1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

K Mehta · Post by **K Mehta** » 15 Oct 2015 12:32

did anyone see the video being shown at the giant screen at Bangalore railway station? it was an excellent video. hope it is released on youtube

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 15 Oct 2015 13:01

Thanks guys. I'd seen the first one but not the second.

member_28652 · Post by **member_28652** » 16 Oct 2015 12:22

Found this on a facebook post byNilesh. Do all targets need civilian permission?
More "revised" History is being manufactured about Jabberlal Neckscrew: The truth is: US advise to Nehru during 1962, led to his grounding the Indian Air Force contributing greatly to India's debacle. India had all the aircraft it needed China did not have an Air Force. My Dad's eldest brother, Air Commodore R. Sitaram coined this name for him. He had returned from RAF Staff College, Andover and as the Indian Government did not know what to do with tall, handsome, well educated, well spoken officers who made Nehru look like something that the cat had brought in, he was made Air Officer (Intelligence) and was sick of Nehru's meaningless inane blathering about matters he knew nothing about and blustering to mask his stupidity and dependency on sycophants and relatives rather than seeking advise from the real top class staff around him bequeathed by the British. He barged into Nehru's room to demand that the Air Force be mobilized during the 1962 war to find Nehru in the Arms of his woman of the moment. It ended his career. Nehru did not mobilize the air force on US advise setting an example that Utterly Bihari Vajpayee followed. This led to India;s debacle in 1962. It was later put out, falsely, that the IAF could not operate at that altitude to cover up this blunder of Nehru's. My next uncle Air Marshal R. Rajaram, DFC, (AOC-in-C Western Command at that time) brought the 1965 war to an early end by bombing Peshawar to smithereens together with Pakistan's reserves, ammo, fuel and other supplies. This was done by surprise without informing anybody till the last minute and without seeking any approval or authorization. Lal Bahadur Shastrhi was very annoyed, fired my uncle and gave ACM Arjun Singh a dressing down for this.. My Maternal Grand Father K.Srinivasan, Mysore Civil Service, slapped Jabberlal at the Lalitha Mahal Palace in Mysore. The rascal was still incensed by his own speech berating the British AND the Princes for their lavish, tyrannical life styles which his audience had suffered patiently only because the Maharaja has asked them to. He then, in high rage, threw a cup of coffee over a priceless carpet from Shiraz because he had expected to be served tea. Nehru was a hypocrite to the core. A scamp, a scallywag, a hollow idiot and as ugly a pick pocket as you might like to find living in Cheapside like Jabber's mentors at Harrow.

--Via S Suchindranath Aiyer

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Oct 2015 02:38

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... tango.html

Tension was high from early morning on 1st September 1965. All the aircraft were loaded with the operational rocket pods. Additional qualified Mystere pilots from Training Command were attached and had reported the previous day. I had been flown out to Palam in an Otter at night to fly one night sortie in a Hunter and brought back by early morning and declared night-qualified "fully operational"! We did not have a single night qualified till then. As I have said, tension was running high but nothing was happening -just waiting and marking time- a repeat of what I had gone through at Tezpur with No.29 squadron on Ouragans in 1962. Finally at about 1700hrs, the CO was ordered to report to the ops room with three of his pilots for immediate briefing. Gp Capt Roshan Suri, the station commander painted a grim situation of our army's position at Akhnoor and the Pak armour's thrust at Chhamb on the river Tawi (near Jammu). Maps were quickly marked with the GLO giving the overall operational situation on the Tawi. The plan was to launch 12 Vampires in three formations to open the air attack to be followed by our Mystere formation (4 aircraft) and then one more similar formation led by Wg Cdr Goodman. It did seem very odd that the Vampires had been selected to open the innings!

The take off and navigation to the target area went as planned and in the outbound I saw the last Vampire formation of 4 intact and homeward bound. RT silence precluded any reporting. It was a short trip to the target and as we pulled up from low level, the sight of Patton tanks everywhere was awesome. They were out in the open with no camouflage and all that was needed was to pick the one that an accurate dive angle and tracking time for the gun sight for a certain kill. The problem was all the RPs were fired in a salvo on the first pass but the sight of the tank blowing up was unforgettable - the first time that I fired in anger. I now had only gun ammo to hammer the support soft skinned vehicles but that too for one pass only as the airspace had to be vacated for the following formation behind us.

The feeling on the home leg was that of exhilaration. What an easy turkey shoot! The only thing I could not explain to myself were some black spots whizzing past the cockpit in the dive. Only after landing did I realize that they were machine gun tracers being fired from the tanks at the aircraft. Some of the light ammo caused minor damage to the aircraft skin.

I was in high spirits after what I considered had been a fruitful mission and proceeded straight to the wing ops room for the mission debrief along with the C.O. along with other formation members. On reaching we found the mood somber with general sadness in the air only then did the cause did the cause for it become clear. We had lost 4 Vampires out of the 12 launched, one from the first formation and three from the second, shot down by PAF Sabres. It was obvious that the PAF had left the tactical area earlier either owing to our arrival or lack of fuel that is how the last Vampire formation had survived intact.

[i{So 1/4 in first formation, 3/4 in second and none from last formation. We don't know more. Need to dig.}[/i]

The question now was planning for the next days. The Vampire squadron was withdrawn immediately and it was decided to induct a flight of Gnats from No.23 squadron to give top cover to the Mysteres so that we could concentrate entirely on our primary mission of ground attack. Till such time as the Gnats actually made their appearance, we cleaned up the Mysteres for high speed reconnaissance of the battle area. In its clean configuration could easily clock 600 Kts at which speed the Sabers would hardly get into gun firing position.

So root cause was lack of escorts for strike missions.

Why did Vampires persist in IAF when Ourgans/ toofanis were younger planes?

Yayavar · Post by **Yayavar** » 17 Oct 2015 03:08

asinh wrote:Found this on a facebook post byNilesh. Do all targets need civilian permission?
More "revised" History is being manufactured about Jabberlal Neckscrew: The truth is: US advise to Nehru during 1962, led to his grounding the Indian Air Force contributing greatly to India's debacle. India had all the aircraft it needed China did not have an Air Force. My Dad's eldest brother, Air Commodore R. Sitaram coined this name for him. He had returned from RAF Staff College, Andover and as the Indian Government did not know what to do with tall, handsome, well educated, well spoken officers who made Nehru look like something that the cat had brought in, he was made Air Officer (Intelligence) ....

--Via S Suchindranath Aiyer

All else is fine but really, Angrezi taught talll (forgot to add fair perhaps) and handsome was the reason Indian governmet didnt know what to do with him; and therefore they made him Air Officer (intelligence)... and then eventually he rose to be an Air Commodore while the government didnt know what to do with him...

Nehru's incompetence in matters war or otherwise has been written of often enough; but his admonishment is from the same class who perhaps have a high(er) opinion of themselves ....

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Oct 2015 03:52

Which makes it even more pungent.. the tfta was a fraud tfta per the tfta

Yayavar · Post by **Yayavar** » 17 Oct 2015 03:57

or merely mutual envy

... in any case the critique seems a lot more personal and that messes things up

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Oct 2015 04:04

depends on the perceiver..to those who still think the nehru clan were some innocents and what not, they'll demur..to anyone else, who has had the misfortune of seeing their antics..it rings true...because if the stuff mentioned is correct.. besides the other folks mentioned in that missive, their record can be ascertained and seen if it matches the narrative broadly (because as all narratives go, it has some hyperbole eg tall handsome etc).

