All,
Please post any relevant news articles and other reports of Pakistan and its agencies proliferating nukes.
ARCHIVE MATERIAL
"A bomb for the Ummah"
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2003/ma03/ma03albright.html
Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Interesting commentary in a Kenyan paper.
As for government policy towards the proliferators it has been, as Michael Klare wrote in his book Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, "ambivalent, indecisive and inconsistent".
A prime example of this is America’s attitude towards Pakistan. In April 1979, the Carter Administration, convinced that Pakistan was secretly building a nuclear weapon, suspended military aid in a move mandated by Congress’ Symington Amendment. However, when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 the Administration persuaded Congress to overrule the amendment and a large arms aid programme was started up again.
For the next decade, in return for Pakistan’s help in building up the Mujahiden fighters in Afghanistan who later turned into Osama bin Laden’s storm troopers, Washington turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear bomb efforts.
Only in 1990, with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan defeated, did President George Bush, the father, belatedly cut off military assistance. Even today, after all the lesson’s learnt, in return for winning Pakistan’s support in defeating the Taliban and pursuing al-Qaeda ,Washington appears to be turning yet another blind eye to Pakistan’s latest acquisition of missiles from North Korea.
The issue of credibility also runs right through two important international agreements. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permits five already declared nuclear weapon states – the US, the UK, Russia, China and France – the right to maintain their nuclear arsenals while denying this privilege to other countries. On the last occasion the treaty was renewed, these nuclear-haves solemnly promised to start getting rid of their weapons in return for most of the rest of the world remaining signatories. The promise has been clearly and unambiguously flouted.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
http://www.intelligenceonline.net
US confronts Pakistan with N.Korea “smoking gun”
17 January 2003: Stung by revelations that Pakistan smuggled a gas centrifuge prototype to North Korea in the coffin of a murdered North Korean diplomat’s wife, Kim Sa-nae, the United States has directed General Parvez Musharraf to break nuclear and non-nuclear links with North Korea.
Kim Sa-nae was shot dead in Islamabad on 9 June 1998 a week after Pakistan exploded six nuclear devices in Chagai Hills in Baluchistan, and the suspicion is that North Korea ordered her assassination fearing she was about to defect to the West with secrets of the Pakistan-North Korea nuclear axis.
US intelligence revealed last year that North Korea supplied nuclear-capable ballistic missiles to Pakistan in return for nuclear technology, but Pakistan has denied this to a disbelieving world.
Diplomats said that the US has presented evidence to Musharraf about the Pakistan-N.Korea nuclear link through second-rung diplomats, and is insisting on taking control of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, including the command and control of weapons, missile deployment, and research and development.
“The US wants to limit the bargaining powers of Musharraf,” a diplomat said.
The US is planning more hot pursuits against suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists from the Afghanistan side into Pakistan and diplomats said it wants to take charge of Pakistani nuclear weapons soon as a safety measure.
“Already, Musharraf has been told to contain anti-US groups within Pakistan objecting to its anti-Al-Qaeda campaign,” a diplomat said.
Analysts said that the new revelations about the Kim Sa-nae murder highlight the vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
Kim and her husband, Kang Thae Yun (economic counselor in the Islamabad embassy), were close to the “Father of the Pakistani bomb,” A.Q.Khan, lived in the same neighbourhood, and received North Korean guests who worked as technicians in the Khan nuclear laboratories.
Under a counselor’s cover, Kang worked for Changgwang Sinyong Corporation that trades for North Korea’s “Second Economic Committee” that manages the country’s nuclear infrastructure.
Indian intelligence and security officials say that the British MI-6 was approached in Islamabad by a “top diplomat” who wished to defect in exchange for nuclear secrets of Pakistan and North Korea.
“We did try to work out details but other pressing assignments forced us to abandon this one,” an official said.
Kim Sa-nae’s death was largely ignored until Japanese intelligence confirmed that a prototype centrifuge was smuggled with her coffin on a special flight, and the US later obtained details.
Kang left Islamabad controversially soon after his wife’s murder and diplomats say it is possible that he killed her to prove his loyalty to North Korea’s “Dear Leader” Kim Jong II.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Pakistani collusion with North Korea in the proliferation of WMD. One can legitimately ask, if the US looking for the lost coin in the wrong place (in Iraq) when it should be looking for it in Pakistan ...
http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/030127fa_fact
THE COLD TEST
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
What the Administration knew about Pakistan and the North Korean nuclear program.
Issue of 2003-01-27
Posted 2003-01-20
Last June, four months before the current crisis over North Korea became public, the Central Intelligence Agency delivered a comprehensive analysis of North Korea's nuclear ambitions to President Bush and his top advisers. The document, known as a National Intelligence Estimate, was classified as Top Secret S.C.I. (for "sensitive compartmented information"), and its distribution within the government was tightly restricted. The C.I.A. report made the case that North Korea had been violating international law—and agreements with South Korea and the United States—by secretly obtaining the means to produce weapons-grade uranium.
The document's most politically sensitive information, however, was about Pakistan. Since 1997, the C.I.A. said, Pakistan had been sharing sophisticated technology, warhead-design information, and weapons-testing data with the Pyongyang regime. Pakistan, one of the Bush Administration's important allies in the war against terrorism, was helping North Korea build the bomb.
In 1985, North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which led to the opening of most of its nuclear sites to international inspection. By the early nineteen-nineties, it became evident to American intelligence agencies and international inspectors that the North Koreans were reprocessing more spent fuel than they had declared, and might have separated enough plutonium, a reactor by-product, to fabricate one or two nuclear weapons. The resulting diplomatic crisis was resolved when North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, entered into an agreement with the Clinton Administration to stop the nuclear-weapons program in return for economic aid and the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors that, under safeguards, would generate electricity.
Within three years, however, North Korea had begun using a second method to acquire fissile material. This time, instead of using spent fuel, scientists were trying to produce weapons-grade uranium from natural uranium—with Pakistani technology. One American intelligence official, referring to the C.I.A. report, told me, "It points a clear finger at the Pakistanis. The technical stuff is crystal clear—not hedged and not ambivalent." Referring to North Korea's plutonium project in the early nineteen-nineties, he said, "Before, they were sneaking." Now "it's off the wall. We know they can do a lot more and a lot more quickly."...
http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/030127fa_fact
THE COLD TEST
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
What the Administration knew about Pakistan and the North Korean nuclear program.
