LCA: News & Discussions - October 2016

[shiv]

Elsewhere, I presented a fighter jet design with 2 engines, and MTOW of 10 tonnes, and I was laughed at;

Wow! Really? Fantastic! We don't have many people who know about aircraft design on here. But its off topic. There is a "design your own fighter" therad though

[JayS]

Probably you should think, why people are not taking your ideas seriously.

Please check the dimensions and weights of and engine vs the gear box.

Also basic rule of thumb for reliability - more moving parts, less reliability. More parts less reliability. So compare number of parts in engine that you propose vs gear box.

Next such gear boxes are typically life-time parts i.e. no ROH required for entire life. Where as an engine in place of that would need far far more maintenance.

I really cannot make it any more simple and thus I will excuse myself out of this discussion.

[Rammpal]

Right about there, sir !

Apparently, 'I know not, what I'm talking ah-boooot' !

[Rammpal]

Probably you should think, why people are not taking your ideas seriously.

Please check the dimensions and weights of and engine vs the gear box.

Also basic rule of thumb for reliability - more moving parts, less reliability. More parts less reliability. So compare number of parts in engine that you propose vs gear box.

Next such gear boxes are typically life-time parts i.e. no ROH required for entire life. Where as an engine in place of that would need far far more maintenance.

I really cannot make it any more simple and thus I will excuse myself out of this discussion.

Tattva Time.

More parts, less reliability ?
Really ?
Are you a single cell Amoeba ?
How many brain cells do you have ?
Does that make you 'less reliable' ?

Anyway;
How 'many' is too many ?

"....... such parts are lifetime parts..."

Says who ?
Isn't that or shouldn't that be an inherent part of The Design Philosophy?
Yes ?
Did I Not pose that question earlier ??

As for the rest of the comment - irrelevant.
We're here to kick a.s, challenge "Zhe Box'...., i.e.: we need folks to think out of zhe box.

[Rishi Verma]

Elsewhere, I presented a fighter jet design with 2 engines, and MTOW of 10 tonnes, and I was laughed at;

Wow! Really? Fantastic! We don't have many people who know about aircraft design on here. But its off topic. There is a "design your own fighter" therad though

ShivJi u r cruel. That's where he had "designed" that fighter. Why Ju send him back there.

[Rammpal]

^^^^ 'that fighter' ?
Could you kindly elaborate...... once you're done rolling on your a.s laughing, of course.

[JayS]

To discuss LCA, reading this report is mandatory


http://www.cag.gov.in/sites/default/fil ... pter_7.pdf

No HAL boss has ever had to be accountable for the delays listed in the pdf. Once you are in a government job your progress is by age alone, not by productivity. In a private company people would have been fired, or the company would have gone bankrupt

I hope you read the report fully before making that comment.

BTW reading the report, I seriously doubt the CAG audit committee had any engineer in it. There are some funky stuff in there. But the most funky of all that I thought was, the amount of upgrades that IAF did that CAG blamed on delayed LCA development.

a. Up-gradation (November 1995) of 125 MiG BIS aircraft at a
cost of 626 million USD (equivalent to `2135 crore)
b. Up-gradation (March 2008) of 62 MiG-29 aircraft into multi
role MiG-29UPG standard aircraft at a cost of 964 million USD
(`3841.87 crore). Upgradation was in progress (February 2015)
c. Up-gradation (December 2009) of 61 Jaguar Aircraft at a cost
of `3113.02 crore. Upgradation was in progress (February
2015)
d. Up-gradation (2011) of Mirage 2000 aircraft through OEM and
HAL at a total cost of `10947 crore. Upgradation was in
progress (February 2015)

It also says that:

The Air Staff Requirement (ASR) (October 1985) envisaged that LCA was
required to be inducted in IAF squadrons by 1994 as a replacement of Mig-21.
The requirement projected by Air HQ was for 200 fighters and 20 trainers,
with a view to form 11 squadrons of LCA in order to overcome depletion of
squadrons due to phasing out of ageing fleet.

So for the delay in induction of 220 LCA which were to replace only MiG21, CAG blamed upgrades of 125 MiG21 + 62 MiG29 + 61 Jaguar + 50 M2K = 298 aircrafts. I could still understand that IAF could have replaced Mig21/Mig29/Jaguar with LCA. But M2K?? This has to be blamed on MMRCA. As such M2K are our N-weapons delivery and would have been upgraded anyway since we do not have an option currently. Of total 20000Cr put on LCA delay, 10000Cr are on account of M2K alone. This is the most absurd thing.

However I stand corrected on the number of orders for LCA. MoD contracted for 20 IOC jets and 20 FOC jets in 2006 and 2010 respectively. While HAL received money for 1st contract, it received only 20% of total money till 2015. But the report also notes that the 20 FOC contract will be revised once FOC is done.

