India-US Relations : News and Discussion- II

[Yagnasri]

Maybe we are like that big green guy Hulk. One who on the same side but will do serious damage if not properly managed.

As Nehru said, "India is too big to be someone's pet."

[Cosmo_R]

^^TJS George (not a Modi fan but knows his mind??). The Modi focus on Putin and Xi has to do with lobbying for NSG (public knowledge) by saying don't push us further into arms of the US.

Modi is telling Putin/Xi what the PRC/Russia/US have always told us: "our relationship with xyz is independent of our relationship with you." How many candle watts of brainpower does TJS need to figure that out?

[Cosmo_R]

Maybe we are like that big green guy Hulk. One who on the same side but will do serious damage if not properly managed.

As Nehru said, "India is too big to be someone's pet."

True but it doesn't pay as LBJ said to be " a pitiful helpless giant". Too big to walk on a leash but also too big a target that cannot retaliate at long range.

[malushahi]

LBJ said to be " a pitiful helpless giant".

or nixon w.r.t. vietnam imbroglio? agree with the rest.

[Cosmo_R]

LBJ said to be " a pitiful helpless giant".

or nixon w.r.t. vietnam imbroglio? agree with the rest.

LBJ said that about the US re Vietnam

[ShauryaT]

Way for India to manage the 800 pound gorilla? A huge trade relationship (mutually beneficial) plus deep relationships with their MIC. You got that and you've got 635 Hill's angels on your side. Leverage Israel and you sealed the deal.

JMT

The above would equal to subservience - a la Japan or a version of it. Even tiny Israel experiences the same, when a President in power feels otherwise. The above MINUS a MIC relationship provides room for independence of action - as China has done. Many confuse power with economics a tad too much. The streams can intersect leading to "alliances". Remaining parallel, it still leaves room to cooperate where interests converge, and go separate ways, when they do not, as China has shown and as Israel has come to accept.

[malushahi]

LBJ said that about the US re Vietnam

address to the nation, about 2/3rd of the way down:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2490

someone's take on the phrase:
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/4/9/965225/-

[Cosmo_R]

The above would equal to subservience - a la Japan or a version of it. Even tiny Israel experiences the same, when a President in power feels otherwise. The above MINUS a MIC relationship provides room for independence of action - as China has done. Many confuse power with economics a tad too much. The streams can intersect leading to "alliances". Remaining parallel, it still leaves room to cooperate where interests converge, and go separate ways, when they do not, as China has shown and as Israel has come to accept.

One can pretend that the 800 pound gorilla is not in the room, in Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai, in forever friend Russia or NAM for that matter. It's a matter of opinion.

At the end of the day without power chips in hand, and knowing how to use them is key. It's not subservience, it's knowing how to be a serious player in the game. When India has the same size economy and MIC as China, it's a different ball game. China did not get there by itself—the US built it up as a bulwark against the FSU.

We are not going to get there by ourselves—thirty years ago we were ahead of PRC in most economic measures. The Chinese got a lot of US jostling (Korean war), encirclement in the Pacific, nuclear threats. Yes, for us the USS Enterprise thingie rankles, as does the Inderfurth war game action. But they overcame the tendency to look at the future through the rear view mirror and their US lobby was/is immense. They play the long game, we do item numbers in foreign policy.

Parallel lines do meet in space I'm told but that's a long way off.

[Kashi]

thirty years ago we were ahead of PRC in most economic measures.

Bakis are quite fond of saying the same about them and us...

Anyway, quite an achievement to have our backsides handed to us 50 years ago by a country that was "behind us in most economic measures"

[malushahi]

Anyway, quite an achievement to have our backsides handed to us 50 years ago by a country that was "behind us in most economic measures"

says a lot about the u.s. (and not the said country). does that not support cosmo's argument?

[ShauryaT]

We are not going to get there by ourselves—thirty years ago we were ahead of PRC in most economic measures. The Chinese got a lot of US jostling (Korean war), encirclement in the Pacific, nuclear threats. Yes, for us the USS Enterprise thingie rankles, as does the Inderfurth war game action. But they overcame the tendency to look at the future through the rear view mirror and their US lobby was/is immense. They play the long game, we do item numbers in foreign policy.

Parallel lines do meet in space I'm told but that's a long way off.

