Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 25 Jan 2004 09:17

Is the "dubai" connection a giveaway for D-company?

Amber G. · Post by **Amber G.** » 25 Jan 2004 10:28

If the international community had a proliferation most-wanted list, A.Q. Khan would be the 'most-wanted' on the list," Robert Einhorn, assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation under former US president Bill Clinton (news - web sites), was quoted saying in The News in January 2003.

From: A.Q. Khan, godfather of the 'Islamic bomb': hero or Goat?

Also

After the May 1998 tests resulted in international sanctions, the sense of anti-Western nationalism among Pakistan's nuclear establishment and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) grew, Hoodbhoy said
"People in PAEC were saying, 'If the US imposes sanctions, and the economy collapses, why not sell our bomb and prevent economic collapse?'"

Hoodbhoy described the atmosphere at KRL as "very religiously charged."

"They have, especially over the last decade or so, become much more religious and their attitudes are considerably more anti-Western than 30 years ago."

Hoodbhoy on AQK:

Hoodbhoy believed the accusations, while yet to be publicly proved, were plausible.

"He's a man who does things for profit. He operates in a milieu where the sharing of such things is not regarded badly," Hoodbhoy told AFP.

AKQ admints he is no scientist . just Xerox:

Khan and the group was mostly responsible for bringing resources for Pakistan's nuclear programme from outside, particularly through a Dubai-based group of international brokers," the official told AFP, requesting anonymity.

"While they were dealing with these brokers, the suspicion is that they may have passed on nuclear know-how to these brokers, who then passed it on Iran and Libya."

Khan himself said in a speech to the Pakistan Institute of National Affairs in 1990 that he had shopped around on world markets while developing Pakistan's nuclear programme.

"It was not possible for us to make each and every piece of equipment within the country," he said.

"We devised a strategy by which we would go and buy everything we needed in the open market."

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 25 Jan 2004 23:28

Investigation of nuclear 'heroes' divides Pakistan

Once again risking domestic upheaval to satisfy the international community, Mr. Musharraf distanced the state from the alleged proliferation deals, which he said were done by the scientists for their own financial gain.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0126/p07s01-wosc.html

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 26 Jan 2004 00:17

Baradei And The Nuclear Bazaar

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 26 Jan 2004 00:20

After working so closely with the US and the west .. this was expected .. Perhaps a reason why the west tries to ignore Pakis, I mean not to get embrassed.

PAKISTANS MUSHARRAF CHALLENGES EUROPEAN N-LEAKS

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 26 Jan 2004 00:21

http://www.cbc.ca/cp/world/040124/w012432.html

Musharraf: 'Covert' Pakistan nuclear program may have allowed technology leak

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 26 Jan 2004 00:39

Libya and the N-arms bazaar

Guest · Post by **Guest** » 26 Jan 2004 03:56

A signal that scapegoating a few scientists will not wash away the sins, perhaps?

A French UN disarmament commissioner: `Private proliferation networks a front for state involvement’

PARIS: Individuals accused by President Pervez Musharraf of involvement in nuclear weapons proliferation serve as a front for states involved in leaking secrets, a UN disarmament commissioner said on Sunday.

"In reality, these private networks allow states to hide," Therese Delpech, the French member of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), told Radio France International.

"Naturally, it’s not the Pakistani state that is going to directly sell this information," she said, adding: "Private proliferation is often a front for public proliferation."

Rak · Post by **Rak** » 26 Jan 2004 04:59

Originally posted by jrjrao:
Investigation of nuclear 'heroes' divides Pakistan

Reminds me of an episode of The Simpsons, where there is a ancestoral hero of the town, Jebadaya Sprungfeld, who was infact a crook and a thug. For some reason down the history, he became a hero by sheer propaganda.

Div · Post by **Div** » 26 Jan 2004 05:46

That is Jebediah Springfield.

<img src="http://nickelarcade.net/modules/Forums/ ... gfield.gif" alt="" />

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 26 Jan 2004 06:12

This is getting to be ridiculous.

Even as trade shoots up between Yindoostan and Terroristan, sales of V.I.P. Briefs, one of India's top quality products for decades, are likely to plummet.

If this keeps up, Terroristan might as well merge with France - everybody going around de-briefed.

Wonder if there is a market developing for diapers?

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 26 Jan 2004 06:43

From the "White Lies" section of The Nation.

http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/Jan-2004/26/EDITOR/op5.asp

Rumour has it that the daughter of a famous scientist left for London with stacks of paperwork and a family spokesman has revealed that should the scientist be hassled unnecessarily, she will be “singing like a canary.”