Note the changes in LSP configurations. They are staggering. It blew my mind. I thought it would be relatively minor changes. No wonder HAL could not productionize the LCA for IOC config in time. Total changes stad at: 3041 new drawings, 3965 changed drawings and cancellation of 245
drawings from contracted ESOP for LSP till LSP8 was delivered.

As such the contract said, delivery should be starting from 42nd month. When IOC was achieved in Dec 2013 and SOP itself was frozen in 2014 or so, as we know it, in fact HAL should be credited to have delivered SP1 in 2015 itself. And no wonder still lot of parts in SP1-3 are not standardized.

Also CAG blamed HAL for increased weight of LCA, not ADA. And didnt accept HAL's reply that it merely built LSPs as per SOP given by ADA.

Another funny thing I found is, CAG actually made a adverse remark on HAL because it procured jigs for 8/yr production rate in 2014 while the old contract, as per old plane, said only 4 aircrafts to be delivered in 2014-15. Talk of double speak and rewarding initiative.

The rate of manufacture of LCA depended on availability of the main
assembly jigs. The time chart prepared by the division showed that 66 weeks
were required for completion of the main assembly activity subject to
availability of the required jigs and man power. The Methods Engineering
Group of LCA division, reassessed (October 2012) the total jig requirement as
57 for manufacturing of eight LCA per annum out of which it already had 32
jigs and balance 25 were to be procured. However, the production plan of the
Division for the year 2014-15 stipulated manufacture of only four LCA.

I will read other chapters as well.

[jamwal]

Did SaiK make another account ? it's even more psycho

[JayS]

Did SaiK make another account ? it's even more psycho

[JayS]

Christine aunty deriding LCA on Twitter, calling it abject failure. While she thinks getting F16 assembly line is strategic win for India.

[tsarkar]

KH-2014 seen here with two 250 Kg HSLD bombs in the MB stations. As the name suggests, the HSLD (High Speed Low Drag) bombs have sleeker frontal surface area thus has different characteristics compared to conventional MK11 heavier bombs. The separation characteristics of these bombs have been favourable and the accuracy parameters too.

Is there a LGB conversion kit for the HSLD bombs as well?

No. The Mark 11 is a NATO standard 1000 lb bomb used on Jaguar and Mirage and Matra BGL, Griffin and Paveway kits fit to it. Only the central warhead is kept - the nose and tail sections are replaced when using BGL/Griffin/Paveway.

The HSLD 250 & 450 kg bombs are slimmer and hence incompatible with any of these kits. A local kit can be made, but with kits, it will stop being high speed and low drag. LGB by design are dropped ballistic to get into the cone of laser reflected by the target.

Better idea would be to fit a GPS kit, now that IRNSS is active. That way it can still remain HSLD.

[Indranil]

^^^ I can't confirm, but I have heard that GPS guided tail kit for HSLD is in the works.

The formal orders for LCA is great news. Kudos Modi Sarkar!

[Indranil]

Rammpal, please take a break for posting nonsense or I have to hand you one.

[Kartik]

"Expanding the operational boundaries"

From the archives of Detachment 2014 ..

KH -2014, seen here, is flying with a 725 centreline drop tank. The integration, the jettison characteristics and the general handling with this drop tank were tested in 2014 and will certainly enhance the flying range with two wing mounted drop tanks.

[shiv]

I hope you read the report fully before making that comment.

JayS ji I request that we do not make insinuations about the other person's thoroughness or understanding. By the time I reached page 10 I had found stuff that indicates why there have been delays and it does not need an engineer to understand. I presume you have read it all.

1.HAL DID NOT BUILD A FATIGUE TEST SPECIMEN

4.2.1 Absence of Fatigue Test Specimen (FTS)
A Fatigue Test Specimen (FTS) was required to be built for testing the
endurance of LCA for determining the total technical life. Audit observed that
(February 2014) building of FTS was not taken up by HAL.

When reasons for not building the FTS was enquired (February 2014) in audit,
HAL stated (July 2014) that production standard fuselage was required for
carrying out the FTS and the same was yet to be manufactured.

Reply of HAL is not tenable in audit as the FTS was to be built under the
MoU of 2006 covering developmental activities and not after building
production standard aircraft as stated by HAL now.

Thus, in the absence of FTS, technical life of LCA could not be determined
and ADA/HAL had to obtain concession at the time of IOC (December 2013)
from Air HQ which limited the life of airframe to 1000 hours as against the
ASR specification of more than 3000 hours.

2.HAL DID NOT CREATE PRODUCTION FACILITIES AS ENVISAGED BUT HAD EXCUSES

4.3.1 Delay in creation of production facilities:
Audit observed that HAL had been utilizing the existing facilities available
with it for manufacture of LCA. Even though HAL initiated action in April
2006 to form a dedicated LCA facility, LCA Project Group was established as
a full-fledged Division only in March 2014 as seen from HAL’s 371
st Board Meeting papers.

