US military, technology, arms, tactics

[brar_w]

The Majority of the USN fleet will be made by Boeing, all the way through the middle to late 2030's (and they could always win the FA-XX given the USN's satisfaction with Hornet and Growler). The Main USAF Bomber fleet will be controlled by Northrop Grumman and Boeing. The F-35 will by the middle of next decade shift to an OMS approach opening Boeing and Northrop Grumman up to compete for mission system upgrades, mission systems that in some cases NG already designs and develops (but it can compete for the main system integrator if it has a better solution since DOD will have ownership of the architecture by then). Lockheed also has pretty much ZERO chance of winning the T-X which is a major competition for a program that will keep one of these production lines funded for well over a decade (its widely considered Boeing's to loose).

Its unfortunate that the industrial base is being allowed to erode in certain cases and I agree on these fronts about Lockheed controlling so much of the fighter market. All or nothing was not the smartest decisions the Congress made, and some of the same folks (McCain et al) were in big favor of this back then. However, that over the next 3-4 years the Air Dominance Initiative X-Planes would be ready to fly and no doubt Boeing would have at least one of the award there. Boeing came out of the ATF and JSF with two fairly poor performances...On the ATF they were 3 or 4 and were forced to team up to get some work through Lockheed, and on the JSF they completely misread the combat requirements. Since then they have invested a lot of money in making sure these mistakes aren't repeated and have followed Northrop Grumman in the center of excellence approach and have been internally funding a fighter design team for nearly 8 years now. Lockheed did after all also come to control the F-16 that the USAF now has 1000+ of. If the Congress feels there is a fast jet industrial base concern they can do a number of things -

- Keep on Buying more Growlers and force the platform on the Marines or USAF
- Keep the F-15 line going by performing a more demanding overhaul of the F-15C's (new wings have been proposed in the past by Boeing as a means to extend the life) and upgrade more F-15C's and E's with EPAWS, and other modernization initiatives to keep the line active.
-Buy more F-15E's, if need be taking F-35's away from the USAF plan to pay for them
- Push the F-X and/or F/A-XX ahead by 5 or so years to get Boeing to transition straight to it once one of its major lines close. i.e. Enter straight into EMD the moment the X-Planes they are working on now have flown and concluded their program.

Also, the JMR is a prototyping strategy. The acquisition strategy has not been decided yet for FVL since they rushed JMR to protect the industrial base given they had very little in rotary craft research in the pipeline between the mid 2010's and middle 2020's . How these teams respond once the prototyping phase is complete could (and most likely would given Sikorsky's deal with Lockheed) be a lot different. I don't think those that loose out on JMR would be worried about not getting another chance or realigning for the eventual FVL RFP when it is released next decade. On the JMR side I'd be more concerned since the Army has no strategy when it comes to its industrial base and given their share of the budget, its not easy for them to recover. I think both Sikorsky and the Bell designs will eventually be operationalized through the JMR efforts partly because they would have learnt the lessons from the JSF, but also because there are missions that both these concepts can be optimized for.

The previous Army Acq. Secretary responding to criticism on the JMR requirements being conservatives made a funny point that FVL (Future vertical lift) requirements hadn't really been determined yet. She said something like we just asked them for 2x more range, 1.5x more speed and higher ceilings for these prototypes and technology demonstrators....the rest will come out in the 2020's when ongoing studies reveal the eventual requirements. Other than the fighter situation work is actually spread quite well with General Atomics and Northrop Grumman having a very strong presence in unmanned with Boeing and Lockheed playing catch up (and unmanned aircraft have been acquired in high numbers by the USAF compared to virtually no fighters besides the F-22's and now the F-35's). They are moving to put a pause on these consolidations because the LRS-B loss by Boeing probably means they would look to acquire someone, and GA has the sort of portfolio Boeing loves (proven, in demand aircraft that Boeing can keep on churning out for some years). That to me is more threatening (M&A's) than the fighter situation that they can mitigate to some extent if they feel the need to do so. The USAF are also just a few years away from another HUGE industrial base shock when they figure out how to recapitalize the strategic ground based deterrence - not that plenty of smart folks hadn't pointed this out to Congress over the decades when they let the capability and industrial base atrophy.

On the new X-Planes -



Its also not a US unique problem. Russia has industrial base consolidation as well with multiple design-houses now brought under very few giant complexes.

[Viv S]

And SOMETHING happens - that makes the ENTIRE fleet irrelevant. I don't know what, I can't predict what, but there is a reason why nations don't go to this Maginot Line design any more. You can bet that every potential adversary is hard at work, big grin on their faces, to find a few of those tricks to use when the time comes up.

Really? Does BAE, Dassault or Saab have a lot of domestic competition? Is state funding in China and Russia going to more than one fifth gen design?

So if 'SOMETHING happens - that makes the ENTIRE fleet irrelevant' (like what?) practically every military in the world will be in the same shoes.

[Philip]

Since the old "Turkey or Talisman" td is dead,here goes-latest info on the JSF's pilgrimage to perfection.
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defens ... /83589006/

Could Connectivity Failure Ground F-35? It's Complicated
Lara Seligman, Defense News 4:01 a.m. EDT April 29, 2016
(Photo: Darin Russell/Lockheed Martin)

WASHINGTON — The F-35 joint program office and a top government watchdog are butting heads about a key question for the joint strike fighter: whether or not the fifth-generation plane can fly if disconnected from a key logistics system.

At the center of the debate is the Autonomics Logistics and Information System (ALIS), an internal diagnostic system that tracks the health of each part of each plane worldwide. ALIS is no stranger to controversy, with top program officials identifying it as the last hurdle to declaring the US Air Force jets operational on time this year.

Now a new report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identifies a new ALIS-related concern — that if a single ALIS server were to go down, whether from loss of electricity or sabotage, it could cripple the entire F-35 fleet.

"Users are concerned that ALIS’ current design results in all F-35 data produced across the fleet to be routed up to the Central Point of Entry and then to the Autonomic Logistics Operating Unit, with no backup system or redundancy,” according to the April GAO report. “If either of these fail, it could take the entire F-35 fleet offline.”

But JPO chief Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan disagrees, telling reporters last week after testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee there is “absolutely” no truth to the claim that a failure to connect to ALIS could ground the fleet.

The differing views of the program office and the GAO over ALIS reflect the ongoing challenges of the F-35 program, and the fleet's logistics system in particular. ALIS is by far the most integrated and complex fleet management system in the US military today, but advances in technology often give rise to new challenges — and without a clear precedent from previous systems, both sides have legitimate arguments to fall back on.

DEFENSE NEWS
Marine Maintainers on F-35B Benefits, Challenges

ALIS, often called the backbone of the F-35 fleet, is an information technology hub that is used to plan missions, track aircraft status, order spare parts, and manage sustainment of the plane. By contrast, legacy aircraft use several standalone systems to perform these daily functions. ALIS is the first system of its kind to manage daily squadron operations, track sustainment trends and protect sovereign information — all in one hub, according to Dave Scott, vice president of training and logistics solution business development for Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training.

All ALIS servers connect through encrypted land or satellite military networks, rather than the “internet” we usually think of, Scott noted.

There is only one global ALIS server, called the Autonomic Logistics Operating Unit (ALOU), where spare parts are ordered and reliability trends are analyzed, Scott said. Each partner nation has its own server, called the Central Point of Entry (CPE), which stores sovereign data and transmits that information to the ALOU, Scott explained.

Individual squadrons operate locally with a server called the Standard Operating Unit (SOU), which communicates with that nation’s CPE. Squadrons can operate independently and store data for about 30 days without connecting to the partner nation’s CPE, Scott said. Then, when a connection is re-established, the SOU uploads the stored data to the CPE.

Differing Opinions

The fact that the F-35 enterprise has so few servers, and just one main hub for the entire globe, is at the core of concerns ALIS could easily be taken down.

The GAO report warned that ALIS has no backup system to ensure operations if any of the servers — the ALOU, a nation's CPE or a squadron's SOU — were to fail. Specifically, squadron leaders at two sites visited by the GAO expressed concern that a loss of electricity, particularly during deployments to remote locations, “could adversely affect fleet operations.”

The program office, for its part, says it is working to build in more redundancy to the ALIS infrastructure. Program officials are also working to procure two additional ALOUs for backup, and possibly relocating the US CPE to another F-35 site, according to the GAO report.

