Indian Navy News & Discussion - 22 April 2015

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 18 Jun 2015 17:23

Dream:

June 12, 2015 :: Carl Vinson, Ronald Reagan and John C. Stennis

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 18 Jun 2015 19:47

Note double layer anti frogmen nets

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 18 Jun 2015 21:06

Dream2 - 3 huge carriers and a naval visionary like him as fleet commander

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 19 Jun 2015 06:26

^^^ Hope to see at least 3 Vikrant class carriers together at Karwar

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 19 Jun 2015 06:30

NRao wrote:Dream:

http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnnnext/dam/as ... er-169.jpg

June 12, 2015 :: Carl Vinson, Ronald Reagan and John C. Stennis

The interesting thing about this image is not the power on display with all those carriers, but the national ability to keep dockyards and industries busy churning out these toys. The possession and wielding is less than half the story

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 19 Jun 2015 06:45

yes, massive investments have been steadily done over decades to have 1 carrier always in construction and 1 in heavy multi-yr refit with the rest free to train or deploy. and they are not letting up...3 new carriers are already funded.

one thing i like about khan naval docks apart from sheer size(necessity) is they have ample land and keep a lot of clear area near the ships(car park above) to prevent any mishap from spreading nearby.

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 19 Jun 2015 06:56

Check out Norfolk (naval base) and the adjacent Newport News shipyard in google maps. Two new carriers getting built and three at the base. That is just 5 flat tops in one place.

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 19 Jun 2015 07:01

We should be able to build the larger dry dock at CSL extending into the lake making room for super carriers and super tankers on the North side of the current activity. This way one can have 2 or 3 large dry docks for use far into the future.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 19 Jun 2015 09:07

I think admiral Yamamoto's vision of a deep undetected strike(long detour via the aleutians, total radio silence, high opsec, high speed) by a mass of 6 carriers, UNACCOMPANIED by battleships with the best air wings and unleashing 300 planes at once was a milestone in naval history.

it cemented the place of the carrier as the most powerful striker in the seas , able to unleash hell from long range like 250km out and then disappear at high speed into the deep ocean....no longer needing to grapple with enemy at visual range.

nothing has come to replace it in 70 years now.

the most powerful battleships like yamato, mushashi, prince of wales were sunk rather easily by air power. the bismark was cripped in her rudder by a torpedo from a fairey swordfish a ancient moth eaten biplane flying off a converted type bartania carrier....truly a case of a moth taking on a elephant.

the tirpitz and pearl harbour ships sunk at their moorings by bombs and torpedoes.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 19 Jun 2015 09:12

must have taken rogue sized brass balls to fly that biplane into the teeth of the hailstorm of gunfire from the AA guns of the 50,000t bismark....the swordfish is no more than a crop duster , unsafe and weak on a bright sunny day over a cornfield...not to speak of hunting the worlds mightiest ship, slayer of the Hood and mauler of the prince of wales over hostile waters and fog of the north atlantic.

gotta give the devils their due, the RN can sure fight even with less resources. their successful attack on Taranto was another example.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 19 Jun 2015 09:51

By 2020 the RuN is to get approx.7 Boreis and another 7 Yasens.This is a massive scale of N-sub building. The GOI has to accelerate our sub building skills asap.This is is the weakest part of the IN.PLAN N-subs ana AIP subs are now making regular patrols in the IOR. We need forward patrols in the Indo-China Sea as well.

SNaik · Post by **SNaik** » 19 Jun 2015 11:24

Philip wrote:By 2020 the RuN is to get approx.7 Boreis and another 7 Yasens.This is a massive scale of N-sub building. The GOI has to accelerate our sub building skills asap.This is is the weakest part of the IN.PLAN N-subs ana AIP subs are now making regular patrols in the IOR. We need forward patrols in the Indo-China Sea as well.

Actually, Naval Shipbuilding Plan calls for 8 Borei and 7 Yasen by 2020. The ugly truth is that Knyaz Valdimir, Borei hull #4, and Kazan, Yasen hull #2, are going to be launched only in December 2016.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 19 Jun 2015 15:43

are all the akulas going to be MLUed...how many serving Akulas and Delta4 are there?
is delta4 the only other remaining ssbn class and akula for ssn?

RoyG · Post by **RoyG** » 19 Jun 2015 20:20

These carrier battle groups are going to be sitting ducks with mach 2+ supersonic anti ship cruise missiles becoming the mainstay of major navies. With the development of mach 7 brahmos and AshBM, it will take some time before laser technology can catch up.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 19 Jun 2015 20:28

RoyG wrote:These carrier battle groups are going to be sitting ducks with mach 2+ supersonic anti ship cruise missiles becoming the mainstay of major navies. With the development of mach 7 brahmos and AshBM, it will take some time before laser technology can catch up.

As mentioned in the missile thread, Mach 2 (Mach 2.5 terminal) terminal sea skimming targets and Mach 3-4 high altitude targets are routinely shot down by the ESSM and SM6's, and even foreign systems (France) have done this on a couple of occasions (iirc). If you want a 200 nm sea-skimming mach 3 missile - have at it

Its going to be large and that will limit the aircraft that can carry it and of course you'll have targeting challenges to overcome.