MoU of 2002 sanctioned 391.18 crore towards creation of facility i.e.
Capital expenditure Rs. 188.71 crore and DRE 202.47 crore. Audit noticed
that as of March 2014, HAL had incurred an amount of `118.99 crore (63
percent) towards capital expenditure and 139.12 crore (69
per cent ) towards DRE.

When reasons for delay in creation of manufacturing facility was enquired
(October 2014) in audit, HAL stated (November 2014) that extensive changes
in the design and development post 2006 had resulted in reviewing the facility
requirement and a capacity augmentation plan was being put up for meeting
the objectives. It was also stated that non-finalisation of configuration of LCA
had led to the postponement of establishment of production facilities.

Reply is not acceptable as the GoI sanction of November 2001 stipulated that
the facilities for manufacture of eight LCA were to be created and the first
LCA was to be delivered within 4 ½ years from the date of sanction i.e. by
May 2006. Further, the delay in creation of manufacturing facility of eight
aircraft per annum impacted the production of LSPs, as discussed in Para 4.3.4
as well as the Series Production Aircraft.

3.MACHINERY PROCUREMENT DELAYED AND ALL OF IT STILL NOT OPERATIONAL

4.3.2 Delay in procurement of plant and machinery
As against the target date of May 2006 for creation of facilities for
manufacture of eight aircraft per annum, HAL placed 308 purchase orders
valued 73.85 crore during the years 2006-07 to 2013-14. Of these, 203
purchase orders valuing 70.84 crore were placed only between 2011-12 and
2013-14. Further, the sanctioned cost of the project was revised
(January 2011) to include procurement of five machines for 54.50 crore to
enhance quality and productivity.

against the order of four machines
between June 2011 and January 2014, three machines valued
29.20 crore were received between December 2012 and June 2014. However, only one
machine has been commissioned so far (November 2014) while two machines
even though installed in May 2013 could not be commissioned as the supplier
had to prove wing drilling on one aircraft. The fourth machine valued
5.41 crore was expected to be received in January 2015. Action to procure
one machine i.e. HSM profiler was yet to be initiated (November 2014).

4.TWO YEAR DELAY IN MAKING HANGARS LED TO INSTALLATION OF LCA MACHINERY IN JAGUAR MACHINE SHOP

4.3.3 Delay in completion of LCA hangars
While according (July 2003) approval for completion of hangars for LCA
production by HAL Board, one of the benefits expected to be realised was
contiguous location of assembly shops with related departments to reduce
movements, handling and reduce the cycle time, etc. Audit observed that the
hangars were completed in April 2009 against the scheduled date of
completion by September 2007. Due to delay in completion of LCA hangars,
certain machines (costing 30.56 crore) procured during 2004 to 2006 out of
LCA funds and installed in the Aircraft Division (Jaguar Machine Shop)
continued to remain in the Aircraft Division even after construction of new
hangars for LCA production. Hence, the intended benefit from construction of
the new building was not realised by HAL completely.

5.HAL BOTCHED THE PROCUREMENT OF JIGS TO INCREASE RATE OF MANUFACTURE

4.3.4 Delay in procurement of tools and jigs
HAL had estimated that 66 weeks were required for
completion of main assembly activity of LCA aircraft and considering the lead
time of one year for procurement of jigs, the purchase orders should have been
placed at least by January 2004. Further, HAL’s reply is silent on the issue of
delayed placement of orders for jigs.

[JayS]

I was kinda kiddin with that statement I hoped the smiley would give it away, apparently not. So I apologize if you felt offended.


Quick comment on 1st point -

HAL's reply was perfectly valid. For fatigue test one shud use production standard article not prototype level. Its a huge testing efforts both economically n manpowerwise. For type certification its mandatory to prove life on exact same component as the one being certified. Any changes require the OEM to recertify all the changes.

However I would also concede on the point that I do not know exactly how much changes were there in basic aircraft structure but looking at 7000+ drawing changes its not far fetched to assume there were at least some on main aerostructure. Also we know changes in wing structure happened circa 2009 due to change in weapons requirement.

Even now they can simply take one of the LSP strip it down n do the fatigue testing to prove life. Some older ones are almost useless now.

[shiv]

I was kinda kiddin with that statement I hoped the smiley would give it away, apparently not. So I apologize if you felt offended.

Jay my offence or non offence is immaterial - but your posts are taken seriously and those who would like to feel more kindly about the issue may not see that the CAG report has some unfair accusations that reveal lack of awareness of engineering problems but it also pulls up HAL in areas where I think HAL is culpable.