Yayavar · Post by **Yayavar** » 17 Oct 2015 04:21

ah! now you want to diss bcos didnt agree with your perception fully.
Nehru's failing in 1962 war is well known and talked about; whether due to US advice or otherwise. The uncle being tall, or govt not knowing what to do with him as a result (was he not in AF), and then given a high post or then walking/barging into Nehru provides no further info other than personal outrage. Air Commodore is a high rank and Air C Sitaram was an important figure in IAF - but his career could have or not have been ended by Nehru's compromising situation, or by the act of barging on the PM, or for some other reason. The main info here is US advice.

So you can perceive through your lens and other through theirs... There is no only bad or only good meme to apply to Nehru clan or those who saw through their wrongs.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Oct 2015 04:51

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... ter03.html

Pursuing Vampires loss in 1965...

On September 1st, The Pakistani artillery started shelling the Indian forward positions, starting 0330 hrs, the shelling was exceptionally heavy and continued till 0630 hrs. At which time a Pakistani Army force of two Infantry Brigades and two Armoured Regiments started their attack on the Indian positions. 3rd Mahar was the forward most battalion and it bore the brunt of the attack along with a solitary squadron of AMX-13 tanks of the 20th Lancers. In spite of their heroic defence the sheer strength of the enemy made its presence felt. No artillery support was given as the Pak shelling has put the guns out of action.

Faced with this critical situation, Commander, 191 Inf. Bde asked for air support at 1100 hrs. This request reached Army HQ without delay. The Army Chief forwarded the request to the Defence Minister for the Govt's permission, and by the time the Defence Minister okayed the request to the Air Chief, Air Marshal Arjan Singh, five hours have elapsed. It was 1600 hrs and within an hour of Air Marshal Singh walking out of the DM's office, the first fighters had taken to the air.

Pathankot Airbase was the nearest airbase available to the zone of conflict. Situated near the border between Jammu and Punjab, Pathankot was a mere 30 seconds flying time from the border. It was the forward most airbase in that area. Heading the airbase was Group Captain Roshan Suri, a test pilot who earned his name as one of the first Indians to break the sound barrier. Suri along, with P.C. Lal and H. Moolgavkar is credited as the first Indian pilots to break the sound barrier in the Mystere, while testflying the Mystere in France.

Assisting Suri in the capacity of the Officer-in-Charge of Operations was Wg. Cdr. Verghese Kuriyan, a veteran of the 1948 Kashmir Operations and ex-commander of the No.29 Toofani Squadron. Kuriyan has been posted to Pathankot just before outbreak of the hostilities from his previous assignment at Agra. Pathankot at that time had two squadrons of Mysteres - No.3 under Wg. Cdr. Paul Roby and No.31 under Wg. Cdr. W.M. Goodman , and No.45 Squadron flying Vampire fighters. There were no true air superiority fighters based at Pathankot at that time.

No.45 Sqn was till recently based at Pune and was moved north in anticipation of hostilities just a couple of days before. This squadron was in fact a composite squadron formed after merging the No.220 Squadron with No.45 Sqn. Under the command of Sqn. Ldr. S.K. "Marshal" Dhar, a very enthusiastic & energetic Commanding Officer, it's Vampires have been ready and armed sitting on the tarmac and on receipt of the CAS' orders, the first wave of four Vampires took of at 1719 hrs.

Dhar had already briefed his pilots about the timings of the sorties. Three missions would be flown. The second one to start off at 1730 hrs and the third mission at 1740 Hours. This would enable the last mission to arrive over the target at dusk, just as darkness is falling and come back after executing its mission in the fading light. Dhar would lead the first mission, the senior flight commander, Flt. Lt. F.J. Mehta would lead the second mission, followed by the last mission to be led by Flt. Lt. A.K. Bhagwagar. The pilots of the third formation were told to carry torches as they would have to fly back in poor light and the torches would help them read the poorly lit instruments.

Just before the first sorties were to take off, Bhagwagar approached Mehta for a change of plan. The last mission required special demands that as the Vampires would be coming back to Pathankot in the darkness of the night, they would require Night Flying Qualified Pilots to lead the formation back. Mehta was one of the qualified pilots and already weary from a long ferry flight from Jamnagar from that morning, agreed for the change. Thus, Bhagwagar led the second mission after Dhar’s first. And Mehta along with another Night Flying Qualified Pilot - Flt Lt. K.D. Mehra flew in the third mission.

Dhar and his formation took off at 1719 Hours immediately on the go ahead. As the Vampires were heading in a north westerly direction towards Chamb, the sun was shining straight into the pilots eyes, many felt that they were the last hope of the Indian Armed Forces. As mentioned before, the Vampire formed the most obsolete aircraft in the IAF's inventory. The Vampires first flight was during World War II, At that time even the propeller driven Tempest had a higher rate of climb than the Vampire. In 1965, facing the PAF's F-86 Sabres, it was hopelessly out of place.

The forward most positions of 3 Mahar were at Alfa Batal. All eyes were turned upwards at the sound of approaching aircraft. The arrival of the Vampires over the battlefield was greeted with relief. But relief turned to horror as the aircraft made a strafing run on the 3 Mahar positions. Luckily there were no causalities. They then turned their attention towards the Pakistani tanks. The Vampires made several passes at the Pakistani Armour at leisure. Ground fire hit one of the Vampires flown by Flt. Lt. S.V. Pathak.

The PAF was called up and soon a pair of Sidewinder armed F-86's were over the area. The Sabres were being flown by Sqn. Ldr. S.A. Rafique of No.5 PAF and Flt. Lt. Imtiaz Bhatti of No.15 PAF Sqns. These Sabres stumbled into the battle area just as the second formation of Vampires led by Flt. Lt. Bhagwagar came in for the attack. The Jawans of 3 Mahar were mute spectators as the Sabres tore into the Vampires and shot them down, one by one, three of them. Flt. Lt. Bhatti recounts in his own words,

"….close to the area, we descended fast, looking all around and below us for the enemy aircraft. At about this time we also learnt that the C-in-C was flying around the area in a L-19. We did not see him, we later on discovered that he left well before we got there. Our search succeeded and I saw two enemy aircraft. They were crossing underneath us and I informed Rafique about it. He immediately acknowledged it "…contact". Rafique said he was going for them. While covering his tail, I spotted two Canberras 9 O'Clock from me at 5000-6000 feet. Then I spotted another two Vampires trying to get behind Rafique. I instinctively broke off and positioned myself behind these two. In the meantime, Rafique had knocked down one of his two targets and was chasing the other. About now I had my sights on one of my own and was holding my fire. I was anxiously waiting for my leader to bring down his second and clear out of my way. When the Vampire I had targeted closed in on Rafique too dangerously, I called out to him break left. Within the next moment Rafique shot down his second, reacting to my call and broke left. Simultaneously I pressed my trigger and hit one of them. Having disposed of one I shifted my sight on the other and fired at him. In the chase I had gone as low as 200 feet off the ground when I shot my second prey, he ducked and went into the trees. We had bagged four in our first engagement with the Indians…"

What is notable in Bhatti's account is that he observed two Vampires try to get behind Rafique while Rafique was chasing the first two Vampires. The Indian Pilots in their outdated aircraft turned into their attackers rather than try to make a run for it and they paid the price for it. However Bhatti is inaccurate in identifying Canberras in the vicinity as no Canberras were flying on that day. He had also missed another fact, that one Vampire escaped the wrath of the Sabres. Flt. Lt. Sondhi managed to escape. Of the four Vampires claimed by the Pakistanis, Rafique was credited with two of the kills, with Bhatti getting the credit for the other two.

No.45 had lost four Vampires that day. One to AA Fire and three to the Sabres. There was only one Survivor, Fg. Off. S.V. Pathak from the first formation managed to bale out from his ill-fated Vampire. Flt. Lt. A.K. Bhagwagar, Flt Lt. V.M. Joshi, and Flt. Lt. S Bharadwaj, all from the second formation were killed. The loss of the pilots was more hurtful than the loss of the planes.