As far as Mach 7 missiles are concerned, expect mach 5-6 targets to be out as the USAF itself funds Mach 5-6 HSSW development that followed on from the X-51 Waverider. Mach 7 missiles in the anti-ship domain are at least 15 years out if not more. Even the USAF that has the most amount of testing on Scramjet through various programs but most importantly the X-51 does not expect to launch a weapons program by 2020 (i.e. to develop a weapons prototype by 2018-2020 and use that to develop a full fledged weapons system). So don't expect even Mach 5-6 scramjets to be operational before 2030 or thereabouts. The longest Scramjet powered Mach 5 flight was for 3 minutes and wasn't that far back and was done by the X-51 team. The challenges are to understand this speed range, understand scramjet technology, build prototype missiles/vehicles, conduct a lot lot more testing and its an area that will take a long time to mature and develop especially if the goal is to get something like 2x the terminal speed of the current Ramjet supersonic anti ship missiles (Mach 2 to Mach 2.5). If the impression exists that they are right 'on the horizon' then I am afraid that 'right on the horizon' has been the phrase for scramjets and more broadly air breathing hypersonics since the 80's.

Also, Lasers are not your main go to point defense against ballistic missiles, your missiles and EMRG are -

http://news.usni.org/2015/01/05/navy-wa ... s-says-rfi

Anti ship ballistic missiles are a far larger long term threat but as mentioned by others, none has ever tested them and for a weapons solution that has not been tested and tested repeatedly involving land based, space based and sea based assets against a fully hard-and soft protected mobile target 2000 nm out at sea you are not going to develop much capability other than some hype. Its a long term threat with the short-medium term threat from the DF21 is more hype than reality.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 19 Jun 2015 20:36

What is not a "sitting duck"?

"Sitting duck": Identify an (enemies) asset and be able to target it.

Because of that there is an entire industry to prevent identification or target the asset that is targeting the "sitting duck".

An endless cat-n-mouse game that keeps MICs chugging.

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 19 Jun 2015 21:20

Singha wrote:must have taken rogue sized brass balls to fly that biplane into the teeth of the hailstorm of gunfire from the AA guns of the 50,000t bismark....the swordfish is no more than a crop duster , unsafe and weak on a bright sunny day over a cornfield...not to speak of hunting the worlds mightiest ship, slayer of the Hood and mauler of the prince of wales over hostile waters and fog of the north atlantic.

gotta give the devils their due, the RN can sure fight even with less resources. their successful attack on Taranto was another example.

The aiming device fitted on Bismarcks anti aircraft guns, such as it was in those days, was designed for faster flying planes. The lowest speed target at which those guns could operate was higher than the speed at which the swordfish biplanes attacked. This allowed the biplanes to conduct successful torpedo runs without even a single plane being hit. This limitation of the German weapon system was not known to the pilots and navigators flying in the planes and it indeed required bravery of the highest order.

There were other instances of biplanes creating trouble, simply by being obsolete. There was a Russian biplane used in Korea for harassment raids on the UN (read US) forces. A jet was sent up to shoot it down at night time, but the biplane was so slow, that in an attempt to match its speed, the jet slowed down below its stall speed and crashed. An entire fleet of such planes would have the enemy prepare, but if used along with an element of surprise, even obsolete weapon systems can make the difference in war!

member_20067 · Post by **member_20067** » 19 Jun 2015 21:24

SNaik wrote:
Philip wrote:By 2020 the RuN is to get approx.7 Boreis and another 7 Yasens.This is a massive scale of N-sub building. The GOI has to accelerate our sub building skills asap.This is is the weakest part of the IN.PLAN N-subs ana AIP subs are now making regular patrols in the IOR. We need forward patrols in the Indo-China Sea as well.
Actually, Naval Shipbuilding Plan calls for 8 Borei and 7 Yasen by 2020. The ugly truth is that Knyaz Valdimir, Borei hull #4, and Kazan, Yasen hull #2, are going to be launched only in December 2016.

Given the oil price those projections are gone for a toss...... Russian economy has long bleak future---the recent re-arming effort was based on sustained...100 dollars/barrel...

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 19 Jun 2015 21:55

The price of oil was a huge factor, no doubt (for the entire economy in fact).

However, exports too - of various items - was also a crucial consideration. And, that too has not happened and has hurt them.

Finally, their R&D has relatively lagged - it is still potent, but not as much as one would expect it to be.

Perfect storm.

I think the IL-476 provides great tea leaves for reading the situation.

SNaik · Post by **SNaik** » 20 Jun 2015 12:40

Singha wrote:are all the akulas going to be MLUed...how many serving Akulas and Delta4 are there?
is delta4 the only other remaining ssbn class and akula for ssn?

Yes, current plans call for MLU of all remaining Akulas AND Oscars AND Sierras, in fact, 2 Aulas, Sierra and Oscar are geting MLU at Zvezdocha enterprize in Severodvinsk. There are plans for upgrade of Amur Zvezda enterprize in Far East in order to speed up MLU, as Zvezdocha is already swamped with orders. Delta4 is not going to get MLU, just maintenance. Ther's a couple of Delta3 left in Pacific which will be passed out as soon as the first Borei shows up there.
There are very few operational Akulas: 1-2 in Pacific and 2-3 in North.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 20 Jun 2015 20:04

Media reports say that the IN is worried about its depleting sub force. No easy options for a quick_fix,though we were offered é Amurs some time back. I remember a decade + ago that there was talk of Amur acquisition.Ironic if we acquire/leqase more conventional subs from Rusia.The reports say that the torpedoes for the Scorpenes have not been finalised and a dsperate IN is trying to get a waivre rom the GOI to purchase asap Whithead BlackSharks from Italy!

