Latest Chinese boast: should we shiver or die laughing?

[ramana]

Rakesh, For that you need to see where all these statements are emanating from and if its a two step tango.
CISMOA wont solve India's China boast.
It will solve US patrol problems.

Only Agni V will give Agony.

[UlanBatori]

I have not understood why battle tanks are sent into this high-altitude theater. How mobile can they be? Probably cannot make it over any of the bridges. Perhaps a type of vehicle should be built, with large-diameter wheels for the gun platform.

[kit]

Does look like the Americans utilising the "situation" to push their alphabet soup treaties ..they never seem to miss an opportunity do they !?

[shiv]

I have not understood why battle tanks are sent into this high-altitude theater. How mobile can they be? Probably cannot make it over any of the bridges. Perhaps a type of vehicle should be built, with large-diameter wheels for the gun platform.

I will make a longer post about this in due course. The Tibetan plateau is flat and good tank country. India is in possession of small parts of this in the Tawang region in Arunachal pradesh as well as much larger areas near Aksai Chin.

[shiv]

Chinese Aircraft Carrier Can Sail Into Indian Ocean At Will, Says Top US Commander
http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/chinese- ... er-1650420

In the words of Shivji...should we shiver or die laughing?

The headline is sensational because our media encourage dhoti shivering - which I believe they do because the media, being Indians are themselves shitting in their pants when they think of China

The detail is below

Asked by NDTV whether he foresees a possibility of a Chinese aircraft carrier battlegroup operating in the Indian Ocean, the Admiral said, "Clearly. Clearly. There's nothing to prevent them from sailing in the Indian Ocean today.'' The Admiral was quick to add that Chinese aircraft carriers are presently unable to maintain the operational tempo of larger US aircraft carriers which can conduct operations day and night. At the same time, the Indian Navy, the Admiral said, ''has far more expertise in operating aircraft carriers than China has and experience and expertise over time matter."

[shiv]

Shiv - since you are the expert on google maps - you should look for geographical choke points on the N-S axis down from the mountains.

Of course I am doing this in great detail, but because I am doing that I can't help notice that your request itself has errors of assumption that stem from a problem that we all face - a kind of mental picture of the geography that puts China on high terrain in the north and India on low terrain in the South and the picture of Chinese hordes running down from those heights, requiring the identification of choke-points. This picture is approximate and only a general pointer.

A far more detailed look at the geography, which I might (inshalla) to do a write up about - either on this forum itself or as a separate article shows that we need to have a better mental picture of the terrain and geography before we can understand what is happening.

The first thing to discard is the "China is north while India is south" idea. In Arunachal - Tibet is West and Arunachal is East in many areas. And in J&K again there is an east-west orientation. But this is a minor point.

Please allow me a rude analogy to describe the geography starting with plate tectonics. I find it easiest to express myself because of an inherent "dirty" mind.

One needs to look at the Indian landmass moving north and hitting the Asian plate as the hand of a man sliding up a woman's thigh pushing up her skirt as the hand moves up. The hand is the Indian landmass. As it moves up the skirt gets bunched up at the crotch and lower belly. Above is the woman's flat belly (Tibet) situated at a higher elevation than the hand, but a lower elevation that the bunched up skirt . The bunched up skirt is the Himalaya mountains.

In order to reach the hand an ant (Chinese) sitting on the woman's belly will first have to move up on to the bunched skirt, negotiate its folds and crevices and then go down to reach the hand which is at the lowest level. The hand consists of Shitistan, India, Nepal and Bhutan. I will end the analogy here and move onto less vulgar and more detailed descriptions later - but I find the "hand", "bunched up skirt" and "woman's belly" analogy useful in describing Himalayan and Tibetan geography

[Singha]

I have not understood why battle tanks are sent into this high-altitude theater. How mobile can they be? Probably cannot make it over any of the bridges. Perhaps a type of vehicle should be built, with large-diameter wheels for the gun platform.

I will make a longer post about this in due course. The Tibetan plateau is flat and good tank country. India is in possession of small parts of this in the Tawang region in Arunachal pradesh as well as much larger areas near Aksai Chin.

