Indian Navy News & Discussion - 22 April 2015

[deejay]

News on 4th Aircraft carrier (news exactly copied from Russian reports it seems):

http://www.defencenews.in/article/India ... rrier-3229

Edit - deleted quote as it was repetitive

[srin]

This thing has EMALS *and* ski-jump ? Why would anyone have both ?

[Sid]

This thing has EMALS *and* ski-jump ? Why would anyone have both ?

To allow EOAL, Engine-On-After-Launch.

During emergency it will also act as a makeshift EM rail gun, just point it towards target and launch a kitchen sink at hyper-sonic velocity.

[nirav]

This thing has EMALS *and* ski-jump ? Why would anyone have both ?

back up, when the roosi EMALS goes belly up ..

Hope it doesn't start with 'A/c Carrier for $ 3 Billion' and then revised prices hit $ 8 Billion.

[Shreeman]

This thing has EMALS *and* ski-jump ? Why would anyone have both ?

back up, when the roosi EMALS goes belly up ..

Hope it doesn't start with 'A/c Carrier for $ 3 Billion' and then revised prices hit $ 8 Billion.

nirav,

why further two myths in one post? each has been debated to death countless times. A hundred craft of all vintage have been operating a hundred plus sorties a day on average for nearly six months. that belly up problem lies elsewhere. the ship is a credit to the service it represents now, you are shooting your own credentials in the feet. it will be the flagship for next several decades. There is no indications even the new r22 will be operational short of another decade. commissioned or not. And then it will not surpass r33s abilities.

You do understand the whole mmrca debate has highlighted price or contract negotiation skills? Take a look at any program -- mrtts, an32s, c295/748replacement, rafale. where exactly have the prices not more than doubled while promised quantities remained a mirage.

Look at your own force structure, then make fun of the hardware developer. Its not russian reputation at risk here, its the operators and buyers who are shouting sour grapes.

[GeorgeWelch]

why further two myths in one post? each has been debated to death countless times. A hundred craft of all vintage have been operating a hundred plus sorties a day on average for nearly six months.

Not with EMALS

The US version is a massive development project that's been going on for over 20 years and still is problematic.

The Russian EMALS project is basically an unfunded design concept at this point.

The odds of them delivering a carrier with a working EMALS in the next 30 years is not good.

[nirav]

Shreeman ji, I too post stuff in jest at times .. Apologies, if you disapprove !

[Shreeman]

Shreeman ji, I too post stuff in jest at times .. Apologies, if you disapprove !

nirav,

I do understand. But these two myths are pure propaganda poison (buy c17!) used by the famous western salespeople (post count 10,000+) so often they are close to becoMing a replacement for truth on the board. You will notice that I contest these without fail, even if it prematurely wakes me from hibernation.

They need to die, just like the weshtern hyooman rights (tm) organization reports, once held in highest esteem.

[Singha]

US to stage naval maneuvers with India & Japan in Philippine Sea

India, the US and Japan will hold naval exercises in waters off the northern Philippines near the South China Sea this year, the US military said on Wednesday. The statement, which is likely to further raise tensions with China, comes a day after Washington warned Beijing against militarization of the South China Sea. Beijing is locked in a territorial dispute there with several countries. Last year, India and the US expanded their annual naval drills in the Bay of Bengal to include Japan after a gap of eight years.

[Philip]

The US is putting intense pressure upon India to sign on for CISMOA,etc.The Logistics agreement may be signed even though the Def. Min is against getting into a "clinch" with the US o keep India's options open.

The advantage of having both cats/Mals whatever plus a ski-jump is that even if there is a problem with the cat system,you can still launch and recover aircraft using STOBAR.Novel idea.

[Singha]

this is considered normal and safe for a fully loaded ULCC in heavy seas. reserve buoyancy + lighter than water nature of cargo

[Philip]

Good analysis of Chinese intentions in the IOR.The IN has to accelerate its future force plans,esp. that of the sub fleet,and plan for more patrols in the Indo-China Sea just as China increases its patrols in the IOR. The IN must also consider setting up a permanent naval facility in Vietnam just as China is doing at Gwadar and Djibouti.India has to match China on every contested square on the maritime chessboard."Tous azimuth".

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/arti ... dian-ocean
China’s ‘String of Pearls’: Naval Rivalry or Entente in the Indian Ocean?

March 2, 2016
James R. Holmes Tuesday, March 1, 2016

Last week, Chinese engineers broke ground on what press accounts styled “China’s first overseas naval base” in Djibouti. That is a big deal. Djibouti lies in East Africa along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the waterway that connects the western Indian Ocean with the Red Sea. It also adjoins the patrol grounds for the Gulf of Aden counterpiracy mission, in which China’s navy has taken part since 2009. In short, it occupies strategic real estate.

China, however, will not be the lone occupant of the seaport. Djibouti is also home to other foreign logistics hubs: The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force operates a facility there, for instance, as does the U.S. Navy. But does the Chinese installation mark a shift in Beijing’s naval outlook? Is Djibouti indeed an overseas naval base, the first in the “string of pearls” that has occasioned so much commentary over the past decade?

