Indian Nuclear Submarines -3

The Military Issues & History Forum is a venue to discuss issues relating to the military aspects of the Indian Armed Forces, whether the past, present or future. We request members to kindly stay within the mandate of this forum and keep their exchanges of views, on a civilised level, however vehemently any disagreement may be felt. All feedback regarding forum usage may be sent to the moderators using the Feedback Form or by clicking the Report Post Icon in any objectionable post for proper action. Please note that the views expressed by the Members and Moderators on these discussion boards are that of the individuals only and do not reflect the official policy or view of the Bharat-Rakshak.com Website. Copyright Violation is strictly prohibited and may result in revocation of your posting rights - please read the FAQ for full details. Users must also abide by the Forum Guidelines at all times.
Post Reply
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by shiv »

Akshay Kapoor wrote: One of the biggest concerns that the armed forces have is that we have no doctrine or mechanism in place to keep fully functional warheads + delivery systems with the armed forces and then a foolproof mechanism to give launch orders from competent authority (PM ?). And no back ups if PM and political leadership is incapacitated. All of these needs to be thought through and mechanisms set, training done if we are to have a robust second strike capability.
From reading statements here and there it seems to me that there is no serious belief among political decision making circles in India that we may be in a situation where we get nuked and we have to suddenly sit up and use nuclear weapons.

This is in stark contrast with the signals we get of testing of nuclear capable missiles (even if that testing in not all that frequent). That apart the information that is leaked out all too infrequently from Atomic energy dept officials is that India has consistently worked on nuclear weapons for a long time. Of course there has been very little public info that I have seen in the last 2 years.

Having said that - senior army officers and diplomats have occasionally made public statements warning that the Indian nuclear deterrent is to be taken seriously. A fairly significant number of retired armed forces officers have been critical of India's opaque doctrine and to me this silence from India while there are almost monthly reports of Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal seems like a surreal drama. India's posture is not reassuring to either Pakis as being harmless and it is not reassuring to Indians because some fear it is toothless. Sorry - this discussion is better off in the deterrence thread - I will cross post there.
ShauryaT
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5351
Joined: 31 Oct 2005 06:06

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by ShauryaT »

Shiv ji: My response in the deterrence thread.
ShauryaT
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5351
Joined: 31 Oct 2005 06:06

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by ShauryaT »

shiv wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:If the silent speed of the enemy sub is 20 knots and yours is 12, will you not be at a significant disadvantage in this silent game of hide and seek? The upcoming type 095 is estimated to have such capabilities.
Shaurya I am not sure what you mean by silent speed. No matter how silent a sub is it will make some noise if it moves and the noise gets louder if it moves faster. If it moves it can be tracked. The tracker may not be able to catch up but he can track. The only way for a sub to be really stealthy is to stop moving and to minimize all noise inside the sub.
Understand that part. The silent speed refers to a magnitude of "noise" based on increasing speed and relevant silencing technology, which allows a nuclear submarine to be fairly undetectable by passive sonar at a certain range?

The science of detecting subs at varied ranges given a variety of variables is a veritable cold war science by itself.
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by shiv »

ShauryaT wrote: The science of detecting subs at varied ranges given a variety of variables is a veritable cold war science by itself.
Cold war is intimately related to clear cold water. Warm muddy water which IN operates in is also a different, but related science.

The book I mentioned by Commodore Franklin speaks of an incident when a Foxtrot of the Indian navy encountered what was possibly a US nuclear submarine underwater. Both subs became absolutely still and silent and both spent time listening for the other. Then, inexplicably the other sub restarted moving and sped away at such high speed that it could only have been a nuclear sub.
ShauryaT
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5351
Joined: 31 Oct 2005 06:06

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by ShauryaT »

shiv wrote:Then, inexplicably the other sub restarted moving and sped away at such high speed that it could only have been a nuclear sub.
This is where top speeds matter for an SSN. A point I am trying to make over the past few pages. If we do not manage to acquire/build reactors to propel the SSN to 30+ knots, we will be at a disadvantage in some desired scenarios is my limited point. The ability to tackle a nuclear sub by an SSK in certain scenarios is well known, however the type of reach and dominance the IN aspires for in the IOR with the SSN's is best served by providing it with that critical capability. The IN with their hands on the Akula is getting spoilt so to say with that new toy.
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by shiv »