I think rather than tawang its the north sikkim region which is a continuation of the tibetan plateau.

the chicken neck region is where the chinese should be shivering, because we can hit them from 3 directions there - tawang , sikkim and west bengal

not a surprise our MSR is supposed to be HQed in west bengal and rafales in hashimara.

[disha]

I've said 2 PLA divisions near DBO, not 10. I've assumed they start earlier than ours (which they will, if they want to initiate hostilities), but will be detected at some point, which is when we decide if we want to make counter moves or not.

Okay 2 PLA divisions near DBO., and I thought the thread was about cheenis showing up in Delhi.

DBO Not Equal To Delhi.

Now even near DBO., are you sure that they are not monitored? You do realize that DBO is a strategic airstrip. Will it not be monitored? For something like a surprise?

[shiv]

I've said 2 PLA divisions near DBO, not 10. I've assumed they start earlier than ours (which they will, if they want to initiate hostilities), but will be detected at some point, which is when we decide if we want to make counter moves or not.

From the link provided "Near DBO" is a bit of a stretch. Unless I am mistaken one is in Hotan and the other in Lhasa. I will look at both in some detail but right now I am concentrating on the east - having spent much time on Aksai Chin back in 2013.

[rohitvats]

I have not understood why battle tanks are sent into this high-altitude theater. How mobile can they be? Probably cannot make it over any of the bridges. Perhaps a type of vehicle should be built, with large-diameter wheels for the gun platform.

These images should tell you how mobile mechanized forces are in eastern Ladakh and what kind of open and flat space we're dealing with:

[Deans]

Disha, I mentioned DBO as I thought it a far more credible scenario than the PLA appearing in Delhi - that was simply a boast designed to get us into collective dhoti shivering. However, the thread is a good opportunity to discuss what might be more realistic for the PLA to attempt. Looking at this from the Chinese POV, I think a limited incursion into DBO is one such scenario, because the possible capture of an advanced landing ground close to the border, (not a strategic airfield) will provide a propaganda value far in excess of its utility.

Shiv - I've assumed these units will have to travel a few hundred kms, to get near DBO (I should have articulated that better). My assumption - looking at a pessimistic scenario for us, is that they get to their jump off points before we reinforce, because the PLA units would have started moving before ours and because there will be a time lag between the time they are discovered and the political leadership agreeing with the army's assessment and then figures out how to react. It could give them a narrow window of opportunity to strike. The limited extent of the incursion could mean they need not wait for a logistics tail to catch up.

[sanjaykumar]

No surly article from the Global Times editor yet; he must be applying the famous Chinese skin lightening lotions to his a$$ in preparation for my having another go at him.

They do read these posts.

[zoverian]

Edited


Jokes Apart, indeed good description easy to understand.

[manjgu]

another aspect of rushing troops to heights is aspect of acclimatization... whose troops are acclimatized will be better able to handle.. what i learnt from my brief interaction with the GOC of the Div near Tawang is the chinkis are not sure of a decisive outcome wrt IA... he said we are getting stronger with each passing year. he particularly said about surveillance equipment and road infra.

[manjgu]

this was 5th Mountain Inf Div at Tenga..

[Lalmohan]

shiv - yes you are quite right
the Chinese have to come up the mountains on their side - and then if they hold the passes, come down the other side. very few of these are suitable for large motorised invasion forces, but ok for infantry. the advantage they have is that from their flat to the hilly combat zone is 50-100kms and on our side it is 200-150kms (roughly - and please update this once you have done the scan on google)

and yes it is not just N/S - it is probably more useful to think of it in terms of the Brahmaputra valley and tributary valleys in the east and the Indus and tributary valleys in the West. the macro view says that the IA's defence and logistics has advantages along the E/W axis in Assam, whilst the Chinese have to come N/S down and therefore we can bottle them up (ref: Tellis - ugly stability)

similarly for us to break out onto the Tibetan plateau - over stretches our supply lines and gives them the advantage of falling back on rail heads and motorable road networks and their supply lines have the advantage. here air interdiction is totally key - and we probably have the advantage here due to the easier target spotting on the Tibet plateau than in the Brahmaputra valley

I sometimes wish I had studied geography more! :-(

[Manish_P]

Emyn Muil.. with Mordor on the other side

(apologies for the OT.. the stark beauty of the place takes the breath away)

[UlanBatori]

Very appropriate analogy for Auspicious Trumpanzee Inauguration Din.