Issue of 2003-01-27
Posted 2003-01-20
Last June, four months before the current crisis over North Korea became public, the Central Intelligence Agency delivered a comprehensive analysis of North Korea's nuclear ambitions to President Bush and his top advisers. The document, known as a National Intelligence Estimate, was classified as Top Secret S.C.I. (for "sensitive compartmented information"), and its distribution within the government was tightly restricted. The C.I.A. report made the case that North Korea had been violating international law—and agreements with South Korea and the United States—by secretly obtaining the means to produce weapons-grade uranium.
The document's most politically sensitive information, however, was about Pakistan. Since 1997, the C.I.A. said, Pakistan had been sharing sophisticated technology, warhead-design information, and weapons-testing data with the Pyongyang regime. Pakistan, one of the Bush Administration's important allies in the war against terrorism, was helping North Korea build the bomb.
In 1985, North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which led to the opening of most of its nuclear sites to international inspection. By the early nineteen-nineties, it became evident to American intelligence agencies and international inspectors that the North Koreans were reprocessing more spent fuel than they had declared, and might have separated enough plutonium, a reactor by-product, to fabricate one or two nuclear weapons. The resulting diplomatic crisis was resolved when North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, entered into an agreement with the Clinton Administration to stop the nuclear-weapons program in return for economic aid and the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors that, under safeguards, would generate electricity.
Within three years, however, North Korea had begun using a second method to acquire fissile material. This time, instead of using spent fuel, scientists were trying to produce weapons-grade uranium from natural uranium—with Pakistani technology. One American intelligence official, referring to the C.I.A. report, told me, "It points a clear finger at the Pakistanis. The technical stuff is crystal clear—not hedged and not ambivalent." Referring to North Korea's plutonium project in the early nineteen-nineties, he said, "Before, they were sneaking." Now "it's off the wall. We know they can do a lot more and a lot more quickly."...
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Cross-posted from Paki-thread
Pak scientists helping Iraq's nuclear programme: report
http://www.rediff.com/us/2003/jan/21pak.htm
<<<
Reports in Asian Pacific Post, a Vancouver-based newspaper, on Monday said at least five Pakistani nuclear scientists, who trained with the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and worked on nuclear reactors in Canada, could be developing nuclear weapons for Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
The five reportedly left Pakistan under mysterious circumstances.
>>>
Surprise Surprise
Pak scientists helping Iraq's nuclear programme: report
http://www.rediff.com/us/2003/jan/21pak.htm
<<<
Reports in Asian Pacific Post, a Vancouver-based newspaper, on Monday said at least five Pakistani nuclear scientists, who trained with the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and worked on nuclear reactors in Canada, could be developing nuclear weapons for Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
The five reportedly left Pakistan under mysterious circumstances.
>>>
Surprise Surprise Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
How stalwart is this ally?
Wilson John
As the US Armageddon is getting ready to launch the Regime Altering Offensive-a new military concept being pursued by the Bush Administration after the successful proxy occupation of Afghanistan and a virtual <B>enslavement of Pakistan-a concerted attempt is being made by certain sections of the Western press to somehow put at least part of the blame for Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons development programme at India's doorstep. This is a calculated move, made at the bidding of Pentagon's sophisticated and experienced Psy War Operations directorate. The objective is two-fold. One, divert attention from Pakistan's unambiguous role in helping North Korea's nuclear weapons development programme. Two, keep India on the defensive for not joining the chorus of support being drummed up by Mr Tony Blair's Britain for Mr Bush's war on Iraq. [/b]
Even if one were to believe that a private Indian firm did help the Iraqi establishment in the nuclear weapons development programme, it would be like saying that President George W Bush helped Osama bin Laden to bring down the World Trade Centre. Interestingly, there is evidence that Mr Bush and bin Laden were not altogether strangers in business, as the US President would like the world to believe.
Quoting court documents, The Houston Chronicle (June 4, 1992) said, "George W Bush's company, Bush Exploration Co, general partner in the limited partnerships, went through several mergers, eventually evolving into Harken Energy Corp, a suburban Dallas-based company. Bush, known informally as George Jr, is a shareholder and director of Harken, which has been granted lucrative offshore drilling rights off the coast of Bahrain in the Persian Gulf." A key partner in the Bush firm was a former naval pilot and businessman, James R Bath. To quote the Chronicle, "According to a 1976 trust agreement, drawn shortly after Bush was appointed director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Saudi Sheik Salem M Bin laden appointed Bath as his business representative in Houston. Bin laden, along with his brothers, owns Bin Laden Brothers Construction, one of the largest construction companies in the Middle East.'' The Bush family never denied the allegations. In fact, the Congressional investigation into the BCCI scandal only corroborated these allegations subsequently.
The point I am making is that the Bush Administration's attempts to discover an Indian hand in nuclear proliferation is completely bereft of any ethical or factual basis. The NEC, the Indian firm allegedly involved in Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme, is a private entity and has no connection to the Government, unlike the Bush-bin Laden connection. The firm can be blacklisted and forced to annul its associations with Iraq.
It is not firms like the NEC but states that openly buy and sell nuclear and missile technologies that pose a serious threat to global peace and stability. That is, if the Bush Administration is really interested in such a possibility and not, as being widely suspected: Making wars to keep the powerful military-industrial complex happy and flourishing. I would like to believe the Bush Administration is indeed keen on a peaceful world despite fugitives like bin Laden plotting attacks on the very notion of a democratic world.
One of the ways is to train its guns on Pakistan, an ally. No doubt President Pervez Musharraf has been more than willing to bend backwards to let American soldiers run around his countryside, bombing madrasas and dragging doctors and nuclear scientists to interrogation camps. But Pakistan is a friend who cannot be trusted. The Americans know this well enough by now. If there is any doubt, what the Bush Administra-tion should do is to hire a battery of Urdu translators and read Pakistan's vernacular press to know what the ordinary Pakistani think about Uncle Sam. They burn his effigy every day.
Pakistan also happens to be run by Governments that have been selling nuclear technology to rogue regimes like that of North Korea. Although the Bush Administration is trying hard to wink at the growing pile of evidence collected by its intelligence agencies about Islamabad's involvement in Pyongyang's nuclear programme, there is a perceptible feeling of doubt and dilemma within the diplomatic and intelligence community in Washington.