ShauryaT wrote:
shiv wrote:Then, inexplicably the other sub restarted moving and sped away at such high speed that it could only have been a nuclear sub.
This is where top speeds matter for an SSN. A point I am trying to make over the past few pages. If we do not manage to acquire/build reactors to propel the SSN to 30+ knots, we will be at a disadvantage in some desired scenarios is my limited point. The ability to tackle a nuclear sub by an SSK in certain scenarios is well known, however the type of reach and dominance the IN aspires for in the IOR with the SSN's is best served by providing it with that critical capability. The IN with their hands on the Akula is getting spoilt so to say with that new toy.
No Shaurya. If the weapon you fire can overtake the other sub - it's speed will be irrelevant. Location and Identification is more critical and staying silent is critical. Top speeds are not compatible with staying silent. Good for escaping or making good headway getting somewhere.
member_28108
BRFite
Posts: 1852
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by member_28108 »

Shiv, the very fact that we are having ELF communication facility (Like INS Kattaboman) means we are planning to ahve our nuclear submarine arsenal mated. There is no reason for this unless you plan to launch strikes. Usually this is like a dead man's swithc - the absence of a regular signal is a starting sequence for a possible strike.
ShauryaT
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5351
Joined: 31 Oct 2005 06:06

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by ShauryaT »

prasannasimha wrote:Shiv, the very fact that we are having ELF communication facility (Like INS Kattaboman) means we are planning to ahve our nuclear submarine arsenal mated. There is no reason for this unless you plan to launch strikes. Usually this is like a dead man's swithc - the absence of a regular signal is a starting sequence for a possible strike.
Is ELF the sole communication protocol or is VLF also used due to limitations of bandwidth on ELF?
Shreeman
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3762
Joined: 17 Jan 2007 15:31
Location: bositiveneuj.blogspot.com
Contact:

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Shreeman »

prasannasimha wrote:Shiv, the very fact that we are having ELF communication facility (Like INS Kattaboman) means we are planning to ahve our nuclear submarine arsenal mated. There is no reason for this unless you plan to launch strikes. Usually this is like a dead man's swithc - the absence of a regular signal is a starting sequence for a possible strike.
simply reflecting longer/different patrols in the present context. ELF isnt a one bit commuNication anymore either. ELF is a secondary protocol for when the others are inaccessible for one reason or another.

It is plausible the submarine will carry warheads, since reaction time for second strike will be a narrow window, before politics starts damage control. And the risk of the supply chain being damaged in the preemptive strike.

It is also possible there is a difference in how the platform is operationalized, including a time of decades of ambiguous operation without clarity on mission load.
Prem Kumar
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4248
Joined: 31 Mar 2009 00:10

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Prem Kumar »

2 questions:

1) Is it even possible for a sub to carry de-mated nuclear warheads? How would someone go ahead and mate them if the balloon goes up, in the confines of a sub?

2) Prasannasimha: why should ELF Kattabomman imply a "dead-man-switch"? A protocol might be for the sub to surface every X days, send a signal and await a response via ELF. Even if the ELF is programmed to send pings at regular intervals, the lack of a ping would likely require the sub to surface and attempt to make contact, rather than assume the worst & launch
JTull
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3129
Joined: 18 Jul 2001 11:31

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by JTull »

This discussion makes no sense. Simplest way for enemies to track all your n-assets would be to track the movement of civilian AEC staff. How stupid would that be?

Why would DRDO be going towards hermetically sealed A-V and sub-launched missiles if there wasn't already a command and control procedure in place? How else would you be able to claim a triad?
sohamn
BRFite
Posts: 461
Joined: 27 Jul 2006 12:56
Location: the Queen of the Angels of Porziuncola
Contact:

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by sohamn »

shiv wrote:
sohamn wrote:]
An SSBN armed with nuclear missile, if attacked, could result in nuclear explosion.
How will the fuse get lit underwater?

