Pakistan arms sales, ops, doctrine, etc

kit · Post by **kit** » 23 Oct 2015 13:47

what if the cold start evolves into a war with multiple fronts where there no complete concentration of armour and also what if the IAF and navy send a gazillion cruise missiles and brahmos ..who are they going to nuke with their tactical weapons ..rather they would send some jehadi with a nuke into Washington or Delhi ! .. cost effective and everything to gain. The world will learn a lesson when it tolerates a rabid nuclear armed country with absolutely no scruples , the generals will continue to live in their paradise bilking every other country

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 24 Oct 2015 13:25

A few snippets from a PN paper on Pak Marines. This unit has no direct equivalent in India... the role played is performed in parts by BSF, Sagar Prahari Bal, ICG, IN and IA.

NEED FOR A PAKISTAN MARINES SEPARATE AVIATION WING

By LIEUTENANT COMMANDER SAQIB HASAN

USMC04 JANUARY 2010

...

In 1986, changes in geo-political situation necessitated the raise of an amphibious force for Pakistan and so the Pakistan Marines were raised in 1990, under Pakistan Navy.1

Initially the Marines were only utilized for perimeter security duties at naval installations, but soon were increased in strength and organized for complex duties like defense of 960 kilometers long Pakistan coastline 2.

...

5. According to 2009 statistics 4, the rotary wing assets of PN are as follows:

a. Westland Sea King MK-45 / 45-A Helicopters.

It is a 2 to 4 crew, typically naval warfare oriented helicopter which is primarily capable of ASW, ASV and SAR at sea. Itis fitted with radar, variable depth sonar, communication suite, winch system for rescue, AM 39 air to surface missiles, MK 46 torpedoes and depth charges (against submarines)5. PN has six of these helicopters in service 6.

As per procedure of PN aviators, four of these can be deployed as organic helicopters on board two of PN tanker ships as two each on one ship. This very rarely fulfills the requirement of PN Fleet since there remain only two helicopters as reserve. The situation is further worsened if the operational availability of these helicopters falls down to the required number to PN Fleet and there is a simultaneous requirement by Pak Marines.

...

b. SA 319 B Allouette Helicopters.

It is a 2-crew helicopter which is primarily capable of limited SAR,reconnaissance and command / liaison duties for PN Fleet at sea 7. The helicopter is only fitted with a radar and communication suite and is ideal for deployment on board PN destroyers only as organic helicopter; since its size is compatible to limited landing space available at those destroyers 8. PN has six of these helicopters in its inventory 9 and are scarcely available as organic helicopters on board six of PN destroyers, with no reserve helicopters.

...

a. Roles / Tasks of Pakistan Navy 10.

(1) Defense of maritime borders of Pakistan on surface, sub-surface, air and amphibious dimensions.

(2) Surveillance / Reconnaissance of the national territorial waters.

(3) Maintenance of liaison between other national maritime agencies.

(4) Search and Rescue Operations at sea.

b. Roles / tasks of Pakistan Marines 11.

(1) Amphibious and anti-amphibious operations along Pakistan Coast.

(2) Harbor Defense of all the naval harbors along Pakistan Coast.

(3) Maintenance of Harbor Protection Organization(HPO) against unconventional attacks on naval vessels stationed inside Pakistan harbors along the Coast.

(4) Humanitarian assistance / disaster relief operations along coast.

....

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 24 Oct 2015 15:18

Are people forgetting what General Paddy said in a press conference on exactly the same issue? What happens if Pakistan nukes advancing Indian columns? His too the point reply was that Pakistan will cease to exist as a nation if it attacks Indian forces?

From NY Times, 2002:

Asked how India would respond if attacked with a nuclear weapon, he assured a packed news conference that ''the perpetrator of that particular outrage shall be punished so severely that their continuation thereafter in any form of fray will be doubtful.''

wig · Post by **wig** » 24 Oct 2015 15:39

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/11/inter ... INDIA.html
I think this is the 'New york times' article, referred to above I have bolded the response of the pak spokesperson. the irony of the statement is clear from the statements emanating now a days

In remarks that seemed to surprise India's own political leadership for their baldness, the army chief declared today that the military was fully prepared for a large-scale conventional war with Pakistan and was also ready to deliver a devastating nuclear strike should Pakistan use its nuclear arsenal first.

"If we go to war, jolly good!" Gen. S. Padmanabhan exclaimed.

Asked how India would respond if attacked with a nuclear weapon, he assured a packed news conference that "the perpetrator of that particular outrage shall be punished so severely that their continuation thereafter in any form of fray will be doubtful."

In answer to another question, he said, "We are ready for a second strike, yes," and added that India had sufficient nuclear weapons. "Take it from me, we have enough."

A senior Indian official was quick to say that the general's pithy, bellicose remarks were not cleared or sanctioned by the prime minister's office.

Their delivery on the eve of a crucial speech by Gen. Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan could make it more difficult for the Pakistani president to offer a commitment to shut down militant Islamic groups battling India in Kashmir.

A senior Western diplomat, who has been pleading with India to give General Musharraf credit for arresting some of the leaders of these groups, groaned in dismay when they heard about the Indian general's comments.

"This is going to make it much more difficult for Musharraf to be forthcoming and conciliatory tomorrow night," said the diplomat, who added that India's army chief "shouldn't be allowed to give a press conference at all at such a moment of acute tension," adding, "The more you talk of war the less freedom of movement you give the other side."

India has mounted a huge military buildup since a Dec. 13 assault on Parliament for which India has blamed two militant groups it said were acting at the behest of Pakistan's military intelligence agency. India has shifted ballistic missiles, tanks, jet fighters and hundreds of thousands of troops to its border with Pakistan.

Responding to the Indian Army chief's remarks, a spokesman for Pakistan's military regime said this evening that Pakistan was militarily prepared "in case the enemy undertakes a misadventure," but refused to rebut the Indian general further.

"Responsible military men do not talk of war lightly and we are responsible soldiers," the Pakistani spokesman said.

The comments by India's army chief seemed to catch India's elected leaders off-guard. The prime minister's office requested a transcript of the briefing and had not cleared comments the general made about a nuclear riposte, Indian officials said.

A senior official pointedly noted that in India "civilian control of the military is supreme" and said General Padmanabahn should not have talked about India's heightened state of nuclear readiness — though the official also confirmed that the statements were generally accurate.

Asked if the timing of the army chief's comments might complicate General Musharraf's efforts to make concessions to India, the Indian official said, "I hope not."

General Padmanabhan, who earned a reputation as a tough, aggressive commander in Kashmir, zestfully answered a barrage of questions. "Any number of questions, I am ready," he said. "I am quite enjoying it."

While he reiterated India's commitment not to use nuclear weapons first, he said that if Pakistan — which has made no such commitment — struck Indian armed forces, ships at sea or economic or human targets, it would pay heavily.

The government, he said, would decide if and when India goes to war, but he gave the clear impression of a man itching for a fight.

Since the mid-1990's Pakistan has waged a proxy war with India through Islamic militants in Kashmir, a Himalayan territory both countries claim. Those militants kill Indian soldiers in guerrilla attacks on virtually a daily basis.

"I am a man of peace," General Padmanabahn said. "But if there is a war, they will find out this man can bite."

Like India's civilian leaders, the general also said today that Pakistan's efforts so far to arrest militant leaders and freeze their assets were largely cosmetic and had not reduced the level of violence in Kashmir.

In the past year, he said, the violence has been at its highest. "The number of kills has correspondingly jumped," he said, explaining that the army, which killed 1,400 militants a year in the past, killed more than 2,000 last year, 70 percent of them Pakistanis.

"In fact, the month average from June onwards is 200 terrorists killed a month," he said. "These are frightfully high figures and yet the termites start coming again and again from new holes."