Now to the tank bijnej. Due to my misspent childhood, whenever I see a tank I am conditioned to think: target.
Note that all pics of tank movements posted so far are along river banks in deep valleys. OK, some of these are pretty broad valleys, 1 -2 km wide maybe. Not all will be so.

So! I need to get a few million yaks and goats and collect enough fuel-air explosive to make a few passes through the passes laying down said explosive. End of tank division, all roasted. Can Indian MBTs withstand the detonation wave and heat of a fuel-air explosive, bouncing off the cliffsides for multiple transits (I mean the detonation waves) across the ruins? Then the vitiation of the atmosphere in the valley will asphixiate any survivors.

I see no pics of tanks cresting ice-laden ridges, hain?

[UlanBatori]

IOW, does IA have investments in Ulan Bator SnowMobiles/ yak-Mobiles etc? One ATGM launcher + 3 spares on each vehicle, and one can occupy the slopes on the valley sides and wait for the tanks as well. Or hit small camps very fast b4 they have any time to react. And escape. If one gets the # of such vehicles up to say 1:2 vs. number of troops - and has good roads to supply fuel - one has an immense mobile advantage, completely avoiding the tank traps.

The other thing needed is a Corps of Ingineurs that can string cables and cable-cars very quickly to hop the ridges.

[shiv]

Shiv - I've assumed these units will have to travel a few hundred kms, to get near DBO (I should have articulated that better). My assumption - looking at a pessimistic scenario for us, is that they get to their jump off points before we reinforce, because the PLA units would have started moving before ours and because there will be a time lag between the time they are discovered and the political leadership agreeing with the army's assessment and then figures out how to react. It could give them a narrow window of opportunity to strike. The limited extent of the incursion could mean they need not wait for a logistics tail to catch up.

Why Deans WHY???? Why do you and so many others conjure up scenarios to scare the crap out of yourself without checking facts - especially when you base your scenarios on what you claim are facts. And what makes you think the army must consult polit leadership before responding to an emergency?

You posted a link that says that the nearest Chinese mechanized regiments are in Hotan and Lhasa. Just fire up Google earth and look.

There is no direct road from Hotan to Aksai Chin. The road heads towards Kashgar and goes around the mountains - covering a distance of 800 km. One small road heads towards Aksai Chin and fades out in the mountains. Lhasa is worse - it is 1200 km away.

It is OK to scare yourself but please show me some serious Chinese forces concentrations within 300 km of Aksai Chin that can move in and surprise us. Sorry to say but it is exactly the sort of underinformed speculation that you make that is also made by too many Indians based on a fear that the Chinese will whip our asses.

[shiv]

Can Indian MBTs withstand the detonation wave and heat of a fuel-air explosive, bouncing off the cliffsides for multiple transits (I mean the detonation waves) across the ruins? Then the vitiation of the atmosphere in the valley will asphixiate any survivors.

I see no pics of tanks cresting ice-laden ridges, hain?

Yak Herder I don't know about FAE but here is an image of survivability of tanks after a 1 kt and 10 kt nuclear blast sourced from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a118342.pdf

For 1 kt (I suspect an FAE blast would be less than 1 kt) tanks survive beyond 180 meters. Spaced 100 meters apart not much devastation will result I guess. Added later: Looks like electronics will be fried up to 3 km



How well would FAE work in already rarefied atmosphere? Interesting question for me to search for info..

[shiv]

Wiki madam says:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thermobaric_weapon

Their reliance on atmospheric oxygen makes them unsuitable for use underwater, at high altitude, and in adverse weather.

