Subba Rao, Santhanam and Iyengar have all claimed that the 1998 P1 test was a failure. Santhanam is on record saying that "more tests will be needed for validation". Iyengar said "partial burn". Based on the doubts expressed we have reached conclusions about the design tested and the yield that "should have been there but did not happen". The people who conducted the tests have been called (by people on BRF) as liars.
That is one side of the story - from people who were not directly involved.
What if the testing team are telling the truth? How much leeway has been given to that possibility before calling them liars?
As I have consistently stated for 19 years - there is no evidence either way to prove the case one way or the other. It is a matter of personal belief.
It is OK for people to believe different things as long as it is accepted that different beliefs are allowed. But in this case the difference in belief leads to one set of people feeling that there can be no deterrence without further testing. This is an assertion that I have never agreed with. Deterrents can be created with no testing. There are some designs which as absolutely sure to work - if one has the materials. Two lumps of 90% plus enriched Uranium weighing 55 kg in total - if separated first and then suddenly brought together - one is sure to get a nuclear explosion of non trivial yield without any prior testing. Even Taliban/ISIS tech could do this if we gave them the Uranium.
Testing per se has different goals and different consequences. The goals have to be weighed against the consequences whether we like it or not
This is something that has been discussed on and off and is worth discussing yet again. Maybe later - when I get the opportunity to summarize my views.
Deterrence
Re: Deterrence
Whether they are truthful or are lying is a tall order to prove in the public domain in the given circumstances. One will have to jump to "beliefs" to do that either way, leading to acrimony and harsh words on either side. There are some posters, who start of with these partisan and harsh words and at least I tune off the rest of the post.shiv wrote: What if the testing team are telling the truth? How much leeway has been given to that possibility before calling them liars?
The approach I have taken is to see, if we have a reason for
1. Credible doubt on the lone TN test, baed on which much of our arsenal is to be based upon
2. Do our deterrence and security and indeed I will add war fighting needs call for additional tests to proof our arsenal
There is a a third point, not directly related to the above two and that is to do with numbers and force structures, associated costs and risk assessments.
By all means, we have a right to believe and present a case, but "character" judgments and personal attacks should be refrained from. All have the national interest in mind and there can be a legitimate difference.
Re: Deterrence
One thing and I admit, these are trying to grab at fig leaves and speculative. Kakodkar's statement to Karnad
Kakodkar's focus on the hydro nuclear testing may reveal something. I admit it is speculative, but is it reasonable to make that speculation?
Does the above tell us something. The hydro nuclear is to test the primary/fission components. The ICF is indeed applicable for the 2nd stage fusion testing. Is the 200Kt limit coming from a reliance on the FBF primary and a lesser or no reliance on the secondary?Further, Kakodakar mentioned in an aside to me, that simulation and hydronuclear tests, etc. can, more than adequately, replace actual testing.
Kakodkar's focus on the hydro nuclear testing may reveal something. I admit it is speculative, but is it reasonable to make that speculation?
Re: Deterrence
There is something else to ponder. Given that even Prithvi III can carry a one ton payload, with varying Agni series at higher payloads and given the fact that we have not yet decided to arm these with multiple warheads, why in this world will we decide to limit the payload to one measly 200Kt?
The question here is not if it is enough and get into fancy arguments on reducing CEP's et al. The question is why will one not optimize the full payload capacity and deliver an MT weapon? The idea is not to be kind to the enemy in this area, is it?
Even when we go into the areas of multiple warheads, from an efficacy perspective the idea should be to deliver an optimal payload on each RV. The fact that again we do not talk of 8-10 RV on say the A5 and instead limit it to 3-4 tells us something?
What it seems to tell us there is a reliance on the weapon being either an FBF or a TN weapon with a reliance on the first stage only. I cannot think of any other reason for this talk of 200Kt, except for it not being a classic Teller-Ulam design or at least not a reliant one?
In light of the fact that it was a Teller-Ulam that was tested (I also have other circumstantial reasons to believe so), this mystery of why 200 KT only needs to be solved.
The question here is not if it is enough and get into fancy arguments on reducing CEP's et al. The question is why will one not optimize the full payload capacity and deliver an MT weapon? The idea is not to be kind to the enemy in this area, is it?
Even when we go into the areas of multiple warheads, from an efficacy perspective the idea should be to deliver an optimal payload on each RV. The fact that again we do not talk of 8-10 RV on say the A5 and instead limit it to 3-4 tells us something?
What it seems to tell us there is a reliance on the weapon being either an FBF or a TN weapon with a reliance on the first stage only. I cannot think of any other reason for this talk of 200Kt, except for it not being a classic Teller-Ulam design or at least not a reliant one?
In light of the fact that it was a Teller-Ulam that was tested (I also have other circumstantial reasons to believe so), this mystery of why 200 KT only needs to be solved.
Re: Deterrence
Let us make one thing clear here:
Any nuclear bum >300 Kt is useless. It is better to use 3-4 200-300 Kt spread across a vast city rather than a single MT bum.
Second., even a dozen 40kt on a vast city strategically used will cause more mayhem and destruction than a single large 500 Kt bum.
Hence the "logic" that bigger is better is not a logic but wishful thinking generally borne out of masochism.
Further., >1 MT size nukes are generally unwieldy to deliver while smaller nukes are easier to deliver. One can have MIRVs of different combinations or same smaller size and able to defeat modern ABMs.
Here size is NOT the key. But precision guaranteed delivery is.
Also when talking of >1MT bums., one also has to discuss the political-scientific milieu around those MT bums. Without that the caterwauling of "oh we do not have big bums and hence we are wasted" is unnecessary.
