Indian Navy News & Discussion - 15 Dec 2016

Bheeshma · Post by **Bheeshma** » 18 Apr 2017 07:34

What is the range of WM 18 rockets?

srai · Post by **srai** » 18 Apr 2017 07:57

Bheeshma wrote:What is the range of WM 18 rockets?

122mm rockets ... probably around 20km.

atma · Post by **atma** » 18 Apr 2017 09:43

I researched the same, these are post WW II soviet /polish design, 140 mm, unguided, probably range to about 10-12 km, supposedly for "beach clearing". Very low tech, probably very cheap. In absence of a guided or targeted weapon, they probably only provide "shock and awe", like earlier versions of land based MLRS (Grads?). Russian equivalent of a similar ship (Shardul class) has a huge naval gun 76 mm in addition to this unguided missiles, and a couple of CWIS guns . We decided to have 4 of the 30 mm Medak guns instead. Russians may build more, since Mistrals are gone!

Bheeshma · Post by **Bheeshma** » 18 Apr 2017 10:08

The Zubr class has the 2 × 140 mm Ogon launchers seen here
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zubr-class_LCAC

These are based on older BM-14's.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 18 Apr 2017 13:37

RBU-1200 aboard many IN ships is already there. It's basically a non auto variant of IRL/RBU-6000

Bala Vignesh wrote:Is there an anti sub projectile available for the WS18?? Would make for a good cost effective anti sub and shore bombardment weapon system on our corvettes and OPV's.

chola · Post by **chola** » 18 Apr 2017 16:52

It looks like the lizard is about to launch its second carrier in the next week or so.

Keel was laid down May 2015 and launch will be end of April 2017. Module fabrication undoubtedly began far earlier than when satellite caught the keel. But still, the time between keel laid and vessel launch for 65000-ton carrier will be an insane two years.

For comparison, the Vikrant's keel was laid down February, 2009. It was launched in June 2013. So it took four years but with a huge caveat. The 2013 "launch" was a hulk with no island because of physical constraints at Cochin. It was relaunched a second time in May, 2015 with the island.

The next milestones will be commissioning and first aircraft launch.

It probably takes two years for fitting and another for sea trials from date of launch. So around 2020 for the chini carrier.

The Cochin Shipyard provided a project plan to CAG that states 2023 as finish date.

If the numbers play out, it would take five years for the PRC to build and outfit a carrier versus 14 years for us. Granted their carrier is a copy of the Kuznetsov while ours is a brand new design. But theirs is also 50% bigger.

Karthik S · Post by **Karthik S** » 18 Apr 2017 17:10

Our ship contruction time is very high indeed across the boeard. I checked khan's timelines nuke sub and ddgs I think it was 2.5 years from start to finish.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 18 Apr 2017 17:34

Ours is a upscaled cavour sourced from.fincantieri...not a clean sheet

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 18 Apr 2017 18:04

That is irrelevant to the time lines for the ship. We need a proper audit of the time lines as to which activity takes the max time in the timeline of ship building to conclude. We need to get our ship building times to be brought under control.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 18 Apr 2017 18:19

Karthik S wrote:Our ship contruction time is very high indeed across the boeard. I checked khan's timelines nuke sub and ddgs I think it was 2.5 years from start to finish.

The Block I Virgina SSNs was built (order to delivery) on an 84 month schedule, Block II's on a 72 month schedule, block IIIs that are currently being delivered are on a 66 month schedule and Block IVs that have been contracted have a goal of first reaching 62 and eventually a 60 month schedule to completion. On the DDG-51 I believe the target is 46 months.

Karthik S · Post by **Karthik S** » 18 Apr 2017 18:38

brar_w wrote:
Karthik S wrote:Our ship contruction time is very high indeed across the boeard. I checked khan's timelines nuke sub and ddgs I think it was 2.5 years from start to finish.
The Block I Virgina SSNs was built (order to delivery) on an 84 month schedule, Block II's on a 72 month schedule, block IIIs that are currently being delivered are on a 66 month schedule and Block IVs that have been contracted have a goal of first reaching 62 and eventually a 60 month schedule to completion. On the DDG-51 I believe the target is 46 months.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Hartford_(SSN-768)

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 18 Apr 2017 18:52

the small lots in which we build ships in sets of 3 gives us neither economy of scale and consistency nor the supplier headroom to produce more in anticipation or give us priority. our mix and match from 10 countries on each ship is also a problem.

our yards remain small as our orders are small, our orders are small because yards are small

if we had the yards to produce 3 DDG in parallel and 3 more feeding in at the 2-3 year mark our results would be much better.

