Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

[deejay]

Some dated but not so irrelevant links on Chinese Infrastructure development in Tibet (may have been posted on BRF earlier)

http://www.claws.in/images/publication_ ... inside.pdf

http://virendrasahai.com/recent-develop ... imensions/

Another VIF article on Chinese military deployment in Tibet:

http://www.vifindia.org/article/2015/se ... s-in-tibet

The VIF link gives a break up of the larges scale military deployment of PLAAF, PLA and Strategic assets in Tibet. The 03 Brigades and 01 Division plus ancillaries are also mentioned.

Something that caught my attention in the article:

...

China also recently flight-tested its latest Z-18 (White Heron) military transport helicopter developed by the Changhe Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG) in Tibet when it broke a record by attaining an altitude of 9000 metres and flying above Mount Everest. Capable of carrying 27 passengers with a 2-man crew, the Z-18 is the second Chinese military helicopter after the Sikorsky S-70C, that can operate in the high-altitude Qinghai-Tibet Plateau.
Similarly regiments of the Second Artillery, Rocket Artillery and Armoured Brigade deployed in the Tibetan Plateau conduct regular training and ‘live-fire’ exercises under conditions of ‘informatisation’. On July 28, 2015 a Regiment of the Second Artillery conducted a live-firing exercise with "new artillery guns" at a location in the Tibet Plateau and at heights between 3700 metres and 4800 metres. The troops “prepared an environment for actual war situations” and conducted an "exercise to address the problems of Combat unit mechanical failure, electrical problems, battle damage repair, and to enhance the soldiers ability in battlefield command and also in practical use of equipments and to support the proper use of artillery. They also carried along 300 electrical equipments".
Apparently expanding the scope of the exercise, the PLA General Logistics Department (GLD) started its materials and POLs supply drill codenamed "Supply Action-2015" in the Tibet Autonomous Region on August 8, 2015. Separately, China's official news agency Xinhua reported on August 10, 2015, that the PLA Chengdu Military Area Command started a joint military drill code-named "Joint Action-2015D" in late July 2015 that entered its 'live fire' stage on August 10, 2015 "in a plateau area in southwest China's Sichuan Province". It disclosed this would be the first of five similar drills that will involve a total of more than 140,000 soldiers from over 140 PLA regiments of various types.
...

[deejay]

Another oldish article on Chinese military in Tibet but a good read.

The thing to note here is that the 03 Brigades and 01 Division is in Tibet Military District alone and there more forces across Tibet:

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... -in-tibet/

...
Of its seven military regions, Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions are responsible for the security of western China. Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions account for the deployment of two army groups and the Xinjiang Military Districts in the former and two army groups and the Tibet Military District in the latter.7 Western Tibet that covers Aksai Chin falls under the Lanzhou military command. The Tibet Military District covers central, northern and eastern Tibet with two infantry brigades and an infantry regiment. These military resources account for 30 per cent of the forces in the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions based on the border between India and Tibet and the remainder in central Tibet and the northwest. The four armies based in western China could be employed to support operations from Tibet against India through flanking attacks through Myanmar or reinforce an offensive from the north. In addition, there are 17 secret radar stations and 14 military airfields, 8 missile bases, at least 8 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 20 intermediate-range missiles.
...

I hope SRai ji, these are sufficient datapoints to undestand what the IA is actually up against and what we must plan for?

[rohitvats]

^^^ The Chinese troops are already in Tibet and at altitude in those numbers. Perhaps you should check a map.

Anyways thanks for your enlightening advice.

Ravi Rikhiye and Shree Bajwa talk of rapid redeployment possibilities because of existing infrastructure. I did not see any example on how they will do it with their troops. The infrastructure can move equipment but fresh fighting men will take time. It is physiological requirement and not some wishful thinking. Anyone who takes a short cut, whether Chinese or Indian will suffer the consequences.

Unfortunately, our policy makers in MOD are also like you and it takes forever and a disaster to make them see. All they need is a Ravi Rikhye article which they failed to see for what it was stating.