The image of a Chinese string of pearls—a putative network of naval bases or lesser port facilities encircling India from the sea and fettering New Delhi’s ambitions—has become a fixture in India’s strategic lexicon. The concept made its debut in 2005, when an Indian participant coined the phrase during a 2004 Booz Allen study for the U.S. Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA). Distinguished Western and Indian commentators subsequently made it a staple of debates about China’s future naval posture in the Indian Ocean and how to respond to it.

Now that a decade has passed, and in light of the developments in Djibouti and elsewhere, it’s worth revisiting what commentators have been saying about the string of pearls more recently. To what extent does the language persist? How do observers interpret it? And does it mold policy in New Delhi and elsewhere in South Asia? These are questions worth pondering, as the answers to them will have implications for the future of great-power naval relations in the region, and perhaps beyond.

A keyword search of relevant news and commentary databases reveals that of the nearly 1,000 mentions of the term since 2005, around 200 appeared in 2015 alone. Brute numbers don’t prove that an idea is on everyone’s lips, but they do suggest that the concept of a string of pearls has lost none of its resonance with regional audiences. Indeed, writers who raise the subject do so matter-of-factly. They take it for granted.

To be sure, the concept is not universally accepted as a description of China’s strategy or intentions. But few discount the possibility of such a Chinese strategy altogether, however much they disagree about whether it will take a malignant or more benign form. Just as Cold War commentators embraced the basic logic of containment while feuding among themselves about how to apply it, so observers of China’s naval emergence, particularly Indian observers, accept the idea of a string of pearls while differing on how to construe and respond to it.

Defining Terms

In terms of strategic logic, the string of pearls refers to Beijing’s efforts to negotiate limited seaport access or full-fledged basing rights with strategically located coastal and island states around the Indian Ocean basin, thereby positioning China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) astride sea lanes through which raw materials and finished goods transit. Such an enterprise may, or may not, prove troublesome for India.

A string of pearls represents a way to bolster China’s strategic position in important waterways under a variety of circumstances, from an utterly “permissive” Indian Ocean theater where few threats manifest themselves, to one on the brink of maritime war. Such a posture, then, could express itself in many ways depending on Beijing’s appraisal of interests, friends and foes, and on naval resources available.

Beijing, in other words, might deploy defensive measures to backstop its interests so long as the strategic setting remains benign. A token naval presence supported by temporary port visits for fuel and supplies may do. Should matters take a turn for the worse, China’s leadership may see the need for more forceful, offensive-minded measures, such as a PLAN squadron sized for battle and permanently homeported at Indian Ocean bases.

Cultivating good ties with governments prepared to offer access to their seaports is only prudent. It meets China’s needs for the present while laying the foundation for something bigger should circumstances warrant. That’s what militaries exist to do: furnish political leaders with options.

China has taken its cue in part from Alfred Thayer Mahan, the pre-eminent sea-power theorist of the late 19th century and the modern U.S. Navy’s intellectual founder.

Chinese strategists, moreover, are theoretically minded. They read, interpret and try to harness classic works about strategy to meet China’s needs. How does a rising great power that vacated the oceans centuries ago learn how to build up sea power? By studying successful models. The U.S. Navy has been arguably the world’s most successful model for a century now, ever since Congress approved a Naval Expansion Act in 1916, designed to field “a navy second to none.”

China, accordingly, has taken its cue in part from Alfred Thayer Mahan, the pre-eminent sea-power theorist of the late 19th century and the modern U.S. Navy’s intellectual founder. Chinese strategists have woven a Mahanian strand into their deliberations, fashioning a strategy best described as an amalgam of Western and Chinese concepts about marine endeavors. Mahan’s approach, in which commerce is king, defines sea power in terms sure to appeal to contemporary China. For Mahan, a people’s propensity to trade is the chief determinant of its maritime fortunes. Commercial access to important theaters constitutes the uppermost purpose of sea power. Political and military access are mere enablers.

In more concrete terms, Mahan declares that sea power rests on three pillars: industrial production at home and markets overseas; merchant and naval fleets; and naval stations scattered along important sea routes to support those fleets. Put in its simplest terms, that amounts to commerce, ships and bases. China possesses the first component in abundance. It has built Asia’s largest indigenous navy, closing the technological gap separating the PLAN from competitors like the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in the process.

What’s missing is Mahan’s third component of sea power: naval stations, or the “pearls” in the so-called string. The debate over the nature and scope of China’s maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean centers on the size, shape and quality of the pearls. Ships need to refuel and replenish stores every few days while underway. Yet Hainan Island, China’s closest seaport, lies too far away to supply logistical support to Indian Ocean patrols. As a result, Beijing needs some form of access to less distant ports if it is to dispatch squadrons to safeguard commercial shipping there.