But in the near-term, the Pentagon feels it can manage even if ALIS were to go down. In fact, the overall F-35 fleet should be able to operate without connection for up to 30 days with maintainers tracking the work off-line, the Pentagon told GAO.

Losing connectivity to ALIS would be a pain, but hardly fatal, the JPO contends. If jets are unable to use ALIS — a ground-based system that provides sustainment and support, but not combat capabilities for the jet — the F-35 is still a usable plane. In fact, the worst case scenario would be that operators would have to track maintenance and manage daily squadron operations manually, just as older jets do.

DEFENSE NEWS

What’s Left on the Air Force Checklist To Make F-35s Operational?

The best description of the problem came from Gen. Ellen Pawlikowski, chief of Air Force Materiel Command, who compared ALIS to a laptop computer.

"You can turn on your laptop, you can use it, you can turn it off and never be on the internet," Pawlikowski said April 28 during a Defense Writers Group event. "But eventually there is stuff you want to send out by email, eventually there are things you may want to put on your Google drive."

Yes, the F-35 can take off and land without connecting to ALIS; yes, operators can make repairs without the logistics system, Pawlikowski said. But at some point users need to feed that information up to the central ALIS hub, she stressed.

"I don't need ALIS to put fuel in the plane and fly it, take a part and replace it if I have the spares there," Pawlikowski said. "But somewhere along the line I've got to tell ALIS that I did it so that the supply chain will now know that that part has got to be replaced."

For his part, Bogdan believes there were "no surprises" in the GAO report.

"All of the issues mentioned are well known to the JPO, the U.S. Services, International Partners and our Industry team," Bogdan said in a written response to the GAO report April 14. "Overall, the F-35 program is executing well across the entire spectrum of acquisition, to include development and design, flight test, production, fielding and base stand-up, training, sustainment of fielded aircraft, and building a global sustainment enterprise."

DEFENSE NEWS
F-35 Chief: Software Bugs No Longer a Threat To IOC
Marine ALIS Users Satisfied

As debate rages in Washington over ALIS' viability, the operators who use the system on a regular basis say they are satisfied so far.

A group of four Marine maintainers from Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort in South Carolina, the training hub for the F-35B for both the Corps and the United Kingdom, told reporters during an April 14 visit that ALIS has made their life easier.

The Marine Corps declared IOC with its F-35Bs last summer, and conducted its first-ever expeditionary test in December. Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121 deployed eight jets to Twentynine Palms, California, for Exercise Steel Knight, where they practiced short takeoffs and vertical landings. The Marines are preparing to deploy to Iwakuni, Japan, next year.

“I am more than satisfied with it and seeing it grow and seeing it change," a Marine said. "There’s not as much troubleshooting anymore so maintenance times are definitely up.”

Overall, maintenance on the F-35 is “10 times easier” than on a Navy F-18, said one maintainer. Despite initial challenges, another Marine stressed that the system is constantly improving.

“Compared to how it was originally, it’s night and day,” said the Marine when asked about updates to the system. “The transition has been good. Every upgrade they do is easy to get ahold of, get your head around. It’s been pretty consistent as far as maintainability.”

Aaron Mehta in Washington contributed reporting.

[brar_w]

Ah ALIS..its a program in its own right. And they'll eventually get it right. Till then its the legacy system just as is being done ATM. The biggest problem with which the program was structured as Bogdan has revealed time and time again is that there were elements within the program that were essentially programs in their own right - as in they should have been developed separately and matured and then adopted. ALIS was the biggest one, helmet possibly another. That is something they are likely to avoid in the next cycle.

Losing connectivity to ALIS would be a pain, but hardly fatal, the JPO contends. If jets are unable to use ALIS — a ground-based system that provides sustainment and support, but not combat capabilities for the jet — the F-35 is still a usable plane. In fact, the worst case scenario would be that operators would have to track maintenance and manage daily squadron operations manually, just as older jets do.

[TSJones]

Israel isn't going to use the ALIS system for their j-35's.

[brar_w]

Austin, they were out of line. They were armed with ZILCH as far as operator furnished requirements, or real world data on performance. They assumed along the way. Same was the case with the threat. The operator, RAAF in this case ran its own series, just like all partner nations out of Wright Patterson Air Force Base, where they have been provided with space to run simulations with the actual requirements and real-world performance data on both their craft, allowing them to plug data from their own sources on the threat if need be. Additionally each operator community at the NATSEC level has its own simulations that they do back home. If someone has zero performance knowledge, assumes away, and then expects a rebuttal, point by point (as if someone owes them this) that can only be given by actually releasing classified level stuff than that is borderline idiotic. I am sure the RAAF and the Australian parliament has closed sessions, the US congress has as many classified briefings for advanced systems and that is the venue you share these sorts of things with. Politos even in the US play along since in democracies you have varying view points. You have folks that will take them extremely seriously in the unclassified setting, and ask for rebuttals that often move over to a classified settings. But then when it comes to appropriate you consider all that collectively and decide. If you go by POGO, the US hasn't built a competent weapons system yet..but they are given an audience and there is a general back and forth tamasha every year, for every major program but saner heads prevail most of the time. There are limits to transparency with the quote that has been traditionally used at the RMA lingo as " We will reveal to deter and conceal for warfighting advantage

Karan , Just check the link above posting here too , In each of the individual pdf you have some very interesting info on radar capabilities etc

http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Bus ... ubmissions

Yet, they speak nothing of how the blue efforts, or indeed the red teaming to deter these radars has progressed as in its INCOMPLETE information. There is quite a bit of information out there, but unfortunately when you draw a conclusion prior to beginning an analysis you seek only the stuff that supports that conclusion. If only one looked, and followed those who's job it is to study the capability and counter-capability mix and pass judgement - if you look at the analysis of the Copp's and Goon's of the world...The whole world is wrong, low frequency radars killed stealth a decade ago..and think, why are these idiots pouring in billions into something that a literature review based on open source knowledge shows to be broken.. - And the APA's are proud that they include stuff from the open source and not from research and their own element level red-teaming effort -


Heck they'll go so far to include Boeing PR knowing full well that to use the classified elements of a system against it is a standard practice used by US OEM's to score points over one another...

https://www.ll.mit.edu/publications/jou ... issile.pdf

^ The Copps of the world won't tell their story, because A) these guys aren't really interested to talk about the details and B ) It doesn't drive the narrative..

What the Copps of the world won't tell you is that the Hughes (now Raytheon) red-team that started at predicting counter-stealth technologies way back in the late 70s (their first publications began appearing in open source materials round the mid 1980's just prior to the revelation of stealth) predicted even back then that the first counter by the adversaries would be to move to lower-frequencies that are harder to conceal given other design challenges. These same folks then began a multi decade investment program to develop those advanced technologies so that future systems are tested and models developed to understand and 'manage the threat' not to stay invisible in all spectrums as marketing would have you believe, but to manage the EMS and stay ahead of the electro magnetic spectrum warfare that goes on behind the scenes. They didn't wake up 5 years ago after reading a Carlo Copp article or a Bill Sweetmann...They have been at it since prior to the first operational deployment of stealth. One would assume that others investing in this also ran their numbers..The EMS is huge, and the military plays in every corner. You have to defeat it and you do so in an integrated way..

[Karan M]

Austin, I guess you were right.