In fact that business of "building of hangar" and "not ordering machinery" may have explanations that are typical PSU workflow related issues. Tenders being written. Tender not sent out because of lack of approval from person who was on leave. then forgotten until someone remembered. Tender to be uploaded, but server down. New internet access being installed and rewiring being done at HAL. Tender to be uploaded after that. Replies for tender start arriving around Dussehra holidays. Selection of vendor process delayed as HAL chairman busy with PM visit, aero India and later Rafale deal. Chairman's daughters marriage. 1 month leave. Hangar building to start after monsoons. Delayed because of runway upgradation work. Building contractor has no workers - all from Tamil Nadu have gone home for Pongal and so on until the process is delayed by 2 years

[ks_sachin]

Shiv / JayS

".HAL DID NOT BUILD A FATIGUE TEST SPECIMEN
4.2.1 Absence of Fatigue Test Specimen (FTS)
A Fatigue Test Specimen (FTS) was required to be built for testing the
endurance of LCA for determining the total technical life. Audit observed that
(February 2014) building of FTS was not taken up by HAL.

When reasons for not building the FTS was enquired (February 2014) in audit,
HAL stated (July 2014) that production standard fuselage was required for
carrying out the FTS and the same was yet to be manufactured.

Reply of HAL is not tenable in audit as the FTS was to be built under the
MoU of 2006 covering developmental activities and not after building
production standard aircraft as stated by HAL now.

Thus, in the absence of FTS, technical life of LCA could not be determined
and ADA/HAL had to obtain concession at the time of IOC (December 2013)
from Air HQ which limited the life of airframe to 1000 hours as against the
ASR specification of more than 3000 hours."


So is 1000 hrs the airframe life of the LCA?

[JayS]

So is 1000 hrs the airframe life of the LCA?

No, it just means they can not with full confidence say that life will be more than 1000Hr as there is no real life validation for 3000hr. For certification you have to prove the life by doing real life full scale fatigue test by actually loading the aircraft structure for equivalent flying hours and then checking for cracks to make sure there are no critical cracks anywhere. Also you need to load it to 150% for Ultimate load test and show it can withstand it without failing. These tests are destructive tests.

BTW a few days ago, a poster reported LCA was certifies for full life.

28 Sep 2016

Update:

Its a twin barrel gun
Rate is 1800 rpm
But we are not restricting, we have different modes of firing

During testing we just check the point of impact after firing 10 rounds
Also in the life time of gun, there are only few occasions where we are carrying out all the rounds at single shot otherwise its like 7, 10 rounds per press (I guess 25 per press is what was meant and I messed up in writing it in the earlier post)

We carried out fatigue life for the aircraft structure, it has passed

I guess this is the full scale fatigue test to certify LCA for full life for 3000hr. GShanker, if you are listening, did you get a chance to confirme on this one, what I had asked that time??

HAL has good experience with this, as they have done it for MiG21 before for life extension.

[Indranil]

Was it HAL which does this structural analysis? I thought these facilities were at NAL.

[JayS]

I was kinda kiddin with that statement I hoped the smiley would give it away, apparently not. So I apologize if you felt offended.

Jay my offence or non offence is immaterial - but your posts are taken seriously and those who would like to feel more kindly about the issue may not see that the CAG report has some unfair accusations that reveal lack of awareness of engineering problems but it also pulls up HAL in areas where I think HAL is culpable.

In fact that business of "building of hangar" and "not ordering machinery" may have explanations that are typical PSU workflow related issues. Tenders being written. Tender not sent out because of lack of approval from person who was on leave. then forgotten until someone remembered. Tender to be uploaded, but server down. New internet access being installed and rewiring being done at HAL. Tender to be uploaded after that. Replies for tender start arriving around Dussehra holidays. Selection of vendor process delayed as HAL chairman busy with PM visit, aero India and later Rafale deal. Chairman's daughters marriage. 1 month leave. Hangar building to start after monsoons. Delayed because of runway upgradation work. Building contractor has no workers - all from Tamil Nadu have gone home for Pongal and so on until the process is delayed by 2 years

I guess I need to tone down my posts. I would also like to add disclaimer - If I put forth one point/side, it does not mean I do not accept or I outright reject other side. I understand those points too and accept that those need to be works on, but in my opinion real issue could be different and the focus should be elsewhere in immediate terms. Sometimes I just take up counterview because I feel its not being highlighted as much as it should be - like in this case of Single engine tender. This taking HAL's side is actually part of playing Devil's advocate. I have worked a little with RnD establishment before and I have fair idea about their weak points.

I do not absolve HAL of all blame. Neither do I contest some of the points which show that HAL had given step-motherly treatment to LCA before say 2010. Only recently they are more willing to take ownership of it and proactive about it. However I decided to highlight counter-points because there are enough people here arguing against HAL. But unless counter points are brought forward its difficult to do root-cause analysis. Its easy to diss HAL saying its PSU and its bad only, nothing good will come out of it. But if we do not understand the real bottlenecks in our projects, we might end up replacing PSU system with another system which is no better than the one it replaced since we never took care of real bottlenecks. We need to the problem dispassionately, on technical, logical and factual grounds. Let's say, I am trying to play a Devil's advocate.