Access can take many forms. Agreements providing for occasional port visits, replenishment and upkeep represent the humblest form of access. Indeed, governments routinely admit foreign shipping to their harbors on this basis. Singapore, to name one such welcoming state, has opened its port of Changi not just to the U.S. Navy, which stations a detachment of littoral combat ships there, but to other fleets—including China’s.

Permission from coastal states to construct permanent, potentially fortified strongholds to permanently forward-deployed units, on the other hand, is the most expansive option, as well as the most politically combustible for the host. Letting a foreign power build installations meant for wartime as well as peacetime pursuits heralds an alliance between the host government and the outsiders. Such an arrangement could entangle the host government in disputes that might not suit their interests. Such is the case with Japan and the United States, which long ago cast their lot together as allies. The U.S. Seventh Fleet calls Yokosuka and Sasebo home under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Intentions & Implementation

Whether Indian Ocean states would similarly tie their fates to China’s, exposing themselves to potential conflict with India or America, remains to be seen. But before even considering that possibility, two more immediate questions arise: What does Beijing want, and what types of access will it seek?

To date China’s Indian Ocean adventure has been a modest affair from a naval standpoint. In 2008, my longtime co-author Toshi Yoshihara and I assessed the state of China’s maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean. We concluded that, by bankrolling seaport development in places like Gwadar, in western Pakistan, China was laying the groundwork for a future naval presence, creating options for itself should it someday see the need to exercise them. That same year, in a similar vein, we and another longtime colleague, Andrew Winner, argued that a U.S.-China-India strategic triangle was taking shape in the Indian Ocean. But the impetus toward conflict was weak on all three sides, leaving the prospective competitors with the time and political space to craft some sort of maritime entente.

What does Beijing want, and what types of access will it seek?

Such an entente remains possible. China has continued to lay the groundwork for a more robust Indian Ocean presence since 2008, financing infrastructure developments in seaports such as Gwadar; Colombo, in Sri Lanka; Mahe, in the Seychelles; and of course the latest project, in Djibouti. Such projects provide harbors for merchant and naval shipping to resupply, advancing China’s economic, diplomatic and military purposes in the region. In the process, such outreach helps Beijing amass goodwill with South Asian governments. In effect, Beijing has done favors for regional governments—favors it may be able to call in should it see the need for naval stations at sites Chinese engineers have developed. China now has options.

But in the current strategic environment, Beijing has minimal incentive to assemble a network of full-blown naval bases, which would entail the expense and strategic risk of diverting forces from East Asia. And so long as great-power relations do not take a turn toward competition and conflict, prompting China to bulk up its Indian Ocean forces, lesser port-access arrangements suffice. Nor is there anything especially worrisome about Beijing’s funding infrastructure in South Asia, or about occasional PLAN forays into regional waters. This is what blue-water navies do. If and when some government consents to full-scale PLAN bases, then it may be time to fret about a string of pearls—and adjust strategy to compensate. In the meantime, Beijing has every reason to court friendly governments, hedging against a downturn in relations, just as India and its friends have every reason to remain watchful.

This is largely where things stand today: wary coexistence coexists with hedging against the worst on the part of all potential antagonists. Nevertheless, the past decade has witnessed some heartening developments. Most noteworthy among these is the multinational counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Since late 2008, an assortment of naval contingents—ranging from NATO and the European Union to the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces command—has patrolled a transit corridor through the gulf to ensure that merchant vessels pass unmolested.

pakistan
A Pakistani soldier at the newly built Gwadar port, west of Karachi, Pakistan, March 20, 2007 (AP photo by Shakil Adil).

Flotillas from China and India, as well as other individual partners such as Russia, joined the expedition, although they declined to submit to foreign tactical or operational command. By most accounts the operation qualifies as a success. It has driven down Somali piracy, while the disparate contingents have coordinated their efforts smoothly and amicably. It also would seem to justify the need for a more permanent installation in Djibouti.

Is this simply a cover for China’s navy to amass experience at sustaining naval forces in waters remote from Chinese shores—experience it could put to work assembling a string of pearls? Of course. Peacetime operations help equip navies for combat. But neither the counterpiracy campaign nor intermittent PLAN probes into Indian Ocean waters with submarines—craft sure to rattle Indian nerves, considering the rudimentary state of the Indian navy anti-submarine capabilities—warrant alarm. Where Chinese interests go, China’s navy will follow. This is natural. While past behavior is no guarantee, how the PLAN conducts itself in encounters with foreign navies today remains the best predictor of future interactions.

And while China’s coercive use of sea power in the East and South China Seas does merit concern, Beijing appears to play by different, less confrontational rules in the waters west of the Indonesian archipelago. The jury thus remains out on whether India, China and America will piece together a seagoing entente in the Indian Ocean despite quarreling in the South China Sea. Nothing has foreclosed that possibility as of yet. Moreover, if China is pursuing a string of pearls, its efforts have done little to stifle India’s high-seas endeavors.