I think in the bolded part lies our difference on what constitutes Indian interests. Power, its accumulation and uses is either an allied, independent or revolves around an agreed upon axis exercise. ANY dependence on a foreign power for the MIC components of such hard power is by definition a loss of strategic space for independent action. A dependent power is not a great power and neither does a great power cede its strategic space to a superior power without the will to fight. Now, it is up to the superior power to marshall its resources to subdue the challenging power. In the context of India and China - I still maintain, this over analysis of a Indo-Pacific based conflict is eating from American hands and is not the core realm of our conflict with China, even if the need to build a coalition with rimland states of the region is great. Our core and far greater conflict is over the Tibetan land mass and over our Northern Areas linking into east Turkestan.

It is in our interests to break this logjam, which stops India from being a continental sized power. It is our will that will allow us to marshall the needed resources to exert such power and is not a complete and direct correlation of economic power. Many examples from history to prove the point. China's finest points of its expanding power was not when it has a $10 trillion economy only. China could successfully challenge the American might to protect its core interests in Korea at great cost to itself and continues to do so. It understood what it meant to subdue Tibet and East Turkestan - which allows it the OBOR and CPEC, India did not challenge. It was thwarted only by Russian power in not being able to take back its northern Han areas, which are now strategic to Russia and China has settled for now on that front.

India does have this inherent power and resources and has proved it in the past too, albeit with the will of colonial power.

[member_29218]

thirty years ago we were ahead of PRC in most economic measures.

Bakis are quite fond of saying the same about them and us...

Anyway, quite an achievement to have our backsides handed to us 50 years ago by a country that was "behind us in most economic measures"

Hmmmm........ my understanding is that it was largely our fault, not superiority of the adversary per se. A blunder of truly Himalayan proportions (pun intended).

[Cosmo_R]

^^^"I think in the bolded part lies our difference on what constitutes Indian interests. Power, its accumulation and uses is either an allied, independent or revolves around an agreed upon axis exercise. ANY dependence on a foreign power for the MIC components of such hard power is by definition a loss of strategic space for independent action.

We are the the largest importer of arms. Seventy percent of our military equipment is from Russia, we are dependent on foreign remittances from 4mm Indians in the Gulf to balance out out our merchandise balance of trade, we import 70 per cent of of our oil, we are encircled by PRC and its vassals, we run a huge trade imbalance with PRC, we don't have the budget for the RMA (85% goes to personnel and pensions). Where is the daylight for 'strategic space'?

What is the one example of 'independent action' we've undertaken in the last the last 30 years? No huge economy, no expeditionary military capability = fantasies about the 'multi-polar' world wherein we are the much beloved (universally) bystanders.

This is the stuff of IK Gujral who tried to talk 'moral authority' into a UNSC seat and was laughed out of the room and even I chuckled at the naivete in real time.

China cynically took up US help because Deng Xiaoping knew PRC could not do it by itself. That was thirty years ago or more.

we can ignore power politics and our children can watch CCTV (that's Chinese Closed Circuit TV) about the billions of satisfied natives basking in Han culture and arts along the CPEC.

JMT

[ShauryaT]

Dear Cosmo: You are actually making my point on India's will to power not innate capacity. There far more severe blunders that can be listed. A few independent actions can be cited too. But, the intent here is not to make a back and forth.

This new union as a nation-state has come into being after a long time. So, towards such an extent, we are fairly new to this game of power politics. Still learning, faltering but with its capacities fairly intact, progress slow but steady. In 30 years, I have seen things change, albeit at a snails pace to my liking but magical to my parents generation.

For a few decades worth of missed opportunities, let us not distract from our rightful place - as an independent power in our own right. If India was so weak kneed, we would not have sailed our warships into the indo-pacific to assert FON and our interests in the rimland states - independent of any joint patrols with the USN. India can make by itself.

[NRao]

CR,

You are right on India needing help. No way she can go it alone. For two reasons, IMHO. First and foremost is rampant corruption (why Indians don't do more, as a society, I have no clue). If not brought under control it will devour this society, like many in Africa.

Second is population. Double edged sword. Deployed properly, the greatest of boons. Else a vortex from which India cannot recover.

This opening for trade etc, is also very, very risky, but an unavoidable poison.

[SSridhar]

As usual, the truth is somewhere in the middle, between completely tilting towards the US or going it all alone. That is easy to say but very difficult to implement. There may be times when India will have to give in but then that would be a complex decision to take. We cannot avoid those situations. We simply cannot grow at the same pace at which we were growing in the 50s through 80s. that would be the worst disservice to the teeming millions of Indians.

[NRao]

I thought Modi had a broader picture, where he did not leave any nation, including China, out.