In a report prepared for US corporations on January 10, 2003, Washington-based consultant John E Carbaugh Jr said: "Pakistan has become a major diplomatic headache for the Bush Administra-tion. On the one hand, Pakistan is a crucial ally in the war against terrorism. Many analysts suspect Osama bin Laden is now hiding somewhere in Pakistan; cooperation from Pakistani security and intelligence officials is needed to capture Osama and cut the power of Al Qaeda. On the other hand, Pakistan's ties to North Korea's nuclear programme have violated bilateral assurances to the US. Pakistan's actions also have facilitated a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (North Korea is a signatory) to violate its commitments.''
The key point which Mr Carbaugh makes in his report is quite succinct: "Pakistan is double-dealing with the US, claiming to work together in the war against terrorism while maintaining ties with North Korea of the sort that essentially facilitated the current nuclear tension on the Korea peninsula.''
Amazingly enough, this double-dealing has been going on for more than three decades now. It was in the 1970s that Islamabad began looking East, especially to rogue nations like North Korea. The relationship remained more or less dormant till Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto made a day-trip to Pyongang at the behest of the Pakistan Army. Although officially bilateral discussions centred on economic relations, the army's representative in the delegation pursued the real agenda of buying ballistic missiles from North Korea. Islamabad was keen to acquire a nuclear weapons delivery system. It already had nuclear warheads, clandestinely acquired from various countries, including China. China had also supplied Pakistan 34 M-11 short-range missiles. But with the US exerting strong pressure, it had become difficult for Beijing to sell long-range missiles to its newfound ally in Islamabad.
Beginning August 1992, several delegations flew back and forth from Islamabad and Pyongang, culminating in the inking of a deal in 1995. As part of the agreement, North Korea's Changg-wang Sinyong Corporation supplied Nodong missiles to AQ Khan Research Laboratories. Pakistan named the missiles Ghauri and tested it in April 1998.
As per the original agreement, Pakistan was to pay cash for the missiles but, by the time, they were delivered, its economy was in dire straits. The solution was Pakistan's assistance in developing a uranium-enrichment programme for North Korea. Pyongang had by then shut down its plutonium-based nuclear programme after signing the Agreed Framework with the US in 1994. It was more than willing to pursue the uranium route Pakistan had taken to develop its nuclear weapons programme. The barter was so secret that it took several years for the intelligence community to discover it.
In March 2000, Mr Bill Clinton, then US President, notified the Congress that he could not certify North Korea was not acquiring enriched uranium for the production of nuclear weapons. On June 9, 2000, the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun, quoting a detailed Chinese Government report, revealed the existence of a uranium enrichment facility inside North Korea's Mount Chonma. Since then, enough evidence has been gathered to expose Pakistan's covert assistance to its nuclear weapons programme.
So why is the Bush Administration still in a dilemma over Pakistan? It can't be oil. There are no strategic gains to be made from a nation ruled by mullahs and Generals. Could it then be plain stupidity? I dread to presume so.
Wilson John
As the US Armageddon is getting ready to launch the Regime Altering Offensive-a new military concept being pursued by the Bush Administration after the successful proxy occupation of Afghanistan and a virtual <B>enslavement of Pakistan-a concerted attempt is being made by certain sections of the Western press to somehow put at least part of the blame for Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons development programme at India's doorstep. This is a calculated move, made at the bidding of Pentagon's sophisticated and experienced Psy War Operations directorate. The objective is two-fold. One, divert attention from Pakistan's unambiguous role in helping North Korea's nuclear weapons development programme. Two, keep India on the defensive for not joining the chorus of support being drummed up by Mr Tony Blair's Britain for Mr Bush's war on Iraq. [/b]
Even if one were to believe that a private Indian firm did help the Iraqi establishment in the nuclear weapons development programme, it would be like saying that President George W Bush helped Osama bin Laden to bring down the World Trade Centre. Interestingly, there is evidence that Mr Bush and bin Laden were not altogether strangers in business, as the US President would like the world to believe.
Quoting court documents, The Houston Chronicle (June 4, 1992) said, "George W Bush's company, Bush Exploration Co, general partner in the limited partnerships, went through several mergers, eventually evolving into Harken Energy Corp, a suburban Dallas-based company. Bush, known informally as George Jr, is a shareholder and director of Harken, which has been granted lucrative offshore drilling rights off the coast of Bahrain in the Persian Gulf." A key partner in the Bush firm was a former naval pilot and businessman, James R Bath. To quote the Chronicle, "According to a 1976 trust agreement, drawn shortly after Bush was appointed director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Saudi Sheik Salem M Bin laden appointed Bath as his business representative in Houston. Bin laden, along with his brothers, owns Bin Laden Brothers Construction, one of the largest construction companies in the Middle East.'' The Bush family never denied the allegations. In fact, the Congressional investigation into the BCCI scandal only corroborated these allegations subsequently.
The point I am making is that the Bush Administration's attempts to discover an Indian hand in nuclear proliferation is completely bereft of any ethical or factual basis. The NEC, the Indian firm allegedly involved in Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme, is a private entity and has no connection to the Government, unlike the Bush-bin Laden connection. The firm can be blacklisted and forced to annul its associations with Iraq.
It is not firms like the NEC but states that openly buy and sell nuclear and missile technologies that pose a serious threat to global peace and stability. That is, if the Bush Administration is really interested in such a possibility and not, as being widely suspected: Making wars to keep the powerful military-industrial complex happy and flourishing. I would like to believe the Bush Administration is indeed keen on a peaceful world despite fugitives like bin Laden plotting attacks on the very notion of a democratic world.
One of the ways is to train its guns on Pakistan, an ally. No doubt President Pervez Musharraf has been more than willing to bend backwards to let American soldiers run around his countryside, bombing madrasas and dragging doctors and nuclear scientists to interrogation camps. But Pakistan is a friend who cannot be trusted. The Americans know this well enough by now. If there is any doubt, what the Bush Administra-tion should do is to hire a battery of Urdu translators and read Pakistan's vernacular press to know what the ordinary Pakistani think about Uncle Sam. They burn his effigy every day.
