US military, technology, arms, tactics

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Manish_P
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Manish_P »

Stealth is all fine... can it do this


The delta force dirtbike :mrgreen:


UlanBatori
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by UlanBatori »

Pretty Awesome! No recoil, but no exhaust impinging on rider's mijjile and thigh either. :eek:
deejay
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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No helmet either.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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USN exploring using LIDAR to assure access in GPS denied maritime environment
The US Navy (USN) is exploring the potential of performing non-Global Positioning System (non-GPS) positioning using Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) measurements of space objects with known orbits, positions, and velocity over time.

The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SSC) Atlantic began work on the LIDAR Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) project in fiscal year 2015. The project is addressing the question of how the USN would navigate the seas in a GPS-denied environment.

The LIDAR PNT provides significant benefits over GPS and various other non-GPS techniques, Phillippe Reed, space systems engineer at SSC Atlantic, told IHS Jane's recently.

"This method is much less susceptible to jamming, requires access to fewer satellites than GPS, and does not require active satellites [it can use simple retro-reflectors or even existing space debris]. A shipboard version of a space surveillance LIDAR system could provide high-accuracy PNT data to the fleet in a GPS-degraded or GPS-denied environment," according to Reed.

The effort uses a high-power LIDAR system, originally designed to track space objects, like debris, he said.

"Because of the unique capabilities of the technology, we wanted to explore what we could do with it if we could put it on a ship. Since the LIDAR system can be used from a known location to precisely determine the orbit of space objects, we speculated that we could use it to determine an unknown location [for example, a ship's position] by tracking an object in a known orbit," Reed said. "This system is not as susceptible to jamming as GPS receivers, and could be part of a suite of alternatives to GPS for the navy in the future."

Besides being resilient to jamming, the LIDAR PNT would provide better accuracy, reduced gimbal/beam-steering requirements, and global coverage; it would need only a single space object, and not require a functioning spacecraft, he added.

The project's positioning method requires only two measurements - range and range-rate - a single space object with known ephemeris, and an approximate altitude, according to SSC Atlantic.

SSC Atlantic is currently in the early stages of development, Reed noted.

"We developed the basic position-fix methods, and we used historical space-object-tracking measurements to show how the system would perform 'in the real world'. We have to continue to work on expanding and improving our algorithms before we will be ready for live testing," he added.

There are challenges with using LIDAR in this manner. One is that this system will be fairly large, expensive, and power-hungry, which means for the time being, it will only be suitable for large ships. Meanwhile, GPS-user equipment is inexpensive and small enough to be used on just about any platform.

Another common problem with using lasers is cloud cover, Reed said.

"Poor weather can make it difficult or impossible to close the link. To some extent, this could be mitigated by changing the receiver sensitivity, optics aperture, and laser wavelength. The greatest immediate challenge is that errors in our estimate of spacecraft position and velocity grow over time [due to drag and other forces acting on space objects] and lead to errors in our position fix. We are using a wide variety of specialised software and measurements to try to correct for these errors," he said.

SSC Atlantic is still too early into the project to discuss schedules or specific timelines or demonstrating the LIDAR PNT. "Future steps eventually will be to perform ground-based testing and then integrate with a ship for testing at sea," Reed said.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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Air Force's secretive X-37 space plane marks a year in orbit
The Air Force’s top-secret space plane just celebrated its one-year anniversary of space flight.

As of May 20, the X-37B has been in orbit for one year, the third time the craft has accomplished such a goal.

The space plane launched on its first mission in April 2010, staying in orbit for 224 days. The second and third missions in 2011 and 2012, respectively, both lasted longer than a year.

Now the fourth mission has hit the one-year mark as well, with no announced plans to bring the plane back to Earth anytime soon.

Service officials told Air Force Times simply that they’re “excited for this fourth flight and look forward to learning from it.”There are actually two X-37 aircraft, according to the Air Force. Each is about 29 feet long and 9 feet high, with a 14-foot wingspan, and they weigh 11,000 pounds each. The program began at NASA in 1999 and transferred to the Pentagon in 2004.

The Air Force, however, has remained tight-lipped about what the space planes actually do. An oft-repeated statement from the service says the craft are testing out “advanced guidance, navigation and control, thermal protection systems, avionics, high temperature structures and seals, conformal reusable insulation, lightweight electromechanical flight systems, advanced propulsion systems, and autonomous orbital flight, reentry, and landing.”

But experts have also noted the Air Force could likely be testing out systems to disable enemy satellites or rapidly replace U.S. satellites if they’re destroyed.

The Air Force said it would not discuss whether the X-37’s fourth mission has different objectives than its first three.

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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Singha »

http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-first-loo ... 1464359194

video and details of the naval railgun
brar_w
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Bob Works has already started shifting the EMRG future investment track from the Navy to the MDA and the Army (a more balanced spread) clearly stating where the priorities lie (defense). As a start, the SCO (the office tasked with rapidly bringing together already established technologies and capabilities) is well funded for the Hypervelocity Gun Weapon System that combines the EMRG round with existing systems, and borrows a Raytheon fighter AESA to target missiles. The objective being to field that at forward deployed locations, and gain experience and mature the round for this application (Missile Defense) and give the EMRG the space it needs to grow. Smaller EMRG applications will obviously be better funded since the ships that can sustain the larger railgun won't even begin their design phase until the second half of the next decade (CGX like vessels that eventually replace the DDG-51). They'll probably mount the big gun on the last DDG-1000 but its quite well understood that the next DDG will be based on the DDG-1000 design as was the plan all along (and the only reason they have continued to invest into the 3-ship class since its going to be a stepping stone for the larger Burke replacement).

SCO aims to flip the script on missile defense with hypervelocity gun

The Pentagon wants to take a weapon originally designed for offense, flip its punch for defense and demonstrate by 2018 the potential for the Army and Navy to conduct missile defense of bases, ports and ships using traditional field guns to fire a new hypervelocity round guided by a mobile, ground variant of an Air Force fighter aircraft radar.

The Strategic Capabilities Office is working with the Army, Navy and Air Force to craft a Hypervelocity Gun Weapon System that aims, in part, to provide China and Russia an example of a secret collection of new U.S. military capabilities the Defense Department is bringing online in an effort to strengthen conventional deterrence.

"It is a fantastic program," Will Roper, Strategic Capabilities Office director, said in a March 28 interview with reporters, who said the project aims "to completely lower the cost of doing missile defense" by defeating missile raids at a lower cost per round and, as a consequence, imposing higher costs on attackers.

Current U.S. missile defense capabilities are centered around very sophisticated guided-missile interceptors, which cost -- in most cases -- millions of dollars per shot, an approach the Army and Navy service chiefs, in a Nov. 5, 2014 joint memo, warned the defense secretary is "unsustainable."

"Projectiles that we fire and test today are on the order of $50,000 currently and we hope to push down to $35,000 -- a two order-of-magnitude swing in some cases," Roper said.


The Pentagon is seeking $246 million for the HGWS in fiscal year 2017, building on $364 million appropriated for the project in FY-15 and FY-16.

The HGWS takes smart projectiles developed for the Navy's electromagnetic railgun and fires them with artillery already in the inventory.

"Cost-effective, large magazine, base defense will be demonstrated by closing the fire-control loop between existing sensors and prototype projectiles launched from existing powder guns including the Navy's Mk-45 5-inch Naval gun and the Army's Paladin 155 mm self-propelled howitzer; advanced powder gun prototypes; and the electromagnetic railgun," the Pentagon's FY-17 budget request states.

The Army and Navy have a combined inventory of approximately 1,000 guns capable of firing rounds of this size, including about 900 Army Paladins. The Navy has about 100 cruisers and destroyers, each with one 5-inch MK-45 gun on the bow.

"The intended end-state is a prototype system that retires risks to allow transition of gun-based defense to partners: the Missile Defense Agency, the Navy, and/or the Army," the budget request adds.

Roper, during the March 28 interview, disclosed a new dimension of the HGWS project.

"We haven't talked publicly about the sensor that we're doing with that," he said. "So, if you're going to do missile defense, you're going to need something to do the tracking. And we are working very extensively with taking fighter radars, in which we have a huge investment, and building ground-based variants of these."

The SCO is working to fashion a ground variant of the most advanced fighter radars, based on active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology: "Putting them on the ground to support intercepts of systems that can truly move," Roper said, referring to the radar's role in plans to take out ballistic and cruise missile threats.

He said the hypervelocity project has evolved to be a joint effort with three services: "We have a Navy round, an Army gun, and an Air Force sensor -- all combined into one Frankenstein architecture."

Roper, who was the Missile Defense Agency's director for engineering before being tapped to head the SCO at its formation in August 2012, declined to quantify the estimated range for the hypervelocity gun system.

"It goes without saying that because it is a gun, it is not a huge area defense," Roper said. "We're wanting to be able to defend high-value, small-area assets -- forward operating bases, ships, ports with a high, high density of fire -- with assets that are completely mobile."

He noted that much of the existing missile-defense capability is hindered by being fixed infrastructure. "Things that don't move give an opponent a decided advantage," Roper said. "We want to deny those, complicate their counter-targeting" with the HGWS, he said.

"We'd like opponents of the U.S. to think: 'I can't saturate their defense by having enough systems on my side.' We'd like them to think these critical forward operating bases and stations will continue to operate no matter how many missiles they continue to throw at them," the SCO director said. "We want that deterrent aspect in play."
SCO provides most detailed accounting to date of once-secret projects

The Pentagon's once-secretive innovation shop charged with gaining back conventional combat advantages against potential near-peer adversaries such as China and Russia provided the most complete public accounting of its work during a congressional hearing Tuesday.