[UlanBatori]

Hmmm! So one would also carry some LOX tanks. I don't think the weight would be much more than that of the fuel part unless the fuel is hydrogen. In the wars of the types we imagine, it may not be explosive, it may be chem/bio.

But think of the other side of the argument. If humans don't need auxiliary oxygen tanks, I think, neither do the FAEs. So it is still the valleys that are the death zones. FAEs may not work that great to fry Pakis sitting on ridges.

A valley is like a resonator. The shocks bouncing off the walls will double in pressure with each reflection - and keep the fire cloud nicely confined.

[Lalmohan]

saar - how will the shock wave remain concentrated? even with the valley effect will it not dissipate and be absorbed?

[UlanBatori]

But so will the pieces/dust of what used to be the tank crews.

[shiv]

On Kookal earth - Tibet is a weird, scary and stark place. It is like an oval table with the north and west side towards Aksai Chin being about 5-5.5 km high and down east and south towards Arunachal it is about 4.5-5 km high. It is a stark moonscape - looking mostly grey-yellow-ochre on Google earth. But photographs on the ground show sparse grass and shrubs. No trees and no animals at least in the photos.

Down south - towards India, Nepal and Bhutan the terrain rises up by about a kilometer or more to form the Himalayas. The biggest differences between the Himalayas and Tibet seem to be that the peaks are 5.5 - 6 km high in the Himalayas with the valleys in between going down as low as 3 km so the valleys are green with trees. In Tibet the peaks go "only" upto about 5 -5.5 km and the valleys are much broader and flatter and remain as high as 4.5 km - so the peaks seem lower and further apart and the "valleys" are above the treeline. That is why Tibet is a "plateau". A mountainous plateau but a plateau nevertheless.

The Western and Southern borders of Tibet with India, Nepal and Bhutan are formed by the Himalayas. If one were to climb up from the Indian plains at about 500 meters above sea level into the Himalayas one would go up mountains over 5 km tall but eventually come down into Tibet which is still 4 km high. And in Tibet would be mountains rising up 500-1000 meters. Lhasa is situated in an unusually low valley at 3500 meters. Not much of that elsewhere in Tibet.

Typically one finds that most of Tibet is occupied by China - but the mountains that set Tibet apart lie within India, Nepal or Bhutan. Still - there are a few "tongues" of Tibet that stick out into other countries and some are Indian territory. One such tongue is in Western Arunachal Pradesh and a larger tongue of Tibet abuts Aksai Chin in the Leh region in the West of Tibet. Many of the big battles of 1962 were fought in these regions.

But by and large (ignoring Nepal and Bhutan for now) the borders of Tibet and India are "blocked" by very high mountains and the borders have been demarcated that way. Anyone who wants to come across from Tiebt to India in these areas will simply have to climb 6 km, climb down 3-4 km, climb up again to 6 km and claimb down again a few times before he hits India (or Tibet proper) depending on which way he is heading.

But the "wall of mountains" is not complete. In Arunachal Pradesh - at the very Eastern tip are two green liver valleys that continue from the lower regions of Tibet into India. These were also the sites of major battles in 1962. I will describe these areas in more detail in due course.

In summary - there appear to be 5-6 areas where The Chinese can do gaandmasti. In Easter Arunachal they have river valleys to come down and enter India along with the river. The have built roads up to the border but no road after the border. But if the look up the mountainside they will see Indian forces. The areas bristles with Indian forces and helipads. One needs to spend some time looking at these regions on Googal yearth to see how we would use our Dhruv, LUH and Ka 226. We really do need hundreds of helos considering the vast numbers of helipads we have. You can see them yourself. I am not going to make it easy for anyone by marking them myself.

Apart from these 3-4 rivers entering India there are those 2-3 regions of the plateau that we control where our forces may face the Cheenis.But I have a lot more "flying" to do. Will post in due course

[Lalmohan]

the passes should be reasonably well marked... ***-La etc.,

[Deans]

Why Deans WHY???? Why do you and so many others conjure up scenarios to scare the crap out of yourself without checking facts - especially when you base your scenarios on what you claim are facts. And what makes you think the army must consult polit leadership before responding to an emergency?

