ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

[Austin]

Some confusion here: I have not seen any claim that S-400 is a BMD system. Wiki aunty lists it as "anti-aircraft defence". Yes it seems to have some ABM capability too

Its got both capability something like our AAD system

[Karan M]

Shiv, half the discussions have been around its BMD claims and many of its PR statements make the same claim.

Pandyan, exactly, first article i saw which stated the context of what x systems would actually protect, though I think he is referring to S-300 PMU2 class of systems or the S-300 VM which would have a smaller footprint.

EItherways, in short, 18-20 systems @10.8 Bn are not that high a number for our needs since each metro/VA/VP (IACCS, SFC node) would take up a couple of S-400s.

Need to find out what exact BMD etc capabilities the MRSAM has. IIRC, it can intercept targets of upto 1.2km/s.
IA has one regiment on order & it can take out Nasr etc. 18 batteries quoted at $1.5Bn.
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defens ... /24050363/
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 364242.cms

IMO, the above regiment classification is probably deliberately underplayed, since Akash showed 1 regiment has some 6 batteries.
http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/ ... 910277.ece

The MRSAM order hence is for at least 3 regiments.

IAF order is for 9 squadrons again at 18 firing units ie batteries.

[Austin]

By the same standards, India's MiG-29K, Smerch, T-90 etc purchases all had "information beyond the brochure stuff". We all know (or should know) what happened thereafter. Glitches galore.

I havent heard any thing on 29K so far if any then IN is all praise for it but there would be operational issue with every new induction for any system foreign or indiginous , if the situation was that bad we wouldnt have been buying Russian system

India has been asking for US stuff for a while now. It does seem though, that instead of getting Patriots we were offered obsolete Hawks and similar 3rd grade stuff.

Initially yes but later they did offer PAC-3 , MOD/AHQ was briefed about PAC-3 systems

Our local BMD will provide the 2nd layer against advanced threats and must and should be continued as the LRTR/MFCR combination plus PDV/AAD and advanced variants are by dint of architecture superior to the S-400 class mobile systems with a size premium & also fully in our control for upgrade and modification

Yes I think S-400 system if purchased would be a stop gap arrangement to protect our Elites/netas in Delhi these people must be shit scared of their own life , in a decade time frame we would have our own AAD/PDV/AD-1/2 operational

And what about the IAF's "due diligence" for its MiG-29s way back, which were hanger queens for a long stint till IAF started making its own spares.

True but recently MOD mentioned 29 and 2K was having 80 % availability , I think spares was the issue then/now with varying degree that affect operational prepardeness

The point is merely saying "if India has chosen to purchase this, its all fine" is a flawed proposition.

A better argument would be that the S-400 is a new product which is in series production for Russia itself, under mass induction and an iterative development of the S-300 series hence (hopefully) most of the flaws and serviceability challenges would have been worked out.

The only common thing that S-400 shares with S-300 is the 48N6E1 missile that can intercept target flying at 2.5km/sec out to 200 km the other 3 missile 48N6E2 , 9M96E and 40N6 were new development specfically for S-400 even the radars are new for S-400 , S-300 never had TBM capability only late model S-300PMU2 had capability to intercept 1000km range BM

The point that I was making is that the LRTR is a more powerful system with better reliability (AESA vs PESA) plus the other advantages (gain/noise etc). Even the MFCR was similarly, an AESA. We chose these expensive & maximized configurations because we wanted a no holds barred BMD system the same as Israel did.

No doubt AESA is better then PESA when it comes to reliability and no doubt Israel helped us a lot with LRTR including TR module etc which is essentially GP indian version , The Russians dont have any one to help except themselves , they were good with PESA with different generation and invested a lot in it so they went with what they knew best , AESA would come now since they have maturity in program , Check the interview on AESA on PAK-FA thread he designer says took them 13 years to be where they are now.

Basically, the S-400 is a further development of the S-300 PMU1/PMU2 family and hence it retains most of the same basic radars with upgrades (power & signal processing). By itself this is not a bad thing. For instance, even the PAC-3 system as I recall had a PESA & it like the LRTR boasts advanced signal processing and power attributes allowing it to distinguish between decoys and real targets.

I clarified about they dont share any thing common except the single missile out of 4 S-400 uses , Radars are new hybrid PESA they call that 3rd Gen PESA type.

The MEADS PAC-3MSE has AESA AFAIK atleast for long range tracking a new type L Band , Their MFCR I think still uses PESA but not really sure.

[srai]

IMO, S-400 will go the way of the Rafale due to "high costs". Probably a limited number of systems will be purchased at the end ... something like 2-squadrons worth which is just about enough to protect New Delhi. More money would be put into purchasing cheap Akash SR-SAM and augmenting it with JV Barak-8 MR-SAM. Plus, indigenous ABM (phase-1 anti-MRBM and phase-2 anti-IRBM) are being developed. Phase-1 ABM production/deployment is coming up in the next 2 or 3 years. Isn't the goal as stated by PM Modi to reduce import by 50% over the next 10-years?

[brar_w]

The MEADS PAC-3MSE has AESA AFAIK atleast for long range tracking a new type L Band , Their MFCR I think still uses PESA but not really sure.

The Patriot and its follow on/of-shots can be loosely put into Standard Patriot, Patriot Adv. and MEADS. All three can and will use the new Pac-3MSE missile but only the Standard Patriot will use the more Air breathing threat specific older missiles. The standard patriot uses a PESA, the Advanced Patriot upgrades include a Gallium Nitride AESA portions of which have been demonstrated this year, with full systems demonstrations expected in the first quarter of 2016. That radar is cleared for export (GaN AESA) and the only one now being actively marketed by Raytheon. The Patriot also works with the THAAD's AN/TPY-2 where both systems are deployed. The US Army will be choosing the Gallium Nitride equipped radar path unless they plan on holding a competition for a sensor (unlikely).

MEADS uses 2 radars, both GaA AESA. One is a UHF band sensor, and the other an X band sensor. The X-band GaA radar designed and built by Lockheed has an open architecture and enough power and cooling to allow swapping out of T-R modules as soon as affordable GaN T/R modules are available to current and future customers. There are no plans to demo MEADS + THAAD sensor interoperability although MEADS is designed to offer plug and play capability with non-MEADS radars but obviously someone has to fund the testing and whatever little integration is required at the BM level. The THAAD's AN/TPY-2 also transitioned to Gallium Nitride electronics late last year or early this year and the transition will be gradual as the radars come back to CONUS through regular rotations.

[Singha]

imo the s-400 deal if any is just to put up a solid air defence at long range (lacking so far) and does not have ABM implications as we might not purchased the expensive long range missiles and stick to the more proven medium range AA types like 9m96.

I think for ABM we will have to persist with our own efforts, with some help from israeli radar technology as really none would like to export or share KV technology. it is very high end and non-exportable tech for anyone who has really mastered it.

I do not think Rus is a leading power in ABM . their philosophy is not expeditionary deployment against limited threats so all they plan for is the overwhelming 1st or 2nd strike and in this they are more than capable.

[shiv]

Shiv, half the discussions have been around its BMD claims and many of its PR statements make the same claim.

I find it highly unlikely that, given the current government, there will be any sidelining or cancellation of our own indigenous BMD program. That means (to my mind) that the S-400 is for a separate and perhaps partly overlapping purpose.

Our ABM tech development seems to be aimed at city defence from ballistic missiles. That still leaves air bases and vital installations being threatened by cruise missiles and short range ballistic missiles apart from air threats. I suspect S-400 will be set up as a separate air defence network to handle those therats while our own ABM development will go on for city protection against ballistic missiles

[Karan M]

Shiv, half the discussions have been around its BMD claims and many of its PR statements make the same claim.

I find it highly unlikely that, given the current government, there will be any sidelining or cancellation of our own indigenous BMD program. That means (to my mind) that the S-400 is for a separate and perhaps partly overlapping purpose.

Our ABM tech development seems to be aimed at city defence from ballistic missiles. That still leaves air bases and vital installations being threatened by cruise missiles and short range ballistic missiles apart from air threats. I suspect S-400 will be set up as a separate air defence network to handle those therats while our own ABM development will go on for city protection against ballistic missiles

Completely agree and do think that's how things will turn out.