Before we go back and start casting doubts on the testing team., one has to genuinely ask - Are bigger bums necessary? If we had a bigger bum., could it have been delivered using Agni-II? Could it have been delivered from a submarine? What is the point of having bigger bums if a. They are not necessary and b. They are not deliverable either!
Hence., the efficiency of S-II Dharmo Test then becomes an intellectual scientific exercise and not a strategic exercise.
Any nuclear bum >300 Kt is useless. It is better to use 3-4 200-300 Kt spread across a vast city rather than a single MT bum.
Second., even a dozen 40kt on a vast city strategically used will cause more mayhem and destruction than a single large 500 Kt bum.
Hence the "logic" that bigger is better is not a logic but wishful thinking generally borne out of masochism.
Further., >1 MT size nukes are generally unwieldy to deliver while smaller nukes are easier to deliver. One can have MIRVs of different combinations or same smaller size and able to defeat modern ABMs.
Here size is NOT the key. But precision guaranteed delivery is.
Also when talking of >1MT bums., one also has to discuss the political-scientific milieu around those MT bums. Without that the caterwauling of "oh we do not have big bums and hence we are wasted" is unnecessary.
Before we go back and start casting doubts on the testing team., one has to genuinely ask - Are bigger bums necessary? If we had a bigger bum., could it have been delivered using Agni-II? Could it have been delivered from a submarine? What is the point of having bigger bums if a. They are not necessary and b. They are not deliverable either!
Hence., the efficiency of S-II Dharmo Test then becomes an intellectual scientific exercise and not a strategic exercise.
Re: Deterrence
Capturing for posterity:
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns ... epage=true
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns ... epage=true
The government on Thursday strongly refuted claims that the 1998 test of a thermonuclear device had been a failure, with Principal Scientific Adviser R. Chidambaram telling The Hindu that those questioning the tests yield had an obligation to back up their charge with scientific evidence.
He was responding to the recent statement by a former defence scientist, K. Santhanam, that “the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed.” Mr. Santhanam, who cited only unspecified “seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over,” went on to say that this was the reason India should not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The stated success of the second generation nuclear device tested on May 11, 1998, was questioned at the time by a number of Western seismologists who said the seismic signatures detected by them were at variance with the claimed yield of 45 kilotons. Although the controversy subsided somewhat once scientists from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre — which designed the weapon — published their scientific evidence, it is likely to be reignited once again since Mr. Santhanam represented the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) team at the Pokhran-II tests and is the first member of that group to echo the arguments of those who say the thermonuclear device failed to work properly.
“If Mr. Santhanam has any scientific data to back up what he has claimed, I am sure BARC scientists would be more than happy to debate it,” said Dr. Chidambaram. “Without that, this kind of statement means nothing.”
In a 2000 article, The May 1998 Pokhran tests: Scientific aspects, republished in 2008 with some updated details, in a French journal, ‘Atoms for Peace,’ Dr. Chidambaram has argued that western seismologists who under-estimated the Pokhran yields did so because they did not take into account the geological structure at the Indian testing range. They also failed to appreciate that India’s weapons designers purposely went for lower yields because the shots had to be fired in existing shafts which could not be dug any deeper for fear of detection. Higher yields, then, would have caused damage to nearby villages and also led to the possible venting of radioactivity.
Dr. Chidambaram wrote that the thermonuclear device tested was “a two-stage device of advanced design, which had a fusion-boosted fission trigger as the first stage and a fusion secondary stage which was compressed by radiation implosion and ignited.” He said the argument that the secondary stage failed to perform is belied by post-shot radioactivity measurements on samples extracted from the test site which showed significant activity of sodium-22 and manganese-54, both by-products of a fusion reaction rather than pure fission. “From a study of this radioactivity and an estimate of the cavity radius, confirmed by drilling operations at positions away from ground zero, the total yield as well as the break-up of the fission and fusion yields could be calculated.” Based on this, he said, BARC scientists worked out a total yield of 50 +/- 10 kt for the thermonuclear device, which was consistent with both the design yield and seismic estimates.
As for the sub-kiloton tests of 0.3 and 0.2 kt of 13 May 1998, which the International Monitoring System for verifying CTBT compliance failed altogether to detect, he said “the threshold limit for seismic detection is much higher in, say a sand medium than in hard rock; the Pokhran geological medium comes somewhere in between” and so it was not surprising these two tests did not show up on the IMS.
“Let someone refute what we have written, then we can look at it,” said Dr. Chidambaram, adding that he was yet to see a published critique of BARC’s scientific assessment by any laboratory-based scientist abroad.
A former senior official of the erstwhile Vajpayee government confirmed to The Hindu that there had been differences of opinion between BARC and DRDO scientists after the May 1998 tests, with the latter asserting that some of the weapons tests had not been successful. The internal debate was complicated by the fact that the DRDO experts, including Mr. Santhanam, were not privy to the actual weapon designs, which are highly classified. But the issue was resolved after a high-level meeting chaired by Brajesh Mishra, who was National Security Advisor at the time, in which the BARC experts established that DRDO had underestimated the true yields due to faulty seismic instrumentation. And the radioactivity analysis provided the clincher.
Since 1998, whatever his private reservations might have been, Mr. Santhanam appears to have stuck closely to the official line in his public pronouncements.
On the fifth anniversary of Pokhran-II, for example, he said in an article in Outlook that “the asymmetry with respect to China stands largely removed” thanks to the 1998 tests. Since China was a proven thermonuclear power at the time and India was not, it is hard to reconcile this optimistic assertion with the scientist’s current claim that the thermonuclear device India tested was “a fizzle.”