Shiv, I don't think we really disagree. I certainly don't intend to scare myself or anyone else with doomsday scenarios. My intent was to look at this from a Chinese POV (or be the Devils advocate for those who feel we face no threat) and see if there is any credible way the PLA might surprise us. I am reassured by the informative posts of Rohit Vats and you, which convince me that the limitations of terrain and distance do not make my scenario workable.

I believe there are probably just 5 points along the Indo-China border where the terrain would enable a conflict and your analysis in earlier posts seems to validate that. These are (from East to West):
- Walong (East Arunachal)
- Tawang (West Arunachal)
- Siliguri Corridor
- Chushul
- DBO.

My belief before this thread started, was that the Siliguri Corridor, followed by DBO were where we would faced the most problems defending.
Rohit Vats blog on Sikkim & the Siliguri corridor provides a great analysis and addressed some concerns I had. (The possibilities it presents for both attack and defence should be the subject of another thread). I therefore raised the possibility of an incursion in DBO, for the forum's views.

[disha]

saar - how will the shock wave remain concentrated? even with the valley effect will it not dissipate and be absorbed?

One hears echoes in valleys and not in deserts. Ulanbatori sometimes leaves some sentences in the camel's hump ., the reflected shockwaves create ripples (and troughs) and basically move back and forth within the valleys - amplifying its effects. In some ways., bombing within the valleys confines the effects within that valley. Check out how Nagasaki was not completely obliterated because of valley effect (at the same time the reflections concentrated on the hypocenter)

[disha]

In summary - there appear to be 5-6 areas where The Chinese can do gaandmasti. In Easter Arunachal they have river valleys to come down and enter India along with the river.

Indians can dam some of the river valleys and let the chinese drown., depends upon the time of the year - but I will believe that to avoid this kind of damning by drowning, the chinese are relegated to the months of March to June. Basically a 4-month window to break through.

From July to September it is Monsoon and from October to February it is winter.

And that is another thing which people sitting on comfy air-conditioned arm chairs do not realize. The environment is harsh. It is not standard temperature 27*C and pressure of 1 Atmosphere.

Anybody tried changing tires on very hot days or on rainy days or in the winter night? If the very thought of it induces groans - think again., 20k soldiers sitting on high-cold desert freezing their butts off just waiting for a meagre chance to prove some browny points.

1962 was an anomaly., Nehru was caught with his pants down and even worse did not have courage to zip his pants back up.

Deans,

If one wants to dhoti-shiver, one will dhoti-shiver.

Nobody can stop you or any contrived lop-sided scenarios to be cooked up. How are you going to stage 20k army in open desert surreptitiously? Have you ever tried to feed 20 people for 5 days leave alone think of logistics of 20k people?

I think you need to answer that first., before coming up with a concept of 2 divisions attacking DBO surreptitiously. Also how will they attack? With heavy armor (tanks, artillery guns, field transport) or will they simply hike and use assault rifles? Just check out the devastation IAF did at Muntho Dhalo.

[UlanBatori]

All of these scenarios are based on 1962 and other missions involving massed human assault by poorly-equipped humans. Guys, IMO the times have changed at least in the PeeAllSee. If they decide to invade north India they will put an immense amount of thought and effort into it. They now have the money to equip each soldier as NASA would equip an astronaut. 10,000 of them, to infiltrate and basically disable defences and bases before the rest come in by plane or whatever.

We do need to at least lay these out as dhoti-shivering in the hope that someone high up will read and support those in the IA/IAF who think ahead to prepare likewise.

For reasons seen in shiv's posts, liberating Tibet will not occur by sending MBTs along nice barren river valleys at 4500m. They will happen by a few thousand monks, nurses etc pulling out syringes and putting the PeeEllA to sleep late on a Sundin morning while the sentries mysteriously go missing and the airbases lose all capabilities. And then by sundown the new air defense system would have arrived and been set up in place of the old. Meanwhile the PeeEllA jarnails etc would have been flown back to Dilli on the empty planes, and arrive well before the 10 hours were up.