The View From India

But important as China’s intentions are in determining how things play out in the Indian Ocean, so too are India’s perceptions of those intentions. So what have Indian observers had to say about China’s string of pearls recently? As noted at the outset, the phrase has become common parlance. At the same time, most Indian commentators evince little panic at China’s increasingly visible presence in their backyard. Many of them see China’s martial endeavors as part of a larger grand strategy, involving not just naval and military but economic and diplomatic implements, which may or may not prove inimical to Indian interests.

Indian observers, it seems, also understand that India need not remain a passive bystander to outsiders’ encroachment in their home region. If Beijing is competing for influence in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi boasts resources of its own with which to compete. It need not submit meekly while China draws a string of pearls tight, smothering India’s rightful interests and aspirations.

Where Chinese interests go, China’s navy will follow.

Several strands of analysis stand out vis-à-vis the string of pearls. First of all, the geospatial dimension that gave rise to the metaphor still pervades Indian thinking. Though a full-blown naval base network remains mostly hypothetical, the prospect of Chinese geostrategic containment of India remains real.

Bharat Karnad articulates an extreme view of China’s strategy, depicting it as implacably hostile and largely India-centric. He sees recent trends in Chinese strategy toward the Indian Ocean—for instance, the so-called Maritime Silk Road initiative, which some Indians regard as an effort to rebrand the string of pearls—as Beijing’s way of “enveloping India in a geostrategic mesh.” Karnad also finds India suffering from a geostrategic deficit due to its innermost circle of neighbors being historically perceived as natural adversaries. That, says Karnad, has created a diplomatic and strategic “near abroad” that leaves New Delhi ill-equipped to cope with China’s string-of-pearls strategy.

If Indians take that strategy more or less as a given, their Chinese interlocutors—in 2015 as in 2005—fervently deny that Beijing entertains such aspirations. Last July, Atul Aneja, a reporter for The Hindu daily, observed that Chinese state media condemned as “groundless” Indian fears that Beijing was intent on acquiring a naval base in the Maldives. The Maldives’ denials were just as forceful. As Aneja pointed out, Chinese interlocutors emphasize that the phrase “string of pearls” was coined not by the Chinese, but by an American consultancy. In an August interview with Ajish P. Joy of The Week, China’s ambassador to India, Le Yucheng, likewise maintained that Chinese ventures in South Asia are “not against India and we have no hidden agenda. China does not have the so-called ‘string of pearls’ strategy to contain India.”

At the same time, Chinese analysts such as Fu Xiaoqiang of the China Institutes of Contemporary Relations argue that Indians must “get used to” a higher-profile Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. According to Fu, Chinese overtures toward Indian Ocean countries “will become more normal with more and more Chinese enterprises going abroad.”

One could reasonably ask, of course—as skeptical Indians do—whether Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean add up to a string of pearls by another name. China, in other words, could distance itself from the string-of-pearls label while pursuing a strategy that amounts to the same thing.

It’s also worth pointing out that the string-of-pearls imagery has filtered into the wider Asian consciousness. Mentions of it are no longer confined to Indian observers, to Chinese disclaimers, or to South Asia specialists in the West. Pundits in Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia evoked the metaphor in 2015, as did numerous observers from the Indian Ocean basin countries. Such acceptance provides a common vocabulary that could work in India’s favor should it decide to undertake a full-bore campaign to thwart China’s Indian Ocean strategy. If foreign interlocutors accept the premises behind the string of pearls, they may prove receptive to Indian appeals to resist it.

piracy
Chinese missile frigate Zhoushan at the Stonecutters Island base,
Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 2009 (AP photo by Vincent Yu).

Significantly, however, the concept has taken on a more multidimensional character since 2005. Then, it was framed as a military cordon. Today, many observers regard it as a Chinese grand strategy, combining political, economic and cultural dimensions alongside the martial component. Karnad, for instance, sees it in those terms, albeit casting the string of pearls in the worst possible light. Not all Indians consider China’s efforts as uniformly detrimental to their interests, however.

Writing in The Pioneer last June, for instance, Rinku Ghosh postulated that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road Initiative” will knit the region together for mutual political, economic and cultural benefit. In this upbeat account of things, a Chinese string of pearls, whatever name it may go by, could be a blessing rather than a curse, ushering in an Asia where economic interconnectedness tamps down the propensity for conflict and war. Clearly, no consensus about China’s strategy yet prevails on the subcontinent.

India’s Ripostes

Disagreement about China’s intentions notwithstanding, Indians are increasingly conscious that New Delhi can deploy reciprocal strategies. With regard to power politics, Indian Ocean geography is nowhere near as complex as that of East Asia. Yet New Delhi controls one of the key strategic features: the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which lie north to south across the Western approaches to the Strait of Malacca. That makes the archipelago an ideal site for monitoring the comings and goings of PLAN task forces.