1
Other Related Matters:
Regulatory Considerations and Impacts
Inquiry into planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II
(Joint Strike Fighter)
Submission
on
Terms of Reference (ToR) Item f.
26 January 2016
EVIDENCE TO THE
PARLIAMENT
AND
THE DEFENCE TRADE
CONTROLS ACT
“The ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) has gone a long way to markedly
reducing the international competitiveness of America’s Defense Industry. European defence
contractors proudly market their wares as ‘ITAR free products’. Another effect has the US
Defense Industry even more stove piped and inwards looking than has been induced by the
‘cold war peace dividend’. This situation is made worse by the way major defense
contractors, with their legions of ITAR administrators, managers and lawyers, interpret the
regulations; leading to the costs to manage/administer/certify the ITAR ending up more than
the direct cost for producing the part. The adage about ‘making money for old rope’ doesn’t
come close to describing this game.”
“While as bad as this is, the senior defence officials inspired DTCA is something else, again.”
“Put simply, the DTCA is the equivalent of ITAR on steroids, EPO and blood-doping that
is then administered under a regime driven by ‘self before service’ and, like all defence
abuse matters, is just as pernicious to Australian citizens and the Nation, alike.”
APA Assessment of the DTCA, circa 2012
Air Power Australia Submission to the
Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade
Structure of Submission: 4 Pages (incl Title Page + Endnotes)
Filename: A4-Evidence to Parliament and the DTCA_26Jan16_Final.pdf
Joint Strike Fighter
Submission 9 - Supplementary Submission
Inquiry into the planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II
2
In late October, 2012, Air Power Australia started closing down all research projects,
all collaborations, and all new publishing activity in all areas of military science,
military capabilities and technological strategy, to accommodate the introduction of
the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012. The bulk of the source research material in APA
submissions to this Inquiry was published between 1998 and October 2012.
The language in the DTCA legislation is very specific and not open to interpretation.
Publishing or disclosing to the publicly any of the type of forensic analytical research that
APA has performed, using public open source materials, could be arbitrarily and unilaterally
deemed by defence officials to be a criminal offence under 14A (1) and (2)1 2.
The requirement, under the 14A (3), for Ministerial Approval to disseminate any such material
makes any effort to continue such research and publishing non-viable.
The monetary/time costs of defending against an allegation by a defence official that the Act
has been breached, even if the publication only disclosed that what was previously published
overseas, are too prohibitive for a non-profit volunteer organisation like APA to carry.
Given the current Defence culture, the expectation that some if any senior defence official
could act as impartial and objective censors under 14A (3) is at best optimistic.
The track record of senior defence officials since 2003 displays a consistent pattern of
muddling public discourse on Defence Matters with vendor propaganda, ideologically
motivated beliefs, errors of fact, misleading distractions, and simple nonsense, the intent of
which invariably appears to be distraction of Parliament, media and public, to draw attention
away from prior mistakes or erroneous advice to Governments by senior defence officials.
The observed track record in public statements by senior defence officials reflects the policy
within the ADO of misconduct being defined as that what “brings the reputation of an
individual, a group or organisation [in the ADO] into disrepute”. Therefore hiding any adverse
realities that might bring the ADO into disrepute is considered “Appropriate Conduct”, no
matter that doing so might be unethical, dishonest or unlawful3.
Put bluntly, Defence are confronted with implicit conflicts of interest if they are to act under
the DTCA as a censor of all public discourse in DSGL matters, as defined by 14A (3) of the
DTCA. Defence personnel tasked with censoring third party publications that might by their
analytical content expose shortcomings in Australian capabilities will be compelled to censor
out or disallow such content, or be subject to internal allegations of misconduct.
This problem is further compounded by the obvious deskilling within the Canberra based
agencies of Defence; especially in performing critical, independent forensic technical
assessments of military technologies, foreign and domestic, then determining its importance.
The DTCA regime is closest in its operation and design to the censorship regime
employed in the Soviet Union, and as of late 2015 employed in Russia. No such
censorship regime exists in other Western democracies.
Defence officials have never explained why Australia must be subject to any such
censorship of public discourse on defence capability topics that are unregulated in
other Western democracies, such as the United States or United Kingdom.
The DTCA strikes at the heart of open public and professional discourse on the
management, governance and implementation of Defence Matters, and especially
renders any robust, critical discourse on procurement of military equipment infeasible.
It will result in further opacity in the Defence Debate, as anything published must first
be approved by Canberra, if the author is not to become exposed to the draconian
search and seizure investigative powers, let alone prosecution under the DTCA.
Joint Strike Fighter
Submission 9 - Supplementary Submission
Inquiry into the planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II
3
The provision of informed professional quality evidence to Parliamentary bodies, and
submissions to inquiries, such as this one, presents significant problems under the DTCA.
Any analytical interpretation or conclusions drawn from public source materials could be, and
likely would be, interpreted by some defence officials as breaches of the Act, as the Act
explicitly exempts only that what has been previously disclosed as lawful.
Performing the necessary research to provide evidence to an inquiry is expensive and time
consuming, and APA has in previous years produced the research, in part, as part of
academic publishing activities, consultancies, and commercial publishing in the media.
None of the latter is feasible any more under the DTCA.
Specific publications APA terminated in late 2012, due to the DTCA, include:
A. A largely completed peer reviewed monograph on the future of Electronic Attack (EA),
surveying extant and future capabilities, and comparing survivability of super-cruising
and subsonic EA platforms in an A2/AD threat environment;
B. A draft peer reviewed paper on the kinematic performance modelling of long range
Russian and Chinese Surface to Air Missiles, developed for A2/AD applications;
Specific research projects APA planned for and did not pursue, due to the DTCA, include:
A. Performance and observables modelling of the Shenyang J-31 fighter;
B. Further costing analysis and modelling of the JSF Program with a principal focus on
the working thesis that the JSF Pricing Strategy/Model has ‘a never ending price’
baked into the JSF designs;
C. Kinematic performance modelling of long range Russian and Chinese Surface to Air
Missiles in the 250 km – 400 km performance envelope;
D. Modelling of deep fading effects in long range microwave propagation, and their
impacts on Electronic Attack operations;
E. Further collaboration with colleagues overseas on a range of performance, system
capability and tactical employment matters of 5th Generation air combat aircraft and
related developments with a focus on the further evolution of this class of weapon and
the associated weaponry.
F. Updates of extant Technical Reports on the T-50 PAK-FA, J-20, S-400 Triumf, S-
300VM/V4, 96K6M-Pantsir SM, Su-34 FULLBACK, Su-35S FLANKER, and various
Russian and Chinese guided munitions, including new cruise missiles;
G. New Technical Reports on the J-31 fighter, the S-350 Vityaz Surface to Air Missile
system, and new guided munitions such as the Kh-59MK and Grom E1/E2.
H. Production of a seminal dissertation on what ails and is broken in Defence, today, with
the evidentiary proofs from PARCA and Risk Based Assessments of the increasingly
moribund and dysfunctional environment Australian Scientists, Engineers and fellow
Technologists must contend with on an increasing basis.
Such research could have usefully contributed to this inquiry, and other Parliamentary
inquiries as well as to the all important contestability and governance of Defence itself.
The principal beneficiaries of the DTCA are Russia and China, as the capabilities and
shortcomings of their military systems that could and should be examined via independent
expert forensic analyses and assessments, will not be subjected to such.
Joint Strike Fighter
Submission 9 - Supplementary Submission
Inquiry into the planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II
4
Endnotes
1 Defence Trade Controls Act 2012, No. 153, 2012: (as amended)
14A Publishing etc. DSGL technology
(1) A person commits an offence if:
(a) either:
(i) the person publishes DSGL technology to the public, or to a section of the
public, by electronic or other means; or
(ii) the person otherwise disseminates DSGL technology to the public, or to a
section of the public, by electronic or other means; and
(b) the person does not hold an approval under this section authorising the publication or
dissemination of the DSGL technology.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years or 2,500 penalty units, or both.
Exception
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the DSGL technology has already been lawfully made
available to the public or to the section of the public.
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (2): see
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code.
Approvals
(3) The Minister may, in writing, approve a person publishing or otherwise disseminating
specified DSGL technology to the public or to a specified section of the public. The Minister may give
an approval only if the Minister is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so.
(4) If the Minister gives an approval under subsection (3), the Minister must give the person
the approval.
Note: Section 67 deals with giving approvals under this Act.
2 DTCA Definition of “DSGL technology”: “technology relating to goods means: (a) information
relating to the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair,
testing, maintenance or modification of the goods (including information in the form of
blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions, specifications, algorithms or
documentation); or (b) software relating to the goods”; This definition, intended to control
“intangible technology transfers” effectively covers anything of any substance relating to any
item in the DSGL – whether the controlled item itself, or any software/technology in a “catch
all” clause, thus effectively prohibiting any discourse other than “dual use” publications
exemptions in DTCA2012/2015;
3 Refer Annex A, Orme C.W., MajGen, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: PROFESSIONALISM,
TRUST AND CAPABILITY IN THE AUSTRALIAN PROFESSION OF ARMS; Report of the
ADF Personal Conduct Review, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2011.
Joint Strike Fighter
Submission 9 - Supplementary Submission

[brar_w]

Nice list of projects that they would have worked on. Lesson for APA being : If you're going to act as an outsourcing agency for operational, open source analysis and will be largely funded by one customer - don't tick that customer off (as in develop fantasies of an All F-22 fleet, augmented of course by a clean sheet F111 for strike). Or else, do what the others do - Develop an analysis that is actually based on new research and offer it to interested parties. I know a few folks who have in the past worked with a Mitre or a RAND pm projects for internal or private customers in situations where the private customer did not have the expertise to put together a competent all round team to obtain an analysis for internal consumption.