Will Roper, director of the Strategic Capabilities Office, told the Senate Armed Services emerging threats subcommittee that the new organization -- since its formation in August 2012 -- has produced 15 projects, six of which have transitioned from prototype experiments to permanent programs with operational sponsors and a secure spot in the Pentagon's future budget plan.

The office, which is seeking $902 million in fiscal year 2017, plans to spread funding across the military departments, including 36 percent for the Navy, 24 percent for the Air Force, 18 percent for the Army and 22 percent for "other organizations," according to Roper's written testimony.

Pentagon leaders, as part of the FY-17 budget request, made a calculated decision to give the SCO -- and some of its work -- a more public profile. Roper told reporters last month that while the SCO is disclosing some of its work, its most powerful new combat capabilities would remain secret.

The 15 SCO projects to date, he told lawmakers, contain 23 capabilities. Roper's testimony identified a dozen items, including new revelations.

For instance, the SCO director revealed that its "Strike-Ex" project -- described in only generic terms in budget justification documents -- focuses on two existing precision munitions: the Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile and the Army Tactical Missile System. The antiship "Maritime Tomahawk" aims to give the weapon an "advanced maritime targeting" capability and the ATACMS project aims to "build and demonstrate an operational prototype, giving the Army multiple options for next-generation fires," according to Roper's written testimony.

He also identified for the first time the F-15 radar as the technology the SCO is utilizing in a ground-based variant as part of a project to create a hypervelocity gun to defend against missile raids.

Roper and Defense Secretary Ash Carter have previously revealed other projects, including the new anti-ship mode for the Navy's Standard Missile-6, the Arsenal Plane, and Sea Mob, a kit to convert existing small boats -- such as rigid hull inflatable boats -- into autonomous "sea mobs."

Other projects include a new variant of the MK-48 torpedo, the Third Eye data architecture to create "kill webs," swarming unmanned aerial vehicles, and advanced navigation kits that give satellite-guided munitions the ability to navigate in GPS-denied environments.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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USAF 'not looking at a mobile GBSD' to replace Minuteman missiles

http://www.janes.com/article/61002/usaf ... n-missiles
The US Air Force (USAF) is pushing ahead with its Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) programme to replace the ageing Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) fleet, and a top service official said a road-mobile option is not currently being considered despite some insinuations otherwise.

"We want to make sure that as we look at GBSD, we're building it modular so if changes need to be made in the weapon system you don't have to open up, let's say, the software to redo the entire software," Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, told a handful of reporters during a recent meeting. "But right now we are not looking at a mobile GBSD" missile, he said.

A request for information published by the USAF in early 2015 raised questions regarding the USAF's interest in retaining the option to field a mobile ICBM, as it said GBSD solutions should "accommodate flexible deployment strategies".

Moreover, the request said the service wanted a solution that "replaces the entire flight system, retains the silo-basing mode while recapitalising the infrastructure, and implements a new weapon system command-and-control [WSC2] system". The new weapon is to use existing Mk 12A and Mk 21 re-entry vehicles in single and multiple RV configurations, but "the remainder of the missile stack will be replaced", it said.

The LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBM - a three-stage, solid-propellant ballistic missile that can reach a maximum range of 13,000 km with a payload of three RVs - has been operational since 1970. The Minuteman system has been the cornerstone of the US land-based strategic nuclear force since the early 1960s, although there have been many upgrades and life-extension efforts since then.

For research and development, GBSD was requested to receive USD113.9 million in fiscal year 2017 (FY 2017), USD294 million in FY 2018, and USD321.1 million in FY 2019, then jump up to USD1.034 billion in FY 2020, and USD1.576 billion in FY 2021.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

GBSD would be a tough sell to the Congress and the next few administrations over the next decade or two. The industrial atrophy means that a huge ramp in $ would be required to develop it making it highly prone to being shelved, or continuously pushed to the right. Bottom line is that the triad is going to 'cost' in terms of conventional capability that must be let go (in the 2020-2060 timeframe) to pay for it. I don't expect both the LRSO, and the GBSD to see the light of day. One will probably go in the next 5 or so years.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Austin »

^^ Considering US deploys most of the strategic weapons on SSBN there wont be incentive to GBSD , specially with New Start the upper limit is already 2220 warhead and much lesser launcher number.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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That is logical but unfortunately the political gridlock won’t allow any POTUS to defer funding unless the Democrats sweep the senate and strengthen their position in the House. The last round of strategic modernization came through an increase (time bound) in the budget topline. This time around, they can’t do that because the budget topline is capped, and under sequesteration they targeted a Trillion dollar shave from around 2010 to 2022. Therefore, they have created or attempted to create a new fund, which is an extremely dangerous thing to do for many reasons the most important being that its fiscally not assured since it would need to be renewed at every appropriation resulting in a higher overall cost to fund stuff through it. The GBSD is essentially a fall back option in case over the next 50-80 years the under sea component looses its survivability, in which case the best course to pursue would be to do some R&D and leave it at that so that you can pursue it in the 2050 time-frame if required.



The LRSO can stay since it will probably have a conventional component to it as well plus the advances made in long range stand-off survivability will no doubt trickle down to smaller conventional systems (there is a JASSM replacement project currently looking at demonstrations in the early 2020’s that will no doubt benefit) The SSBN is probably the most assured of funding as a program because replacing the Ohio is the most urgent need. Under sequestration, the operator would not be willing to trade conventional capability for strategic modernization especially if that modernization under the current timeline (All three triads concurrently developed) will cause quite a lot of shift in money over the next few decades from conventional programs that are likely to be used much more often than a weapon that is unlikely to be ever launched.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by TSJones »

a change in administration may think differently especially with the rodina morphing it's nuclear forces.

I do think it will probably be on a slow funding cycle as long as the ssbn's are still deemed effective.

somebody always wants the work.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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It’s the congress that ultimately gets to decide here and play kingmaker since under sequestration the NDAA is forced into a conference and ultimately a negotiated increase In the OCO funding to compensate for the base budget caps. The republicans view funding the ‘triad’ as something that is indicative of a strong posture on national defense even though their actions have contributed equally (if not more) to the gridlock, and the resultant mess that is the Budget control act. Furthermore, in an era of sequestration, and negotiated agreements, a commitment to funding the triad probably weakens the overall NatSec posture given what has to be given away to pay for it. At the end of the day, you can strengthen your strategic position all you want, and if you fund 2 or one leg at a time it will still strengthen it just to a lesser degree. It’s the conventional capability that you use, and will be using and what will ultimately decide whether your armed forces can meet the challenges that the politicos are likely to put them in.



If there were no BCA, I’d support concurrent development of the SSBN, LRSO and the GBSD. But that is unlikely to happen till the early to mid 2020’s. Under such a case, I’d move the LRSO procurement to the mid 2030’s (Post ALCM retirement) and the GBSD funding to the 2040’s. The SSBN development, and procurement is plenty to have a credible deterrence against any strategic threat. There is a whole laundry list of systems the USAF, USN and the US Army have deferred to immediately post BCA-lapse and some of those will be gone if the policy to pursue concurrent triad modernization is stuck too...
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by TSJones »

the point is, they may be forced into it by russian nuke changes......in spite of Obama's failed "reset" policy......
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

You don't peg yourself like that. What determines how much you escalate your strategic spending is the ability of your opponent to diminish your under sea capability and survivability, to be able to deny assured strategic deterrence through a credible Anti-ICBM ABM (and here we are speaking of hundreds of warheads) and shoot down all your penetrating and stand off launch platforms and weapons. What that adversary invests in its own deterrence is a focus on its modernization and its confidence of what it needs to create a credible strategic threat against its adversaries moves to deny it.

Given that, a diminished strategic status-quo would have occurred, had the USN decided to prolong the Ohio or not replace it at all, not replace the MIII, and not invest in anything beyond the small fleet of B-2 bombers and ALCM's from the stand-off bombers. That isn't what is happening. They are poised to spend $80 Billion in designing, developing and procuring the B-21 fleet, are investing for a 2030's capability LRSO, and are enhancing the survivability of the B-2 over the next decade. Additionally there is a nearly $100 Billion investment in the SSBN program that will recapitalize Ohio class fleet and keep it for the next 6+ decades. That is not the status quo, its called a balanced and realistic look at developing a strategic capability that you can afford and sustain without taking away from other conventional programs that have a more pressing need.

The industrial base is simply not big enough to support multiple hypersonic programs, sustain multiple robust teams for a new ICBM, and develop penetrating airborne attack and fighter aircraft plus significantly move ahead in directed energy offense and defense (and defense against them). You would need to invest in the industry to make it capable of delivering that over the next 2 decades. Just wait till they figure out the bill for the GBSD - It will be a massive sticker shock primarily, because they let the capability atrophy and the industry moved on and invested in areas where there was business. You can do R&D at a small scale but unless you have a program office with a defined procurement number, you can't sustain an industrial work force for specialized design and production.

