What the hell is this guy trying to insinuate? Does he has any self respect as Indian?vaibhav.n wrote:Porbeen Swami.....Need i say more!!
A short history of Indian Special Ops
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What sort of IA SF history is this?
What the hell is this guy trying to insinuate? Does he has any self respect as Indian?vaibhav.n wrote:Porbeen Swami.....Need i say more!!
A short history of Indian Special Ops
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But Karan Ji,Karan M wrote:There is something seriously wrong with the dude to begin the article with allegations which have nothing to do with Indian SF even per his own account.
But if u ask people in the know, they neither confirm nor deny the involvement of Ikhwan force. You know who constituted Ikhwan force. Some beard men in black dress unlike army......vaibhav.n wrote:Porbeen Swami.....Need i say more!!
Did someone talk or did he invent "sources?"ramana wrote:True that. By his own admission it has nothing to do with Indian SF.
Also those intelligence officials probably failed the IQ test to talk to an idiot like him.
There is only a few of the garrulous kind.
The reason I hate Praveen Swami is that he is a bad journalist with an inferior mind and dishonest character who passing off as a good one. Reporting by innuendo doesn't automatically get a pass just because his stories are supposedly "reveal" India doing "bad" things.sanjaykumar wrote:http://indianexpress.com/article/explai ... ecial-ops/
This is a must read. However I am not sure the Tamils were 'terrorists', a people who are despised and oppressed have a duty to gain freedom.
I am afraid there is much about India people do not want to accept, very similar to the situation in the US. Because we believe India is 'good' we shoot the messenger, like Swami.
As someone who has difficulty justifying even the death penalty for murder and in fact as someone who has had to get a 'white' person to kill laboratory animals because I could not do it, it is unsettling to read such accounts. I am amazed that there are human beings who can do this "With deliberation, it seemed, the killers left behind a watch, Indian-made, and a hand-written note: “how does your own blood feel”.
Perhaps it saved (Indian) lives.
KLNMurthy wrote:Did someone talk or did he invent "sources?"ramana wrote:True that. By his own admission it has nothing to do with Indian SF.
Also those intelligence officials probably failed the IQ test to talk to an idiot like him.
There is only a few of the garrulous kind.
It was a certain parochial connection that got him in the limelight and attentionnferior mind and dishonest character who passing off as a good one
Amitabh is saying Newton didn't discover Gravity because it has always existed. No change in policyakshat.kashyap wrote:why this constant chanting of "no change in policy", are you trying to say that credit for this operation should go to UPA govt.?
Media Management hasn't been Modi Sarkar's strong suit. The TerrorBoat sinking is another example. The reason for a bit of unbridled jingoism (much needed) was pressure relief from being a caged tiger for so long. The animal is relishing its kill. The Indian public wants it too. Its a collective catharsis.Raja Bose wrote:Anujan, I think we are saying the same thing. The op on the ground required secrecy from the Myanmar military and that was handled correctly. What was not handled correctly by GoI was too much trumpeting of the fact that we crossed over into Myanmar without their knowledge
IndraD wrote:It seems congi assets have identified Doval as efficient task master who has potential to deliver, if presstitutes are criticising him, he must be doing a commendable job!
http://www.firstpost.com/world/armys-my ... 90698.html
Army's Myanmar strike: Blindly following the Doval doctrine can make India most dangerous place on Earth
Drawing a line between Lanjote and Indian special ops is complete BS. That said, he's right about retaliation (a surprising view); the IA does not let provocations go unpunished even if the details of response never makes into nightly TV debates.vaibhav.n wrote:Porbeen Swami.....Need i say more!!
Excerpts:A short history of Indian Special Ops
Has Prime Minister Narendra Modi changed the rules of the game? Yes, and no. It’s often imagined that the Indian Army has been a passive victim of enemy atrocities — but it has, in fact, dished out at least as good as it has got. In Myanmar, the Indian Army has staged largescale cross-border operations in 1999 and 2006. In 2009, it pushed Northeast insurgents out of Bhutan. Indian intelligence services have successfully operated in Nepal, Bangladesh, and even Pakistan. For the most part, the Army is also believed to have retaliated against atrocities — though without publicity.
Inside the culture of covert killing
PRAVEEN SWAMI
Early in the summer of 1988, as scorching winds of death blew across Punjab, a short, wiry man entered the Golden Temple, invisible among the great throngs of pilgrims gathering at the shrine from across India. Inside, he was greeted as an honoured guest by Surjit Singh Penta, the Khalistan terror commander who had made the temple his fortress. For the next several days, Mr. Penta worked with his visitor, an officer assigned by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, wiring up the temple with explosives. The threat, he was certain, would deter India from considering storming the temple, as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had done in 1984.
New Delhi ignored Mr. Penta’s threats: the bombs were duds, and the man Mr. Penta thought was an ISI officer would serve, decades later, as Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB). Nine days into an almost bloodless siege, the terrorists surrendered
Like many intelligence officials, Ajit Kumar Doval has never discussed what happened in the Golden Temple. Those who served during the period, though, speak of skilful deception operations that allowed the penetration of the networks linking Mr. Penta to the ISI; of the interception and disappearance of the Pakistani intelligence official as he made his way across the Punjab border to Amritsar.