However this terrible loss did not deter the Vampires, as the Sabres cleared out, the third wave led by Flt. Lt. F.J. Mehta came in to strike at the Pakistani targets. F.J. Mehta had Flt. Lt. K.D. Mehra, Fg. Off. Manjit Singh and Fg. Off. Ahuja as his wingmen. The last formation too leisurely went about attacking ground targets, completely oblivious of what had happened with the second formation.

Those Vampire pilots were truly awesome.

Flying old clunkers to chase a F-86 Sabre in a dog fight is bravest of brave.

thanks to Jagan and Samir for chronicling the bravery.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Oct 2015 04:59

asinh wrote:Found this on a facebook post byNilesh. Do all targets need civilian permission?
More "revised" History is being manufactured about Jabberlal Neckscrew: The truth is: US advise to Nehru during 1962, led to his grounding the Indian Air Force contributing greatly to India's debacle. India had all the aircraft it needed China did not have an Air Force. My Dad's eldest brother, Air Commodore R. Sitaram coined this name for him. He had returned from RAF Staff College, Andover and as the Indian Government did not know what to do with tall, handsome, well educated, well spoken officers who made Nehru look like something that the cat had brought in, he was made Air Officer (Intelligence) and was sick of Nehru's meaningless inane blathering about matters he knew nothing about and blustering to mask his stupidity and dependency on sycophants and relatives rather than seeking advise from the real top class staff around him bequeathed by the British. He barged into Nehru's room to demand that the Air Force be mobilized during the 1962 war to find Nehru in the Arms of his woman of the moment. It ended his career. Nehru did not mobilize the air force on US advise setting an example that Utterly Bihari Vajpayee followed. This led to India;s debacle in 1962. It was later put out, falsely, that the IAF could not operate at that altitude to cover up this blunder of Nehru's. My next uncle Air Marshal R. Rajaram, DFC, (AOC-in-C Western Command at that time) brought the 1965 war to an early end by bombing Peshawar to smithereens together with Pakistan's reserves, ammo, fuel and other supplies. This was done by surprise without informing anybody till the last minute and without seeking any approval or authorization. Lal Bahadur Shastrhi was very annoyed, fired my uncle and gave ACM Arjun Singh a dressing down for this.. My Maternal Grand Father K.Srinivasan, Mysore Civil Service, slapped Jabberlal at the Lalitha Mahal Palace in Mysore. The rascal was still incensed by his own speech berating the British AND the Princes for their lavish, tyrannical life styles which his audience had suffered patiently only because the Maharaja has asked them to. He then, in high rage, threw a cup of coffee over a priceless carpet from Shiraz because he had expected to be served tea. Nehru was a hypocrite to the core. A scamp, a scallywag, a hollow idiot and as ugly a pick pocket as you might like to find living in Cheapside like Jabber's mentors at Harrow.

--Via S Suchindranath Aiyer

Here is an account of Peshawar raid which did all that!

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... hawar.html

See the briefing where the plan was developed and AOC-in-C decisive intervention.

Don"t forget he was a DFC from WWII!

Writer is wrong. AVM R. Rajaram died in service in 1969

The information I had sought in this column on January 16 about what might have been the first family of Madras flying came to me in rather sad circumstances. It reached me a few days after the passing away of Air Commodore R. Sitaram at the age of 90 in Bangalore. The Air Commodore was one of the principals of that story of the early days of flying in Madras.The first principal in the story was his father, B. S. Ramaswamy Aiyar. He was a PWD executive engineer in `Trichinopoly' in 1931 when he got interested in a couple of aircraft flying in the area. In his early forties at the time, he decided to enrol himself as a trainee in the Madras Flying Club that same year. He must have been one of the first five or six Indians to get a private pilot's licence in Madras. He went on to become a superintending engineer and a Rao Bahadur.Ramaswamy Aiyar had from the first planned out the lives of his sons. He wanted Sitaram to join the ICS and Rajaram, the IPS. Since getting into both services would be easier if the applicants had a good record in extra-curricular activities, he enrolled them too in the Madras Flying Club. So, by the time they were 17 and 16 respectively, they not only were on the way to their flying licences but they also seemed to have made up their minds about an alternative career _ flying.When World War II broke out, Ramaswamy and sons volunteered for active flying service. The father was told he was too old for active service, but the brothers received King's Commissions and joined the newly created Royal Indian Air Force. They were joined by Atmaram _ whom many thought was a third brother, but was in fact an inseparable friend from Madras Flying Club days. Curiously, when they were all group captains they had at the same time commanded the Indian Air Force stations at Jalahalli (R. Sitaram), Tambaram (R.Rajaram) and Secunderabad (P. S. Atmaram).Rajaram, who was with No. 1 Squadron, the Tigers, was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross during World War II. The squadron, commanded by Squadron Leader Arjan Singh, who went on to become a Marshal of the Air Force, flew Hurricanes. It was stationed mainly in the Northeast and won seven DFCs. Rajaram in time became an Air Vice- Marshal and was Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Western Air Command, during the 1965 war with Pakistan. He was Vice-Chief of Air Staff when he passed away in 1969.Reader V. Theetharappan also writes of a couple of other Royal Indian Air Force pilots of the same period, who he thinks graduated from the Madras Flying Club - a Henry from Madras Christian College School and Sathyanarayana who he thinks later commanded the Tambaram station.S. MUTHIAH

So Air Commodore R Sitaram died @age 90 in Bangalore.

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp ... 188947.ece

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Oct 2015 05:38

I was reading about the four Vampires lost over Chaamb and subsequent withdrawal from service.
I note the four were part of a flight of 12 Vampires along with 12 Mysteres.

None of the 12 Mysteres were shot down nor the other four Vampires.
In Army terms the 4 Vampires were like "forlorn hope" which enabled the rest to survive.
Also the four Vampires were from 220 squadron which was renamed 45 squadron to match existing 44 squadron.

I think we need to chronicle the saga of the successful Vampires to restore the honor of the squadron.
----

Old post

member_28638 · Post by **member_28638** » 17 Oct 2015 15:39

'I hate these Pakistanis'

http://www.rediff.com/news/special/i-ha ... 150922.htm

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Oct 2015 16:31

yayavar wrote:ah! now you want to diss bcos didnt agree with your perception fully.

No, I am saying unlike you, I don't have any such luvv for them to put them on a pedestal and disregard what's written in that post until there is evidence to the opposite. And that article can be dismissed if corroborating information is pulled out which contradicts many of the other points made in it, since direct confirmation is not available. Zimble.

Understood? There is no "didn't agree with my perception fully" or whatever confused rejoinder you attempt to make.

The only thing I find unrealistic is the slapping incident, but having heard of much more stranger things (wherein so called lower level functionaries have done equivalent things to many phamous politicos) even that may have occurred.

Next, as regards the perception of these gents, unlike you, who seems to be engaged in some convoluted defense of the gent in question, there are enough accounts from people who interacted with all these worthies & know exactly how they were regarded by several of their peers or even common citizens. (https://www.facebook.com/Humans-of-Bomb ... 068070045/#).

For instance lets take that aside of yours as the reason the argument is invalid, oh jee, the writer comes across as TFTA or personal or whatever semantic /pedantic detail you ascribe. Yes sure, as if people who were on the receiving end of such decisions wouldn't be personal but would write some polished communique with footnotes.