Those problems you highlight above, I see some of those affecting projects in private industry too. Frankly speaking, based on my little experience in private industry, I do not see them as much capable of creating technology centres of excellences in short to medium term as its generally tried to impress on public's mind from everywhere. Ability of private industries to replace institutions like ADA/NAL/HAL is over-rated IMVVHO. I can show you examples of people getting much more salary than they deserve or their contribution deserves, or people not getting fired even when they are absolutely incompetent and them dragging down the team in Private industry as well. I can show you people passing time in coffee breaks/lunch breaks in private companies, I can show you, people shrugging off shoulders when something goes wrong or unwilling to take responsibilities. I can show you private companies unnecessarily creating bureaucratic hurdles in simple simple matters when the changes are not in their favour. I can show you examples where companies spending unnecessary money on things just because someone in the company does not want to take responsibility when things go wrong and happy to make the company throw far more significant amount to outside contractor so the responsibility will be passed on to that guy. May be PSUs do it 60% of the time and private companies do it 30% of time. But in my observation this is the part of Indian work culture, and is not the real problem as I believe its solvable if the top administration cracks the whip. The real problem that plagues PSUs or in general any government endeavour is lack of autonomy. But this is all OT here.

I stand by statement that I do not see much engineering audit in CAG report. If I was an HAL Manager or engineer, I would be pissed at CAG's report where they make snide remarks over far more crucial technical issues and concentrate more on bean counting with issues such as those you have highlighted above. I did not see a single statement from CAG over delays that must have occurred due to some files not cleared from MoD on time. Please take note, HAL was given Navaratna status only in 2009. Before that the HAL management seating in Bangalore had almost Zero financial autonomy and almost every procurement file/tender that's worth as low as few lakhs would go to MoD for clearance. And once file goes to Delhi it takes lot of time. I have one personal experience while working with Navy when we tried to keep cost under a certain limit (5lakh) just so it would not go to Delhi. And I will not even talk about other thing that one must to circumvent things like single-vendor, L1 bidder etc. BTW Have you ever wondered why HAL suddenly started looking much more proactive post 2010 about some of its projects such as HTFE-25 or HTT-40 or LCH where they put money from their own pocket taking significant risk without orders or even intent in some cases?? The reason is HAL was given limited financial autonomy in 2009, which allowed them to take decisions worth less than 1000Cr (Max limit, the rule seems little more complicated) on their own without begging for approval from MoD babu or Minister. I have seen first hand how autonomy could transform a lethargic government organisation in a much more agile one, given only a handful of good guys seat at the helm who can drive things, and there is no dearth of such people in India. Yes things take time to change, but so will if we have to create entirely new system from scratch. By all means create a parallel system for competition and let the best win, but also reform the existing system from within by first understanding what the real bottlenecks are and removing them. In LEAN methodology, they say its always focus on non-productive things rather than making somewhat productive things more and more efficient, because the ROI on efforts is far more in former case. Even as a rule of thumb in real life 80:20 rule always applies, that 20% things create 80% issues. So just focus on 20% things.

Sorry I digress from the point, I started with something in mind and ended up somewhere else. I am not too good with words and thus try to stick to technical points, generally. I would have liked CAG to make a more nuanced analysis of how much of the LSP production delay caused by HAL not setting up factories and how much of it was due to changes in SOP. If LSPs were not going to be able to manufacture as desired rate anyway due to constant changes, and even then HAL had created all the facilities, we might have seen CAG making adverse remark on that one as well. Had HAL produced structural specimen for Fatigue specimen before all the changes related to structures were incorporated and the later it had to be again retrofitted with those changes, CAG would have remarked on HAL's stupidity to make it too early and cause extra expenses due to retrofitting. There is no limit to bean counting like this.

But I would say this much, if you want to audit an Aerospace OEM, it should be a Engineering focused Audit with more holistic view of picture. I am disappointed with CAG report. It does not take efforts to actually find out issues with project management or technical difficulties and try to give resolution to them. As I said in other thread, CAG report for such technical program is fantastic source for facts, but one should draw own conclusions based on those facts rather than taking CAG conclusions at face value.

[Rishi Verma]

So how do CAG guys know that a FTS is a pre-requisite in manufacturing a Tejas? Is it possible that they (CAG) jotted down all the complaints from IAF then went to HAL to verify?

(or did Boeing spies lobby fed it to CAG to discredit HAL/Tejas)

If such a check-list was available from IAF and it wasn't shared with HAL? Or this is an obvious known step that HaL screwed up or overlooked.

One should dissect each of cag points to understand the inner workings of HAL/MoD.

[RKumar]

LCA orders are as follows
- 20 LCA-Mk1 IOC - SP1-SP3 will not be part of IAF, so thats why 3 additional (80 -> 83) - ordered
- 20 LCA-MK1 FOC - Not sure if order is already placed or will be placed in one go (83+20)
- 83 LCA-MK1A - Under approval

Nevertheless very good move by GoI, Jai ho ... Modi & MP. I hope they can cancel this single/double engine plane stuff also.