APA shouldn't have a problem finding sources of funding, if there work is cutting edge and not replicated elsewhere particularly when it comes to Russian and Chinese military systems (it probably is however). Most large OEM's do have internal analysis even for open source information, and then they sanction classified and unclassified reports for internal consumption. At the system level, the US shares intel through an annual assessment of adversary systems at the various classification levels with all domain approved OEM's..There is a small space to exist if you want to play globally, lack the technical infrastructure to do an experiment driven analysis, or have access to classified level data...APA falls in that category, and Australia isn't beaming with companies, or policy makers that will be dyeing to have these guys analyze stuff for them given their benefactor doesn't want to be associated with them anymore. They were at their core a one-client, one mission shop as opposed to a large think tank with a long term mission and vision..

[NRao]

Israel isn't going to use the ALIS system for their j-35's.

C4 for sure and proposing "heavy maintenance" to be done locally. But, that does not mean that ALIS will not be used. ?????? They are proposing to build on the F35's open architecture.

Since the old "Turkey or Talisman" td is dead,here goes-latest info on the JSF's pilgrimage to perfection.

I miss that thread too, not the same posting Turkey stuff in an international/US thread. The Turkey thread had flavor.

However, find the following very, very funny:

"Users are concerned that ALIS’ current design results in all F-35 data produced across the fleet to be routed up to the Central Point of Entry and then to the Autonomic Logistics Operating Unit, with no backup system or redundancy,” according to the April GAO report. “If either of these fail, it could take the entire F-35 fleet offline.”

Why?

Job description for a DBA for ALIS:

Job Description :
Database Administrator for Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) for CONUS and OCONUS enterprise needs, traveling across the enterprise sites to fill surge requirements.. Database Administrator for an operating unit, responsible for ensuring the integrity of all the databases within the system. The Database Administrator maintains the internal database of the system as well as the individual applications. The Database Administrator works closely with the System Administrator to carry out and sustain system-wide backups and restores. The Database Administrator will provide maintenance of databases to include the following: backups, disaster recovery, database support (status checks, Oracle critical patch updates). Performs Database technical duties to include general backups, restore, updates, testing, debugging, integration and analysis. The specific duties include performing data transfers between operating units and other systems (internal and external), providing user access to data, keeping servers operational, configuring assets to support user needs, troubleshooting assets. Monitors test progress, corrective actions, hardware/software baseline status, testing patches and an overall status of the system. Also, this candidate will serve as the point of contact to for the JSF Squadron discussion during the flight and evaluation activities. Must be willing to travel, to include Squadron deployments for extended periods depending on operational needs. Position may require the ability to perform in an arduous duty environment. Successful candidate must be capable of passing a Physical and must maintain their medical fitness for this position. The selected applicant selected may be required to work at deployed locations, work rotating shifts, and work in excess of 40 hours per week
- See more at: https://search.lockheedmartinjobs.com/S ... 35uZY.dpuf

2016 and people are concerned about "backup"? This job app talks about Orcale, which has robust features for such things. Implemented solutions cut across the nation.

[brar_w]

C4 for sure and proposing "heavy maintenance" to be done locally. But, that does not mean that ALIS will not be used. ??????

No they'll be using their existing system to track and order supply. At least for now.

[Karan M]

Nice list of projects that they would have worked on. Lesson for APA being : If you're going to act as an outsourcing agency for operational, open source analysis and will be largely funded by one customer - don't tick that customer off (as in develop fantasies of an All F-22 fleet, augmented of course by a clean sheet F111 for strike). Or else, do what the others do - Develop an analysis that is actually based on new research and offer it to interested parties. I know a few folks who have in the past worked with a Mitre or a RAND pm projects for internal or private customers in situations where the private customer did not have the expertise to put together a competent all round team to obtain an analysis for internal consumption.

APA shouldn't have a problem finding sources of funding, if there work is cutting edge and not replicated elsewhere particularly when it comes to Russian and Chinese military systems (it probably is however). Most large OEM's do have internal analysis even for open source information, and then they sanction classified and unclassified reports for internal consumption. At the system level, the US shares intel through an annual assessment of adversary systems at the various classification levels with all domain approved OEM's..There is a small space to exist if you want to play globally, lack the technical infrastructure to do an experiment driven analysis, or have access to classified level data...APA falls in that category, and Australia isn't beaming with companies, or policy makers that will be dyeing to have these guys analyze stuff for them given their benefactor doesn't want to be associated with them anymore. They were at their core a one-client, one mission shop as opposed to a large think tank with a long term mission and vision..

I don't see any mention of the one client. I see a lot of references to a new law that states the Aus Gov can prosecute them with wide latitude if they p!ss the Gov off.

[brar_w]

I don't see any mention of the one client

We'll if they have other customers they won't really have a problem in continuing their work in areas that don't concern the Australian government or areas they sought their analysis. Hammer away at those and Chinese and Russians system analysis that we all love

[Karan M]

Again, what part of the Gov can prosecute them at leisure is so hard to get? You are ignoring what these folks are asking Gov to repeal.

They were anyhow doing all this by themselves and were not relying on some secret huge funding.

It doesn't matter if they have 50000 people willing to pay for them, if the Gov laws are so rigid and they have made enemies within. As he says, even defending themselves from such charges is a problem.

And lets not even pretend similar stunts haven't been done before by other parties regarding embarrassing mavericks who were making inconvenient deductions.

And why should they only focus on Russian and Chinese systems. India is non aligned. We'd be interested in seeing the US systems too. Given how the law might be interepreted even analysing R/C systems could land them in hot water.

[brar_w]

Again, what part of the Gov can prosecute them at leisure is so hard to get? It doesn't matter if they have 100 clients, if the Gov laws are so rigid and they have made enemies within. As he says, even defending themselves from such charges is a problem.

So if they do an assessment of the FGFA, they'll be prosecuted by the Australian government? I find that hard to believe but if its what these guys are themselves claiming its something worth looking into.

And lets not even pretend similar stunts haven't been done before by other parties regarding embarrassing mavericks who were making inconvenient deductions.

Absolutely, folks have been disciplined, throttled, and sidelined in every corner of the world. What if you have to see, is whether its an exception or the norm.

[Karan M]

Again, what part of the Gov can prosecute them at leisure is so hard to get? It doesn't matter if they have 100 clients, if the Gov laws are so rigid and they have made enemies within. As he says, even defending themselves from such charges is a problem.

So if they do an assessment of the FGFA, they'll be prosecuted by the Australian government? I find that hard to believe but if its what these guys are themselves claiming its something worth looking into.

If they analyze the FGFA and are considered to have "given away" any aspect of stealth technology or gone into technology details that apply to Australian platforms, they can land in hot water.

Any interpretation thereof with wide latitude in terms of interpretation.

And lets not even pretend similar stunts haven't been done before by other parties regarding embarrassing mavericks who were making inconvenient deductions.

Absolutely, folks have been disciplined, throttled, and sidelined in every corner of the world. What if you have to see, is whether its an exception or the norm.

[/QUOTE]

Its most definitely the norm when folks start getting the eyeballs and have the kind of credence Kopp was assessed to have in several respectable circles (his idee fixe/dislike of the JSF apart)

Given the commercial interests at risk, and also the local political issues, he was most likely at risk.

[brar_w]

I'd wait till there are other credible assessments of the law and its amendments over the years. I highly doubt the Australian government will start prosecuting analysts for simply sharing open source data on their product, or open source data on products that do not concern the Australian government or its armed forces. Its a highly stupid move on their part if indeed APA's interpretation is valid, in the legal sense.

Kopp has however been writing papers since 2012.. describing (using open source information) Russian, American and Chinese systems in addition to other topics so we'll be hearing from him on different topics, probably not through the APA but him as a researcher.

[NRao]

C4 for sure and proposing "heavy maintenance" to be done locally. But, that does not mean that ALIS will not be used. ??????

No they'll be using their existing system to track and order supply. At least for now.

ALIS does a lot more than that. From what I have read they will piggy back some features - mix and match.

And Israel is not seeking local maintenance for all times. Their F-35s will have to visit other depots at times.

[brar_w]

And Israel is not seeking local maintenance for all times. Their F-35s will have to visit other depots at times.