I do not see anything as a tilt towards any nation. I see most of his actions as pro india.

?????

As he mentioned in his speech, 2022 is the target year. He seems to be gearing towards that.

[Vayutuvan]

What is the difference between 'offset' and 'backsheesh' pls?

"Baksheesh" goes into Swiss bank account, I think.

[member_20292]

CR,

You are right on India needing help. No way she can go it alone. For two reasons, IMHO. First and foremost is rampant corruption (why Indians don't do more, as a society, I have no clue). If not brought under control it will devour this society, like many in Africa.

Second is population. Double edged sword. Deployed properly, the greatest of boons. Else a vortex from which India cannot recover.

This opening for trade etc, is also very, very risky, but an unavoidable poison.

1. Opening for trade allows people to super specialize and use their own competencies and trade for the others competencies.
2. No one needs to deploy a populace. People can sustain themselves. Enabling them to do this is good infra + ability to access world clients and markets. Then let them fish and fend for themselves in the world markets.

[Cosmo_R]

Dear Cosmo: ....For a few decades worth of missed opportunities

As you know, the decades pile up. A few more decades of missed opportunities and our BRF descendants will have the same conversation about our rightful place in the comity of nations...

"There is a tide in the affairs of men which when taken at flood...On such a full sea are we now afloat."

Elliptically, I don't want deja vu all over again.

[SSridhar]

U.S. howitzer to add to Army’s firepower - Dinakar Peri, The Hindu

In the M-777 deal for 145 ULH worth around $750 million, the DAC approved the case under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route from the U.S. The DAC directed independent progressing of the offsets. Under this, BAE systems, which manufactures the guns, will set up an Assembly, Integration and Test (AIT) facility in India for which it has already selected Mahindra group.

[arun]

Mean-e-while, India as a special partner bill rejected by Senate :

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 759681.cms

The US seems to have backed out of its commitment really rapidly. Posters here on BRF will recollect that the “Official” India-US Joint Declaration of June 7, 2016 stated that “the United States hereby recognizes India as a Major Defense Partner.” (See Here).

Our Prime Minister Narendra Modi will do well to be a great deal more circumspect in dealing with the US given the past history of their unfriendly acts and not get carried away with flattery.

I smell the spiel of a snake oil salesman.

In a legalistic rule bound society like the US “language you would not find in any arms transfer legislation or any of our existing policies” means only one thing, it means nothing, zero, nada, zilch especially when the necessary legislative underpinning for the term “'Major Defence Partner” was summarily turned down by the US legislature:

India to get access to almost 99% of US defence technologies: US official

[SSridhar]

^ The US is untrustworthy even when there are solid agreements.

[TSJones]

I smell the spiel of a snake oil salesman.

In a legalistic rule bound society like the US “language you would not find in any arms transfer legislation or any of our existing policies” means only one thing, it means nothing, zero, nada, zilch especially when the necessary legislative underpinning for the term “'Major Defence Partner” was summarily turned down by the US legislature:

India to get access to almost 99% of US defence technologies: US official

this can't be true. any serious US official knows about India's close relationship with Russia, so most definitely a lie......

[Manish_Sharma]

this can't be true. any serious US official knows about India's close relationship with Russia, so most definitely a lie......

US official and you both are liars !!!

Even if Bharatvarsh and Russia were sworn enemies the US won't give 99% tech or even any percentage unless indiginously Bharat was close to develop one.

That is only for fellow same-DNA race UK wallas. Who are even given trident slbms. Only impediment to give them any tech is due to fear of them not being competent enough to keep it secret from Russkies.

All 3 presidents clinton, bush, obama had bills passed that all the aid funds going to Bharat will only go through church.

Bharat is the biggest enemy of US, cause unlike south korea, china Bharat fights back from christian crusade. Nobody else fights that much. Bharat fights back from digestion of its Hindu parampara into christianity.

Only aadambar dikhawa is to somehow weaken Bharat. By getting us to lock huge amount of money on a single platform like super heavy aircraft carrier. Instead on Himalayan borders.

Would be easy for US to put pressure on politicians beureacrats to let it used for US causes whenever they want. While genuine needs like Rafale MMRCA which will be more useful on northern-western-eastern borders are cancelled.

[SanjayC]

thirty years ago we were ahead of PRC in most economic measures.

Anyway, quite an achievement to have our backsides handed to us 50 years ago by a country that was "behind us in most economic measures"

That was due to Nehru's juvenile delusions, and not any particular superiority of Chinese compared to Indian army. If Nehru was the US president, he would have got the US army beaten by Ethiopia.