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 20 Jun 2015 20:19

SNaik wrote: Yes, current plans call for MLU of all remaining Akulas AND Oscars AND Sierras, in fact, 2 Aulas, Sierra and Oscar are geting MLU at Zvezdocha enterprize in Severodvinsk. There are plans for upgrade of Amur Zvezda enterprize in Far East in order to speed up MLU, as Zvezdocha is already swamped with orders. Delta4 is not going to get MLU, just maintenance. Ther's a couple of Delta3 left in Pacific which will be passed out as soon as the first Borei shows up there.
There are very few operational Akulas: 1-2 in Pacific and 2-3 in North.

Not All but only 6 Akula , 4 Oscar-2 and 2 Sierra-2 ( 12 SSN/SSGN ) , The rest would be discarded after end of life

Delta 4 are already upgrade or being upgraded as it goes into Life entension Program with Sonar and other things plus the new Liner SLBM an upgrade of Sineva....Delta 3 as you said is almost end of life

Samudragupta · Post by **Samudragupta** » 20 Jun 2015 22:55

Why dont the Russians give us the Yassens? Now that they need the much needed cash and we need SSNs??

Samudragupta · Post by **Samudragupta** » 20 Jun 2015 23:23

Arun Menon wrote:^Ok. Any reasons to prefer the the Swedish sub?

The single most utility for the DE subs is to use it as the hunter killer platforms for underwater subs in the IOR specially for the noisy PLAN subs....Nothing can be better than the Swedish technologies which are probably the world leader in the underwater stealth technologies......Soryu carries the Swedish AIP from Kockums... Japs are not interested to provide their Soryus for India....experiences with the NATO navies in the Atlantic bear testimonial to that... now add this SAAB offer for full TOT for the Gripen E with the source code and advance production procedures to be setup in India....and the fact that PAF uses Saab supplied AWACS for command and control.....

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 21 Jun 2015 08:42

IDRW - @ almost 3000cr per minesweeper these got to be the biggest and baddest in the world imo.

GSL Rs 32,000 cr order creates scope for Goa industries, vendors
Published June 21, 2015 | By admin

SOURCE: NAVHIND TIMES

Ministry of Defense, Govt of India, has placed a large order on Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) for building 12 mine sweepers valued at Rs. 32,000 crores. This is a landmark order and can be a potential game changer for GSL as well as the industries in Goa, who can partner with GSL to support such a large shipbuilding activity in Goa as component suppliers and subcontractors.

A high level Indian delegation visited Republic of Korea during 15 to 18 Apr 2015 and held interactions with the representatives of Korean business houses on possibilities of increasing business opportunities between the two countries through setting up of shipbuilding auxiliary equipment Industry in India directly or through collaborations / joint ventures with Indian business houses in line with ‘Make in India’ theme of Government.

It was observed that success of Korean shipbuilding Industry was mainly due to very efficient supply chain of raw material, equipment and fittings within close proximity and cost competitiveness due to scale of production and quality. In view of large shipbuilding orders with various shipyards, including MCMV Project to be executed by GSL, the companies involved in shipbuilding / MCMV were invited to visit India / Goa to participate in setting up of manufacturing units in collaboration with local industry.

The business houses from City of Busan, which is a major Shipbuilding Hub in Republic of Korea, facilitated by the Mayor of Busan and other suppliers have agreed to visit India. The Korean delegation of these industries (28 Companies) has agreed to interact with the local industry for three days in Goa.

Against this backdrop, Confederation of Indian Industry, Goa State in association with GSL is organizing a two-day convention in Goa from 24 to 26 Jun 2015, for understanding the capabilities of each of these industries through B2B meetings between representatives from various Indian shipbuilders and business houses with the Korean counterparts

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 21 Jun 2015 10:27

Absurd cost.Had we designed our own vessels'with tech input from various yards,we could've had these in service years ago. However,a weakness in the IN's strength being taken care of,but should be built at speed.

I think thqt the Yasen will be too costly and technologically a challebge to operate.We're still learning the ropes of the Chakra/Akula_é.More Akulas on leasee preferable for now.

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 21 Jun 2015 11:40

^Ooooh, too good for the SDREs is it? Is it only a step away from starship enterprise? Maybe it has photon torpedos.

SNaik · Post by **SNaik** » 21 Jun 2015 15:57

Austin wrote:
SNaik wrote: Yes, current plans call for MLU of all remaining Akulas AND Oscars AND Sierras, in fact, 2 Aulas, Sierra and Oscar are geting MLU at Zvezdocha enterprize in Severodvinsk. There are plans for upgrade of Amur Zvezda enterprize in Far East in order to speed up MLU, as Zvezdocha is already swamped with orders. Delta4 is not going to get MLU, just maintenance. Ther's a couple of Delta3 left in Pacific which will be passed out as soon as the first Borei shows up there.
There are very few operational Akulas: 1-2 in Pacific and 2-3 in North.
Not All but only 6 Akula , 4 Oscar-2 and 2 Sierra-2 ( 12 SSN/SSGN ) , The rest would be discarded after end of life

Delta 4 are already upgrade or being upgraded as it goes into Life entension Program with Sonar and other things plus the new Liner SLBM an upgrade of Sineva....Delta 3 as you said is almost end of life

Austin, your numbers are referring to the current contract with Zvezdochka only. There are currently 12 Akulas, 8 Oscars and 4 Sierras which are listed as active/under repairs/reserve and the plan is (prbably rather "was") to modernize them all.
Delta4 is not getting an upgrade (with exception of missiles and linked systems (software upgrades)) just a "recovery of technical readiness", Russian term for SLEP. They have the same Skat-BRDM sonar, Omnibus CIC and Medvedica comms as before.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 21 Jun 2015 17:32

the south korean navy has a grand total of 3 x 900t YangYang class mine hunting vessels in service. construction ceased in 2008. they are alleged to have invested more in mine hunting helicopter based systems post that.

per globalsecurity, all the eqpt was american or european in origin.