×
Similarly, in June 2007, Mr. Santhanam declared on CNN-IBN on a programme about the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in which this correspondent was also a participant: “After May 1998, there was a clear declaration from India that we don’t have to conduct any more nuclear tests. India should not have any problem legalising this position. But this is subject to the condition that if the international security condition changes, then we should be allowed to test."
Re: Deterrence
And one more comment:
I will source the URL later.Dr. Iyengar, who is critical of the Indian tests does not, however, question the Indian estimates as he says- see his quote above- “If one goes by the numbers for the total nuclear yield put out by the Department of Atomic Energy, which I see no reason to dispute, the yield of the thermonuclear device detonated on May 11, 1998 was around 40 kilotons.”
Re: Deterrence
Ah thank you sir! Will read over it.shiv wrote:Here is the Evernden paperRoyG wrote:
One thing that may of be of interest to us is the Everden note supposedly in the 1998 Physics and Society journal. I'm curious how he reached 46 kt for the TN. Couldn't find it. If you or anyone else can, it could throw more weight behind the claim that it did indeed sizzle that day.
.
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B3JNY ... FZXUEZLNXc
Re: Deterrence
BK revealed that we may have gone past the 200 kt limit w/ a 275 kt warhead. Interestingly enough, Russia and US have many warheads of this particular yield. I wonder if this is some kind of learning curve limitation which can be overcome through tweaking the design.ShauryaT wrote:There is something else to ponder. Given that even Prithvi III can carry a one ton payload, with varying Agni series at higher payloads and given the fact that we have not yet decided to arm these with multiple warheads, why in this world will we decide to limit the payload to one measly 200Kt?
The question here is not if it is enough and get into fancy arguments on reducing CEP's et al. The question is why will one not optimize the full payload capacity and deliver an MT weapon? The idea is not to be kind to the enemy in this area, is it?
Even when we go into the areas of multiple warheads, from an efficacy perspective the idea should be to deliver an optimal payload on each RV. The fact that again we do not talk of 8-10 RV on say the A5 and instead limit it to 3-4 tells us something?
What it seems to tell us there is a reliance on the weapon being either an FBF or a TN weapon with a reliance on the first stage only. I cannot think of any other reason for this talk of 200Kt, except for it not being a classic Teller-Ulam design or at least not a reliant one?
In light of the fact that it was a Teller-Ulam that was tested (I also have other circumstantial reasons to believe so), this mystery of why 200 KT only needs to be solved.
Regardless, we're safe wrt our neighbors and maybe even slowly making the Europeans and Russians sit up. If the test did indeed fizzle, 2-3 tests should probably do and I'm sure we'll do what's required at some point in the near future.
Re: Deterrence
No, no. Bharat Karnad does not believe a word of what comes out of RC and his gang - until proven, IMO. Furthermore he is convinced that P1 was a fizzle. BARC can claim 275 or 2 MT, it does not matter. Russian and US stick 8-12 warheads per missile, for the US the yield is close to 500KT per warhead and for Russia even higher. My demand is from 50KT to 2MT weapons for varying uses and force structures. I fully subscribe to the theory of escalation dominance subscribe to by an esteemed Indian military warrior, knowledgable about these matters. How many more tests, certainly higher than 2-3.RoyG wrote:
BK revealed that we may have gone past the 200 kt limit w/ a 275 kt warhead. Interestingly enough, Russia and US have many warheads of this particular yield. I wonder if this is some kind of learning curve limitation which can be overcome through tweaking the design.
Regardless, we're safe wrt our neighbors and maybe even slowly making the Europeans and Russians sit up. If the test did indeed fizzle, 2-3 tests should probably do and I'm sure we'll do what's required at some point in the near future.
Last edited by ShauryaT on 10 Feb 2017 07:45, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Deterrence
RoyG: This is where I agree with Shiv ji. Knowing about the science can help you see through things. I am myself loathe to do so but forced to, so that I may at least understand all the jargon thrown around. Shiv ji has toiled to understand this for the better part of two decades and I am a beneficiary but no one has perfect information and this includes the designers!
If as the claim goes they have moved only from 200 to 275 kt, (I do not recall reading that figure but do recall reading 225KT somewhere), it is actually quite depressing. Scalability for a Teller-Ulam design does not have to be so linear that it moves forward in baby steps. The yield differences can be many factors between iterations and sometimes a few factors in so called yield dial configurations, like the one Sikka claims.
If as the claim goes they have moved only from 200 to 275 kt, (I do not recall reading that figure but do recall reading 225KT somewhere), it is actually quite depressing. Scalability for a Teller-Ulam design does not have to be so linear that it moves forward in baby steps. The yield differences can be many factors between iterations and sometimes a few factors in so called yield dial configurations, like the one Sikka claims.
Re: Deterrence
ShauryaT,
I said the US and Russia have many warheads stockpiled of this particular yield. They aren't part of the deployed force.
As far as BK denying, he says that we may have 175/275 kt TN warheads fielded alongside FBF depending on who you talk to. He may not personally believe it. Who really knows. Personally, I lean towards fizzle side but time will tell. The Everden note however is interesting.
As far as the science is concerned, I know enough to figure out that LIF isn't just some "science experiment". Perhaps, we could all use some additional education.
Now as far as validating the current design, 2-3 should do if it will form the bulk of our deterrent but I've also said that we need to test a range of yields if we are to deter the West at some point in the future.
For now, we have adequate deterrence against China and Pakistan. We may have fcked some things up along the way and lost 1-2 decade in higher order deterrence value but these things will fix themselves overtime.