Besides about the tone and what not, its common knowledge our senior military leadership of that era, just like Nehru, was heavily Brit influenced and would talk/communicate in those terms. Good or bad, that's how it was. Hence its very likely that the communique is a product of its times wherein those folks would evaluate Nehru on the same lines he'd behave as, and it would come short. You regarded this as its failing, which is irrelevant.

Nehru's failing in 1962 war is well known and talked about; whether due to US advice or otherwise. The uncle being tall, or govt not knowing what to do with him as a result (was he not in AF), and then given a high post or then walking/barging into Nehru provides no further info other than personal outrage. Air Commodore is a high rank and Air C Sitaram was an important figure in IAF - but his career could have or not have been ended by Nehru's compromising situation, or by the act of barging on the PM, or for some other reason. The main info here is US advice.

In short, all you are doing here is more mumble jumble. It could have, might not have, did not, could have and so forth.

Instead of all this mumble jumble, all I said was that the salient details the author mentioned elsewhere about the gents in question could have been corroborated. As simple as that. If all the rest turned out to be hyperbole, chances were even this would have been. Instead of that, you went off on an extended defense of the "leader" in question which turned out to be more of a damp squib.

Take a look at what Ramana did with the same information. He dug out corroborating information, at least some of it rings true. That's all you had to do. Instead off you went on a not all bad, not this not that stuff which is irrelevant.

so you can perceive through your lens and other through theirs... There is no only bad or only good meme to apply to Nehru clan or those who saw through their wrongs.

Oh thank you so much your gracious lord for telling us what we can do and that we are ok to perceive with our lens.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Oct 2015 16:56

The original article BTW is by Suchindranath Aiyer, and it is indeed a real person. He repeats the claim about the 1965 war here:

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/1962 ... -not-used/

S.Suchindranath Aiyer on October 20, 2012 at 9:48 am said:
India is woefully bereft of leadership both civilian and military. The one page they could learn from Mrs Gandhi is perhaps respect for competence. Task a service and resource them to get on with it. Not, as in Kargil, tie their hands behind their back at the behest of foreign powers, or attempting to micro manage a sister service by telling them what to do and how to go about it. Ultimately, it is India’s bayonets, the finest fighting infantry men in the World who are sacrificed in their thousan ..

Note the praise for Mrs Gandhi as versus the others. In short, can be an "old tale, long in the telling", can be fake, can be many things. Merely to accuse it of bias based on dislike of Nehru etc, may be unsound.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Oct 2015 17:04

ramana wrote:
asinh wrote:Found this on a facebook post byNilesh. Do all targets need civilian permission?
More "revised" History is being manufactured about Jabberlal Neckscrew: The truth is: US advise to Nehru during 1962, led to his grounding the Indian Air Force contributing greatly to India's debacle. India had all the aircraft it needed China did not have an Air Force. My Dad's eldest brother, Air Commodore R. Sitaram coined this name for him. He had returned from RAF Staff College, Andover and as the Indian Government did not know what to do with tall, handsome, well educated, well spoken officers who made Nehru look like something that the cat had brought in, he was made Air Officer (Intelligence) and was sick of Nehru's meaningless inane blathering about matters he knew nothing about and blustering to mask his stupidity and dependency on sycophants and relatives rather than seeking advise from the real top class staff around him bequeathed by the British. He barged into Nehru's room to demand that the Air Force be mobilized during the 1962 war to find Nehru in the Arms of his woman of the moment. It ended his career. Nehru did not mobilize the air force on US advise setting an example that Utterly Bihari Vajpayee followed. This led to India;s debacle in 1962. It was later put out, falsely, that the IAF could not operate at that altitude to cover up this blunder of Nehru's. My next uncle Air Marshal R. Rajaram, DFC, (AOC-in-C Western Command at that time) brought the 1965 war to an early end by bombing Peshawar to smithereens together with Pakistan's reserves, ammo, fuel and other supplies. This was done by surprise without informing anybody till the last minute and without seeking any approval or authorization. Lal Bahadur Shastrhi was very annoyed, fired my uncle and gave ACM Arjun Singh a dressing down for this.. My Maternal Grand Father K.Srinivasan, Mysore Civil Service, slapped Jabberlal at the Lalitha Mahal Palace in Mysore. The rascal was still incensed by his own speech berating the British AND the Princes for their lavish, tyrannical life styles which his audience had suffered patiently only because the Maharaja has asked them to. He then, in high rage, threw a cup of coffee over a priceless carpet from Shiraz because he had expected to be served tea. Nehru was a hypocrite to the core. A scamp, a scallywag, a hollow idiot and as ugly a pick pocket as you might like to find living in Cheapside like Jabber's mentors at Harrow.

--Via S Suchindranath Aiyer
Here is an account of Peshawar raid which did all that!

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... hawar.html

See the briefing where the plan was developed and AOC-in-C decisive intervention.

Don"t forget he was a DFC from WWII!

Writer is wrong. AVM R. Rajaram died in service in 1969

The information I had sought in this column on January 16 about what might have been the first family of Madras flying came to me in rather sad circumstances. It reached me a few days after the passing away of Air Commodore R. Sitaram at the age of 90 in Bangalore. The Air Commodore was one of the principals of that story of the early days of flying in Madras.The first principal in the story was his father, B. S. Ramaswamy Aiyar. He was a PWD executive engineer in `Trichinopoly' in 1931 when he got interested in a couple of aircraft flying in the area. In his early forties at the time, he decided to enrol himself as a trainee in the Madras Flying Club that same year. He must have been one of the first five or six Indians to get a private pilot's licence in Madras. He went on to become a superintending engineer and a Rao Bahadur.Ramaswamy Aiyar had from the first planned out the lives of his sons. He wanted Sitaram to join the ICS and Rajaram, the IPS. Since getting into both services would be easier if the applicants had a good record in extra-curricular activities, he enrolled them too in the Madras Flying Club. So, by the time they were 17 and 16 respectively, they not only were on the way to their flying licences but they also seemed to have made up their minds about an alternative career _ flying.When World War II broke out, Ramaswamy and sons volunteered for active flying service. The father was told he was too old for active service, but the brothers received King's Commissions and joined the newly created Royal Indian Air Force. They were joined by Atmaram _ whom many thought was a third brother, but was in fact an inseparable friend from Madras Flying Club days. Curiously, when they were all group captains they had at the same time commanded the Indian Air Force stations at Jalahalli (R. Sitaram), Tambaram (R.Rajaram) and Secunderabad (P. S. Atmaram).Rajaram, who was with No. 1 Squadron, the Tigers, was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross during World War II. The squadron, commanded by Squadron Leader Arjan Singh, who went on to become a Marshal of the Air Force, flew Hurricanes. It was stationed mainly in the Northeast and won seven DFCs. Rajaram in time became an Air Vice- Marshal and was Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Western Air Command, during the 1965 war with Pakistan. He was Vice-Chief of Air Staff when he passed away in 1969.Reader V. Theetharappan also writes of a couple of other Royal Indian Air Force pilots of the same period, who he thinks graduated from the Madras Flying Club - a Henry from Madras Christian College School and Sathyanarayana who he thinks later commanded the Tambaram station.S. MUTHIAH

So Air Commodore R Sitaram died @age 90 in Bangalore.

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp ... 188947.ece

Ramana, that fascinating account talks of the planning and details of the attack - this corroborates the strategic effect of the attack. So bringing the war to an early end by bombing fuel, stores, reserves and other supplies may be a civvies interpretation of the attack taking out the base infra and its wider ramifications.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Galle ... 5.jpg.html

Tuskers raid Peshawar: Indo-Pak War 1965

This is an account of a few audacious Canberra crews who flew almost 600 NMs into the enemy territory at night, trailing one another at near medium levels without any escort and without any radar cover, to bomb a very formidable airbase of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in 1965 war with Pakistan. Unlike IAF in 1965, PAF with its US built F 104 Starfighters equipped with Sidewinder AIM 9B missile had night intercept capability and vintage Canberras practically were sitting ducks against this supersonic, state of the art interceptor. PAF also was fortunate to receive from US an effective radar chain for early warning purposes. Against this background, planning a mission to Peshawar for Canberras was suicidal as it entailed flying to a target at its extreme flying range, through the enemy heartland with no allowance of fuel for any tactical routing. Fuel constraint also meant limited payload.

