdle will be the traditional mindset of giving a lot of operational autonomy to the army. One take away from Parakram is that a perfectly workable operational doctrine - the Sundarji doctrine - had its limitations exposed when it was applied to a fluid and unsettled political situation. I realize I am making a very strong statement here that I might not have opportunity to expand on, but think about it.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 20 May 2015 09:25

http://www.idsa.in/event/AnAssessmentof ... 80515.html

An Assessment of Organisational Change in the Indian Army
Vivek Chadha

May 08, 2015
Event: Fellows' Seminar

Chairperson: Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar (Retd.)
External Discussants: Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd.), Brig. Rahul Bhonsle (Retd.)
Internal Discussants: Gp. Capt. Ajey Lele (Retd.), Col. Vijai Singh Rana

The paper analysed military change in the context of the Indian Army, with specific focus on organisational innovation and change. It specifically looked at two case studies – the restructuring of the army after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the drive towards mechanisation based on the 1975 expert committee recommendations. The paper then assessed the drivers for organisational change in the Indian Army, with the further aim of deriving policy recommendations which could be apt in light of the ongoing transformation of the Indian Army.

The paper identified operational environment and technology as the principle drivers for change. It stated that successful change required supportive political leadership, professional and visionary military leadership, long-term strategic assessment, strong institutional structures and follow up action. The author used the two case studies in relation to conventional threats. The first related to changes post 1962, which led to an increase in the size of the army by almost 33 per cent. It also saw the raising of divisions which were tailored to the needs of mountain warfare.

The second case study assesses the 1975 committee recommendations which were successful in aiding the army’s drive towards mechanisation. Not only was the organisational structure transformed, the resultant innovations had a lasting impact on the strategic thought of the army, which continued to guide subsequent adaptations thereafter. The author also pointed to pertinent aspects related to organisational change after the 1999 Kargil conflict and Operation Parakram in 2001, besides noting changes related to the ongoing transformation.

Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author

It was pointed out that political support for carrying out military change was very crucial. Top level political intervention was important to achieve unity of thought and unity of purpose. This was particularly relevant in the Indian context where turf war was a glaring feature of the armed forces and the absence of the Chief of Defence Staff affected unity of thought and action. It was noted that political leadership in India has been more than encouraging in this regard. Though lacking an institutional mechanism of interface between top political leadership and the armed forces, many chiefs have successfully won over political support for bringing about organisational change.

The aim of military change should be to have a capability-based force and threat-based force existing simultaneously to deal with the challenges being posed in an era of strategic uncertainty.

Apart from operational environment and technology being drivers of change, it was noted that post-1962, changes were largely driven by doctrinal shift in thinking.

A crucial area of military change related to professional military education and training. The aim of military education and training should be to train for certainty and educate for uncertainty to deal with broad military challenges and threats.

The absence of a national security strategy has led to the rise of service-specific doctrines, which are linear in approach and lack a broad national outlook.

The sense of the house was that the Indian army fought bravely in the 1962 war. If not for some strategic miscalculations and a degree of misfortune, Indian army would have turned the tables on the Chinese despite facing all odds. Moreover, the engagement of Air Force would have significantly altered the course of the war. Most importantly, the war did not shatter the morale of the Indian Army, contrary to the common perception because our soldiers fought fearlessly and ferociously. It was largely the failure of top level military/political leadership. The Indian army would do well to look inward for its failures as this will pave the way for course correction.

It was suggested that the paper should look into the aspect of organisational change pertaining to staff. The teeth-to-tail ratio, recruitment policy and restructuring of the organisation merited the attention of the author.

The nature of change should be analysed in order to understand whether change is reactive in nature or whether it was shaping the battlefield favourably.

The Kargil review committee was the first attempt at evolving a comprehensive national security system engaging all three services. The Krishna Rao report primarily dealt with the army. In an era of jointness, efforts to bring about change in the army must find a resonance among the other services. A tri-service approach looking at change would bring far greater dividends than a service-specific approach. In this context, post-Kargil reform process needed to be better analysed.

The Indian army aimed to achieve the capacity of network-enabled to network-centric warfare capability but has not been able to do so. It should be explored as to what are the reasons behind our inability to achieve this capability. Similarly, the aspect of cyber warfare should be included in the paper to understand the phenomenon of change in its entirety.