---
The minehunting capabilities consist of: the Thomson Marconi SAS TSM 2061 Mk 3 combat system integrating a Thomson Marconi 2093 variable depth minehunting sonar; Raytheon I-band navigation radar; and two Italian Gaymarine Pluto Gigas ROVs. The ships are also fitted with the BAE Systems Wire Sweep Mk 9 deep wire sweep system and CIS combined influence sweep. Self-defence is provided by a Sea Vulcan Gatling 20 mm light AA gun and two 7.62 mm machine guns.

A Kongsberg Simrad integrated navigation and dynamic positioning system is fitted to aid in precise manoeuvring during minehunting and route survey operations. The machinery system comprises two MTU 2,000 bhp diesels driving two independent vertical Voith-Schneider cycloidal propellers through a gearbox and universal joint shaft. A 134 hp thruster is transversely mounted in the bow for precise manoeuvring. Machinery control is exercised through an Integrated Platform Management System (IPMS) supplied by CAE of Canada and sited in the machinery control room. The digital IPMS monitors and controls the ship's entire hull electrical and mechanical systems as well as the propulsion, electrical distribution, steering, damage control and navigation system. A microprocessor-based semi-automatic manoeuvring system co-ordinates the movements of the cycloidal propellers. In addition the engines can be controlled from the wheelhouse or from a local position in the engine room.

---

so if we lack the GRP hull making capability why dont we get that from euro shipyard , buy or develop all the necessary systems like the above and integrate the whole thing ourselves. it looks no bigger than a Tarantul class boat..perhaps the massive price tag is for the imported mission equipment......for 5 decades TSP has been planning to lay mines both from SSK and from mini-subs , PNS Ghazi blew up under our chair laying mines and here we are with no equipment for mine hunting and no ships either after the retirement of the pondicherry class.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 21 Jun 2015 18:24

Navy transfers Kiran jet trainers to Air Force

June 21, 2015
The Navy has transferred nine Kiran jet-trainer aircraft from its inventory to the Air Force, which is facing an acute shortage of intermediate jet trainers.

Naval sources have confirmed that the assets have been transferred from the Naval air station INS Hansa in Goa where the Kiran fleet is based.

“The ab initio training takes place with the Air Force. The Navy now has the Hawk advanced jet trainers and so they [Kiran] have been transferred to the Air Force,” a senior Navy official said.

Naval aviators are oriented on the Kiran trainers after which they graduate to frontline fighter jets such as Sea Harriers and MiG-29 Ks. However, the Navy recently inducted the Hawk advanced jet trainers (AJT) and has completely migrated to them for this stage of training.

While the Kiran trainers help in mid-level flying before trainees move on to the AJTs, they are over 30 years old and in urgent need of replacement.

The HJT-36 Sitara intermediate jet trainer being developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. is facing technical issues and has missed several developmental deadlines.

So severe is the crisis that the IAF was forced to disband its aerobatic team, Surya Kiran, and divert the planes for training. The shortage of trainers has forced the IAF to cut down on the flying hours of trainee pilots.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 22 Jun 2015 06:37

NZ navy chief on Chinese foray in Indian Ocean

Interestingly, China's recent assertive white paper on defence talks about enhancing its naval reach for the first time to "open seas protection" far from its shores.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 22 Jun 2015 06:44

Dragon vs elephant (Part-1): Indian Navy’s massive modernization drive

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Ocean is fast turning into one of the busiest oceans in the world. Most of the world’s oil supply passes through this region which makes secure sea lines very vital. Who will play a major role in the Indian Ocean is often a topic of debate. India has a large responsibility in the region, being a powerful and democratic nation with peaceful ambitions. The US has a military presence in the form of its base, Diego Garcia. However, China has been repeatedly making forays into this region of late, to showcase its naval reach and project power. This has turned the Indian Ocean into a playground for powerful navies.

Australian researcher Lindsay Hughes, who is now a contributing guest author for Defencyclopedia, analyses the role and growth of Indian and Chinese navies. This is 4-part series will document the historical, geographical, economic and military reasons reaponsible for the military buildup and this article is the first one in the series.

Summary

To protect their growing economies, China and India have securitised their sea-borne trade routes by enhancing their naval prowess, which act enhances their seapower. This enhancement, however, causes each other concern by making each suspicious of the other’s intention. Thus, they further strengthen their navies, leading to a cycle of enhanced naval power and growing suspicion.

For strategic reasons – sometimes referred to as the logic of their growth – China and India deploy – or plan to deploy – their navies near each other’s maritime borders. China is creating strategic relationships with littoral states in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and India does likewise, with the same states and others in the East and South China Seas. This leads each to further debate the other’s intentions to understand how those may impact upon their own interests. What remains unclear to the independent observer, however, is whether the intention of both countries in developing their navies is defensive or if each has an underlying agenda for its naval enhancement.