Ravi Rikhye knows exactly what he's talking about. People are drawing wrong conclusions out of it. He knows military geography, Orbat, TO&E and military history better than most.

What he's saying is that Chinese know that India will not fire the first shot in next Sino-India war. And that is why it maintains such a small PLA foot-print in the area. Compared to China, we've much more forces 'in-being' in both eastern Ladakh and NE theater. As per him, there was a time when Chinese were actually scared of our fighting capability in NE and in case of an attack from our side, were sure that Lhasa itself would be gone. One of the reasons Chinese got us to sign various CBM on border management was to nullify OUR advantage.

But this has changed. The excellent infrastructure allows Chinese to move large body of men and material into Tibet. This will allow Chinese to build-up troops and equipment in numbers required to achieve superiority. In our case, the forces in the given theater will have to be sufficient to counter the sledge-hammer which Chinese will throw at us. Because unlike China, we will not have large body of troops coming from outside into these sectors.

Sure, there will be reserve divisions and some from western theater but not something like moving 2 Strike Corps into Ladakh sector. Therefore, the comparison being done by Ravi is for capability which we have and what the Chinese can throw at us courtesy their superior infrastructure.

The build up will be visible to us, but it will be fast.

For example, we've presently 1 x infantry division defending eastern Ladakh. Tomorrow, Chinese will throw an entire Army (equivalent to a Corps) with strong armored element at it. What do we do then?

Choice is between beefing up 14 Corps NOW with everything required to take on what Chinese might throw at us or prepare infra like Chinese. And induct troops beyond the present level from other sectors? Like moving Strike Corps, may be!

Ravi is doing the former - talking about required defenses given the geographical issues and considering not much reinforcement from outside.

This is the two front war scenario where tensions on western border will not allow you to move troops to eastern one. At least, not at required level.

The question of acclimatization remains. But it does not take a man 6 months to acclimatize to fight in the mountains.

It takes between 2-3 weeks for a man to be able to fight in the kind of altitude we operate in. The acclimatization schedule of Indian Army is as follows:

First stage : 6 days, 2,700-3,600m (8,900-11,800 ft)
Days 1-2: rest except short walks about barracks, no climbing.
Days 3-4: walk slowly for 1.5-3km (1-2 miles), avoid steep climbs
Days 5-6: walk up to 5 km (3 miles) and climb slowly up to 300m (1,000ft )

Second stage: 4 days, 3,600-4,500m (11,800 - 14,700ft)
Days 1-2: walk slowly for 1.5-3km (1-2 miles), avoid steep climbs
Days 3 : walk slowly and climb up to 300m (1,000ft)
Days 4 : climb 300m (1,000ft ) with equipment

Third stage: 4 days, > 4,500m (14,700ft )
Days 1-2: walk slowly for 1.5-3km (1-2 miles), avoid steep climbs
Days 3 : walk slowly and climb up to 300m (1,000ft)
Days 4 : climb 300m (1,000ft ) with equipment

[srai]

So my proposal still has merits then ... be like the Chinese Long term solution is that India needs to invest in infrastructure with high speed rail networks, airfields and roads to be able to rapidly deploy its troops and increase mobility of its troops. Also, re-equip them to give them more flexibility.

[srai]

There are also hypobaric chamber, or altitude chamber for Pre-acclimitisation Training.

[deejay]

^^^ The Chinese troops are already in Tibet and at altitude in those numbers. Perhaps you should check a map.

Anyways thanks for your enlightening advice.

Ravi Rikhiye and Shree Bajwa talk of rapid redeployment possibilities because of existing infrastructure. I did not see any example on how they will do it with their troops. The infrastructure can move equipment but fresh fighting men will take time. It is physiological requirement and not some wishful thinking. Anyone who takes a short cut, whether Chinese or Indian will suffer the consequences.

Unfortunately, our policy makers in MOD are also like you and it takes forever and a disaster to make them see. All they need is a Ravi Rikhye article which they failed to see for what it was stating.