Fuse can be lit underwater, there are many instances of that. For e.g. depth charges etc.

see a atomic bomb has huge amount conventional explosives that are lit by fuses. And the conventional explosives is used to trigger a chain reaction. Now these conventional explosives can be triggered by
a) Electrical issues that results in triggering of fuse. ( e.g. short circuit )
b) Explosion is triggered by presence of another oxidizing agent ( depends on the type of explosive )
c) Explosion triggered by another explosive device
d) huge amount of heat which melts some insulators, wiring etc

Now I am not an atomic scientist , but I am intrigued because many here seems to be so dismissive of this issue without stating facts to counter my theory. I would surely take back my theory if someone can scientifically explain how can it be so fool proof. Especially when we know for sure that conventional explosives can be lit by fire, other explosion, bad fuses etc etc.
nirav
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2020
Joined: 31 Aug 2004 00:22
Location: Mumbai

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by nirav »

Sohamn,

you need to lookup "how a nuke works" to clear this up.

Nuclear detonation requires very specific explosion of the trigger around the core to achieve criticality and have the big dhamaka.

Else, it just wont blow up. External attack via explosion on a nuke warhead will only result in explosives in the nuclear weapon to explode. Some localised radiation contamination,maybe. But thats that.

Nuclear weapons have been around from 60 years and have been involved in numerous accidents. In subs to hydrogen bombs falling off of bombers. Ever wondered why none caused a nuclear blast ?

Do look up historical accidents involving nuclear weapons.

Im no atomic scientist either. But this is basic stuff ! Google it.
Shreeman
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3762
Joined: 17 Jan 2007 15:31
Location: bositiveneuj.blogspot.com
Contact:

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Shreeman »

Prem Kumar wrote:2 questions:

1) Is it even possible for a sub to carry de-mated nuclear warheads? How would someone go ahead and mate them if the balloon goes up, in the confines of a sub?

2) Prasannasimha: why should ELF Kattabomman imply a "dead-man-switch"? A protocol might be for the sub to surface every X days, send a signal and await a response via ELF. Even if the ELF is programmed to send pings at regular intervals, the lack of a ping would likely require the sub to surface and attempt to make contact, rather than assume the worst & launch
1) One argues there is your natural thought process that patrols, most patrols wont be strategically deterrent in nature. Starting those is a threshold thing. Generally there are two options, make these systems harbor queens for 30 years (oriental method) or employ them without care of souls onboard (the kursk method). Given relative uncertainty over deep sea rescue, the idea is to be closer to the kursk method, but without crown jewels. This is also the reason the celebrated cave complexes of NSN are being faithfully recreated near bangalore, kerala. Jewellary will be stored there and employed upin "tensions" appearing. It is still a 2.5 legged deterrent. But thats how far NSN R&D went before the kendostyx agitation of 2007. There is a strategic void in thinking and/or insecurity about maturity and experience that will take the thirty years of oriental method to go away.
Aditya G
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3565
Joined: 19 Feb 2002 12:31
Contact:

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Aditya G »

Trying to answer my own q ... here this neat video about Scorpene hunting LHD task force.


Aditya G wrote:It is widely held belief that pak navy will maintain a cordon sanitaire around it's key shore facilities, while the agostas venture out to hunt for Indian navy ships in lone wolf attacks.

How do they hope to trap any ship in this scenario? Bangor in '71 basically lined itself up outside vizag harbour ... And we know how that went for them.

On the west khukri and kirpan were looking for the submarine when khukri was detected first and killed.

Will pak navy be satisfied by sniping and easier to get merchant shipping? It seems asw should be easier in out scenario as we have to sanitize only a particular area and not the open ocean.
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 59810
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by ramana »

Once US exits Afghanistan the patrols have to start.
member_28386
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 9
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by member_28386 »

Any Navy including the Pakistan and Indian Navy would be happy to take out all the easier merchant shipping of the rival country. That should actually be the primary objective in a war for taking out the enemy's assets and destroy his shipping routes and disrupt trade. The other would be to destroy and disrupt his Ports and Trade Routes - Fundamental rules of Naval Warfare, Sea Control or Sea Denial.

Of course, the navy of the other side is going to try and protect their economic assets. Therefore they also have to be engaged and destroyed as they try to protect their county's ports and shipping.

Submarines are very good for this. Take out the enemy merchant shipping, stealthily lurk and destroy his Ports and of course target their Naval escorts. The other suitable vessel for this are of course small missile boats and even torpedo boats as naval history testifies to.
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by shiv »

sohamn wrote: Fuse can be lit underwater, there are many instances of that. For e.g. depth charges etc.
Sorry that was meant to be a joke.
sohamn wrote:Now I am not an atomic scientist , but I am intrigued because many here seems to be so dismissive of this issue without stating facts to counter my theory. I would surely take back my theory if someone can scientifically explain how can it be so fool proof. Especially when we know for sure that conventional explosives can be lit by fire, other explosion, bad fuses etc etc.
It is far easier to set off conventional explosives than trigger a nuclear explosion. It is theoretically possible to cook off the conventional explosive in a nuclear bomb and still not get a nuclear explosion.