India has adopted a policy of upgrading its naval capacity since the 1980s.Given China’s growing presence in the IOR and its long-standing power competition with India, this section will consider whether India’s on-going naval modernisation aims to achieve an active force posture driven by its strategic intent to have secure open-ocean access or if China’s growing naval ambitions compel New Delhi to respond. It will do this by examining India’s naval growth, its force posture and its maritime policy in relation to extending its influence in South-East and East Asia.

This study, therefore, will examine the reasons for the enhancement of Chinese and Indian naval capability, to determine if these are benign or otherwise.
Analysis
India’s Naval Modernisation

Between 1980 and 2009, however, the Indian Navy progressed from being a “brown-water” to almost a “blue-water” force; i.e. from one relatively bound to a land base to one almost capable of projecting power at considerable distances from its bases. In 1980 the Indian Navy’s core comprised of ten Soviet-origin Petya-class frigates, two Whitby-class frigates, five Leander-class frigates, and three Nanuchka-class corvettes. In total, there were twenty three major warships, including one aging aircraft carrier. Unsurprisingly, when during the so-called “Tanker War” period of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 – 1997 the largest number of tankers to be hit in the Persian Gulf were Indian, the Indian Navy did not deploy, leave alone take action to protect them. While government policy may have been responsible to some extent for this lack of action, the fact that long-range ships were so scarce as to make any retaliatory action impossible provides a better reason.
Leander ‘Nilgiri’ class frigate
The old INS Vikrant was decomissioned in 1997

By 2010, however, these older ships had been decommissioned. In their place are one more modern aircraft carrier, fourteen operational submarines and 34 major war ships. There are also eight world-class hydrography vessels, which have completed several major oceanographic surveys in the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans for the Indian Navy. However, the planned 140-ship navy is still a far way off, since various Indian governments have allocated more of the defence budget to the air force and army. Nonetheless, the modernisation of the Indian Navy has advanced considerably.

By 2013, ninety five per cent of India’s foreign trade by volume and seventy five per cent by value was conducted by sea; also, more than seventy per cent of its oil was imported by sea. With India’s economic growth, its navy has grown in importance. This growth may be measured by three parameters: the number of ships, their size and the number of missile batteries per ship. The following Table gives an indication of the Indian navy’s growth.

Indian Navy in 1991 – 2012

The Indian Navy has remained more or less static in the number of its ships. It is the number of ship-borne missile cells available today that indicate its modernisation. This begs the question, why is India modernising its navy? Does it, like China, seek regional hegemony? Does it conform to Mahan’s theory of sea power and Mearsheimer’s offensive-realism? These questions are best answered by examining its process of modernisation, the types of vessels being built and acquired, and its maritime strategy.

Missiles first made their appearance in the Indian Navy in 1971 during the Indo-Pakistani War, when they were used in Operations Trident and Python to effectively neutralise the Pakistani Navy in Karachi for the term of the war. This success led the Indian Navy to convert the main armament of their ships to missiles. More recently, the Shivalik and Talwar-class ships have been fitted with modern Klub (Russian Novator KH-54 TE) active radar-homing missiles as well as the Russo-Indian supersonic Brahmos missiles. The Klubs have been replaced by the Brahmos missiles on the very latest Talwar-class ships being built in Russia. However, missiles are a standard part of a ship’s armament today and can be offensive or defensive in nature, making it is difficult to gauge India’s strategic maritime intent from their numbers alone; other facets of the Indian Navy’s modernisation must be examined to reach a reasonable conclusion.
Shivalik class
INS Vikramaditya

Building an aircraft carrier is one of the biggest and most complex tasks of any navy. India planned to build a twenty thousand ton carrier, but its tonnage was soon expanded to forty thousand. Additionally, the Indian Navy has purchased the refitted Russian aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, as its second carrier. A third carrier, designed to accommodate thirty fighter aircraft, is being built at the Kochi Shipyard in Kerala, India.

Aircraft carriers are the most conspicuous symbol of a nation’s ability to project maritime power. They carry fighter aircraft, primarily to take the battle to an enemy and move it away from the homeland. As such, they are offensive by their very nature. The Indian Navy plans to operate three carriers by 2017. This demonstrates India’s desire to be acknowledged as a maritime power and, more broadly, a rising world power. To an extent, it also demonstrates India’s aspirations towards projecting its power over distances, which could demonstrate aspirations towards regional hegemony. However, while the general contours of a move towards regional hegemony are discernible, further examination is needed to determine if this is the case.

India’s ship-building industry is no match for China’s. Nevertheless, it is a collaboration between shipyards, ship designers, technical specialists, equipment suppliers and an arm of the Indian Navy called the Weapons Electronics System Engineering Establishment (WESEE). This body was established to ensure the compatibility between Russian-supplied missiles and Western electronics systems. The Indian Navy also has engineers at Mazagaon Docks in Mumbai, where the Godavari-class ships were designed and built from 1983, and the previously-noted facility at Kochi.