Ravi Rikhye knows exactly what he's talking about. People are drawing wrong conclusions out of it. He knows military geography, Orbat, TO&E and military history better than most.

...

The question of acclimatization remains. But it does not take a man 6 months to acclimatize to fight in the mountains.

It takes between 2-3 weeks for a man to be able to fight in the kind of altitude we operate in. The acclimatization schedule of Indian Army is as follows:

First stage : 6 days, 2,700-3,600m (8,900-11,800 ft)
Days 1-2: rest except short walks about barracks, no climbing.
Days 3-4: walk slowly for 1.5-3km (1-2 miles), avoid steep climbs
Days 5-6: walk up to 5 km (3 miles) and climb slowly up to 300m (1,000ft )

Second stage: 4 days, 3,600-4,500m (11,800 - 14,700ft)
Days 1-2: walk slowly for 1.5-3km (1-2 miles), avoid steep climbs
Days 3 : walk slowly and climb up to 300m (1,000ft)
Days 4 : climb 300m (1,000ft ) with equipment

Third stage: 4 days, > 4,500m (14,700ft )
Days 1-2: walk slowly for 1.5-3km (1-2 miles), avoid steep climbs
Days 3 : walk slowly and climb up to 300m (1,000ft)
Days 4 : climb 300m (1,000ft ) with equipment

Okay, Rohit, never said Ravi Rikhiye does not know what he is talking about. I said planners in MOD take out wrong conclusions. I have provided data subsequently (links to other article) for my contention on Chinese forces other than those stationed within the Tibetan Military District.

Also, please check induction- deinduction practiced by IA into glacier and out of it. 01 Battalion at North Pulu, 01 in glacier and 01 deinducting at South Pulu. Each stays there for 06 months. This also gives us 03 battle ready battalions.

@SRai ji, your mechanical solutions are being tried and have some utility but the real acclimatization cannot be done away with. Even if 02 weeks is required for acclimatization what happens to rapid deployment. Problem in your approach is that you are unable to accept what IA is planning despite its experience. Do you see IA as deliberately inflating problems or asking for the moon?

[srai]

The area of contention is the new manpower requirements for MSC (now there are talks of not one but two). Questions being asked as to how the IA could achieve similar outcomes with its current size of over 1.3 million troops without adding another 60,000+.

Here is a piece written by Gen Malik, which I tend to agree with.
Reducing flab in armed forces
Gen V P Malik (retd)
Modernisation and expansion can’t go together
Posted at: Jun 6, 2016, 12:09 AM

[member_29190]

The terrian on our side is dificult and in Tibet it is almost flat lands.

So let me take a alternate thinking. The Chinese can mobilise fast and due to our terrain we can't. Let's make it an advantage.

The IA can see Chinese mobilisation on the Tibetian flatlands, brilliant. Let's rain rockets on their concentration area.

The chinese would do the same thing? I wish them all the best raining rockets on mountainous terrian with inclined slopes. The chinese would be able to invade ? They already found out in 1962 LOC fails miserably.

Instead of trying to match the Chinese man to man, we need to up our rocket & missile productions.

This is exactly similar to Houtis' versus the Saudi. The houtis fire rockets from their mountainous hideouts directly on to Saudi bases and all Saudi can do is pray.

[deejay]

The area of contention is the new manpower requirements for MSC (now there are talks of not one but two). Questions being asked as to how the IA could achieve similar outcomes with its current size of over 1.3 million troops without adding another 60,000+.

Here is a piece written by Gen Malik, which I tend to agree with.
Reducing flab in armed forces
Gen V P Malik (retd)
Modernisation and expansion can’t go together
Posted at: Jun 6, 2016, 12:09 AM

Firstly, no arguments over need to trim the IA/IAF/IN. I am all for it. Infact, the Gen Malik article says it very well -

the Prime Minister exhorted the Defence Minister and the military commanders to promote "jointness" across every level, shorten the tooth-to-tail ratio, and re-examine assumptions that keep massive funds locked up in inventories.