Karthik S · Post by **Karthik S** » 18 Apr 2017 18:54

I saw a report that both MDL and GRSE, 25% disinvestment is going to be made. I really hope the private player who takes up this ownership, looks into these matters.

chola · Post by **chola** » 18 Apr 2017 21:52

Singha wrote:the small lots in which we build ships in sets of 3 gives us neither economy of scale and consistency nor the supplier headroom to produce more in anticipation or give us priority. our mix and match from 10 countries on each ship is also a problem.

our yards remain small as our orders are small, our orders are small because yards are small

if we had the yards to produce 3 DDG in parallel and 3 more feeding in at the 2-3 year mark our results would be much better.

There is really no reason between the SOE's of MDL, HDl, CSL and GRSE why we can't do DDG/FFG classes in parallel. It is just poor planning and management. Waiting for Mazagon to finish one P15A/B at a time is maddening. I could understand that private enterprises would have issues with splitting up a contract but SOEs? Purely a management issue.

That said, this issue has less bearing with CSL and the Vikrant though. I don't expect us to build carriers in parallel but telling the CAG that the finish date is 2023 for a ship they began in 2009 is absurd.

I need to be more nuanced on the Kuznetsov copy vs new design statement. I understand that we had Italian advisors but the Vikrant is far larger than the Cavour and has a ski jump. But more importantly, the design is brand new to India and in particular to the team at Cochin. The Kuznetsov design is already known to the chinis at Dalian SL since their refurbishment of the Varyag. This undoubtedly contributed to their ability to build their new carrier so quickly.

This brings us back to planning and management again. If we had insisted on rebuilding the Vikramaditya ourselves we would be in a better situation with an experienced workforce on carriers. Hapzard planning is detrimental.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 18 Apr 2017 22:00

We dont have long term plan as funds are allocated on yearly basis. Only atv and missile project under pmo have better long term funding.

chola · Post by **chola** » 18 Apr 2017 22:59

Singha wrote:We dont have long term plan as funds are allocated on yearly basis. Only atv and missile project under pmo have better long term funding.

So Project 15A and its Project 15B followon are not "projects" with long term funding? It can't be.

At any rate, the funding for the three Kolkata class ships were approved by the MoD. Who and how they were built was not dictated by the budget. The money has already been set aside.

I would think it would have been feasible to have all three ships of either class built simultaneously at different government shipyards instead of all being backlogged at MDL.

Bheeshma · Post by **Bheeshma** » 18 Apr 2017 23:29

I am yet to see the any report on the 6 SSN builds? These are probably most critical after Arihant class.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 19 Apr 2017 00:29

Indian Navy to Sign $4.9Bln Deal With S Korean Firm for Minesweeping Vessels

https://sputniknews.com/military/201704 ... esweeping/

"Issues between Goa Shipyard and the South Korean collaborator in the project have been sorted out and the deal should be sealed by the end of this year," Vice Admiral DM Deshpande, Controller of Warship Production and Acquisition, said in New Delhi.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 19 Apr 2017 01:27

Singha wrote:the small lots in which we build ships in sets of 3 gives us neither economy of scale and consistency nor the supplier headroom to produce more in anticipation or give us priority. our mix and match from 10 countries on each ship is also a problem.

our yards remain small as our orders are small, our orders are small because yards are small

if we had the yards to produce 3 DDG in parallel and 3 more feeding in at the 2-3 year mark our results would be much better.

Why look at DDGs?

GRSE is presently executing an order of 8 LCU Mk. IV:

GRSE signed an agreement for INR21 billion (USD340 million) with the Indian Navy for designing and building eight LCU ships on 28 September 2011 and construction began in September 2012. The craft are built from 16 hull blocks, the largest of which weighs 25 tons. Block production has been outsourced to smaller yards around Kolkata.