General Padmanabahn shared a few vignettes that suggested the scale of India's military buildup, as well as its human costs. "I was talking to one of my field commanders the other day," he related with a smile, "and he said, `This place is so full of troops I have no privacy.' "

The general also told about one of the worst dangers now facing his troops: land-mine accidents. Indian soldiers are planting mines all along the border to prevent Pakistani incursions. One soldier stepped just inside a mine field, tripping a wire.

"I lost a number of good men," the general said. "But this is an accident. Accidents will happen when you play around with mines."

Reporters repeatedly tried to draw the general out on what strategy the military might pursue in the event of a war. He gave no definitive answers, but he did offer some clues.

Asked if India might strike militant training camps in Pakistan-controlled parts of Kashmir, he replied that such an option was viable. "If possibly we know the location of the camp well, we possess the arms to reach those camps and if we can believe that civilians will not be killed unnecessarily, then we can destroy them," he said.

A bit later, when asked if India might begin an offensive on other parts of the international border with Pakistan, he threw the question back at the journalist.

"This is the devilish military mind again," he said. "What would you do sir?"

"I would like to get that answer from you, sir," the journalist replied.

"We'll see," the general answered. "When the time comes, decision will be taken."

Some defense analysts here have contended that the Indians and Pakistanis will not go to war because of the substantial number of American troops deployed at airbases in Pakistan. The general acknowledged that this situation might be inhibiting, as well as giving the Americans a reason to discourage fighting.

"On the other hand," he said, "when two wild bulls decide to fight in a jungle, they carry on regardless."

krishna_krishna · Post by **krishna_krishna** » 24 Oct 2015 17:28

^^^ awesome blast from the past rohitvats, Gen. paddy's statement. I will start posting this online to all herbal bector's online

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 24 Oct 2015 21:06

Nasr missile and the response it will get

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GxJvLNrZzdU

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 25 Oct 2015 08:00

rohitvats wrote:Are people forgetting what General Paddy said in a press conference on exactly the same issue? What happens if Pakistan nukes advancing Indian columns? His too the point reply was that Pakistan will cease to exist as a nation if it attacks Indian forces?

From NY Times, 2002:

Asked how India would respond if attacked with a nuclear weapon, he assured a packed news conference that ''the perpetrator of that particular outrage shall be punished so severely that their continuation thereafter in any form of fray will be doubtful.''

I have heard such statement before , it is just Gen Paddy bluff , because to use a Nuke is not a decision he would take.

Such statements are the long list that we hear from our GOI every time , When Mumbai was bombed in 93 there was talks of Rao Govt blocking Karachi port via Naval blockade that never happened while Dawood still remains their state guest, In Kargil our forces were strictly told not to cross over to Pakistan airspace our then Army Chief mentions in his book that Atal-jee went on a long pause when Army Chief spoke of hitting targets in POK , Then came Parliament attack where we warned pakistan of the last chance we give them else we would take decisive action , then came 26/11 same story rinse and repeat nothing happened while Hafiz and Lakhvi enjoy state patronage in Paki land , I am excluding the many blasts that took in in the 2 decades in India killing hundred of civilian and our own GOI says its come from Pakistan terrorist. Post 26/11 too there were blast in Mumbai and we said its Paki sponsored and nothing happened.

We can just hope that Pakistan does not do any thing stupid as Nuking us in any form and its just plain rhetoric and we don't have to go on a long pause if they ever do that.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 08:30

>>I have heard such statement before , it is just Gen Paddy bluff , because to use a Nuke is not a decision he would take.

And you think he would not have been aware of the NSAB eqvt and the Indian deterrence posture? I'd request you to look at Gen. Padmanabhan's COIN tenure in J&K before dismissing him as a bluffer.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 25 Oct 2015 08:45

Karan M wrote:>>I have heard such statement before , it is just Gen Paddy bluff , because to use a Nuke is not a decision he would take.

And you think he would not have been aware of the NSAB eqvt and the Indian deterrence posture? I'd request you to look at Gen. Padmanabhan's COIN tenure in J&K before dismissing him as a bluffer.

Its a bluff that any one would have made in his position , its not just about him , its just a mental game you play to gauge your opponent , Pakistan does the same every time it does its own bluff with Nukes

Using Nukes is GOI decision of the day and I have seen many past statements from GOI that does not stand the test of times , Nukes is an order of magnitude much tougher to make.

It would be better for GOI to do small things like bring Dawood , Lakhvi Hafeez and other to justice for crimes done here , lets walk the talk

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 09:05

Sure it is a bluff because you say so. Indian Army formations attacked with nukes would not invite retaliation and our entire nuclear apparatus has been developed for show, since after all, you have made such a convincing argument about it.

Anyone would have reached the IA Chiefs position and made a bluff. Furthermore, we can waltz into Pakistan anytime and get Dawood etc. Thats not akin to a full scale conflict either & won't be escalatory. How logical and convincing.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 25 Oct 2015 13:08

Karan M wrote:.... Indian Army formations attacked with nukes would not invite retaliation and our entire nuclear apparatus has been developed for show, since after all, you have made such a convincing argument about it....

I second Austin's point, that our enemies may assess India's nuclear posture as a 'bluff', and may actually proceed to launch tactical nukes against India, knowing the history and tendency of Indian politico-bureaucracy's indecision or reticence against use of force may preclude any retaliation.

Assume Pak Army nukes an armoured brigade in Rajasthan deserts. Minimial civilian casualties and environment fallout. The tactical nuke was inefficient as forecasted in Shiv's video. I can fully image the discussion in CCS "Our strategic nukes have failed to deter nuclear aggression from Pakistan. Only 600 army men dead or injured. Order them back to barracks and lets take up with UN a treaty for global disarmament.

"

Give it a thought - why were we so ecstatic with SF raid in Myanmar? Its because we finally took an action which public never thought GoI will take. The terrorists had same assessment and that's why they took the bold action in the first case. But now they know.

India needs to repeatedly convey its nuclear posture publicly to ensure that Pakistan does not have a wrong perception about India's reaction. I am still waiting for NSA, RM PM to clearly counter with words so that Paki generals know and understand whats coming to them. The Pakis have clearly developed Nasr with belief that India will never strike back to a tactical strike. Just like we think that cold start will not invite Pak nuclear strike.

ravip · Post by **ravip** » 25 Oct 2015 13:29

Aditya G wrote:\ The Pakis have clearly developed Nasr with belief that India will never strike back to a tactical strike. Just like we think that cold start will not invite Pak nuclear strike.

The fact that Pakis have developed Tactical Nukes and they yelling about it at every opportunity makes it clear that their response to clod start will not go beyond Tactical nukes on advancing forces in their territory.

More over after 26/11 Former NSAB Member Mr. Shyam Saran has made it clear to every listening ear about our nuclear policy. He said,
1. We will not First Use nukes on countries not having nukes, that means we have the right of first use against Pak and China.
2. He also made it very clear that what ever may be the intensity of the nuke and in what ever territory, if used against Indian Military then Indian will respond with full scale destruction of such perpetrator.

Reference:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 793847.cms

nirav · Post by **nirav** » 25 Oct 2015 13:52

Its incredible !

India's stand on usage of nuclear weapons usage against India or its armed forces is unambiguous and absolutely clear.

To suggest that the stance is bluff ?!
What's wrong with you folks ?

Gen. Padmanabhan was only articulating govt policy !
And he did so, crystal clear.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 25 Oct 2015 14:13

I think one thing is being missed - a fact that has not been missed by those who firmly argue against tactical nuclear strikes. It's like this
1. Paki terror attack occurs
2. India retaliates
3. Pakis nuke the attacking column
4. Does India stop or go on?
If India stops after a tac strike Pakistan has won cheaply. India, whose forces have been preparing to fight in an NBC environment will not stop cheaply.

So what does Pak do?
Threaten a strike on Indian cities?
Nuke the forces again?

Pakistan is setting up the scenario for a "spiral of escalation" in which they think Indian politicians can be forced to stop. If they stop - we are back to point 3 above. "India attacked. Pak used a nuke. India stopped"

India's nuclear doctrine is to avoid this tamasha. It may not be Islamabad or Karachi that are nuked - but certainly the Paki army is going to see some of its biggest assets vaporized if they start this game.