Pakistan also happens to be run by Governments that have been selling nuclear technology to rogue regimes like that of North Korea. Although the Bush Administration is trying hard to wink at the growing pile of evidence collected by its intelligence agencies about Islamabad's involvement in Pyongyang's nuclear programme, there is a perceptible feeling of doubt and dilemma within the diplomatic and intelligence community in Washington.
In a report prepared for US corporations on January 10, 2003, Washington-based consultant John E Carbaugh Jr said: "Pakistan has become a major diplomatic headache for the Bush Administra-tion. On the one hand, Pakistan is a crucial ally in the war against terrorism. Many analysts suspect Osama bin Laden is now hiding somewhere in Pakistan; cooperation from Pakistani security and intelligence officials is needed to capture Osama and cut the power of Al Qaeda. On the other hand, Pakistan's ties to North Korea's nuclear programme have violated bilateral assurances to the US. Pakistan's actions also have facilitated a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (North Korea is a signatory) to violate its commitments.''
The key point which Mr Carbaugh makes in his report is quite succinct: "Pakistan is double-dealing with the US, claiming to work together in the war against terrorism while maintaining ties with North Korea of the sort that essentially facilitated the current nuclear tension on the Korea peninsula.''
Amazingly enough, this double-dealing has been going on for more than three decades now. It was in the 1970s that Islamabad began looking East, especially to rogue nations like North Korea. The relationship remained more or less dormant till Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto made a day-trip to Pyongang at the behest of the Pakistan Army. Although officially bilateral discussions centred on economic relations, the army's representative in the delegation pursued the real agenda of buying ballistic missiles from North Korea. Islamabad was keen to acquire a nuclear weapons delivery system. It already had nuclear warheads, clandestinely acquired from various countries, including China. China had also supplied Pakistan 34 M-11 short-range missiles. But with the US exerting strong pressure, it had become difficult for Beijing to sell long-range missiles to its newfound ally in Islamabad.
Beginning August 1992, several delegations flew back and forth from Islamabad and Pyongang, culminating in the inking of a deal in 1995. As part of the agreement, North Korea's Changg-wang Sinyong Corporation supplied Nodong missiles to AQ Khan Research Laboratories. Pakistan named the missiles Ghauri and tested it in April 1998.
As per the original agreement, Pakistan was to pay cash for the missiles but, by the time, they were delivered, its economy was in dire straits. The solution was Pakistan's assistance in developing a uranium-enrichment programme for North Korea. Pyongang had by then shut down its plutonium-based nuclear programme after signing the Agreed Framework with the US in 1994. It was more than willing to pursue the uranium route Pakistan had taken to develop its nuclear weapons programme. The barter was so secret that it took several years for the intelligence community to discover it.
In March 2000, Mr Bill Clinton, then US President, notified the Congress that he could not certify North Korea was not acquiring enriched uranium for the production of nuclear weapons. On June 9, 2000, the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun, quoting a detailed Chinese Government report, revealed the existence of a uranium enrichment facility inside North Korea's Mount Chonma. Since then, enough evidence has been gathered to expose Pakistan's covert assistance to its nuclear weapons programme.
So why is the Bush Administration still in a dilemma over Pakistan? It can't be oil. There are no strategic gains to be made from a nation ruled by mullahs and Generals. Could it then be plain stupidity? I dread to presume so.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Professor lectures on Pakistan nuclear threat
http://www.dailyillini.com/jan03/jan24/news/stories/news_story08.shtml
http://www.dailyillini.com/jan03/jan24/news/stories/news_story08.shtml
"Time is of the essence with respect to shutting off the Pakistani program," Singer said.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
CP on TSP-NK nuke link
Q: How concerned are you by the evidence that continues to dribble out about Pakistan's role in this and the reports that we continue to get, or hear about, about Pakistan talking to people in Iran, in Indonesia, about further proliferation?
A: We are concerned about all forms of proliferation, which is why we are taking the North Korean situation so seriously. We still think there's a diplomatic way to work our way through this. We don't need to abandon the diplomatic effort yet.
The connection between North Korea and Pakistan that you have been reading about in the papers and Pakistan and other countries is troubling.(neither confirm nor deny..which means it is true but we can't say so) I've had many conversations with President Musharraf about this over the last year and a half or so and he fully understands that our position that these kinds of proliferating activities, if they do exist, it would be very troubling with respect to our relationship; and if they are in the past, make sure they remain in the past because it would be awfully difficult to justify or explain away any new evidence of that kind of activity. He fully understands our position on this.
Q: You were saying, "If they are in the past."
A: If they're in the past, they're in the past.
Q: No, you said, "If they're in the past."
A: I'm -- I think I was clear. I said, you know, if they are in the past, they're in the past. We have made it clear to them that this kind of activity in the present or in the future is what I said it was. But I can't -- I can't talk about -- I can't say anything about the past because it is the past, and I don't want to get into the issue of what may or may not have happened in the past for a variety of reasons.
Q: How concerned are you by the evidence that continues to dribble out about Pakistan's role in this and the reports that we continue to get, or hear about, about Pakistan talking to people in Iran, in Indonesia, about further proliferation?
A: We are concerned about all forms of proliferation, which is why we are taking the North Korean situation so seriously. We still think there's a diplomatic way to work our way through this. We don't need to abandon the diplomatic effort yet.
The connection between North Korea and Pakistan that you have been reading about in the papers and Pakistan and other countries is troubling.(neither confirm nor deny..which means it is true but we can't say so) I've had many conversations with President Musharraf about this over the last year and a half or so and he fully understands that our position that these kinds of proliferating activities, if they do exist, it would be very troubling with respect to our relationship; and if they are in the past, make sure they remain in the past because it would be awfully difficult to justify or explain away any new evidence of that kind of activity. He fully understands our position on this.
Q: You were saying, "If they are in the past."
A: If they're in the past, they're in the past.
Q: No, you said, "If they're in the past."
A: I'm -- I think I was clear. I said, you know, if they are in the past, they're in the past. We have made it clear to them that this kind of activity in the present or in the future is what I said it was. But I can't -- I can't talk about -- I can't say anything about the past because it is the past, and I don't want to get into the issue of what may or may not have happened in the past for a variety of reasons.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Arun,
Qualin Powell comes close to matching Clinton's "It depends on what your definition of is is"
Qualin Powell comes close to matching Clinton's "It depends on what your definition of is is"
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Quote, from another board..