The President of India later handed Mr. Doval a small silver disc, embossed with the great wheel of dharma and a lotus wreath, and the words Kirti Chakra.
For influential traditions of human rights discourse in and outside India, the law represents a kind of secular version of divine will: a credo that will build a utopian order, free of the filth of politics. “The law liberals venerate,” John Gray has noted in a stellar essay, “isn’t a free-standing institution towering majestically above the chaos of human conflict.”
Instead, Gray pointed out, “modern law is an artefact of state power.” “Western governments,” he went on, “blunder around the world gibbering about human rights; but there can be no rights without the rule of law and no rule of law in a fractured or failed state.”
The Indian republic, fractured from the moment of its birth, faced stark choices between order and law — which are not, as we fondly imagine, the same thing. Its ill-trained, ill-equipped and understaffed criminal justice system just didn’t have the resources to deliver justice. Killing is a lot easier to do than building capacities for surveillance, investigation and prosecution. Torture thus came to substitute for criminal investigation; the bullet through the back of the head for prosecution and punishment.
The awful truth is this worked: each life not lost in Punjab or Tripura or Andhra Pradesh is a powerful argument for the proposition that the morally-condemnable can also be praiseworthy.
The costs of victory
Yet, these victories have come at an unacceptable price. They absolved governments of responsibility for actions that engendered crisis in the first place: there’s never been a Commission of Inquiry into Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s sponsorship of religious reaction in Punjab, to cite just one example. They also freed the state of any compelling incentive to change its behaviour. India's police and intelligence services aren't fundamentally better off than they were decades ago. Police forces, the government's own data shows, don’t meet even basic norms. The intelligence services are grossly understaffed and underskilled, with the bulk of staff committed to duties which have nothing to do with national security.
India’s security services may be able to stamp out insurgencies, but not ensure the maintenance of a public culture based on law, the keystone of a democracy. We’re left, thus, with a perpetual-motion machine of killing, unable to stop the republic from dissolving into a state of criminal injustice.
According to assessments being conducted by the Army with Intelligence services, just seven bodies have been recovered so far — as reported by The Indian Express on June 9 — and wireless intercepts suggest less than a dozen insurgents were injured.
Moreover, the targets, one camp in Onzia and two adjacent camps in Ponyo, did not hit perpetrators of the June 4 ambush that killed 18 Army personnel, said a senior military intelligence official who is involved in collating these assessments.
“These camps were chosen for reasons of tactical viability, rather than specific retaliatory intent,” said the official, “given the short time frame available…the main idea was to deliver a message that camps across the border were not safe for anyone.”
they are congi media arm sir, need i say more?Hari Seldon wrote:The praveen swami, Burkha and coupta types seem ISI-compromised. The packees likely have the goods on them - evidence of monetary, honeytrap or other blackmail. Ideology alone doesn't explain their sticking neck out and actively sowing FUD when silence would have done just as well. They're being goaded to do this, IMO. Am sure IB has dossiers on them. MAD will, to paraphrase Col. Rathore, "strike at a place and time of its choosing."
In a classic study on the evolution of co-operation in the early 1980s, political scientist Robert Axelrod demonstrated that the best way to ensure desired behaviour in an adversary is to engage in tit-for-tat. This seems juvenile, even repugnant to many civilised people. Yet, counter-intuitive as it may be, tit-for-tat strategies are known to bring about peace and stability among irreconcilable adversaries who do not trust each other.
With this week’s cross-border raid by Indian special forces against militant camps, the Modi government has given it back to the NSCN(Khaplang) and KYKL guerrillas for their unprovoked ambush of Indian army troops a few days earlier. That the retaliation is heavier than the provocation is calculated to signal New Delhi’s new determination—both to the militants and to the Indian people—to take the fight to the enemy. If the militants get the message and desist from further attacks, then this chapter has ended for now. If they do not, and decide to up the ante, New Delhi will be faced with tougher decisions on escalating or deepening the conflict.As the raid has shown, India’s armed forces have adequate capacity to not only retaliate successfully but to dominate the adversary. However, if the conflict draws on, other factors: political and diplomatic costs, co-operation from the foreign governments, public perception and conflict economies will begin to take the shine off. The militants know this, and we should not be surprised if they try to regain psychological advantage by trying to draw the Indian armed forces into more fighting. The Modi government’s challenge will be to quickly consolidate psychological and military gains from this conflict and use intelligence and political methods to prevent the need for such operations in the future.
What about the wider implications of this attack? First, militant groups operating on India’s frontiers and within India will have to reckon with the risk that New Delhi will more readily employ military force against them. Also, public opinion is largely supportive of the government taking a muscular approach to conflict management. Therefore, it is likely that they will have greater pause for thought before crossing thresholds of violence.Second, it should be noted that New Delhi’s act was a punitive, retaliatory strike and not an unprovoked armed intervention in an ongoing conflict. It is an act of “offensive defence” which implicitly lays down a red line: New Delhi will not act with force if the line is not crossed (and, conversely, act decisively it it is). This position opens up space for negotiated settlement, albeit on terms favouring the Indian government.