What would be interesting is if Paki incoming missiles - eg Nasr are shot down, or worse, do not explode as planned.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 25 Oct 2015 14:27

nirav wrote:Its incredible !

India's stand on usage of nuclear weapons usage against India or its armed forces is unambiguous and absolutely clear.

To suggest that the stance is bluff ?!
What's wrong with you folks ?

Gen. Padmanabhan was only articulating govt policy !
And he did so, crystal clear.

They captured Indian territory, they were holding it, our Army men were being killed, our Govt did not allow the fighters to cross the LOC. LOC!!! not IB. POK is our territory and our fighters were not allowed to go there. Kargil for you!

In 2002, they attacked our Parliament. Our center of governance. All we did was spend billions in massed summer vacations in the desert. The IAF Chief addressed us - "Gentlemen, I promise you war, I promise you revenge". Two days later alert levels were lowered for good. My unit has moved from East to West for what? The sister unit which did not deploy, their CO had asked me to get a copy of the crossword of Dawn. It dawned on me later we are only good for bluffs. All the ladies had come to give us proper "Kshatriya" goodbyes with Tilak and rona-dhona (Pati is going to war). We returned buying Rajesthani Chairs and handicraft. That was a billion dollar bluff. Think about it. Ya, Ya, I have heard the reasons for the call off but I was there and I knew exactly how well we were placed.

In 2008, I thought this is it. This is irreversible. Guess what, we sent a "Demarche!!!". Now, who is bluffing? We just don't have the balls. Our goody two shoes don't fit the attacking man's foot.

I have said this before, we will fight our battles on our territory. The enemy knows this. Even if some brave soldier were to advance inside their territory, we will gift wrap and return. Nuclear weapons? What Nuclear weapons? What is the status of the Strategic Forces Command? If we are serious, it will show.

The bureaucracy controls national defence and not military men. Military men control point defence or at best area defence. The bureaucracy is scared of war.

Rant off

member_29089 · Post by **member_29089** » 25 Oct 2015 14:27

shiv wrote:I think one thing is being missed ...
<chop>
What would be interesting is if Paki incoming missiles - eg Nasr are shot down, or worse, do not explode as planned.

Or what if they explode as not-planned .. . right over their head

Would india nuke N destroy pakistan if pakistan exploded a nuke on themselves first?

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 25 Oct 2015 15:12

The establishment should make it a point to articulate the intended position at every opportunity to ensure the enemy is cognizant of it.

Narendra modi keeps harping "make in India" at every forum to ensure its clear to everybody what he wants.

The nuclear policy should be clear and imprinted on all stakeholders minds else they will dither when time comes yo press the proverbial button.

ravip wrote:
Aditya G wrote:\ The Pakis have clearly developed Nasr with belief that India will never strike back to a tactical strike. Just like we think that cold start will not invite Pak nuclear strike.
The fact that Pakis have developed Tactical Nukes and they yelling about it at every opportunity makes it clear that their response to clod start will not go beyond Tactical nukes on advancing forces in their territory.

More over after 26/11 Former NSAB Member Mr. Shyam Saran has made it clear to every listening ear about our nuclear policy. He said,
1. We will not First Use nukes on countries not having nukes, that means we have the right of first use against Pak and China.
2. He also made it very clear that what ever may be the intensity of the nuke and in what ever territory, if used against Indian Military then Indian will respond with full scale destruction of such perpetrator.

Reference:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 793847.cms

kmkraoind · Post by **kmkraoind** » 25 Oct 2015 15:34

Paki buggers are forgetting one thing. Any tactical explosion on Punjabi delta, will be catastrophic for Paki's agrarian and health sector. All the water+monsoons will wash away radiation towards Pakjab and Sindhi deltas.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 25 Oct 2015 17:04

Karan M wrote:Sure it is a bluff because you say so. Indian Army formations attacked with nukes would not invite retaliation and our entire nuclear apparatus has been developed for show, since after all, you have made such a convincing argument about it.

Anyone would have reached the IA Chiefs position and made a bluff. Furthermore, we can waltz into Pakistan anytime and get Dawood etc. Thats not akin to a full scale conflict either & won't be escalatory. How logical and convincing.

The leadership does not have courage to fight by leadership I mean the Government of the day , aptly demonstrated during Kargil , Parliament and 26/11 , All 3 were nothing short of war against India in a way that maximises the pain with minimum investment for pakis.

I have keenly observed GOI reaction since 1993 mumbai blast and I found on all occasion GOI develops a freeze or a sort of decision making paralysis and takes a path to least resistant , do some diplomatic demarches , send letters to some 120 nations in case of 26/11 , give Pakistan stern warning next time it wont be tolerated , deploy forces in land and sea in a way that can be seen as we are ready and then just cool it off claming pakistan has learnt its lesson etc Public memory is short in India and things just fade away from memory. This happens across government be it NDA or UPA or what ever.

We can have some wonderful doctrine enshrine in golden words but we cant walk the talk , No one takes such doctrine seriously if we dont put it into practise , Certainly not Pakistan

We can ofcourse debate endlessly on this on how the new Cold Start or Nasr can change the situation and how a Nuclear Strike will just mean wiping out pakistan for good but I can bet ever penny I have that nothing will happen.

Indian leadership would just hope Pakistan does not do any thing stupid ( which unfortunately it does at tremendous cost of Indian life both common man and armed personal ) and that it does not end up in a situation where it has to take military action that can lead to even a kargil type local war much less a full fledge war along IB and LOC.

my 2 cent , I dont have any intention to debate on this as nothing good will come out of it.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 17:53

Austin wrote:The leadership does not have courage to fight by leadership I mean the Government of the day , aptly demonstrated during Kargil , Parliament and 26/11 , All 3 were nothing short of war against India in a way that maximises the pain with minimum investment for pakis.

Yes, the current Govt was the same one as in years previous and the same Govts existed throughout eternity. They have been ruling India in secret. Also they must and should declare open war in response to any provocation. All other options including covert or other ones should be off the table.

my 2 cent , I dont have any intention to debate on this as nothing good will come out of it.

Which is why you are writing paragraphs in response after having called the Indian Army chief a bluffer whilst implying the Indian nuclear doctrine is a hoax and claiming that we should just waltz into Pakistan and do "small things" like take out Hafiz Saeed etc.

And all this on the basis of having been part of the secret discussions involving the IA/IN/IAF top leadership or having been part of GOI decision making at that level to conclusively state the Indian nuclear response won't occur (was probably a state secret till you let it out). No wait, its based on No one takes such doctrine seriously if we dont put it into practise, so we should have a war and nuke Pakistan to make them believe that we would nuke them.

So why exactly has India been making Agnis and bombs and setting up a SFC with its C3I. Because its a bluff, all a big bluff.

I am sure somebody is bluffing away, just that its probably not the Army Chief.

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 25 Oct 2015 19:27

^^ I'm not sure why so much importance is given to Nasr.

The 300 mm Nasr goes 60 km and has a salvo of 4 per launcher. Our 300 mm Smerch goes 70-90 km with a salvo of 12 per launcher. Pinaka range is being extended to 60 km. We've UAVs and WLRs in widespread service that can direct effective counterbattery fire.

Also, an exploding Tactical Nuke will also deny Pakistan the ability to counterattack, whose NBC warfare capabilities are quantitatively much less than India's.

If India attacks along rivers, then nuking near the rivers will result in radiation poisoning of livestock & crops. If India attacks along its major roads or Industrial centers, then use of those will be denied after the war.

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 25 Oct 2015 19:50

alas i fear the journails don't care what happens to the mango abduls, all that matters is that the kafirs are eliminated

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 20:12

They will definitely care because wherever there is land, that's what they are grabbing.

Mangroves
http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2005/09 ... land-grab/
Urban areas
http://www.dawn.com/news/1153569
Regular land
http://www.pppusa.org/Corruption/1.htm

Question: How much land does the forces own in each province?