They are working on obtaining their own MRO's.

[brar_w]

Some of the stuff submitted however ....

While it may not have the stealth capabilities of 5th generation aircraft such as the F-
35, the Gripen has many other attributes such as higher speed (up to Mach 2 I
understand, as opposed to 1.6 for the F-35A), better manoeuvrability due to its
canard-delta wing configuration, the ability to carry a greater weapons payload for
sustained fighting, and perhaps most importantly, a better range and combat radius,
able to be extended even further through aerial refuelling with our fleet of KC-30A
MRTT aircraft. As a complete package, it out-performs the F-35A in almost every
arena, and would give our forces one of the best platforms with which to fight and
win against the newest generations of Sukhoi, Mikoyan and various Chinese-built
fighters which have been talked about already.

WTF...Stealth - lets forget about it..Radius, well the F-35A does around 600 nm (radius not range) with internal weapons, integrated A2G pod etc. The Gripen would immediately need to carry bags. The F-35 will get bags to increase its range, the IDF (the only air-force currently in need for it) is working on them. Top Speed of Mach 2, yes an advantage but what all begins to sets limits on that for the Gripen? A pod? How many missiles, or bombs before Mach 2 is unachievable ? In cases where it is achievable it can't be sustained for very long...More weapons is also fairly unsubstantiated and one can twist data to make it look like that. The F35 bays are designed for eventual 6 A2A missile carriage (studies have already demonstrated feasibility and its in the roadmap), and it has full external stores carriage ability with a equal to or greater than the Gripen's munition offerings..The Gripen may be able to go faster in certain mission/range-payload envelopes, can't go as far in internal fuel, requires bags and weapons tradeoffs to get everything into one mission. And of course he throws In the tanker just in case as if it won't be an option for the F-35?

It would be interesting to compare the Gripen C range to the F-35B, the variant with the least amount of fuel and shortest range. The E should outrange the F-35B, but the Gripen C on internal fuel, I doubt it. The Gripen E is still a small-medium fighter that attempts to play in the medium-large category, just like the block 60 F-16. This configuration has its advantages and disadvantages. The F-35 is an F-16 and F/A-18 replacement and not an F-15 replacement...and as such it beats both the F-16 and F-18 in practically all (but a very few) range/payload comparisons while matching or exceeding the F-15C and even the F-22 raptor in some.

[TSJones]

according to David Axe, cheerleader and honorary chaplain of the j-35 forever fan club, Israel is paying $5 billion for 33 j-35 short stubby aircraft.

that works out to be about $151 million of US tax payer military assistance to Israel *per bird*. Out de hanger door.

https://warisboring.com/israels-f-35s-w ... .vz00yxn80

[UlanBatori]

If I were General Li of the Pee Ell Ay Eph, I would have the Gobi Desert Re-education Center for Aerospace Machinists going all-out, cranking out thousands of UCAV type thingies and hypersonic weapons. No human-carrying aircraft can match a UCAV for maneuvering, or be able to do anything against a hypersonic cruise missile. OK, maybe they can down 3 each, but can they down 27? Inside 30 minutes, the $T fleet would be finished.

On the JMR (and on JSF, but fortunately Lockheed engineers are more seat-of-the-pants types than most ppl believe), the problem, gentlefolks is that they are using computer codes that don't work worth a damn.

[TSJones]

There is no way that the military is not testing specs on the deliverables of the contract of the bird. No way.

asserting that the acceptance procedures are phony? a desperate accusation I would say.

does the military depend on the tech reps of the manufacturer(mostly all former Snuffies and licensed FAA Mechanics and Avionics techs) ? they sure do. but the tech reps have to work with the military where it counts. on the flight line and in the hanger. Their word means their job down where it counts. and your life depends on their ilk every time you ride a civilian jet liner.

been there, seen it, got the tee shirt,

[Shreeman]

what is the slogan on the back of the tee shirt?

[TSJones]

"I'll launch the bird when I'm done with the #@!!!!!*** pre-flight inspection. Not before!"

or

"You wanna fly this when? ".

[brar_w]

according to David Axe, cheerleader and honorary chaplain of the j-35 forever fan club, Israel is paying $5 billion for 33 j-35 short stubby aircraft.

that works out to be about $151 million of US tax payer military assistance to Israel *per bird*. Out de hanger door.

https://warisboring.com/israels-f-35s-w ... .vz00yxn80

DA aside, here's an article on how they'll be modifying their aircraft upon arrival in Israel :

Israel’s F-35 App And Its Implications

Israel has announced it will equip the F-35s it starts receiving this December with its own command, control, communications and computing (C4) system. The software, produced by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), is an upgrade of an existing C4 system the Israeli air force flies on its F-15 and F-16s.

By adapting proprietary software to the F-35, Israel has leveraged the strike fighter’s open-architecture software design long touted by Lockheed Martin and the Joint Program Office (JPO). In effect, IAI has written the first “app” for the F-35 and, arguably, set a precedent for F-35 software independence. “Imagine putting some new applications on your mobile phone,” says Benni Cohen, general manager of IAI’s Lahav Division. “It is not difficult. You can do it without touching the mission systems.”

His metaphor is a useful one. While the specifics are not exactly the same, think of the F-35’s software backbone as an “operating system” like Apple’s iOS and IAI’s C4 software, which sits atop it as an “application.” With the right application interface, developers can write new apps for the F-35, adding new functionality. “Yes, it is straightforward to tap into that [F-35 system] data and build upon that information to make new applications or add new functionality that benefits the overall fight,” John Clark agrees. Clark is director of mission systems and software at Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works, which is working with the U.S. Air Force to craft a software protocol called Open Mission Systems (OMS), designed to enable faster technology insertion into existing and future platforms.

By standardizing the process for moving data around the F-35’s open architecture backbone, OMS will enable more rapid software development and mission systems integration. The protocol is still in development but is planned to be introduced on the F-35 “in the near future,” says Lockheed. By working independently, however, Israel may have already changed the game.

Israel will not add its C4 system using OMS but instead exploit the F-35’s existing openness. Whenever OMS does arrive, the fact that someone has already written an app for the aircraft now provides F-35 customers the option to add their own software, rather than waiting for upgrades planned by the U.S. Current plans for the JSF partner nations to develop a follow-on Block 4 software package are not expected to start until 2018 and will take six years.

“The folks at IAI doing that will certainly bring up [the issue] as more partner nations have the desire to do that,” says Clark. “But it is also a double-edged sword. They do not get the benefits of the rest of the ecosystem the F-35 has by deviating.”

Clark points out the F-35 program has a defined joint standards process intended to align partner nations with common enterprise support across the board, for software or hardware. “Each country has the choice to make on how much value it puts on the enterprise support structure to maintain systems long-term,” he says. “If there is an interoperability issue with one, you see it get fixed and the fix applies to all, as opposed to an interoperability issue that may exist with an IAI one-off.” The crux of the issue is how many other JSF partners will look at what Israel is pioneering and desire similar one-off software programs. Their motivations could range from strategic/tactical independence to the timing of JSF program software releases and, possibly, commercial concerns. Ironically, the open architecture design of F-35 systems potentially abets such desires.

“The open architecture gives the Israeli air force the option to operate new systems and to address, let us say, special needs without needing to change versions of the airplane’s software,” says Cohen.

What are those “special needs”? “It gives the Israeli air force the capability for EW [electronic warfare] that is not part of the software for the normal F-35.” Cohen says.

The explanation aligns well with comments made to Aviation Week in 2012 by a senior Israeli air force official: “We think the stealth protection will be good for 5-10 years, but the aircraft will be in service for 30-40 years, so we need EW capabilities [on the F-35] that can be rapidly improved. The basic F-35 design is OK. We can make do with adding integrated software” (AW&ST Aug. 6, 2012, p. 28).

The ability to write its own apps is consistent with Israel’s general desire for a level of independence from U.S. control. This emphasis on flexibility is evidenced by its push for an exemption from the JPO to carry out maintenance work in-country, rather than at predetermined Lockheed Martin-established logistics centers in Europe and elsewhere.

“The idea is to give the [Israeli air force] the opportunity and capability to add new applications without the [backbone] system blocking that opportunity,” Cohen adds. “If you decide to add another system, another missile, another capability, you do not need to touch the mission system, you just add the new application.”

Simply adding a new application sounds appealing and efficient, but the JPO sounds a cautionary, and possibly conflicting, note on the precedent of JSF partners writing their own apps.