Japanese to flee south korea
Either Tokyo is being extra cautious, or its leaders know something. The Japanese government is reviewing plans to evacuate its citizens, even the tourists, from South Korea, United Press International reports.
Japan's top-selling daily Yomiuri Shimbun reports that Tokyo "will ask the United States and South Korea to hold talks with Japan about the plan as cooperation from both countries will be essential" for the evacuation of the approximately 30,000 Japanese in the country.
The plan says: "If North Korea attacks South Korea, a full evacuation must be completed within 70 hours.
Israel is number three after US/Russia in arms export
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Japanese to flee south korea
Either Tokyo is being extra cautious, or its leaders know something. The Japanese government is reviewing plans to evacuate its citizens, even the tourists, from South Korea, United Press International reports.
Japan's top-selling daily Yomiuri Shimbun reports that Tokyo "will ask the United States and South Korea to hold talks with Japan about the plan as cooperation from both countries will be essential" for the evacuation of the approximately 30,000 Japanese in the country.
The plan says: "If North Korea attacks South Korea, a full evacuation must be completed within 70 hours.
Israel is number three after US/Russia in arms export
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
A new report in Washington Post says that Dubya and his govt knew of TSP-N.Korean link all along...
N. Korea's Nuclear Plans Were No Secret
N. Korea's Nuclear Plans Were No Secret
the Livermore report included the disclosure that Pakistani scientists had been the source of the plans showing the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, how uranium is enriched, the sources said.
Just weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, joined the United States in the fight against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan. The United States, in return, dropped sanctions which it had imposed on Pakistan for pursuing a nuclear program. According to one senior administration official, it was at this point that Musharraf's government provided some of the new intelligence about North Korea, and the Pakistani president took steps to close down the channel that had delivered the nuclear know-how to Pyongyang. Pakistan's leadership "wanted to show they were cooperating,"
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Now you want to hear it from an OFFICIAL source, here it is:
Issue Brief to US Congress dated Jan 22, 2003
Issue Brief to US Congress dated Jan 22, 2003
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Div,
This is uncanny!
I can open it now, but I could not do so a few minutes ago.
Basically, Congressional Research Service reports and Issue Briefs are accessible thru the Web thru 3 sources:
1. Website of Congressman Chris Shays
2. Website of Consgressman Mark Green
3. US Department of State
Some other special interest groups such as environmental lobbnies have CRS reports related to their topic.
Anyway, Try now.
This is uncanny!
I can open it now, but I could not do so a few minutes ago.
Basically, Congressional Research Service reports and Issue Briefs are accessible thru the Web thru 3 sources:
1. Website of Congressman Chris Shays
2. Website of Consgressman Mark Green
3. US Department of State
Some other special interest groups such as environmental lobbnies have CRS reports related to their topic.
Anyway, Try now.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
A new report in Washington Post says that Dubya and his govt knew of TSP-N.Korean link all along...
Nothing surprising. If you had followed **** Armitage in 2001 before 911 he had made statements about rogue scientists from Pak going to rogue nations. Now once the opportunity came after 911 US forced Pak Generals to cooperate about their clandestine activities. They may have also got some assurance from the Pak military that they would stop this.
Something made the Pak to change its stance in 2002 and they started cooperting with NK.
Nothing surprising. If you had followed **** Armitage in 2001 before 911 he had made statements about rogue scientists from Pak going to rogue nations. Now once the opportunity came after 911 US forced Pak Generals to cooperate about their clandestine activities. They may have also got some assurance from the Pak military that they would stop this.
Something made the Pak to change its stance in 2002 and they started cooperting with NK.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
From JDW, Feb 15 issue.
Pakistan tightens security of its nuclear arsenal
Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha JDW Correspondent
Islamabad
Pakistan has again decided to strengthen the security of its nuclear weapons, equipment and technology, the government has announced.
In a meeting of the National (Nuclear) Command and Control Authority (NCA) on 22 January, orders were issued to institute a multi-layered physical security approach for the country's nuclear arsenal.
The announcement comes at a time when Pakistan is under increasing pressure to secure its nuclear programme following allegations that it supplied uranium enrichment and other nuclear technology to North Korea, a claim vociferously denied by the Pakistani government.
The additional physical security measures include increasing the number of soldiers guarding the facilities, strengthening air defences, and installing electronic sensors. The government is working to introduce extensive export controls as well.
The measures, however, do not necessarily involve closer monitoring of nuclear programme personnel. With a large number of people expected to retire from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission over the next two years, guarding their know-how could be every bit as important as the physical security improvements. Few, however, have served in key positions.
Given the increased scrutiny and apprehension over the country's nuclear activities, the government has given nuclear decision-making authority to President Pervez Musharraf. The chief executive of the state, normally the prime minister, had originally headed the NCA. The prime minister has now been moved to the post of vice-chairman. Although the change was not formally notified, it stemmed from a 6 January meeting of the NCA.
The move is the latest attempt by Pakistan in the past several years to increase its nuclear security. Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, director of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) that is the NCA's secretariat, told Jane's Defence Weekly last year of then new nuclear security and export-control measures (JDW 9 October 2002). Those measures included placing all of the country's strategic development organisations and personnel under direct SPD, and thus military, control for the first time.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
EU Condemns North Korea’s Nuclear Policy, Urges Reversal
European Union officials are warning North Korea and its allies there will be serious consequences for their bilateral relations with Europe if Pyongyang does not reverse its decision to develop a military nuclear capability. Members of the European Parliament have condemned the decision, and the union is preparing to send a high-level delegation, led by its top security official, to North Korea soon.
In an all-party resolution adopted Jan. 30, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) overwhelmingly condemned North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and urged the country to cease its efforts to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
The resolution demands that nuclear weapon inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency be let back into the country to inspect facilities and re-install security equipment at the Yongbyong nuclear power station. Surveillance cameras at the plant were removed last year by the North Korean government.
MEPs also censured Pakistan for its recent decision to provide North Korea with uranium-processing technologies. “Our so-called ally of Pakistan should reflect upon the consequences of its decision,” British MEP Charles Tannock declared , adding that “no one is duped by North Korea’s intentions.”