Suitably armed and backed up by the Indian navy, the islands could also bar Chinese access to the Indian Ocean. If Indian forces closed the narrow passages through the island chains, they could compel Chinese vessels to detour through one of the lesser straits that pierce the Indonesian archipelago, adding distance—and thus time, cost and hazard—to cruises bound for the Indian Ocean.

Small wonder Chinese analysts liken the Andamans and Nicobars to a “metal chain” impairing China’s use of sea routes vital to its economic prosperity. So New Delhi enjoys geostrategic options of its own. And the fact that it occupies the “interior lines” in the Indian Ocean region, placing powerful forces near likely trouble spots, constitutes a critical advantage. China, by contrast, must operate along distended “exterior lines” just to gain access to the region. It is no simple matter for a faraway great-power navy to overpower a fellow great-power navy—even a weaker one—in that navy’s home waters.

But power politics isn’t New Delhi’s only alternative. Wooing South Asian nations goes hand in hand with geostrategic competition. However, India’s complicated relations with its neighbors, combined with China’s active courtship of them through economic and security overtures, mean that its diplomatic prospects are mixed. On the positive side of the ledger, Iran offered India the rights to develop and operate the Iranian port of Chabahar, near the Pakistani port of Gwadar along Iran’s Arabian Sea coast. From a political standpoint, Tehran’s offer allows New Delhi to hint that it too can accumulate the makings of a string of pearls. From a material standpoint, it lets India threaten to station forces along Iranian shorelines—outflanking and one-upping any PLAN presence at Gwadar. Such gambits favor India, the natural hegemon of the Indian Ocean region.

Competitive interaction—the cycle of challenge and reply—thus promises to be the name of the Indo-Chinese great game in maritime Asia. If China pursues economic and naval expansion in the Indian Ocean, India can reply by “acting east,” as Prime Minister Narendra Modi has urged. In concrete terms, if the PLAN dispatches submarines and surface forces to the Indian Ocean, the Indian navy can take part in exercises and port visits in the Western Pacific—as indeed it has done from time to time under the aegis of the annual Malabar multinational exercises. If PLAN subs mount forays into South Asian waters, Indian navy subs could make their presence known in the South China Sea.

All of this is to be expected when a rising great power mounts an incipient naval presence in a fellow great power’s environs, necessarily eliciting a response. By and large, India has reacted calmly and maturely to apparent Chinese encroachment, and it is mulling its options carefully should the surroundings turn hostile. That bodes well for Indian purposes and power in the Indian Ocean, where competition seems certain, but conflict far from inevitable.

James Holmes is professor of strategy at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., and co-author of “Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century.” The views voiced here are his alone.

[Singha]

even the open deck below the helicopter deck of our talwar class ships will be awash in heavy seas.

[Philip]

Singha,why in the Ru Talwar variants,the deck is enclosed.

The US is doing its best to rope in India into an anti-China naval alliance in the Asia-Pacific.US envoy Verma is throwing his coin into the "fountain" hoping like the 3 hopeful lovers in that famous film (3 coins in a fountain) ,singing "make it mine","it" being the IN! Here's a candid view from the NYT of the issue.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/world ... .html?_r=0

U.S. Proposes Reviving Naval Coalition to Balance China’s Expansion
By ELLEN BARRYMARCH 2, 2016

An Indian naval vessel near Visakhapatnam last month. India has not, to date, shown interest in carrying out joint patrols with the United States, even under the more neutral auspices of counterpiracy operations. Credit Saurabh Das/Associated Press

NEW DELHI — The chief of the United States Pacific Command, Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., on Wednesday proposed reviving an informal strategic coalition made up of the navies of Japan, Australia, India and the United States, an experiment that collapsed a decade ago because of diplomatic protests from China.

The proposal was the latest in a series of United States overtures to India, a country wary of forming strategic alliances, to become part of a network of naval powers that would balance China’s maritime expansion.

The American ambassador to India, Richard R. Verma, expressed hope in a speech that “in the not-too-distant future,” joint patrols by navy vessels from India and the United States “will become a common and welcome sight throughout Indo-Pacific waters.”

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And officials have said that the United States is close, after 10 years of demurral from the Indian side, to concluding a logistics agreement that would allow the two countries’ militaries to easily use each other’s resources for refueling and repairs.

What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea

China has been feverishly piling sand onto reefs in the South China Sea for the past year, creating seven new islets in the region. It is straining geopolitical tensions that were already taut.

Though he did not specifically mention China on Wednesday, Admiral Harris said powerful countries were seeking to “bully smaller nations through intimidation and coercion,” and made the case that a broad naval collaboration was the best way to avert it.

“Exercising together will lead to operating together,” he said, before meetings with his Indian counterpart. “By being ambitious, India, Japan, Australia and the United States and so many like-minded nations can aspire to operate anywhere in the high seas and the airspace above it.”

Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office, India has ramped up naval cooperation with the United States. It reacted angrily in 2014 when a Chinese People’s Liberation Army submarine docked in the Sri Lankan port of Colombo, and has warily watched the expansion of one of President Xi Jinping’s priority projects, a maritime “silk road” with major ports in Gwadar, Pakistan, and Chittagong, Bangladesh. When President Obama visited India last year, the two countries issued a joint statement on “the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region,” something India had refused to do in the past.