“By U.S. government policy, any integration of F-35 software must be done with U.S. government oversight and with the two prime contractors’ involvement. Having open architecture systems on the F-35 will make it easier to integrate future improvements onto the aircraft, but it does not equate to every country or industry having free rein to integrate their own add-on software and systems,” says the JPO.

Whether or not JSF partners add their own apps and functionality, the schedule for U.S. software updates once the program concludes its developmental phase could provide additional motivation to operate independently.

According to the JPO, hardware and software releases will alternate on a four-year schedule. A software release will be followed two years later by a hardware release and so on. But it is a schedule that simply does not align with software development and operational realities.

“This is the idea of our system,” Cohen says. “Instead of waiting two years or four years for another [software update] version, we can [update] it in 4-5 months.”

“The speed at which you could make [software] changes could certainly play a role in what is motivating partner nations,” Clark allows. “I do not know that it is the only factor, but I don’t have firm data to say one way or the other.”

The JPO does not acknowledge the timing of its software releases as problematic: “We are working with all partners and [Foreign Military Sales (FMS)] customers to ensure we all have timely updates to meet various sovereign requirements in the coming years.”

If Israel and other partners are sufficiently motivated to write their own apps, several questions arise, starting with interoperability. While commonality is foundational to the F-35 program, Skunk Works’ Clark says conflicts can be managed.

“The Israelis are very innovative,” he says. “I would expect they will work in their own way, but that does not preclude having interoperability with other standards. It just means that when interoperability is sought, they’ll have to ensure that whatever implementation they have built on top of the data provided via F-35 can operate with other pieces of software or hardware. . . . With our [OMS] effort we are trying to minimize the upfront systems engineering required to do those sorts of things.”

Interoperability will not be an issue, the JPO assures, again citing U.S. oversight of the two contractors involved (Lockheed and IAI). The office adds that it “applies strong systems engineering rigor and discipline to all software development efforts supporting both partners and FMS customers.”

The prospect of writing apps for the F-35 also raises the issue of cybersecurity. Commercial software development security experts repeatedly point out that the intersection of manufacturer and vendor software is perhaps the chief point of vulnerability for integrated systems.

Clark concedes that developing apps for the F-35 is analogous but stresses the program has sufficient security assurance in place. “We all see the news in the broader context of what is going on in the cyberenvironment,” he says. “If you look at what the banking industry has to deal with, those are the type of [security] technologies that we are exploring and evaluating to try to apply to our airborne avionics environment.”

The F-35’s open architecture design follows strict principles on the provision of data for third-party evaluation, according to Lockheed. There are high assurance guards within the system that can integrate cross-domain devices while keeping mission systems and outside apps separate.

IAI’s Cohen says the company is confident its C4 software will not have any influence on the security of the overall system. But what if a partner nation does not strictly adhere to correct security protocols, or makes a mistake?

“It depends on what application you are talking about and what data that system is trying to access. There is no one easy answer on that,” Clark admits.

Another question is whether F-35 users that create their own apps could share or potentially sell them? Would IAI consider that possibility?

“Yes,” Cohen answers. “We would need special permission to export [new applications]. We would need an export license.”

Surely, F-35 users must have U.S. government authorization to market, sell or discuss non-U.S. add-ons, software updates, non-U.S. weapons, or any other F-35 equipment the program office emphasizes. Interestingly, the JPO does not completely shut the door to partner-to-partner nation add-on/software sales, saying, “The U.S. government will review each situation individually as countries discuss their intent with us.”

Could the possibility of JSF user-to-user sales combined with the issues of software control, independence, updates and security see the F-35 program again mimic the Apple mobile device world? Could the U.S. set up its own F-35 “App Store”?

Lockheed has “brainstormed” the idea, Clark confirms. “It could provide for a greater ecosystem of software developers and tailorization of the system for unique needs, but we are still sorting out how we would manifest that in a way that would not just be a marketing pitch,” he says.

[brar_w]

And more on what has been and is planned to be done to address some of the software stability issues highlighted a couple of weeks ago in the PEO-DOTE open house bring your own drinks event :

Stability Fix Shows Progress In F-35 Software Development

Flight testing of software stability fixes for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) indicates the problem has been resolved, says Lockheed Martin, keeping the aircraft on course for initial operational capability (IOC) with the U.S. Air Force this year.

Resolving the issue is a key to enabling Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James to certify to Congress that F-35As delivered in fiscal 2018 will have the full combat capability planned, lifting a limit on funding for procurement written into the fiscal 2016 defense budget.

Stability issues were uncovered when, as planned, the Block 2B mission-system software with which the U.S. Marine Corps’ F-35B was declared operational in July 2015 was rehosted onto the upgraded TR-2 processor to create the Block 3i configuration for Air Force F-35A IOC.

The problems also affected the Block 3F software that will provide the full combat capability planned under the F-35 system development and demonstration program, causing the team to halt testing of 3F and convert the software development laboratories back to 3i configuration to address the issues.Mean time between stability events during flight testing for the 3iR6 software was just 4.3 hr., compared with 32.5 hr. for 2BS5.2, the final version of Block 2B, Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation, told Congress on April 26.

Instability causing the system to shut down and reboot was traced to the timing of software messages from the sensors to the main fusion computer. A new version of the 3i software—3iR6.21—was loaded on to the mission-systems test aircraft and flight testing began March 25.

F-35 Program Executive Officer Gen. Christopher Bogdan told Congress on April 26 that, by April 13, the aircraft had flown 29 sorties and 75 hr. and seen an improvement to more than 10 hr. between stability events. Plans then called for another 50 hr. of flying in an operational test (OT) environment. The additional flying by OT aircraft was completed on April 29.

“We are analyzing the final data from the software stability update and are confident . . . the update shows a 2-3 times greater rate of stability than previous versions,” says Lockheed Martin spokesman Mark Johnson. “We agree with Gen. Bogdan this particular set of issues has been resolved to the program and warfighter’s satisfaction.”

If the fixes have been successful, Bogdan says they will be incorporated into a new version of Block 3i and fielded in time for Air Force IOC, which is planned sometime between Aug. 1 and Dec. 31. They will also be incorporated into the 3F software in flight testing.

Gilmore commends the decision to pause 3F development and rework 3i and says stability in flight has improved but cautions that “significant initial startup problems continue to be a problem.” During the first 30 flights of 31R6.21, he says, 27 power cycles were required to get all systems functioning.

These cycles varied from “cold iron” resets to battery recycling. “The extent to which the initial startup sequence has improved—or not—compared to earlier versions of Block 3i software is not known, as the program does not track startup events in the same manner as flight instability events,” he testified.

Bogdan told Congress that assuring the software stability problems “are behind us” was one of the pieces he was waiting for before forwarding a recommendation to James that she certify that F-35s delivered in fiscal 2018 will have full combat capability with Block 3F.

That certification is required before the program office can award Lockheed Martin a contract for low-rate initial-production Lot 10, for aircraft to be delivered in fiscal 2018, Bodgan told Congress. The Lot 9 contract, also in negotiation, would be awarded in the “near future,” he said on April 29.

Gilmore says the decision to pause 3F, reconfigure the labs and rework 3i has further delayed progress with 3F. The latest version of 3F—3FR5—was delivered in February, but it was so unstable that productive flight testing could not be accomplished, he says, and the previous 3FR4 version had to be reloaded.

Block 3F had completed approximately 20% of baseline test points by March, when work was paused, Gilmore says, describing the decision to rework 3i as a necessary step to ensure the Air Force has adequate software for IOC and the combat capabilities planned for 3F can be effectively tested on stable software baseline. Bodgan says delivery of 3F to fielded aircraft could be four months late, in fall 2017.

The performance of the Lockheed-led team in tackling the software deficiencies is being watched closely as the Joint Program Office begins planning the F-35 Follow-On Modernization program, with the development of Block 4 planned to start in 2018.

Gilmore supports the program’s recent shift to capability-based software releases, rather than schedule-driven releases that have overlapped and caused conflicts for development and testing resources. “While this may cause further short-term delays to the program, I agree with the decision to shift to a serial process of testing and fixing software in the lab before releasing the next software version, and the recent improvements observed in Block 3i stability validate this serial approach,” Gilmore testified.