Of this sizable number we have inducted only 1 till now. GRSE took 3 years from Launch to Commissioning!

chola · Post by **chola** » 19 Apr 2017 02:01

Aditya G wrote:
Singha wrote:the small lots in which we build ships in sets of 3 gives us neither economy of scale and consistency nor the supplier headroom to produce more in anticipation or give us priority. our mix and match from 10 countries on each ship is also a problem.

our yards remain small as our orders are small, our orders are small because yards are small

if we had the yards to produce 3 DDG in parallel and 3 more feeding in at the 2-3 year mark our results would be much better.
Why look at DDGs?

GRSE is presently executing an order of 8 LCU Mk. IV:

GRSE signed an agreement for INR21 billion (USD340 million) with the Indian Navy for designing and building eight LCU ships on 28 September 2011 and construction began in September 2012. The craft are built from 16 hull blocks, the largest of which weighs 25 tons. Block production has been outsourced to smaller yards around Kolkata.

Of this sizable number we have inducted only 1 till now. GRSE took 3 years from Launch to Commissioning!

Sounds like GRSE is dedicating only one dock to this order?! With the modest size of the craft, it could have been built at any number of docks at Garden Reach or any of the other GOI yards. This is not a carrier like the Vikrant where we could argue that Cochin with the largest dock is the only place for it. This thing is a mere 400-tons. At this rate, we'll get all 8 LCUs in two decades?

This is where planning and management must do better. Build these damn things in parallel. Spread them out across even private yards. Those that are slow, incompetent or shoddy gets less or none of the work next time. This is how you create capacity and eliminate poor performers.

Bheeshma · Post by **Bheeshma** » 19 Apr 2017 04:42

The LCU-MK-4 is 1000 tonne displacement not 400 but yes it is slow.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 19 Apr 2017 10:28

China is building ASW/missile corvettes twice the size at the rate of of every 4-6 months or so! They plan something like 30-40 of them.

Media report. Alt. solution to sub crisis. There appear to be problems with the "strat. partner" policy for the next sub line,P-75I,according to a sr. admiral (procurement) of the IN. The IN is looking at other alternatives.Apparently MP wanted something different,but for 2 yrs. was stalled becos of this stated policy. So what are our options?

Here's a recent article on the IN,which broadly suns up our take on the carrier Q. As the writer says,investing in FFGs,DDGs,subs and helos,gives more bang for the buck.

http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/itCxLcl ... ildup.html

Wed, Mar 15 2017
The problem with India’s naval build-up
Naval build-ups, because of their capital-intensive nature, are frequently more fatal to the originator than they are to the opposition

Abhijit Iyer-Mitra
The whole rationale of aircraft carriers for middle-power navies like India needs to be re-examined in the interests of fiscal prudence and the creation of a navy that realistically serves India’s interests. Photo: Abhijit Bhatlekar/Mint
The whole rationale of aircraft carriers for middle-power navies like India needs to be re-examined in the interests of fiscal prudence and the creation of a navy that realistically serves India’s interests. Photo: Abhijit Bhatlekar/Mint
Much of the focus of Aero India 2017 was on the navy’s fighter requirement following the abject failure of the MiG-29K and the abandonment of Tejas. However, given that India’s capital acquisition budget will remain plateaued for the foreseeable future, the whole rationale of aircraft carriers for middle-power navies like India needs to be re-examined in the interests of fiscal prudence and the creation of a navy that realistically serves India’s interests, rather than ending up subsidizing dangerous delusions of grandeur.

Naval build-ups, because of their capital-intensive nature, are frequently more fatal to the originator than they are to the opposition. Admiral Tirpitz’s build-up of the Imperial German Navy, for example, contributed to the German defeat in World War I, with no significant returns on the massive investment. Similarly, Admiral Gorshkov’s expansion of the Soviet navy directly contributed to the fall of the USSR.

Both Tirpitz and Gorshkov were tactical geniuses who were unmitigated strategic disasters because they were economic ignoramuses, ignoring the military dictum of economy of effort where every action must extract a disproportionate cost from the opponent. Ominously, the INS Vikramaditya once bore the ill-fated name: Admiral Gorshkov.

The navy forwards three reasons for its carrier craze. First, the Chinese naval build-up and forays into the Indian Ocean; second, to dominate the littoral and project power; third, to protect the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) and, as a corollary, deny China energy supplies in the event of war. Not one of these reasons holds up to scrutiny.