[Karan M]

I havent heard any thing on 29K so far if any then IN is all praise for it but there would be operational issue with every new induction for any system foreign or indiginous ,

Radar, structures, engines..all have had significant issues..

if the situation was that bad we wouldnt have been buying Russian system

As if foreign arms purchases in India have been purely on performance (anything but in many cases!!)

Initially yes but later they did offer PAC-3 , MOD/AHQ was briefed about PAC-3 systems

Briefed, but was it up for purchase?

Yes I think S-400 system if purchased would be a stop gap arrangement to protect our Elites/netas in Delhi these people must be shit scared of their own life , in a decade time frame we would have our own AAD/PDV/AD-1/2 operational

~18-20 batteries would mean Delhi, Mumbai and possibly a few SFC/C3I centers. Presumably, since you are in Mumbai that would mean you are safe, while we dehaatis will continue to shiver. (Hope they give us a few old Pechoras for psychological == with you fancy Mumbai types)

True but recently MOD mentioned 29 and 2K was having 80 % availability , I think spares was the issue then/now with varying degree that affect operational prepardeness

Link? This would be great news.

The point is merely saying "if India has chosen to purchase this, its all fine" is a flawed proposition.

thing that S-400 shares with S-300 is the 48N6E1 missile that can intercept target flying at 2.5km/sec out to 200 km the other 3 missile 48N6E2 , 9M96E and 40N6 were new development specfically for S-400 even the radars are new for S-400 , S-300 never had TBM capability only late model S-300PMU2 had capability to intercept 1000km range BM

S-400 base radars & C3I are all derivatives of S-300 PMU-2. Same systems, upgraded. Its basically S-300 PMU3.

No doubt AESA is better then PESA when it comes to reliability and no doubt Israel helped us a lot with LRTR including TR module etc which is essentially GP indian version , The Russians dont have any one to help except themselves , they were good with PESA with different generation and invested a lot in it so they went with what they knew best , AESA would come now since they have maturity in program , Check the interview on AESA on PAK-FA thread he designer says took them 13 years to be where they are now.

The good part is now they have AESAs for the Nebo-M system, hopefully we get a few VHF AESAs with the S-400 for counter stealth!

I clarified about they dont share any thing common except the single missile out of 4 S-400 uses , Radars are new hybrid PESA they call that 3rd Gen PESA type.

Its not an issue of "common" but derivative.

See:
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-S-400-Tr ... ocId215257
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-S-300PMU2-Favorit.html

The Command Post 55K6E is derived from S-300 PMU2 (upgrade). Logistics Vehicles are common.
The S-400 base radars are 92N6E Grave Stone and 91N6E Big Bird - both upgraded variants of standard radars on S-300 family and then there is the third radar 96L6E which is again from the S-300 PMU2 Favorit.

The 92N6E Grave Stone is an evolution of the 30N6 Tomb Stone / Flap Lid series
The new 91N6E is a derivative of the 64N6E Big Bird series. It is readily identified against the 64N6E by the use of the new build MZKT-7930 tractor. It retains the general configuration of its predecessors.
PLA S-300PMU2 Favorit battery components - LEMZ 96L6E acquisition radar, S-400:Late production LEMZ 96L6-1 acquisition radar

You are stating "ah Swathi WLR is not the Rajendra". Yes its not. Its a derivative though and not a brand new design like the MMSR.
Basically apart from the other radars which are add ons, all the base radars are S-300 PMU2 upgrades.

The MEADS PAC-3MSE has AESA AFAIK atleast for long range tracking a new type L Band , Their MFCR I think still uses PESA but not really sure.

Am speaking of the base PAC-3 in US service not the MEADS one.

[Austin]

Karan and All , SOC has shared his extensive write up on S-300 and 400 Family in 2013 , Covers many aspects of the system including Deployment etc

Russia's Defenders : The S-300P , S-350, and S-400 SAM System

http://speedy.sh/32NWz/The-S-300-and-S-400.pdf

PS: Can some one put that article at a place where its more convenient to download and its permenant

[Karan M]

Karan and All , SOC has shared his extensive write up on S-300 and 400 Family in 2013 , Covers many aspects of the system including Deployment etc

Russia's Defenders : The S-300P , S-350, and S-400 SAM System

http://speedy.sh/32NWz/The-S-300-and-S-400.pdf

PS: Can some one put that article at a place where its more convenient to download and its permenant

Great writeup - addresses the deployment aspect as Ausairpower addresses the tech.
One of the key details of the program is the Orientir nav system for a strat system! We addressed this with our own nav package using the Sagem/Honeywell RLG-INS without even the need for a sat fix (unless absolutely necessary). Just reiterates my view of the growth potential in the Akash system with a new missile!

[Karan M]

A key variable which nobody has addressed so far is the "protection footprint" provided by each "system", i.e. the acquisition radar, the engagement radar and the 8-12 launcher units that make up the core of each system. That will determine how many "systems" are needed for protection of various assets i.e. cities, airbases, refineries etc. and very importantly therefore, the cost of protection.

Depends on what we classify as footprint. If we see it as a combination of missile detection/radar range combinations, then the theoretical footprint (max) of the S-400 is 230 km (as that is the range at which it can detect a 0.4 sqmtr BM) and somewhere between 185km (height max) & 400km (slant range max) that the 40N6 missile can provide vs a 3000km ranged BM. So basically it would be around a 100km radius (200km dia) for a maximal footprint.

Delhi has a length of 52km and width of 49km, so all iz well. But wait. You can't intercept over the city & populated environs so you would need to put the system outwards. Also, what if the enemy uses a combination of strike packages - both low flying cruise missiles and BMs? The same radars can't do both. You will have a radar on a mast for a low flying target, yes, but the fire control radar would be tilted against BMs. You may need more radars. So - either more radars per battery or more batteries per city!

Plus approach vectors. Against TSP - a battery to the west. Against PRC, one to the east. But for comprehensive coverage, you may need full 360 degrees. Whats to prevent a F-16 from a dog leg maneuver before launching its Ra'ad?

So in short, its all upto your level of coverage. IMO, a large metro will require at least two batteries with fixed sectoral radars (@230km) & cheaper Akash/MRSAM for cruise missile work provided we can get some aerostats up for adequate warning time.

Cost factors alone will make providing a full ABM shield over all of India an unviable proposition. At best the Green Pine derived LRTR will provide protection to the major metros.

Folks keep saying metros but they are not our only vital areas/points. You need to protect key AFB and industrial areas too. CSD assembly points. Munition areas. C3I nodes especially those linked to SFC.

I think the area where India lags behind right now is not radar tech, good progress has been made, supposedly the LRTR can detect a cricket ball sized object at (600 kms?). It is fast acceleration long range ABM missiles that are missing. Wasn't there supposed to be AD-1 and AD-2 missiles developed as a follow on to AAD/PAD? What happened to those?

Agree, its the missiles where we need to pick up pace. The LRTR can detect a 0.1 Sq Mtr target at 600km. In short, 3.7 times the performance of the S-400 Big Bird radar.
The AD-1, AD-2 were supposed to be available for tests around now, but the entire missile complex has gone into silent mode. Anyways, for ~2000km class missiles (and data suggests more than that), the PDV is sufficient.

What combination of radars and missiles will be needed to achieve such boost phase intercepts?

Fighters operating over enemy territory with specialized missile killers are the only way you can go for boost phase intercepts! Or a laser on a 747 which even Khan gave up on. I think you are referring to midcourse and not boost phase intercepts in actuality.

[Sanjay]

Two key areas that I do not think have been satisfactorily addressed by India:

1) A target capable of simulating an RV

2) A target discrimination system to filter out decoys.

I know that there has been some work using a modified Prithvi as a target and there were reports of another target missile being developed.

What's to stop an Agni-1 being modified as a target ?

Until we get a realistic target, the progress made to date with AAD and PAD, is still incomplete.