[UlanBatori]

That was due to Nehru's juvenile delusions, and not any particular superiority of Chinese compared to Indian army. If Nehru was the US president, he would have got the US army beaten by Ethiopia.

(Sigh! ) Sure, the Indian Army would have just stepped over the Himalayas and brought the Chinese generals down "by the scruff of the neck" as the Brigadier at Kargil commanded Lt. Kalia and his team.

Please take a moment to revisit the history of what happened **BEFORE*** Nehru stopped the Indian Army from driving all the way to Beijing and getting "Home By Holi" to paraphrase Gen. McArthur.

Oh, BTW, that was the **United Nations** fighting under McArthur. Incl. Indians. Indian Army was of course vastly better equipped than the Americans, Australians, British etc to fight mountain warfare in extreme winter. Such great roads we had too!

The Chinese Intervention

3 November 1950-24 January 1951

They came out of the hills near Unsan, North Korea, blowing bugles in the dying light of day on 1 November 1950, throwing grenades and firing their "burp" guns at the surprised American soldiers of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division. Those who survived the initial assaults reported how shaken the spectacle of massed Chinese infantry had left them. Thousands of Chinese had attacked from the north, northwest, and west against scattered U.S. and South Korean (Republic of Korea or ROK) units moving deep into North Korea. The Chinese seemed to come out of nowhere as they swarmed around the flanks and over the defensive positions of the surprised United Nations (UN) troops. Within hours the ROK 15th Regiment on the 8th Cavalry�s right flank collapsed, while the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 8th Cavalry fell back in disarray into the city of Unsan. By morning, with their positions being overrun and their guns falling silent, the men of the 8th Cavalry tried to withdraw, but a Chinese roadblock to their rear forced them to abandon their artillery, and the men took to the hills in small groups. Only a few scattered survivors made it back to tell their story. The remaining battalion of the 8th Cavalry, the 3d, was hit early in the morning of 2 November with the same "human wave" assaults of bugle-blowing Chinese. In the confusion, one company-size Chinese element was mistaken for South Koreans and allowed to pass a critical bridge near the battalion command post (CP). Once over the bridge, the enemy commander blew his bugle, and the Chinese, throwing satchel charges and grenades, overran the CP.

Elements of the two other regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 5th and 7th Cavalries, tried unsuccessfully to reach the isolated battalion. The 5th Cavalry, commanded by then Lt. Col. Harold K. Johnson, later to be Chief of Staff of the Army, led a two-battalion counterattack on the dug-in Chinese positions encircling the 8th Cavalry. However, with insufficient artillery support and a determined enemy, he and his men were unable to break the Chinese line. With daylight fading, the relief effort was broken off and the men of the 8th Cavalry were ordered to get out of the trap any way they could. Breaking into small elements, the soldiers moved out overland under cover of darkness. Most did not make it. In all, over eight hundred men of the 8th Cavalry were lost�almost one-third of the regiment�s strength�in the initial attacks by massive Chinese forces, forces that only recently had been considered as existing only in rumor.
In retrospect the events on the battlefield in late October and early November 1950 were harbingers of disaster ahead. They had been foreshadowed by ominous "signals" from China, signals relayed to the United States through Indian diplomatic channels. The Chinese, it was reported, would not tolerate a U.S. presence so close to their borders and would send troops to Korea if any UN forces other than ROK elements crossed the 38th Parallel. With the United States seeking to isolate Communist China diplomatically, there were very few ways to verify these warnings. While aware of some of the dangers, U.S. diplomats and intelligence personnel, especially General MacArthur, discounted the risks. The best time for intervention was past, they said, and even if the Chinese decided to intervene, allied air power and firepower would cripple their ability to move or resupply their forces. The opinion of many military observers, some of whom had helped train the Chinese to fight against the Japanese in World War II, was that the huge infantry forces that could be put in the field would be poorly equipped, poorly led, and abysmally supplied. These "experts" failed to give full due to the revolutionary zeal and military experience of many of the Chinese soldiers that had been redeployed to the Korean border area. Many of the soldiers were confident veterans of the successful civil war against the Nationalist Chinese forces. Although these forces were indeed poorly supplied, they were highly motivated, battle hardened, and led by officers who were veterans, in some cases, of twenty years of nearly constant war.