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 26 Jan 2004 08:38

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/26/international/asia/26STAN.html

January 26, 2004

Pakistan Said to Investigate Nuclear Scientist's Real Estate Holdings

By DAVID ROHDE

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Jan. 25 — Pakistani investigators are looking into the vast real estate holdings of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, and into Mr. Khan's and other nuclear scientists' bank accounts, Pakistani officials said Sunday.

"Investigators are looking into all dimensions, including financial dimensions," said a senior Pakistani official. He said offshore accounts "are part of the investigation."

The comments came as a leading Pakistani newspaper, The News, reported that investigators had discovered that millions of dollars were deposited in the bank accounts in Dubai of two senior Pakistani nuclear scientists as nuclear hardware arrived in Iran. The report in The News, citing unidentified government sources, did not identify the scientists.

The newspaper also said a senior scientist had been found to have tens of millions of dollars' worth of financial and real estate holdings in Pakistan and overseas, primarily in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates. The senior scientist also paid a Pakistani newspaper editor in Islamabad to run a publicity campaign, publish books and organize seminars praising the scientist, The News reported.

The senior government official said he could not comment on the details of the investigation. But a former senior intelligence official with knowledge of the probe said Dr. Khan and a close aide, Dr. Mohammed Farooq, are its focus.

"They are not naming them but we know that the two main suspects are A. Q. Khan and Dr. Farooq," said the former intelligence official. "A. Q. Khan's interests in the real estate have been known to us for quite some time. So this has not come as a big surprise."

Pakistani officials are expected to announce soon the results of an inquiry into whether the country's nuclear technology was shared with Iran and Libya. The inquiry was begun after Iran gave the International Atomic Energy Agency a list of scientists and middlemen who it said had aided its nuclear weapons program. The agency, the United Nation's nuclear regulatory body, conveyed the list to Pakistan in November.

It included the names of several Pakistanis and Europeans, Pakistani officials have said. Teams of Pakistani investigators have gone to Iran, Pakistan and Vienna to investigate.

The United States has also presented Pakistan with evidence of proliferation, American officials say. American intelligence officials contend that Pakistan has provided nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya, which would make it one of the world's most active proliferators.

President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, a general who seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999, said Friday that the government had never approved such transfers or sales, but that "some individuals" may have sold technology for their own personal gain.

In Pakistan on Sunday, accusations persisted that the nuclear scientists are being made scapegoats by the country's powerful army. A wide range of Pakistani analysts question how nuclear scientists who were kept under tight surveillance could have transferred technology without the knowledge of the powerful military intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence.

In Rawalpindi on Sunday, several hundred supporters of an alliance of hard-line Islamist parties protested the investigation, The Associated Press reported. A relative of Dr. Farooq, the aide to Dr. Khan under investigation, said in a telephone interview that government officials had the scientist's family under surveillance and are intimidating them.

The relative insisted that Dr. Farooq, who was in charge of overseas procurement at the country's premier nuclear facility and has been in detention since Nov. 22, is being made a scapegoat because he has no connections with the country's powerful military.

"They are following us," said the relative. "They are threatening us."

saip · Post by **saip** » 26 Jan 2004 17:15

Pakistan bashing

This person makes interesting accusations reg India. According to him/her it is India that supplied nuke tech to n korea.

Taiwan customs seized 1000 tons of North Korea bound Aluminum Oxide manufactured by India used in making shelves for nuclear device purposes. Americans charged India in December 2003 for supplying important nuclear components to North Korea. India also supplied chemical, biological and uranium to Syria in 1992.

No, it is not pakis that proliferated but the rest of the world that did it. We are the most innocent people in the world and get blamed for everything because we are peaceloving people.

arun · Post by **arun** » 26 Jan 2004 17:17

Originally posted by manku thimma:

"In reality, these private networks allow states to hide," Therese Delpech, the French member of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), told Radio France International.

"Naturally, it’s not the Pakistani state that is going to directly sell this information," she said, adding: "Private proliferation is often a front for public proliferation."

Guess Pakistan’s “tactical brilliance”, which seems in large part to hinge on abandoning its citizens under adverse circumstances, of attempting to pass the buck solely onto individual scientists is being viewed with scepticism by some. That this scepticism is coming out of UNMOVIC is better still.

Meanwhile the IAEA’s Mohamed El Baradei in an interview with Der Spiegel had this to say, or more accurately declined to say that Pakistan was not involved in the “nuclear bazaar”. From WND :

He refused to answer when asked if Pakistan was the starting point for what was referred to as this "nuclear bazaar."