As Bob Works put it a few months ago, they tried a dozen different things in the 70's, they just couldn't make nukes more 'usable', so you can't really raid massive investment in conventional capability to fund an arbitrary definition of strategic capability that would be an absolute over-kill given especially if the arbitrary capability as defined in the GOP's lingo is something that is simply +++ to whatever the other side proposes. The NatSec community within the GOP hasn't yet realized how diminished they are in terms of influence over their own party. Its those loonies in the Tea Party that run the show and it may even be that at the WH level a Democrat in the White House could manage to work with the Republican NatSec community to get some of these things funded that neither party can fund on its own. The few NatSec wonks I know that consistently lean GOP will pick Michele Flournoy every time over Trump without blinking an eye and its generally established that MF would be a SecDef at some point if the Dems end up in the White House.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by TSJones »

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/09/scien ... .html?_r=0

gene editing to alter whole species..........
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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Boeing To Add Second JDAM Production Shift
As Boeing Defense, Space & Security’s weapons division prepares to double Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) tail kit production from 75 units per day to 150 by next summer, the production facility in St. Charles, Missouri, has temporarily manned its second shift for a trial run.

Workers there spent the evening of June 3 practicing how they will transition from one shift per day to two, and perhaps even three if the demand for general purpose bomb guidance kits continues to rise.

The GPS-aided inertial guidance kits convert 500-lb. (227-kg), 1,000-lb. and 2,000-lb. “dumb bombs” into highly-accurate, low-cost, precision-strike weapons. But they are being expended by the U.S. military and coalition forces at a faster rate than they are currently being replaced.

To reverse this trend, the U.S. Air Force on May 31 almost doubled the ceiling value of its JDAM indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract with Boeing from $1.7 billion to $3.2 billion for about 36,500 guidance kits over the next year. At the today’s production rate, it would take 487 work days to assemble that many guidance kits, but 243 work days with two shifts at the planned rate of 150 units per day.

Boeing’s director of direct attack weapons, Cindy Gruensfelder, said June 6 that the practice run last week was successful in helping to identify any kinks in the line prior to standing up the second shift next month.

“In our peak, we will get to 36,500 per the air force contract by next summer,” Gruensfelder says. “That’s just per the contract. We’re leaving some additional capacity in order to meet any urgent operational needs that come in.”

Production rates have not hit this level in the post-9/11 era since a request for 36,000 JDAMs between 2004 and 2005 to replenish stocks expended in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.

Now, the U.S. military is conducting what is said to be the most precise military air campaign in history against the Islamic State group in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and even Libya and Yemen.

There are currently 27 customers for the Boeing weapon system, which entered development in 1994 and went into full production four years later. JDAMs provided better accuracy at night and in poor weather conditions than existing weapons. The development came just in time to support the 1999 air campaign in the Balkans, whereNorthrop Grumman B-2 bombers were flying 30-hr. roundtrips from Whiteman AFB, Missouri, loaded with the new “smart bombs.”

Production rates have waxed and waned in recent years, with orders from the U.S. government dropping to between 5,000 and 10,000 units at low points during the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan. Before this latest contract modification, foreign purchases accounted for just more than 50% of total orders, Boeing says.

The weapons are furnished via the U.S. Air Force weapons office at Eglin AFB in Florida as a foreign military sale. But several nations have been approved by the State Department to order directly from Boeing.

Gruensfelder says ongoing military campaigns have highlighted the need for JDAM customers to establish “more proactive acquisition plans” to ensure adequate supply. “I am seeing that from both the U.S. government and the international partners,” she says.
Despite having a well-established line, Gruensfelder says the JDAM team is continually working to reduce costs and cycle times at the St. Charles plant and among suppliers, but without compromising “first-time quality. That, we know, is ultimately important because it allows them to buy greater quantities,” she says. “The lower cost we get, the more they can purchase for those fixed dollars.”

The production teams are trained to build JDAMs or GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs, as well as a growing number of variants and add-on kits for both weapons. Boeing produces a laser guidance kit for JDAM, and it is also promoting the JDAM-ER wing kit for the 500-lb. Mk 82 bomb. That wing kit was developed for Australia, and larger versions are being explored for 1,000-lb. and 2,000-lb. class weapons.

St. Charles also produces the 30,000-lb. Massive Ordnance Penetrator and will build Boeing’s in-development guidance assembly for the B61-12 nuclear bomb and the high-altitude “HAAWC” wing kit for the Mark 54 lightweight torpedo. That High Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare Weapon will allow the Boeing P-8A Poseidon submarine hunter to attack targets from 30,000 ft.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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USAF Arms F-16, A-10 With Laser-Guided Rockets
The Marine Corps recently began carrying the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) on its Boeing AV-8B Harrier II, but the F-16 and A-10 deployments mark the first time the weapons have been sent into combat zones by the Air Force.

The BAE-developed guidance kit was first tested on the AV-8B, F-16 and A-10 during flight demonstrations in May 2013, the company said. It is already widely used on Navy and Marine Corps helicopters such as the Bell AH-1Z Viper, and was acquired last year by the Army for the Boeing AH-64 Apache gunship.

By adding laser guidance, the long-used “Hydra” rocket transforms from an area assault weapon into a precision-guided munition capable of destroying soft targets like hostile boats, vehicles and exposed enemy combatants without expending more expensive guided bombs and missiles, like the Lockheed AGM-114 Hellfire or future Joint Air-to-Ground Missile.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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New long-range, guided missile wins AROC approval; DAB next for ATACMS follow-on

The Army's top brass has formally endorsed the requirement for a new long-range, guided missile, forwarding a recommendation to the Office of the Secretary of Defense that the Pentagon proceed with a competition for the Long Range Precision Fires program -- potentially worth billions of dollars and expected to draw interest from Raytheon, Boeing and Lockheed Martin.

On June 9, the Army Requirements Oversight Council -- chaired by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley -- approved the requirement for a new ground-launched, deep-strike weapon, a follow-on to the Lockheed Martin-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) program that would provide a capability deemed critical to future operations, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. The Army terminated ATACMS production in 2007.

"The Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) reviewed the Long Range Precision Fires draft Capabilities Development Document (CDD) on 9 June and approved the requirements contained in the draft CDD," Army spokesman Dov Schwartz wrote in a June 10 email statement. "The AROC recommended transition to Milestone A."

That recommendation will be forwarded to the Defense Acquisition Board, chaired by Pentagon acquisition chief Frank Kendall, which is empowered to approve the LRPF program transition into technology maturation and risk reduction, the first phase of material development. The Army's fiscal year 2017 budget proposal includes plans to spend $305 million to develop LRPF through FY-21, including $39.2 million in the first year.

In November 2013, Kendall directed the Army to explore options for a new deep-strike weapon, setting an initial affordability goal of $720,000 per missile, assuming annual production purchases of at least 200 -- or $1.4 billion a year.

Among other things, the draft CDD includes an estimate of total unit procurement in order to provide a baseline for estimating affordability factors such as average unit cost and total life-cycle cost. It is an outcome of a nearly two-year analysis of alternatives that examined a range of options that included a service life extension program of the current ATACMS, restarting the ATACMS production line, developing a new missile, potential allied systems, and a combination of all of these alternatives.

The LRPF requirement sets a threshold for minimum distance of 70 kilometers and an objective requirement of 60 kilometers; the maximum range threshold is 300 kilometers with 499 kilometers the objective, according to a June 25, 2014 Army summary of the key parameters.

The guided missile is to be compatible with both the M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and demonstrate flight speeds "comparable with or superior to ATACMS," the Army document adds.

The new missile is also to be compliant with the Defense Department's 2008 cluster munition policy, which means the new weapon will likely carry the unitary warhead on currently fielded ATACMS.

If the Pentagon acquisition executive approves LRPF to proceed with technology maturation and risk reduction, the Army program office plans to launch a "limited competition" that utilizes special contracting vehicles for competitive prototyping, according to the Army's FY-17 budget request.

The Army plans to select two contractors for a 45-month TMRR phase of the program that will conclude with flight demonstrations and preliminary design reviews in FY-19. The Army then intendeds to run a competition for the next phase of the program, engineering and manufacturing development, in FY-19, and select a single winner in FY-20 to "complete product development, qualification, production readiness assessment, and limited user test," the budget request states.
Austin
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Austin »

brar_w
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Austin wrote:Lockheed - THAAD Extended Range

http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x4h0y1 ... range_tech

As per my understanding of the history behind the system, the original baseline THAAD design was to cover only partial IRBM footprint. IIRC, the baseline THAAD was to take out at <5000km ranged IRBM's (That will actually be demonstrated in the August 2016-August2017 time period as far as the longest range IRBM intercept attempt for the fielded THAAD). When Lockheed and Boeing/Aerojet presented the original booster stack option to the MDA the new missile would have enabled them to cover the entire IRBM threat (5500km) and perhaps even beyond due to higher velocity at burn out thanks to the kick stage. At that time the MDA wanted something much more ambitious than simple velocity and range extension but Lockheed was reluctant to tinker around with the front end since they would have had to do a lot of company funded demonstrations prior to award. There were GiF's of this on reddit a while back and I posted it here. They aren't messing around or trying to hide the main marketing feature for this in 3:15 given the intercept trajectory. Even in the aerospace media, they have quite openly said its mainly to more efficiently tackle boost glide threats where you need that cross range capability. Everything else (Full IRBM capability, longer range, greater defended area etc) is obviously an extra and a consequences of gearing up for that challenging threat. There is language in the budget this year that keeps R&D on this going, and I think they are planning for a full up program in the next budget so that its fielded in the 5-8 years that it will take to test everything out (MDA is behind in testing due to shortage of funds and even IRBM and ICBM targets). As a proof of concept, Aerojet and Lockheed self funded the booster and ran bench tests many years ago (iirc around 2010-12) so its a relatively low risk upgrade.