Attacking Peshawar became important for India as PAF had moved bulk of its attack force to its rear airfields and almost the entire B 57 ac bomber force was shifted to Peshawar immediately after IAF carried out retaliatory strikes on most of PAF bases with its Hunters and Mysteres on 07 Sep 1965. PAF considered Peshawar to be outside the range of Indian strike aircraft and hence a safe haven for its strategic force of US made B 57 long range bombers. Yet, as night fell at Peshawar on 13 September 1965, 08 (Eight) Canberras of 5 Squadron stealthily approached Peshawar. The typical profile of a Canberra raid was to approach to a pre –calculated pull up point between 200 and 500 ft AGL, pull up steeply to about 12,000 feet to drop the load and then climb progressively to 40,000 ft, to escape from Pakistani territory.

As Canberras closed in to their target, the ack -ack batteries opened up signaling raiders have been detected. PAF pilots and ground crew ran to take shelter in trenches and they had the rare privilege of seeing the first Canberra drop flares to illuminate the airfield and then thunder down the main runway at 200 feet, before pulling up at its end in an wingover to turn back and drop its bomb load at the end of a dispersal of parked aircraft. Had luck favoured the Tuskers, they would have wiped out the entire strategic strike component of the PAF with a single blow as the entire force of sixteen B 57s were lined up wingtip to wingtip on a dispersal. Unfortunately for IAF, the single 4000 lb bomb that fell closest to the parked B 57s hit soft soil and its explosive force was dissipated. However, bombs dropped from other members of Tusker force found their marks as fuel dumps were set ablaze, ATC building was flattened and aircraft on ground were damaged.

As Canberras set course for home, the inevitable happened. A lone Starfighter was vectored for an intercept on to the retreating bomber force. Canberras did all that was possible to do to prevent a massacre. Sqn Ldr Gautam saw a streak of flame appear in the darkness and made its way towards the bombers as the Starfighter launched its missile. However, luck favored the brave and the missile exploded harmlessly, possibly due to its proximity fuze malfunctioning. All eight Canberras landed safely at Agra.

The raid shook the PAF out of its complacency. No airfield or town was out of range of Indian bombers. No one in Pakistan had thought that the IAF would bomb Peshawar with impunity. The raid also forced the Americans (USAF), that had maintained a full- fledged Signal Intelligence base about 20 miles South of Peshawar, to evacuate all its personnel with families through Iran and return only after cessation of hostilities.

Tuskers raid of Peshawar will certainly go down as one of most audacious bomber attack in history of military aviation. The significance of the raid was a symbolic gesture, less material damage. Even John Fricker, the PAF commissioned hagiographer was moved to an effusive turn of phrase in describing the raid as, ‘the most effective Canberra attack of the war’.

The real heroes of the raid were undoubtedly the Navigators whose chances of survival without an ejection seat for them in Canberras were very close to nothing. It is, therefore, rightly so that Navigators Sqn Ldr SN Bansal and Flt Lt P Dastidar were awarded Vir Chakras for their acts of exceptional gallantry and Commanding Officer Wg Cdr PP Sing was decorated with a Mahavir Chakra, country’s second highest gallantry award.

Other members of the raid were Sqn Ldr JC Verma (Leader), Flt Lt Deshpande, Wg Cdr PP Singh, Sqn Ldr CR Mehta, Sqn Ldr VC Godwin, Navigators Ahluwalia and S Kapoor.

My painting “Tuskers raid Peshawar” was inspired by the account I read in the book “The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965” by Jagan/Samir duo. So it was initially composed entirely on impressions created in my mind of the attack as it was narrated in the book. I was very fortunate to have received more inputs from Capt Vivian Goodwin who was one of the members of this fateful raid of 1965 war. I am also glad that Canberra gang of veterans has appreciated my painting. I am told that they are an extremely close knit lot and thick as thieves. It was wonderful to interact with few of them through e mail and very sincerely hope the painting evokes some memory for those remaining ‘Few good men’ of 5 Squadron and JBCU of September 1965.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Oct 2015 17:26

This is perhaps what the author meant by "and reserves" etc.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Units ... adron.html

On the night of 13/14 September the squadron carried out a particularly unexpected and unprecedented attack, on the PAF base at Peshawar. This base was so deep in enemy territory (closer, indeed, to the Afghan border than to the Indian) that the PAF had assumed it was safe from IAF attack. They were using it as the night harbour at which to concentrate their strategic assets of the time, their B-57 force. The Tuskers were to prove the PAF as wrong about the immunity of Peshawar as the Katangans had been about Kolwezi. Led by their Senior Flight Commander of the time, Squadron Leader JC “Boss” Verma, and bombing on the fires of a Target Indicator Bomb planted by Tusker alumnus Sqn Ldr P Gautam, VM (now commanding the co-located JBCU) and his navigator Flight Lieutenant Deshpande, No 5 Squadron surprised the PAF in harbour, deep within their own territory. They damaged the runway and BPIs, and threatened the entire PAF B-57 force with destruction, eliciting respectful comments even from Pakistani chroniclers. They evaded interception and at least one missile launch by PAF F-104s, aimed at Squadron Leader VC Goodwin, and returned to base without loss. This raid may have contributed to Pakistan’s uneasy perception that it lacks strategic depth.

The squadron also attacked several other PAF airbases during the war, including Akwal, Chaklala, Dab, Murid, Risalwala, and Wagowal. The squadron also provided close support to the Indian Army, attacking enemy troop concentrations at Chawinda, Kasur, Khem Karan, Pasrur and Sialkot. Altogether, the squadron flew around 300 sorties in the course of the war. Most of its counter-air sorties were undertaken at night, while those on enemy troop concentrations were often undertaken in daylight.

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 17 Oct 2015 17:31

Ramana, IIRC, the first Vampire strike package that was decimated was actually the second strike package of 4. It had no CAP.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Oct 2015 19:51

Sanjay, Correct. First one lost one Vampire to ground fire and pilot recovered. Second flight lost 3. Of which two were chasing a Sabre and in turn chased by another F-86.

I wish IAF commissions a painting of those brave warriors.

2 Vampires, followed by A F-86, chased by 2 Vampires and another F-86 scene @ dusk, ground littered with burning tanks.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Oct 2015 19:57

KaranM, In the Peshawar raid, the lead aircraft was to drop flares and its load of one 4000 lber. Mr. Ahluwalia who actually planned raid says fuze setting was to be 100 feet high. Looks like lead plane dropped it low to ensure flares are in right location. Misfortunately the 4Ker hit soft soil before exploding.
Wish had an extra two 1000 lbers.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Oct 2015 19:58

abhibhushan saar, Can you tell us more about AVM Rajaram?

Yayavar · Post by **Yayavar** » 17 Oct 2015 22:24

Karan M wrote:
yayavar wrote:ah! now you want to diss bcos didnt agree with your perception fully.
No, I am saying unlike you, I don't have any such luvv for them to put them on a pedestal and disregard what's written in that post until there is evidence to the opposite. And that article can be dismissed if corroborating information is pulled out which contradicts many of the other points made in it, since direct confirmation is not available. Zimble.

pah! you have found a reason to bloviate that is all

. Your hatred is showing rather than any love I might display.
All I pointed out, and you agreed that there is a tfta on tfta in the writeup - the tall handsome, govt didnt know what to do part - and that mars the excerpt.