Pakistan deploying tactical nuclear weapons is a signal that they have stockpiled enough city busters and think they can dominate India up the escalation ladder. It's logical in the sense that you might as well work to limit an indian advance past lets say 30-50 km and hold territories outside the Punjab hostage in the event that they decide to secede. On the other hand, we are working to add more countervalue power to the arsenal wrt China and keep the balance of power as the face off the US.
I said the US and Russia have many warheads stockpiled of this particular yield. They aren't part of the deployed force.
As far as BK denying, he says that we may have 175/275 kt TN warheads fielded alongside FBF depending on who you talk to. He may not personally believe it. Who really knows. Personally, I lean towards fizzle side but time will tell. The Everden note however is interesting.
As far as the science is concerned, I know enough to figure out that LIF isn't just some "science experiment". Perhaps, we could all use some additional education.
Now as far as validating the current design, 2-3 should do if it will form the bulk of our deterrent but I've also said that we need to test a range of yields if we are to deter the West at some point in the future.
For now, we have adequate deterrence against China and Pakistan. We may have fcked some things up along the way and lost 1-2 decade in higher order deterrence value but these things will fix themselves overtime.
Pakistan deploying tactical nuclear weapons is a signal that they have stockpiled enough city busters and think they can dominate India up the escalation ladder. It's logical in the sense that you might as well work to limit an indian advance past lets say 30-50 km and hold territories outside the Punjab hostage in the event that they decide to secede. On the other hand, we are working to add more countervalue power to the arsenal wrt China and keep the balance of power as the face off the US.
Re: Deterrence
According to Ashley Tellis book, Evernden data is to be discounted because it was found to have included data from another earthquake that happened at the same time.
Re: Deterrence
How is that possible!vera_k wrote:According to Ashley Tellis book, Evernden data is to be discounted because it was found to have included data from another earthquake that happened at the same time.
Re: Deterrence
^
Read footnote on Page 509 in India's Emerging Nuclear Posture (available from Google Books).
Read footnote on Page 509 in India's Emerging Nuclear Posture (available from Google Books).
Re: Deterrence
RoyG,
"Doesn't it seem more plausible that if one had only undergone partial burn, then hold off on the subsequent tests to debug the design? And if it worked, detonate the next two for consistency? "
I am not into any advance tech or remotely related to it. But I have some experience in mundane IT coolie job which I would like to share with you.
You statement correct in surface but may not be practical in this particular scenario. For reason::
1. Even in my IT RnD when we reached a final prototyping stage or final system testing.. by that time all sub module , components , Hardware and mechanical parts and sensors are tested, unit wise, module wise and simulated in every possible way. Including environmental tress testing. So when the day come for final demo, or acceptance testing... We dont create multiple jig-system to test.. rather we create mostly 1 or some cases min logical number in a interdependent or networked environment. But that does not mean that we dont keep back up system. Yes we always have some quantity in back up.
2. So the next question is why back up? it is because of simple reason of uncertainty. and also because no Hardware component you can order to manufacturer for just 1 piece unless COTS, and even they too have min number in most cases if not all. There is always a minimum quantity. So we normally have abandoned quantity, and in case of failure to save face we keep 1 or 2 handy. It is done in every level of team not only at system level.
3. There are always a possibility that something can go wrong. But most of the time, it never deviate from theoretical tolerance area due verification and each functional module level. These back up system or face saving measure come into play only when some system behavior goes beyond deterministic logic or explanation... In that case we suspect Hardware and to verify if it is indeed shows similar error behavior.
4. In this nuclear device I believe, even the smallest screw goes through stringent design review and testing, let alone a functional module. They would already knows the expected good and bad scenarios. So if the 1st test pattern matched with copybook any of the expected part. There is no point in wasting one more shaft / tunnel which could be used in future for further testing.
5. We have to remember, that every explosion, will render a few KM of test area useless. No sane mind will want that kind of resource waste , unless the result is unpredictable, or non deterministic. We in IT collie dont do that even for a 1 lakh rupee device.
Thanks.
"Doesn't it seem more plausible that if one had only undergone partial burn, then hold off on the subsequent tests to debug the design? And if it worked, detonate the next two for consistency? "
I am not into any advance tech or remotely related to it. But I have some experience in mundane IT coolie job which I would like to share with you.
You statement correct in surface but may not be practical in this particular scenario. For reason::
1. Even in my IT RnD when we reached a final prototyping stage or final system testing.. by that time all sub module , components , Hardware and mechanical parts and sensors are tested, unit wise, module wise and simulated in every possible way. Including environmental tress testing. So when the day come for final demo, or acceptance testing... We dont create multiple jig-system to test.. rather we create mostly 1 or some cases min logical number in a interdependent or networked environment. But that does not mean that we dont keep back up system. Yes we always have some quantity in back up.
2. So the next question is why back up? it is because of simple reason of uncertainty. and also because no Hardware component you can order to manufacturer for just 1 piece unless COTS, and even they too have min number in most cases if not all. There is always a minimum quantity. So we normally have abandoned quantity, and in case of failure to save face we keep 1 or 2 handy. It is done in every level of team not only at system level.
3. There are always a possibility that something can go wrong. But most of the time, it never deviate from theoretical tolerance area due verification and each functional module level. These back up system or face saving measure come into play only when some system behavior goes beyond deterministic logic or explanation... In that case we suspect Hardware and to verify if it is indeed shows similar error behavior.
4. In this nuclear device I believe, even the smallest screw goes through stringent design review and testing, let alone a functional module. They would already knows the expected good and bad scenarios. So if the 1st test pattern matched with copybook any of the expected part. There is no point in wasting one more shaft / tunnel which could be used in future for further testing.
5. We have to remember, that every explosion, will render a few KM of test area useless. No sane mind will want that kind of resource waste , unless the result is unpredictable, or non deterministic. We in IT collie dont do that even for a 1 lakh rupee device.