We faced a similar situation in the late 1990s. As Army Chief, I decided to suppress 50,000 manpower (mostly from non-field force) over a period of three years, provided the money saved would be given to the army for capital purchases.

In the past, many units were raised to meet special operational circumstances of that period e.g. Rashtriya Rifles for Punjab. A review to examine the need or quantum of such forces is overdue.
Meanwhile, there is considerable scope for downsizing forces in areas which are not of operational importance, and to reduce the flab. Some suggestions which require further study are:
-By further improving jointness amongst the forces, there is scope to cut down duplication (sometime triplication) of logistic (medical, supplies, station duties) and security resources.
-Reducing size of headquarters, particularly of field formations, training establishments and shedding redundant establishments.
-Merger and pruning of logistic units and training facilities of the army like the EME, Ordnance, Army Service Corps, Army Education Corps, and so on.
-Clubbing of non-essential unit functions such as Military Farms and Army Postal Service, or outsourcing their functions.
-A review of all peace establishments.
-Multiple use of lands/facilities wherever units and formations are in close proximity to each other.

Now, he never says that the MSC is not required. All reductions are from the "tail", i.e. HQs, logistics, redundant position etc. MSC can be formed while this reduction also goes on. MSC is a field requirement.

Can only MSC solve our problems or what you said earlier (which is what I countered), is doable. You said:

^^^
That article itself had one "indirect" solution for India ... do it like the Chinese. Build infrastructure and equip formations so that they allow for rapid reinforcement all over India. Other is paradigm shift from specialised geo-bounded formations of either defensive or offensive in nature to ubiquitous ones ... why not make all formations (brigade/division level) capable of both defense and offense? How about some highly motorised brigades that can self-deploy anywhere in India within 24-72 hours using existing road networks? The IA needs to be able to rapidly mirror Chinese deployments i.e. if they start moving troops to border areas, India should also have that capability to rapidly move equal number of troops to those areas. Infrastructure development on the Indian side needs to overcome difficult geography to allow for such movements all year round.

...
Chinese expansion across all its frontiers is swift and aggressive. It stations only three brigades in Tibet proper, and a division close to east Ladakh. But it is building a formidable series of railroads in the region that will permit rapid reinforcement.

Its ground forces are shifting from a defensive to an offensive posture.
...

This cross deployment of forces from plains to mountains and such is not possible at short notice either for us or for the Chinese. They have sufficient reserves within the Tibetan region (Theater) to rapidly redeploy using the infrastructure. I have posted detailed articles on this which I assume you have read but it seems you have still not digested. That is not the case with us both with reserves and infrastructure.

We will take a very long time to build that infrastructure. The Chinese are busy building a railway line all along the NW-SW axis of Tibet even while we discuss these.

So to mirror Chinese, we need more troops in that area for us to deploy them rapidly against them. This can be done by removing some existing formation from Western theater to Eastern theater and call it the MSC or build a new MSC.

The cross deployment idea from plains to mountains is just not workable.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>Okay, Rohit, never said Ravi Rikhiye does not know what he is talking about. I said planners in MOD take out wrong conclusions. I have provided data subsequently (links to other article) for my contention on Chinese forces other than those stationed within the Tibetan Military District.<SNIP>

deejay - my reply was not directed at you. I will expand on the topic sometime later. Long story short, we need mix of good infrastructure (this is must not only for inter-theater movement but intra-theater movement), flexibility in deployment, more troops and better weapons. Geography works against us in many areas and places severe handicaps. So, we will need forces in being in a given area.

[srai]

...
The cross deployment idea from plains to mountains is just not workable.

Ok. Let's leave it at that; we can disagree on the final bit.