Q.E.D. PLA would arrive in Delhi without roads.

[ShauryaT]

^China will either fight to defend herself or fight to gain in areas, where we do not have capabilities. The border is no longer that area for capabilities exist now. The only way China fights on the border is if we choose to or China uses the border to gain asymmetrical advantages somewhere else.

I am not saying China cannot fight on the border but saying their reasons to do so is NOT going to be gaining of territory, which maybe a byproduct. There are some scenarios, where such a territory grabbing venture makes sense for China but the cost/benefits for doing so is not in favor of China.

At this point of time the biggest threat to India from a power equation perspective is not the LAC but CPEC that transgresses Indian territory. We need moves to disable it and make it very clear, we are willing to fight both Pakistan and China to bring that link down.

It is this conviction and an ability to initiate attack that will rattle them and force a rethink. If they know we have the will and capabilities to make a move on Lhasa as a mountain cold start (in 48 hours) then that would be a credible threat. The question is, we should then be ready to defend the counter attack and it is still better to do so in Tibet than in AP or Ladakh. A move on PoK to cut its links is another way and then there are other asymmetrical responses with strong naval action and management of littoral states.

What we need to do is make our priorities clear. There is lot of abuse for JLN fr 1962 and rightly so. But, beyond the emotional and in the world of cold hard analysis, what one sees is the IA was actually strengthened post independence, albeit the focus was the west. The threat from the east was ignored and we paid for it. The war time mismanagement simply exasperated the down fall. It is this resource mismatch that continues to worry me. 3 strike corps for the west, 10 Pivot corps for the west as opposed to 10 mountain divisions for the east and a fledgling mountain corps in the making. The strategic mindset still does not want to deal with the China threat in earnest. What and how this mismatch between threats and capabilities manifest itself is to be seen.

[sanjaykumar]

One big problem for China is after their 200 000 troops come down the arunachal valleys in the Himalayan summer, they need to be repatriated by the onset of winter.

If I were the planner, I would save up the ammunition for when they figure this out and are scurrying backup those valleys.

[UlanBatori]

The trouble is actually that the border/LAC is set at the "imp(o/a)ss(i/a)ble" mountains. There should be some agreement to demilitarize the mountains and set military borders/ entry checkpoints only at sensible places. Again, problem may be that this places Chinese forces in comfortable plateau positions close to the LAC, whereas India either has to retreat or put soldiers permanently in ridiculous conditions. The solution might have been long ago, to set the border at the Tibet/PRC border and provide Indian security guarantees to Tibet. Not possible now unless there is a huge destabilization with PRC giving up Tibet to save control of Xinjiang. Is there a PRC-agreeable solution where they pull back north of Manasarovar etc, and India pulls military back to below 3500 meters?

Mountains being patrolled jointly by Indo-Tibetan-Nepalese-Bhutani-Han Border Police? Mainly charged with asking the filthy tourists to take their pakistan back with them, not deposit it on our holy mountains?

As for CPEC, solution is clear: break up Pakistan. So CPEC becomes CIBPSBEC. Tax at each border crossing: Balwaristan, Pakjab, Sindh, Balochistan. Or Balwaristan, Pakhtoonistan, Balochistan. Build the India-Afghanistan Trade Route through Balwaristan.

[UlanBatori]

One big problem for China is after their 200 000 troops come down the arunachal valleys in the Himalayan summer, they need to be repatriated by the onset of winter.

If I were the planner, I would save up the ammunition for when they figure this out and are scurrying backup those valleys.

NOW you have hit on the real story of the 1962 war. It was **NOT** a case of "China showed that they could march to Tezpur, Guwahati, or Delhi any time, and then they just went back home after teaching the yindians a lesson".