[brar_w]

The HEL was a correct approach that unfortunately did not wait for a true Directed energy option to open up. It even shot down ballistic missiles in the boost phase. The problem was that it was COIL and as such a very very large form factor for the megawatt class setup. Now however you can pack a similar sized SSL or fiber laser into much smaller footprint and that will eventually revive the BPI option. One can also take out missiles with missiles and there were options studied. The PAC 3 based ALHTK comes to mind along with a much shorter ranged NCADE. There were also ground based plans presented around the turn of the century iirc. Bottom line is that it can be done but not all options are going to be cheap and/or cost effective when the cost to develop is factored in. 10 years from now it could look a lot different however.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnVHEmROaMM

[Karan M]

Two key areas that I do not think have been satisfactorily addressed by India:

1) A target capable of simulating an RV

2) A target discrimination system to filter out decoys.

I know that there has been some work using a modified Prithvi as a target and there were reports of another target missile being developed.

What's to stop an Agni-1 being modified as a target ?

Until we get a realistic target, the progress made to date with AAD and PAD, is still incomplete.

I think you don't have clear data on either to conclusively state either of the points you are making.

1. Regarding your first point, the DRDO uses the Prithvi for a reason. It has a (relatively) low RCS & the last PDV test was done with a new Prithvi derived target.
http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 250_1.html
Do we know exactly what the target mimicked and its attributes? No - but that's ok since the military and decision makers need to know it. Releasing this data is not necessarily a plus. Using the Agni is meaningless and a waste of an expensive missile as given our testing conditions it has to fired in a depressed trajectory yet achieve the speed of a missile at full trajectory launch. Better to use n inexpensive purpose designed missile which achieves the same results with a high apogee.

Besides DRDO would definitely track all its own IRBMs using its radars and update the signal processing accordingly. Hence, it would know whether the radar can track such targets and their attributes. The actual challenge is then seeing whether a missile can take them out in the real world. If the target missile intercept meets key parameters then you know your model is robust enough to handle such targets.

Next, in case a missile is not available, DRDO can even plot a simulated target trajectory into its battle management system and see whether its launched missile can target it. In case it can't because the missile aborted or whatever reason, they have noted that failure. http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 007_1.html

So, there are a variety of ways to check the interceptor/s performance.

2. Regarding your second point - the LRTR can be used to discriminate decoys & engage with the PDV. There is still a chance that the occasional decoy may get through the processing and hence the combination of actual missiles plus decoys may make us run out of PDVs, hence the AAD. The only other way to work out against decoys is to take them all out with MKVs in midcourse.

At <30km conditions, the decoys are stripped away thanks to their differing drag characteristics and hence its shoot, shoot with the AAD and two repeat shots per target. Hence with ~4missiles/target overall, the Pk is 99.6%. There is clearly sufficient redundancy built into the system.

[Sanjay]

I will agree on the data issue. I have read all the articles you have cited and with respect, they do not quite address my concerns

RV RCS and velocities are very difficult to simulate.

The Prithvi has a low RCS but not as small as a missile RV. I'd suggest trying to obtain the air launched target system the Israelis use.

I should also say that some of the old stock of Agni-1s will be due for re-lifing soon. Using one for testing is not beyond reason.

Your point about LRTR is noted but give consideration to limited range of it. Unless slaved to longer-ranged radars and satellite surveillance, reaction time will be too low.

India's domestic BMD project still has some ways to go. Good start but still progress to be made.

[Karan M]

I will agree on the data issue. I have read all the articles you have cited and with respect, they do not quite address my concerns

RV RCS and velocities are very difficult to simulate.

I am sorry but what technical concerns do you really have as your statements are quite generic and are not specific.

For instance, RV RCS and velocities are very difficult to simulate. Is there anything lost in translation here, because DRDO makes its own IRBMs and tracks them & hence has access to all the data that RV's generate (including performance characteristics) & would be visible on radars. It can then store this data, derive models to approximate & then use it to test its systems. What exactly is so hard to simulate about RV velocities either & having them as part of a simulation test bed & why are we assuming that these were not done as standard?

The Prithvi has a low RCS but not as small as a missile RV. I'd suggest trying to obtain the air launched target system the Israelis use.

Why? What can you achieve with an imported expensive target merely for low RCS when you can do a variety of things to test whether your systems are capable against low RCS targets to begin with?

Further, the two stage target used for the PDV test may well have had a lower RCS than a single stage Prithvi variant used earlier. At this point, we don't know, and that is fine, because DRDO should not be releasing some of these details anyhow (in fact, I'd argue the entire BMD program should have remained black & it was only revealed because of the anti-DRDO campaign spearheaded by the media which made VKS start being open, too much so, about some of the orgs achievements).

I should also say that some of the old stock of Agni-1s will be due for re-lifing soon. Using one for testing is not beyond reason.

Again, why would you test an Agni-1 when you dont have a floating test range yet, and range considerations mean you have to have a target that can be launched in a short ranged trajectory yet meet the speed & trajectory considerations of a longer ranged missile?

A floating test bed would mean longer ranged missiles can be tested & that in particular is one of the key reasons in all likelihood before AD-1/AD-2 tests can commence.

Your point about LRTR is noted but give consideration to limited range of it. Unless slaved to longer-ranged radars and satellite surveillance, reaction time will be too low.

The LRTR has a range of 600 odd km which covers most of Pakistan & in a surveillance mode is sufficient against 2K class missiles. The automated battle management system is designed to provide adequate warning with even the 300km MFCR to engage the leaker missile with dual AADs.

The longer ranged radars are required for 5000km+ class missiles which will come in at higher speeds.

Its instructive to note that even for 3K class missiles, the Russian S-400 as we were discussing is fine, with a radar with a fraction of the range performance of the Indian one.

India's domestic BMD project still has some ways to go. Good start but still progress to be made.

Which is true of any system & has long been known, given what we have demonstrated is Phase 1 with 2K km class systems & Phase 2 was meant for 5k class missiles. So not any particular insight, I'm afraid.

[ramana]

Sanjay, An RV decoy has to be an RV. Reason is there is a very unique signature of a RV due to nature of re-entry dynamics. So long ago decoys were given up by West.

India needs to test against targets with upto 4km/sec for IRBM.

Prithvi tests all the Pak related near range missiles. < 400 km range.

[Sanjay]

KaranM, data for RCS for RV and trying to simulate is not quite the same as actually doing a test on an RV.

Critical thing about the Prithvi target - AFAIK the warhead does not separate. You are engaging the whole missile (subject to correction).

The US and Israel have oodles of data as well but chose to develop a target missile that simulated the characteristics of RVs.

The LRTR purchase and further development is still limited to 2 systems. Until more are purchased

What India has done and demonstrated is develop a technology demonstrator. From the target missiles produced to date, we have simulated missiles of up to 1000km in range and have done a number of successful endo-atmospheric and 2 exo-atmospheric intercepts. The 2000km range claim by DRDO is not one I reject but no target missile with that range or to simulate that range has been produced.

Does anyone have any video footage of S-400 tests vs ballistic missiles ?

Ramana, I agree with some of what you say but decoys have not been given up - certainly not by Russia and I doubt by China.

[Karan M]

KaranM, data for RCS for RV and trying to simulate is not quite the same as actually doing a test on an RV.

Sanjay, you don't seem to get this. DRDO has its own IRBMs. It can use its own radars to track & test their attributes including RCS and trajectory. This allows it to fine tune the signal processing, data processing & C3I of its radars & BMD system respectively.

It can then run its battle management system which has attributes of the exact performance of its AAD/PDV combination to see if it can set these missiles to intercept these.

Of course real tests are not the same as simulated ones. A million things can go wrong in a real world test, but the point is you can and will evaluate baseline capabilities. There is nothing out there to suggest we cannot do so & haven't done so.

Critical thing about the Prithvi target - AFAIK the warhead does not separate. You are engaging the whole missile (subject to correction).

You are speaking of the first target which was used for the first series of tests, the second target is not the same as the first.

From 2014, the PDV's dual seeker test in particular.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/i ... 908926.ece

A real battle-like scenario would be simulated for the test, DRDO missile technologists told The Hindu. For the first time, the interceptor missile (PDV) would be seeking to destroy the separating payload of the target missile (a modified PAD) after discriminating between the booster and the payload.