6

Perhaps the most critical element in weighing the risks of Chinese intervention was the deference paid to the opinions of General MacArthur. America�s "proconsul" in the Far East, MacArthur was the American public�s "hero" of the gallant attempt to defend Bataan and Corregidor in the early days of World War II, the conqueror of the Japanese in the Southwestern Pacific, and the foreign "Shogun" of Japan during the occupation of that country. He was also the architect of the lightning stroke at Inch�on that almost overnight turned the tide of battle in Korea. When he stated categorically that the Chinese would not intervene in any large numbers, all other evidence of growing Chinese involvement tended to be discounted. MacArthur and his Far Eastern Command (FEC) intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, continued to insist, despite the CCF attacks at Unsan and similar attacks against X Corps in northeastern Korea, that the Chinese would not intervene in force. On 6 November the FEC continued to list the total of Chinese troops in theater as only 34,500, whereas in reality over 300,000 CCF soldiers organized into thirty divisions had already moved into Korea. The mysterious disappearance of Chinese forces at that time seemed only to confirm the judgment that their forces were only token "volunteers."

The overall situation in early November 1951 was unsettled, but UN forces were still optimistic. The North Korean Army had been thoroughly defeated, with only remnants fleeing into the mountains to conduct guerrilla warfare or retreating north toward sanctuary in China. Eighth Army positions along the Ch�ongch�on River, halfway between the 38th Parallel and the Yalu, were strong. The 1st Cavalry Division had admittedly taken a beating, but two regiments were still in good condition, while the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions had generally recovered from their earlier trials. On the Eighth Army�s right flank, the 2d Infantry Division was in a position to backstop the vulnerable ROK 6th and 8th Divisions. In northeastern Korea, the units under X Corps were fresh and, in the case of the 1st Marine Division, at full strength. By the first week of November, despite the surprise attacks by what were still classed as small Chinese volunteer units, the United Nations forces as a whole were well positioned and looking forward to attacking north to the Yalu to end the war and being "home by Christmas."

Forces opposing the UN in early November were organized under a combined headquarters staffed by North Korean and Chinese officers. Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea, was also commander of the North Korean Armed Forces based at Kanggye, deep in the mountains of north central Korea. On paper, the North Korean forces consisted of 8 corps, 30 divisions, and several brigades, but in fact only 2 corps totaling some 5 weak divisions and 2 depleted brigades were in active operations against UN forces. The IV Corps with one division and two brigades opposed the ROK I Corps in northeastern Korea, while the II Corps with 4 scattered and weakened divisions was engaged in guerrilla operations in the Taebaek Mountains both above and below the 38th Parallel. The remainder of the surviving North Korean Army elements were resting and refitting in the sanctuary of Manchuria or along the border in north central Korea, away from the main lines of UN advance along the east and west coasts of the peninsula. Most of the enemy striking power was contained in the 300,000-strong Chinese People�s Liberation Army (PLA). They had entered Korea during the last half of October, undetected by FEC intelligence assets. The stage was set for the near-destruction of Eighth Army and the abandonment of the military attempt to reunify Korea.

[UlanBatori]

The Battles Along the Ch’ongch’on

On the night of 25 November the Chinese struck Eighth Army again. The first CCF attacks hit the 9th and 38th Infantries of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division about eighteen miles northeast of Kunu-ri along the Ch’ongch’on River. Charging to the sounds of bugles, the Chinese 40th Army found gaps between the units and struck their flanks. They hit units on both sides of the river just south of a low mountain called, ironically, Chinaman’s Hat. Infiltrators also attacked elements of the 23d Infantry just behind the 9th Infantry. The Chinese took heavy casualties and were forced to suspend their attack in the early morning hours, only to resume just before dawn. Vigorous U.S. counterattacks restored most of the main line positions. Attacks also were pressed against the U.S. 25th Infantry Division to the 2d Division’s left, prompting a now-alerted U.S. command to cancel the advance planned for 26 November. Suddenly on the defensive, U.S. soldiers dug in and consolidated their positions while waiting for new Chinese attacks.

Eighth Army’s situation was complicated by the fact that the Chinese broke through elements of the ROK II Corps on the army’s right wing. They penetrated the ROK front in several places, establishing roadblocks to the rear of ROK units, cutting them off and creating panic. By noon on the twenty-sixth the ROK II Corps front had folded, exposing Eighth Army’s entire flank.