The main crux is that it was US advice. The rest was irrelevant wrt Ari Cdr Sitaram part.

Understood? There is no "didn't agree with my perception fully" or whatever confused rejoinder you attempt to make.

ha ha! headmaster like... i think it is time to exit this discussion but thanks for the old memories of empty instructors ..

The only thing I find unrealistic is the slapping incident, but having heard of much more stranger things (wherein so called lower level functionaries have done equivalent things to many phamous politicos) even that may have occurred.

Right... and Air Commodore not becoming AVM is due to catching the PM in a compromising situation? or, could it be other reasons or 'barging' in against protocol. One doesnt know. Afterall his brother did get promoted to AVM... so this part was OT to the info is all that I've said. Your Nehru hatred causes any other opinion to be seen as luvv

Next, as regards the perception of these gents, unlike you, who seems to be engaged in some convoluted defense of the gent in question, there are enough accounts from people who interacted with all these worthies & know exactly how they were regarded by several of their peers or even common citizens. (https://www.facebook.com/Humans-of-Bomb ... 068070045/#).

irrelevant to this excerpt ...

For instance lets take that aside of yours as the reason the argument is invalid, oh jee, the writer comes across as TFTA or personal or whatever semantic /pedantic detail you ascribe. Yes sure, as if people who were on the receiving end of such decisions wouldn't be personal but would write some polished communique with footnotes.

This is a much later article by a nephew and you agreed on tfta-ism on display -- and thereby saw it as being more near truthfulness. So you can easily let the opinion that the career-cide part be and let it go.. no?

Nehru's failing in 1962 war is well known and talked about; whether due to US advice or otherwise. The uncle being tall, or govt not knowing what to do with him as a result (was he not in AF), and then given a high post or then walking/barging into Nehru provides no further info other than personal outrage. Air Commodore is a high rank and Air C Sitaram was an important figure in IAF - but his career could have or not have been ended by Nehru's compromising situation, or by the act of barging on the PM, or for some other reason. The main info here is US advice.
In short, all you are doing here is more mumble jumble. It could have, might not have, did not, could have and so forth.

ha ... it is straightforward... becoming AVM might not have been due to that barging. It is irrelevant information to the core info that Nehru was adviced by US to not use Air Force. Whether Nehru was vain or had affairs or didnt know about war - that is not new.

Instead of all this mumble jumble, all I said was that the salient details the author mentioned elsewhere about the gents in question could have been corroborated. As simple as that. If all the rest turned out to be hyperbole, chances were even this would have been. Instead of that, you went off on an extended defense of the "leader" in question which turned out to be more of a damp squib.

Your umbrage is unnecessary. I only pointed out the hyperbole - and the slapping seems doubtful to you too - and that it was irrelevant. I know of the gents having read the BR articles on Peshawar barging - not the Nehru barging. And the latter is certainly irrelevant and neither a defence nor any attack on Nehru.

Take a look at what Ramana did with the same information. He dug out corroborating information, at least some of it rings true. That's all you had to do. Instead off you went on a not all bad, not this not that stuff which is irrelevant.

yep..on AVM Rajaram which I did too

. Not on the irrelevant barging into Nehru on compromising situation.

so you can perceive through your lens and other through theirs... There is no only bad or only good meme to apply to Nehru clan or those who saw through their wrongs.

Oh thank you so much your gracious lord for telling us what we can do and that we are ok to perceive with our lens.[/quote]

You are welcome headmaster jee.. exiting this discussion.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Oct 2015 23:10

yayavar wrote:pah! you have found a reason to bloviate that is all . Your hatred is showing rather than any love I might display.
All I pointed out, and you agreed that there is a tfta on tfta in the writeup - the tall handsome, govt didnt know what to do part - and that mars the excerpt.

I think you are projecting, so spare me your flatulence.

your love for the G-N clan as evidenced in your periodic defense of them/taking random umbrage at any statements referencing them is a matter of record. enough gas vis a vis your japes with brihaspati f.e. so try the ah'm so innocent act elsewhere..

listen, unlike you i bear them no special luvv - so if you can't stand it, find the nearest airport or wutever named after him to do a jig, but spare me the convoluted logic.

The main crux is that it was US advice. The rest was irrelevant wrt Ari Cdr Sitaram part.

LOL, so you can pick and choose what you want to believe. perfidious US versus luvvable leader, eh?

ha ha! headmaster like... i think it is time to exit this discussion but thanks for the old memories of empty instructors ..

more like explaining simple things to folks blind in their herrow worship and hence twisting simple things into complex claims

Right... and Air Commodore not becoming AVM is due to catching the PM in a compromising situation? or, could it be other reasons or 'barging' in against protocol. One doesnt know. Afterall his brother did get promoted to AVM... so this part was OT to the info is all that I've said. Your Nehru hatred causes any other opinion to be seen as luvv

LOL, i don't know which world you are living in, but stranger things have happened in india. whether i hate n or luvv him (like you) is irrelevant since i didn't make those claims about him, but you are most definitely acting like an apologist who can't even bear to have anything about him discussed and are hence rushing to be thought police.

You could have merely left it at "dubious", unsourced post etc. but the rush to his defence was typical.. hey, you might even get some akademi award for such chamcha-giri.. A year or so later, you can even return it.

irrelevant to this excerpt ...

Quite relevant. shows your herrow had feet of clay and others also regarded him with less than fond memories. and hence other folks might also recall him in a rather critical vein.

This is a much later article by a nephew and you agreed on tfta-ism on display -- and thereby saw it as being more near truthfulness. So you can easily let the opinion that the career-cide part be and let it go.. no?

my goodness, are you really that dense? i didn't particularly care about the tfta-ism or what not. i just thought it was a product of the times, one tfta vs other tfta and what not. but it seems to have offended you particularly that your tfta was not on top.

ha ... it is straightforward... becoming AVM might not have been due to that barging. It is irrelevant information to the core info that Nehru was adviced by US to not use Air Force. Whether Nehru was vain or had affairs or didnt know about war - that is not new.

more mumble jumble. so now its not herrow's fault at all. it is only US. in short your counter of the claims is as humorous as the claims themselves.

Your umbrage is unnecessary. I only pointed out the hyperbole - and the slapping seems doubtful to you too - and that it was irrelevant. I know of the gents having read the BR articles on Peshawar barging - not the Nehru barging. And the latter is certainly irrelevant and neither a defence nor any attack on Nehru.

lol, if that was the only part you were upset about, a mere i disagree would have sufficed and we would have been spared your gas. what that excerpt states is that according to the nephew of two people who interacted with your herrow, they had a very negative view of him and thought his individual foibles overtook his common sense. is it true? dunno.

but watching you squirm attempting to categorically claim that its all a lie, a lie, without being able to counter anything, but objecting away, is amusing in itself.

yep..on AVM Rajaram which I did too . Not on the irrelevant barging into Nehru on compromising situation.

err, you did nothing except take specious and silly umbrage

You are welcome headmaster jee.. exiting this discussion.

its ok "kiddo". anytime.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Oct 2015 23:22

ramana wrote:KaranM, In the Peshawar raid, the lead aircraft was to drop flares and its load of one 4000 lber. Mr. Ahluwalia who actually planned raid says fuze setting was to be 100 feet high. Looks like lead plane dropped it low to ensure flares are in right location. Misfortunately the 4Ker hit soft soil before exploding.
Wish had an extra two 1000 lbers.