Describing it as a “big challenge,” they said the interceptor’s “kill vehicle,” equipped with a dual seeker, would attack the payload (warhead portion) as it descends towards its intended target. The advantage of intercepting an incoming missile at such a high altitude was that the debris would not fall on the ground and there would be no collateral damage.

Both the new missiles have been configured to have two stages. While the target missile would be launched from a ship near Paradip, the interceptor would take off from Wheeler Island the moment the incoming target missile is detected. The long range radars would track the missile and the information would be passed on to the interceptor’s on-board computer as it homes in on to the target.

From detection to interception, the entire exercise would be fully automated and there would be no human intervention, the scientists said. The kill vehicle of the interceptor, equipped with an attitude control mechanism, would hurtle towards the target’s missile payload at a speed of 1500 metres per second as it seeks to engage and destroy it.

After some more trials, India plans to deploy a two-tiered Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system to protect important cities from external threats. In the first phase, incoming enemy missiles of 2,000-km range are envisaged to be waylaid and destroyed, while those with about 5,000-km range would be tackled by the interceptors in the second phase.

So far, six of the seven interceptor missile tests, carried out by the DRDO, have been successful. While two interceptions were conducted in exo-atmopshere (altitudes between 47 and 80 km) the rest were in endo-atmosphere (below 40 km altitude).

The US and Israel have oodles of data as well but chose to develop a target missile that simulated the characteristics of RVs.

Because RVs cost money. A target missile can be packed full of telemetry & be designed for the express purpose without having to carry all the payload cost of a real missile in terms of both design and technology.

In our case the missile development agency is the same as the missile defence agency - DRDL & ASL combination, located in the same campus, which gives us a huge amount of strategic cooperation between designers of both systems.

Next, I would sincerely ask you to stop thinking of how the US and Israel do things as the be-all and end-all to emulate. The US's fancy concept of Red Air had to be reworked when they went up against the IAF at Cope India and realized it was an imperfect way to do things.
The Israelis who are hyped up more than evolution itself almost lost a ship because the crew shut off the ADMS in a high risk zone.

Point is we don't exactly do things for the heck of it. Our plans and aims are methodical & objective.

The LRTR purchase and further development is still limited to 2 systems. Until more are purchased

You are completely mistaken here. Are you aware, for instance, that currently, DRDO has two AESA radars in tests for the IAF, both of which are superior, technology wise, to the LRTRs that it developed with Israel? That another semi-active AESA system for light weight applications is in series production?

Do you think the DRDO S-Band AEW&CS which is in trials now, is less capable than the LRTR technology wise or actually equally advanced?

Apply some critical discernment here. The LRTR is now old hat for DRDO/LRDE & it's now almost a decade since it was first revealed. India has moved on & yet media fools keep repeating India bought 2 radars and the like.

What India has done and demonstrated is develop a technology demonstrator. From the target missiles produced to date, we have simulated missiles of up to 1000km in range and have done a number of successful endo-atmospheric and 2 exo-atmospheric intercepts. The 2000km range claim by DRDO is not one I reject but no target missile with that range or to simulate that range has been produced.

Again, you are mistaken.

The correct information is available.
http://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/English/dpi ... se/pdv.pdf

Both, the PDV interceptor and the two stage target e
quipped with motors were specially developed for
the PDV mission. The target was developed for mimicking a "hostile Ballistic Missile approaching
from more than 2000 km away" was launched at 0907 hrs from a Ship in the Bay of Bengal.

Lets be clear here, DRDO stated that their aim was to develop a system in Phase 1 that could protect Mumbai and Delhi. They have done so. Deployment will be classified but the capability has been developed.

http://www.defencenow.com/news/665/indi ... iring.html
http://articles.economictimes.indiatime ... ler-island

No technology demonstrator and similar rubbish claims by buffoons like Sengupta and the lay press.

These two cities in particular because of the range profile of the missiles that are directed against them which would be of 2000 km class and below. The M11s not the Shaheen-2s.

Cities like Bangalore, Chennai and deeper in the Indian south would require a phase-2 system because the missiles targeted against them would be of the highest range class (above 2000km) when launched from somewhere in the middle of Pakistani & other hard to track Pakistani launch locations. Higher speed missiles, newer interceptors required.

Straightforward.

[Sanjay]

KaranM. Let's just end this. You are relying entirely on press reports and dismissing anything that doesn't agree with your view. I am more cautious.

As to what I know and understand about DRDO's missile capabilities, I don't really think I need go into any detail there.

[brar_w]

how does alhtk counter the decoys, primarily decoy detection algo?

Boost phase decoys? In the terminal phase it acts the same as a standard Pac-3. In the boost phase intercepts it was meant to work with an AESA and IRST combination to help it on an intercept..

[ldev]

Fighters operating over enemy territory with specialized missile killers are the only way you can go for boost phase intercepts! Or a laser on a 747 which even Khan gave up on. I think you are referring to midcourse and not boost phase intercepts in actuality.

That may be so for the US but not for India. The US looks at places like Iran and North Korea and has difficulty in placing radars and ABM missiles close by, although it has now placed the AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey as part of its THAAD missile defence. The US decided not to pursue boost phase intercepts because of the difficulty of getting radar/missiles into a proximate position reliably and on time. But the US DOD Missile Defence Agency has acknowledged via this report that boost phase intercepts are the most effective if possible. India has no such problem. India has a long border with Pakistan, it is 1200 kms from Srinagar to the Rann of Kutch and the depth of Pakistan from the Indian to the Afghan/Iran border varies from 300 to 500 kms.

India has to come up with its own solution to its own unique threat from Pakistan. The US or Russia have come up with products for their own threats. With a range of 600 kms the S400 radar networked with AWACs, Aerostats and a must have satellite based infra red missile launch early warning system will enable the 400 km range 40N6 from the S400 to get to any Pakistani missile launch. 12 S400 batteries placed at a distance of 100 kms apart will cover the entire border from Srinagar to Kutch. Simulations will have to be run to ensure that the 40N6 accelerates fast enough to intercept Pakistani missiles while still in the boost phase or in the early mid course phase preferably before they deploy countermeasure and decoys but with a maximum intercept altitude of 185 kms it should be capable of intercepting these short range missiles even during the mid course of their relatively short flights. Why also wait for the S400 radar to pick up the launches. AFAIK the S400 system missiles are active radar homing and as such should be able to be launched even before the S400 radar picks up the missiles (assuming that they are picked up by satellites etc.) and the launched missile is still below the horizon.

Russia designed the S400 system as a terminal air/missile defence system. India has to try and adapt it's components alongwith other assets as a boost/early midcourse interception asset.

Agree, its the missiles where we need to pick up pace. The LRTR can detect a 0.1 Sq Mtr target at 600km. In short, 3.7 times the performance of the S-400 Big Bird radar.
The AD-1, AD-2 were supposed to be available for tests around now, but the entire missile complex has gone into silent mode. Anyways, for ~2000km class missiles (and data suggests more than that), the PDV is sufficient.

No doubt that the LRTR has a longer range and overall better performance. But that level of performance (in fact even better than what LRTR has achieved to date) is necessary for the second layer in missile defence i.e. interception at the terminal/re-entry stage. As the US DOD MDA report says, the most difficult intercept is the terminal defence on reentry, the warhead is small, fast moving, there could be decoys, it could manoeuvre to avoid ABM defences etc. etc. Why is India concentrating all of its energies on this last stage, most technologically challenging component of missile intercepts and only on that component rather than the much more effective boost/early midcourse stage? Just because other countries are concentrating on terminal defence? But they are doing it for reasons of geography etc. they have no other option. India can pursue the much more effective early stage option.