Bogdan's carrot and stick policy is at work here. He is essentially holding the signing of the 150+ aircraft order with Lockheed until they speed up the stability fix development so as to get the USAF to IOC within their window (August - Dec). Even a few months of delay (the original contracts ere to be signed by early March) in signing these would increase Lockheed's cost of getting stuff pre-ordered and ready for assembly 2 years from now given the fixed cost contractual environment. The carrot being faster Block 4 contract and a more favorable reporting structure for that FOD..

[member_20067]

Pretty cool video of inside operation of a Virginia class nuke sub

http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/05/politics/ ... index.html

[UlanBatori]

asserting that the acceptance procedures are phony? a desperate accusation I would say.

Thanks! That is ****EXACTLY*** the intelligence that one expects from said entities, and that is ***EXACTLY**** why ppl who know don't state that in public with the evidence that would take more than the intelligence that these oh-so-patriotic einsteins can collectively muster. They can test the production vehicles all they want for Specifications and Acceptance, the problem is elsewhere.

The Military is ALWAYS right. NEVER makes mistakes and NEVER has... those leading it are even more infallible.

Let me put it this way. The government had this database of computer codes developed under government **CONTRACT*** back in the 1980s-90s. Final Reports with the codes supplied. Called COSMIC. What is the probability that a code in there had, say, gross FORTRAN errors including infinite loops? Out of a random sampling of say 100 codes, how many had huge, gross bugs?

So if the answer to that is not "less than 20", then you have a 20 percent probability that not only do the contractors cheat, but the govt's acceptance people don't bother to check anything.

The point is this:
Those who cheat, and have been cheating for decades, are not &^%$*( stupid. It takes a bit of patience and thinking to figure out the depth and breadth of the scam, and why it has survived and is growing and spreading.

**NOT** going to happen with the sort pictured in "Men In Black"

So dude, why were u & ur boys selected for this mission?

BECAUSE WE ARE THE BEST OF THE BEST OF THE BEST, SSSSSSIIRRRRRRRRRR!

Oh so u ain't got no clue neither, huh?

It will all come out in some huge investigation with all the
"I Do Not Recall" and the "By the 5th Amendment.." - after the $T is already burned and the lemons are fully ripened.
And, not to trouble ur fine brain, but why the *&^( would I be "desperate" to make any "accusation"? I already sold my company that offered to make the F-35 for less, and made my $40B profit before it was unfairly denied the contract.

[Shreeman]

le 1000 is some ship, even if it ends up doing a poor mans impression of a sub some day. glance at them bichhars on teetar folks.

[shiv]

whoa whoa whoa! This is some scathing write-up and 2 years old. Maybe a bit unfair but anyway judge for yourself..

An Officer Corps That Can’t Score

An Officer Corps That Can’t Score
How military careerism breeds habits of defeat
By William S. Lind • April 17, 2014

The most curious thing about our four defeats in Fourth Generation War—Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan—is the utter silence in the American officer corps. Defeat in Vietnam bred a generation of military reformers, men such as Col. John Boyd USAF, Col. Mike Wyly USMC, and Col. Huba Wass de Czege USA, each of whom led a major effort to reorient his service. Today, the landscape is barren. Not a military voice is heard calling for thoughtful, substantive change. Just more money, please.

Such a moral and intellectual collapse of the officer corps is one of the worst disasters that can afflict a military because it means it cannot adapt to new realities. It is on its way to history’s wastebasket. The situation brings to mind an anecdote an Air Force friend, now a military historian, liked to tell some years ago. Every military, he said, occasionally craps in its own mess kit. The Prussians did it in 1806, after which they designed and put into service a much improved new model messkit, through the Scharnhorst military reforms. The French did it in 1870, after which they took down from the shelf an old-model messkit—the mass, draft army of the First Republic—and put it back in service. The Japanese did it in 1945, after which they threw their mess kit away, swearing they would never eat again. And we did it in Korea, in Vietnam, and now in four new wars. So far, we’ve had the only military that’s just kept on eating.

Why? The reasons fall in two categories, substantive and structural. Substantively, at the moral level—Colonel Boyd’s highest and most powerful level—our officers live in a bubble. Even junior officers inhabit a world where they hear only endless, hyperbolic praise of “the world’s greatest military ever.” They feed this swill to each other and expect it from everyone else. If they don’t get it, they become angry. Senior officers’ bubbles, created by vast, sycophantic staffs, rival Xerxes’s court. Woe betide the ignorant courtier who tells the god-king something he doesn’t want to hear. (I know—I’ve done it, often.)

At Boyd’s next level, the mental, our officers are not professionals. They are merely craftsman. They have learned what they do on a monkey-see, monkey-do basis and know no more. What defines a professional—historically there were only three professions, law, medicine, and theology—is that he has read, studied, and knows the literature of his field. The vast majority of our officers read no serious military history or theory. A friend who teaches at a Marine Corps school told me the most he can now get majors to read is two pages. Another friend, teaching at an Army school, says, “We are back to drawing on the cave wall.”

As culpable as our officers are for these failings, they are not the whole story. Officers are also victims of three structural failures, each of which is enough to lay an armed service low.

The first, and possibly the worst, is an officer corps vastly too large for its organization—now augmented by an ant-army of contractors, most of whom are retired officers. A German Panzer division in World War II had about 21 officers in its headquarters. Our division headquarters are cities. Every briefing—and there are many, the American military loves briefings because they convey the illusion of content without offering any—is attended by rank-upon-rank of horse-holders and flower-strewers, all officers.

The pathologies that flow from this are endless. Command tours are too short to accomplish anything, usually about 18 months, because behind each commander is a long line of fellow officers eagerly awaiting their lick at the ice-cream cone. Decisions are pulled up the chain because the chain is laden with surplus officers looking for something to do. Decisions are committee-consensus, lowest common denominator, which Boyd warned is usually the worst of all possible alternatives. Nothing can be changed or reformed because of the vast number of players defending their “rice bowls.” The only measurable product is entropy.

The second and third structural failings are related because both work to undermine moral courage and character, which the Prussian army defined as “eagerness to make decisions and take responsibility.” They are the “up or out” promotion system and “all or nothing” vesting for retirement at 20 years. “Up or out” means an officer must constantly curry favor for promotion because if he is not steadily promoted he must leave the service. “All or nothing” says that if “up or out” pushes him out before he has served 20 years, he leaves with no pension. (Most American officers are married with children.)

It is not difficult to see how these two structural failings in the officer corps morally emasculate our officers and all too often turn them, as they rise in rank and near the magic 20 years, into ass-kissing conformists. Virtually no other military in the world has these policies, for obvious reasons.

Of these two types of failings, the structural are probably the most damaging. They are also the easiest to repair. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the president, and Congress could quickly fix all of them. Why don’t they? Because they only look at the defense budget, and these are not directly budgetary issues. They merely determine, in large measure, whether we win or lose. marapr-issuethumb

Fixing the substantive problems is harder because those fixes require changes in organizational culture. OSD cannot order our officers to come out from the closed system, fortified with hubris, that they have placed around themselves to protect the poor dears from ever hearing anything upsetting, however true. Congress cannot withhold pay from those officers who won’t read. Only our officers themselves can fix these deficiencies. Will they? The problem is circular: not until they leave their bubble.

If American military officers want to know, or even care, why we keep losing, they need only look in the mirror. They seem to do that most of the time anyway, admiring their now-tattered plumage. Behind them in the glass, figures in turbans dance and laugh.

William S. Lind is author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook and director of the American Conservative Center for Public Transportation.

[shiv]

American of Desi origin supports F-35 over A-10
http://www.businessinsider.in/Air-Force ... s?from=mdr

More :
defense
Air Force test pilot shares if the F-35 or A-10 is better for close air support
Alex Lockie0May 7, 2016, 11.06 PM

Lately, the Armed Services Committees of the US House and US Senate have been on a crusade to save the Cold War-era A-10 Warthog from being mothballed in favor of the F-35, but an Air Force test pilot just gave surprising testimony on the two air frames' relative close-air-support capabilities in an interview with Defense News.

Lt. Col. Raja Chari, director of the F-35 integrated test force and commander of the 461st Flight Test Squadron, makes an important distinction between the capabilities of the two competing aircraft.

"You need to really define: What exactly are you talking about when you say [close-air support (CAS)]? The way you define the question will dramatically affect the answer that you come up with," Chari said. "Are you talking about CAS in a low-threat environment, or CAS in a high-threat environment? Basically, contested or uncontested?"

For Chari, when the enemy has substantial antiair capabilities, the A-10 "isn't really in the conversation."