This is because the nuclear material in a compact nuclear bomb needs to be compressed uniformly from all sides within a very short period of time - typically microseconds (1 microsecond = 1 millionth of a second), or a nuclear explosion will not occur. In order to achieve this the actual physical shape of the nuclear material, the physical shape of the layers around it and physical shape of the conventional explosive are critical and that physical shape is maintained within a shaped container to preserve that exact shape and size. Even after all that, timing is crucial. The conventional explosive needs to be triggered in a specific way at multiple points so that the actual explosive compression wave goes inwards to compress the fissile material before it breaks apart the outer casing and dissipates its energy. If one side of the explosive is triggered before the other side the bomb will simply break apart and no nuclear explosion will occur.

So if you have an explosion that rips apart the nuclear bomb casing from the outside, the physical structure of the nuclear bomb is disrupted, and even if the conventional explosive is triggered it will simply dissipate in every direction and blow away the fissile material without compressing it. That will cause contamination but not a nuclear explosion
Shreeman
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3762
Joined: 17 Jan 2007 15:31
Location: bositiveneuj.blogspot.com
Contact:

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Shreeman »

^^ You are just saying that to make us feel better.
member_28108
BRFite
Posts: 1852
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by member_28108 »

It is well described. To sustain arunaway nuclear explosion the two cores have to be rapidly mated by a properly directed sequence or else a sustainedreaction is not maintained. The pressure required is very high or else th cores fly apart. So a dud explosion occurs. It can contaminate local area at the most not a fission or fusion bomb. If this was so easy many countries would have these weapons. The timing for the triggers is critical
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by shiv »

Shreeman wrote:^^ You are just saying that to make us feel better.
It proves that faith is better than heavy water.
Austin
BRF Oldie
Posts: 23387
Joined: 23 Jul 2000 11:31

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Austin »

shiv wrote:So if you have an explosion that rips apart the nuclear bomb casing from the outside, the physical structure of the nuclear bomb is disrupted, and even if the conventional explosive is triggered it will simply dissipate in every direction and blow away the fissile material without compressing it. That will cause contamination but not a nuclear explosion
Ejjactly as Dr says

All you get is fissile material with 90 % plus enrichment and radiation plus contamination
Shreeman
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3762
Joined: 17 Jan 2007 15:31
Location: bositiveneuj.blogspot.com
Contact:

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Shreeman »

^^^Dont mis-under-estim-guess the power of radioactivity even at the lowest levels. You thyroid is particularly gluttonous. And it just goes from there. Seriously, instead of taking electricity out of the water, the sdres should be big hearted older richer brother and recycle heavy water. But then, mutations may cause even wilder organisms to appear. My last, pinky promise.
Shreeman
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3762
Joined: 17 Jan 2007 15:31
Location: bositiveneuj.blogspot.com
Contact:

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Shreeman »

ramana wrote:Once US exits Afghanistan the patrols have to start.
That would be never. Afg is worse than the perpetual 99 year guano lease. It is a one way system. You can invite in, but then there is no medicine or vaccine.
Austin
BRF Oldie
Posts: 23387
Joined: 23 Jul 2000 11:31

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Austin »

Shreeman wrote:^^^Dont mis-under-estim-guess the power of radioactivity even at the lowest levels. You thyroid is particularly gluttonous. And it just goes from there. Seriously, instead of taking electricity out of the water, the sdres should be big hearted older richer brother and recycle heavy water. But then, mutations may cause even wilder organisms to appear. My last, pinky promise.
I am not stating Radioactive substance are any less dangerous after all we have all the scaremongering about Dirty Bomb these days , much less for 90 % enriched Pu or U , But that a fission or fusion would successfully take pace if the integrity of structure fails is less likely.