Reacting quickly, Walker sent the 1st Cavalry Division, at that time guarding supply installations and routes in Eighth Army’s rear, and the Turkish Brigade, in IX Corps reserve, forward to protect possible Army lines of retreat. Farther west, Walker halted the 24th Division and prepared to conduct an active defense all along his lines. Although his intelligence officer (G–2) raised the estimate of Chinese troops in the area from 54,000 to 101,000, Walker still did not realize the size of the Chinese offensive. No one did. FEC headquarters merely reported to Washington that "a slowing down of the UN offensive may result" from these new attacks.

Late on the twenty-sixth Chinese forces struck again on the Eighth Army’s right flank, with the goal of exploiting the collapse of the ROK II Corps while attempting to flank the entire Eighth Army from the east. Attacking heavily in the east and center sections of the UN line, the Chinese threw five field armies into the fight while sending another

11

against the 24th Division to the west on a holding mission. Attacks against the ROK 1st Division drove that unit back and soon exposed the flanks of both the U.S. 24th and 25th Divisions. Only a rapid readjustment of forces plugged this gap and stabilized the situation by early evening on 27 November. However, the situation was growing grim. By mid-afternoon on the twenty-eighth all U.S. and ROK units were in retreat. Attempts by the 2d Division to hold the line and by the 1st Cavalry Division and Turkish Brigade to restore Eighth Army’s right flank were in vain. Two Chinese Armies, the 42d and 38th, were pouring through the broken ROK lines to Eighth Army’s east and threatening to envelop the entire force. Walker’s only hope was to bring off a fighting withdrawal of his army deep behind the Ch’ongch’on River line, below the gathering Chinese thrust from the east.

The withdrawal of Eighth Army units was made more difficult by the thousands of fleeing Korean refugees who blocked the roads. In addition, the hordes of refugees gave excellent cover to Chinese and North Korean infiltrators, who often dressed in Korean clothing, went through U.S. checkpoints, and then turned and opened fire on the startled Americans. The tactics repeated those used by the North Koreans during the initial invasion of the South and were often equally effective. One 7th Cavalry company commander was killed and eight of his men wounded by enemy infiltrators throwing hand grenades. As in the summer, Eighth Army orders directed that refugees be diverted from main roads, escorted by South Korean police, and routed around allied defensive lines, although the strictures were often difficult to enforce.

The brunt of the renewed enemy attacks fell on the exposed U.S. 2d Infantry Division. With his division almost cut off from the rest of the Army, Maj. Gen. Laurence B. "Dutch" Keiser relied upon the Turkish Brigade to protect his right flank as he prepared to withdraw from Kunu-ri. The Chinese, however, bypassed the Turks, who remained concentrated at Kaech’on, ten miles to the west of Kunu-ri, and established roadblocks on the 2d Division’s withdrawal route to the south. These roadblocks, combined with attacks against U.S. and ROK troops north and northeast of Kunu-ri, proved a lethal combination. As the 2d Division began its withdrawal under pressure on the morning of the thirtieth, it found itself literally "running the gauntlet" as its trucks and vehicles were trapped on a congested valley road under fire from Chinese positions on the high ground to the east and west. Air strikes helped but could not dislodge the Chinese troops as they poured rifle and machine-gun fire into the slow-moving American vehicles. Soldiers were often forced to crouch in the ditches as their vehicles were raked with enemy fire; while hundreds were killed or wounded, others were forced to proceed on foot down the long road to Sunch’on, almost twenty miles to the south of Kunu-ri. Chinese roadblocks halted the columns repeatedly as the casualties mounted. Some artillery units were even forced to abandon their guns. The 37th Field Artillery Battalion, for example, lost 35 men killed, wounded, or missing and abandoned 10 howitzers, 53 vehicles, and 39 trailers. As the road became clogged with abandoned vehicles, men were forced to leave the column and make their way south as best they could. Unit integrity in some places broke down under the murderous fire. Finally, late on 30 November, the last units closed on Sunch’on and the shattered Eighth Army established a hasty defensive line from Sukch’on to the west to Sinch’ang-ni in the east, some twenty-five miles south of their initial positions on the Ch’ongch’on River line.

The battles along the Ch’ongch’on River were a major defeat for the Eighth Army and a mortal blow to the hopes of MacArthur and others for the reunification of Korea by force of arms. The 2d Division alone took almost 4,500 battle casualties from 15 to 30 November, most occurring after the twenty-fifth. It lost almost a third of its strength, along with sixty-four artillery pieces, hundreds of trucks, and nearly all its engineer equipment. While the rest of Eighth Army had not been hit as hard, with the possible exception of the ROK units whose total losses will probably never be known, there was no doubt about the magnitude of the reverse. The U.S. 1st Cavalry, 24th and 25th

Sorry, OT I I know but I am sick and tired of ppl on this forum fart8ng about "if it weren't for Nehru we would have raced all the way to Beijing with the Kerala Police, barefoot and armed with 0.303 rifles with 1 bullet for every 5 policemen, leading the spearhead." People need to get **SOME** sense of reality into their skulls to dilute the bigoted stupidity, hain?