Ramana, my understanding is that the raid had zero margin for error. To have managed to still hit everything out there (base infra) and come back speaks volumes.
I am just surprised they managed to get so many hits in (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... odwin.html)

Its just a testament to their incredible skill and training they pulled it off. Stuff like this and repeated attacks to compensate for misses in Vn let US to focus on PGMs as priority.

I was looking at this as an exercise at how far we have come. For us, now, our Su-30 MKIs are our Canberra equivalents. With IFR and proper navigation, truly much more can be done. Su-30 MKI with a good payload can hit Peshawar (light payload, it has a range of 1500km).

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 18 Oct 2015 00:20

Is the Peshawar raid the longest ever air raid in IAF history? Or is the one on Katanga airfield in Congo?

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 18 Oct 2015 02:07

Katangan targets were at upto 1000km away per IAF site. Peshawar is mentioned as 600nm i.e. around 1100km.
But more than the distance IMO is the fact that Peshawar was in the teeth of an armed opponent who was capable of putting up highly advanced interceptors, plus significant ack-ack and had radar coverage (which would mean complicated mission planning).
IMHO, Peshawar at night was orders of magnitude harder than Katanga mission.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Oct 2015 03:11

Group Cap Deb Gohain's Painting
Vampires over Chaamb

Vampires over Chaamb

Dil khush!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Oct 2015 03:15

And his painting of Peshawar Raid

Tuskers raid Peshawar

Tuskers raid Peshawar: Indo-Pak War 1965

This is an account of a few audacious Canberra crews who flew almost 600 NMs into the enemy territory at night, trailing one another at near medium levels without any escort and without any radar cover, to bomb a very formidable airbase of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in 1965 war with Pakistan. Unlike IAF in 1965, PAF with its US built F 104 Starfighters equipped with Sidewinder AIM 9B missile had night intercept capability and vintage Canberras practically were sitting ducks against this supersonic, state of the art interceptor. PAF also was fortunate to receive from US an effective radar chain for early warning purposes. Against this background, planning a mission to Peshawar for Canberras was suicidal as it entailed flying to a target at its extreme flying range, through the enemy heartland with no allowance of fuel for any tactical routing. Fuel constraint also meant limited payload.

Attacking Peshawar became important for India as PAF had moved bulk of its attack force to its rear airfields and almost the entire B 57 ac bomber force was shifted to Peshawar immediately after IAF carried out retaliatory strikes on most of PAF bases with its Hunters and Mysteres on 07 Sep 1965. PAF considered Peshawar to be outside the range of Indian strike aircraft and hence a safe haven for its strategic force of US made B 57 long range bombers. Yet, as night fell at Peshawar on 13 September 1965, 08 (Eight) Canberras of 5 Squadron stealthily approached Peshawar. The typical profile of a Canberra raid was to approach to a pre –calculated pull up point between 200 and 500 ft AGL, pull up steeply to about 12,000 feet to drop the load and then climb progressively to 40,000 ft, to escape from Pakistani territory.

As Canberras closed in to their target, the ack -ack batteries opened up signaling raiders have been detected. PAF pilots and ground crew ran to take shelter in trenches and they had the rare privilege of seeing the first Canberra drop flares to illuminate the airfield and then thunder down the main runway at 200 feet, before pulling up at its end in an wingover to turn back and drop its bomb load at the end of a dispersal of parked aircraft. Had luck favoured the Tuskers, they would have wiped out the entire strategic strike component of the PAF with a single blow as the entire force of sixteen B 57s were lined up wingtip to wingtip on a dispersal. Unfortunately for IAF, the single 4000 lb bomb that fell closest to the parked B 57s hit soft soil and its explosive force was dissipated. However, bombs dropped from other members of Tusker force found their marks as fuel dumps were set ablaze, ATC building was flattened and aircraft on ground were damaged.

As Canberras set course for home, the inevitable happened. A lone Starfighter was vectored for an intercept on to the retreating bomber force. Canberras did all that was possible to do to prevent a massacre. Sqn Ldr Gautam saw a streak of flame appear in the darkness and made its way towards the bombers as the Starfighter launched its missile. However, luck favored the brave and the missile exploded harmlessly, possibly due to its proximity fuze malfunctioning. All eight Canberras landed safely at Agra.

The raid shook the PAF out of its complacency. No airfield or town was out of range of Indian bombers. No one in Pakistan had thought that the IAF would bomb Peshawar with impunity. The raid also forced the Americans (USAF), that had maintained a full- fledged Signal Intelligence base about 20 miles South of Peshawar, to evacuate all its personnel with families through Iran and return only after cessation of hostilities.

Tuskers raid of Peshawar will certainly go down as one of most audacious bomber attack in history of military aviation. The significance of the raid was a symbolic gesture, less material damage. Even John Fricker, the PAF commissioned hagiographer was moved to an effusive turn of phrase in describing the raid as, ‘the most effective Canberra attack of the war’.

The real heroes of the raid were undoubtedly the Navigators whose chances of survival without an ejection seat for them in Canberras were very close to nothing. It is, therefore, rightly so that Navigators Sqn Ldr SN Bansal and Flt Lt P Dastidar were awarded Vir Chakras for their acts of exceptional gallantry and Commanding Officer Wg Cdr PP Singh was decorated with a Mahavir Chakra, country’s second highest gallantry award.

Other members of the raid were Sqn Ldr JC Verma (Leader), Flt Lt Deshpande, Wg Cdr PP Singh, Sqn Ldr CR Mehta, Sqn Ldr VC Godwin, Navigators Ahluwalia and S Kapoor.

My painting “Tuskers raid Peshawar” was inspired by the account I read in the book “The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965” by Jagan/Samir duo. So it was initially composed entirely on impressions created in my mind of the attack as it was narrated in the book. I was very fortunate to have received more inputs from Capt Vivian Goodwin who was one of the members of this fateful raid of 1965 war. I am also glad that Canberra gang of veterans has appreciated my painting. I am told that they are an extremely close knit lot and thick as thieves. It was wonderful to interact with few of them through e mail and very sincerely hope the painting evokes some memory for those remaining ‘Few good men’ of 5 Squadron and JBCU of September 1965.

Date: 12/24/2014

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Oct 2015 03:46

We should also keep in mind the youth or young age of those in higher command.
ACM Arjan Singh was very young in 1965!!!

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 18 Oct 2015 05:12

IMHO the ethos of the IAF comes out very well as does that of the PAF post 1965. IAF veterans proud, but also upset they could have done more and looking to improve.
PAF - take Sajad Haider as an example - full on braggadacio and Nur Khan goes funding movies and the finds Fricker, who takes till 1979 to find a publisher. In 1971, the IAF gives the PAF a bloody nose. In 1999, the PAF sits the war away. In short, its not hard to figure out which force has been more and more the poseur and which force became a seasoned warfighter.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Oct 2015 07:11

ka

KaranM, From Gp Capt. Ahluwalia we know there were two raids on Peshawar. 14 Sept where he was navigator for Victor 1. He returned as navigator on 16 Sep in the tI plane.

What do we know of this raid?

He writes it was repeat success. Page 214

Airborne to Chairborne in goggle books.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Oct 2015 07:14

Karan M wrote:IMHO the ethos of the IAF comes out very well as does that of the PAF post 1965. IAF veterans proud, but also upset they could have done more and looking to improve.
PAF - take Sajad Haider as an example - full on braggadacio and Nur Khan goes funding movies and the finds Fricker, who takes till 1979 to find a publisher. In 1971, the IAF gives the PAF a bloody nose. In 1999, the PAF sits the war away. In short, its not hard to figure out which force has been more and more the poseur and which force became a seasoned warfighter.

Did you read Sqd Ldr. Goodwin's innovation to turn the Orange Putter facing forward to give some sensor ability for night fighter role.