The Glasshouse: Pakistan Army's Multimillionaires

Dr. Siddiqa: Difficult to bifurcate but to give you a taste - they own about 7-9 million acres in Punjab alone

Question: What percentage is it of whole of Punjab ?

Dr. Siddiqa: I am still trying to figure this out. It is not an issue of what percentage is this of Punjab but that a major portion of state land is appropriated by one group

Question: What about Sindh?

Dr. Siddiqa: My sense is that it is less in Sindh

Question: Why is that?

Dr. Siddiqa: Most of the land is around the 2 barrages constructed after independence.

Because they didn't make new barrages.

Question: What is their modus operandi in getting these lands allotment

Dr. Siddiqa:10 % of land, according to the 1912 Colonization of Land Act, is allotted to the military

Question: 10% everywhere?

Dr. Siddiqa: Yes it would be everywhere land is found. Colonization of land refers to each land reclaimed due to creation of water channels and other irrigation projects.

However, they tend to get more in Punjab

Question: Does India have this act too?

Dr. Siddiqa: No. They got rid of such acts when they did land reforms.

http://antisystemic.org/satribune/www.s ... P1_hrw.htm

Moral of the story - attack in Punjab if you can manage the engineering challenge (DCBs etc) - the PA will sh!t bricks before even thinking of using nukes

nirav · Post by **nirav** » 25 Oct 2015 20:35

deejay wrote:
nirav wrote:Its incredible !

India's stand on usage of nuclear weapons usage against India or its armed forces is unambiguous and absolutely clear.

To suggest that the stance is bluff ?!
What's wrong with you folks ?

Gen. Padmanabhan was only articulating govt policy !
And he did so, crystal clear.

Rant off

Bhaijaan,

While I Understand where the rant is coming from, none of the scenarios either warranted a nuke attack or all out war.

GoI has made its nuclear doctrine very clear and unambigous.
Any sort of nuke attack on India or its forces will invite a maa cho deb kind of response.

If the Pakis want to doubt Indian resolve to convert them to crapistan invade of a tac strike on IA, its their choice to make and find out.

We meanwhile mustn't dhori shiver needlessly.
It only gives credence to Paki theory of using tactical nukes on IA in Pakiland.

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 25 Oct 2015 21:07

Attack in Punjab and the port facilities of Karachi. What are they going to do? Nuke Karachi? Thats 25% of their GDP. Tactical nukes are also dirty nukes.. If they want to stop using Karachi for the next decade, go ahead.

The problem is, you may not be able to justify the cost of such a campaign. The most cost effective way of making them hurt is still through 'non state actors', tactical ops on the border and a naval blockade.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 21:25

Aditya G wrote:Give it a thought - why were we so ecstatic with SF raid in Myanmar? Its because we finally took an action which public never thought GoI will take. The terrorists had same assessment and that's why they took the bold action in the first case. But now they know.

Its not that GOI will never take action. The Pak Pasand Man mohan gang would never take action. The likes of Indira Gandhi were different from the craven gang that we had in power for a decade.

India needs to repeatedly convey its nuclear posture publicly to ensure that Pakistan does not have a wrong perception about India's reaction. I am still waiting for NSA, RM PM to clearly counter with words so that Paki generals know and understand whats coming to them.

We have a policy of massive retaliation because we have NFU. Both go hand in hand. We have made several public statements to the effect. Repeated mention runs the risk of Cashmere nuclear dispute stuff.
Our day to day reaction will tell the Pakistanis a lot about our present leadership. They hit back hard and that speaks deterrence. Yell shared origins, we are one people, Nobel peace prize and you devalue your own strength.

The Pakis have clearly developed Nasr with belief that India will never strike back to a tactical strike. Just like we think that cold start will not invite Pak nuclear strike.

You are mistaken. We don't think Cold Start won't invite nuclear strike. While its designed to reduce the chance of making Pakistan lose its undies, but every IBG or Indian Army formation has been busy rehearsing under a NBC backup. Its primary aim was to reduce mobilization time and attack Pakistan before its international friends can beg/plead with us to reconsider.

Bharat Karnad - who can at least be looked at dispassionately for nuclear topics, if not technology. Noted that even without equipment inductions which would be expensive, the IA Cold Start would end up breaking through Pakistani lines and constantly seek to advance by moving around areas that are NBC contaminated.

Link

Indeed, the Indian Army's Cold Start plan hopes to confront the adversary with impossibly difficult choices at every turn, leaving it to Pakistan to escalate hostilities to the nuclear realm, confident that India has the upper hand. This is exactly what some Pakistani analysts fear and is the situation, which they imply Pakistan will not be able to cope

Another view:

IA focus is on protecting operational coherence and force protection under enemy's nuclear usage.

(Ashley Tellis, 2001,India's Emerging Nuclear Posture)

Thereafter, IA went ahead with significant eqpt inductions.

For instance:
http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories576.htm
. “Our CBRN products are being used in large numbers in the army and we are the only suppliers. It is a planning of the army to deter such attacks
NBC suits
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php? ... 4297613479
Recce vehicles
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 735145.cms (8 such vehicles, can sanitize an area of around 70x5 km, 10kt strike, operating for 3-4 hours each); more would have followed thereafter - we order 362 BMP-2s in 2014 end - of what kind were these is not known.
http://www.army-technology.com/news/new ... -equipment

Point is if the IA did not expect to fight in an NBC environment, it would neither train for it or order equipment.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 25 Oct 2015 21:27

shiv wrote: India's nuclear doctrine is to avoid this tamasha. It may not be Islamabad or Karachi that are nuked - but certainly the Paki army is going to see some of its biggest assets vaporized if they start this game.

What would be interesting is if Paki incoming missiles - eg Nasr are shot down, or worse, do not explode as planned.

Shiv ji: In war gaming scenarios, by senior ex SFC personnel, our operational doctrine is clear and unambiguous, it is premised on massive retaliation. However, there are caveats based on political interference. The irony is TSP seeks to prove it is India's doctrine, which is irrational. An argument that is receptive amongst those, who think a nuclear war is within the realm of reason - so called experts of the west. The PA takes its cues from these "experts".

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 21:39

deejay wrote:They captured Indian territory, they were holding it, our Army men were being killed, our Govt did not allow the fighters to cross the LOC. LOC!!! not IB. POK is our territory and our fighters were not allowed to go there. Kargil for you!

In 2002, they attacked our Parliament. Our center of governance. All we did was spend billions in massed summer vacations in the desert. The IAF Chief addressed us - "Gentlemen, I promise you war, I promise you revenge". Two days later alert levels were lowered for good. My unit has moved from East to West for what? The sister unit which did not deploy, their CO had asked me to get a copy of the crossword of Dawn. It dawned on me later we are only good for bluffs. All the ladies had come to give us proper "Kshatriya" goodbyes with Tilak and rona-dhona (Pati is going to war). We returned buying Rajesthani Chairs and handicraft. That was a billion dollar bluff. Think about it. Ya, Ya, I have heard the reasons for the call off but I was there and I knew exactly how well we were placed.

In 2008, I thought this is it. This is irreversible. Guess what, we sent a "Demarche!!!". Now, who is bluffing? We just don't have the balls. Our goody two shoes don't fit the attacking man's foot.

I have said this before, we will fight our battles on our territory. The enemy knows this. Even if some brave soldier were to advance inside their territory, we will gift wrap and return. Nuclear weapons? What Nuclear weapons? What is the status of the Strategic Forces Command? If we are serious, it will show.

The bureaucracy controls national defence and not military men. Military men control point defence or at best area defence. The bureaucracy is scared of war.

Rant off

In 2002, the IA took so long to mobilize its heavy formations that the US and west operated with a mix of carrots and incentives to have the GOI back off.

If we hadn't, they would have intervened more overtly - eqpt supplies & tacit support to the Pakistanis to stall, delay Indian capabilities.