Imagine that Canada became hostile to the US and placed missiles in Montreal targeting US cities. You think the US is going to wait for that missile to launch, go through the boost phase, mid course phase and then wait around say in Los Angeles with THAAD/Aegis/Patriot/Meads? Or will they just try and intercept it while it is in the boost phase just across the border in Montreal? But India by concentrating on AAD/PAD is doing just that. Is AAD/PAD necessary? Yes it is, to handle long range threats from rational nuclear players. But Pakistan is not a rational nuclear player vs India for all the historical/religious reasons. And so, India has to be prepared for 50% or more of Pakistani nuclear warheads to head towards India at one go if e.g. India retaliates against Pakistan terrorism. That is the defence that India needs. Only AAD/PAD/THAAD etc. are for defence against rational actors but India needs early intercepts to take out the majority of launches and a secondary terminal area defence such as AAD/PAD for the few that get through the first layer.

In fact, that long border and narrow width of Pakistan should make DRDO think about directed energy weapons including souping up the LRTR to emit massive amounts of radiated power as a directed energy weapon for boost phase destruction of Pakistani missiles and/or build gigantic 10MW ground based lasers, no need to mount them on airborne 747s, enough power can be generated on the ground. Place 6-10 of these on the border from Kashmir to Kutch eventually.

[Singha]

sire we need a few space spaced staring IR sats of the DEW kind to keep a constant eye on launch areas in TSP and cheen to give us a additional 10 mins of warning time that is difference between losing the national leadership or some of it surviving.

the big boys have them , with coverage over the oceans (for SLBM launches) and over landmasses of northern hemisphere for sure.

[Karan M]

KaranM. Let's just end this. You are relying entirely on press reports and dismissing anything that doesn't agree with your view.

Sanjay, au contraire, reports from more authoritative sources, including the developers themselves, directly contradict some of the claims you have raised. What you are doing is making claims & then rejecting anything which contradicts those claims as being mere "press reports".

Lets recap, you noted:

1. That RVs cannot be somehow simulated or tracked & that we currently lack the means to somehow do so. However, you have provided no evidence. And there is the reality that the same agency which makes IRBMs & RVs is also developing the missile shield and is hence aware of the nitty gritties of both systems.

2. The claim the Prithvi target does not separate and is hence flawed. We have a direct report opposing your claims from a test itself. This claim was wrong, period. Similarly, no target missile was developed with a range of >2K km. Again, incorrect.

3. India only purchased two LRTRs and hence by implication, we haven't any more - again, this is the sort of stuff written in the lay press. One can either repeat it or looks into who/what can make the systems that would go into a LRTR & where India is in terms of making similar or even more advanced systems.

There are things which LRDE is doing for its own advanced LRTR which can be discerned from multiple sources, but at this point, given your casual dismissal of facts, I won't bother. But the rest of the public here should know what is what.

I put this out there for other folks who are interested, about the current LRTR.
A LRTR has two elements to it - the hardware & the software. This:
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/_44d3OT-xI3U/ ... r+AESA.jpg

- these are the crucial TR Modules for even which we have our own design and this is from several years back & these are in assembly at BEL. The L Band ones are the ones used for the LRTR. If you pick up a paper released on the GreenPine by IAI several years back, you'd see the modules are of similar layout and design. Apart from this there are many other components which go into a radar - all of which are being made for AESAs by Indian firms & for the LRTR itself, way back, the same firms & people were roped into to indigenize the critical hardware within the radar.

Next, the signal processing for AESAs is being done in India as is the data processing.

I am more cautious.

There is no harm in being cautious, but your claims have to be technically sound.

For instance, if you had pointed out that if decoys are deployed en masse in a saturation attack focused on one city, chances are that any BMD system would be overwhelmed until & unless it over provisions radars & interception missiles, and hence more advanced solutions that need to be found - statements like these would be one thing.

However, to postulate vague generalities or assumptions even when the data exists to contradict those assumptions, is thoroughly flawed.

As to what I know and understand about DRDO's missile capabilities, I don't really think I need go into any detail there.

Oh that's fine. I am afraid the statements you made though, so far, don't pass muster.

[Karan M]

Russia designed the S400 system as a terminal air/missile defence system. India has to try and adapt it's components alongwith other assets as a boost/early midcourse interception asset.

LDev, adapting other peoples technology, especially Russian (who use their own proprietary processor and hence even firmware) to other attributes is well nigh impossible. For BPI, there is no other go but for India to actually have its own fighters or laser jumbo jets - adapting a 400 km missile to fire onto the target is one thing. How will you guide it? The 400km 40N6 missile is likely cued by a complex mix of its ground based 96L6E-1 set plus cues from the ground based battle management set. How will we cart all this around in an airborne form factor? Plus issues of Russian acquiescence.

It may be far easier, for instance, to develop a lightweight missile with booster & onboard seeker & cue it from say, a modified transport which can loiter around provided you have won air superiority.

No doubt that the LRTR has a longer range and overall better performance. But that level of performance (in fact even better than what LRTR has achieved to date) is necessary for the second layer in missile defence i.e. interception at the terminal/re-entry stage. As the US DOD MDA report says, the most difficult intercept is the terminal defence on reentry, the warhead is small, fast moving, there could be decoys, it could manoeuvre to avoid ABM defences etc. etc. Why is India concentrating all of its energies on this last stage, most technologically challenging component of missile intercepts and only on that component rather than the much more effective boost/early midcourse stage? Just because other countries are concentrating on terminal defence? But they are doing it for reasons of geography etc. they have no other option. India can pursue the much more effective early stage option.

I don't know which report you are mentioning but what you have stated is partly correct. The decoys are deployed during the midcourse segment. The advantage of the midcourse segment from the perspective of the defender is that you can send up your missiles with the least amount of stress as versus the late game intercept. However, it then becomes an issue of decoy discrimination. Per reports, the LRTR does have this capability.

But the concern remains about sufficiently advanced decoys still posing a challenge. For this, you then start deploying advanced sensors on your kill vehicle (hence our move to multi sensor seekers for vehicles like the PDV), even so the more "elegant" though technically complex answer is to deploy kill munitions en masse. Don't discriminate, just destroy. These would be KVs for instance deployed en masse from a single carrier missile. We don't have this capability yet.

What we are attempting to do, is discriminate, based on our LRTR & then take out the specific target with an enhanced missile which carries the sensors to achieve this capability at the high end of the endo-atmospheric stage, the assumption is that decoy discrimination becomes easier but there are risks of decoys being around. The same applies for instance to complex considerations eg warhead separation. You need multi sensor tracking and fusion to ensure you hit the right thing.

Next, the close in intercept ~30km. At this point, the defender has the advantage that the discrimination between decoys & the actual targets is clear. This is the real reason for instance, India is concentrating so much on this stage & yet trying to take it as high as possible in the endo stage to get enough time to launch more missiles. This has little to do with geography or aping the west. Its a pure hard nosed consideration which even the Russians followed with their mobile S-300 systems & now the S-400. At this point you know what you have to hit, it then becomes a question of how to do so.

Here the challenge is now, your missiles have to be very agile and the acquisition and shootdown has to be as efficient and precise as possible. Hence, we moved to S-band for the radar for even better tracking and developed the AAD. To eliminate the time issue altogether, we moved to a full blown automated system & developed the AAD for maneuverability within atmospheric conditions. Plus repeat shots as a standard.

In short, our choices are driven by hard nosed technological considerations on what we could make or develop within a reasonable timeframe.

We "want" to move "up" ie firmly MCG and BPI, but we need to have the building blocks in place for that. Right now, our BMD system is Pak focused and against some PRC targets. This was the mandate in 1995, look at what's in their inventory, project and stop.

Howver, against long range PRC missiles and future variants, we need to develop further.

Imagine that Canada became hostile to the US and placed missiles in Montreal targeting US cities. You think the US is going to wait for that missile to launch, go through the boost phase, mid course phase and then wait around say in Los Angeles with THAAD/Aegis/Patriot/Meads? Or will they just try and intercept it while it is in the boost phase just across the border in Montreal? But India by concentrating on AAD/PAD is doing just that. Is AAD/PAD necessary? Yes it is, to handle long range threats from rational nuclear players. But Pakistan is not a rational nuclear player vs India for all the historical/religious reasons. And so, India has to be prepared for 50% or more of Pakistani nuclear warheads to head towards India at one go if e.g. India retaliates against Pakistan terrorism. That is the defence that India needs. Only AAD/PAD/THAAD etc. are for defence against rational actors but India needs early intercepts to take out the majority of launches and a secondary terminal area defence such as AAD/PAD for the few that get through the first layer.