The vast difference in the economies of China and India means that the former can counter our naval aviation assets many times over. Operationally, China’s naval fighter, the Su-33, outclasses India’s failed MiG-29K. While Western naval fighters like the Rafale or F-18 are undeniably superior electronically, a cost difference of almost 10:1 in the Sukhoi’s favour presents an insurmountable quantitative challenge. To quote Stalin, “Quantity has a quality all of its own.” This, in fact, is similar both to World War II, where Russian bulk overcame the Luftwaffe’s vast qualitative superiority, and the Falklands war where Harriers bested superior Argentine Mirages because Argentina failed to mobilize sufficient numbers or absorb high losses against the Harrier. Clearly, the quality-quantity matrix favours Chinese quantity over Indian quality.

Dominating the littoral with carriers is also a problematic proposition. A cursory glance at the Indian Ocean reveals two kinds of states here—very powerful ones and very weak ones. Sending all three carriers against powerful countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Pakistan, Singapore and Australia would be suicidal, with each of these countries possessing the ability to tackle India’s naval fighters effectively. On the other hand, even one aircraft carrier is a farcical overkill against countries like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Somalia, Mauritius, Mozambique et al. This means the Indian carrier build-up answers a question nobody asked.

Protecting SLOCs, and in wartime destroying China’s energy access, is best achieved by other assets. During peacetime, the best way to police the Indian Ocean is a fleet of cheap offshore patrol vessels. During wartime, the lack of littoral aircraft carriers means frigates with an excellent anti-submarine (ASW) component and air defence missiles are more than qualified to do the job. Yet, curiously, the critical ASW helicopter shortage is something the Indian Navy has dangerously subjugated to its quixotic quest for inutile carriers.

Denying the Indian Ocean to the Chinese navy in the event of war will mean countering two main threats—their nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. Chinese nuclear submarines will, in such a situation, challenge the Indian surface fleet and are best countered by a strong anti-submarine helicopter force for the fleet. Chinese aircraft carriers, on the other hand, are best countered by Indian submarines.

Submarines and anti-submarine components are also an area where India enjoys an advantage. Chinese submarines are noisy and relatively crude, whereas the Western submarines and helicopters that India has access to have superb stealth and electronic capabilities. In war games, conventional Western submarines have routinely sunk US aircraft carriers while avoiding detection. The latest generation of French sonars on British submarines is able to acoustically detect every single ship leaving New York harbour thousands of kilometres away.

While submarines are not cheap, they are much cheaper than aircraft carriers, play to India’s strength and meet our requirement set in a much more affordable, versatile and sustainable way.

In the final analysis, if India wants to change the current situation where it punches far below its weight, a shift to air-centrism is the only answer. However, an ill-planned, operationally inadequate and economically catastrophic air-centrism of the Indian Navy variety will do far more damage to Indian interests, with gains being illusory at best.

Being a serious player requires the ruthless culling of deadweight. And the bellwether for Indian seriousness will be decisions that the country’s strategic managers take on the future of aircraft carriers in lieu of realistic and affordable goals (read frigates, submarines and helicopters) that yield true “bang for the buck” in the short to medium term.

Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is senior fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 19 Apr 2017 12:58

Latest news about our 4 20K t LPDs.
https://sputniknews.com/asia/2017041910 ... transport/
XCpt:

Indian navy shipsIndian Navy Expects $2.6 Bln Deal for Amphibious Transport Dock by Year End
19.04.2017
The Indian Navy has set its target to finalize a $2.6 billion contract for Landing Platform Docks with private Indian shipbuilders by the end of this year.
Indian Navy to Sign $4.9Bln Deal With S Korean Firm for Minesweeping Vessels
New Delhi (Sputnik) – “If all goes well, then the Navy is expected to close the LPD contract by end of this year,” Vice Admiral DM Deshpande, Controller of Warship Production and Acquisition, Indian Navy, said in New Delhi.
Indian Navy has planned four 20,000 ton LPD for induction in the next decade. India’s private manufacturers Reliance Defence and Engineering Limited (RDEL) and Larsen & Toubro (L&T) have cleared the financial and technical tests and have submitted commercial bids to the Indian defense ministry. L&T has a tie-up with Navantia of Spain and RDEL with DCNS of France.