Thanks.
Re: Deterrence
svinayak wrote:How is that possible!vera_k wrote:According to Ashley Tellis book, Evernden data is to be discounted because it was found to have included data from another earthquake that happened at the same time.
quite possible.. you would be surprised at the number of earth quakes that happen daily all around the globe .
http://www.emsc-csem.org/Earthquake/world/M5/
quite possible some quake could have obfuscated the data collected by western countries at long ranges
Re: Deterrence
one would not be surprised if the western calculations of Indian weapon design and yield were off by a whole magnitude
Re: Deterrence
[/quote]shiv wrote: That was his only reference to a "radiation implosion." That expression was used once and I must admit that it must mean something. The words "radiation implosion" were never used again.
FWIW - From what I know/think about the term used in the context: "Radiation implosion" is simply the "compression of material" by high levels of electromagnetic radiation (mainly Xrays). As we know most of the energy released by a fission bomb is in the form of x-rays. This may be more efficient then compressing by mechanical means. The critical mass depends on pressure so the bomb is more powerful with less material. This could be used for fission but main use for fusion type bombs so that fusion can start by keeping the maal inertially confined. Actually original idea and calculations, developed by Neumann in 1940's, was for fission type bombs and "two stage" fission bomb could deliver explosion in megaton range... But Teller and others realized that this could be used more efficiently when the second stage is fusion.
I think , a few fission bombs, pre-cursor to fusion bombs from Operation Greenhouse (in 1950's) were based on Neumann's design. (I just checked google to check that it was in 1950's)
Re: Deterrence
IMO think diameter. Not weightShauryaT wrote:There is something else to ponder. Given that even Prithvi III can carry a one ton payload, with varying Agni series at higher payloads and given the fact that we have not yet decided to arm these with multiple warheads, why in this world will we decide to limit the payload to one measly 200Kt?
I doubt this.ShauryaT wrote: In light of the fact that it was a Teller-Ulam that was tested (I also have other circumstantial reasons to believe so), this mystery of why 200 KT only needs to be solved.
Even a brief study of the history of Tellr Ulam designs shows that multiple tests were required to optimise and make warhead - while fission warheads were made (and used) after 1 test and the Soviet Joe-4 was a deliverable warhead. The first US Teller Ulam bomb was simply a science experiment.
If I was a scientist (I am a scientist in a different field) given one chance to develop a workable system - I would test something that is least likely to require more hot nuclear tests - not some fancy gizmo that requires multiple tests to master. There are a number of designs that are sure to work but a few things can do with practical measurement and that is stuff like the number of neutrons produced at a specific level of temperature and pressure. This is what I would test. Not megatons. It is easy to assume that the test team were bums - but I never fail to point out how we are personally very sensitive to anything that remotely looks like criticism of us on this forum but we are generous with our accusations of those who cannot answer.
I see a chain of assumptions about the integrity and competence of the test team that in my view demand that in the interest of objectivity we need to ask if they were not lying and were working on a logical scientific plan.
But what I see is the assumption that it was a Teller Ulam, the assumption that it fizzled followed by an assertion that the team were lying and or incompetent and ignoring the fact that from day one the test team said that the maximum scalable yield could be 200 kiliotons. Weird. All successful Teller Ulam tests have all exceeded a megaton and have all been used to create the megaton warheads of the 50s and 60s. Were the Indian test team so stupid that they did not know that the first "hydrogen bombs" tested by anyone far exceeded their puny 200 kiloton limit by a huge margin? Some thing simply does not gel and it is being explained away as lies and incompetence which is an accusation we make all too easily about all things Indian.
It is OK to be a critic, but in all fairness the other side of the picture - that they were not lying or bluffing must be taken into account. It is easy to get worked up when sceptics are questioned - but I must point out how easily people on the test team have been called liars. There are other designs and I note that AmberG has pointed out one more possibility
Re: Deterrence
Excellent post Shiv saar.
To me, without going into the specifics which btw me or anyone posting here has no actual access, deterrence holds.
It was mentioned clearly that the H bamb was deliberately tested for a lower yield keeping in mind the limitations of testing range and adjoining populated areas.
Also the H bamb isn't the only warhead intended to be used for MR.
Even if one were to theoretically accept that the H bamb fizzled, the deterrence value of the other 4 devices tested and built upon in the past 19 years is SOLID.
Furthermore, while I understand the clamour for testing ( I once was in that camp too), the signing of nuclear deals with multiple countries 19 years down the line give an indirect indication of the confidence of the govt,SFC, scientific community in the data obtained from that test of 98. Our confidence in not needing testing has allowed us to enter these N deals based on that very premise.
Deterrence is holding for North Korea at the moment.
For bhagwaans sake,folks need to stop shivering about Indian deterrence.
To me, without going into the specifics which btw me or anyone posting here has no actual access, deterrence holds.
It was mentioned clearly that the H bamb was deliberately tested for a lower yield keeping in mind the limitations of testing range and adjoining populated areas.
Also the H bamb isn't the only warhead intended to be used for MR.
Even if one were to theoretically accept that the H bamb fizzled, the deterrence value of the other 4 devices tested and built upon in the past 19 years is SOLID.
Furthermore, while I understand the clamour for testing ( I once was in that camp too), the signing of nuclear deals with multiple countries 19 years down the line give an indirect indication of the confidence of the govt,SFC, scientific community in the data obtained from that test of 98. Our confidence in not needing testing has allowed us to enter these N deals based on that very premise.
Deterrence is holding for North Korea at the moment.
For bhagwaans sake,folks need to stop shivering about Indian deterrence.