I completely agree, but the challenge is two fold. Political will - and lets not even go there about wishy washy attitudes towards Pak. Second, capabilities. We aren't there yet regarding higher up intercepts and funded accordingly.

In fact, that long border and narrow width of Pakistan should make DRDO think about directed energy weapons including souping up the LRTR to emit massive amounts of radiated power as a directed energy weapon for boost phase destruction of Pakistani missiles and/or build gigantic 10MW ground based lasers, no need to mount them on airborne 747s, enough power can be generated on the ground. Place 6-10 of these on the border from Kashmir to Kutch eventually.

Problem is a missile is basically set by its initial alignment and midcourse trajectory correction. If you even bake out its electronics during the terminal phase, there is no guarantee it won't be destructive.

IMHO, we looked at DEWs & they weren't worth the effort but are seriously looking at lasers. However, that effort, like all local efforts is nowhere funded near he mega scale you envisage. Its at the TD and competence building stage.

[Singha]

looks folks before we even talk of interceptors and cold-gas X-thrusted long-pole exo-atmospheric KV iphone type stuff

(a) we need DEW sats to spot launches
(b) OTH cricket field sized radars pointing in all directions to provide the initial cues to ABM radars
(c) we have neither.

need to put in place the infra even in TD format before we dream of ABM shields for areas. it cannot be a CIWS type thing on a ship with a couple AK630 starting to fire when the supersonic ASM is 2km out and looking to tear our hides.

ignore the stupid Nasr. they could well have a couple jihadis drive a toyota with a nuke strapped on the back. (a) and (b) is what will really scare the A-league players.

[Karan M]

looks folks before we even talk of interceptors and cold-gas X-thrusted long-pole exo-atmospheric KV iphone type stuff

(a) we need DEW sats to spot launches
(b) OTH cricket field sized radars pointing in all directions to provide the initial cues to ABM radars
(c) we have neither.

need to put in place the infra even in TD format before we dream of ABM shields for areas. it cannot be a CIWS type thing on a ship with a couple AK630 starting to fire when the supersonic ASM is 2km out and looking to tear our hides.

What this boils down to is if you don't have AEGIS would you not have a Barak or CIWS either if that's what you make today?
We are making do with what we can technically achieve. OTH radars & DEW sats are great but they will take a ton of time to achieve.

ignore the stupid Nasr. they could well have a couple jihadis drive a toyota with a nuke strapped on the back. (a) and (b) is what will really scare the A-league players.

But the A-league players give their R&D teams unlimited budgets and sanction.

When the US decided to field bombers against moscow, the soviet union used an entire years worth of cement production to lay concrete launch pads for SAMs around moscow. They pulled the entire graduating class of their top university in computer sciences plus the professors who taught them, to develop algorithms for their SAMs. They created missile cities where the entire city and all in it were for one plant.

That's the level you play at, for such efforts. Its easier to buy stuff from Russia.

[Karan M]

Sanjay, please tell us what is the huge technology gradient between this radar and the LRTR and why is it that the latter is superior and that India can make this and not the LRTR?
https://3.bp.blogspot.com/_o_no4M2xEPY/ ... 787700.JPG

After all, you made the statement that India only has 2 LRTR and cannot make/upgrade any more. Please explain. Lets see what points you have that are fact based as versus the statements Sengupta and Joshi make. As mentioned we have even a thread tracking these gents lack of any serious commentary (http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... &start=440) speaks volumes about our media & not in a positive way.

But lets stick to the above facts first. Why is it that India can make a more advanced S-Band radar but not a LRTR from a decade back when we have multiple reports from the developers noting what the terms of the agreement included.

[Karan M]

Sengupta, lest I be accused of going after the poor chap. Paging Rohitvats to share more analysis by Sengupta.

Bwahahaha after the complete expose here, Sengupta rushed back to his blog and put up a picture of the R118 realizing it made him look like a twit that he had put up the digital receiver only (and claimed it was the R118). <SNIP>

That is his standard tactic.

And that is why I keep copies of his articles as back-up.

I've been exposing his plagiarism on another thread and each time I write something, he goes back and either removes the content or modifies it. I've both the versions saved for sake of posterity

After initial series of such exposures some time back, he became a bit more circumspect in the way he lifted things. But the plagiarist that he is, he cannot let go off the habit.

He somehow seems to have this desire to showcase himself as technology and strategy expert at the same time and lifts technical write-up from various sources and passes it off as his uvacha on the subject.

Last expose that I did was the technical stuff he had lifted from an article by senior executive of Lockheed on Javelin ATGM and another source - he removed the complete post from his blog

He is simply shameless on this count....

An entire thread in which shri Sengupta has pride of place. The number of "conclusions" he draws. The sheer amount of claims as versus facts (which invariably contradict his claims).

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... &start=440

He also seems to suffer from a complex by which India is a helpless child, Indian scientists etc are incompetent and have to buy out whatever they develop.

Take for instance his attempt to run down domestic developments here. As versus what PIT of Poland itself says.

http://www.livefistdefence.com/2008/08/ ... sun-k.html

As versus:

Case1:
For instance, DRDO collaborated with PIT of Poland to make a radar, India launched it as 3D CAR and Poland made its own variant called the TRS-19.

PIT itself, noted that this was a JV:
POLISH RADAR DEVELOPMENT, 2002
Wiestaw Klembowski, Waldemar Wizner, Jerzy Milos2

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.js ... %3D1017879

A family of mobile S-band radars has been developed with close cooperation of LRDE (India).

In fact, DRDO Technical Focus also shows the amount of work done by LRDE for 3D CAR.

Subsequently, LRDE made further derivatives of 3D CAR called Rohini (IAF), Revathi (IN), TCR (Army), wherein even many of the original JV Hardware assemblies were replaced with new Indian designed ones based on improved tech. Again, this is documented in literature.

Meanwhile, Sengupta ran a campaign that India "bought out the technology from Poland" and used it in India. This laughable conclusion was based on what? He googled up TRS-19, saw it looks the same as 3D CAR...ah haaa!! This is "bought out technology"..

And this is what India did for its domestic radars. The follow on edition gets into component level work. Note the PDF talks only of inducted tactical systems. The MFCR/LRTR are strategic.

http://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/techfoc ... 13_WEB.pdf

In short relying on this chap for anything, bar the brochures he puts up, is to jump to conclusions most of which are always going to be wrong.

[Karan M]

This was also an interesting find by a person how DRDO was testing and its plans for the LRTR. Looks like they set up a facility specifically for low rate assembly and production of the LRTR on their own. The number required would be limited.
http://sniperz11.blogspot.in/2008/02/dr ... ility.html

Of course subsequently BEL started assembling the TRMs along with a bunch of pvt players, the hardware also got support from MSMEs and SMEs (the usual bunch).. so AESA radar development has advanced by leaps and bounds in India.

The next threshold which DRDO is clearly aiming for are higher power systems above & beyond what they have today. At Aero India there was another "reveal" about some AESA programs.

I am in two minds whether to post all that (is it even worth the effort?) plus whether it draws undue attention to information, even if it is public. That is the reason I deliberately held off from going into subcomponent level stuff which can point to how we are making all these radars inhouse. DRDO has spent the time & effort & it has paid off.

In terms of assembly, TATA SED recently set up a huge facility for assembling radars in Karnataka. L&T and Thales also have a JV per memory. This should (hopefully) translate to better competence in radar tech across multiple groups apart from the usual BEL, MSME combine.

Another huge step forward was this. http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 868_1.html

In short, this is a high resolution system which can be adapted for defence applications including BMD.

Unlike the normal radars with a dish antenna, the MOTR has a rectangular antenna which is stationary during operation and would radiate beam which is electronically steered to identify the objects. The rectangular antenna comprises of 192 rectangular bricks or tiles, which has a total of 4608 radiating antenna elements connected. The antenna could be rotated 360 degree and fixed vertical or horizontal angle.

It is capable of tracking long range to 50 cm X 50 cm object size at a slant range of 1000 kilometer for objects and 30 cm X 30 cm size at a slant range of 800 kilometer in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) for space debris.