Earlier, the government had planned to give the contract to private as well government-owned shipbuilders but reworked it and decided to give all four shipbuilding contract to private players as the public sector shipbuilder had too many orders.

According to the Indian Navy tender issued in 2013, LPD should not be more than 215 meters long and have a draft no more than 8 meters in full load conditions. The ships will be powered by electric propulsion systems. The proposed LPD will have the capacity to carry six main battle tanks, 20 infantry combat vehicles and 40 heavy trucks. Each ship is expected to carry 1,430 personnel, 470 sailors and 900 troops.

Currently, India’s amphibious warfare capability is burdened with nine older tank landing ships of various sizes and capabilities. The 5655-ton Shardul class ships are the latest ones which are a hybrid of LST and LSD designs. They are an evolution of the Magar class amphibious landing ships. Shardul and Magar class can carry 10 armored vehicles, 11 armored personnel carriers and more than 500 troops.

JTull · Post by **JTull** » 19 Apr 2017 18:43

We're back to 20,000 ton

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 19 Apr 2017 18:53

Told ya. It would be around 30m beam and 180m length for that tonnage.

Cosmo_R · Post by **Cosmo_R** » 19 Apr 2017 20:58

"To quote Stalin, “Quantity has a quality all of its own."

I always saw this as Stalin's quality of sending millions to their death.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 19 Apr 2017 21:27

Could someone take a shot at this?

RohitAM wrote:The PLAN easily has at least 35 known active or under construction DDG's (Most of them are pretty recent with commissioning dates on or after 2000). Considering that their major threat is on the Pacific seaboard rather than the IOR, and the fact that the Pakistan Navy has no DDG's (and can't afford any), what should be the ideal number of DDG's in our ORBAT? We have 13 active/under construction destroyers (INS Paradip and INS Porbandar 15B class DDG's have been laid down yet?), but how long are the Rajput class DDG's expected to soldier on? We would need a follow-on order of at least 4-5 more destroyers to cover the retirement of the Rajput class (5 in number), and that has to be planned now, given the abysmally slow rate of construction in our shipyards.

It would be great if one of the gurus on here can give an overall qualitative naval threat assessment from our neighbours and suggest an ideal Indian Navy Orbat to deal with the threat? A suggested timeline would be 2025, I suppose, considering that the Pakistan Navy is/will be pretty much an extension of the PLAN anyways?

I will just add that Wiki does not state a range for Chinese Guided mijjile destroyers. But comparable ships have a range of 4000 nautical miles.

The distance from Hainan to Singapore in 1200 nm and Singapore to Port Blair is about 1100nm. Where would Chinese ships refuel? At sea off Malaysia/Vietnam? In Sittwe Burma? In Hambantota? Srilanka is another 1000 nm away - so the ships would not be able to get home without refuelling

srai · Post by **srai** » 19 Apr 2017 21:39

PLAN has some 17 fleet replenishment ships. New Type 901 fast combat support ship is being inducted.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 19 Apr 2017 21:43

Where would that happen if we talk of a hostile fleet coming from Hainan to Port blair. This side or that side of Malacca? Because it things get hot Sittwe will be Sitting Duck to be roasted and Hambantota would be Hamban-toast-a

vina · Post by **vina** » 19 Apr 2017 22:01

shiv wrote:Where would that happen if we talk of a hostile fleet coming from Hainan to Port blair. This side or that side of Malacca? Because it things get hot Sittwe will be Sitting Duck to be roasted and Hambantota would be Hamban-toast-a

Andaman and Nick are based strikers would hit on the other side. Subs and other assets taking pot shots. The Chinese fleet suffering interdiction and deep gashes even before rounding Malacca which is a choke point and kill zone, rounding out at Sunda probably, perfect spot for subs to lie in ambush, sea mines and torpedo mines to be laid... Not looking good at all. And with the others like Unkil and the Roos providing early warning and targeting and other covert help..