Still, some of the American proposals smack of wishful thinking. India has not, to date, shown interest in carrying out joint patrols with the United States, even under the more neutral auspices of counterpiracy operations.

Officials here rebutted a Reuters report last month in which a United States official suggested India might participate in joint patrols in the South China Sea, something not even treaty allies like Australia or Japan have agreed to.

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“The last thing India wants to do is accidentally make itself into a front-line player in the South China Sea,” said Nitin A. Gokhale, a security analyst, adding that “the best U.S.-aligned players can expect” is for India to remain active in regional forums, and shore up smaller navies like those of Vietnam and the Philippines.

“I don’t think India will be a front-line state,” he said.

Admiral Harris’s proposal of a quadrilateral security grouping, given at a forum hosted by the Observer Research Foundation, is certain to capture Beijing’s attention. It did the same in 2007, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan introduced the idea.

But Chinese analysts viewed the grouping as hostile; one called it a “mini-NATO.” Even before the four countries convened for their first joint meeting, China had sent formal diplomatic protests to Washington, New Delhi, Canberra and Tokyo. At a summit meeting with China less than two years later, Australia announced that it was withdrawing from the quadrilateral arrangement.

Under Mr. Modi, India’s navy has embarked on the creation of a web of bilateral and trilateral agreements, which serve the same purpose but are less likely to be “caricatured” by China as a containment strategy, said Rory Medcalf, the head of the National Security College at the Australian National University. He added, however, that growing cooperation with the United States had forced China to take India more seriously.

Shen Dingli, a professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, dismissed the idea that the grouping could be revived, and said that India would not join such a network for fear of Chinese retaliation.

“China actually has many ways to hurt India,” he said. “China could send an aircraft carrier to the Gwadar port in Pakistan. China had turned down the Pakistan offer to have military stationed in the country. If India forces China to do that, of course we can put a navy at your doorstep.”

[Austin]

Parrikar rules out joint patrolling with the US in Asia Pacific

NEW DELHI: India on Friday ruled out the possibility of undertaking joint naval patrolling or hopping on board a quadrilateral security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region, which has been proposed by the US as a counter to China's aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea and elsewhere.

"Till now, India has never participated in joint patrolling. We do participate in joint exercises. So, the question of joint patrolling at this stage does not arise," said defence minister Manohar Parrikar.

India, for instance, will be undertaking the Malabar naval exercise with the US and Japan, off the Japanese coast in the Pacific, in June-July.

This comes three days after the visiting US Pacific command chief admiral Harry Harris pitched for a quadrilateral security dialogue among India, Japan, Australia and the US, even as he hoped that joint patrolling would materialise in the Asia-Pacific region in "the not too distant future", as was reported by TOI.

India has for long positioned itself as "a neutral player" in the ongoing geopolitical jostling between the US and China, especially in the South China Sea where the latter is locked in bitter territorial disputes with its neighbours.

"I am not responding to what the US admiral has said. Our viewpoint will come to you if we at all consider any such thing from our side,"
said Parrikar.

Asked whether India was going to ink the nearly-finalised Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) when US defence secretary Ash Carter comes visiting India next month, Parrikar said the government would take all decisions in the interest of the country.

"It has to benefit the nation on various counts. We definitely would say that our government is very active on almost everything. We don't like to unnecessarily delay things. So, we definitely do paper work, discussions are going on many things," he said.


The US has been pushing the bilateral "foundational agreements" like the LSA, the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA) for over a decade now.

Though the previous UPA regime had stonewalled them, the NDA government feels the LSA is "relatively easier to ink", while more clarifications and discussions are needed on the CISMOA and BECA, as was reported by TOI.


Modelled on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements the US has inked with scores of countries, the LSA envisages the two militaries providing logistic support, refuelling and berthing facilities for each other's warships and aircraft on a barter or an equal-value exchange basis.

[srin]

Minor fire on INS Viraat. One sailor dead. RIP.

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... ns-viraat/

INS Viraat, which was on a routine deployment to Goa, reported an incident of steam leak and minor fire in one of the ship’s boiler rooms late this afternoon.
While the incident was quickly brought under control, four sailors who were present at the scene and combating the fire sustained injury from the smoke.
One of them, Chief Engineering Mechanic Ashu Singh was critical having suffered smoke inhalation. He was shifted to the naval hospital at Goa where he suffered a cardiac arrest and succumbed to his injury. Next of kin have been informed.
The other three are under treatment and out of danger. Prima facie, some insulating material in the boiler room appears to have caught fire from heat due to steam leak. Investigations are on. Viraat is expected to sail back to Mumbai soon.

This was just after the family day. http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 544_1.html

[Philip]

How can it be described as a "minor" event? A sailor tragically died! Such is the worth of life today...esp in India,where those fighting for the nation against terror external (Paki) and internal (Naxals/Maoists) have been reduced to mere statistics.