The Pakistanis threatened Indian cities. We had gone officially nuclear in 1999. By 2002, we were probably not in an ideal place to probably fight a nuclear war with a counterforce response either. A few Prithvis and Agnis and some Mirage 2000s for our delivery vehicles.

http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/inside- ... tan-twice/

While we will have to wait for Mishra’s memoirs to find out what happened on Raisina Hill those days, it is certain that NDA leadership under Atal Behari Vajpayee had given a green signal to Indian military to strike at Pakistan in December 2001 and then again in May 2001 but the military brass failed to deliver.

Post 26/11 attack, the Indian mood was ugly but there was no plan on the table to attack Pakistan or Lashkar headquarters at Muridke, Lahore even though Mukherjee read the riot act to Islamabad. When Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major talked about a missile strike or air strike on Pakistan post 26/11 at a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting, he was dismissed as being too emotional.

However, the Indian posture post Parliament attack was really angry and meant business. Two days after the Parliament attack, the CCS under Vajpayee ordered full scale mobilisation of forces on the western borders. The window for limited war in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) was last week of December but the military took its own sweet time to mobilise and was just about prepared to go across by December 28, 2001.

International diplomacy had taken over the course by that time with US putting pressure on Pakistani dictator Pervez Musharaf to ban LeT and JeM groups, and also condemn jihadists based in Pakistan. With top diplomats like British Prime Minister Tony Blair, then US secretary of state Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage making to and fro trips to New Delhi and Islamabad, the war opportunity was lost as the then home minister LK Advani was given a preview of Musharraf’s impending January 12, 2002 speech during his January 8 visit to Washington. Once the war moment was lost, Mishra and then foreign minister Jaswant Singh called it coercive diplomacy.

With Indian troops deployed at the border as part of Operation Parakram, tensions flared up yet again after terrorist attacked Kaluchak army camp near Jammu on May 14, 2001 leaving 31 dead including 18 family members of Indian Army personnel in the camp.

The CCS met yet again on May 18, 2002 and gave a nod for strike to the military, which was seething with revenge. This time again the Indian Air Force delayed the proceedings as it ran short of laser guided ammunition and night vision pods. New Delhi gave a SOS to Tel Aviv, which sent three C-130 J Hercules full of laser guided bombs and pods on June 5, 2002 at Palam airport with Israeli Director General (Defence) Amos Yaron on board. But a fortnight delay was too much for the international community to let go.

Musharraf was yet again hauled by the scruff of his neck by Armitage and the dictator again made a public statement on May 27, 2002 stating that he would not allow Pakistani territory to be used for terror attacks against India. While Mishra did meet Atomic Energy Commission officials at Kudankulam on May 24, there was no evidence of Indians mating nuclear warheads on their missiles or even moving them towards border.

It is quite evident now from Rice’s book excerpts that Mishra decided to get maximum diplomatic mileage out of Kaluchak as he knew that Indian war plans were not coming to fruition. The fact is that American diplomacy worked post Parliament attack as Indian military and not political leadership faltered. Rice’s memoirs would have been different and so would have been history had Indian war plans worked out.

Over the past decade, we elected the most craven GOI and the worst Pak Pasand PM India has ever had whose chosen media editors were yelling "coup, coup". So why is it a surprise then, that the Armed Forces were kept firmly under heel?

26/11, there was no plan to attack Pakistan. FH Major was dismissed as being too emotional by the CCS. Tells you the quality of our leadership when civilians were attacked.

So what has changed?

1. New Govt in power which will hit back and does not bleat about Pakistan being its brother and what not.
2. Cold Start and exercises from IA side to improve readiness.
3. NBC equipment inductions, better training & equipment for SFC both (one to operate within the n-backdrop, other to hit back)
4. Better readiness for Armed Forces - we will have that fixed in the years to come as tank ammo, arty guns etc are all on their way.

Having said the above, why would the current Govt ONLY use the sledgehammer to crack a fly.

In fact the window for the IA/IAF/IN to be the only player in the deterrence game will steadily erode once R&AW builds up capabilities in Pakistan.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 21:43

sudeepj wrote:Attack in Punjab and the port facilities of Karachi. What are they going to do? Nuke Karachi? Thats 25% of their GDP. Tactical nukes are also dirty nukes.. If they want to stop using Karachi for the next decade, go ahead.

The problem is, you may not be able to justify the cost of such a campaign. The most cost effective way of making them hurt is still through 'non state actors', tactical ops on the border and a naval blockade.

Completely agree. Maximum damage to Pakistan and its economy at minimal cost. Naval blockade, limited air war, daily arty fire assaults and covert ops and moral and diplomatic support to the oppressed Baloch, Mohajir and Sindhis.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 21:54

As to why Covert Ops. Writing in the "oh wot will happen to secooolarism", Chindu
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/an ... 139262.ece

However, there is another source of clues. Since 1998, Indian Prime Ministers have appointed a National Security Advisor (NSA). The post is a powerful one. Its occupant enjoys excellent access to the Prime Minister, holds a key position in India’s nuclear chain of command, and sits atop the intelligence agencies.

Mr. Modi’s predecessors chose all but one of their NSAs from among the nation’s senior-most diplomats. The exception was former Intelligence Bureau (IB) chief M.K. Narayanan, who filled the seat in the crucial years from 2005 to 2010 when the U.S. and India struck a series of historic deals. Mr. Modi has now sent out an important signal in appointing as his NSA one of Mr. Narayanan’s protégés: former IB chief Ajit Doval, a highly decorated intelligence officer who until his appointment had been leading the right-leaning Delhi think-tank, the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF).

Mr. Doval is an acclaimed spook. He is reputed to have infiltrated the Golden Temple in the 1980s posing as an Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officer, spent many years in Pakistan, turned in insurgent leaders in Mizoram and Kashmir, and negotiated the infamous release of hostages aboard hijacked Indian Airlines Flight 814 in Kandahar in 1999.

Security starts at home

Fortunately for analysts, Mr. Doval has left a rich seam of writing on national security issues, running to tens of thousands of words. It would be unfair to Mr. Doval to treat these as a perfectly formed body of thought. Moreover, officials’ behaviour in government frequently diverges from their rhetoric in opposition. But Mr. Doval’s arguments could help us understand the sort of advice that Mr. Modi might receive.

First, Mr. Doval clearly believes that national security begins at home. Reflecting his career in the field, his writings are marked by a consistent emphasis on the primacy of domestic problems over foreign ones. Indeed, as early as 2006, Mr. Doval argued, “India’s internal vulnerabilities are much higher than its external vulnerabilities.” He therefore sees the most dangerous foreign threats as being those that target India’s domestic weaknesses, and lays stress on the importance of growing and equipping State police forces (he calls for a minimum of 200 policemen per lakh population). But his severest warning is directed elsewhere: “I consider infiltration of Bangladeshis the biggest internal security problem. Bangladesh supports the demographic invasion of India.”

Hence the emphasis on improving ties with Bangladesh and improving its economy so that the push into India reduces.

Second, he views internal security in broad and sweeping terms. One recurring theme is his disdain for “front organizations supporting the cause of anti-national forces, masquerading as human right groups.” This is an issue with particular resonance after the IB’s recent description of Greenpeace and its European funders as “a threat to national economic security,” and the government’s subsequent crackdown on transfers.

In a Hindi speech to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) last summer, Mr. Doval also argued that a millennia-old Indian national identity was under threat. He bemoaned the tendency to emphasise Indian diversity, rather than unity. Most remarkably of all, he claimed that the core of national security was not physical security but cultural identity, and praised the BJP as being the only political party promoting Indian-ness. This suggests a crucial — and controversial — cultural dimension to internal security.

Tells it like it is. Compare and contrast to teh janus faced folks who supposedly "led" India in the past.

Adding muscle to intelligence

Third, he wants to add muscle to Indian intelligence. There has been considerable excitement that Mr. Modi will reverse I.K. Gujral’s purported decision to dismantle the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)’s covert action capability. Some are salivating for Abbottabad-style raids. It is clear that the NSA sympathises, though his language is guarded.