Report prepared by Amit Kumar, Research Assistant, IDSA.

Avik · Post by **Avik** » 20 May 2015 13:05

YI Patel,

Some thoughts on your post above:

The engineer brigade in the strike corps is in addition to the engineer regiments organic to the divisions in the corps. These organic engineer regiments are supplemented by an additional corps engineer regiment. Also, the indep armoured bdes in the strike corps have indep engineer sqns organic to them. So, in total, we're talking about 8 to 10 engineer regiments for a strike corps. The primary purpose of engineers during the assault phase would be to bridge the canals and breach the minefields. All the armoured regiments have trawl tanks; they also have a few BLTs for bridging organic to them. So, I'd think, with eight to ten enginer regiments available, the strike corps would be able to ' break in' at atleast 2-3 bridgeheads, and not just 1. The constraining factor for the strike sorps is the lack of mechanization- barely 4-5 brigades are mechanized out of the 10-11 in a corps. So, right at the beginning, you have the non-mech bdes falling behind the mechanized ones. Once the breakout happens, this problem is aggravated, as there is inadequate flank protection for the mechanized bdes that have moved ahead. The same applies to artillery assets since barely a few are SP. The rest of the field regiments are unable to keep up. This problem is even more acute in the pivot corps where mechanization is even less.
The other issue with pivot corps is that their axes of advance, limited that they are, are fairly obvious to the Pakis, and hence, fixed defenses are already in place. Hence, with the limited mechanization of pivot corps, their maneuver capability is even less compared to strike corps. So, I dont really see the point of transferring the armd div to pivot corps. It will only end up being pushed against fixed defenses and get bogged down a few miles into the border

The probable solution is more mechanization of atleast the RAPIDs; addition of 2-3 armour regiments and 2-3 mech inf battalions to the RAPIDs provide an additional armour and mech bde to the strike corps. This would also obviate the need for the third infantry div in the strike corps. In addition, even if the pivot corps are motorized (not mechanized), then they'll have greater mobility to get around Pak's fixed defenses and concentrate forces for breakthrough.

But again coming back to the previous point, I really dont see how transferring armr div to pivot corps helps the situation .

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 20 May 2015 14:43

Avik,

The Engineer Regt will all be of different types. Armoured Divisions have Armoured Engineer Regts while others have a Gen Engr Regt.

Corps Engineer Bde will have something like an Pontoon Bridge Regt (PMS) an Assault Bridge (AM 50 Mobile Bridge Launching Vehicle) Regt etc. IIRC, they are relatively large at around 3000 personnel strong.

BLT's are with the Armoured Bde's Engineer Squadron.

For those interested, the British Army's future combat capability roadmap. While their cuts have gone to far, they are fairly good pointers too.....

srin · Post by **srin** » 20 May 2015 17:03

This is really good information. Thank you YIP, RahulM & vaibhav.n

Is there a strike / pivot concept for mountain ops ? When we talk about Mountain Strike Corps, is that armor centric or infantry centric ? Reason is: to strike deep into Tibetan plains, armor and mechanized infantry seems to be required, but only place where there seems to be space for armor is Ladakh. So what is Strike Corps doing based out of Panagarh ?

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 21 May 2015 08:10

Reflects the discussion here over the past few days.

Parrikar, on the other hand, has proved he is no Solomon. Called on to decide which of two women was mother of a child claimed by both he would probably have cleaved the baby down the middle! That is what he did with the new 17 (Mountain Strike) Corps under raising.

Saying the fund crunch mandated it he halved its strength to 35,000 troops and saved Rs 32,000 crore. It, presumably, is another example of “wise use of money” that he said led to the purchase of only 36 Rafales (as against the requirement of 126 aircraft). For all the good the two Rafale squadrons and the truncated Mountain Corps will do, he might as well trash them both.

What it reveals about Parrikar and the BJP government is that, like Antony and the Congress regime before them, they are not applying their mind, perhaps, because it requires a broader perspective and a threat-reorienting political decision they are fearful of making. China is emerging, finally (whew!), as the consensual main-threat.

