massed artillery, tactical airpower, nukes, T-80 and T-64 to launch the main attack and punch a few holes. they would be too attrited to exploit and would just open and hold open these points.
the T-72s were supposed to accompany the BTR/BMP horde in fast columns deep into the rear of the shattered fronts....on many fronts....those lines that failed to make progress would not be resupplied, the ones that made good progress would be supplied and re-inforced. T-72 was not supposed to go toe to toe in the initial fights but move fast later, smash up soft skinned convoys trying to approach the area, use speed to advantage.
strike deep, dislocate the transport network , disrupt attempts to reinforce the shaky areas, link up in multiple pincers.
this would set stage for (a) negotiated talks (b) continue the march toward french border if no talks
we took the T-72 and attempted to make a tier-1 MBT out of it, and that without the huge tactical airpower, artillery and VVD airborne unit support it was meant to leverage...then panicked when Abrams was tested in Sindh...panicked again when ukraine gave 300 T80s and pakis built huge stocks of TOW missiles in special M113 ATGM batallions and got cobra gunships .......
our tank strategy has been a shambles for a long long time. and continues to be. we neither have the inventory for tank vs tank brawl (mass artillery and rockets, heavy tanks) or fast moving deep battle in the rear (fully mech divs and airborne brigades)
they came up with a wishy washy cold start doctrine but publicly limited the depth of advance to 80km to not cross "redlines" as if GHQ pindi had given a affidavit signed for the same