Over the years, Mr. Doval has talked of the importance of covert action. In a 2012 article, he defines these as “a low cost sustainable offensive with high deniability aimed to bleed the enemy to submission.” He despairs of New Delhi’s failures to sharpen its tools in this regard, and dismisses conventional wars as “cost-ineffective and high-risk ventures.” In his view, “the most effective way of dealing with terrorism would be to identify boys who have got the courage of conviction to match that of the fidayeens and who are capable of taking risks. Identify them and put them in action.” He notes, ominously, that “Pakistan has its own vulnerabilities many times higher than India.”

Mr. M.K. Narayanan also pushed for covert action against Pakistan after the 2008 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, but was rebuffed by Dr. Singh. Mr. Modi might well share this caution, although another Mumbai would almost certainly tip the scales.

But Mr. Doval is not just talking about assassination. His writings repeatedly emphasise the importance of disrupting terrorist logistics and communications, rather than just leaders. In 2011, he lamented that Indian intelligence had become fixated on foreign terrorists rather than those within India, and argued that the States’ district and local level intelligence units had to step up. He praised the formation of the long-delayed National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) the next year, but urged that it be beefed up with manpower, resources and more legislative authority.

The clock is ticking for Pakistan.

Fourth, the NSA is pessimistic about Afghanistan’s stability as western forces draw down. He squarely blames Pakistan for the insurgency, and is concerned about the impact on India. Last summer, he told a pro-India lobby group in Washington that if things worsened, “start preparing for the worst,” adding that “you often don’t have to fight the wars you had prepared for in advance.” Responding to attacks on Indian diplomatic missions in Afghanistan, Mr. Doval demanded “enhanced security cover and not abandonment or appeasement.”

How might Mr. Doval counsel Mr. Modi on outgoing Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s long-standing request for Indian arms? Two years ago, I served alongside Mr. Doval on a British-Indian working group on Afghanistan, whose joint recommendations included a “substantial and rapid” growth of India’s role in building up Afghan security forces. Mr. Doval has never been explicit on this question, but he seems likely to nudge Mr. Modi in a more assertive direction.

On the U.S.

Fifth, Mr. Doval does not trust the United States — as is typical in officers of his generation. He warns that the U.S. “will seek to outsource their counter-terrorism to Pakistan” as they withdraw from Afghanistan. He was scathing of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, bitterly warning in 2006 that “it will stunt India’s emergence as a genuine nuclear weapon state, cripple its strategic deterrence, and reduce it to a US satrapy.” Of course, Mr. Modi is extremely unlikely to downgrade the strategic relationship with the U.S. It transcends national security. But such thinking might have implications for whether the government will modify India’s draconian nuclear liability law, as per the wishes of Washington and other Indian nuclear suppliers.

Believe in your own capabilities and not sugar daddies abroad.

Taken together, these writings portray a details-oriented, methodical, and pragmatic thinker. Mr. Doval is not one for grand, cooperative schemes. He is a hawk, but a cautious one. His diagnoses are gloomy, but his prescriptions restrained. His vision is quite different to Mr. Modi’s globalism. It is more inward looking, localised, and distrustful. His vision of national security is primarily internal, peripheral, and — perhaps most intriguingly — cultural. Farther afield, Mr. Doval warns of developments in Afghanistan and strikes an uncompromising tone on Pakistan — but there is little on China, let alone India’s partners in East and Southeast Asia. Europe and the Middle East are almost entirely absent. Mr. Doval is the foil to the Prime Minister’s enthusiastic internationalism — an NSA for hard times in the neighbourhood?

And therein lies the difference. A nationalist GOI which routinely hits back across the border.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 22:01

Put together as a pension issue, but clearly also about stiffening up the CPMFs

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/army ... 72063.html

Why was this not done earlier? Everyone knows about the distrust the G-N dynasts had about the IA becoming too powerful and hence creating a parallel empire in the CPMF. But the above has huge ramifications for interior security as knowledge transfer & combat hardened veterans make their way into CPMF.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 22:07

And for those who think "doctrine is mere words" and the leadership is the decider:

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/in ... -soon.html

Islamabad may not be awed, but it certainly is shocked by the ferocity and volume of the Indian response to ceasefire violations along the International Border in Jammu and Kashmir.

Given complete freedom to act by the government, the Indian Army and Border Security Force are firing back at will from every spot the Pakistanis have targeted.

The volume and intensity of India’s return fire is much higher than the usual calibrated response the Pakistanis have come to expect.

Top government sources told Mail Today that Indian forces are systematically targeting infrastructure and force deployment nodes on the other side.

The damage on the other side is so high that Pakistan is, according to an internal report sent to South Block by the Indian mission in Islamabad, “ducking for cover”.

A media blackout of sorts is in place in Pakistan’s affected areas, so as to keep a lid on the extent of damage suffered. Pakistan’s military establishment is on the verge of losing face, and it doesn’t like the evolving situation one bit.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the picture of confidence on Thursday evening during a function at Air Chief Arup Raha’s residence.

“Everything will be all right soon,” he said.

The government is understood to have also told Indian forces not to seek any flag meeting with the other side, thus sending the signal that it is in no mood to ease situation on the border with Pakistan until the ceasefire violations come to a complete halt.

The point is the rules have changed.

The Pakistanis will continue to press us.

Their rangers will still try to kill our BSF troops. Infiltration will be attempted.

The US will be roped in to ask us to be more amenable to talks and what not.

But we will no longer be playing with some book on Gandhi's sayings & will give back in spades as we need to.

Remedial policies are being put in place for conflict as well.
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 282705.cms

All this takes time.

Also, the above should make it clear the Rafales or the Tejas were not just ordered for the heck of it. This is a Govt that understands what national security requires.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 22:21

And the entire BS about NDA == Congress. The biggest thing the NDA under Vajpayee did, was that it made India an overt n-weapons state, hence bringing the entire system into the light and giving India a deterrence capability which can be deployed.

In short, by moving the NWS to the open status, we operationalized and worked on our capabilities to the point that today we have a range of options, both missiles and aircraft and a nuclear command and control system in place.

BARC, DRDO, IAF , IA, SFC etc can openly collaborate and share information to put our deterrence in place which was not the case BEFORE

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf ... EC_a_00158

Indian political leaders feared pressures for nuclear rollback from the United States. These pressures pushed the weaponization process underground, deep into the bowels of the state. To safeguard secrecy, policy planning was weakly institutionalized. Sensitive nuclear weapons–related information was tightly compartmentalized and hived off within an informal social network consisting of a small number of scientists and civilian bureaucrats. Secrecy concerns prevented decision-makers and policy planners from decomposing problem sets and parceling them out simultaneously for resolution to multiple bureaucratic actors, including the military …

In the absence of holistic planning stretching back to the 1980s, many technical problems, particularly those related to the integration of weapons with combat aircraft, were only partially anticipated. In other instances, policy planners remained unaware of the technical challenges until they demanded resolution. All of these factors became roadblocks on the path to weaponization. Secrecy concerns similarly prevented policy planners from institutionalizing the soft organizational and training routines between the scientific and military agencies necessary to move weapons from the stockpile to the target, in effect attenuating the state’s capacity to make good on its insinuated threat to punish a nuclear aggressor via a retaliatory response.

The DRDO first conducted trials in the early 1980s to test the Jaguar combat aircraft, which India had purchased from Britain in the late 1970s, as a potential delivery vehicle … Having found the Jaguar unsuitable because of the low ground clearance between the aircraft and the nuclear weapon container, DRDO next identified the Mirage 2000 as its choice for a delivery system …

The trouble, recalls another senior air force officer who served at the time, was that “the boffins developed it [the device] independently without reference to the delivery platform. There was a problem with carriage because the weapon was too long.” This was cause for concern especially during the “rotation maneuver during the takeoff stage. A skilled Mirage pilot could have pulled it off . . . but not just any pilot,” a senior air force officer with an intimate view of the program told the author. The “size of the weapon itself, its length and weight upset the aerodynamics and center of gravity of the aircraft.”