Hence, rationally speaking, the army’s three strike corps for the Pakistan front absorbing 17%-22% of the annual defence budget should be rationally reconfigured to one composite armour-mechanized corps for contingencies in the west, with the funds and manpower thus freed up switched to form three offensive mountain corps for operations in Tibet to keep the Chinese forces there honest.

Why is this so difficult for Messrs Modi and Parrikar to understand and act on? As I have been arguing for over two decades, it is not the scarcity of resources but their misuse, owing to a complicit Indian government and military that is the problem.

Time for an Overhaul

The mismatch between resources and requirements will only grow especially in the face of demands by powerful legacy combat arms, such as the plains/desert-limited armoured and mechanized formations, including a massive self-propelled artillery element, that are irrelevant to 21st Century warfare transitioning to network-centred, robotic, remotely-controlled, long range, precision munitions. Then again, the Indian armed forces are pretty antique, as is their thinking and, in that, they are in sync with the government.

India’s Defence Sector is Looking for a Visionary Modi

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 21 May 2015 08:43

^
To me BK sounded like Paki-Lover when I had an opportunity to interact with him in a BR Jirga. So no wonder he would love our western borders to be less crowded and move focus to eastern borders.

Funny thing is he says armed infantry blah blah are gone & new age is for robots, drones & looong range precision munitions... But asks India to raise a 90K size infantry for eastern borders. Why not all those electronic thingis for eastern borders & a million strong army in western border to occupy Pakistan & kick Islamists out? Secularism at risk?

I don't think China is going to attack from eastern borders of India. It will try to hurt India thru Pakistan.

It's in Sun-Tsutiyapanti's book!

srai · Post by **srai** » 21 May 2015 09:19

vaibhav.n wrote:...
For those interested, the British Army's future combat capability roadmap. While their cuts have gone to far, they are fairly good pointers too.....

Good read!

The whole force is organized around a 3-year readiness cycle:

Training year - live & simulated training culminating in a major exercise which will bring all skills together
Contingency/Committed year - ready for deployment to support operations worldwide, including Mission Speciﬁc Training
Other Tasks year - focus on career courses and individual skills building the foundation for further training; also includes support to the training of other units

Every specialized regiment/battalion (below) is in multiples of 3 in order to have at least one in a Contingency/Committed state.

The Armoured Cavalry Regiment

Doctrine
Armoured Cavalry regiments will be manned and equipped to provide the formation level ground manned reconnaissance capability within the three Reaction Force brigades, in 3 (UK) Division. They will be equipped with CVR(T) initially and, from 2020, with SCOUT Specialist Vehicle (SV). They will be capable of effectively conducting reconnaissance tasks and a wide range of enabling tasks in all environments. Armoured Cavalry soldiers will either form part of an Armoured Cavalry battlegroup or work in squadrons supporting the Armoured or Armoured Infantry battlegroups within their Brigade.

Organisation
Each Armoured Cavalry regiment will be structured around three Sabre squadrons, optimised for reconnaissance tasks, a Command and Support squadron and a Headquarters squadron. The Sabre squadrons will have three Reconnaissance troops, each with four vehicles, and a Support troop. The Command and Support squadron will contain three Guided Weapons troops and a Surveillance troop. The Armoured Cavalry battlegroup headquarters will retain the capability to plug into the brigade headquarters, but will also be prepared to command an independent reconnaissance or all arms battlegroup.

The Armoured Regiment

Doctrine
Armour will continue to provide a crucial combat capability in the Army 2020 construct. The primary role of the Armoured regiment will be support to the infantry, closely followed by its secondary role, the destruction of enemy armour. Armour and Armoured Infantry will train together to exploit fully these facets of the capability. A change to a 4-tank troop construct will mean operating in pairs within the troop, though this change of organisation will not dramatically alter how the commander will employ Armour.

Organisation
There will be three Regular Type 56 regiments, supported by a single Reserve Armoured regiment, in the Reaction Force. The regiments will be organised into three Sabre squadrons of four 4-tank troops, delivering 18 tanks and an enhanced echelon. The Command & Reconnaissance squadron will include Reconnaissance troop, Command troop, the ISTAR troop and the Training Wing. These elements will be deployed as battlegroup troops, with the squadron headquarters reinforcing battlegroup headquarters. Headquarters squadron will be re-titled Support squadron and will continue its role of delivering regimental CSS.