Look at all aspects he covered: technicians, aerodynamics via test pilot

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Oct 2015 22:34

karanM, have you seen any IAF study of Canberra bombing effects during 1965 war? In particular am interested in twin raids on Peshawar base.

First raid on 14 September delivered 32,000(4*8*1000) + 32,000 (4* 2*4000) for a total of 64K lbs. Of these we don't know how many exploded? And more importantly what damage to target

Next raid on 16 Sept., delivered another 64,000 (8*8*1000).

Both these are strategic bombing raids: long range, strategic goal of destroying PAF long range bomber fleet.
Rest of operations are to support IA in Forward edge of battle (FEBA).

I think Sqd Ldr. Goodwin's idea of delayed stick of 8 bombs was effective.

See his article.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 19 Oct 2015 00:14

Considered to be successful, its combination of payload and range, see Page 139
https://books.google.co.in/books?id=Na- ... 20&f=false

PC Lal himself appears to rue the rigid doctrine that managed to have canberra's lose many more opportunities
https://books.google.co.in/books?id=eBs ... ra&f=false

An ex Jaguar pilots view on Canberra -
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... y-warfare/

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 20 Oct 2015 03:39

I keep getting drawn back to Vampires over Chamb.

Vampires over Chamb

This painting is about the very first day IAF was called into action to blunt a massive armoured thrust across the IB by the Pakistani Army on 01 September 1965 code named “Operation Grandslam”. Main objective of the Pakistani thrust was to cut off Kashmir supply line from the rest of the country by taking the bridge at Akhnur. As Pakistan offensive with nearly 70 tanks and two infantry brigades crossed the IB towards Indian Army forward positions at dawn of 01 September 1965, Indian Army was completely outnumbered and asked for air support at 1100 hrs. So far both countries had not declared war and hence use of Air Force had to be cleared only by the Cabinet. Defence Minister gave the approval at close to 1800 hrs and first formation of Vampires of four aircraft lead by Sqn Ldr SK Dahar took off from Pathankot at 1719 hours. Two more formations armed with rockets and guns took to air at interval of 10 minutes each with last formation attacking the enemy positions at fading light.

Vampires pounced on Pakistani armour with rockets and guns doing repeated attacks unmindful of intense ground fire and possible air threat from Pakistan Air Force (PAF). Second Vampire formation was bounced by a pair of PAF F 86 Sabres. Faced with threat from a superior aircraft the right action for the obsolete Vampires should have been to hit the deck and get out of the area at the fastest. However, from account now available from a PAF Sabre pilot including of a gun camera photo taken from his aircraft, it has been confirmed that far from running away, Vampires tried to give a fight to the Sabres. In the completely uneven duel, three gallant Indian pilots lost their lives.

Vampires were followed by Mysteres into the battle area. In this very first action by IAF in 1965 war it claimed 13 tanks, 2 guns and 62 soft-skinned vehicles destroyed and most importantly IAF was able to prevent a major Pakistani breakthrough.

They flew obsolete centrifugal turbojets designed during WWII.

Wiki Vampire

And to make matters worse the armament was pre-WWII for the cannon.

HS 404 cannon

We don't even know if they had the AP M95 rounds for the 20mm cannon.
The 20mm Hispano Suiza was pre WWII and more lie a pop gun against the M48 Patton tanks.

Next the rockets which most likely were used against the tanks were the old 3" RP-3 rockets used at Normandy landings. And these were very tricky to aim and deliver a knockout to the tanks by most accounts. And it needed the pilot to get close to 1700 yards slant range! and very vulnerable to ground fire. The Vampire that was shot by ack-ack most likely was in firing its rockets.

RP-3 rockets

So considering these pilots had obsolete aircraft, puny weapons, and tricky rockets what was achieved was tremendous.

13 tanks, 64 vehicle and 2 guns.

The pilots were the bravest of brave.

They did all this with superior PAF intervening and no fighter escorts of their own.
More importantly they stopped the Pak armored force advance dead in its tracks.
This is the real significance. The key is the 64 vehicles which are needed to transport the supporting personnel and ammo for the armored brigades.

KaranM,
As a comparison please look at Battle of Mortain after Normandy landings.

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disha · Post by **disha** » 20 Oct 2015 04:02

ramana wrote:
Tuskers raid Peshawar: Indo-Pak War 1965

Tuskers raid of Peshawar will certainly go down as one of most audacious bomber attack in history of military aviation. The significance of the raid was a symbolic gesture, less material damage. Even John Fricker, the PAF commissioned hagiographer was moved to an effusive turn of phrase in describing the raid as, ‘the most effective Canberra attack of the war’.

Date: 12/24/2014

I had the privilege of hosting one of Tusker Raid hero at my house (it was on a very short notice). Of course, the hero had a pick of any of my prized scotch collection. Well that is the least I could do.

Vivek K · Post by **Vivek K** » 20 Oct 2015 07:06

Ramana, not to be impolite or unfair - I want to understand the situation. Was IAF's threat perception wrong? Did they not expect the Vampires to be bounced by Sabres? PAF had Sabres. IAF bras should have expected their ops in support of their troops. Why weren't the Vampires sent in with adequate fighter cover? Not flame bait - an ignorant trying to understand.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 20 Oct 2015 09:06

I too am trying to study it. Was moved by the lady's anguish at her husband's death.
Every account laments but no clear root cause(s).

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 20 Oct 2015 15:51

ramana wrote:I too am trying to study it. Was moved by the lady's anguish at her husband's death.
Every account laments but no clear root cause(s).

ramana - the answer to your query may lie in this piece of information:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Histo ... ter03.html

The next day (the day after Vampires were shot down), September 2nd, saw relatively less action. The Mysteres undertook more sorties attacking Pak supply convoys. The PAF was seen in the area but no engagements took place. A Strike Mission led of Vampires to be escorted by Mysteres was planned keeping in view the disastrous losses suffered by the Vampires on the first day. But the mission was called off soon after. The air force was convinced that further ground support missions would need escorting fighters to deal with the Pak interceptors.(So, there were no fighter a/c on the base in Pathankot to escort the strike a/c)

Accordingly Air HQ made plans to dispatch air defence fighters to Pathankot. Around afternoon, two MiG-21FLs from Ambala were dispatched. Wg. Cdr. M.S.D. Wollen the CO of No.28 Sqn, the only MiG Squadron with India at that time, arrived in the MiGs with one of his Senior Flight Commander, Sqn. Ldr. Mukherjee to the Airbase. Air HQ also made arrangements to beef up the fighter defence forces with Gnat fighters. (Fighters arrived subsequent to the incident)

The move fell on No.23 Squadron, based at Ambala. Under the command of Wg. Cdr. S. Raghavendran, this Squadron has been involved in intensive air combat training for the past few months. The Squadron had evolved a fighter combat leader course and most of the pilots spent hours training in combat. Keeping in view the escalation of hostilities, a detachment of four Gnats under the command of Sqn. Ldr. B.S. Sikand, had been dispatched to Halwara the previous day. Now No.23 Sqn received orders to move four fighters from Ambala to Pathankot and also to move the Halwara detachment to Pathankot.

On a staff job at Ambala, Sqn Ldr Johnny William Greene, was a seasoned pilot, and was one of the few pilots who had done his Combat Fighter Leader Course from the RAF School in the UK. Greene, an experienced pilot and described as an old-timer, was a source of inspiration to the young and eager Gnat pilots at Ambala. So it came as no surprise that he was deputed as the detachment commander of the Gnats to be moved onto Pathankot.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 20 Oct 2015 18:16

1965, there was a lot of angst at lack of planning and coordination at senior levels.