There is an obvious mismatch between China’s and India’s ship-building capacities. Since ship-building is an important facet of seapower, the question must be asked: does this mean India has no aspirations to regional hegemony? Up to this point, this study shows that the Indian Navy has not increased in size but has been modernised, it has plans to obtain three aircraft carriers, and it has a comparatively minor ship-building industry. These observations produce conflicting signals, making it difficult to determine if India has regional naval aspirations. This study must examine its maritime doctrine to make a determination.
Official Indian Navy CGI of the new INS Vikrant
vikrant 2
The new INS Vikrant will be ready by 2018
The Indian Navy’s Changing Force Posture

Despite traditionally being perceived as adhering to pacifist principles, India has undergone a dramatic shift in its stance on self-defence. Correspondingly, its military doctrine has also undergone significant change. India has fought four wars since independence in 1947 and as its economic and political power grew, its military situated these experiences into its doctrine. For instance, in 2004 the Indian Army began to roll out its “Cold Start” doctrine. This grew from political and military frustration with India’s inability to deter or respond to incursions such as those which led to the 1999 Kargil incident and terror attacks like that which occurred in December 2001 on the Indian Parliament. Indian leaders wanted the military to rapidly mass its troops on the Pakistani border, threatening overwhelming conventional attack on that country if it did not cease its support for attacks on India by groups based there. The military, however, was incapable of such rapid deployment. Cold Start emphasised forward deployment, decisive offensive strikes launched from a standing start with a minimal mobilisation period, and pre-emptive strikes on enemy forces. It had three main objectives:

To avoid triggering an enemy’s nuclear response
To move so fast that Indian political leaders could not halt or terminate it
To secure India’s objectives before the international community could intervene.

Concomitant with this change in the Army, the Indian Navy’s Maritime Doctrine released in 2004 also shows a major change in its outlook. Echoing the statement of Indian strategist, K. M. Panikkar, the document implies that the Indian Ocean is, in a singular way, Indian. Thus, Admiral Mehta, the Navy Chief of Staff remarked, “The Indian Ocean is named after us. … If required in this IOR, we will undertake humanitarian missions, stop piracy and gun running, and all those kinds of things in asymmetric warfare.” Left unstated was the role of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines in achieving these goals.

For more info about INS Chakra : The Great Indian Nuclear Submarine Saga
INS Chakra, India’s sole nuclear-powered attack submarine will play a major role in the IOR

The Maritime Doctrine is designed to maintain Indian autonomy and security against any regional threat. China is defined as a competitor, but as Sakhuja writes, the Navy is required to “provide maritime security in all directions – the classical doctrine of ‘tous azimuths’”, a clear reference to the US, which, unlike China, is accepted as a comparatively benign presence in the region. However, the Indian Navy does not see itself as primarily a defensive force. Specific undertakings of the Indian Navy include exercising sea control in designated areas of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal and at the entry/exit points of the IOR; in case of war to carry the conflict to the enemy’s territory, to strangulate his trade/oil arteries, to destroy his war waging potential and naval assets and to ensure a decisive victory; to provide power projection force; and to work in conjunction with the two other services to preserve, protect and promote India’s national interests.

The 2004 Maritime Doctrine notes China’s naval-building and pays close attention to its submarine acquisition. It also considers the PLANs power projection abilities using aircraft carriers. The 2007 Maritime Military Strategy emphasises three new issues: power projection including the development of expeditionary forces, securing Indian interests in a wide arc including the Indian Ocean, the Middle East / Persian Gulf and East Asia, and strike capabilities in littoral warfare to support land forces in war. It also lays emphasis on developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent.

“Pakistan could not fight for longer than a week in the face of an Indian naval blockade – unless the U.S. Navy challenged it.”

The Indian Navy is primarily focussed on a possible confrontation with Pakistan. This was made evident during the Kargil Crisis in 1999 when it was used to blockade the Pakistani Navy, preventing vital supplies from reaching Karachi. Margolis believes it could be used in any future confrontation to overwhelm Pakistan’s aging navy. He further notes, “Pakistan could not fight for longer than a week in the face of an Indian naval blockade – unless the U.S. Navy challenged it.” This assertion appears to have its roots embedded in history; many Indians believe that a US carrier group in the Arabian Sea to support Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War forced New Delhi to halt its plan to crush West Pakistan. This has led for calls ever since for a naval build-up to counter any future US intervention.
Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet was moved to the Arabian Sea during the Kargil War
Indian Navy’s western fleet, spearheaded by INS Viraat, was ready to blockade Pakistan in 1999

Pakistan aside, Indian strategists are today very aware of China’s increasing activity in the IOR. China’s development of a blue-water navy has caused a great deal of concern in New Delhi. Margolis again observes,

In coming decades, geopolitical tensions between the two uneasy neighbours and rivals easily could intensify as they vie for hegemony over South and Central Asia, Indonesia and even the South China Sea, political influence, oil, resources and markets.

In India’s perception the IOR holds the same interests for itself as Central America and the Caribbean do for the USA. As such, China’s activity in the region causes India concern. This concern partly stems from the Communist takeover of China in 1949, when the Indian politician, Vallabhbhai Patel, enunciated his concerns with China in the IOR. This concern grew after India’s defeat by China in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Since relations were normalised in 1988, this view has been modified to an extent but fundamentally remains the same. As Indian strategists see it, any Chinese activity in the IOR diminishes India’s security. These concerns have been compounded over the last twenty years with five categories of Chinese activity in the IOR. These are

Covert and overt assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile development, assistance to its military development and enhancement of its military-industrial capability.
Initiation of defence relations and intelligence-sharing with Nepal.
Military and deep economic co-operation with Myanmar including development of its transport and maritime infrastructure.
Growing PLAN activity in the IOR including ship visits and the creation of electronic monitoring facilities.
The cultivation of ties with Bangladesh and the normalisation of ties with Bhutan.