[malushahi]

^^^ obviously it was the fauj who promulgated the forward policy and established suicidal penny-packet posts all on its own - chachaji and chums had no say in the matter. and of course he had gotten that 4-lane highway built from tawang to namka chu, but the 7th inf bde zimbly showed up there in cotton clothes after walking for 3 days to spite him. (i use just one episode, there are countless others). they were obviously well-kitted and well-trained for high-altitude warfare having been put to work on activities such as house-building as a result of his benign policy towards fauj.

that chachaji did not need fauj's or anyone else's help in bringing misery to his country is well documented - and i don't mean just 1962. can't think of anyone else who can rightfully be called a world-statesman, for we see his after-effects even today.

`Nehru declined offer of permanent U.N. seat'

In his latest book, "Nehru — The Invention of India," Mr. Tharoor writes that Indian diplomats who have seen files swear that Nehru declined the offer about the same time as he turned down "with scorn" John Foster Dulles' support for an Indian Monroe Doctrine.

Nehru had suggested that the seat, till then held by Taiwan, be offered to Beijing instead. He wrote that "the seat was held with scant credibility by Taiwan."

Rafiq Zakaria, historian and scholar, and Murli Deora, MP, highlighted the disclosure at a function organised here to release the book. Manmohan Singh, Leader of Opposition in the Rajya Sabha, handed over the first copy to the Maharashtra Chief Minister, Sushilkumar Shinde. {all bhateejas onlee}

Nehru's refusal of Kennedy's offer of nuclear detonation kept India out of the NSG

NEW DELHI: Had India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru accepted US President John F Kennedy's offer of helping India detonate a nuclear device much before China did in 1964, India need not have to make desperate efforts to enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) now, according to former Foreign Secretary Maharajakrishna Rasgotra.

Rasgotra said if Nehru had accepted the offer, not only India would had tested the nuclear device first in Asia, before China, but it "would have deterred China from launching its war of 1962 and even imparted a note of caution to [Pakistan's] Field Marshal Ayub Khan's plans for war in 1965".

In the book, Rasgotra notes that Kennedy made the extraordinary gesture towards India after learning through American intelligence in the late 1950s that China's nuclear programme was progressing towards a weapons' detonation in 1964.

Rasgotra said "Kennedy, who was an admirer of India's democracy and held its leader Jawaharlal Nehru in very high esteem, felt that democratic India, not Communist China, should be the first Asian country to conduct a nuclear test".NEW DELHI: Had India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru accepted US President John F Kennedy's offer of helping India detonate a nuclear device much before China did in 1964, India need not have to make desperate efforts to enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) now, according to former Foreign Secretary Maharajakrishna Rasgotra.

Rasgotra said if Nehru had accepted the offer, not only India would had tested the nuclear device first in Asia, before China, but it "would have deterred China from launching its war of 1962 and even imparted a note of caution to [Pakistan's] Field Marshal Ayub Khan's plans for war in 1965".

In the book, Rasgotra notes that Kennedy made the extraordinary gesture towards India after learning through American intelligence in the late 1950s that China's nuclear programme was progressing towards a weapons' detonation in 1964.

Rasgotra said "Kennedy, who was an admirer of India's democracy and held its leader Jawaharlal Nehru in very high esteem, felt that democratic India, not Communist China, should be the first Asian country to conduct a nuclear test".

[TSJones]

this can't be true. any serious US official knows about India's close relationship with Russia, so most definitely a lie......

US official and you both are liars !!!

Even if Bharatvarsh and Russia were sworn enemies the US won't give 99% tech or even any percentage unless indiginously Bharat was close to develop one.

That is only for fellow same-DNA race UK wallas. Who are even given trident slbms. Only impediment to give them any tech is due to fear of them not being competent enough to keep it secret from Russkies.

All 3 presidents clinton, bush, obama had bills passed that all the aid funds going to Bharat will only go through church.

a bald faced lie with no facts presented.

[TSJones]

Boss, you wanna point to the Korean War?

where the Chinese lost 360,000 killed by their own estimates??