The design of the radar was done by ISRO and the high end software used in the systems was also developed by its team. The software, which was developed by a six member team, has developed the software would cost around Rs 100 crore in the market now, said V Seshagiri Rao, former project director of the MOTR project. A total of 100 young engineers worked behind the whole project, of which around 80 were in the SDSC SHAR, Sriharikota, in Andhra Pradesh.

Industry collaboration

While globally there are a few companies which has been developing MOTR for several years, the radar now developed by the ISRO is technology-wise on par with the systems developed many of these companies, said Prasad. A MOTR, developed by Israel-based Elta and sold widely for defense operations across the globe, costs around Rs 800-900 crore while practically, in size and capabilities is almost equivalent to the MOTR developed by ISRO now.

It also tells us how closely held the LRTR & MFCR programs are, in terms of data & literature & that ISRO & DRDO continue to be firewalled.

Anyone who reads the above though, with interest in Indian defence, should be able to tell what DRDO's tacit contribution is though.

But now capability exists in several firms and places for enhanced programs.

[Austin]

^^ here is something I found from VKS
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/agni ... 86248.html

We have a Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) used in the Ballistic Missile Defence Programme that has a range of over 600 km. We will increase the range to 1,400 km allowing us to track satellites in orbit.

It is far more difficult to intercept ballistic missiles than it is to intercept satellites. Satellites follow a predictive path. Once you track a satellite, you will know its path.

In the BMD project, we track and intercept a 0.1 square meter target over 1,000 km away. A satellite is ten times larger-over 1 meter wide.

[Karan M]

Austin, that's a great find. Confirms PDV has both RF & IR seekers too.

[Austin]

Austin, that's a great find. Confirms PDV has both RF & IR seekers too.

Yes that was always the case , RF for seeker head and IR for Lateral thruster movement.

[Sanjay]

"In the BMD project we track 0.1 sq m targets". Impressive but...

Please look at this for RCS calculations with an interesting slide on RV RCS. They can go as low as 0.001 sqm from the front angle.

http://aess.cs.unh.edu/Radar%202010%20P ... on%201.pdf

From your own statement above, LRTR will be hard-pressed to do so.

KaranM, did I ever say anywhere that India cannot make more LRTR ? Please show me the quote or withdraw the statement.

2 Swordfish were procured and one was used to tinker around with to evolve into the LRTR. Until the BMD project enters a production phase, production facilities are going to be kept to a minimum.

If you want to know the big difference between LSTAR and LRTR, it isn't in technology gradient but in the nature of the targets to be tracked.

LSTAR can track cruise missiles and aircraft. A cruise missile seems to have a RCS of about 0.1 sqm.

Please note that the missiles were are trying to guard against - except the M-11 - have detachable RVs.

I take note of all the claims and press reports by DRDO that they are simulating and factoring it in.

If you make the claim that the system can deal with M-11s - perfectly fine. Any other claims, I do not reject but will say that it has not been fully demonstrated.

But I ask this, why not try a test against an Agni-1 RV ? You are correct in the need for a floating test range, but it is something that must be considered for the future.

BTW, had the Shaurya system been pushed, Agni-1 may have been phased out.

Now to the claim that we have some system that can deal with missiles with a range of 2000km. Early warning will still be a problem until the LRTRs are augmented by longer ranged systems.

Your point about the S-400 is noted but remember that the S-400 will be operating as part of Russia's AD network which is capable of tracking ballistic missiles.

India's AD network isn't there yet. Still relying on THD-1955s is an indication of the neglect the ADGES network has faced (to be fair upgrades have kept them viable).

Two interceptor missiles have been successfully tested: AAD and PAD.

PAD was only tested twice - 2006 and 2009 - and has a speed of about Mach 5. A max altitude of 75km has been achieved.

However, has the PAD been viewed as anything other than a TD ?

AAD tested more times with a speed of 4.5. For the AAD, intercept altitudes above 16km have not been demonstrated.

Hemant Kumar Rout made a claim (will need to look for it) that some of the tests (not the outright failures) did not result in successful intercepts.

In 2012, VK Saraswat made the statement that

"The DRDO chief said the Indian missile defence system is comparable with the U.S. Patriot 3 system, which was successfully used during the 1990 Gulf War against Iraq."

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a ... 390404.ece

That is an interesting claim. Completely plausible but at odds with capability vs 2000km range missiles as the very short range of the PAC-3 would render it less than effective at those targets.

Interesting to note that in neither the case of the AAD or the PAD, was the slant range revealed (happy to be corrected on this).

WRT Austin's find - all good. However, PDV was not completely successful on its first try and at this stage cannot be counted on as part of Phase 1 (nobody is thinking that it is I hasten to add).

[Austin]

Sorry didn't get that. Can you explain further?

The gimbaled seeker is on the nose of the missile and the IR window can be seen on both the side , so the IR seeker would come into picture when miss distance is large and needs a high G lateral thrust for direct hit. Technically both seeker would track the target depending on FOV of the sensor.

[Karan M]

"In the BMD project we track 0.1 sq m targets". Impressive but...

Please look at this for RCS calculations with an interesting slide on RV RCS. They can go as low as 0.001 sqm from the front angle.

http://aess.cs.unh.edu/Radar%202010%20P ... on%201.pdf

From your own statement above, LRTR will be hard-pressed to do so.

"From your own statement above, LRTR will be hard pressed to do so"

When did i say this? First, using the fourth square law & simplifying things, the above RCS translates to a 190 km detection range from the very front for a LRTR! This is sufficient for fire control purposes.

This assuming the radar since 2006 has had no further improvements (actually Austin's quote implies that by 2012, they were at 1000km for 0.1 Sq Mtrs) but lets leave that aside.

You have the answer on your slide itself. Page 9.

Radar A sees 0.001 Mtr Sq. Radar B, located at the side sees 0.75 Mtrsq.

So DRDO has two radars aka LRTR for the purpose - in short they are very aware of how RCS can vary from different angles & have taken that into account.



The combination of two radars is sufficient for surveillance & fire control. By enhancing the power & playing around with different bands (at the cost of further mobility/power trade offs) they may even go to one radar. But for now, they have their answers in place.

In short, lets not assume that folks who are doing this day in and night out, don't know as much as we can from a link on the internet. Fundamentally, that's the issue with a lot of critique from the other folks (not you) who seem to come up with a lot of claims.

KaranM, did I ever say anywhere that India cannot make more LRTR ? Please show me the quote or withdraw the statement.

Well that statement most certainly implied it with otherwise what's the relevance of stating 2 LRTR or even 3 or 4? If we make our own, the initial number is meaningless.

Be as it may, lets address that line of thought:

2 Swordfish were procured and one was used to tinker around with to evolve into the LRTR. Until the BMD project enters a production phase, production facilities are going to be kept to a minimum.

The number is irrelevant because India already has significant production facilities for AESA radars in that it can turn out enough radars of differing kinds. That was the exact point of stating how many AESA programs are in place.

I keep seeing this OMGZ Israel sold AESA radars to India in xyz time & then they completely ignore the Indian advances in the field since then.

BTW Swordfish is the DRDO name for the LRTR program. Claiming two Swordfish were procured and one was modified into the LRTR does not make add up.

The Swordfish aka LRTR is basically a modified GreenPine expressly developed for the purpose. Two were developed with Israeli help for the BMD program, DRDO subsequently indigenized it further, replacing the original Israeli components.

If you want to know the big difference between LSTAR and LRTR, it isn't in technology gradient but in the nature of the targets to be tracked.

LSTAR can track cruise missiles and aircraft. A cruise missile seems to have a RCS of about 0.1 sqm.

I am afraid you didn't get the point I was making. Fundamentally, there is no technological challenge or in the nature of targets tracked which is unique to the LRTR and not the LSTAR for DRDO since it began with the LRTR developing its algorithms and proceeded to move ahead to the LSTAR.

The LSTAR is actually more sophisticated from the hardware perspective as it has several improvements in its waveform generator as versus technology used for LRTR and MFCR. The recent MPRs & LLTRs are one further step ahead in terms of beam forming & the advantages that accrue. By making more sophisticated multi-function AESAs we demonstrate we can build huge semi-mobile AESAs as well.