The Armoured Infantry Battalion

Doctrine
Armoured Infantry battalions will be the core of the Reaction Force’s combat power in the newly named Armoured Infantry brigades, nested in 3 (UK) Division. Battlegroups will be able to operate with an integrated Reconnaissance squadron, Armoured squadron and a Heavy Protected Mobility company, in addition to their own Armoured Infantry and Support companies. They will be equipped and trained for warﬁghting tasks anywhere in the world and will be able to be adapted for other tasks.

Organisation
The battalion will continue to operate three Riﬂe companies, complemented by Support and Headquarter companies, with the additional capability provided by an Assault Pioneer platoon. Armoured Infantry section manpower will be reduced from 10 to 9 soldiers.

The Heavy Protected Mobility Battalion

Doctrine
Heavy Protected Mobility (PM) battalions will be nested in the Armoured Infantry brigades as part of the Reaction Force. They will have numerous roles, whether providing a Riﬂe coy to an Armoured Infantry or Armoured (tank) battlegroup or being the lead troops within a deployment where tracked vehicles may be unsuitable.

Organisation
The battalion will continue to operate three Riﬂe companies, complemented by Support and Headquarter companies, and with the additional capability provided by an Assault Pioneer platoon. Heavy PM infantry platoons will be formed of 30 soldiers mounted in 4 Mastiffs.

The Air Assault Battalion

Doctrine
Air Assault forces will continue to use air manoeuvre in order to achieve decisive effect within the land environment. They will be best suited to providing a point of entry for land operations through Air Assault, Airborne and Air-Land operations.

Organisation
The two Parachute battalions within 16 Air Assault Brigade will form the core of the Air Manoeuvre Battlegroup, fully integrated with the Reserve Parachute battalion, as part of the Air Assault Task Force. Each Regular battalion will continue to have 3 Riﬂe companies, an ISTAR company, including the Reconnaissance and Communications platoons, and a Support company with Mortars, Machine Gun and Anti-Tank platoons. The brigade will remain a light, adaptable and potent force, packing a powerful punch wherever required around the world.

The Light Cavalry Regiment

Doctrine
Light Cavalry regiments will provide a highly mobile ﬁnd, understand and inﬂuence capability. They will combine the mounted reconnaissance skills of the Light Cavalry soldier with capable, battle-proven wheeled vehicles to provide a force that can operate at reach and across a wide range of different physical environments. These characteristics will ensure Light Cavalry regiments can deliver a wide range of tactical actions, from reconnaissance tasks such as scouting, screening and patrolling, to offensive actions such as the attack or raid. Light Cavalry’s versatility will ensure it will be widely employable, including in Major Combat, Counter Insurgency or Peace Support operations.

Organisation
Regular and Reserve Light Cavalry regiments will be fully integrated, with each pair in the same Adaptable Force brigade. Each Regular Light Cavalry regiment will consist of a Headquarters squadron, three Sabre squadrons, and a Command and Support squadron. Each Sabre squadron will have three Find troops of twelve men mounted on four vehicles. Three Support troops will train together as part of the Command and Support squadron in barracks. When deployed they will work with one of the Sabre squadrons to provide additional specialist capabilities such as Javelin and Snipers. Yeomanry soldiers will integrate throughout this structure at crew, troop and squadron level for exercises and deployments.

The Light Protected Mobility Battalion

Doctrine
The Light Protected Mobility (PM) capability, comprising Regular and Reserve infantry battalions will be unique and critical in the new Army 2020 structure.The integrated battalion will provide a highly deployable wheeled battlegroup capability nested within four of the infantry brigades in 1 (UK) Division, as part of the Adaptable Force.They will be prepared for numerous roles, such as reinforcing task forces or being the lead elements of an overseas operation where dismounted troops or tracked vehicles may not be the best options.