The way I see it is given India has pretty extensive knowledge of high altitude warfare and facilities that could be made use of to plan for acclimatisation training rotation of troops in a staggered manner where xx number of troops are available as immediate reinforcements while other yy number of troops ready in a short time y and so on. And you need a way to get them there "rapidly" when reinforcements are required. Hence, the idea for self-deploying motorised brigades using existing road network along with additional border area infrastructure development. Even with static troop increases in those areas how has the IA planned for reinforcing these areas "rapidly" to match the Chinese? If the Chinese mobilize their troops within a "short span of time" to target an area (or areas), how long will it take the IA to do the same and reinforce its defenses in that particular area(s)? Permanent high number of troops deployment of its forces at those remote locations would be very expensive. According to the article, the Chinese have stationed only the essentials permanently (one division East Ladakh and three brigades Tibet proper) while rest are to be deployed "rapidly" from elsewhere and they have built the infrastructure and reorganised/re-equipped its forces to do so. Nothing "laughable" about it.

Added later: Look I've done my fair bit of solo high altitude multi-day hiking/trekking with 15kg bagpack carrying everything from -40 degree Celsius sleeping bags to tents to cooking gear and other essentials. So I understand acclimatisation process and the science, remedies (natural/local/medicine) and technologies behind it having countless hours researching best practices from nutrition requirements to gear to physical limits and talking to experienced people. Spent quite a bit of money too Then putting those into practice summiting peaks and sleeping above 12000ft for days at end. Refining methods and gear next time round. Although I didn't use it, there are companies/facilities where not only you can train in their altitude chambers you can also rent out altitude adjusted sleeping pods to use at the conscience of your own home. From my experience, most people can handle 12,000ft -15,000ft with little preparation and for those that require physical excursion then altitude chamber training is quite sufficient. But once you get past 17,000ft, that's when you really need proper acclimatisation. Endurance at those levels start to drop rapidly no matter how acclimatised and fit one may be.

[Lalmohan]

ashley tellis in his book on the indian nuclear deterrent explains very well the 'ugly conventional stability' across the himalayas between india and china, there has been a strategic stalemate for some time with both sides able to neutralise the other's posture. infra build up in tibet starts to change that equation

[ramana]

Did Mandeep Bajwa complete his article on raising the armoured brigade?

[rohitvats]

Did Mandeep Bajwa complete his article on raising the armoured brigade?

It has already been raised under 14 Corps. Equipped with T-72. In fact, some time back AGDPI had released pics of 63 Cavalry celebrating its golden jubilee. It had T-72 tanks of the regiment in winter camouflage carrying side placard of 'Plateau Warriors'. And these tanks were moved by road unlike earlier time when these were moved by IL-76

[Khalsa]

@Rohit

where were they moved to ? and can you point to the source of the pics.
Marvellous news by the way.

By road, my hats off, knew the CO of the regiment that got the BMPs over ChangLa into Chushul area.
Its a bloody effort and a half.

[Surya]

pictures on twitter ADGPI

[Sid]

You folks talking about this pic?

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CdfsXhTVAAA ... name=large

[rohitvats]

You folks talking about this pic?

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CdfsXhTVAAA ... name=large

Yes. Thanks for posting. Look at the camouflage on T-72 tanks along with uniform worn by its crew. The placard on the side skirts reads 'Plateau Warrior'.

[ShauryaT]

where were they moved to ?

One of these.

In Leh district, one Brigade would be stationed near Patharsahib Gurdwara, which is situated around 20 kilometers from Leh town while as second Brigade will have the Headquarters in Durbuk, which is one of the points where Indian and Chinese troops have frictions after regular intervals. The third Brigade will be stationed in Nimo village, sources said while disclosing that infrastructure for these Brigades would be completed during the upcoming working season.
Disclosing that one of these Brigades is full-fledged Armoured Brigade, sources said, “this is for the first time that Armoured contingent is being deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. Mainly, there are Infantry and Artillery Brigades”, adding “this is for the first time that Ministry of Defence has shown such a fastest reaction towards the increasing Chinese aggression”.