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/ ... s-60-years

yay, real nice Chinese victory..........

and who's democratic and relatively weathy and has been for decades........? why South Korea of course

yup, great chinese victory........

Trump is right....... give South Korea the bomb and send our troops home.

God, I hope he gets elected,,,,,,,,,probably won't....

[UlanBatori]

I once did some web searches on this traumatic issue.
American version of Chosin reservoir battle:

Our feet couldn't touch ground, it was covered with Red Chinese corpses

Chinese riposte:

How would the Americans know? They were too busy running away!

My only point above is that the Chinese Army was very well trained and experienced in winter mountain warfare, and their tactics overwhelmed far better equipped, better supported forces than the Indian Army of 1962. I think all accounts are agreed in that the American victory was in not getting **TOTALLY** annihilated and managing to get out many soldiers out of the area.
In comparison, the Indian Army fought until the Chinese retreated in panic from (most) of their occupied area, hain? Probably the Chinese panicked when they realized that their supply lines ran over the mountains through Tibet, and the arrival of B-52s in Kolkatta meant that the supply lines and avenues for retreat would get annihilated in short order, as American revenge for the Yalu river experience. This aspect has never been discussed by all the ppl bleating about "Chinese voluntary withdrawal".
I doubt if Indian Army losses exceeded 1000, but many soldiers were captured and died of torture / exhaustion/ starvation in Chinese camps. A terrible time.
Even today India is poorly equipped to fight anything in the Himalayas because Arunachal, Ladakh, etc etc are kept as "border areas", with minimal economy or infrastructure. A national shame. I don't think India could bring 300,000 soldiers into the area at a couple of months notice even today, equipped to fight high-altitude winter warfare. People here need to understand that harsh reality.

BTW, I have never read a reliable account of Chinese losses in the 1962 war. My guess is that thousands died, not least in the trek through Tibet to the border. The region is not kind to anyone. Attacking entrenched positions using infantry is never cheap. So in reality there was no real Indian ***defeat*** except in the self-hating sh1t-filled crania of Indians. There was a Tactical Withdrawal until the Chinese realized they were in a trap, and then they ran like hell. Why is this the proper interpretation of Napoleon's Withdrawal from Moscow but not Mao's from Tezpur?

IOW, Field Marshal Nehru won a brilliant strategic victory by pulling his forces back and waiting for the Chinese to exhaust themselves - his only kindness to them was not asking the USAF to carpet-bomb their supply lines and retreat. That was done to minimize civilian casualties, of course, as with the USAF against ISIS in Iraq.

[malushahi]

^^^you have clearly outdone yourself with those facts and that analysis. where is the <clapping> emoticon?

[UlanBatori]

Thankye Thankye Thankye! As The King would have said b4 he overdosed on drugs.

[TSJones]

oh sure.....yer comparing 1962 incident to the korean war....

boss, we had to send you guys a couple plane loads of machine guns in '62 for crying out loud......you guys were poorer than temple mice...

[UlanBatori]

Hey, and here I thought it was B-52s! Planeloads of machine guns is what the mercenary pilot dropped at Purulia. Rest assured, the machine guns were well used. Problem is we didn't have money to buy bullets for them after a few thousand invaders had been killed. Which is my point exactly:
1) Chinese losses in 1962 were massive.
2) The Chinese realized with a shock that the IA had drawn them all the way to Tezpur - and the Americans were bringing in machine guns in (DC-3s disguised as) B-52s. At least they had "B-52 Bombel" written all over them. And once they realized this in Beijing there was a rush on the Pepto Bismol - Mao ordered his commanders to pull back with panic-level haste before the passes were bombed. Thousands of PLA must have died.

The initial Chinese invasion was also at massive cost. Many Indian posts were overrun, but after they had run out of bullets.
**AND** all done with the loss of only 800 Indian soldiers and policemen. Compare THAT to the 55,000 American martyrs of Korea to achieve the same result: get the PLA to withdraw. Such a horrible tragedy!!!

And BTW, Temple Mice are very rich and well-fed. Takes a lot to be richer than THEM!

[Cosmo_R]

^^^Guys and especially TSJ stop it. BRF, as I have come to appreciate, is where grownups share their insights on some very specific issues of the day. I hope I am more than one in this regard.

Ramana, Sridhar and all of you admins. Thank you for a forum that does not involve Starfleet badges and avatars and the like, redolent of social media today.

[ramana]

Guys on that note locking the thread.

Open a new one and dont continue in this vein.