Needless to add sections of the Pakistani Press will take delude themselves that Pakistan has been absolved of wrongdoing by this statement and we shall no doubt be regaled by a few articles tomorrow.

Any kind soul with access to Der Spiegel is requested to post the article refered to.

Posted Later :

The News of the Jang Group seems to have shamelessly plagiarised the Therese Delpech story from AFP. Here is the link to the AFP story.

Editor · Post by **Editor** » 26 Jan 2004 19:40

> private proliferation and not state proliferation.

Yes, Kargil was a mujaheddin operation, not a Pakistan Army operation. Proliferation was by individuals and not by Pakistani Army people.

Plausible deniability as always.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 26 Jan 2004 21:08

The levels that the Foggies and TSP toadies go to shield their client nation...

Below is a report from Plat''s NuclearFuel magazine, earlier this month.

Pakistan takes back denials personnel at KRL helped Iran

By Mark Hibbs, Bonn; Shahid-ur-Rehman, Islamabad

5 January 2004

Nuclear Fuel

Volume 29, No. 1

The Pakistani government confirmed Dec. 23 that both Iran and the IAEA have identified specific Pakistani scientists who provided know-how about centrifuge uranium enrichment to the Iranian nuclear program.

Nearly one year ago, NuclearFuel was informed that classified U.S. government intelligence dossiers had spelled out that personnel inside the Pakistan uranium enrichment program, run by the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), had sometime between 1988 and 1991 provided to Iran design information for gas centrifuges (NF, 20 Jan. '03, 1).

Upon publication and until last week, the Pakistan government firmly denied that any such transfer of its nuclear know-how to Iran had ever taken place.

Separately, a few personnel at U.S. nuclear laboratories, some sources close to U.S. efforts to enlist Pakistan in the U.S.-led war against terrorism, and some officials close to the IAEA's investigation of Iran's centrifuge enrichment program, ongoing throughout 2003, also tried to discourage further investigation. regarding the prospect that Pakistan had assisted Iran's nuclear program. He said that while in recent years Pakistan would for foreign policy reasons ``certainly not'' have aided Iran's nuclear program, during the period identified by NuclearFuel as the likely period when the assistance was provided, ``Pakistan was intoxicated with visions of becoming a regional power cemented with alliances in Afghanistan and Iran.''

While at the U.S. State Department from 1985 through 1987, Cohen said he, together with Robert B. Oakley, an official then on the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) who was dealing with nuclear intelligence affairs in Pakistan, ``learned about Pakistan's overreaching political ambitions, and Bob and I both were very upset about this.'' [/b]

Last week individuals close to A.Q. Khan suggested to some media outlets that a transfer of centrifuge technology to Iran may have taken place long before the late 1980s. But Cohen said that, when conferring with Oakley and other officials in the years before he left the State Department in 1987, he had not been apprised of any electrifying U.S. intelligence findings that that KRL personnel had passed know-how to Iran at any time.

Last January, sources having routine access to U.S. intelligence files on nuclear programs in both Pakistan and Iran identified Oakley, who in 1988 was named U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, as having learned, prior to leaving Islamabad in 1991, of the sale of centrifuge know-how by KRL personnel to the Atomic Organization of Iran (AEOI). Oakley declined to comment (NF, 3 Feb.'03, 3).

Oakley's NSC dossier on Pakistan's nuclear activities is now at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, Calif. In response to an initial query to obtain access to the documents under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), NuclearFuel was told by FOIA personnel that the U.S. government would not likely approve the request on grounds that it concerned Pakistan's nuclear program and that the request might not be processed for several years.

But diplomatic sources from the Urenco countries and other European Union states, keenly interested in where Iran obtained know-how with details of early-vintage European machines, this fall urged perseverance. Regarding the source of Iran's know-how, one official in Vienna in September said, ``the IAEA thinks it's Pakistan and we think it's Pakistan.'' It is believed Pakistan had stolen centrifuge design data from Urenco's partners during the 1970s.

Umrao · Post by **Umrao** » 26 Jan 2004 21:20

I think it is time for sree Coelho to write a sequel to his
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE6-1/Cohen.html

Its time we expose the fraud of these South Asian experts at the expense of US tax dollars.

The american people deserve better than Uneven Cohens for their money.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 26 Jan 2004 21:46

The institutionalized sacrificing of individuals to protect the elite is probably part of Shivs psychological deconstruction chapter. But agree that we need to document the back-pedaling and selective amnesia of these so-called experts.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 26 Jan 2004 21:54

Please note the following background.