4 more Army Brigades being deployed in Ladakh to effectively counter China threat

[manjgu]

3 yrs back ,i saw tanks crossing Zoji La pass towards kargil...perched on trailer trucks ..

[shiv]

From teetar

[rohitvats]

3 yrs back ,i saw tanks crossing Zoji La pass towards kargil...perched on trailer trucks ..

That was the trial run.

[malushahi]

Look at the camouflage on T-72 tanks along with uniform worn by its crew. The placard on the side skirts reads 'Plateau Warrior'.

this one shows the details better.

That was the trial run.

"advance party" actually. with recent bde accretion, now there is more than "1.5" armd bde in ladakh.

@rv, against that backdrop, check the email i had sent you in 01/2014.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>@rv, against that backdrop, check the email i had sent you in 01/2014.

You've mail.

[deejay]

^^ RV the background in that pic looks familiar.

[Baikul]

From teetar.................

Just following up.

http://twdi.in/node/4279

[Prem]

Watch The New Desi Chopper At Siachen
1.03+

[putnanja]

Follow "ADGPI - Indian Army" on Facebook. They have been posting significant events of Kargil war on current day during 1999.

[rohitvats]

Some pictures from MOD PR handle on Twitter - T-72 and BMP-2 in eastern Ladakh.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ck1IDXRUgAAV11D.jpg
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ck1IDhuUkAEMFDE.jpg

[abhishek_sharma]

Pulgaon disaster: On a short fuse

[malushahi]

Some pictures from MOD PR handle on Twitter - T-72 and BMP-2 in eastern Ladakh.

"central ladakh". check email.

[rsingh]

Watch The New Desi Chopper At Siachen
1.03+

Good video but -200°C was bit too much. watch around 2.20.

[abhishek_sharma]

The Ins and Outs Of Infiltration: The Real Problem In Jammu and Kashmir – Part One

[abhishek_sharma]

Counter-Infiltration Part 2: Success Due To Tight Grip On The Grid And 24x7 Alertness

[mody]

The Indian Army has beefed up its presence along the china border quite a lot over the last few years.
I was in Sikkim in 2012 and there were T-72 tanks deployed in North Sikkim at Thangu and new T-90 tanks were coming in to replace or add to the same. These were being brought in by road. Not all bridges had been upgraded to 70 ton capacity, but the army engineers were erecting temporary support structures where needed to allow the tanks to cross some of the bridges. The rods leading up to north Sikkim are really bad and prone to landslides and using tanks on our side, south of Thangu, is very difficult. However, north of Thangu is the Tibetan plateau and its nice and flat. The area is not big, but is ideal tank country.
Some of the areas in eastern Sikkim bordering China and near the tri-nation border with Bhutan and Sikkim are now off limits for tourists and the entire area has been taken over by the army.

I had visited West Kameng district in Arunachal last November and here too, the army presence seemed to have been beefed up quite a lot. Bofors have also been deployed north of Bomdilla and dirang valley with big posters showing the guns been used at altitudes in excess of 14,500 ft.

The new Dhanush guns were also tested in North Sikkim and I am sure once the new 155 mm guns start arriving, they will be deployed across north Sikkim and AP, besides Ladakh.

The whole point of MSC was to have offensive capability vis-à-vis China, apart from just having a defensive posture. Offensive capability demands having better infrastructure to move the forces around and to support the offensive thrust from our side. Having a purely defensive posture, requires this to a lesser extent and having greater number of troops and fire power in the area would suffice for this.

It is high time IA, GOI and MoD start thinking in terms of offensive capabilities on both fronts rather then just having a defensive mindset with ahimsa and gandhian principles dictating our actions.

I have for long wondered how we can even leverage our supposed advantageous position on the Saltoro ridge to force a military solution to the siachen problem. This can help us reduce the number of troops and resources that we have to deploy to maintain our hold on the area. With the danger of two front war and of china attacking along the DBO axis to help the pakis in the siachen area and try and force a tri-nation boundary at KK pass, it is imperative that we think in terms of offensive action that we can take, that can put us on the western side of the saltoro ridge, make the paki presence at Gyari untenable and move the pakis a safe distance westwards. Offcourse the most ideal solution would be take control of all of Baltistan, so that siachen becomes a non-issue and we would be position to shut down KKH with artillery fire, whenever we want.
This would also elevate some of the pressure that we are feeling from the Chinese in ladakh.