The real story is that the Chinese, who in those days specialized in Human Wave assaults, sent a lot of soldiers to rush headlong into India, with no logistics to keep them alive beyond a few weeks. All the stories we heard at the time wondered at the Chinese soldier, who seemed to survive on a very small satchel of rice and dried meat. The reality is that these were conscripts. The US was building up a bomber force in India. Once they got started with IAF, the return path would be closed off for the Chinese forces stuck in the lowlands, and none would make it back up into Tibet. This is why they withdrew ASAP - like Napoleon from Russia. Shouldn't India have attacked? Well.. a lot of Chinese conscripts would have been killed, along with many more Indian soldiers. JLN &Co, for better or worse, chose Insaniyat over Insanity. I for one am proud of their choice.

There was no magic in the Chinese attack, they would have been destroyed in another month, or most would have had to surrender. Unfortunately, the Indian media and "hysterians" are such stinkin' losers that they never consider this reality.

[sanjaykumar]

Yes India has its own General Winter. But as Brajesh Mishra said about Kargil, it is not our parampara to shoot the enemy soldier in the a$$.

[Atmavik]

Another thing to consider in the event of a Chinese attack is that the Pakis will jump in. They will not repeat the mistake made in 1962

[shiv]

Another thing to consider in the event of a Chinese attack is that the Pakis will jump in. They will not repeat the mistake made in 1962

How are you so sure?

May I ask my original question again.. Why is it that Indians are sceptics when they hear the army chief say we CAN fight on two fronts and then express anxieties that there will be a two front war?

I mean - look at the paradox here. Every dhoti shivering scenario expressed by forum aheadofcurvites says there may be/will be a 2 front war. But when someone in the armed forces says "Yes we know. We are preparing for it - we shiver in our pants and bite our nails in anxiety" Why? When has India ever reduced defences on one front because there was a war on another front?

We were prepared for 2 fronts in 1965 and in 1971. We had set forces aside for both. In fact it would have been 3 fronts in 1971 if the US had stuck its nose in. China did not step in even in 1971 when the US was urging it to do so. If it is a 2 front war we have to fight it and be prepared for it. The fact that it can be a 2 front war is not some great revelation.

What I find amazing is that the minute we start discussing the details of what shape a conflict with China can take - there is a shift of goalpost that say "Baaw the Pakis will also attack" First let us separate the myths from facts and try and try to get to the bottom of what a war with the Chinese would be like minus the mythology. It will then be easier to speak of what a 2 front war entails

As far as I can tell - when people get their eyes off the love and marriage/nukkad thread and click on the mil forum they are able to quickly balance China against India. On the Chinese side is a 1 trillion GDP. That GDP will jump across the Himalayas to face a poor population doing public defecation. The outcome of the war is clear. China has already won. Then the real military experts chime in to say "China has 3500 aircraft. India has 750 and only 33% of them fly. When war starts all 3500 Chinese aircraft will appear over India and make short work of 250 Indian aircraft." So the outcome of war is already known.

Starting from this baseline I was just wondering if any Indian can ever be facetious enough to talk about actually fighting a war whose outcome is not already known to us.

I can understand the sentiment that "We need to be strong or get stronger" Fine But if people speak of war in mythological terms then we have already lost all future wars. By our metrics as long as China has an economy larger than ours we cannot win any war. If someone disagrees with this I would like to know why he disagrees in some detail because I am already equipped with a thousand arguments to prove that he is wrong.

[shiv]

The solution might have been long ago, to set the border at the Tibet/PRC border and provide Indian security guarantees to Tibet.

Not for want of trying as far as I know. Tibetan rebels were supported from launch points in India (via Nepal) with American support. In fact many were trained in the US. India did not have the arms or the aircraft to air-drop weapons to the Tibetan rebels and we were dependent on the US. Eventually the US backed out and the Tibetan rebellion died out. Of course India was fairly staunch in its non military support - allowing in refugees. The PLA - after kicking Fu Man Chu er Chiang kai Shek offshore were too powerful for the Tibetan rebels - the latter also had plenty of traitors who cooperated with the Chinese - with internal family squabbles among Tibetans

[sanjaykumar]

https://www.google.ca/maps/place/Arunac ... 94.7277528