[IMG]
Chinese Naval ships docked in Sri Lanka during a visit
It is likely with this in mind that the Indian strategist, C. Raja Mohan, conceives of an Indian maritime strategy premised on three concentric geographic circles. The innermost circle contains India and its immediate neighbourhood, a view consistent with that of the Indian Navy’s doctrinal statement, Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy. The neighbourhood also contains Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Mohan alleges that India’s goals in this region are to ensure its primacy and to retain the capacity to veto actions seen as infringing on India’s interests. Needless to add, this is not stated in the Navy’s public document. Primacy implies India’s capacity to impose its will and influence the states of the region, including militarily. While the naval document is less aggressively stated than Mohan’s article, the section titled “Strategy for Employment in Conflict” envisions the conduct of sea-control and sea-denial operations in wartime in India’s vicinity, including at the entry/exit points of the IOR. This appears to be aimed at China, it being a prerequisite to denying China’s ships access to and from the Straits of Malacca. Such an action would shut off China’s and other “hostile extra-regional powers with inimical intentions” access to India’s immediate maritime neighbourhood.

Mohan’s middle circle encompasses the rest of continental Asia, including China. Again the naval document does not treat this area in as starkly plain terms as Mohan does. It instead emphasises its role in naval diplomacy and maritime cooperation so as to prevent “incursions by powers inimical to India’s national interests by actively engaging countries in the IO littoral and rendering speedy and quality assistance in fields of interest to them.” This clearly alludes to China’s increasing activity in East Africa, Persian Gulf, and the rest of the IO littoral. It was likely this thinking which saw the Indian Navy dispatch four warships on a two-month journey along the coast of East Africa to engage in “naval diplomacy” and offer a counter to China’s influence and activity there.

“Current power projections indicate that India will be among the foremost centres of power”

Mohan’s third circle, consisting of the rest of the world, envisions India as a world-power in maintaining international peace and security. Prime Minister Singh endorses this view in his introduction to the doctrinal statement, stating “current power projections indicate that India will be among the foremost centres of power”. He also notes that military capacity will be a critical component of India’s increased power.

Part-2 of this series will cover the Indian Navy’s role in the Indian Ocean and will be published soon.
About the Author

Lindsay Hughes is a Senior Research Analyst at Future Directions International, a think-tank established by the former Governor General of Australia, Major General the Hon. Michael Jeffery. He specialises in the security and politics of the Indo-Pacific region, with an emphasis on the Sub-continent and China.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 22 Jun 2015 10:21

SNaik wrote: Austin, your numbers are referring to the current contract with Zvezdochka only. There are currently 12 Akulas, 8 Oscars and 4 Sierras which are listed as active/under repairs/reserve and the plan is (prbably rather "was") to modernize them all.
Delta4 is not getting an upgrade (with exception of missiles and linked systems (software upgrades)) just a "recovery of technical readiness", Russian term for SLEP. They have the same Skat-BRDM sonar, Omnibus CIC and Medvedica comms as before.

Replied here http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1859082

wig · Post by **wig** » 22 Jun 2015 10:57

Indian Navy rescues 20 crew members of a merchant vessel after distress signals

In a daring rescue operation in adverse weather conditions, India Navy on Monday rescued 20 crew members of a vessel in distress, Jindal Kamakshi, 40 nautical miles northwest of Mumbai harbour, a Navy official said.
All rescued crew members are undergoing medical check-up.
"While 19 were airlifted and brought to INS Shikra in Mumbai, one more on board the vessel was airlifted by a second Navy chopper," a defence spokesperson said.
The Navy got a request at 7am for immediate evacuation of those on board the ship which was listing precariously, he said.
According to the defence spokesperson, the information was received around midnight by the Indian Navy that a vessel in distress 'Jindal Kamakshi', which was 40 nautical miles from Mumbai harbour and 25 nautical miles off Vasai coast, has listed heavily.
The distress message said the vessel listed heavily, with 20 persons on board and requested assistance, the official said, adding the cause of the listing was not confirmed.
The Indian Navy had launched one Seaking helicopter to provide immediate assistance and a ship was also deployed for rendering assistance, he said.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 764646.cms

srin · Post by **srin** » 22 Jun 2015 18:14

X-posting tsarkar-ji's CAG link (for year 2008-09) from LCA thread:

tsarkar wrote:
Sanjay wrote:tsarkar, in what way was R77 disappointing ?
Refer Page 47 http://cdasecbad.ap.nic.in/sankalan/COM ... 0India.pdf

http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/n ... rt/490055/

Also, Bars radar being the only fighter radar being manufactured in India, and its technology actually being transferred, it was easier to integrate with it than Elta 2032.

This answers two questions related to Vikky - absence of CIWS and absence of jet blast deflector

From page #17:

The Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) is a vital naval shipboard point weapon for
detecting and destroying incoming anti-ship missiles and enemy aircraft at short
range. The anti-aircraft missile complex selected to be fitted in ship `Q' failed
during trials and the R&R contract was, thus, concluded without the missile
system. Estimated expenditure on the missile system was in the range of Rs 161
crore to Rs 230 crore. Due to the considerable time and cost overrun already
prevalent in the R&R, it was decided to fit the CIWS on-board the ship after her
arrival in India. This decision implied that:
x The ship would not have a CIWS till her first refit in India in 2017;
x 23 Compartments meant for the CIWS would remain vacant till refit.

Interesting - I suspect that could refer to Kashtan. And maybe that's the reason it isn't fitted on any new ship (other than Russian-made Talwars) ?