Re: Deterrence
If one reads the history of nuclear weapons one finds that the ICBMs of the 50s were so inaccurate that they could miss cities. At that time megaton warheads were thought necessary.
But now things have moved into much more dangerous territory. All those thousands of megaton warheads were not used because of the fear of global fallout.
What is happening now is extreme accuracy of missiles. Now people (meaning USA) (India was saying that but India is dogs, not people. USA is people) say that small 50 kiloton bombs can actually hit pinpoint targets to take out leadership and key targets and not leave much fallout. What we are now seeing is a door being left open for a war where nukes are used.
At this point in time US missiles can hit pinpoint targets. Korean missiles can't. Inaccurate missiles + low yield nukes means US can accurately hit hardened sites with 20-50 kiloton nukes and not have the fallout of 400 kt or 1 megaton nukes.
But now things have moved into much more dangerous territory. All those thousands of megaton warheads were not used because of the fear of global fallout.
What is happening now is extreme accuracy of missiles. Now people (meaning USA) (India was saying that but India is dogs, not people. USA is people) say that small 50 kiloton bombs can actually hit pinpoint targets to take out leadership and key targets and not leave much fallout. What we are now seeing is a door being left open for a war where nukes are used.
At this point in time US missiles can hit pinpoint targets. Korean missiles can't. Inaccurate missiles + low yield nukes means US can accurately hit hardened sites with 20-50 kiloton nukes and not have the fallout of 400 kt or 1 megaton nukes.
Re: Deterrence
Advanced physics is 90% maths. But simple school maths can be used to show how multiple small warheads have a greater destructive effect on a flat surface (earth) because at least 50% of yield is always wasted and sent into the atmosphere
The table below shows that the area of a city destroyed by 3 x 50 kiloton bombs is the same as that of a single 300 kiloton bomb
You need to use the formula 3.142 x (radius of destruction^2)
The table below shows that the area of a city destroyed by 3 x 50 kiloton bombs is the same as that of a single 300 kiloton bomb
You need to use the formula 3.142 x (radius of destruction^2)
Re: Deterrence
For all this talk about mega booms, just for perspective -- A powerful hurricane (like Katrina) releases 10 megatons --- Ohh every 20 minutes.. (Katrina was 300 Megatons!)
The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake (that generated a tsunami which was a big disaster) was about 20-30 megatons.
Recently I watched star wars and the destruction of Alderaan and I computed that the energy needed there was about billion megatons! ( one way to do it is to compute the amount of energy required to give an Earth-sized planet its own escape velocity and a figure I saw in internet was 819,083,688.72 megatons
)
The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake (that generated a tsunami which was a big disaster) was about 20-30 megatons.
Recently I watched star wars and the destruction of Alderaan and I computed that the energy needed there was about billion megatons! ( one way to do it is to compute the amount of energy required to give an Earth-sized planet its own escape velocity and a figure I saw in internet was 819,083,688.72 megatons
)Re: Deterrence
at least the puny humans wont blow the earth off course for any time nowAmber G. wrote:For all this talk about mega booms, just for perspective -- A powerful hurricane (like Katrina) releases 10 megatons --- Ohh every 20 minutes.. (Katrina was 300 Megatons!)
The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake (that generated a tsunami which was a big disaster) was about 20-30 megatons.
Recently I watched star wars and the destruction of Alderaan and I computed that the energy needed there was about billion megatons! ( one way to do it is to compute the amount of energy required to give an Earth-sized planet its own escape velocity and a figure I saw in internet was 819,083,688.72 megatons
Re: Deterrence
hyper sonic weapons have the most likely chance of being used than nukes per se and get almost similar results..shiv wrote:If one reads the history of nuclear weapons one finds that the ICBMs of the 50s were so inaccurate that they could miss cities. At that time megaton warheads were thought necessary.
But now things have moved into much more dangerous territory. All those thousands of megaton warheads were not used because of the fear of global fallout.
What is happening now is extreme accuracy of missiles. Now people (meaning USA) (India was saying that but India is dogs, not people. USA is people) say that small 50 kiloton bombs can actually hit pinpoint targets to take out leadership and key targets and not leave much fallout. What we are now seeing is a door being left open for a war where nukes are used.
At this point in time US missiles can hit pinpoint targets. Korean missiles can't. Inaccurate missiles + low yield nukes means US can accurately hit hardened sites with 20-50 kiloton nukes and not have the fallout of 400 kt or 1 megaton nukes.
Re: Deterrence
This video (class lecture of a Berkeley Physics course by Prof Mueller) may be interesting to those who want to understand basics of nuclear bomb..
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BHdsjo-NR4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BHdsjo-NR4
Re: Deterrence
The design of the Hiroshima atomic bomb was never "live" tested, in spite of some pressure outside. The reason was the scientists felt quite confident that "gun design" will work and did not want to waste precious U235. Most of their calculations/testing was sort of "cold testing".Neilz wrote: We in IT collie dont do that even for a 1 lakh rupee device..
The Pu bomb design (Nagasaki) was more complicated so it was tested by actually exploding the bomb.
If we trust our scientists, who actually did all the work then we must trust their judgment. Those who call these scientists "liars" -- and have done no real work should not be given = = treatment.
Re: Deterrence
The efficacy gained due to improving missile CEP's and MIRV is not in dispute. What is often missed/omitted is the fact that the overall destruction with modern missiles and warheads is actually higher than older MT warheads based on a single missile/warhead.
The destructive force unleashed by a single missile and this can be on a single target is upwards of 5-8 MT from these new modern missiles. Now compare this with India's stuck 200 KT with no MIRV.