The Director for OT has pretty much asked for a merging of the ABM capability of the Patriot and THAAD systems so I think more short term they'll focus on that - Shooting PAC-3 MSE's using the AN/TPY-2 radar since the long term focus is on defending fixed areas (like SOKO, Japan and Guam) as opposed to moving with expeditionary troops at a high speed (Like Iraq). THAAD-ER will be interesting but I think what would be better would be to bring in THAAD into he IBCS (just like Navy has done with AEGIS) and use it to augment Patriot batteries. Given launcher dimensions you should be able to also put in longer ranged air-defense weapons into the THAAD launcher further increasing the defending area against cruise missiles (use IBCS for cues since TPY-2 is an ABM sensor). Once TPY-2's have the capability to cue MSE's (there is already an X band radar that does it in the MEADS) you can then let the Patriot sensor act as an air-defense node for protecting against the Cruise missile and even anti-air (even though that is unlikely to be a high priority for doctrinal reasons) threat using much cheaper interceptors (ESSM etc). That could even open the door to bring the MEADS sensor in as the US Army won't accept a rotating sensor for the ABM role. It would all depend upon the next GOTUS and how the Congress shapes up since the Patriot is an orphan system with the PEO and the end-user mostly at odds on pretty much everything. With the 7th Battery (THAAD) they will also field (this year) the new improved TPY-2+ radar with software and hardware (Gallium Nitride modules) upgrades focused at improving range and discrimination.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=6846&start=880#p2011370

Image

The image to me describes the utility of this system in that it can act as a deployable mini-AEGIS ashore (even though it won't ever replicate the full capability of a full up SM3 Block IIA) since you can take it to a hot spot in a relatively short amount of time at a fraction of the cost since there is very little in fixed infrastructure. At Guam this will be a permanent fixture with the ER version pretty much being the exoatmospheric interceptor (shot doctrine) and the baseline being for lower altitude intercepts. With Block IIA SM3 getting into service in the next couple of years, I really do not see the need to go in for another AEGIS ashore anywhere (Like japan for example) since both these systems combined (SM3 IIA's on AEGIS ships, both US and Japanese) pretty much make it redundant.

Unlike the three services, the MDA has done a fairly good job at listening to the DOTE, and the National Academy of Sciences even though they have lagged adopting their recommendations by a few years largely driven by budgetary reasons (tests cost money and they plan 10 years at a time (design and procure intercepts) so can't really rapidly introduce new testing in a matter of months to a few years). All three of them have been recommending merging THAAD and PATRIOT/MEADS for nearly a decade now and given the money involved to bring them together (AEGIS THAAD integration was relatively easy) it would be a low hanging fruit that they can do in a matter of a couple of years.

NAS report summary (circa 2012):
Although the report found PAC-3 and THAAD to be "well-executed programs," the MEADS ultra-high-frequency surveillance radar "is a good candidate for the addition to the PAC-3 because it would allow the Patriot radar to concentrate on the fire control task. In addition, the THAAD's interceptor would perform better if it took greater advantage of its radar capability," the report released on Sept. 11 states.

MEADS -- a trinational, co-development program between Italy, Germany and the United States -- was canceled early last year, but allowed to continue through a two-year proof-of-concept phase. Completion of the phase would allow all three countries to harvest technologies developed through the program for use in future systems.

Frank Kendall, the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, warned that not funding MEADS through the proof-of-concept phase, as some lawmakers have proposed, would prevent the United States from receiving data rights for technologies developed through the program. He issued the warning in a June 26 letter to Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL), who sits on the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee.

Kendall specifically points to the radar discussed in the report -- "the 360-degree, long-range Ultra High Frequency surveillance radar demonstration unit" -- in his list of desired technologies.

The new report also discusses the possibility of upgrades to the THAAD system. "A THAAD Block II interceptor has been proposed that would be fast enough to take full advantage of the TPY-2 radar coverage," it states.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Avarachan »

http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/weapo ... press.html
Lt. Gen. Bogdan, the F-35 program executive officer, found himself hauled before a congressional subcommittee hearing in October 2015 after it emerged that he had grounded pilots weighing less than 136 pounds because mannequin tests showed that the ejection seat would kill them—and that no mannequin testing at all had been done for pilots weighing 137 to 244 pounds. The problem was a result of a number of faults in the seat design, exacerbated by the extra weight of the high-tech helmet.

This was far from the only F-35 safety issue engineers grappled with during the past year. For example, the F-35 Block 2B aircraft the Marine Corps claimed in July 2015 to be ready for combat had 27 serious safety deficiencies as of the end of October 2015. When DOT&E recognizes an issue, it is assigned to one of two categories based on severity and whether it threatens the safe operation of the plane. Category I is the most severe, being “those which may cause death, severe injury, or severe occupational illness; may cause loss or major damage to a weapon system; critically restrict the combat readiness capabilities of the using organization; or result in a production line stoppage.” The report lists a total of 91 current deficiencies, 27 of which are Category I.
http://cqrollcall.com/top-weapons-teste ... not-fixed/
In a roundtable with reporters Feb. 10, Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, head of the F-35 program, said his office oversaw three tests last fall to assess a pair of solutions to the problem first revealed in tests last summer. The first fix is a switch that pilots weighing less than 136 pounds can hit to delay the release of the parachute by fractions of a second — enough so the pilot’s body readjusts in the seat so it’s in a better position when the parachute releases. The second solution is sewing material into the seat to restrain a pilot’s head from going too far backward.

“Both those fixes have already been tested and already worked,” Bogdan said, adding that they are “ready to go into the field and into production by the end of the year.”

The only remaining challenge that Bogdan acknowledged was that the weight of a new helmet, which may be exacerbating the whiplash problem, must be reduced before the ban on pilots less than 136 pounds can be lifted.

Gilmore had a much different take.

Tests to date have been done either on unusually light mannequins (136 pounds or less) or on extremely heavy ones (245 pounds), but nothing in between those weights, Gilmore’s written comments show. Consequently, there is no data that could shed light on risks to the majority of pilots.
What’s more, the only ejection seat tests in the last three years that have not put unacceptable stresses on the necks of mannequins have been conducted on those weighing 245 pounds ....

Gilmore also pointed out other reasons to believe last fall’s tests are not the final word. First, he said, the trials were conducted “by contractors for the program office,” not independent assessors. He also said his office has not received the data from these tests, only summaries by the program office.
Gilmore noted, too, that he’s “concerned about the lack of information or plans from the program office” for testing ejections in conditions where the plane is out of control or damaged. He said there may be “additional risk to the pilot” in these circumstances from pieces of the cockpit canopy, which shatters by design ahead of the ejection sequence.

He said several testing conditions must be in place before anyone can say, as Bogdan did, that the ejection seat fixes have worked. The seat must be tested on the full weight range of mannequins. They must be wearing a new lighter weight helmet. The conditions tested must include those where the plane is damaged or out of control. And the raw data, not just summaries, must be submitted to the testing office.

Until then, Gilmore said, “we cannot assess whether the fixes work and are ready to field.”
The fixes would then need to be incorporated into the planes, he said.

Lastly, Gilmore rebutted a statistic frequently used by Bogdan to minimize the risk to F-35 pilots, which he has used repeatedly before lawmakers and reporters: that the risk to an F-35 pilot ejecting and dying due to an ejection seat flaw is 1 in 50,000.

But Gilmore said those odds are minimal because the figure takes into account the small chance that a pilot will have to eject in the first place. When the risk is assessed on the odds of a pilot surviving an ejection if it occurs, the odds worsen drastically, according to the Pentagon safety documents signed by Bogdan.

“However, when the situation requires ejection, the ejection seat and life support equipment should function reliably and properly,” Gilmore said. “The low probability of an actual ejection should not reduce the importance or value of having an ejection seat that provides an opportunity for the pilot to survive the ejection. Also, the seemingly low probability cited by the program likely does not include the risk of needing to eject in combat due to battle damage.”

The F-35 program office had not responded by press time to repeated requests for comment.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

In another note, Gilmore has yet to personally fly the aircraft to validate that it can indeed fly and its not a hoax ;). I wonder why British, Norwegian, Israeli, Australian and soon Japanese safety boards have not interpreted the JPO findings (all members get it) in a way that was identical to the DOTE? DOTE is an institution in need of a big reform (like most Pentagon institutions), they advocated launching half of USN's torpedo quota for a year (training) to test a software fix. Their purpose has become to take a contrarian view to the operator community and then let the Congress decide. Thats who they serve and that is a reason why they exist. POGO must be frothing at their most since now they have an agency the inadvertently leaks documents right before a congressional hearing and does it like clockwork.

There is a safety board that takes things into considerations, puts restrictions and lifts them if they think something has been adequately addressed. DOTE is not that board. They have no expertise to do that. As Bogdan explained in congressional testimony (I posted a video if it here back then) ejection is about managing risk as there is no 100% safe ejection. They were well within the safety margins set forth by the SOP's of the USAF and USN for all weight classes below the weight at which they put a restriction. Similarly, they are accelerating the fix deployment and once again, the same operator organization that recommended the restrictions will decide if they can be lifted. Back then only ONE USAF pilot had to be reassigned while no Navy or Marine pilot and to since their minimum weight requirement was above 136 pounds.
“However, when the situation requires ejection, the ejection seat and life support equipment should function reliably and properly,” Gilmore said. “The low probability of an actual ejection should not reduce the importance or value of having an ejection seat that provides an opportunity for the pilot to survive the ejection. Also, the seemingly low probability cited by the program likely does not include the risk of needing to eject in combat due to battle damage.”
Dr. Gillmore should point to a 'model' program that tested the entire spectrum of the ejection sequence, for every damn weight class in every scenario where the test-article was subjected to battle damage. Just two to three examples of current, or previous programs having done that should suffice. Testing is a means to an end, but it seems it may be the end for some ;)

BTW, the lighter helmet is out :

Light F-35 Helmet Tests Begin, DOD Aims To Fix Escape System This Year

WASHINGTON — The F-35 joint program office will begin testing the first prototype of the new, lightweight Generation III helmet later this month, with the hope of resolving by November issues with the jet’s escape system that have kept some pilots grounded.