Organisation
Light PM battalions will be fully integrated with their Reserve paired battalion, from the outset of the re-role to Light PM. By 2018, the Reserve will be providing fully capable platoons to each Light PM Riﬂe company, and sections to Support company, during key collective training exercises and on operational deployments. Additionally, Light PM Regular battalions will receive a signiﬁcant uplift to their REME Light Aid Detachments.

The Light Infantry Battalion

Doctrine
Regular and Reserve Light Infantry will continue to be at the core of the modern Army’s combat capability. Under Army 2020, they will train and operate together as integrated battalions. The Light Infantry’s primary role will remain to close with and defeat the enemy in close combat. It will be especially suitable for operations in complex terrain but will also be trained and prepared for a wide range of tasks including mentoring or partnering with another nations’ forces, providing security to vital locations and reinforcing high readiness forces such as the Lead Armoured Task Force or 16 Air Assault Brigade.

Organisation
Light Infantry battalions will be nested in the seven infantry brigades of 1 (UK) Division, as part of the Adaptable Force. An integrated battalion will consist of both Regular and Reserve elements delivering up to four Riﬂe companies, a Fire Support company and a Headquarters company. The integrated Light Infantry Riﬂe company will consist of three Riﬂe platoons, one of which will be found from the Reserve, and a Machine Gun platoon.Fire Support company includes the specialist Reconnaissance, Sniper, Anti-Tank, Assault Pioneer and Mortar platoons. The Headquarters company exists to command and sustain the battalion, supported by specialist platoons including the Communications and Information Systems platoon, ISTAR platoon, a ‘Mobility Support and Training Wing’ and the Quartermaster’s department.Integrating with combat support and CSS elements generates a highly capable and ﬂexible battlegroup capable of a wide variety of missions from war-ﬁghting to stabilisation operations.

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 21 May 2015 16:33

Karnad has a point, the threshold for India to engage Pakistan in a war is much lower than with China. Hence even if China uses Pakistan as a proxy, India will engage in full force against the proxy. Losing territory to Pakistan any more than what is not under our control at present, is not an option for India. Kargil was an example of that. With China however, if it engages more aggressively with action in any of the sectors, India will be made to think twice the scale of the response. This means an extremely sound defensive posture is required on that front to keep the Chinese in taking the first step as we are loathe to engage them if not needed.

The best threat to Pakistan is takeover of PoK in the event of the next war. This will keep them quiet for some more time and not fall to Chinese pressures to engage India. The thrust should be both in the eastern and western mountain sectors.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 21 May 2015 17:34

Bade wrote: The best threat to Pakistan is takeover of PoK in the event of the next war. This will keep them quiet for some more time and not fall to Chinese pressures to engage India. The thrust should be both in the eastern and western mountain sectors.

This, I have no issues with.

Sri BK called Indo-Pak wars as Hindu-Muslim riots with tanks, soon to be with nukes. That puts the threat assessment at a different level.

As you can read, my recommendation is to increase the boots in Indian army.

Next 5 years we will see the defense budget increase by at least $6B/Year (Total $30B). My proposal is to set aside 50% ($1B/Yr) of it to recruit 75,000 new youth (18yrs+) and put them thru army engg schools with a focused training & academic regime, so you are preparing next-gen army who are tech-savvy. After 10yrs of military service (when they reach 28-30) they can slowly transition into MIC as engineers and technicians (By that time our MIC will be in full swing).

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 May 2015 00:00

News Item in Missiles thread.....

VinodTK wrote:Israel will partner India to develop missile system
:
:
Defence ministry sources on Wednesday said the contract negotiation committee had now virtually sealed the joint development of a medium-range surface-to-air missile system (MR-SAM) for the Indian Army through collaboration between DRDO and Israeli Aerospace Industries.

Defence PSU Bharat Dynamics, in turn, will undertake bulk production of the systems in India. Incidentally, Israel is among the top defence suppliers to India, having already inked deals and projects worth around $10 billion over the last 15 years, which range from spy and armed drones to sophisticated missile and radar systems.

During his visit to India in February, Israeli defence minister Moshe Ya'alon had even offered the advanced Iron Dome interceptor, which was used to intercept the flurry of rockets fired into his country last year, for PM Narendra Modi's Make in India policy.