Addressing the Euro-Parliament’s plenary session, Poul Nielson, European commissioner for humanitarian aid, called for a rapid diplomatic solution. “If North Korea begins processing significant amounts of military-purpose plutonium, the situation would deteriorate very quickly, very seriously,” he said.
Meanwhile, the European Union is preparing its diplomatic plan of attack. During a Jan. 27 meeting here, EU foreign ministers agreed to send a high-level delegation to North Korea to confront the government about its nuclear intentions. Diplomats here said the team probably will head for Pyongyang in mid-February, led by Javier Solana, EU high representative for security and defense policy, and Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou. The latter’s government currently holds the Europen Union’s six-month rotating presidency.
Neilson said the union will insist that its delegates’ talks with the North Korean government take place at the highest level — with the country’s leader, Kim Jung
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Richard Armitage tells US Senators about TSP-N Korean links
Mr. Armitage also confirmed to the senators that Pakistan had helped North Korea develop its nuclear weapons program, saying technology transfers between the two countries had gone "both ways."
He declined to provide details, however, saying Pakistan had assured the administration that such transfers had ended.
Administration officials have in the past been willing to acknowledge only in private that North Korea provided missile technology to Pakistan in exchange for assistance in enriching uranium for weapons.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Look at the State Department Website's published Armitage's Statement
There is no mention of TSP here. I guess the inconvenient parts were blacked out.
There is no mention of TSP here. I guess the inconvenient parts were blacked out.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Testimony of Donald P Gregg , ex US S.Korean Ambassador to Senate Foreign Relations Committee today - Feb 4, 2003
From mid to late October, the U.S. government released information on Assistant Secretary of State Kelly's visit to Pyongyang that had taken place in early October. The visit had not gone well from the North Korean point of view as Kelly had confronted them about the development of a secret highly enriched uranium program using equipment acquired from Pakistan.
From their long association with Pakistani nuclear scientists and technicians, the North Koreans have most probably observed the sense of security that Pakistan derives from its nuclear weapons.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
A Recording Amritraj's tetimony can be seen at C-Span
Look for "Senate Foreign Relations Cmte. Hearing on North Korea Relations "
Forward to minute 29
After making mealymouthed statements about the TSP-NK deal, Armitage says - Well, additional information is classified . The Senator who asked the question, Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, then says - "Yes perhaps we should revisit that in a closed door meeting"
Can someone please download that clip? I don't know how to do it.
Look for "Senate Foreign Relations Cmte. Hearing on North Korea Relations "
Forward to minute 29
After making mealymouthed statements about the TSP-NK deal, Armitage says - Well, additional information is classified
. The Senator who asked the question, Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, then says - "Yes perhaps we should revisit that in a closed door meeting" Can someone please download that clip? I don't know how to do it.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Crossposted with TSP News thread - From DefenseNews.com - Subscription site - posted in full
U.S Examining Pakistan-North Korea Nuclear Connection, Officials Say
The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush soon will complete a review of Pakistan’s alleged sharing of nuclear know-how with North Korea, an effort that could lead to new weapon sanctions against America’s ally in the war on terrorism, U.S. government sources said.
The administration’s displeasure with Pakistan’s North Korea connection emerged last summer, following news reports that Islamabad had traded nuclear secrets with North Korea in exchange for ballistic missile technology.
Secretary of State Colin Powell said in November that he repeatedly had warned Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf that inappropriate contact between Pakistan and North Korea would result in “consequences.” Powell also said Musharraf assured him that no such relationship now exists.
Despite such assurances, the Bush administration initiated the inquiry last fall to examine allegations that appeared in a New York Times article asserting North Korea obtained from Pakistan designs for gas centrifuges and machinery needed to make highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. In exchange, North Korea reportedly gave Pakistan ballistic-missile parts, allegedly transported as recently as last summer in Pakistan’s U.S.-made C-130 transport aircraft.
Pakistan publicly has denied such accusations, though experts say Islamabad has been trading nuclear data and assistance in exchange for North Korean missile technology for more than a decade. The relationship began when North Korean President Kim Jong Il surreptitiously started a highly enriched uranium program at a time when Pakistan was having difficulty paying Pyongyang for its missile-parts deliveries.
The administration’s review is examining the veracity of the Pakistan-North Korea connection, and will determine whether technology transfers, if they occurred, violate U.S. law. It also will consider imposing new weapon sanctions, U.S. government sources said.
By press time, White House National Security Council officials had not returned repeated telephone messages seeking comment.
The United States has a long history of restricting economic and military ties with Pakistan, beginning in 1979 when Washington suspended most of its trade over concerns that Islamabad was developing nuclear capabilities. The relationship recovered in the early 1980s when the United States donated millions to Pakistani-backed rebels who were fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.
In 1990, renewed concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions led once again to suspended military aid. In 1998, after Islamabad staged its first nuclear weapon tests, the Clinton administration imposed sanctions.
Those sanctions were waived after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, in light of Pakistan’s help with the global fight against terrorism.
Even if Washington opts to punish Pakistan with additional arms sanctions based on the findings of its current review, such sanctions are likely to be waived, congressional sources said.
While Congress is not likely to oppose additional sanctions, and their subsequent waiver, arms control advocates are expected to press the Bush administration to curb pending transfers of major defense equipment to Pakistan, one congressional aide said.
“Waiving sanctions is one thing, but it doesn’t mean they have to follow through with positive rewards for a country that is violating international agreements,” the aide said.
And while the United States is expected to continue a steady supply of spare parts and components for Pakistan’s C-130s and F-16 fighters, “actually shipping additional C-130s is a positive policy decision on the part of the government that sends the wrong message,” the aide said.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
CIA Head Predicts Nuclear Race
Using North Korea as a starting point, Tenet said, "Additional countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes clear their neighbors and regional rivals are doing so."
In North Korea's case, Pakistani scientists in the mid-1990s laid out a road map of companies from which Pyongyang could purchase needed nuclear equipment. Iraq, according to U.S. intelligence, has been able to purchase from a variety of sources aluminum tubing that can be used in a centrifuge for producing weapons grade uranium.
Using North Korea as a starting point, Tenet said, "Additional countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes clear their neighbors and regional rivals are doing so."