The JPO and industry will begin testing Rockwell Collins’ latest version of the F-35 helmet, built to be about 6 ounces lighter than the original Gen III helmet, in late March, said Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian, director of the F-35 integration office. This will be the first time the JPO has tested the full-up Gen III “Light," although the program office has tested a modified helmet that is about the same weight as the light version, he said.

The new light helmet is one of three solutions the Pentagon and industry hope will allow the military services to lift restrictions on lightweight pilots flying the F-35. Last year, Defense News first reported that pilots under 136 pounds were barred from flying the fifth-generation aircraft after testers discovered an increased risk of neck damage to lightweight pilots ejecting from the plane. The Air Force has also acknowledged an “elevated level of risk” for pilots between 136 and 165 pounds.All three fixes — the lightweight helmet and two modifications to the F-35 ejection seat — will be finalized and ready for incorporation into the production line by November, said JPO Chief Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan during a March 10 event in Washington. This reflects an acceleration of the schedule since January, when the JPO estimated the services would be able to implement the three parts of the complete solution in October 2017.

“That schedule showed me that the helmet wouldn’t be ready until late 2017. That was not good enough, so I sent the team back,” Bogdan said at the Credit Suisse/McAleese FY2017 Defense Programs Conference. “The good news is the team did a lot of hard work [and] we will have our first Gen III light helmets now aligned with the seat in November 2016 so we can remove the restriction for the pilots under 136 pounds.”he Fix

The prototype helmet the JPO will test weighs about 4.63 pounds and will help ease some strain on smaller pilots' necks during ejection, Harrigian said during a March 9 interview. Testers have found that the heavier helmet adds risk of neck damage during the first phase of an ejection, after the windscreen canopy is breached. The seat and pilot are launched upward via a rail system at a jarring rate, causing back and neck injuries if the pilot is not in the correct position with his or her head directly centered on the spine. The heavy helmet pushes a pilot’s head down, increasing the risk of injury particularly for lighter pilots.

But the helmet is only part of the problem. Once the pilot and seat reach the top of the rails, a rocket under the seat is ignited to lift the pilot-and-seat package free of the plane. At this point, the seat can begin pitching back and forth, a motion much like that of a rocking chair. This pitching motion is worse with a lightweight pilot, putting him or her in a potentially dangerous position when the main recovery parachute deploys – the pilot could be completely upside down at this moment. The rapid deployment of the parachute snaps the pilot back into an upright position, potentially injuring the head and neck.

To fix the ejection seat itself, the team will install a switch on the seat for lightweight pilots that will delay deployment of the main parachute. The proposed switch will keep the smaller "drogue" chute attached longer to further reduce the speed of the seat before the main parachute deploys, hopefully easing the pilot's motion back into an upright position. In addition, the program office will mount a “head support panel,” or HSP, a fabric panel sewn between the parachute risers that will protect the pilot’s head from moving backwards during the parachute opening. This will prevent the potential hyperextension of the neck and protect the head.

Since November, the JPO, Lockheed Martin and seat-maker Martin Baker have conducted seven tests — three out of an airborne jet and four so-called “sled tests” on the ground — with the latest version of the seat, which included the switch and HSP, according to Harrigian. Although most tests have been done with mannequins in the lightest and heaviest weight classes – under 136 pounds and above 245 pounds – the latest test on March 3 was done with a 150-pound mannequin, which represents “the heart of the envelope,” Harrigian said.

The program office has about another 11 tests planned, which are expected to incorporate the lightweight helmet solution, Harrigian said. The tests will use a mix of low, middle and high-weight mannequins, he said.

All of the test results have been “fairly positive,” so far, although the team is still working through analysis of the latest March 3 test, Harrigian said.

“We’re waiting for a little more feedback, but everything thus far has been positive,” Harrigian said. “As you can imagine we’re going to continue to track this closely and stay very well connected with the JPO and industry to make sure we’re monitoring how this goes as we continue through the test.”


Weapons Tester Weighs In

A spokesman for the Pentagon’s top weapons tester, known for his criticism of development programs across the armed services, said the JPO’s test schedule for the escape system fixes is “aggressive,” but "achievable." However, the spokesman cautioned that the schedule for flight clearance and implementation of the three solutions assumes that no discoveries are made during testing that would require additional modifications.

“If discoveries are made during the testing, the timeline to achieve full qualification of the seat and helmet for ejection will take longer because additional regression testing and analyses would be likely be required,” Maj. Adrian Rankine-Galloway, a spokesman for the director of operational test and evaluation, said in a March 7 email.

The upcoming tests will reveal if any other changes are required to the ejection seat, Rankine-Galloway said. In addition, the tests should show whether the new lightweight helmet is strong enough to withstand the wind blast from high-speed ejections, as well as any impact from pieces of the canopy that have been shattered by the initial blast, he said.

“Until this testing is completed and DOT&E has analyzed the data, we cannot assess whether the fixes work and are ready to field,” he said.

Tests late last year with 103-pound mannequins at various speeds demonstrated the two seat fixes worked as planned, Rankine-Galloway said. In at least one recent test, the HSP successfully prevented a “neck exceedence” during deployment of the main parachute, and the lightweight switch delayed parachute opening, he noted.

However, there is still work to be done to completely eliminate the risk. During Oct. 15's low-speed "proof-of-concept" test at 160 knots, the HSP did not prevent strain on the lightweight pilot’s neck in the early stages of an ejection due to the rocket firing and initial wind blast, according to Rankine-Galloway. During the Nov. 19 test at 450 knots – or high speed – neck strain was still seen during the initial catapult and windblast phases, and during parachute opening.

These tests were done using a surrogate helmet that is not quite as light as the proposed lightweight Gen III helmet, Rankine-Galloway noted. Until the program has completed full testing of the new seat changes and the new helmet, DOT&E will not have adequate data to make a judgment, he cautioned.

DOT&E does not have the final say in when the Pentagon can lift the restriction on lightweight pilots.
- [ And that is where the problem lies]
Fixing the escape system is not part of the Air Force's criteria to declare its F-35A variants operational this summer, but "it remains a fundamental concern that the Chief and the Secretary have because this is all about the safety of our airmen and that is the bottom line," Harrigian said.
Dr. Gillmore also needs to remind the media and Congress that Martin Baker and Lockheed Martin are on fixed contracts. Therefore, any problems that arise during the concurrency phase must be fixed by them at their own expense. It is therefore incumbent upon them to design, develop and demonstrate the fixes to the JPO's satisfaction, and then seek approval from each service. They would then implement those fixes into their production jets and retrofit existing fleet. They do this at their own expense (Every fix found post LRIP5 has this arrangement). The testing is therefore left for them to 'demonstrate' to the operators satisfaction and is not added over and above the Integrated Test Team schedule that would cause further delays. The Video from Bogdan's presentation mentioned above, was posted here in March. The Congress has sided with the JPO on this but no doubt the next DOTE report will get a small mention of the fix having been fielded by the end of the year since they write these things in October. This has been DOTE's pattern, they shout, cry then quietly burry the fix in the next year's report and move on. Some of us still haven't forgotten how they, the GAO and the CAPE had a $1.5 Trillion estimate for O&S cost just 5 or so years ago. POGO made a field day out of that and I'm sure many careers were made writing monthly on that during sequestration...

So if one reads into the above report, the likely scenario is as follows :

Gilmore's team knew of the fix and that they were being developed. They probably also knew that higher testing would begin in the Spring or summer of 2016, they most likely also had an idea of the number of tests that were to be scheduled over the summer and into the fall. Yet, he didn't miss an opportunity to chime in in Feb. at a congressional hearing to blast the program office that had planned all this over the coming months. Its a comfortable job, predict or read what is to happen 6 months down the road and then call for it to happen 6 months down the road ;) or better still cry about it not having happened already. I wonder how you simulate mannequin ejections in the air in an aircraft simulating loss of control or battle damage. Perhaps strap Dr.Gilmore in?

I am sure there would be calls for DOTE resignation from the operator and ex-operator community, if a certain ship clears shock trials over the next week with results that go against what the DOTE had predicted and had quite publicly and through their regular modus operandi (Leaks) made sure were well publicized. The organization was meant to introduce 'better testing' and not necessarily 'more testing' to the OTE process. While they have brought consistency, and their recommendations are generally well thought out, they have done nothing but add to the already lengthy OT&E cycle in an era where the strategic imperative is to cut design and fielding cycles. The only recourse is to take it up with the Congress and get approval despite DOTE's objections but that allows the media to have a field day. All of us that follow these things go through a lot of popcorn early every year :)
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Manish_Sharma »

:)

Like in hollywood movies the big law firm lawyers say "we will bury your case under tons of paperworks, reports and files..."

brar any post made against amrikan mic you bury under huge posts with tons of words.
brar_w
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Against american MiC? I try to set things straight, if I know something is posted that takes it totally out of context. If someone is going to post a POGO link, then I'm sure going to rebut it because A ) They make it so easy to do so, and B ) I know something about the matter having researched it for a long time. This was an absurd allegation made by a power hungry organization that was pissed off that it wasn't the ultimate arbitrator and didn't have the authority to overrule established safety boards. They are in on future testing, most likely knew what was coming as the JPO advanced into the design changes they had identified but took a confrontational approach regardless and pulled their usual tricks .