As for the initial Army order for one regiment of the MR-SAM systems, with their multi-function surveillance and threat tracking radars as well as weapon control systems, it would cost over Rs 9,000 crore. "More orders might later follow since the Army's air defence capabilities are relatively weak," said a source.

The DRDO-IAI-BDL model is identical to the SAM projects already under way for the Navy and IAF, which are together worth around Rs 13,000 crore. While the interception range of IAF-Navy versions is 70-km, the one for the Army will be 50-km.

Such SAM systems are basically "area defence weapons" that locate, track and destroy incoming hostile aircraft, drones, missiles and helicopters. They are the advanced versions of the Israeli Barak-I "point anti-missile defence systems" with a 9-km range, which were fitted on 14 Indian warships several years ago.

The new SAM projects, however, have been plagued by huge delays. The one to arm Indian warships at a cost of Rs 2,606 crore, which was approved in December 2005, was to be completed by May 2011.

But it's only now that an Indian warship — the 6,800-tonne destroyer INS Kolkata commissioned by Modi in August last year — is gearing up for the actual test-firing of the SAM system for the first time. After its HOT (home on target) tests were completed in Israel last year, the SAM has also been fitted in another destroyer INS Kochi, which will be commissioned later this year.

The story has been similar for the Rs 10,076 crore SAM project sanctioned in February 2009 for IAF to plug the existing gaps in air defence coverage of the country. The project completion date has been pushed back to August 2016. It was this long delay, in fact, which had led India to put negotiations for the Army version on the backburner till now.

A lot of questions come to mind?

- How did the Indian Army become weak in air defence?
- How is a improvement an existing missile require so much time and money?
- How does one regiment of Indian Army requirement cost as much as the other services procurement?
Rs. 9000 vs 2606 vs 10,076 ! Is this development cost or delivered units cost?
and the range (50km vs 70 km) is less than the others?
So what is wrong in this picture?
What was Indian Army fielding before this requirement came up?

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 22 May 2015 00:01

Wonderful Campaign e-book taken out by IA for WW1 celebrations!!

Lots of archival snaps...World War 1-Remembering the Sacrifice

raj-senthil · Post by **raj-senthil** » 22 May 2015 01:19

We have to use terrorists to neutralise terrorists: Manohar Parrikar

In a statement that will create ripples across the border, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar declared on Thursday India should counter Pakistan-backed cross-border terror attacks with terrorism directed back at Pakistan.

Speaking at the Aaj Tak Manthan conclave in New Delhi on Thursday, Parrikar dropped his bombshell in response to a question about how India would react to another Mumbai-type 26/11 terror attack.

"Rather than reacting to a repeat of 26/11, it would be better not to let such an attack happen. Whatever we have to do, whether it is diplomatic, pressure tactics, or using a thorn to extract a thorn (kaante se kaanta nikalna)," answered Parrikar.

"We have to use terrorists to neutralise terrorists", he said, to applause from the audience.

"(Is this the) first time an Indian defence minister has hinted at covert response to terror attack?" tweeted Sandeep Unnithan, deputy editor at India Today, who was in the audience.

Pakistan consistently says Indian-backed terrorism is responsible for the unsettled state of Baluchistan, a claim that India vehemently rejects. In July 2009, after a meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani at Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, the joint statement mentioned Baluchistan and recognised terrorism as the "chief threat" to both countries, leading to Bharatiya Janata Party leaders accusing the government of undermining India's position by equating the victim with the perpetrator.

Separately, Parrikar said clearly for the first time that the 36 Rafale fighters that Prime Minister Narendra Modi requested the French government for during his visit to Paris last month would not be followed by more Rafales. Instead, the money saved by curtailing the Rafale contract would be used to buy large numbers of the indigenous Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA).

"By buying 36 Rafale fighters at a price less than (what was quoted in response to) the earlier tender for 126 aircraft, I have saved the cost of 90 Rafales. We will use that money to buy Tejas LCAs," said Parrikar.

This will address the concerns of aerospace experts, who had questioned the plan to buy 126 Rafales (six squadrons) to take the place of MiG-21 squadrons retiring from service this decade. It has been argued that the Rafale is too heavy, expensive and capable to replace a cheap, light, utility fighter like the MiG-21.