[ramana]

Believe me they are thinking in those terms. In a two front war one front has to be neutralized. Pak is being ringed to prevent it from intervening.

[Prem]

I have for long wondered how we can even leverage our supposed advantageous position on the Saltoro ridge to force a military solution to the siachen problem. This can help us reduce the number of troops and resources that we have to deploy to maintain our hold on the area. With the danger of two front war and of china attacking along the DBO axis to help the pakis in the siachen area and try and force a tri-nation boundary at KK pass, it is imperative that we think in terms of offensive action that we can take, that can put us on the western side of the saltoro ridge, make the paki presence at Gyari untenable and move the pakis a safe distance westwards. Offcourse the most ideal solution would be take control of all of Baltistan, so that siachen becomes a non-issue and we would be position to shut down KKH with artillery fire, whenever we want. This would also elevate some of the pressure that we are feeling from the Chinese in ladakh.

With Doval Doctrine, Baltistan makes perfect sense. present ANA skirmishes with Paki may move toward GB from Afghan side. GB is in revolt and now many J& K expatriate groups are gunning after Paki on SM etc. With new Chopper power,we can bring the heavy guns in Siachen field and bury Paki for ever there on cold heights.

[Manish_Sharma]

http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/ ... 78400.ece#

Defence sources said preparations are on in full swing at Chandipur-based defence test facility off the Odisha coast for the test next week. In fact, two rounds of test of the missile have been planned in two days.

"While the first one has been scheduled for June 14, the second one will be on June 16. The test window, however, is from June 14-17. If everything goes as per planned and weather favours, the missile will be test fired as per the schedule," said a defence official.

Prahaar, which can be comparable with ATACMS missile of the US, is a counter to Pakistan's 'Nasr'. Developed by DRDO with the support of Missile System and Quality Assurance Agency (MSQAA), the missile is small, lean and slim to achieve better and high maneuvering mid-air.

Its sophisticated inertial navigation and electro-mechanical actuation system give it an edge over other weapons in its class available elsewhere. It is developed to provide Indian Army a cost-effective, all-weather and all-terrain battle field support system.

The missile can be transported to anywhere within a short span of time and the canister-based launcher can be fitted with six missiles at once having different kind of warheads meant for different targets. It can be fired in salvo mode in all directions covering the entire azimuth plane.

It has short cycle time of reloading and making the missile ready for launch. In a gap of less than five seconds, the missile can be fired from same launcher in ripple firing mode. It has the capability of deployment in both stand-alone and canisterised mode. The missile's maiden test was conducted in July 21, 2011 and since than it was kept under wraps for obvious reasons.

Is it possible to mass produce these and deploy along the borders of Tibet? Since they are cheap light but highly accurate with "sophisticated inertial navigation and electro-mechanical actuation system" in large numbers they destroy chineez infrstructure and halt their movements?

Until 2 Mountain Strike Corps are raised?

[rohitvats]

I'm hoping we see a quick induction of this missile. Perfect company for Brahmos Missile Regiments that we have with Artillery Divisions. The Missile Brigade of an Artillery Division can have 1 x Brahmos Regiment and 1/2 x Prahaar Regiment(s).

And takes away that much burden from IAF. In fact, I don't see why IAF should not have 9-10 Prahaar Regiments or Squadrons as part of overall strike matrix.

[adityadange]

rohit,
what is structure/layout of missile squadron in iaf? no of launchers/loaders/radars etc? how are they deployed in wartime scenario (spread over a line xx km long or concentrated at a point or arranged in square like formation across xx * yy km)?
or is it too much to ask these details on public forum?