If you read it, you'd realize the MIC isn't concerned here (this is total politics). The OEMs or rather just Martin Baker (Not an American firm), just pays for whatever that needs to be corrected. They are contractually bound to do so. There is no argument there. If you go into this further using the search feature, you'd realize that I was the first to bring this up on this board. I was also the first to post about the engine fire 2 years ago .

This issue is between the two folks running the JPO, and Gillmore who thinks that he should have the decision authority and not someone who is tasked with safety. If you look who he said in Feb. in front of Congress (I even shared a video back then) and then read the March article, you will realize that the JPO actually PLANNED to do most of what he was so aggressively pushing for. He just adopted a confrontational tone as if the JPO is not interested in doing it.

See This in Feb :

ests to date have been done either on unusually light mannequins (136 pounds or less) or on extremely heavy ones (245 pounds), but nothing in between those weights, Gilmore’s written comments show. Consequently, there is no data that could shed light on risks to the majority of pilots.

And the JPO just a few weeks after that shared the entire 6-8 month process to get those light weight plots margins back -
The program office has about another 11 tests planned, which are expected to incorporate the lightweight helmet solution, Harrigian said. The tests will use a mix of low, middle and high-weight mannequins, he said.

All of the test results have been “fairly positive,” so far, although the team is still working through analysis of the latest March 3 test, Harrigian said.

“We’re waiting for a little more feedback, but everything thus far has been positive,” Harrigian said. “As you can imagine we’re going to continue to track this closely and stay very well connected with the JPO and industry to make sure we’re monitoring how this goes as we continue through the test.”
The problem lies in the last part
DOT&E does not have the final say in when the Pentagon can lift the restriction on lightweight pilots.
that shows that the DOTE, unlike most systems has no say in this so why the fuss about it in congressional testimony? Why not get someone from the safety authority, that has the authority and that can explain the process?? The answer to that is 'theatrics' and that has what these congressional hearings have become.

BTW, the Ejection seat issue was so severe that only the USAF has strapped weight restrictions. The USN, and the USMC have not since they don't even allow pilots in those weight margins to fly fighters. The Ejection seat requirements (weight range) were large for the F-35/JSF but most of the operators (including foreign partners) don't have pilots that fit into the USAF's restrictions but regardless, this is something that they will be correcting and getting back over the next 6-8 months. No milestone was impacted, and the entire USAF ramp up roster had just one pilot that was affected and he was transferred out to a different aircraft for the interim.

There were two nearly 1000 word articles taking a very weird and inaccurate view of what happened, and what is happening in the current program. How else do you want someone who knows a little about the issue to respond?? If you don't want to read my posts, watch the video, or better look the issue (s) up (if interested).



If not the whole thing watch a few minutes starting here : https://youtu.be/fV83HSY6azA?t=1527

and reference to the hemet and ejection seat fix here : https://youtu.be/fV83HSY6azA?t=2656



As I have reiterated a few times over the last year, the F-35 program (the largest of its kind) has risk in software, and has risk in its PHM system. Beyond that there may be a few months risk in weapons integration but that is largely because of software consuming more time. Those are all risk areas that may cause the final development build to be delayed anywhere from September 2017, to May-July 2018. The First squadron is READY, has all of its JETS and will over the next few weeks go through evaluation to see whether they are ready to deploy and are properly trained to fly it. Then between August and October, the USAF will be the second F-35 operator to declare IOC (The first Marine Squadron did it last year).

The helmet issue is something they want to settle for the long term and it has no delay on the program. They asked for a very wide weight margin on the JSF as far as pilots are concerned (compare this to the F-16) but they'll still go ahead and certify the weight range they asked for just after the three corrections are made with the seat, helmet and the liner. We can be critical about ALIS and certainly that is a justified criticism (that I have myself leveled given that I have some experience with PHM systems). The same applies to software capability that should have been put in much smaller bite sizes as opposed to the rather extensive Block 3F/C (Compare that to say the S Hornet, or the Rafale program both of which were multi-role aircraft). Ejection seat changes are minor concurrency issues that are routine to a very large developmental undertaking.

The DOTE is getting 22 US Aircraft (USAF, USMC and USN) and 2 from the Dutch for a total of 24 (23 for Operational testing and evaluation and one in reserve) for operational test and evaluation. For over a year (Starting in mid 2017ish) his office will control these aircraft , putting them through their paces in order to 'break them' and then finally sign off on SDD (That is mark the program as COMPLETE). In addition to this he will be getting two independent handling teams for all the ground OT&E, 3 simulation labs at Eglin, Wright Patterson and Luke and one full L-Class deployment utilizing an operational USMC squadron.He still wants more. What would have happened if this was a 150 aircraft program? Would he still have asked for 24 aircraft or close to 20% of the entire fleet? They require a ton of resources and the JPO and everyone else does best to provide them. They then complain about not having the resources fast enough..and their tribe is always asking for more (one can see how DOTE office has grown since its inception). If ultimate Operational test and evaluation authority was not good enough, they want to by default take over the air-worthiness authorities as well something that is and SHOULD BE controlled by those that ultimate are responsible for it. Very few organizations look to hold their leadership responsible for X.Y and Z without giving them authority to direct X Y and Z. By handing off the air-worthiness approvals to the DOTE, the Congress would have done exactly that i.e. fire the USAF leadership if safety suffers, yet have them be directed by the DOTE on what to do. BTW, after the theatrics were done, the Congress sided with the USAF and Gilmore won't sign off on the helmet fixes. Only once the OEM's, and the JPO has convinced the US Air Worthiness authority, would the restrictions be lifted. Gilmore will get 'ONLY SUMMARIES" since they aren't answerable to him on this issue much to his dissatisfaction no doubt.

The DOTE is a perfect case/example of 'trying to solve a large problem' and ending up 'creating another, equally as large'.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Avarachan »

Brar_w, thanks for the response. I don't follow the F-35 program closely, because I don't think the program's overall goal of building one design (of three variants) to replace the F-16, A-10, and AV-8B is sensible. Those three planes are so different that the attempt to replace them all with a single design is doomed to failure, in my opinion.

Regarding the ejection seat, I'm sure the problems will get fixed eventually. What makes me uneasy about the issue is the way the program leaders are handling criticism regarding it. Instead of dealing with the issue forthrightly, as you did in your post, Lt. Gen. Bogdan has repeatedly made the weasel-like statement that the risk of an F-35 pilot ejecting and dying due to an ejection seat flaw is 1 in 50,000. As any educated person knows, this is not a straightforward way of talking about probabilities. As Dr. Gilmore correctly pointed out, when the risk is assessed on the odds of a pilot surviving an ejection if it occurs, the odds worsen drastically, according to the Pentagon safety documents signed by Lt. Gen. Bogdan himself.

Regarding the USAF and safety concerns, keep in mind that there were persistent whispers regarding the F-22 and hypoxia-like symptoms years before the USAF finally admitted there was an equipment problem. Accordingly, I don't think it's fair to entirely dismiss concerns regarding this issue as a tribal desire for increased attention and power.

You can have the last word regarding this, if you want. As I mentioned, I don't follow the F-35 program closely.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Regarding the ejection seat, I'm sure the problems will get fixed eventually. What makes me uneasy about the issue is the way the program leaders are handling criticism regarding it. Instead of dealing with the issue forthrightly, as you did in your post, Lt. Gen. Bogdan has repeatedly made the weasel-like statement that the risk of an F-35 pilot ejecting and dying due to an ejection seat flaw is 1 in 50,000. As any educated person knows, this is not a straightforward way of talking about probabilities. As Dr. Gilmore correctly pointed out, when the risk is assessed on the odds of a pilot surviving an ejection if it occurs, the odds worsen drastically, according to the Pentagon safety documents signed by Lt. Gen. Bogdan himself.
There in lies the problem. You need to understand the 'theatrics' of it all. Their is something called the air-worthiness-authority. That authority submits a report that puts down the law for each service in terms what is safe, what is not and for what parameters etc . That report is available to all the parties that were present in Feb. It was available to Bogdan, it was available to Gillmore, and it was available to each of the politicos in the committee. What Bogdan referred to was the overall risk or the likelihood of this ever being a serious event. And keep in mind, that he is not in the USAF capacity..he is the JPO. He reveals test details to each partner (including each US service) and if one service's (USAF in this case) air-worthiness authority decides to impose temporary restrictions, he recommends that other jets in the same class also do the same (if they apply). Keep in mind that Gilmore's outfit has no say in this. the JPO falls back on the USAF (in this case) and Gilmore must also fall back on the USAF. He or his outfit holds no qualifications to overrule the experts on this matter, and if they want to do so they have to get Congress to expand their scope. The Navy (USN and USMC) did not and will not put any restrictions because the lower limit of the weight class is USAF specific. You can't be 60kg and fly as a USN or a USMC fighter pilot so its a moot point for them.