In the mid 90's the UK science magazine New Scientist had an article about the origins of the centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment. In the hoary past (circa WWII) a group of Nazi Germans had hit upon the idea of cascaded high speed centrifuges as a means of separating the isotopes of uranium. While they were still working on the idea the lot was captured by the Soviets and promptly put to work.
The basic design that they perfected was the sub-critical speed centirufge which whirls below the critical speed of the shaft. In the the early 50's the technology to achieve the super critical speeds necessary to achieve better efficiency was not there - rotor dynamics, magnetic bearings to allow the shaft to comply/bend and pass through the first critical speed etc. After the group achieved success the Soviets allowed them to go back in late 50's(?) assuming that was the limits of the technology. However the group assembled together and developed enhancements and used the technology to enrich reactor fuel (URENCO). So the Soviet/Russian centrifuges are based on sub-critical rotors. What Iran revealed were the next genaration model which is defintely not Russian origin but Pakistani based on purloining by Abdul Qadeer Khan in mid 70's. So the US expert quoted in Mark Hibbs report was disingenous or ignorant and possibly throwing a red herring.

------------------
Calvin, What they are doing is perfectly allright for an Islamic state. The problem for all of us we aer viewing them through Western constructs. More in the appropriate thread.

James Bund · Post by **James Bund** » 26 Jan 2004 22:08

Good report in Nuclear Fuel.

Obviously the media frenzy in Nov-Dec over Pak nuclear proliferation was carefully orchestrated by Washington, likely to put inexorable pressure on Musharraff to cooperate with Vajpayee. Remember that in American politics, being branded a WMD proliferator, regardless of the merits, is the kiss of death.

This intimates:

1 Musharraff means only as much as his utility to the Americans-this point needs to be emphasised as Indians tend to see the relationship as being something deeper.

2Washington has had the facts-again contrary to much Indian opinion on the naivete and gullibility of Washington.

3Washington plays a more sophisticated game than it is credited with, and will reveal all through the media's silences and "investigative" journalism-"Kremlinology" is not passe.

4Why? What's the game plan, why do India this favour?

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 26 Jan 2004 22:42

Pakistan was intoxicated with visions of becoming a regional power cemented with alliances in Afghanistan and Iran.</font>

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 26 Jan 2004 22:44

Originally posted by James Bund:
4Why? What's the game plan, why do India this favour?

There are several scenarios. It needs a thread of its own. The simple answer is that TSP is a low cost check on India's growth.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 26 Jan 2004 23:03

Prolonging mushy's life by getting him to change to "peaceful" tactics does not amount to doing India a favour, IMO. Let us see whether we consider this a favor when the terrorist attacks resume after the snow melts, and India is accused of "blocking the peace process" for silly reasons like "cross border terrorism", especially when we have supported Mushy's contention that he does not contol all terrorists. Mushy's special mention of this point in recent interviews is a harbinger of the paki strategy if India does not give them what they want -- not that India is going to oblige.

On the other hand, by protecting pakistan's real nuke assets (i.e., chinese nukes) but focussing on the bogus "pakistani nukes" amounts to doing pakistan a huge favour, not India.

GoI just took a couple of steps back for god-know-what reason.

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 27 Jan 2004 03:08

Pakistan polishes its tarnished nuclear image

ISLAMABAD - The story of nuclear leaks from Kahuta, the site of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory, to Iran, Libya and North Korea has forced Pakistan to investigate some of its key scientists to prove to the world that it's a responsible country, not involved in proliferation, at least not at the state level.

According to official statements, the Pakistan government has sent official investigators to Iran and Libya, after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sent a letter to Islamabad in the light of its probe into Iran's nuclear program. Iran disclosed to the UN inspection agency the names of people who provided it with nuclear technology - including Pakistani scientists.

As a result of initial investigations, the Pakistan government detained key scientists at KRL, including Major Islamul Haq, the principal staff officer of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the father of Pakistan's 30-year nuclear program. Two army brigadiers dealing with sophisticated construction and engineering activities and security matters have also been interrogated.

Pakistan embarked on its covert nuclear program in the early 1970s to counter the perceived threat posed by Indian nuclear tests. Khan spearheaded the whole exercise throughout this period until his replacement two years ago as head of KRL, under severe pressure from the United States, which feared connections of al-Qaeda elements with some Pakistani scientists.