Bumb by nature are designed to fail unless all the failsafe condition are met and locks released mechanical/electronic both , I susbscribe to our Good Dr POV
putnanja
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4668
Joined: 26 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: searching for the next al-qaida #3

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by putnanja »

If only nuclear weapons would detonate so easily, there would have been no debate on Pokhran-II :)
member_28108
BRFite
Posts: 1852
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by member_28108 »

The area of damage of a dirty bomb is inherently limited to the spread of the bomb.The radioactive damage is not as much as you would think.

If you go through various events during the development of the atom bomb people were handling the seperated cores and there are only a couple of incidents when the cores were united manually by mistake and separated causing a partial "critical event".

Most of the effects are on the thyroid and that is attenuated by giving OralIodine immediately to the vitim.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-coll ... bombs.html

Also

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb

http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2 ... f2e8e6134a

Radiological Dispersal Devices

A dirty bomb is a type of radiological dispersal device (RDD), and RDDs are, as the name implies, devices that disperse a radiological isotope. Depending on the motives of those planning the attack, an RDD could be a low-key weapon that surreptitiously releases aerosolized radioactive material, one that dumps out a finely powdered radioactive material or something that dissolves a radioactive material in water. Such methods are intended to slowly expose as many people as possible to the radiation for as long as possible without becoming detected. Unless large amounts of a very strong radioactive material are used, however, the effects of such exposure are limited. To cause adverse effects, radiation exposure must occur either in a very high dose over a short period of time or in smaller doses sustained over a longer period. This is not to say that radiation is not dangerous, but only that small amounts of radiation exposure do not necessarily cause measurable harm. In fact, people are commonly exposed to heightened levels of radiation during activities such as air travel and mountain climbing.

By their very nature, RDDs are prone to be ineffective. To maximize the harmful effects of radiation, victims must be exposed to the highest possible concentration of a radioisotope. But by definition and design, RDDs dilute the radiation source, spreading smaller amounts of the substance over a larger area. Additionally, the use of an explosion to spread the radioisotope alerts the intended victims, who can then evacuate the affected area and be decontaminated. These factors make it very difficult for an attacker to administer a deadly dose of radiation through a dirty bomb.

It is important to note that a dirty bomb is not a nuclear device, and no nuclear reaction occurs. A dirty bomb will not produce an effect like the nuclear devices dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. A dirty bomb is quite simply an RDD that uses explosives to disperse a radioactive isotope; the only blast effect or damage produced is from conventional explosives and not from the radioactive material itself. In a dirty bomb attack, radioactive material is spread in an obvious manner, causing mass panic. In other words, the RDD is a weapon intended to create fear and terror.

The radioisotopes that can be used to construct an RDD are fairly common. Those materials considered most likely to be used in an RDD, such as cobalt-60 and cesium-137, have legitimate medical, commercial and industrial uses. Organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency warn that such radioisotopes are readily available to virtually any country in the world, and they are almost certainly not beyond the reach of even moderately capable non-state actors. Indeed, given the ease of obtaining radiological isotopes and the simplicity of constructing a dirty bomb, it is surprising that we have not yet seen one successfully used in a terror attack, especially considering jihadist groups in Iraq, Syria and Libya have captured cities that likely contain radioactive sources. In light of this, let’s examine what effectively employing a dirty bomb would entail.

Creating An Effective Dirty Bomb

Like nonexplosive RDDs, unless a dirty bomb contains a large amount of very strong radioactive material, the radiological effects of the device are not likely to be immediate or dramatic. In fact, the explosive effect of the RDD is likely to kill more people than the device’s radiological effect. Moreover, the need for a large quantity of a radioisotope not only creates challenges for obtaining the material but also means the resulting device would be large and unwieldy — and therefore difficult to smuggle into a target such as a subway or stadium.

In practical terms, a dirty bomb can produce a wide range of effects depending on the size of the improvised explosive device (IED) and the amount and type of radioactive material involved. (Powdered radioisotopes are easier to disperse than materials in solid form.) Environmental factors such as terrain, weather conditions and population density also play an important role in determining the effects of such a device.

Significantly, while the radiological effects of a dirty bomb may not be instantly lethal, the radiological impact of an RDD would likely affect an area larger than the kill radius of the IED itself and persist far longer. The explosion from a conventional IED is over in an instant, but radiation released by an RDD can remain for decades unless the area is decontaminated. While the radiation level may not be strong enough to affect people exposed briefly during the initial explosion, the cumulative effects of such radiation could prove very hazardous. Again, the area contaminated and the ease of decontamination depends on the type and quantity of the radioactive material used. Materials in a fine powdered form are easier to disperse and harder to clean up than solid blocks of material. In any case, it would be necessary to evacuate people from the contaminated area, and people would need to stay out of the area until it could be decontaminated, a process that could prove inconvenient and expensive.