Other aspects that needed resolution were the aircraft’s electronic interface and sighting systems to enable the arming and release of the weapon. The electronic interface could not be reconfigured without what one air force officer described as access to the “manufacturer’s database” and computer source codes. The aircraft also required extensive rewiring for electrical connectivity to enable the bomb’s functions. The Mirages that India had acquired from France in the mid–1980s were not nuclear certified. There were thus concerns that a post-detonation electromagnetic pulse could interfere with the aircraft’s computer-controlled fly-by-wire, communications, and other electronic systems.

According to one senior air force official, “In the early 1990s, the air force was thinking of one-way missions. . . . t was unlikely that the pilot deployed on a nuclear attack mission would have made it back.” … Until 1994, DRDO conducted experimental modifications on just one Mirage 2000 with a single test pilot. There was no backup .. [but] an Indian air force study conducted in the early 2000s highlighted the logistical challenges of planning nuclear missions against Pakistan. It showed that a single mission alone could tie up as many as sixty aircraft to assist the penetrating nuclear aircraft.

“the author’s interviews with several senior retired Indian air force officers at the highest levels suggest that India achieved an air-deliverable capability sometime in 1995” (p86), a much later date than is usually assumed in the literature

[P]rior to 1999, the air force did not know who possessed the codes for arming nuclear weapons and how those codes were to be deployed during a mission. Indian weapons at this time did not incorporate permissive action links that would enable arming the weapons at will. The assumption in the air force was that the task of arming the weapon would fall on the pilot at a designated time during oight. The air force and the scientific agencies, however, did not conduct practice drills to test the communication and weapon arming protocols during a potential nuclear mission …

As the Indian government secretly prepared for an all-out war with Pakistan [during Kargil, in 1999], the spotlight turned to the nuclear aspect and the lack of operational planning with the Indian military. A senior Indian defense official privy to this effort disclosed to the author that, until then, the air force had no idea (1) what types of weapons were available; (2) in how many numbers; and (3) what it was expected to do with the weapons. All the air force had was delivery capability in the form of a few modiaed Mirage 2000s. At that point, only the air chief, the vice air chief, and two other individuals at Air Headquarters had knowledge of the program.

In the event of the prime minister’s incapacitation, power would devolve upon the Cabinet Committee on Security, but the likelihood of that event happening was thought low. A Pakistani nuclear attack, the officials believed, would be limited and symbolic and leave the functioning of the federal government relatively undisturbed.

But in the worst-case “bolt-out-of-the blue” scenario in which Delhi did go up in a mushroom cloud, power would devolve upon a hierarchy of state governors and principals in the state civil service who would assume responsibilities of the federal government, while the military would function under a reconstituted civilian authority. India, the leaders of the nuclear network believed, was a “big country. It would survive!” But how, they could not tell.

Similarly, a spare oral brief was made to new holders of the prime minister’s office. If, however, they were deemed disinterested, and at least three incumbents in the 1990s were, their principal secretaries were briefed instead. Beyond prime ministers and their principal secretaries, no information was shared with ministers on the Cabinet Committee on Security or with federal governors and provincial civil service chiefs who might be called to assume responsibilities.

If civil-military institutional tensions were the cause, however, one would see greater aggregation of information among civilians, but the regime of information scarcity operated with nearly equal severity on both the civilian and military sides of the nuclear equation. As a senior Indian defense official at the heart of the nuclear network put it: “Yes, the military was kept out of the information loop. There were no serious reasons to bring the military into the loop because of the danger of secrecy being compromised. The chiefs of staff are trustworthy. But who can vouch for the trustworthiness of their staff, their drivers? The latter could be spies and the weak link in the chain. The military’s complaints have more to with a sense of privilege and pride. Why should they be told? The cabinet ministers weren’t told, the defense minister, their political boss was not told. So why should the armed services chiefs be told?” … More significant, India’s civilian leaders have shown little hesitation in institutionalizing the military’s role in nuclear planning post-1998, once India stepped out of the nuclear closet. This change has occurred without any fundamental rewrite in the DNA of India’s civil-military relations.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 22:30

What is the current status? As of May 2013

Shyam Saran, ex head NSAB notes:
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/we ... 681085.ece

A more recent argument is that since the May 1998 tests, India has not taken credible steps to operationalise its nuclear deterrent. And this demonstrates, it is claimed, that India looks upon its nuclear weapons as a political instrument, a source of prestige, rather than as a deterrent.

In fact, since January 2003, when India adopted its nuclear doctrine formally at a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security, it has taken a series of graduated steps to put in place a triad of land-based, air-delivered and submarine-based nuclear forces to conform to its declared doctrine of no-first use and retaliation only. Currently, at least two legs of the triad are fully operational. These include a modest arsenal, nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles, both in fixed underground silos and those mounted on mobile rail and road-based platforms. Land-based missiles include both Agni-II (1500 km) as well as Agni-III (2500 km).

The range and accuracy of further versions for example, Agni V (5000 km) which was tested successfully only recently, will improve with the further acquisition of technological capability and experience.

The third leg of the triad is admittedly a work in progress. We need a minimum of three Arihant class nuclear submarines so that at least one will always be at sea. The submarine-based Sagarika missiles have been developed and tested but are still relatively short in range. It is expected that a modest sea-based deterrent will be in place by 2015 or 2016.

The National Command Authority (NCA) is in charge of India’s nuclear deterrent. At its apex is the Political Council which is headed by the Prime Minister and includes all the ministerial members of the Cabinet Committee on Security such as the Ministers of Defence, Home and External Affairs.

Today, that's Modi, Rajnath Singh, Parrikar, Sushma Swaraj. All committed peaceniks.

At the next level is the Executive Council which is headed by the National Security Advisor and includes the Chiefs of the three armed forces, the Commander-in-Chief of India’s Strategic Forces Command, a three star officer, among others. There is an alternate NCA which would take up the functions of the nuclear command in case of any contingency that renders the established hierarchy dysfunctional.

The NSA I am told, has 3 doves circling around him, and the Chiefs of the 3 Armed Forces, bluffing apart, have a daily dose of "My Experiments with Truth" with their evening scotch.

The NCA has access to radiation hardened and fully secured communication systems, and redundancies have been put in place as back-up facilities.

All just for timepass. Those communication systems have direct links to play World of Warcraft.

In order to support the NCA, a Strategy Programme Staff has been created in the National Security Council Secretariat to carry out general staff work for the NCA. This unit is charged with looking at the reliability and quality of our weapons and delivery systems, collate intelligence on other nuclear weapon states, particularly those in the category of potential adversaries, and work on a perspective plan for India's nuclear deterrent in accordance with a 10-year cycle. The Strategy Programme Staff has representatives from the three services, from our Science and Technology establishment and other experts from related domains, including External Affairs.

The dastardly Indoos will build more if the opponent builds more.

A Strategic Armament Safety Authority has been set up to review and update storage and transfer procedures for all categories of nuclear armaments. It will be responsible for all matters relating to the safety and security of our nuclear and delivery assets at all locations.

The NCA works on a two-person rule for access to armaments and delivery systems.

Regular drills are conducted to examine possible escalatory scenarios, surprise attack scenarios and the efficiency of our response systems under the no first use limitation. Thanks to such repeated and regular drills, the level of confidence in our nuclear deterrent has been strengthened. Specialised units have also been trained and deployed for operation in a nuclearised environment.

Its all theoretical onlee yaar. Army chief is a bluffer.

This is clearly not the record of a state which regards its nuclear arsenal as having only symbolic value. While further steps may be required to make our deterrent more robust, it is misleading to spread the notion that it is dysfunctional or worse, that it is non-existent.

This is coming from the mouth of a man who was 10x more peacenik than the present bunch and was operating under the most WKK bunch ever. Think!!