In North Korea's case, Pakistani scientists in the mid-1990s laid out a road map of companies from which Pyongyang could purchase needed nuclear equipment. Iraq, according to U.S. intelligence, has been able to purchase from a variety of sources aluminum tubing that can be used in a centrifuge for producing weapons grade uranium.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
'The road to disarmament starts from Pongyang and ends in Islamabad goes via Bejing' Spinster 1998.
Watch Iran, and Saudis to get one for themselves.
KSA would get one like the way Pakis got from Bejing. Ready to go.
I think the stock of Pakis will go up in the arms bazars of Middle east. In this conjunction the importance of Mushy sayin , 'Next up Pakistan' need to be understood.
Watch Iran, and Saudis to get one for themselves.
KSA would get one like the way Pakis got from Bejing. Ready to go.
I think the stock of Pakis will go up in the arms bazars of Middle east. In this conjunction the importance of Mushy sayin , 'Next up Pakistan' need to be understood.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
The latest push that the Paki nukes are stored in Chagai Hills, home territory of the fundoos is something that is worth thinking about. It could give a whole new meaning to nuclear proliferation.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
"Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Are Already In The Wrong Hands"
http://www.outlookindia.com/
(Click the link in the top left)
http://www.outlookindia.com/
(Click the link in the top left)
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Now this guy is actually a rocket scientist..
Glenn: Action against dictator could inflame world’s Muslims
COLUMBUS - Posing one of the "what ifs" surrounding a U.S. invasion of Iraq, former U.S. Sen. John Glenn yesterday expressed concern that al-Qaeda could obtain nuclear weapons by toppling Pakistan’s government.
Mr. Glenn said U.S. military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power could "inflame the whole Muslim community across the world" and threaten President Pervez Musharraf’s control over Pakistan.
Glenn: Action against dictator could inflame world’s Muslims
COLUMBUS - Posing one of the "what ifs" surrounding a U.S. invasion of Iraq, former U.S. Sen. John Glenn yesterday expressed concern that al-Qaeda could obtain nuclear weapons by toppling Pakistan’s government.
Mr. Glenn said U.S. military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power could "inflame the whole Muslim community across the world" and threaten President Pervez Musharraf’s control over Pakistan.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
well.. I'll be.. WTF-do-you-know.. it actually does take a rocket scientist to figure that one out!!
I knew that Glenn was among the smarter people on the hill..
I knew that Glenn was among the smarter people on the hill..
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Non profileration Jihadi Gordon Prather's latest column.
Promiscuous nukes
Promiscuous nukes
But then, in 1998, Pakistan – neither a NPT signatory nor a NSG member – surprised the world by testing a half-dozen sophisticated nukes. Would Pakistan share these "gifts from Allah" with Iraq and other Islamic nation-states?
Well, apparently, not with Iraq. The IAEA reports that Iraq has been unable to reconstitute its illicit program to develop nukes.
But what about North Korea? The IAEA reports the North Koreans may soon have nukes. Did Pakistan aid them? Yes – reportedly supplying the Koreans with technical assistance, equipment and a list of non-state outlets to contact.
Bummer. North Korea is probably the only nation-state in the world that would make nukes a "cash crop," for sale to the highest bidder, including terrorists. That means that North Korea is probably the only nation-state the UNSC and NATO would and should authorize a pre-emptive strike against for developing a nuke capability.
The warhawks haven't been able to pin Sept. 11 – or any other terrorist act – on Saddam Hussein. Until they do, neither NATO nor the UNSC is going to authorize the use of force, under Article 5 or UNSCR-1331.
So, why haven't the warhawks shifted their focus to North Korea? In particular, when North Korean Pooh-bahs visit Pakistan and other Islamic states to market their most recent "cash crop," do they meet with al-Qaida? Stay tuned.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Mansoor Ijaz: Al Qaeda's Nightmare Scenario Emerges
The Weekly Standard ^ | 02/19/03 | Mansoor Ijaz
The Weekly Standard ^ | 02/19/03 | Mansoor Ijaz
OSAMA BIN LADEN, or some good likeness of him, spoke from the ether
again on two occasions last week, releasing two undated audiotapes as
Muslims completed their pilgrimages to Mecca. His call to Jihad did
not stop at tying himself to Iraq's people, by which he had clearly
hoped to provoke Washington into immediate unilateral military action
against Saddam Hussein. Nor did it end with his messianic recitation
of verses in the Koran that clearly demonstrated he knows the end game
is near. Predicting his martyrdom this year, he vowed to die in "the
belly of the Eagle," an Islamist reference to ending his life in a
final act of terror against the United States on our soil. The man,
put simply, is on the run...
...While bin Laden's vision of dividing the West and driving a wedge
between the United States and her allies, whether Arab or European,
has become a political reality, his terrorist acts have not yet
reached their intended crescendo--to use a weapon of mass destruction
against civilians. That is why bin Laden spoke and why we need to
quickly and effectively decipher what he is really trying to tell us.
A plethora of available but seemingly unconnected evidence provides
important clues for what may be bin Laden's final act. To understand
the data, we must be imaginative and accept that al Qaeda's highest
military objective is the economic paralysis of the West--killing us
softly, to quote Roberta Flack. Hardcore acts of terrorism against
civilian targets that cause mass casualties are certainly a part of
the al Qaeda Jihad thesis, but these acts are designed more for
recruitment than long-term debilitating impact...
...Constructing the Tools of Armageddon
AL QAEDA has explosives expertise that is unsurpassed in non-military
circles. It gets military-grade C4 charges from China and Iran; it
employs Hezbollah and Hamas guerillas trained in the fine arts of
detonation devices (witness particularly the maritime attacks against
the USS Cole and the French oil tanker); and it has brainwashed
legions of men who are willing to die for the cause.
What's missing? Plutonium, and the scientific expertise to build a
crude but highly explosive nuclear bomb. (Plutonium is more easily
transported without detection and offers a bigger bang for the buck
than typical enriched uranium devices.)
Who's supplying the material and expertise? North Korea, and,
surprisingly, our ally in the war against al Qaeda, Pakistan.
Pyongyang--with a lot of help from China (which is supplying key
chemicals to separate plutonium from depleted uranium) and Pakistan
(which gave North Korea its uranium enrichment centrifuges and tutored
its nuclear scientists)--will be able to churn out Coke cans of
plutonium at the rate of one per week by the end of March.