Khan was associated with Urenco, a British, German and Dutch consortium, in the 1970s in the Dutch city of Almelo. After his return to Pakistan, the Dutch government accused him of stealing centrifuge plans from the plant. He was tried in absentia and convicted; the verdict was later overturned on a technicality. Western experts believe that Pakistan used Urenco gas centrifuge blueprints and information to build its own facilities. Urenco was the first name to appear in various international reports with suspicion of being the primary culprit for leaking uranium enrichment technology to Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

The same company has been linked to the construction of a new enrichment facility in Hartsville, Tennessee in the United States. Urenco has major financial interests in the Louisiana Energy Services, which was to construct this plant. According to US officials, concerns about Urenco emerged more than 10 years ago when thousands of centrifuge parts, based on Urenco designs, were discovered by UN inspectors in Iraq after the Gulf War.

When the US and the IAEA engaged in investigations into the Iranian nuclear program, suspicions emerged that its uranium enrichment program used technology identical to Pakistan plans. A report of the IAEA requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the agency in the clarification of open questions on the Iranian program, after conducting field investigations in recent months in Iran.

According to some reports, Iran has admitted that its centrifuge enrichment program was based on Urenco designs. Urenco is the leading firm in design and operation of centrifuges. To enrich uranium to weapons-grade, centrifuges are used to process the raw uranium into fuel for reactors or fissile material for bombs. This process requires machines that spin at twice the speed of sound. Pakistan has developed the capability of producing these centrifuges.

Urenco has denied providing technology or blueprints to Iran. Investigators are probing the possibilities of obtaining such designs and expertise through "middle men and black marketers", or theft from a nuclear laboratory, including KRL. The IAEA found traces of weapons-grade uranium in two locations in Iran where the machines had been assembled and tested. One such facility was discovered near Natanz in central Iran, which was similar to Urenco designs, but slightly modified. The second one was found at Kalaye Electric Company. According to reports, Iranian authorities told the IAEA that they bought the enriched uranium outside the country "on the black market" through middlemen.

This is going to be a long international investigation to determine who exactly was involved, and how the delivery took place. But the Pakistani scientists came under investigations as the Foreign Office said that the IAEA and the Iranian government had provided information that warranted such investigations to determine the veracity of the information and to ensure the strict export control regime of the country was not being violated. "We do not proliferate," said Masood Khan, Foreign Office spokesman. The name of Dr Khan, a national hero in Pakistan, appeared in the media when a former Iranian diplomat, Ali Akbar Omid Mehr, claimed that Khan had visited Iran in 1987, and assumed that it was for some cooperation.

Pakistani investigators also picked up Dr Mohammad Farooq, a senior scientist at KRL dealing with gas centrifuges, in late November after receiving information from Iran and the IAEA, which indicated "contact persons" in Pakistan. Following debriefing sessions of Farooq, Dr Nazeer Ahmad, the director general of KRL, Yasin Chohan, the director KRL, and other senior scientists were also detained.

The sale of nuclear designs and components is obviously a very secretive business. No one is sure about its exact potential threat and capability. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 that reports started appearing indicating the scouting of Russian nuclear scientists by aspiring countries around the world. An interesting finding of the IAEA was that Iran had been conducting research using exotic laser technology to enrich uranium for 12 years, and this laser technology apparently had come from Russia via European suppliers. Some reports claimed that Iran acquired some of the equipment during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88).

Iran informed the IAEA in August 2003 that the decision to launch a centrifuge enrichment program had actually been taken in 1985, and that Iran had received drawings of the centrifuges through a foreign intermediary around 1987. Iranian officials further described the program as having consisted of three phases. The IAEA has condemned Iran for 18 years of covert nuclear activities, but has stopped short of taking Tehran to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions. Interestingly, Britain, France and Germany have suggested rewarding Iran for cooperating since October.

On December 18, 2003, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Seyed Salehi, and the director general of the IAEA, Mohamed El-Baradei, signed an additional protocol to Iran's Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement, granting agency inspectors greater authority in verifying the country's nuclear program. The additional protocol requires a state to provide an expanded declaration of its nuclear activities and grants the agency broader rights of access to sites in the country. The IAEA director general is scheduled to provide the next report, on the implementation of agency safeguards in Iran, to the IAEA board of governors in February, prior to the board's next meeting in March.

Pakistan apparently wants to move forward in its investigations before the next IAEA report to make a point that the state was not involved in proliferation. The particular concern for Pakistani authorities is said to be the fact that nuclear programs in Pakistan and Iran are based on highly enriched uranium, which was detected by the IAEA at two of the sites in Iran. This raises suspicion of close involvement of "some individual or individuals in the process", as stated by President General Pervez Musharraf at the weekend.