Recently, there have been claims by Pakistan that it has developed theatre nuclear weapons which could be used to meet a conventional armed thrust across the border by Indian forces. By seeking to lower the threshold of nuclear weapons use, Pakistan’s motivation is to dissuade India from contemplating conventional punitive retaliation against sub-conventional but highly destructive and disruptive cross-border terrorist strikes such as the horrific 26/11 attack in Mumbai.

Massive retaliation

India’s nuclear doctrine declares that while India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the perspective of its doctrine.

Rinse, lather, repeat. Nuke an IA formation, India will nuke a PA formation - the manner of our escalation is our choice, but it will be massive.

The security of both India and Pakistan would be enhanced if Pakistan abandoned cross-border terrorism as an instrument of state policy and instead joined India in the pursuit of nuclear and conventional confidence building measures which are already on our bilateral agenda. An agreement on non-first use of nuclear weapons would be a significant follow-up to the existing bilateral commitment to maintain a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing.

India and Pakistan should take the lead in promoting multilateral negotiations to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. That is a better future for which to aspire.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 22:51

How effective is NASR or TNW against any Indian Cold Start?
https://www.princeton.edu/sgs/faculty-s ... istans.pdf

The limited military utility of Pakistan’s battle -field use of nuclear weapons in response to large-scale Indian conventional attack

General Deepak Kapoor, India‟s army chief, claimed in December 2009 that the army had made progress in operationalising a strategy for rapid mobilization of conventional military forces capable of mounting a decisive attack on Pakistan .
3
The strategy, dubbed „Cold Start ,‟can be traced to the unexpectedly slow pace of mobilization and deployment of Indian forces to the border with Pakistan after the December 2001 attacks on India‟s parliament by militants believed to be linked to Pakistan.
4
It involves the creation of eight to ten „integrated battle groups‟ (IBGs) of army, air force and special forces intended “to destroy and not to hold or
capture territory.”
5
As part of this doctrine, India‟s armed forces have been rehearsing large scale manoeuvres, the most significant of which came in a May 2006
military exercise close to the border with Pakistan.
6
The Sanghe Shakti (Joint Power) exercise brought together strike aircraft, tanks, and over 40,000 soldiers from the 2nd Strike Corps in a war game whose purpose was described by an Indian commander as “to test our 2004 war doctrine to dismember a not-so-friendly nation effectively and at the shortest possible time.”
7
General Daulat Shekhawat, Commander of the Corps, explained that “We firmly believe that there is room for a swift strike even in case of a nuclear attack, and it is to validate this doctrine that we conducted this operation.”

India seems to have anticipated the possibility of Pakistani leaders using nuclear weapons against Indian military forces. Since the early 1980s, confronted with the prospect of possible Pakistani use of nuclear weapons on the battle-field, Indian forces have prepared to survive and prevail. Indian Army Chief General
K. Sundarji claimed in early 1987 “We in the armed forces are gearing our organization, training and equipment in such a manner that in the unlikely event of the use of nuclear weapons by the adversary in the combat zone, we will limit the damage, both psychological and physical.”

The year-long Brasstacks exercise in 1986 involved Indian tanks and other armoured vehicles practising procedures for moving through an area that had been subject to nuclear attack.

The May 2001 Indian military exercises Poorna Vijay (Complete Victory) gave every indication that Indian planners anticipate Pakistan‟s battle-field use
of nuclear weapons.
15
The exercises were aimed at testing equipment, troops and maneuvers in a situation where nuclear weapons were used against them, with an Indian official confirming that “Drills and procedures to meet the challenges of a nuclear, chemical or biological strike are also being practiced.”
16
Among the options worked through were a Pakistani nuclear attack on a bridgehead or bridge, armored forces and troops.
17
A year later, India‟s Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Lt.-General Raj Kadyan, confirmed that the Indian army was continuing to train to cope with a nuclear strike on the battle-field.

Limited use against armor

For a tank spacing of 100 meters, one 15 kT weapon could destroy about 55 tanks. To destroy this many tanks if they were spaced 300 meters part woul
d take 8 weapons of 15 kiloton yield each. To destroy by blast alone roughly half of a force of 1000 tanks that were well dispersed would require on the order of
100 nuclear weapons of 15 kiloton yield.

the attack is organised around tank divisions of 330 tanks, with each division moving forward on a 10 kilometer long front, then the 1000 tanks would occupy a 30 km long front. The depth of the formation would be determined by the spacing of the tanks. As noted earlier, an attacking tank formation following U.S.
tactics might have tanks that are 50 meters apart in rows separated by 250 meters (the effective spacing would be 120 meters).

A force of tanks prepared for a possible nuclear strike might have larger distances between individual tanks.

So TSP nukes our troops, we nuke theirs back with far more devastation in the Punjab. Lose Lose.

Their only card is political signalling and the current bunch are not dreaming of good old 'Pindi like MS Aiyar.

vishvak · Post by **vishvak** » 25 Oct 2015 22:52

Pakistan however itself is a special case, a failed jihadi state with nukes pointed at no other country and despicable proliferation record worldwide. The nukes themselves are not under civilian authority, which is why Indian nuke thresh hold needs to be REALLY low for paki misadventure, though reality is opposite because of fourefathers supporting the jihadi state. Wonder how no first use works against it, when the paki nukes are themselves not under civilian control.

nirav · Post by **nirav** » 25 Oct 2015 23:00

Excellent posts, Karan M.

now we can rest easy on the shivers.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 25 Oct 2015 23:02

So the assumption is that we will take offensive action - a.k.a. Cold Start. They will retalliate - Tactical nukes. We will second strike - Total annihilation. Great.

But it begins with our offensive action over enemy territory. So we will go on the offensive?

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 25 Oct 2015 23:08

The above should make it clear what is happening in the overall Indo-Pak dynamic.

Pakistan intends to continue to provoke India and was caught flat footed by Cold Start. Its nuclear stockpile is not enough for both TNW and strategic deterrence, hence its rush to make more nukes. Its also affected by the fact that India is developing BMD systems & acquiring better SAMs - Akash, MRSAM, now talk of S-400. What these do is again, force Pakistan into spending more on nukes. More it does so, more its conventional capabilities suffer. Whilst it can savvily use this arguement to make the case for international intervention, its basic problem is that the Indian Army intends to wage Cold Start in a manner that it can dismember Pakistan despite nukes (until and unless Pakistan literally nukes its own territory out of existence OR attacks Indian civilian targets, which would mean it commits suicide again).
In short, each time Pakistan has to divert funds to make a new missile & payload. It loses out on x-tanks and y-thermal imagers.

This is why Pakistan wants India to shut down its BMD program and calls it destabilizing etc. The BMD program basically starts making Pakistans targetting mechanism completely haphazard. They can either target the military or the strategic targets. Doing both in the numbers they had thought will bankrupt them..

Indian response then is to continue to build up capabilities for Cold Start (forcing Pakistan into an arms race it cannot afford), and most of its Cold Start centric capabilities, eg artillery and infantry equipment are dual use. They can be used to effect in the hot peace to punish Pakistan as well. Air Power is important because even if the war turns hot, air power can offer us significant hitting potential even without occupying territory. We can just keep punishing Pakistan.

What will truly FCK Pakistan is when India too starts deploying covert assets deep into Pakistan. It will then be further embroiled in Balochistan, NWFP and even Punjab as we exploit TSP faultlines. It cannot wage conventional war with us (its conventional assets would have been reduced). Its nuclear showpiece eqpt will be useless. And if we strengthen our domestic security and political situation, keeping the appeasement politicians out of power, then a stronger India will have far too many cards to play against TSP.

And that is what is driving their frustration. Things were going well. A bit of terror there, here, everywhere. Siachen talks. J&K joint control and all that sh!te. And then India goes and changes its Govt.

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 25 Oct 2015 23:12

Deejay saar, I think under modi, the answer is more likely to be yes than with any other. One problem with a nuke scenario is that india might suffer heavily in economic terms, Chinese will be real winners.

It is for this reason that less escalatory destabilizing tit for tat actions are more likely..