There is a fundamental reason why MT levels of destruction is deemed required and no it is not just to do with CEP. The 1950's missiles may miss cities but the missiles deployed in 60's/70's with large MT warheads had 2 digit CEP's at inter-continental ranges. The MIRV modern missiles only make it more efficient.
Even the new air launched warheads are primarily about the ability to make them lighter. For an aircraft carrying a 150KT warhead would be the same as carrying a 250 lb TNT bomb. Let us not assume that it will carry only one at a time.
We are seeing the same transition in China moving away from large MT single warheads to 10 MIRV - likely yielding more destructive power not less.
For India we need to see the same, large MT warheads on our missiles with single warhead and when we move to MIRV we need to see a net increase in yield per missile delivered.
The destructive force unleashed by a single missile and this can be on a single target is upwards of 5-8 MT from these new modern missiles. Now compare this with India's stuck 200 KT with no MIRV.
There is a fundamental reason why MT levels of destruction is deemed required and no it is not just to do with CEP. The 1950's missiles may miss cities but the missiles deployed in 60's/70's with large MT warheads had 2 digit CEP's at inter-continental ranges. The MIRV modern missiles only make it more efficient.
Even the new air launched warheads are primarily about the ability to make them lighter. For an aircraft carrying a 150KT warhead would be the same as carrying a 250 lb TNT bomb. Let us not assume that it will carry only one at a time.
We are seeing the same transition in China moving away from large MT single warheads to 10 MIRV - likely yielding more destructive power not less.
For India we need to see the same, large MT warheads on our missiles with single warhead and when we move to MIRV we need to see a net increase in yield per missile delivered.
Re: Deterrence
Anil Kakodkar using the term 'radiation implosion' in 2000.
BARC claim has always been that they tested a weaponized thermonuclear device, with a boosted fission primary. To claim now that they did not say that or did not mean that is a goal post jugglery of the worst kind.Are you convinced that we need not explode more nuclear devices, thermo-nuclear bombs with bigger yields?
I will not put it the way you are putting it. The 45-kiloton thermo-nuclear test that we did was in a configuration which allows us to easily go up to 200 kiloton. So far as thermo-nuclear technology is concerned, there is no doubt that we have the full capability.
A thermo-nuclear device is popularly called the hydrogen bomb. According to a top DAE scientist, the hydrogen bomb and the neutron bomb are the same. Is there any difference between them?
A thermo-nuclear bomb or hydrogen bomb is a two-stage weapon, which consists of the primary which is based on fission or boosted fission system, and the secondary is where the radiation implosion is used to get a large yield. So any thermo-nuclear weapon will have a certain amount of energy coming in the form of fission, and a certain amount of energy coming in the form of fusion.
In a neutron bomb, the fusion energy is maximised. With minimum fission energy, you get maximum fusion energy. So you end up getting a much larger neutron output and so it can create much more damage by radiation. That is the difference.
Re: Deterrence
Wiki gyan: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B61_nuclear_bomb
The sequence of yields suggests that they are increasing the level of fusion and boosting. The yields are embarrassingly close to BARC claims. (0.3, 15 and 46 KT).The B61 is a variable yield, kiloton-range weapon called "Full Fuzing Option"(FUFO) or "Dial-a-yield" by many service personnel. Tactical versions (Mods 3, 4, and 10) can be set to 0.3, 1.5, 5, 10, 45, 60, 80, or 170 kiloton explosive yield (depending on version).
Re: Deterrence
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns ... epage=true
I read somewhere the Russian used nukes to block couple of oil leaks which they could not stop. The world never knew about it until the Russians talked about it after the collapse of USSR.
Would the world know if US or Russia test some device in remote corner of their country? Artic/ Antartic regions? Pretty sure there are many more secrets out there.
For all we know, we might have tried out some design with detonation not big enough to be detected.
This is something interesting. How small can a fusion device be? Are sub-kilo's very inefficient regular nukes?As for the sub-kiloton tests of 0.3 and 0.2 kt of 13 May 1998, which the International Monitoring System for verifying CTBT compliance failed altogether to detect, he said “the threshold limit for seismic detection is much higher in, say a sand medium than in hard rock; the Pokhran geological medium comes somewhere in between” and so it was not surprising these two tests did not show up on the IMS.
I read somewhere the Russian used nukes to block couple of oil leaks which they could not stop. The world never knew about it until the Russians talked about it after the collapse of USSR.
Would the world know if US or Russia test some device in remote corner of their country? Artic/ Antartic regions? Pretty sure there are many more secrets out there.
For all we know, we might have tried out some design with detonation not big enough to be detected.
Re: Deterrence
Thanks for this. Probably answered my question above.sudeepj wrote:Wiki gyan: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B61_nuclear_bomb
The sequence of yields suggests that they are increasing the level of fusion and boosting. The yields are embarrassingly close to BARC claims. (0.3, 15 and 46 KT).The B61 is a variable yield, kiloton-range weapon called "Full Fuzing Option"(FUFO) or "Dial-a-yield" by many service personnel. Tactical versions (Mods 3, 4, and 10) can be set to 0.3, 1.5, 5, 10, 45, 60, 80, or 170 kiloton explosive yield (depending on version).
I have a feeling we have done more "fusion sub-kiloton" tests, which are easier to hide.