Musharraf maintained that since the entire program has been covert for the past 30 years, autonomy had been granted to certain individuals to keep it a secret while acquiring the required capabilities. This "freedom of action" appears to be the real factor, according to official claims. Officials of the Interior Ministry have said that the government has extended its probe to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, where some individuals acted as front men to buy state-of-the-art dual use equipment from the international market.

The recent arrest of Asher Karni, an Israeli citizen living in South Africa, at Denver international airport on January 2, indicates how such front men act in such deals. The man was accused of illegally shipping triggered spark gaps to Pakistan. The spark gaps are capable of sending synchronized electronic pulses, which can be used to destroy kidney stones - or in the nuclear field.

A recent report of the US on chemical and biological weapons said that the IAEA had documented almost 400 cases of trafficking in nuclear or radiological materials since 1993. Many such supplies are subject to few controls or are poorly guarded, particularly in the former Soviet Union. Reports also have cited weak protection of spent fuel at nuclear facilities in the US.

Other experts worry about the security of the nuclear facilities in Pakistan, India and other developing countries. An estimated 1,300 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 180,000 kilograms of plutonium, the main fuels for a nuclear device, exist in civilian nuclear facilities around the world. There are nearly 450 nuclear power plants, nearly 300 nuclear research reactors, and 250 nuclear fuel cycle plants around the world.

In April 2000, customs officers from Uzbekistan discovered 10 lead-lined containers at a remote border crossing with Kazakhstan. These containers were filled with enough radioactive material to make dozens of crude weapons, each capable of contaminating a large area for many years. The consignment was addressed to a company in Quetta, Pakistan, called Ahmadjan Haji Mohammed. Quetta, where border controls are virtually non-existent, is the main Pakistani crossing into southern Afghanistan, and only a six hour drive from Kandahar, the chief southern town in that country.

The US report also mentioned that in 1994, Czech police seized three kilograms of highly enriched uranium. During the same year, German police seized 360 grams of plutonium. In 2001, Turkish police caught two men with 1.16 kilograms of weapons grade uranium.

The report maintains that a crude but deadly radiation dispersal device fashioned from stolen nuclear material (from a nuclear waste processor, a nuclear power plant, a university research facility, a medical radiotherapy clinic, or an industrial complex) and a few sticks of dynamite could spread radioactive material across an area without a nuclear detonation. Such a weapon could kill many, contaminate a square mile for many years, and cause widespread panic.

The US strengthened its export control regime after September 11, and recently the US Defense Authorization Bill for fiscal 2004 incorporated a plan for "the assessment of strategies or options for dealing with nuclear-capable nations that may provide nuclear weapons to terrorist or transnational groups, and an assessment of the effect of the strategy on the nuclear programs of emerging nuclear weapons states, including North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and India".

The Iranian and Libyan investigations pointed fingers at individuals from Pakistan, and some Dubai-based companies are also being mentioned. Some reports claimed that these companies bought loyalties of some individuals to provide sensitive information to Iran.

The uranium conversion facility of Iran, according to IAEA reports and Iranian claims, was originally based on a design provided by a foreign supplier in the mid-1990s. The plant was supposed to have been constructed by the supplier under a turnkey contract, but the contract was cancelled in 1997 and, according to Iran, the supplier did not provide any equipment. Iranian authorities said that they received from the supplier the blueprint of the facility, including equipment test reports and some design information on the equipment, but claimed all the parts and equipment for the plant were manufactured domestically.

Pakistani investigators may have looked at the two major facilities in Iran in their probe to find out the extent of involvement of Pakistani scientists, but nothing is said about the military officials who have actually controlled all the operations over the years.

Pakistan's nuclear program conceived by then prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the early 1970s, was supervised in the 1980s by General Zia ul-Haq and his close associate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who became president after Zia died in a mysterious plane crash. General Aslam Beg replaced Zia as the chief of army staff after his death in 1988. The timing of the Iranian nuclear advancement and changes in Pakistan coincide. Nuclear proliferation due to a deliberate act of some individual, or with the connivance of the army, is obviously the responsibility of the army chief.

On the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Musharraf told Associated Press: "The security of all of this is a military responsibility. As long as the military of Pakistan remains, nothing can go wrong." The president denied involvement of the army. He also said that proliferation of nuclear technology in the world was not possible without the help of Europe, which has all the technical know-how and expertise in the field.