The refit schedule did not cater for fitment of Jet Blast Deflectors10 even though
these are considered essential as the fighter aircraft is an aircraft that engages
reheat for deck launches. As a result, there can be no movement, of men or
aircraft, behind the aircraft taking off till it has left the deck. This deficiency was
sought to be resolved by increasing the distance between the two planes though
this would result in increased time lapse between two launches.

I wonder why it wasn't. Seems like such a basic necessity for safety of deck crew.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 22 Jun 2015 18:28

there is blast deflector on kuznetsov...see 3:15

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kacZpw1dTqE

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 22 Jun 2015 23:11

@srin - I'm happy you read that.

Kashtan is sub optimal, which is why Vikramaditya was to be fitted with LRSAM, but is finally being fitted with Barak-1 from INS Godavari. Which is also why INS Teg does not have Kashtan.

Two IN delegations that visited the foreign country in August 1995 and January 1998 commented on the deteriorating material state of the ship and stated that it was apparent that little or no maintenance efforts had been undertaken. A third delegation (October 1999) also observed that the material condition of the ship `Q' had further
deteriorated and that the process of deterioration was likely to accelerate with the passage of time. The delegation indicated that the state of machinery and systems had worsened to such an extent that the refit could hardly be called `repair'.

Operationalising ship `Q' as a carrier required large-scale design changes as the ship`Q' was not an aircraft carrier but more of a cruiser equipped with a flight deck. Therefore, it had to be configured for a different type of service from that of its original design.

IN never wanted the Vikramaditya. However,

IN had two aircraft carriers, i.e `X,8 and `Y'9, in its fleet. While the aircraft carrier `X' was to be decommissioned in 1997, aircraft carrier `Y' was likely to be decommissioned by 2007. Aircraft carrier `Y' is, however, presently undergoing
repair/refit. The construction of indigenous Air Defence Ship (ADS) was expected to be completed by 2012. The acquisition of ship `Q' was to fill the five-year carrier void during 2007-2012.

To be fair, Vikramaditya is filling the void between the geriatric Viraat and the new INS Vikrant. George Fernandes in the right spirit purchased Vikramaditya. It would've been a good buy had only US$ 700 Mn been spent on refit instead of the later price escalation to US$ 2.3 Bn.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 23 Jun 2015 01:52

Both Vik-A and Vikrant will complement each other very well giving us at least one carrier on each seaboard.But a 3rd is essential.Why we need another Vikrant class CV. I would still delicately nurse along the Viraat until 2020 ,at least in the amphib/ASW role,when another Viklrant CV could be commissioned.Kashtan is being superseded by a new lightweight CIWS Pantsir (?) with the SAMs having an increased 20km range.This CIWS system can be used on small combatants upto CVs.The missile/gun combo is ideal when the ship is also armed with LRSAMs like B-8.Our capital ships should have a multi-tiered anti-air/missile defence system,as using B-8s for all missile/air threats is both v.expensive,plus our warships also have a limited magazine of the same.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 24 Jun 2015 01:52

VKD will not have a single gun CIWS? At least a quartet of AK-630s should be placed. If not for air defence then at least for protection from asymmetric threats.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 24 Jun 2015 02:29

To be fair, Vikramaditya is filling the void between the geriatric Viraat and the new INS Vikrant.

Do not know. But, from what is out there on the net, the plans changed as they went along.

As an example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vikrant-c ... ft_carrier

In 1989 India announced a plan to replace its ageing British-built aircraft carriers, Vikrant and Viraat, with two new 28,000 ton Air Defence Ships (ADS) that would operate the BAE Sea Harrier aircraft. The first vessel was to replace Vikrant, which was set to decommission in early 1997. Construction of the ADS was to start at the Cochin Shipyard (CSL) in 1993 after the Indian Naval Design Organisation had translated this design study into a production model. Following the 1991 economic crisis, the plans for construction of the vessels were put on hold indefinitely.

In 1999, then Defence Minister George Fernandes revived the project and sanctioned the construction of the Project 71 ADS.[12] By that time, given the ageing Sea Harrier fleet, the letter of intent called for a carrier that would carry more modern jet fighters. In 2001, CSL released a graphic illustration showing the 32,000-ton STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) design with a pronounced ski jump.[13] The aircraft carrier project finally received formal government approval in January 2003. By then, design updates called for a 37,500 ton carrier to operate the MiG-29K. India opted for a three-carrier fleet consisting of one carrier battle group stationed on each seaboard, and a third carrier held in reserve, in order to continuously protect both its flanks, to protect economic interests and mercantile traffic, and to provide humanitarian platforms in times of disasters, since a carrier can provide a self-generating supply of fresh water, medical assistance or engineering expertise to populations in need for assistance.[14]

In August 2006, then Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Arun Prakash stated that the designation for the vessel had been changed from Air Defence Ship (ADS) to Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC). The euphemistic ADS had been adopted in planning stages to ward off concerns about a naval build-up. Final revisions to the design increased the displacement of the carriers from 37,500 tons to over 40,000 tons. The length of the ship also increased from 252 metres (827 ft) to over 260 metres (850 ft).[15]

I seriously think that this effort with the US is first one to sit and *really* think. Point being Paki centrism can and is perhaps more knee jerk, very-little-thought-needed actions.

That doe not mean that earlier efforts were not worth the while, just that being Paki centric is a LOT more easier than trying to design carriers for a wider regional play. This "each seaboard" has no real meaning any longer. And, when one looks at the expectation of the Indian economy re-thinking makes more sense. But, then it is up to the political wing to dictate what they envision. I just happen to think/feel that the old Vishal will be inadequate. ?????