A great shame that on its last operational deployment,this world-famous carrier must claim a victim. Our condolences to the family of sailor killed and a prayer for a speedy recovery for the wounded.

[Cain Marko]

DSRVs at last?

http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/it-took- ... topstories

[Singha]

mubarak ho boys - arihant effect proved last straw on camels back
--

India will spend 1,900 crores on buying two rescue submarines from a UK firm, the government has decided.

The decision to buy submarines for emergency deep-sea missions was first taken 14 years ago, but it was only last night that the Cabinet Committee on Security chose UK manufacturer James Fisher for the purchase.

http://jfdefence.com/products/dsar/index.php

[Shanu]

Also P-17A Frigate weapon systems acquisition cleared today by DAC. Hopefully we'll stay on schedule on these 7 frigates.

http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/new ... 342626.ece

The DAC, chaired by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, also gave its nod to acquire weapons and sensors package for Project 17A stealth frigates for the Indian Navy.

[Aditya G]

Which ship?

mubarak ho boys - arihant effect proved last straw on camels back
--

India will spend 1,900 crores on buying two rescue submarines from a UK firm, the government has decided.

The decision to buy submarines for emergency deep-sea missions was first taken 14 years ago, but it was only last night that the Cabinet Committee on Security chose UK manufacturer James Fisher for the purchase.

http://jfdefence.com/products/dsar/index.php

[Singha]

Probably our existing sub tenders diving support ships or survey vessels will have the cranes and c3 room fitted newly

[Austin]

Russia in talks with India to sell three Project 11356 frigates

http://tass.ru/en/defense/861603

[Shreeman]

Russia in talks with India to sell three Project 11356 frigates

http://tass.ru/en/defense/861603

Injuns buy engines separately?

[Austin]

Should be no different on how we deal with Zorya for P-15 class and other ships using their enjine

[Aditya G]

We have only one diving support ship INS Neereekshak, which is equipped with a diving bell. This is an ex-ONGC ship - it gets the job done but it is a civvie ship. The previous Neereekshak was a Prut class ship - same as RFS Epron who supported INS Arihant trials! INS Matanga also pitches in for this role.

The submarine tender - INS Amba - was retired some years back. She used to operate with MARCOS chariots and considered quite effective.

I think there has to be an order of 2 new diving tenders - should be easy for likes of ABG shipyard:

CCC Pioneer - electric propulsion diving support ship:



Shaddad - built for Qatari company:



Built in India by ABG Shipyard, the Dynamic Positioning (DP2-enabled) vessel is equipped with the latest generation diving equipment that qualifies the vessel to undertake subsea maintenance with saturated diving capability up to 300m depth, as well as air diving and Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) operations.

Research Vessel Sindhu Sadhana:

Russia in talks with India to sell three Project 11356 frigates

http://tass.ru/en/defense/861603

This proposal is for the last tranche of ships i presume? I think a direct sale makes more sense than the Reliance Make in India offer. Buy now and get an early accretion to force levels on expense of desi orders. Tough call.

[Prem]

Firing missiles frigate Admiral Grigorovich(P11356) new weapons

[John]

Grigorovich are designed to carry vl shtil which opens the possibility of modifying these to carry barak 8. With perhaps El/m 2238 fitted in place of positiv radar ( similar to shivalik ) for target acquisition and mid course guidance.

[arun]

GRSE launches 6th LCU MK IV L56:

Navy's sixth landing craft utility ship launched in Kolkata

[Aditya G]

^

The first ship of the class ‘LCU-L51’ was launched on March 12, and is presently undergoing sea trials at GRSE. The vessel is likely to be delivered shortly to the Indian Navy.

[Philip]

Another report on the rejection of joint patrols.
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htm ... 00519.html

India Rejects Joint Naval Patrols with U.S. in South China Sea

India has ruled out participating in joint patrols in the South China Sea proposed by the United States. Experts say that India wants to focus on containing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and despite a growing strategic partnership, it remains wary of being part of a military alliance with Washington.

The proposal that the navies of Japan, Australia and India could join the U.S. in preserving freedom of navigation in the contested waters of South China Sea was voiced recently by chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry B. Harris.

But within days, Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar said, "As of now, India has never taken part in any joint patrol; we only do joint exercises. The question of joint patrol does not arise."

Indian naval spokesman D.K. Sharma underscored India's position that it only participates in military operations that take place under the United Nations flag.

"The biggest example in contemporary times is the Gulf of Aden patrols. From 2008 onwards when piracy has infested the Gulf of Aden and North Aegean Sea, India has not joined hands with any NATO or any other construct," said Sharma.

Wary of China’s push in South China Sea, where maritime and territorial disputes are festering, India has shed its traditional diffidence and been vocal in calling for freedom of navigation and maritime security in the disputed waters.