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 27 Jan 2004 03:15

Fighting the proliferation syndrome
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FA27Df04.html

The constant dribbling of news about Pakistan's nuclear scientists' role in the proliferation of nuclear know-how to North Korea, Iran and Libya is likely to damage the United States' ties with Pakistan. The surprising aspect of this development is that Islamabad has shown a certain amount of insensitivity, if not outright ignorance, about the seriousness that the Bush administration attaches to non-proliferation, especially since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

Right now, the focus of Washington's attention is the global "war on terrorism", in which Pakistan plays a prominent role. Once that war looses its current primacy, Washington is likely to unleash its criticism, scrutiny and even sanctions against the South Asian nation, unless it clamps down hard now on all potential sources of nuclear proliferation from within.

Recent reports indicate that the transfer of nuclear knowledge to Iran from Pakistan took place in the late 1980s. The father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb - Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan - was reportedly involved. Other Pakistani nuclear scientists are also reported to have assisted Iran under a secret agreement between the two countries. That agreement was supposedly limited to the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology.

Pakistan has launched its own investigation on the foreign involvement of its nuclear scientists under US pressure, and also because of a complaint launched by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last November. That complaint alleges that Pakistani scientists played a prominent role in the development of centrifuges used to enrich uranium, a key ingredient in nuclear weapons. The US alleges that Pakistan has played a similar role in North Korea, and even in Libya.

President General Pervez Musharraf has finally publicly conceded that his country's nuclear scientists have been involved in the proliferation of nuclear technology for "personal gain", but rejected any notion of an official sanctioning of their role. He said: "There is no such evidence that any government personality or military personality was involved in this at all."

The government of Pakistan has identified a second prominent scientist, Dr Mohammad Farooq, in nuclear proliferation activities. He has been under government custody since November 22 of last year and is expected to be charged under Pakistan's Official Secrets Act. He is reported to have implicated Khan under questioning. These events are said to have taken place many years ago.

Washington has thus far accepted Musharraf's assurances that all cooperative activities between his country and North Korea have been suspended. However, it continues to watch the pace and scope of this inquiry inside Pakistan.

Musharraf's dilemma is how far he should go in investigating the role of Pakistan's nuclear scientists, and what punitive measures, if any, he must take. Of course, Washington will be delighted to see Khan, Farooq and others receive some sort of punishment; however, they - especially Khan - are regarded as national heroes and cannot be unceremoniously put even under house arrest without a public backlash and resentment. Islamist groups have already shown their rage on the "humiliation" of Pakistani national heroes, and have accused Musharraf of conducting the inquiry to appease the Bush administration.

The very fact that Pakistan's intelligence agency - Inter-Service Intelligence - is conducting the inquiry has already ensured that no ranking past or present military officer will be charged with any involvement in the transfer of nuclear know-how to other countries. In fact, the former chief of army, General Aslam Beg, who, during his tenure (1988-1991) publicly advocated a military alliance with Iran, now denies authorizing the transfer of nuclear technology. He depicts all allegations of his involvement as "part of the conspiracy against me".

Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto has pitched in her own share by maintaining from exile that the military sustained total control of all nuclear matters during her administration, thereby implying that the military was involved in nuclear proliferation to Iran. A former official during her successor Nawaz Sharif's government is also blaming the military of deciding in the 1990s to transfer nuclear know-how to Iran. Even though Iran has not directly named Pakistan in its acquisition of nuclear know-how, the IAEA has surmised that Iran's centrifuges were probably based on Pakistan's designs.

Undoubtedly, Pakistan, despite official denials, is not exactly an innocent party in this nuclear proliferation syndrome. As the inquiry of nuclear scientists and the blame game continue, the US will be content for now if Pakistan ceases all proliferation activities, officially sanctioned or otherwise. Aside from Washington's determination to bring about global nuclear non-proliferation, the international community appears equally resolute to disallow the repeat of the North Korean example of nuclear blackmail.

Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.

payani · Post by **payani** » 27 Jan 2004 04:12

From Associated Press - MATTHEW PENNINGTON

Pakistan's government on Monday made its clearest public statement yet that scientists of its secretive nuclear weapons program leaked technology and would face legal action.

Pakistan: Nuke Scientists Leaked Secrets

Same in Yahoo News

payani · Post by **payani** » 27 Jan 2004 04:51

Another article by David Rohde, NYT in International Herald Tribune

General Mirza Aslam Beg said it was natural for nuclear scientists to want to collect "gold dust" from their work, a reference to an employee profiting from his work without stealing from his employer.