Though dirty bombs are not truly weapons of mass destruction like nuclear devices are, they are frequently referred to as “weapons of mass disruption” or “weapons of mass dislocation” because they can temporarily render areas uninhabitable. The expense of decontaminating a large, densely populated area, such as a section of London or Washington, would be quite high. This cost also makes a dirty bomb a type of economic weapon.
member_28108
BRFite
Posts: 1852
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by member_28108 »

The area of damage of a dirty bomb is inherently limited to the spread of the bomb.The radioactive damage is not as much as you would think.

If you go through various events during the development of the atom bomb people were handling the seperated cores and there are only a couple of incidents when the cores were united manually by mistake and separated causing a partial "critical event".

Most of the effects are on the thyroid and that is attenuated by giving OralIodine immediately to the vitim.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-coll ... bombs.html

Also

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb

http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2 ... f2e8e6134a

Radiological Dispersal Devices

A dirty bomb is a type of radiological dispersal device (RDD), and RDDs are, as the name implies, devices that disperse a radiological isotope. Depending on the motives of those planning the attack, an RDD could be a low-key weapon that surreptitiously releases aerosolized radioactive material, one that dumps out a finely powdered radioactive material or something that dissolves a radioactive material in water. Such methods are intended to slowly expose as many people as possible to the radiation for as long as possible without becoming detected. Unless large amounts of a very strong radioactive material are used, however, the effects of such exposure are limited. To cause adverse effects, radiation exposure must occur either in a very high dose over a short period of time or in smaller doses sustained over a longer period. This is not to say that radiation is not dangerous, but only that small amounts of radiation exposure do not necessarily cause measurable harm. In fact, people are commonly exposed to heightened levels of radiation during activities such as air travel and mountain climbing.

By their very nature, RDDs are prone to be ineffective. To maximize the harmful effects of radiation, victims must be exposed to the highest possible concentration of a radioisotope. But by definition and design, RDDs dilute the radiation source, spreading smaller amounts of the substance over a larger area. Additionally, the use of an explosion to spread the radioisotope alerts the intended victims, who can then evacuate the affected area and be decontaminated. These factors make it very difficult for an attacker to administer a deadly dose of radiation through a dirty bomb.

It is important to note that a dirty bomb is not a nuclear device, and no nuclear reaction occurs. A dirty bomb will not produce an effect like the nuclear devices dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. A dirty bomb is quite simply an RDD that uses explosives to disperse a radioactive isotope; the only blast effect or damage produced is from conventional explosives and not from the radioactive material itself. In a dirty bomb attack, radioactive material is spread in an obvious manner, causing mass panic. In other words, the RDD is a weapon intended to create fear and terror.

The radioisotopes that can be used to construct an RDD are fairly common. Those materials considered most likely to be used in an RDD, such as cobalt-60 and cesium-137, have legitimate medical, commercial and industrial uses. Organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency warn that such radioisotopes are readily available to virtually any country in the world, and they are almost certainly not beyond the reach of even moderately capable non-state actors. Indeed, given the ease of obtaining radiological isotopes and the simplicity of constructing a dirty bomb, it is surprising that we have not yet seen one successfully used in a terror attack, especially considering jihadist groups in Iraq, Syria and Libya have captured cities that likely contain radioactive sources. In light of this, let’s examine what effectively employing a dirty bomb would entail.

Creating An Effective Dirty Bomb

Like nonexplosive RDDs, unless a dirty bomb contains a large amount of very strong radioactive material, the radiological effects of the device are not likely to be immediate or dramatic. In fact, the explosive effect of the RDD is likely to kill more people than the device’s radiological effect. Moreover, the need for a large quantity of a radioisotope not only creates challenges for obtaining the material but also means the resulting device would be large and unwieldy — and therefore difficult to smuggle into a target such as a subway or stadium.