In short, your statements looked like that the LRTR is some huge issue which we cannot improve upon or even address. That is not the case.

Lets track what happened.

The DRDO worked with Elta to design the LRTR, did the signal processing for LRTR, indigenized the hardware for the LRTR/MFCR, then went onto develop improved AESAs for multifunction requirements which hence have more technology in them then the original LRTR.

BTW, the MPR/LLTR AESAs developed for the IAF and in trials now, are per reports, more sophisticated than the AESA on the AEW&CS.

A scaled up LSTAR can do a lot of what the LRTR can do. A LSTAR can detect a 0.1 Sq Mtr target too, and much lower targets provided its signal processing is modified accordingly. The ranges will be lower because its a less powerful system but as mentioned, it can be scaled.

The significance of the LSTAR is in that DRDO has actually gained domain experience in a very complex field for AESAs - that they can now field lightweight AESAs with significant signal processing improvements (which require compact hardware/power requirements) as versus ground based AESAs where the DRDO can literally stick one in a building & call it a day. However, the services would not accept that lack of mobility hence the LRTR is the largest we can do, but its still a far sight less restrictive than making an airborne AESA.

Which is why this entire 1-2-3 LRTR stuff is meaningless.

We are now at the level we can develop various classes of radars of different kinds. We have a ways to go with compact x-band airborne radars or more non traditional bands but we will get there.

Please note that the missiles were are trying to guard against - except the M-11 - have detachable RVs.

I take note of all the claims and press reports by DRDO that they are simulating and factoring it in.

If you make the claim that the system can deal with M-11s - perfectly fine. Any other claims, I do not reject but will say that it has not been fully demonstrated.

The last test in 2014 clearly looked at a detachable payload. Clearly, the new target is purpose designed for the aim.

As regards fully demonstrated, a definite case can be made for a substantial increase in # of tests, with services involvement (AF) but per se, this is not a technology challenge or one DRDO has ignored.

But I ask this, why not try a test against an Agni-1 RV ? You are correct in the need for a floating test range, but it is something that must be considered for the future.

Again, this is good to have, but not essential given they have data on Agni RVs and would design the target accordingly.

BTW, had the Shaurya system been pushed, Agni-1 may have been phased out.

Shourya being originally derived from a naval system has extra dead weight, this was noted by the DRDO head in a direct response to an India today journalist.

Your point about the S-400 is noted but remember that the S-400 will be operating as part of Russia's AD network which is capable of tracking ballistic missiles.

India's AD network isn't there yet. Still relying on THD-1955s is an indication of the neglect the ADGES network has faced (to be fair upgrades have kept them viable).

Sanjay, as mentioned above, our LRTR based system is sufficient to deal with 2K class ballistic missiles.

Next, regarding ADGEs being ignored.

Have you seen this regarding the THD-1955?
http://hal-india.com/Common/Uploads/Ten ... 0RADAR.pdf

These are not the answer because the THD-1955 & the IAF's HPRs are not meant for BMs. But the ADGES is not being ignored.

Unfortunately, we will have to invest in both separately partly because of the nature of the beast - scan angles, power requirements, mobility, precision differences etc. And before you ask as to why we are ordering HPR from abroad or putting out a tender - the answer is there are around 10-12 DRDO AESA programs are currently underway..

India has ordered around ~130 radars of different types over the past few years across MPR/LLTR/LLWR/Mountain Radar classes. Further, there are force accretions due to the different SAM networks being acquired - Akash (8 squadrons), MRSAM (9 squadrons), SpyDer etc.. plus the 3 Phalcons, some 4 aerostats (3 operational in likelihood), 2 DRDO AEW&CS .. etc

In short, I don't think the ADGES is being ignored & the CAGs dire warnings etc did have a salutary effect as did the improvements in local radar development.

Two interceptor missiles have been successfully tested: AAD and PAD. PAD was only tested twice - 2006 and 2009 - and has a speed of about Mach 5. A max altitude of 75km has been achieved. However, has the PAD been viewed as anything other than a TD ? AAD tested more times with a speed of 4.5. For the AAD, intercept altitudes above 16km have not been demonstrated. Hemant Kumar Rout made a claim (will need to look for it) that some of the tests (not the outright failures) did not result in successful intercepts.

I would take whatever Rout says with skepticism or gather further data to crosscheck his statements. His record on Akash was abysmal. He has sources on failures but they are not always accurate. PAD was in my view & I can only speak for myself, an attempt to rapidly qualify a capability in case India needed it, and GOI gave political sanction for immediate development. The AAD envelope at 30km test can most certainly be done, its more a function of cost at this point & with services employment, specific points can be used as representative.

In 2012, VK Saraswat made the statement that
"The DRDO chief said the Indian missile defence system is comparable with the U.S. Patriot 3 system, which was successfully used during the 1990 Gulf War against Iraq."
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a ... 390404.ece
That is an interesting claim. Completely plausible but at odds with capability vs 2000km range missiles as the very short range of the PAC-3 would render it less than effective at those targets.

And there are comments the Akash is a Patriot too.
IMHO VKS is referring to the Patriots allure as being a sophisticated high end system which India has now equaled in that the endoatmospheric capability is equivalent. And PAC3 was not really used in the Gulf War either. And which PAC3 variant matters and may not even be germane overall, given the huge differences in architecture between the systems.
In short, not that useful as versus the detailed statements made in a more comprehensive fashion.

Interesting to note that in neither the case of the AAD or the PAD, was the slant range revealed (happy to be corrected on this).

Ashwin aka Prahar is derived from the AAD. It has achieved 150km in its ballistic configuration.

WRT Austin's find - all good. However, PDV was not completely successful on its first try and at this stage cannot be counted on as part of Phase 1 (nobody is thinking that it is I hasten to add).

I hope they are thinking of it! Why deploy the PAD when a better alternative is now available and needs some further trials.

A liquid fueled PAD was always a bugbear meant for quick induction. We can do better.

At any rate before any Phase-1 induction is done, there have to be user trials, and a comprehensive system of test fires.

Which means its a GOI decision at this point on how to proceed.

[Karan M]

Sorry didn't get that. Can you explain further?

The gimbaled seeker is on the nose of the missile and the IR window can be seen on both the side , so the IR seeker would come into picture when miss distance is large and needs a high G lateral thrust for direct hit. Technically both seeker would track the target depending on FOV of the sensor.

Thanks Austin. I think your latter statement is on the ball as I have seen references to multisensor seeker fusion.

[ramana]

Sanjay, RVs are tracked sideways everywhere. Not frontal.

Anyway folks keep the discussion going.

KaranM, Do we want a ABM thread to capture the discussion?

[Sanjay]

Ramana, not entirely true.

The radar network has to be organized appropriately.

Radar numbers are a problem for India - even AD radars are in short supply. Being able to make LRTR is one thing, actually doing it is another and that is where things are not moving.

Funding for BMD is still at experimental and not geared up towards even phase-1 deployment.

I have to say - and it would actually be why KaranM may be angry with me - that I am involved in some research on the subject for a new book and let's just say have a problem naming sources (waiting for the chastising).

Just be careful with Saraswat's claims. He didn't lie but it wasn't exactly accurate either.

There are some very serious hurdles being faced and a shortage of funding for tests. The PDV setback and the AAD failure this year have not yet been resolved satisfactorily.

The IAF is not satisfied as the end-user with progress to date. AAD was deemed potentially viable for limited deployment but the last failure set that back.

AD-1 and AD-2 and PDV are the great hopes. However, seekers are continuing to be a problem.

Agni-1 is being considered as a potential target missile.

Again, can't yet share sources but I will as soon as I can.

There is a school of thought which suggests that AAD should be deployed as phase-1 as an experimental system while work is done on everything else.

As you no doubt know, the Israelis have made a proposal to the IAF to integrate the LRTR with the S-400 (hence the reason for the interest in the S-400).

Akash and the MRSAM theoretically have ABM capability but I am advised that some changes to the algorithms need to be done.

Take it for what it is worth right now.