Karthik S · Post by **Karthik S** » 19 Apr 2017 22:22

shiv wrote:Where would that happen if we talk of a hostile fleet coming from Hainan to Port blair. This side or that side of Malacca? Because it things get hot Sittwe will be Sitting Duck to be roasted and Hambantota would be Hamban-toast-a

Just a quick calculation. From the tip of A&N islands, the distance to tip of Indonesia is less than 200 km and to Thailand to the east is around 500 km. The distance from Nagapattinam in TN to the southern tip of A&N is around 1500 km. To completely block the Bay of Bengal inlet, we need to get our 800 km wala Brahmos.

Just a poonch, can we build artificial Islands in Bay of Bengal at the edge of Indian Maritime boundary and use them as bases like the Chinese are doing in SCS?

RohitAM · Post by **RohitAM** » 19 Apr 2017 23:18

Karthik S wrote:Just a poonch, can we build artificial Islands in Bay of Bengal at the edge of Indian Maritime boundary and use them as bases like the Chinese are doing in SCS?

I don't think the IN intends to do that, simply because it is much more feasible to use land/A&N-based assets to sanitize the Bay of Bengal. In any case, it is fairly easy to imagine that the IN has the entire Bay mapped out, and has action plans in place for incursions by any ships/submarines. Do we have something like the SOSUS line laid out around the Straits of Malacca for monitoring and noise signature recording purposes??

PS: These Chinese artificial islands are in international waters or the maritime boundaries of other countries, right? They are within the "supposed" Chinese Maritime boundary, not the actual, internationally-recognized one (they consider the whole of SCS as within their maritime boundary, so their grandiose delusions know no bounds).

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 20 Apr 2017 01:46

http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/itCxLcl ... ildup.html

The author makes several confident assertions. Unfortunately does not have solid research to back up.

...The vast difference in the economies of China and India means that the former can counter our naval aviation assets many times over. Operationally, China’s naval fighter, the Su-33, outclasses India’s failed MiG-29K....

How did he arrive at this conclusion. MiG-29K is infact a better ship borne fighter than Su-33K thanks to the higher payload. The big Su thanks to its higher empty weight has to make trade offs between fuel and weapons. The MiG is also a modernized fighter, while I doubt how modern the Chinese jets or their weapons are. in any case "many times over" - seriously?

Dominating the littoral with carriers is also a problematic proposition. A cursory glance at the Indian Ocean reveals two kinds of states here—very powerful ones and very weak ones. Sending all three carriers against powerful countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Pakistan, Singapore and Australia would be suicidal, with each of these countries possessing the ability to tackle India’s naval fighters effectively. On the other hand, even one aircraft carrier is a farcical overkill against countries like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Somalia, Mauritius, Mozambique et al. This means the Indian carrier build-up answers a question nobody asked.

The carrier is just one of the components of a naval build up against any littoral state. The fighters may not even attack land targets, but provide a protective bubble to the fleet. We deployed Viraat to coerce Pakistan for example, during 1999 or was it 2002.

Yet, curiously, the critical ASW helicopter shortage is something the Indian Navy has dangerously subjugated to its quixotic quest for inutile carriers.

That is a downright lie. IN has been demanding choppers for years. It was IN, who decided to 'field' 2 Sea Kings off our frigates and destroyers when no other world navy was doing it.

Chinese nuclear submarines will, in such a situation, challenge the Indian surface fleet and are best countered by a strong anti-submarine helicopter force for the fleet.

Where will these ASW helicopters deploy from may I ask?

While submarines are not cheap, they are much cheaper than aircraft carriers, play to India’s strength and meet our requirement set in a much more affordable, versatile and sustainable way.

This tru-ish type of statement cannot be proven wrong or right. A Submarine vs Aircraft Carrier debate has to be framed in terms of the strategic effect they have, i.e. Sea Denial vs Sea Control.

....(read frigates, submarines and helicopters) that yield true “bang for the buck” in the short to medium term.[/b]

A carrier is going to be in service for 30-40 years.

A lot of fancy English, but pure garbage article.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 20 Apr 2017 01:58

RohitAM wrote:The PLAN easily has at least 35 known active or under construction DDG's (Most of them are pretty recent with commissioning dates on or after 2000). Considering that their major threat is on the Pacific seaboard rather than the IOR, and the fact that the Pakistan Navy has no DDG's (and can't afford any), what should be the ideal number of DDG's in our ORBAT? .....

I don't think Navy build up is to be seen as DDG vs DDG. An invading DDG fleet could be countered by missile boats as well.