In practical terms, a dirty bomb can produce a wide range of effects depending on the size of the improvised explosive device (IED) and the amount and type of radioactive material involved. (Powdered radioisotopes are easier to disperse than materials in solid form.) Environmental factors such as terrain, weather conditions and population density also play an important role in determining the effects of such a device.

Significantly, while the radiological effects of a dirty bomb may not be instantly lethal, the radiological impact of an RDD would likely affect an area larger than the kill radius of the IED itself and persist far longer. The explosion from a conventional IED is over in an instant, but radiation released by an RDD can remain for decades unless the area is decontaminated. While the radiation level may not be strong enough to affect people exposed briefly during the initial explosion, the cumulative effects of such radiation could prove very hazardous. Again, the area contaminated and the ease of decontamination depends on the type and quantity of the radioactive material used. Materials in a fine powdered form are easier to disperse and harder to clean up than solid blocks of material. In any case, it would be necessary to evacuate people from the contaminated area, and people would need to stay out of the area until it could be decontaminated, a process that could prove inconvenient and expensive.

Though dirty bombs are not truly weapons of mass destruction like nuclear devices are, they are frequently referred to as “weapons of mass disruption” or “weapons of mass dislocation” because they can temporarily render areas uninhabitable. The expense of decontaminating a large, densely populated area, such as a section of London or Washington, would be quite high. This cost also makes a dirty bomb a type of economic weapon.
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 59810
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by ramana »

No more on dirty/virty bums.
Aditya G
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3565
Joined: 19 Feb 2002 12:31
Contact:

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Aditya G »

From: http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/09 ... dian-ocean

Image

Image

K-4 can attack facilities in Indo-China Sea as well.
Bade
BRF Oldie
Posts: 7212
Joined: 23 May 2002 11:31
Location: badenberg in US administered part of America

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Bade »

K-16 is for Pak and K-4 is to deter China. Very simple onlee.
SaiK
BRF Oldie
Posts: 36424
Joined: 29 Oct 2003 12:31
Location: NowHere

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by SaiK »

^what is the +1 for? ;)
Bade
BRF Oldie
Posts: 7212
Joined: 23 May 2002 11:31
Location: badenberg in US administered part of America

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Bade »

To increase your post count. ;-)
SaiK
BRF Oldie
Posts: 36424
Joined: 29 Oct 2003 12:31
Location: NowHere

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by SaiK »

ours :)
member_23370
BRFite
Posts: 1103
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by member_23370 »

The real deal will only be known once they release a footage of the K-4/5 being launched from Arihant is released. The youtube video of K-4 looks nothing like the graphics but closer to what Karan posted.
krishna_krishna
BRFite
Posts: 917
Joined: 23 Oct 2006 04:14

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by krishna_krishna »

This is the first video of an old K-4 launch from DRDO:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_feco6 ... e=youtu.be
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 59810
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by ramana »

If INS Arihant carries the K-4 with four payloads, thats 4x4 equal 16 total warheads.
If it carries the K-15 in triple launchers per tube then its 3x4 equal 12 warheads per patrol.

So K-4 gives INS Arihant, the Polaris equivalent with its four tubes. Not bad for India's challengers.

Most likely the long sea trials are to make it ready for the K-4.
member_28108
BRFite
Posts: 1852
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by member_28108 »

The ring pull launch system has been used for two purposes one as a tractor but more importantly to create a gas bubble through which the missile is pushed through water. There is a video on YouTube of a similar testing of one of the Russian ICBM's being launched in a similar manner
Gyan
BRFite
Posts: 1183
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by Gyan »

I think that Indian SSBN may have been intended to have only 4 tubes for K-5 of dia 2.0m+ with 6 nukes ie 4x6=24 but now Arihant "follow ups" will have 8 tubes of k4 ie 8x4=32 nukes. So the options are:-

k14 = 12 missiles = 12 nukes and and follow on Arihant class SSBNs to have 8x4=32 nukes (Range 2000-3000km)
k4 = 4x4=16 and follow on Arihant class SSBNs to have 8x4=32 nukes(Range 3000-5000km)
k5= 4x6 = 24 nukes or 6x6=36 nukes (Range 5000-8000km) till we go for next class of SSBNs
member_28108
BRFite
Posts: 1852
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: INS Arihant (ATV) News and Discussion -3

Post by member_28108 »

See the similarities between a K4 Launch and an RS 39 launch.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=TSn6_p8DTww
Post Reply