At the same time, strategic experts say that New Delhi wants to be seen as a "neutral player" in an area where it is not directly involved.
Satellite imagery analysis by geopolitical intelligence firm Stratfor shows overall land, building and military expansion by China on Woody Island in the South China Sea. Satellite imagery analysis by geopolitical intelligence firm Stratfor shows overall land, building and military expansion by China on Woody Island in the South China Sea.

◆ Wary of Provoking China

Manoj Joshi at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi says India is concerned about the potential ramifications in the Indian Ocean if its ships take part in U.S.-led patrols in waters close to China.

"India is worried that if we do joint patrols with the U.S, the Chinese could do it to us with Pakistan. That is really the worry -- the US navy can operate globally, but India is not that powerful and that same thing could be turned on its head as far as we are concerned," says Joshi.

Beijing's bid to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean remains a huge concern for India and has partly prompted its growing defense partnership with Washington.

Overriding Chinese objections, last year India invited Japan back into annual naval exercises held with the U.S. for the first time in eight years.

◆ Planned Exercises

This year, the three countries are scheduled to hold naval drills in waters off the northern Philippines near the South China Sea -- a move that is likely to irk Beijing.

But for the time being, joint exercises is as far as India is willing to go. "If India and the U.S. have not contemplated similar kind of patrol in Indian Ocean, what could justify India and U.S. patrolling waters of South China Sea?" asks Chintamani Mahapatra, a foreign policy professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.

India's decades-long border dispute in the Himalayas with Beijing where their armies face off is also likely to hold New Delhi back from wading into the contentious waters of South China Sea.

"We have a long border and it is just us and them on that border. We will certainly stand firm in our position, but we don’t want to provoke," says Jayadeva Ranade, a China specialist at India's National Security Advisory Board.

[deejay]

Another report on the rejection of joint patrols.
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htm ... 00519.html

India Rejects Joint Naval Patrols with U.S. in South China Sea

...

Manoj Joshi at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi says India is concerned about the potential ramifications in the Indian Ocean if its ships take part in U.S.-led patrols in waters close to China.

"India is worried that if we do joint patrols with the U.S, the Chinese could do it to us with Pakistan. That is really the worry -- the US navy can operate globally, but India is not that powerful and that same thing could be turned on its head as far as we are concerned," says Joshi.
...

While I have no disagreement with India not doing joint patrols with US in South China Sea, what Manoj Joshi of the ORF says is a stupid thing to say.

Seriously, I am more and more convinced that ORF is a congregation of self serving, ill informed people with a platform to keep themselves in news.

[arshyam]

^^ Chinese navy joint patrols with whom? PN? They will most likely end up racing the Chinese while shouting AoA

Seriously, what the heck is this ORF come to? First, Sudheendra Kulkarni, and now this guy. (shakes head in disgust)

[Aditya G]

If PLAN wants to patrol the IO then they will do it in any case whether or not you patrol the Indo China Sea/SCS.

When will we learn

[nirav]

we must not forget that budget wise and capital ships wise, we are behind the Chinese.

While IN is making impressive additions to it flotilla, theres no need for now to engage in this "joint patrol" stuff with the Americans.

The PLAN will find a very potent adversary/match in the IN when it comes to PLAN patrols in Arabian sea and bay of bengal. Routine Sukhoi and Jaguar IM missions can be mounted to remind the Chinese whos the boss in these parts of the high seas .. Same holds true for us when we venture out in their sphere of influence. .

We dont need to go in SCS to do a "tit for tat patrol" without shoring up our capability first. It doesnt serve us much practical purpose.

The Malabar exercises with US and Japan meanwhile do serve our purpose and im glad GoI is going forward with it.

[John]

^

The first ship of the class ‘LCU-L51’ was launched on March 12, and is presently undergoing sea trials at GRSE. The vessel is likely to be delivered shortly to the Indian Navy.

Once they get inducted that will give IN one of largest fleet of LCU with USN and PLAN only other nations operating a larger fleet. The main missing piece now is LHD hope a design is picked soon so construction can start asap.

[Philip]

China is to shortly fly the world's largest amphib multi-role aircraft.Designed for China's Asia-Pacific requirements. This may spur the GOI to acquire amphibs for the IN and CG.However,the price of the Japanese amphib is v.high and other alternatives from other manufacturers should be looked at. The construction of the 3-4 amphib vessels is another issue.What is the design/config? The rate at which China is building its naval vessels and subs is higher than any other nation on the planet,with th4 exception of Russian and US N-subs. The IN has a lot of catching up to do.

[SNaik]

Firing missiles frigate Admiral Grigorovich(P11356) new weapons

Actually, the first 30 seconds are of 20380 corvette firing 9M96 SAM.

[ramana]

deejay, M Joshi was a Communist in his student days per his relative!!!

[deejay]

deejay, M Joshi was a Communist in his student days per his relative!!!

Thank you for that tid bit Ramana ji. With my current mental disposition against the Communists, I am tempted to say "Why doesn't it surprise me?"