Asked Monday if investigators had questioned him yet, Beg replied: "They would not dare. They would not dare."

In Monday's interview, Beg confirmed that in the spring of 1991 he had proposed a policy of "strategic defiance" by Pakistan. According to his proposal, made after the United States defeated Iraq in the first Gulf war, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan would share "their strengths" and form a grand military alliance to thwart what the general said was an expected American invasion of all three countries.

Pakistani denies transfer of nuclear arms data

arun · Post by **arun** » 27 Jan 2004 06:20

PPP blames Musharraf for nuke transfer :

LAHORE: The Pakistan Peoples’ Party has written a letter to all foreign embassies in Pakistan asking them to hold President Pervez Musharraf accountable for the transfer of technology, instead of Pakistani nuclear scientists, since he was controlling the command and control system when the technology was transferred.

PPP Foreign Liaison Committee Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan wrote the letter on Sunday in which he said that it was important to note that General Musharraf was in charge of nuclear command and control when the nuclear transfers took place . If so, then General Musharraf and not the nuclear scientists, must be held answerable to the nation for jeopardising the nuclear assets. He wrote that it was hard to imagine that a bunch of Pakistani nuclear scientists, despite having stringent security measures at the Kahuta Research Laboratories, were able to transfer the nuclear technology to any other country.”

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Jan 2004 07:11

Doesnt Ehsan bhai show quintessential RAPE qualities? BTW he is from India.

Amber G. · Post by **Amber G.** » 27 Jan 2004 07:11

Same here: (Sorry... I know its a repeat..)

N-probe narrowed down to seven men
* Musharraf chairs meeting to review investigation
* Vows harsh punishment for proliferators
* Sheikh Rashid says money involved
* Says the innocent will go home
* Khawar Rizvi to be put on trial

Amber G. · Post by **Amber G.** » 27 Jan 2004 08:37

General Denies Letting Secrets of A-Bomb Out of Pakistan

SLAMABAD, Pakistan, Jan. 26 — Days after Pakistan's president acknowledged that scientists from his country had most likely sold nuclear designs to other nations, the army commander formerly in overall charge of the program declared Monday that he had never approved a transfer of atomic information.

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"I was never confronted with any such situation," said the retired general, Mirza Aslam Beg, who was the army commander from 1988 to 1991.

His comments, in an interview, contradicted assertions last week by a senior Pakistani intelligence official, who said General Beg had approved the transfer of technology to Iran. The official also said the scientist who led Pakistan's effort to build an atomic bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, had told investigators that any sharing of nuclear technology had had General Beg's approval.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 27 Jan 2004 10:03

http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_548964,00050004.htm

And now the chinese apply for membership in the NSG.
what next? mass murderers applying for a position in the police force?

suryavir · Post by **suryavir** » 27 Jan 2004 10:16

This is probably a device to innoculate itself against some damning connection to the Paki outing.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 27 Jan 2004 10:41

Originally posted by suryavir:
This is probably a device to innoculate itself against some damning connection to the Paki outing.

yes, I agree.

I wager that the chinese will be ably assisted by the non-prolif crooks in the west to cover up the tracks w.r.t. chinese nuke proliferation to pakistan. Perhaps some pakistani proliferation of PAEC-related material, that the chinese already know about, and the west already knows about, and chinese and pakistani proliferation can both be pinned on Xerox Khan and other scapegoats. The non-prolif crowd in the west is absolutely spitworthy.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Jan 2004 10:59

All this debriefing of AQK and his cohorts only reveals the links to the URENCO route. There is still the prolif by the dargon yet to come out. Bet you $ to donut hole that the NK real stuff is Chinese. A good thing is all the arms peddlers in Europe will get their just dues. Wonder what the mandrins in Delhi are thinking?

SunilMenon · Post by **SunilMenon** » 27 Jan 2004 12:07

IMO, this recent debriefing frenzy is just a natural progression of the US's nuke nude policy.
First the bombs. Then they shut down the Uranium enrichment. The third and the obvious next step to is to round up the nuclear "scientists" (read thieves) to prevent any future developments. Pretty soon we will hear about a mysterious fire that burned all the records.

All that grass eating for nothing! What a bunch of clowns.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 27 Jan 2004 18:50

Does anyone have all the old Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation Threads stashed away somewhere?

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 27 Jan 2004 20:00

Originally posted by sunil s:
Does anyone have all the old Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation Threads stashed away somewhere?

I have them

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 27 Jan 2004 20:16

Hi Rangudu,

Can you zip them and email them to me at breadomlette at yahoo dot com.

TIA