Third, we should not immediately expect the Modi government to take an interventionist approach in conflicts in India’s subcontinental and maritime neighbourhood. New Delhi’s response to the arrest and incarceration of former Maldives’ pro-India president Mohamed Nasheed and the provocative rhetoric by President Yameen’s officials has been hands off, with a mild diplomatic rebuke at best. We should not therefore expect this week’s operation to indicate a new willingness in New Delhi to militarily intervene in neighbourhood’s domestic or international conflicts that do not have a direct bearing on India’s defence.Fourth, there has been rhetoric–some deliberately employed by the Modi government’s politicians–suggesting that New Delhi could do the same vis-a-vis Pakistan should the need arise. Many analysts, especially Pakistani ones, have countered this by drawing attention to the nuclear angle and to the fact that unlike the Myanmarese government, Islamabad will not countenance an Indian military operation, even a limited targeted one involving special forces, on its soil. They are not wrong in this contention.
However, the Modi government’s highly publicised cross-border raid challenges the comfortable conclusions drawn by the Pakistani military-jihadi complex that they can carry out terrorist attacks against India with impunity, secure in the knowledge that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will limit New Delhi’s response. India’s national security requires communicating to the malcontents in Pakistan that if New Delhi exercises restraint, it is by its own choice. India could very well choose to respond with force, putting the ball in Pakistan’s court on whether it is Rawalpindi/Islamabad that now wants to escalate the conflict.
This is obviously risky. The Modi government is hinting that it is prepared to take such a risk. For instance, it is common knowledge that both Pakistani and Indian troops cross the Line of Control to carry out minor tactical operations. The next time a terrorist attack is traced back to Pakistan, New Delhi might well decide to let special forces cross the Line of Control deeper into Pakistani-held territory. The Line of Control, after all, is not an international border. No Indian prime minister, not even Narendra Modi, wants to be in a situation where he has to order this. But he just might. Pakistan, for its part, no longer enjoys the patronage and sympathy of the West as it once did. The generals in Pakistan, like everyone else in India’s neighbourhood who play around with guns and lives, should rework their calculations.Finally, while the Modi government deservedly basks in the afterglow of a prompt and effective military operation–the first such in years–it should realise that this will not happen every time. Public memory is short and reaction to adverse outcomes severe. It is important, therefore, to have a measure of sobriety and composure in public messaging, once the immediate celebrations are over.
Singha wrote:meantime khaplang is in a rangoon hospital this week. looks like he deftly fell ill and was flown to rangoon for treatment leaving his boys to die.
I read even NSCN (IM) was ready to help in hunting down NSCN (K)..but government said we are capable... unable to locate the link. Any one remembers or seen it?chetak wrote:Singha wrote:meantime khaplang is in a rangoon hospital this week. looks like he deftly fell ill and was flown to rangoon for treatment leaving his boys to die.
didn't some chota rajan type crooks attack some enemies in a thai hospital??
Could not the RAW task something like that on this khaplang creep??
Myanmar operation: Government turned down NSCN-IM offer to take on rival NSCN-K
Thursday, 11 June 2015 - 11:00pm IST | Place: New Delhi | Agency: PTI
There was an offer from NSCN-IM to security forces that it would like to join the operations against NSCN-K militants in Manipur, Nagaland as well as across Indo-Myanmar border immediately after the June 4 incident, sources privy to the development said. However, government turned down the offer saying it was capable of dealing with the Naga insurgent group.
NSCN (Issac-Munivah), which is in peace talks with the Centre, had expressed its desire to help security forces hunt down its arch rival NSCN-K rebels, who killed 18 soldiers in Manipur, but the offer was turned down.
There was an offer from NSCN-IM to security forces that it would like to join the operations against NSCN-K militants in Manipur, Nagaland as well as across Indo-Myanmar border immediately after the June 4 incident, sources privy to the development said. However, government turned down the offer saying it was capable of dealing with the Naga insurgent group.
On Tuesday, Special Force of the Army had attacked rebel camps deep inside Myanmar and inflicted heavy casualties on them. Two top leaders of NSCN-IM, Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, were once close friends of NSCN-K chief S S Khaplang. The trio had revolted against the Shillong Accord of November 1975 which was signed by Angami Zapu Phizo's Naga National Council.
The three leaders then formed NSCN (Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland). In April 1988, Khaplang announced the formation of NSCN-K after making an unsuccessful attempt on Muivah's life.Khaplang now heads recently-floated United National Liberation Front of Western South-East Asia, an umbrella group of five more rebel outfits from northeastern region, including ULFA, PLA and NDFB(S). NSCN-K, along with a few Manipuri outfits, were responsible for the killing of 18 army men in Chandel district of Manipur on June 4.