Re: Deterrence
There is no such thing as a fusion subKT. The subKTs tested were basically the boosted fission devices without the boosting tritium. It is thought that the process of boosting is very well understood. the tricky part is getting the plutonium to yield a subKT bang reliably.
https://cryptome.org/2014/06/wmd-4th-gen-quest.pdf
a: Get the fission process going using a very small amount of Pu and explosives.
b: Whether the fission process can ignite a small amount of tritium. Once the tritium is ignited, it will all burn, and the final and largest contribution of energy from fast neutrons fissioning more Pu is guaranteed.
https://cryptome.org/2014/06/wmd-4th-gen-quest.pdf
Basically, what you are testing is:When actually exploding an experimental boosted device for testing purposes,
there are several advantages in keeping the yield as low as possible. This enables:
(1) to insure that the technique of using an implosion device that would be a fission-
fizzle without tritium gives the calculated yield with only a minimum amount of
tritium in the pit, (2) to enhance the contribution of the delicate initial fission fusion
phase relative to the final fusion-fission phase which is a simple nuclear
amplification process, (3) to minimize the background signals which may overload
the measuring instrumentation, (4) to be able to explode the device at a relatively
low depth into the ground and to minimize the damage to the test range and its
vicinities, and, finally, (5) to waste as little precious tritium as possible. This
explains why most of the tests performed par India and Pakistan in May 1998 were
of very low yield, i.e., of only a fraction of a kiloton.
a: Get the fission process going using a very small amount of Pu and explosives.
b: Whether the fission process can ignite a small amount of tritium. Once the tritium is ignited, it will all burn, and the final and largest contribution of energy from fast neutrons fissioning more Pu is guaranteed.
Re: Deterrence
Another excerpt from the same source:
Thus, a major feature of the Teller-Ulam design is that it provides a straightforward
and intrinsically fail-safe method for making a thermonuclear bomb. In
fact, this method is so good that all the first hydrogen bombs worked the first time.
Moreover, the Chinese were able to detonate their first full-yield hydrogen bomb
after only three fission bomb tests, one boosted-fission test, and one preliminary
two-stage hydrogen bomb principle test [26]. This demonstratesthat a rather primitive
technology is sufficient to construct a megaton-yield hydrogen bomb with
the Teller-Ulam method. On 17 May 1998, Indian officials claimed that one of
the devices detonated on 11 May was a two-stage hydrogen bomb with a yield of
about 45 kt. Since a relatively low-yield H-bomb is more difficult to make than
a high-yield one, this test means that India was capable to detonate a sophisticated
thermonuclear device 24 years after it made its only previous nuclear test — a 12
kt fission bomb [65].
Re: Deterrence
Shiv ji, Maybe in addition to weight, diameter is also a limitation for BF devices. Weight also makes sense. A 200KT BF weapon would weigh about 750 KG, hence maybe extend it to 225KT to max payload levels on most of our missiles. If we did have a TN deployed force, then we would hear of higher yields for the given mass. A quick compare is Topol-M with Agni-V. Topol-M carries a single 800KT TN warhead, has less payload capacity than Agni-V, probably slightly larger diameter in the third stage. It will be interesting to find out if India can stick 4-6 warheads in an Agni-V derivative and what will be the warhead yield. Anyways, DRDO and BARC do collaborate to change the dimensions of the warhead for a given platform, say the K15. One thing we do not hear much about is the air dropped warheads, which seems to be stuck with plain old fission weapons, not much scope for heavy BF based payloads here, especially not on long range ALCM's.shiv wrote:IMO think diameter. Not weightShauryaT wrote:There is something else to ponder. Given that even Prithvi III can carry a one ton payload, with varying Agni series at higher payloads and given the fact that we have not yet decided to arm these with multiple warheads, why in this world will we decide to limit the payload to one measly 200Kt?
Re: Deterrence
^^ Where are you getting your numbers from? How are you calculating that a BF will require 750 Kg of weight and how are you calculating non-BF weight? Is it 200 Kg? 300 Kg? 700 Kg?
Re: Deterrence
From here, there are other sources too for these calculations, including BRF archives.disha wrote:^^ Where are you getting your numbers from? How are you calculating that a BF will require 750 Kg of weight and how are you calculating non-BF weight? Is it 200 Kg? 300 Kg? 700 Kg?
Re: Deterrence
They never claimed a Teller Ulam design - which is infinitely scalable to multiple megatons. The entire idea of Teller Ulam in having a separate Fusion stage was to make it infinitely scalable, and not restricted to 200 kilotons which is achievable from any boosted fission device.sudeepj wrote:
BARC claim has always been that they tested a weaponized thermonuclear device, with a boosted fission primary. To claim now that they did not say that or did not mean that is a goal post jugglery of the worst kind.
All I am saying is that the assumption that this was a Teller Ulam device has no basis whatsoever. Chidambaram's credibility in forum discussions was so low that no one seems to recall that he pointed out that Santhanam and other sceptics did not know the design details. In fact from 8th May 1998 the assumption has been "Teller Ulam" as depicted in open source literature. Every reference I read about that design says that it is scalable to huge yields. It requires refinement with multiple tests.
Multiple unsolvable mysteries come up when you look at the available details. P1 was said to have used a primary identical to the standard fission bomb tested in another pit. Assuming that one was 8-12 kt - where did the extra 20 odd kilotons come from? Assuming it was a fizzle - why did the designers plan (and admit right from the beginning) that it was scalable only to 200 kt - a figure that can be achieved by boosting.
It has long been assumed that it is shameful to admit that a Thermonuclear test gave only 200 kilotons. In fact the first British test gave 200kt. Then they were desperate to get 1 megaton and their second test gave them 300 kt. Finally they got 1 megaton on test 3 to prove a point that they really had "The Hydrogen bomb". Here we are saying that our people had low ambition. They planned for only 200 kiloton, got 40 kiloton and then claimed that it was Thermonuclear and therefore they do not have boasting rights. They must be liars.
I repeat. It is OK to make all these assumptions. But add one more alternate assumption. What if they were NOT lying? Why leave out that?