[JayS]

Was it HAL which does this structural analysis? I thought these facilities were at NAL.

Facilities are at NAL, yes. But HAL is prime contractor and would have ownership of it, I guess. They would subcontract work to NAL. As such our organisations work together very closely and could be considered as one big family.

PS: Correction, just checked about MiG21 and it seems NAL was directly contracted for TTL. So for LCA also NAL might have been contracted directly by ADA. I am not sure about this. HAL had to make the test airframe, for sure.

[JayS]

LCA orders are as follows
- 20 LCA-Mk1 IOC - SP1-SP3 will not be part of IAF, so thats why 3 additional (80 -> 83) - ordered
- 20 LCA-MK1 FOC - Not sure if order is already placed or will be placed in one go (83+20)
- 83 LCA-MK1A - Under approval

Nevertheless very good move by GoI, Jai ho ... Modi & MP. I hope they can cancel this single/double engine plane stuff also.

Interesting. Just curious - Is this your conclusion or you saw it somewhere mentioned?

[RKumar]

^ All this info is in public domain there is nothing secret. Otherwise, it should not be on BRF

[shiv]

If it is true that the IAF is going to get its numbers fluffed up by a second/third line of fighters, but the LCA program is "protected" - then it also means that those whose work is protected - i.e. HAL have to deliver and have to deliver quality goods and on time. No more buggering about. This is not just about LCA but everything else - including IJT, HTT 40 and AMCA and that HAL engine

[maitya]

I hope you read the report fully before making that comment.

JayS ji I request that we do not make insinuations about the other person's thoroughness or understanding. By the time I reached page 10 I had found stuff that indicates why there have been delays and it does not need an engineer to understand. I presume you have read it all.

<snip>

2.HAL DID NOT CREATE PRODUCTION FACILITIES AS ENVISAGED BUT HAD EXCUSES

4.3.1 Delay in creation of production facilities:
Audit observed that HAL had been utilizing the existing facilities available
with it for manufacture of LCA. Even though HAL initiated action in April
2006 to form a dedicated LCA facility, LCA Project Group was established as
a full-fledged Division only in March 2014 as seen from HAL’s 371
st Board Meeting papers.

MoU of 2002 sanctioned 391.18 crore towards creation of facility i.e.
Capital expenditure Rs. 188.71 crore and DRE 202.47 crore. Audit noticed
that as of March 2014, HAL had incurred an amount of `118.99 crore (63
percent) towards capital expenditure and 139.12 crore (69
per cent ) towards DRE.

When reasons for delay in creation of manufacturing facility was enquired
(October 2014) in audit, HAL stated (November 2014) that extensive changes
in the design and development post 2006 had resulted in reviewing the facility
requirement and a capacity augmentation plan was being put up for meeting
the objectives. It was also stated that non-finalisation of configuration of LCA
had led to the postponement of establishment of production facilities.

Reply is not acceptable as the GoI sanction of November 2001 stipulated that
the facilities for manufacture of eight LCA were to be created and the first
LCA was to be delivered within 4 ½ years from the date of sanction i.e. by
May 2006. Further, the delay in creation of manufacturing facility of eight
aircraft per annum impacted the production of LSPs, as discussed in Para 4.3.4
as well as the Series Production Aircraft.

<snip>

JayS, pls don't feel guilty etc as there's a huge chance (and I'm being very very polite) of people are not trying to understand what is quite plainly written in these reports ... to me the above can be paraphrased as follows:

CAG: Why did you, HAL, not start setting up a production facility in 2002 and complete by 2006?

HAL: Saar, the design itself is not frozen, what am I supposed to produce from a setup production facility?

CAG: Not an acceptable reason (as shivji points out, it's an excuse) - tell me again why, "despite a GoI sanction of November 2001 that stipulated that the facilities for manufacture of eight LCA were to be created and the first LCA was to be delivered within 4 ½ years from the date of sanction i.e. by May 2006", no facilities were setup even by 2014?

HAL: Saar, as I said it's not possible to setup a production facility without having the detailed design and a finalised configuration in place.
For example, if I don't know exactly what moment loading I need to budget for in the wing attachment beam in the main body, I can't really finalise the detailed dimensions and the load bearing characteristics of the mid-fuselage structure.

CAG: What is moment loading? Are you trying to fool me by throwing difficult terms etc? Tell me why did you agree to GoI's diktat in Nov 2001, that you'd know all these details, and be ready with a setup production facility to churn out LCA?

HAL: Saar, that is not possible to know until the entire configuration of the external loads are tested in real time flying etc.
Also for example, in 2001 to say 2009 we were hoping that a heavier engine (Kaveri) would be required to be budgeted for - the supporting rings etc were thicker (and heavier) so the mean-CG and CP distances were maintained ... but it turned out that a lighter F404 will be required. So we needed to change the dimensions of these rings etc.