Furthermore, the future test plans were also available to all. Under such an event what Gillmore (a political appointee) alleged something that he would have known the JPO was already scheduling in a matter of weeks to months. Look what has happened since, the lighter helmet was released in a matter of months, 11 tests were revealed to be scheduled between March 16 and Nov. 16 etc. The USAF Liaison to the JPO was forced to make these things public because his service was put on a spot since it was unique to them. There was no need to take these things public. There was no 'need to know'. The operators in the US (USAF, MC and N) and the international partners were aware (Test manifesto), the Congress was aware, and the DOTE and OSD were naturally aware. Yet 'sensationalism' drove the discussion forcing them to release information that wasn't really necessary. It was the same when they put the operators in a spot regarding the Tail Hook redesign, and also the ALIS 2.0 deal when those that know PHM (I being one of them) can tell you that you have fall back options to go back to legacy systems just as Israel plans to do during wartime (instead of relying on 100% automation). It was a pattern long before this incidence. They must be glad

that Dr. Gillmore wasn't denied 2 dozen jets to carry out is OT&E and he had to do it with less than half that number as was the norm before his shop was created.
As any educated person knows, this is not a straightforward way of talking about probabilities. As Dr. Gilmore correctly pointed out, when the risk is assessed on the odds of a pilot surviving an ejection if it occurs, the odds worsen drastically, according to the Pentagon safety documents signed by Lt. Gen. Bogdan himself.
That is the case for all. In an F-16 your odds of dying due to an ejection failure will always be better overall than in case you were ejecting. Plus, the report that Gillmore sites is available to the Congress. They still sided with Bogdan, and the USAF's air-worthiness authority. You must factor in that when these theatrics happen on C-SPAN, the actual reports have been read, digested by all parties concerned and its 'old news' to them. Staffers have already sifted through all relevant information by the time the hearings actually occur. Only oral and written statements are presented on the day of. For those of us that have followed this and other programs through over the last 15 years, this is nothing new. Some of us can even predict what questions some of these politicos will ask and which reports they'll site in support of them.
Regarding the USAF and safety concerns, keep in mind that there were persistent whispers regarding the F-22 and hypoxia-like symptoms years before the USAF finally admitted there was an equipment problem. Accordingly, I don't think it's fair to entirely dismiss concerns regarding this issue as a tribal desire for increased attention and power.
There are concerns, and there are concerns about the unknown. What may be made public is the former and not the latter. Additionally I am not siding with any one side on this. There is blame to go around about the program in general, and the DOTE is something that the Pentagon wished upon itself (but if one does the autopsy one would realize the root cause, and why the DOTE is the wrong solution). However, the DOTE has to certainly carry his offices fair share of blame and in this instance its overwhelmingly him and his outfit trying to make a big deal out of a minor incidence just because he was pissed off that their is an organization called the air-worthiness authority that decides matters in place of him JUST BECAUSE they are qualified to do so, and his outfit is NOT. If you are going to take credit for improving the acquisition and T&E system (which not him personally, but his outfit in general has) you must also take the blame when there is plenty to go around. The Cyber issue is another. The reports that were leaked out suggested that no cyber had been done on the sub-systems when NSA approval had been given for each. The point he was claiming was they they still need to do an end to end analysis that they would 'like to' (Here gilmore was asking for more) do since they historically find something that even the NSA missed out..but they spun it in the media (pre-hearing) as " No Cyber clearance has been given to the main sub-systems'. I'm sorry for some of us this has become a recurring pattern and is very similar to what was happening in the program-office pre-Bogdan which was ever bit as disgusting.

Gilmore's track record is for all to see. He has in the past been wrong on quite a few occasions and at times what he has pointed out has been what was scheduled anyways between his submitted report and his next one. His reports also have a habit of being leaked a few hours before every hearing and of late those of us following this closely can even predict the reporter it is leaked to. Its consistently been bloomberg's TC for a few yeas now.

I am sorry but as the law stands the DOTE gets to dictate the test phase of things under his control as directed by the Congress. He/She cannot dictate how the program office, or its equivalent decides to develop and test something that is not controlled by it. If the Congress wishes to make it his/her concern, they will expand his/her role. In that case, might as well turn totally 'political' and create a parallel shadow secretary of defense that just dictates to the services on matters of acquisition or testing and if they don't listen, use dirty tricks to get them in line. These are tactics reserved for the SASC and HASC bosses not a leading civilian leader overseeing the uniforms from the building. The DOTE as envisioned was a part to the solution to the various things that came out of acquisition and testing reform. I don't think anyone was looking to create another political power center. Te Secretaries of the services, the HASC, SASC and the czars within each outfit should be plenty for that role.
Accordingly, I don't think it's fair to entirely dismiss concerns regarding this issue as a tribal desire for increased attention and power.
If elements within the service, or the political masters that control them (or the civilian leadership these uniforms answer to) feel there needs to be additional investigation, or that the air-worthiness authorities have left room to be desired they can sanction additional investigations, to be conducted by disinterested parties that are no doubt qualified to do so. You don't reach out unilaterally, make wild accusations and then cry and shout that you are being fed just a synopsis as if the JPO is mandated to do anything over and above (They are not). 6 months from now, this will be old news and Gilmore would also move on if he's still around. As I said, I am open to criticism on the program on matters that genuinely deserve it. An over-ambitious software schedule, and combining two- ACAT-1's within the program was a GRAND mistake of giant proportions. Recently, the choice to keep Block 4 FOD inside the program (as opposed to a seperate program) is arguably questionable as well. In the past this program had very very poor management that did not help the engineering in any way when they were at a stage of solving design, and performance related problems (as most high end programs do at that stage). The leadership failed them and short-cited decisions were made. Since then, things have improved but large risk was still kicked down the road and is only now being mitigated (100% software teams working on Block 3F for example). However, this instance much like the other small scale issues that come up during testing have been blown out of proportion and DOTE has played along in the game that is generally associated with politicos.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by NRao »

Regarding the ejection seat, I'm sure the problems will get fixed eventually. What makes me uneasy about the issue is the way the program leaders are handling criticism regarding it. Instead of dealing with the issue forthrightly, as you did in your post, Lt. Gen. Bogdan has repeatedly made the weasel-like statement that the risk of an F-35 pilot ejecting and dying due to an ejection seat flaw is 1 in 50,000. As any educated person knows, this is not a straightforward way of talking about probabilities. As Dr. Gilmore correctly pointed out, when the risk is assessed on the odds of a pilot surviving an ejection if it occurs, the odds worsen drastically, according to the Pentagon safety documents signed by Lt. Gen. Bogdan himself.
While understandable, that is life (or science that supports many decision-making.

Another example is building roads. Hidden somewhere is the number of deaths a proposed lane or a road or stop sign, etc will cause.

Build a factory and the insurance guy will compute and factor in accidents and deaths.

Buy a car. Who drives and where it is driven determines insurance premiums. Death is a part of that computation.

Normal stuff.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Ejecting with heavier helmets is a 'safety risk' with the risk being higher since the JHMCS was introduced than with the legacy, smaller and lighter helmet. This is a matter of academic research within both the USAF and USN. Not carrying an HMS is also a safety risk in the sense that you are likely to get SHOT Down in a close in fight without it. Its up to the internal control to determine what risk is manageable and acceptable and what is not. Ever since the JHMCS was introduced to the fleet they have looked at this. In case of the Gen III HMD + Martin Baker ejection seat, they have deemed the risk to pilots between 61kg and 74 kg as acceptable and the risk to pilots between 48kg and 61kg (you aren't going to get a lot of pilots int hat weight class anyways since they aren't allowed to fly in other types) as unacceptable. Efforts are underway to solve this problem both to reduce risk to acceptable levels for pilots weighing below 61 kg and to reduce risk overall for all weight classes. I've provided a synopsis in the International thread, post linked below :

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=5092&start=2560#p2034129
To recap some points from the previous discussions and background –

- During testing the ITT found unacceptable risk for neck injury during the escape process for pilots weighing below 136 pounds (60kg).

-The risk of injury to pilots above 136 pounds was found to be acceptable by the ari worthiness authorities – Keep in mind that with the heavier helmets there is always a HIGHER risk compared to non HMS escape scenarios – USAF’s own expereince with ACESII and the F-16 proves that, including fatalities. Therefore, there is elevated risk of neck injury even on the upgraded f16s with the JHMCS compared to pre-upgraded f-16Cs.

- At the moment the F-35A (USAF) is restricted to pilots weighing 61.7 kg to 111.1 kg

-The current ACES II ejection seat, along with the current standard HMS (JHMCS) has 60 kg as its lower limit when it comes to pilot weights when the heavier HMS’s are involved

-The USN’s NACES has a pilot nude weight range of 61.7kg to 96.6 kg so they are not affected by the restrictions


-The US16E seat on the F-35 was/is EXPECTED to sustain the widest range ever asked for in an ejection seat + HMS scenario by a US service - between 46.7 kg and 111.1 kg

-Despite having this wide range, apart from the USAF, the other two services were to continue to maintain their existing weight ranges (61.7 kg to 96.6 kg for the USN and USMC)

- It is unclear what the international customers are planning, but its quite likely that they will keep their institutional status-quo (mostly built around the F-16+ACESII+JHMCS combo)

- The USAF is still STICKING to its weight range, and EXPECTS Martin Baker to fulfill its contractual agreement to fix the seat using its own money

- There are three fixes planned to open up the 46.7 kg to 60 kg envelope. All three of these fixes have begun testing and 11 tests through the differnet weight classes are to be pefromed till november to confirm that the fixes are suffiecient to open up the envelpoe, and reduce overall risk fo death or serious injury during escape.

o compare weights of helmets. The original JHMCS I was a 4.5+ pound setup. The JHMCS II is a 4.3 pound system, while the Gen III HMD for the F-35 weighs 5.2 pounds. The re-designed, lightweight helmet weighs in between 4.6-4.8 pounds so is fairly close to the JHMCS I which is the most widely used HMS between the USAF and USN (JHMCS II hasn’t yet been adopted by a US customer, only Saudi’s).
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

DARPA revives turbine-ramjet concept for hypersonics
A turbine-based combined cycle (TBCC) propulsion system to enable routine hypersonic flight by a vehicle that can take-off and land from a runway is back on the agenda at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) after a five-year hiatus.
The experimenting agency has set a “proposers day” on 13-14 July for potential bidders of the Advanced Full Range Engine (AFRE) programme, which is scheduled to launch as a new-start effort in Fiscal 2017.