"The Rafale is not meant to replace the MiG-21," said Parrikar, saying he would instead buy large numbers of Tejas fighters, which he said would come cheap at a price of around Rs 150 crore each.

The Indian Air Force (IAF), which currently has 34 fighter squadrons against an assessed requirement of 42 squadrons, will lose during this decade another 7-9 squadrons of MiG-21s and MiG-27s that have already exceeded their service lives.

Yet, the IAF has ordered just 20 Tejas fighters (one squadron) from Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), with an additional order of 20 more promised after the fighter achieves final operational clearance, expected in early 2016.

Asked whether he was satisfied with the Tejas' performance, the defence minister replied he was "satisfied to a certain level".

The IAF had accorded performance waivers while giving initial operational clearance to the Tejas, but Parrikar pointed out that none of the waivers affected flight safety.

Asked whether he would deliver on his promise to appoint a tri-service chief of defence staff (CDS) within two months, Parrikar backpedalled somewhat. "By June-end, my proposal will be ready. But it is not my decision per se. It has to go before the National Security Council", he said.

srai · Post by **srai** » 22 May 2015 04:00

Talking about the French, check out the similar camo patterns.

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 23 May 2015 03:49

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 391311.cms

But the Army can take solace from the fact that Parrikar said he had imposed just a "temporary, not permanent, freeze" on the ongoing raising of the MSC, the 17 Corps, which the force feels is critical for acquiring the "requisite deterrence" against China along the 4,057-km Line of Actual Control.

The previous UPA regime had approved the raising of the 17 Corps, with 90,274 soldiers, at a cost of Rs 64,678 crore over seven years. "I agree the MSC is a necessity. I have not cancelled it. But I have put a temporary stop to it. The previous UPA government arbitrarily approved it without any fund allocation or proper planning," said Parrikar.

"It's downsizing of the plan, not the MSC itself. The 37,000 troops already inducted need infrastructure, arms and equipment, which are currently being drawn from our reserves since the previous government made no arrangements," he said.

After the review to make the Army a leaner and meaner force, the government will reconsider the entire MSC plan. "The freeze will remain until I can make arrangements to address its needs. I will first make financial provisions and then come back for completion of the task," he added.

It was in January 2014 that the Army had kicked off the raising of the 17 Corps -- which is supposed to have its permanent headquarters in Panagarh (West Bengal) -- to build "quick-reaction ground offensive capabilities" against China.

With two new infantry divisions geared for high-altitude warfare as well as armoured, artillery, air defence, engineer brigades spread from Ladakh to Sikkim, the 17 Corps was slated to be fully in place by 2018-2019. As of now, one division and its associated units have been raised, with a couple of T-72 tank regiments also being placed in Ladakh as well as Sikkim.

I guess better sense has prevailed after the China visit of the PM.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 23 May 2015 07:36

How can a corps be in ladakh and sikkim and still have one HQ.its best to plan for offensive in Sikkim to crush the salient between Sikkim and Bhutan and eat up backside of pla tawang plans and stick to that for now.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 23 May 2015 07:37

Move the parachute regt under this corps also.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 23 May 2015 08:29

Singha wrote:Move the parachute regt under this corps also.

Not a deployable formation unlike the Agra based Para Brigade. But yes, ideally we ought to raise at least one more para brigade (if not two) and then rotate them through attachments with the MSC (as and when its set up).

srin · Post by **srin** » 23 May 2015 10:18

Singha wrote:How can a corps be in ladakh and sikkim and still have one HQ.its best to plan for offensive in Sikkim to crush the salient between Sikkim and Bhutan and eat up backside of pla tawang plans and stick to that for now.

You mean the Chumbi valley ? Yeah, but what armor maneuver can you do to get there ? On the sikkim side (Nathu La etc) is all light infantry terrain. Only space for armor is ladakh - east of pangong, south of Demchok and east of DBO.

RKumar · Post by **RKumar** » 23 May 2015 13:16

VinodTK wrote:Israel will partner India to develop missile system

I hope it is DDM, we talking about making country free from missile imports in next 5 years.

Other wise, it could be we will import everything in coming 4 years so that for next 20 yrs we are satisfied