CAG: What is mean-CG? What is CP? Who heads those depts? A Joint-sec or an addn-sec?

HAL: Saar, sorry, who heads what saar?

CAG: This discussion is going nowhere ... the report also needs to be finalized for triplicate signing, photocopying, attestation, submission, submission receipt etc etc and many such important activities. We can't waste time in your technical non-sense etc.
So this is a NC - a pure NC and I'll put it as such ...

HAL: Saar, as you wish, saar ...

===============================================

Happens when you put a bunch of MA-in-Medieval-History or MCom types to "audit" a project like LCA.

And we get a lot of people in BRF in their respective twisted-undies because of such gobermint sourced-info and thus must to authentic and true reflection of everything.

[Gyan]

Draft audit report is given to HAL for comments. Wonder why they said nothing? Because ....there was no explanation. But HAL is in good company; OFB has fxxked up Dhanush and BDL has messed up Akash in the same manner. ECIL has pulled similar stunt regarding electronic fuses. This type of extraordinary incompetence is not accidental but can only be intentional. Tell me, even in ordinary course, in which industry PSU is even mildly competitive compared to pvt sector? Does anyone remember sarkari Jongas, scooters, trucks, dial phones, medicines, TVs, Bread?????

BAck to HAL, Production lines are generic and can take substantial changes. It is like saying that cement mixer will be bought for construction of a house after deciding which TV will be installed in kids room. Anyway, if GOI was ready to fund and take risk of concurrent production line, then HAL cannot whine 15 years after taking the money. HAL is neither an R&D nor production agency. It can lend only its name, for foreign products, where production line is set up and run by foreigners for screw driver assembly of foreign products under foreign supervision and guarantees. If HAL was waiting for FOC then why did it even bother to set up production line for claimed 4 LCA per annum?

If CAG people are morons, the what was the qualification of previous Chairman of HAL? IIRC he was from crude oil marketing division. He would know less about aerospace then a 15 year old reading BRF. Guess his connection and role in HAL?? hint hint ... oil ... oil.

[Karan M]

ADA noted CAG report was released without them having a look at it. So Maitya, yes you are right.

[Karan M]

Gyan,

"Production lines are generic and can take substantial changes."

Come on man. Now you are just argueing for argueings sake. The LCA line as is the Rafale line as is the EF line is bespoke

[SaiK]

BREAKING: Indian MoD's Defence Acquisition Council clears purchase of 83 Light Combat Aircraft Tejas. https://t.co/UfnUmLYncz


HAL Tejas order guideline
1. 20 MK-I IOC config (2006-firm)
2. 20 MK-I FOC config (2010-firm)
3. 83 MK-IA - DAC nod given. in process
https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/795618105913315328

[Rishi Verma]

Zimble answer is no one in the gov does any proactive-giri and a lot of reactive-giri. Dedicated folks needed to champion various strategic projects. Right now different players playing football.

[shiv]

From the CAG report that I cross posted & quoted above - I am going to take 2 paragraphs and reverse their order

Reply is not acceptable as the GoI sanction of November 2001 stipulated that
the facilities for manufacture of eight LCA were to be created and the first
LCA was to be delivered within 4 ½ years from the date of sanction i.e. by
May 2006. Further, the delay in creation of manufacturing facility of eight
aircraft per annum impacted the production of LSPs, as discussed in Para 4.3.4
as well as the Series Production Aircraft.

When reasons for delay in creation of manufacturing facility was enquired
(October 2014) in audit, HAL stated (November 2014) that extensive changes
in the design and development post 2006 had resulted in reviewing the facility
requirement and a capacity augmentation plan was being put up for meeting
the objectives. It was also stated that non-finalisation of configuration of LCA
had led to the postponement of establishment of production facilities.

As per this audit report, the GoI sanctioned in 2001 the construction of facilities to deliver 8 LCA's, including 4 to be delivered by May 2006

LSP 1 was delivered in 2007 - but LSP 1 to 4 should have been delivered by 2006

What I do not understand is as follows: If design changes were made in 2006, by which time not even one LCA was delivered, what was happening between 2001 and 2006 - by which time 4 LSPs should have been delivered? OK after 2006 there were design changes - but those should have caused delays from LSP 5 onwards, because 4 should already have been delivered. Why were those 4 not delivered? So were there design changes still going on from 2001-2006?

If design changes were made between 2001 and 2006
1. Why does HAL not say so in its reply?
2. How did HAL accept the monies for 4 LSPs when the design was not frozen and they were in no position to actually deliver even 1 let alone 4.