Combining a turbine engine with a ramjet in the same vehicle has been a dream for the aerospace industry since the early 1950s, when the US Air Force proposed adapting Republic’s concept for the XF-103 fighter with a ramjet to intercept Soviet bombers at speeds up to Mach 5.

But TBCC concepts are limited by a propulsion gap between the Mach 2.5 top speed of a turbine engine and the Mach 3-3.5 minimum speed for a ramjet engine.


In 2009, DARPA attempted to bridge that gap with a high-speed turbine and a low-speed ramjet under the Mode Transition (MoTr) programme, but the project was cancelled two years later. By 2013, Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works organisation appeared to lobby for a revival of the research effort by releasing a concept for a Mach 6.0-capable SR-72 for high-speed surveillance missions, which was based on a similar TBCC propulsion system.

The AFRE programme now seeks to pick up where MoTr left off, leading to a ground demonstration of a fully integrated propulsion system capable of taking-off from a runway and accelerating beyond Mach 5. The system will include an off-the-shelf turbine engine and a dual mode ramjet/scramjet capable of operating with subsonic or supersonic airflows. Both engines share a common inlet and exhaust nozzle, but transition from turbine to ramjet power at a certain speed over Mach 2.5.

“This won’t be the first time that ambitious engineers will attempt to combine turbine and ramjet technologies. But with recent advances in manufacturing methods, modeling, and other disciplines, we believe this potentially groundbreaking achievement may finally be within reach,” says Christopher Clay, DARPA programme manager.

The programme could benefit from other recent experiments, including the Boeing X-51 Waverider programme funded by the Air Force Research Laboratory. The X-51 completed the first flight tests of a ramjet powered by hydrocarbon fuel, which also served as a coolant. The X-51, however, required a disposable rocket — a booster stage from the Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) — to accelerate to Mach 4.0, where the ramjet took over.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by TSJones »

dunno where brar-w went but to kick start this topic......

http://spacenews.com/first-intercept-te ... r-october/

new version of sm-3 is developed with the sons of nippon. confusing article especialy since sm-6 has already been developed.

the house rethuglicans want a new missile defense site on US east coast. what this has to do wioth sm-3 I have no idea.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by TSJones »

US Army wants some small satellite on-demand action......

Army hoping for new smallsat imaging and space situational awareness sensors - See more at: http://spacenews.com/army-hoping-for-ne ... XQTBD.dpuf

muy pronto. get the lead out.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by shiv »

Where is brar_w?
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by kit »

gone with the wi.. i mean the hard disk crash ! :wink:
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by rkhanna »

Army recon targets Apache helicopter cannon for Humvee replacement
http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2016/08/30/ ... ement.html

Interesting as the article is (Americans love their overwhelming firepower) I found these two comments in the Article interesting specially from the perspective of how India has gone about its own testing and "failures"

3ddesigner 1 day ago
The wheeled M8 Greyhound used in scouting in WWII and Korea not only had a .50 HMG but a 30 cal MMG (7.62) AND a big 37mm!



Notice how the Russians have not altered their low profile 'combat' vehicles? BTR, BTRM and BMPs?

These new, tall vehicle systems built to mainly combat IEDs go against that low profile rule. Hmmm
Just hope the designers take into account the stress caused by extra weight places on the running gear and suspension . having worked in Recovery out of Tallil,Iraq since late 04 to 2010 I've seen my fair share of busted Humvee's drive train from all the additional weight from the up armor . From busted wheels we had to haul out on our flatbeds. Our men and women deserve a vehicle weapons platform that is capable of giving them a round trip safely. regardless of costs ,In Vietnam our cobra gunships with the 20 mm Vulcan canon vibrated so badly the electrical harness literally had to be completely replaced every hundred hours of flight time failure in flight and on the ground were all to common little things like chucking out grenades on the flight line after it landed. They need to make darn sure it works before being delivered Another example was our M-16's jamming,if it is slightly dirty, or loading an extra round in magazines Humvee trials were tested without the extra weight of up armor the industrial military complex designers were selling a bill of goods fact sheet specs don't tell what happens in actual combat conditions .How many died over Colt firearms original design concepts....BTW Lyndon B. Johnson who forced the M-16 into service actually owned or had 51% stock in the company he also owned Sea land(shipping company) , Johnson&Johnson (who made not just band aids but the uniforms we all wore . Another example I worked for General Dynamics ...on the F-16 R&D seems when they first designed it to pitch to the Air Force. Then when they bought from different subcontract suppliers they found out that the different on board radar systems fit but would only fit but left no room for...the pilot. That little mistake not only created an expensive cost over run and delayed delivery date ..what good was a billed as an all weather fighter that could not fly...could not fly..when it rains ??? Lets get it right THE FIRST TIME
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by NRao »

U.S. Office of Naval Reactors outlines $1 billion R&D plan for development of LEU fuel
A July 2016 report by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Naval Reactors Conceptual Research and Development Plan for Low-Enriched Uranium Naval Fuel (PDF), sketches out a $1 billion, 15-year plan to develop, test and build a laboratory-scale line for production of high-density low-enriched uranium that could replace the highly enriched uranium currently used as fuel in U.S. naval reactors.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by NRao »

Air Force investing $12B in F-15s

A $12 billion makeover is underway for the US Air Force's 1980's-era F-15 fighter, a step towards upgrading an air fleet that one military official recently called the "smallest, oldest and least ready" in history.

The F-15 has long been hailed as the most successful dog-fighting aircraft in US history, boasting an undefeated air-to-air combat record with more than 100 aerial combat victories, according to Boeing, the plane's primary contractor and developer.

The Air Force initially planned to replace the entire F-15 fleet with the fifth-generation F-22 Raptor, but production of the stealthy aircraft was halted in 2009 and only 188 of the 749 F-22s purchased by the Pentagon were ever produced.

With rival nations like China and Russia quickly closing the technology gap that has allowed the US to rule the skies for decades and fewer F-22s than expected at its disposal, the Air Force has decided to invest in a major facelift for the battle-tested F-15 to help fill the void by extending its lifespan through 2040.

The upgrade will cover 435 F-15s, boosting them with new radar technology, updated mission computer systems, modern communication tools, advanced infrared search and track capabilities and electronic warfare defenses so the F-15s can work in concert with more advanced aircraft, the Air Force told CNN.

Many of the upgraded F-15's will also be modified to carry 16 missiles, rather than the standard eight, giving those aircraft greater lethality, said Boeing spokesman Randy Jackson.

"Our potential adversaries are keenly aware of the importance of air superiority to our nation's way of war," Air Force spokesman Maj. Robert Leese told CNN. "This is why they continue to seek ways to contest our advantage in the air through the development and proliferation of new weapon systems."

"To maintain this advantage, the Air Force must not only develop new systems of our own, but continue to upgrade the capabilities of our legacy systems like the F-15," he said.

While the current initiative to update the F-15 with new technology dates back to 2002 with the development of its advanced radar system, the Air Force says the process has been a gradual one, with work on the modern radio and infrared targeting programs beginning just this year.
"The process to upgrade these planes is currently being evaluated and capabilities are being developed and tested," Boeing spokesman Randy Jackson told CNN.

While the F-15 will still lack the stealth capability of the F-22, upgrades in radar technology, infrared search and track, and electronic warfare capabilities will significantly improve its ability to detect, target, and engage enemy aircraft at a tactical advantage, according to the Air Force.
And the new high-tech mission computer and upgraded radio communication tools will not only allow the F-15 to better complement and communicate with its F-22 partner on the battlefield, but are also designed to support future technology as it is developed.

"The fourth generation F-15 has an unmatched record of success in the air-to-air role, and provides the critical additional capacity needed to augment and supplement the F-22 force in support of today's air superiority mission sets," Maj. Leese told CNN.

"As the Air Force continues to review our future force structure over the coming year, balancing operational effectiveness with current budget limitations, we expect the F-15 to play a critical role in the defense of our nation for the foreseeable future," he said.
The various upgrades will finish installing between 2024 and 2030, according to the Air Force
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by TSJones »

artist rendering and new name assigned to new air force bomber to be developed.

http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2016/09/19/ ... aider.html
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Skunk Works Contracted for Tactical-Boost-Glide Prototyping
The Pentagon's advanced research arm has awarded a $147.3 million contract to Lockheed Martin as part of its Tactical Boost Glide program.

According to the Sept. 19 contract announcement, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency awarded Lockheed the "cost-sharing, other transaction for prototype agreement for a research project under the Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) program."

The program, which is a joint DARPA-Air Force effort, seeks to "develop and demonstrate technologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems," according to DARPA's website.

The program intends to use lessons learned from flight tests of the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 and other boost glide systems in an aim to help develop weapon systems that can fly more than five times the speed of sound.
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