In my view, IN has deficiency primarily in ASW corvettes and SSNs in relation to PLAN. We should place an order of at least 12 ASW corvettes;

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 20 Apr 2017 04:43

Karthik S wrote:To completely block the Bay of Bengal inlet, we need to get our 800 km wala Brahmos. g]

love to see an Ashm variant of the shourya...would need some Sat support at longer distances and a big seeker in the nose, but this beast could cover 1500km in about 15 minutes..... Sanitizes a truly massive area. Ship based air defense will find it hard because of speed even if it is high altitude, they'll need to have ABM for defence, and even that is no guarantee.

Of course, the big problem here is actually finding and then tracking the targets. But once found, time to target is very, very short. Would make life miserable for any adventurous PLAN battle groups. What IN needs is a real robust surveillance system extending out 2000km from shore - a flotilla of MPAAs, underwater assets, and cheap ships that can stage large, long ranged choppers, not to mention space based assets. Much of these can be produced and procured fast and cheap instead of trying to match the PLAN ship for ship.

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 20 Apr 2017 05:17

Aditya G wrote:http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/itCxLcl ... ildup.html....
A carrier is going to be in service for 30-40 years.A lot of fancy English, but pure garbage article.

Would have to agree, that article seems to have a lot of issues. But one point that it does raise and I would love to see BRFite views on this - how many carriers does IN need and how big should they be? What are the roles envisioned?

My thought is that these CBGs will at most provide air cover to other assets and perhaps aid in sea denial. In a more defensive posture they could be used to protect sea lanes and manage a degree of control. But power projection is more likely to be of a defensive nature within the IOR - perhaps a Charles De Gaulle type thing vs. an IOR Libya. Beyond this I don't really see any true power projection possible.

For such roles as above, I would think 3 Stobar types - Vikad, VIk 1 and possibly a slightly bigger Vik 2 would do the job. I see SSNs/SSGNs as a much better idea for offensive and riskier roles related to the East.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 20 Apr 2017 07:04

Aditya G wrote:http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/itCxLcl ... ildup.html

How did he arrive at this conclusion. MiG-29K is infact a better ship borne fighter than Su-33K thanks to the higher payload. The big Su thanks to its higher empty weight has to make trade offs between fuel and weapons. The MiG is also a modernized fighter, while I doubt how modern the Chinese jets or their weapons are. in any case "many times over" - seriously?
.

It's not about BRF. It's about any educated Indian. There is a culture of simply giving up and shivering with fright the moment anything Chinese is mentioned. This comes through in all sorts of ways in almost any random article or forum post sometimes. This language is typical. Also - many of these posts and articles about China are fingerwagging admonitions to Indians. "Hey you useless Indians. What are you doing? Are you sleeping like 1962? Look at China. You will be defeated again". This is one reason that I wanted to keep the China thread free from complete collapse and self flagellation. That was the thread which was typically derailed by these ideas. But on here I think analyses - such as AdityaGs critique are possible while we look at Indian issues, good or bad.

srai · Post by **srai** » 20 Apr 2017 07:24

shiv wrote:Where would that happen if we talk of a hostile fleet coming from Hainan to Port blair. This side or that side of Malacca? Because it things get hot Sittwe will be Sitting Duck to be roasted and Hambantota would be Hamban-toast-a

If they want to get into the Indian Ocean far from Malacca strait, they could use Sunda, Lombok, or Wetar straits.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 20 Apr 2017 08:45

As I see it. in wartime any base used by Chinese vessels within range of IAF/IN will be toasted. China's bet bet is to do an America- that is, to build up, in peacetime, naval bases that are out of easy reach of Indian aircraft or Indian aircraft carriers. If China acquires such a base it would have to be on our target list - either by naval bombardment of air attack via a carrier task force. Obviously China would try everything to sink that carrier - but hey that is what war is all about. We fight with war fighting assets - using our best assets to hit out while trying to minimize risk. I disagree with ideas that say "sending a carrier is risky. Don't send. Sending aircraft is risky. Don't send". Instead don't fight war at all. That could be the most risky course.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 20 Apr 2017 08:52

we need OTH radars track naval movements south of indonesia and a sosus necklace across bay of bengal and west coast. infact layers of necklaces