Let me be kind to HAL and give an excuse. I have heard that ADA gave HAL an aircraft that was not manufacture friendly. HAL may have found it hell to actually make a production line out of what they got - and to find suppliers for the design. If that is the case this should come out in the open - because ADA is still in the plane designing business and there designs should be made manufacture friendly from ground up

However there may be other reasons that I don't know. But when money was sanctioned in 2001 for 4 planes by 2006, claiming design changes after 2006 for the first plane actually does not sound like a valid excuse. There is much missing from these communications

[Marten]

Gyan,

"Production lines are generic and can take substantial changes."

Come on man. Now you are just argueing for argueings sake. The LCA line as is the Rafale line as is the EF line is bespoke

There is absolutely no point discussing with a person who conflates BDL issues or OFB politics with HAL's issues. There is no rational method to discuss such situations if one has made up his mind. Let's focus on dissecting the issue itself rather than get distracted by this fudging or rubbish.

Shiv saar, you are onto something. Perhaps we should do CAG's job and identify the real gaps between design drawings and SOP for manufacture (baselines). 3,000+ changes in drawings indicate major revisions. But this was BEFORE the timeline of review (2006). We need to look at when IAF got involved in the design reviews and whether HAL did any work at all at that point (due to perhaps its belief that the PVs/TDs were not up to final production standards). The introduction of TDs into the FSED stage must be accounted for in this mess. Long term, will the final configuration enable the IAF to utilize this aircraft as a satisfactory replacement to 125 Mig-21s or would the platform run out of steam in another 15 years? We're getting distracted by the noise in CAG's reports primarily because the timelines are not clear in the report itself.
Disclaimer: As part or head of several PM teams, I'm predisposed to take the auditors' reports with a bag of salt.

[rohiths]

After today there is no excuse for HAL. They need to deliver 120 aircraft within 8 years. By 2024 we should have 270 MKI + 120 LCA +36 Rafale at the bare minimum.

[shiv]

Perhaps we should do CAG's job and identify the real gaps between design drawings and SOP for manufacture (baselines). 3,000+ changes in drawings indicate major revisions. But this was BEFORE the timeline of review (2006). We need to look at when IAF got involved in the design reviews and whether HAL did any work at all at that point (due to perhaps its belief that the PVs/TDs were not up to final production standards). The introduction of TDs into the FSED stage must be accounted for in this mess. Long term, will the final configuration enable the IAF to utilize this aircraft as a satisfactory replacement to 125 Mig-21s or would the platform run out of steam in another 15 years? We're getting distracted by the noise in CAG's reports primarily because the timelines are not clear in the report itself.
Disclaimer: As part or head of several PM teams, I'm predisposed to take the auditors' reports with a bag of salt.

These issues will play a huge role for AMCA because as the saying goes there's many a slip twixt cup and lip. There is much to be said for more openness and accountability with exposure of gandugiri no matter who has done it. IAF, HAL, ADA or CAG

I am always the first person to call out "torn shirt open fly" but let me do it here. Let me do an imaginary CAG like critique on J-20

Those who recall the first flight of J 20 in 2011 may recall how it was claimed that it would be in service by 2013. This was stated and believed although I bet my left testimonial that it will be denied by someone now. That is the best part about predictions on BRF. They will all be forgotten. But the J 20s role was never defined It was supposed to get Chinese engines very soon and even I with my big mouth was chary of laughing at that for fear of getting bashed up by the "See how great China is" lobby. It is just one huge monster of a plane doing some gentle Odissi in 2016 with no clue of where it is going except that it is not going to be exported. What is CAG saying in China?.

China is opaque about issues. In India we are opaque about all the wrong things. We are honest up to a point - but out socialist model PSUs are hiding a lot of rot. This must come clean

[Mihir]

That CAG report should be read in conjunction with Shukla's excellent rebuttal: http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2015/05/ ... -many.html

[Marten]

Yes Shiv saar, however, I do not believe AMCA is really being pushed as hard as the other Import to India efforts. In other words, AMCA will be LCA redux, and limited to less than 80 a/c based on our dynamic requirements 10 years from now. I think we will simply move on to the unmanned platforms because testing will be easier and ADA/HAL/TAxL will be happier testing more TDs at Chitradurga. I do not recall a public timeline for AMCA, but there are absolutely no signs that the lessons from the LCA are being learnt or applied to AMCA. Would be very happy to know otherwise.
PS: As in, if the design teams were doubled and more funds released to double the number of test items given our experience with the slow pace of testing iterations on the LCA. The least risk approach is right for this article, but it is slowly killing the prospects. FGFA or F-35 will be preferred over the AMCA (depending on whether we got more Rafaels or F-16s at that point).

[RKumar]

First of all congrats to involved ADA, NAL, HAL, IAF and numerous other persons/institutions involved in this national project.

This order of 83 indirectly means
- Final production design is frozen.
- SP fighters are ready to walk out of production line.
- FOC at advance stages then we at BRF think.
- Second production line order can be placed. By the time MK1A is ready, we will have two production lines ready.

I am still puzzled by this "Make In India" ....