The A-10, as a low-cost, long-serving close-air-support platform, has earned a dear place in the hearts of infantry soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the success of the Warthog largely hinges on the fact that it is used to wipe up insurgents and militias with little or no antiaircraft capabilities.

The F-35, on the other hand, is well suited to evade detection and enemy defenses.

The A-10 has also been heralded for its ability to fly slow and low over targets, sometimes loitering in the air for up to 90 minutes, but, as Chari notes, with tanker planes to refuel, the F-35 can achieve a similar loitering time.

"If you are talking a non-contested environment, which would be the only place you could make that comparison with the A-10, you are going to have tankers, so it's kind of moot," Chari said of the A-10's supposed loitering advantage.

"You could easily get to 90 minutes [in the F-35] if you are 15 minutes from where you are going to loiter," Chari continued.

Also, the faster F-35 can reach its destination before the A-10 and has a bigger gun than the F-15s currently carrying out CAS alongside the A-10.

"I'm not downplaying the A-10, it's an awesome platform, but it's also - you have to know the role it can fit in," Chari concluded.

[brar_w]

The most likely scenario is that the A-10 vs F-35 debate will likely fizzle out. The next budget will be that of a new President, and there is likely to be some sort of resolution or agreement on sequestration that could allow them to retain the A-10 into the mid 2020's and still get funding for the other priorities (allowing the SeCAF and the CSAF to drop the recurring annual request for early A-10 retirement to reallocate manpower on the F-35 and other systems). A new CSAF, most likely a new SASC chairman(McCain is unlikely to get reelected) and a new Secretary of Defense (perhaps the first women) will probably cut a deal and fund it through. The path from going for 2 decades of COIN to higher end warfare preparation isn't going to be reversed despite the current COIN operations. They are however likely to reverse some of the sequestered triggered funding cuts allowing more breathing room to fund short term commitments, while preserving long term modernization and most importantly the training required for the high end battle that was cannibalized for other commitments due to the Budget Control Act.

[Austin]

US Hypersonic Program ( via Saurav Jha )

[brar_w]

^ The link does not work.

X-Posting form SpF

The US Air Force (USAF) is currently engaged in a flight test programme for its new Talon HATE pod for the F-15C Eagle. Talon HATE is a new system designed to help integrate and enhance the relationship between its two air dominance platforms - the F-15C Eagle and the F-22 Raptor.Developed initially by the company's secretive Phantom Works as a rapid-prototyping concept, Talon HATE is a podded system that combines a covert data exchange capability with an inbuilt infrared search-and-track (IRST) sensor. It has been seen flying recently with the USAF's elite 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron (422 TES) at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) in Nevada.

Boeing completed the final design review for Talon HATE in September 2014, although public information remains scant. Many see Talon HATE acting very much along the lines of the USAF's Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) currently deployed on E-11A, EQ-4, and WB-57 aircraft, and essentially acting as a data relay platform for a wide range of information."The system assimilates information in real-time from multiple domains, creating an improved common operating picture for tactical awareness," said Alex Lopez, vice president, Advanced Network and Space Systems at Boeing Phantom Works.

One of the major limitations of the F-22 is its inability to communicate covertly with other aircraft types, although the F-22 features an intra-flight datalink (IFDL) that enables the aircraft to exchange data within a formation of F-22 aircraft.

Similarly, the F-22's Increment 3.2A spiral upgrade added Link 16, but only as a receive-only terminal because the non-stealthy Link-16 with its omnidirectional emissions could reveal the aircraft's location.

However, under programme director Sean Rice, the Talon HATE project has integrated the F-22's IFDL with the proven Multifunctional Information Distribution System-JTRS (MIDS-J) system. MIDS-J serves as a host for multiple concurrent communications waveforms that are essential for Talon HATE operations, with Talon HATE essentially receiving and translating the F-22 data and processing it for redistribution on MIDS/Link 16 waveforms to other friendly aircraft.Four engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) pods are thought to be on contract for ACC. The first public sighting of an Eagle carrying Talon HATE was in December 2015 when 422 TES F-15C serial 83-026/OT passed through Fort Worth, Texas. Another F-15C (82-022) has also been seen active at Nellis AFB in 2016.

Despite calls to re-start F-22 production, the reality is that the F-15C is needed to help meet long-term USAF air superiority needs, and will need to work closely with the F-22.

A smooth method of covertly exchanging data between the F-22 and F-15C will have many benefits. The new system should allow the F-22 to disperse data from two of its most sophisticated sensors: the AN/APG-77 radar and AN/ALR-94 electronic warfare system, a capability hitherto seemed impossible. Meanwhile, the F-15C's new AN/APG-63(V)3 AESA radar offers extremely long-range detection.

In addition, the new IRST sensor on the Talon HATE pod will enable the F-15C pilot to transmit both long-range radar and IRST data to the F-22, increasing its detection capabilities and decreasing reliance on its own sensors - thereby helping it to remain undetected. The ability to passively relay target data forward to the F-22s will mean they only break cover when they have to release a weapon. Conversely, the F-22s will be able to act as a passive sensor for missile-laden F-15Cs.

The only thing that the article doesn't emphasize is that under the F-15 missile truck (mini arsenal plane) concept, the F-22's that are well ahead of the Eagles don't really need the 2-Way L16 to get the SA passed on to them by the F-15's blasting away their radars and IRST's. As long as there is software level support (which came with inc. 3.2a) they can passively receive the data from the F15's in the back. Also, with the current 3.2(b) there has been a lot of emphasis on improving the Geolocation capabilities (threat emitters) of the AN/ALR-94 (through hardware upgrades, and software development) and this is likely to open up opportunities of cooperative targeting (like the USN's passive Growler concept) that the Mini BACN - Talon hate can provide benefit in (F-22's passes data for F-15 to target).

The Talon Hate is just a stepping stone and will be acquired in limited amounts to support a small deployable force. The long term goal is MAPS, that not only translates IFDL but also MADL (even though F-35's have full 2--way Link 16 capability), and future Common Advanced Data Link waveforms. One option has been to use the F-22's and F-35's embedded L-band antennas as communications nodes and that is being looked into as well, but it will most likely be a pod (for the F-15's to pass along using MIDS) that will naturally be quite a bit more complex than the talon hate.

[brar_w]

US Hypersonic Program ( via Saurav Jha )

Here's the latest Open source program status update from just one agency supporting the two short term projects

http://i63.tinypic.com/aup9d.png

http://i68.tinypic.com/2zfpm4g.png

http://i63.tinypic.com/347ji1g.png

http://i67.tinypic.com/33k8483.png

[UlanBatori]

Imagine! The Han-Wu Chen (HAWC) and the Tan Bo Guang (TBG), built in thousands and launched as a swarm using a swarm of PLAF JF-17 Bundaars - one aimed at each $200B F-35 struggling to lift off from concealed forward bases as well as sheltered air bases and aircraft carriers. Each identified easily by the thermal signature of a V/S takeoff by the Guan Peng Shen satellite constellation. Or maybe by the sound of the rattling airframes and engines.

Maginot Line all over again.

Hypersonic glide and airbreathing tactical weapons. How are the uber-expensive cellphones going to survive beyond the first 15 minutes of a real conflict I wonder.

[TSJones]

you're right as usual Boss.

we could never stop enemy satellites from revealing our locations because that would be militarization of space and we don't do things like that because that would be cheating and we don't cheat.

so we would be completely helpless from a swarm assault that knew our locations.

we fight honestly and fair.

and we would never harm innocent civilians in an all out retaliatory strikes because WE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR THE WORLD in how to comport oneself in time of war.

doesn't president Obama give an example in the struggle against ISIS when we pretend to bomb them?

why do we do that?

because our morals are better than anybody else's morals, that's why.

and we refuse, and I mean we absolutely don't have the capability., to commit to war in space.

we are sitting ducks because WE LOVE EVERYBODY and we have honor and dignity while our enemies do not.

and we're going to prove it.

[UlanBatori]

And a Power Salute to you for that commendable sentiment!

The only question is whether the US will have $$ left over for those ASATs to take down the Long March Guang Peng Shen system in time when the war breaks out, say, in the Phillippines or South Korea.

[TSJones]

1. diversity is our strength.

2. whut ASATs?

[brar_w]

Wouldn't take a whole lot of time to dig up what sort of interceptor (s) would be used for an ASAT mission and what sort of numbers exist and are planned for such an interceptor.