According to my intelligence sources in the Far East, the outlying
renegade provinces of Indonesia (Aceh, for example) and the
Philippines (where al Qaeda affiliate Abu Sayyaf rules) are infested
with senior al Qaeda leaders. Each one is financially empowered to
purchase North Korea's plutonium the moment it is reprocessed. Ayman
Zawahiri, al Qaeda's number two, was reportedly in Indonesia last
September, a month before the Bali bomb blast that killed 200 mostly
Australian tourists. He could easily be there again.
We also know from published--and so far undisputed--reports that from
February 2000 until July 2002, eight senior Pakistani nuclear
scientists left their country without obtaining the required No
Objection Certificates needed for travel abroad. They remain
unaccounted for and at least some are reported to have traveled to
Australia and Indonesia.
In a worst case scenario, al Qaeda could construct a crude but
effective nuclear device in weeks, if not a month, from Hezbollah C4,
North Korean plutonium, and a little nuclear expertise from
disaffected Pakistani scientists. Making a "dirty" radiological
dispersion device with Strontium or Cesium also remains an option,
although it is clear that al Qaeda has the intent and resources to go
for weapons that cause maximum collateral damage.
Add to this troubling possibility the fact that the terror group has
resorted to the use of seafaring vessels to move its people around,
and now has a fleet large and diverse enough that one or two could
seamlessly move into a large harbor or congested waterway undetected,
and a picture emerges of an unparalleled potential threat to the
global economy from the paralysis that could be caused by a crude
plutonium bomb exploding in the belly of an al Qaeda ship with bin
Laden onboard
The Targets
THE EASIEST TARGETS today for such an al Qaeda plot are Singapore
harbor--the world's second largest seaport and the gateway to and from
all trade done in the Far East--and the mouth of the Persian Gulf,
which if irradiated could disrupt the normal flow of reasonably priced
oil for half a century, no matter how much oil Alaska, Russia and
Venezuela produce. There have been reports that easily accessed
Australian ports, possibly even Sydney harbor, might be the target of
an al-Qaeda dirty bomb plot. There are other potential targets with
more symbolic value: the Panama Canal, to demonstrate al Qaeda can hit
us again in our hemisphere; the Suez Canal, to hurt what bin Laden
perceives as the traitorous Arab governments of Egypt, Jordan, and
Saudi Arabia simultaneously; and the Straits of Gibraltar, where al
Qaeda cells in Morocco tried to launch an attack last year.
But the target closest to bin Laden's heart likely remains a seaport
that would allow him to go to his Allah in the belly of the
Eagle--perhaps on the western seaboard of the United States. One thing
is sure: Bin Laden's ego and ethos will compel him to go out in a
blaze of glory that will secure the recruitment of his legions for
decades to come and enshrine him as one of history's most evil beings
America has a moral responsibility to the rest of the world to get on
with the onerous task of dismantling and destroying those who enable
al Qaeda's evil designs. To delay or fail in this task is to watch the
destruction of humanity, bit by bit, by men who never understood God
or His teachings, and with whom we can never achieve peaceful
co-existence.
Mansoor Ijaz, chairman of Crescent Investment Management in New York,
negotiated Sudan's counterterrorism offer of data on al Qaeda, Osama
bin Laden, and other terrorist groups to the Clinton administration in
1997. He also worked closely with Mujahedeen and Islamist leaders in
Pakistan to enact the July 2000 cease-fire in Kashmir between Muslim
separatists and India's security forces.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Now its TSP's link with Iranian nuclear program.
NY Times Report
NY Times Report
During the visit to the Natanz site, inspectors found that it included a small network of centrifuges for enriching uranium. The inspectors also learned that Iran had components to make a significant number of additional centrifuges.
American officials believe Natanz is part of a long suspected nuclear weapons program, an Iranian project that American intelligence believes has benefited from Pakistani assistance and that is far more advanced than the effort by Iraq.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
A Hard hitting article by William C. Triplett, a conservative hawk on China. Jumrao garu, note the title 
Therefore, the idea that Beijing shares our desire for a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula is nothing more than a dangerous self-delusion, however well-intended. In the same way that Beijing uses Pakistan as its proxy to attack Delhi, they are using Pyongyang to inflict a political defeat on the United States and its North Asian allies.
[/quote]
Therefore, the idea that Beijing shares our desire for a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula is nothing more than a dangerous self-delusion, however well-intended. In the same way that Beijing uses Pakistan as its proxy to attack Delhi, they are using Pyongyang to inflict a political defeat on the United States and its North Asian allies.
[/quote]
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Non proliferation Wahhabi, Gordon Prather's new column.
Focus on nukes
Focus on nukes
Suppose some time after we’ve forcibly changed the regime in Iraq, and are preparing to forcibly change the regime in Iran, a small nuke takes out Baltimore, or perhaps Tel Aviv.
Who did it?
Probably al-Qaida. But where did they get the nuke?
Well, nukes leave "fingerprints." Our radio-chemists are going to know right away if the nuke came from Pakistan, the most likely source.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Inspection of nuclear facility in Iran adds to fears over weapons program
During the visit to the Natanz site, inspectors found it includes a small network of centrifuges for enriching uranium. Inspectors also learned that Iran has components to make a significant number of additional centrifuges.
U.S. officials believe that Natanz is part of a long-suspected nuclear-weapons program, an Iranian project that U.S. intelligence believes has benefited from assistance from Pakistan and that is far more advanced than the effort mounted by Iraq.
During the visit to the Natanz site, inspectors found it includes a small network of centrifuges for enriching uranium. Inspectors also learned that Iran has components to make a significant number of additional centrifuges.
U.S. officials believe that Natanz is part of a long-suspected nuclear-weapons program, an Iranian project that U.S. intelligence believes has benefited from assistance from Pakistan and that is far more advanced than the effort mounted by Iraq.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Iran will have a working weapons (5 at minimum) ready to go by 2006.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Here's a REAL Audio clip of Seymour Hersh being interviewed on radio.
He talks about the TSP-N.K connection.
He talks about the TSP-N.K connection.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
CNN: No plan for N. Korea sanctions: Powell
Is that diplomatic lingo for China and TSP?Wrapping up a four-day trip to Japan, China and South Korea, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell repeated calls for the international community to come together to persuade North Korea of the error of its ways.