Deterrence

Supratik · Post by **Supratik** » 08 Apr 2017 01:37

Yes, we have deterrence against China but it hasn't stopped them from arming Pak. I won't be surprised if even the TNWs, alleged MIRV and alleged sub-launched Babur are all with Chinese help.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Apr 2017 02:08

Supratik and Gagan, US arsenal is based on high yield weapons. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) limits underground tests to 150Kt and is in effect since 1963. So who doubts the US weapons credibility?

And take a look at US tests since 1980s to get an idea of how the yields were?

sanjaykumar · Post by **sanjaykumar** » 08 Apr 2017 02:51

India needs to outsource its quotidian defence problems and cultivate a rent boy that China can deal with directly. Much as China has done in Pakistan and North Korea. There are several candidates, but what Asia needs is for Japan to go nuclear.

Parenthetically, Trump is calling China's bluff on North Korea and has just shown Xi how the US can mend 'errant' ways, as in Syria. Surprised Xi hasn't stormed off yet.

Supratik · Post by **Supratik** » 08 Apr 2017 03:28

True, ramana.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 08 Apr 2017 05:25

Supratik wrote:Focus should firmly be on Pakistan. Nuclear posture against China should be defensive. Karnad is trying to distract. Why I don't know.

Karnad, whom you are quoting, has not explained how he will kill the cat.

I will try to explain the perspective. Karnad's prime concern is to harness Indian power towards the role of a great power. These are not some fuzzy words but are defined by him. Towards this objective, Pakistan is deemed to be a distraction. Given that the reality of partition cannot be wished away, he would like to dilute the effects of partition - who's primary effect is on India's power projections capabilities especially as it relates to geo-political power. With Pakistan he has preferred to co-opt the state rather than be in a fight that weakens both with China eating the cake.

The constant harp about advanced nuclear weapons is precisely due to the fact these capabilities bestow on the nation the pinnacle of hard power projections. Furthermore, he would like our conventional capabilities to be aimed squarely at China. Over the years there are many things he has suggested, including an ask for 10 more mountain division - doubling our capabilities in the area along with a host of others including but not limited to supply of arms to SCS nations and overseas bases in the IOR. Between land and sea, he has preferred to focus on land warfare as land is far more strategic with permanent effects. He has asked for nuance in recognition of TAR. He has preferred allying with other nations like Japan but not the US.

I do not know, what do you mean by kill the cat, the objective is to meet the challenge of China's power and protect Indian power capabilities in an expanse that more or less moves along the Caspian, the straits of Hormuz, malacca and the south African coast.

If you have not read his latest book, you may do so and know precisely what he has articulated and then gauge if he has a plan against China. It does not look like you have read his works, "books" that is or the many, many pieces on China that he has articulated over the years. BTW: A view of about 500 warheads against China's estimated 800 is - defensive! Anything less is delusional and non-realistic and giving up on this game of power, chanakian theories aside.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Apr 2017 06:37

Sanjay Kumar,
Trump.is following std template.

https://twitter.com/ramana_brf/status/8 ... 3784895488

sanjaykumar · Post by **sanjaykumar** » 08 Apr 2017 07:44

Seen this movie many times. Remember how Libya in Chad was the end of civilisation? The only ones who don't seem to know the role play are the Americans and Europeans; third worlders can recite the script by heart.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 10 Apr 2017 07:58

Opinion piece by Yusuf of DFI in Livemint
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/Xgg3LgQ ... trine.html

VKumar · Post by **VKumar** » 10 Apr 2017 22:19

India should help Vietnam, Taiwan, Mongolia get stronger. Cooperate more with S.Korea and Japan.

vasu raya · Post by **vasu raya** » 10 Apr 2017 22:24

the Chinese phrase is "share the prosperity" ...

Supratik · Post by **Supratik** » 10 Apr 2017 22:44

Shaurya, will post a rebuttal when i have time. give it a few days.

Supratik · Post by **Supratik** » 10 Apr 2017 22:54

I see Yusuf Unjhawala making several mistakes. The leaks are coming from people who are actually in the business. How do you know Pak is going to initiate with just TNWs? Is there any agreement signed in triplicate? Why would India want to go up the escalatory ladder? The leaks specfically mention it is Pak specific. No one knows really how many nukes China, India, Pak have. Why base it on western estimates which have no source? What is the motivation behind India denying Pak the escalatory ladder. It is basically to deny nuclear black-mail. He doesn't realize it.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 11 Apr 2017 09:12

ShauryaT wrote: A view of about 500 warheads against China's estimated 800 is - defensive! Anything less is delusional and non-realistic and giving up on this game of power, chanakian theories aside.

Expressions like "delusional" and "non realistic" should be eaten side by side with counter expressions like "logical", "sensible" and "practicable"

Interesting numbers 500 and 800

If the Chinese know that India has 500 warheads why would they be deterred? Has Karnad explained that? Why would China think that it is OK if they can knock out 99% of Indian nukes and just get hit by 5 of them?

"We don't mind 5 bombs landing on us."

If 5 out of 500 is all that we can hit them with before we are devastated by Chinese nuclear numerical superiority surely it is better to simply ensure that we put at least 10-15 on them and hiding them well among 1000 decoys no?

I have personally never managed to understand why China would be deterred by 500 or even 1000 Indian warheads. The assumption is that the other guy looks at you and gets scared that you have so much destructive power. Karnad himself clearly respects "megatonne" power over kiloton power. He seems to respect what he defines as "thermonuclear" over something else. In this vein he thinks China would get deterred by more Indian nukes.

Platitudes about how others should think cannot replace explanations. China does not sound like it is deterred by the US either so what would 500 Indian weapons achieve in terms of causing fear. I have not understood the thought process.

Of course this entire argument is time-pass but I do think Karnad puts up timepass arguments A nation that does not want nuclear war will likely be deterred at the thought of just 10 bombs falling on their nation let alone 200 or 500. I have not understood the logic that says " I am not deterrred by 10 but I am deterred by 500"

The endless timepass comes from this numbers game

I am not deterred by 10 but am deterred by 500
I am not deterred by 20 but am deterred by 500
I am not deterred by 30 but am deterred by 500
[..]
I am not deterred by 200 but am deterred by 500
[..]
I am not deterred by 499 but am deterred by 500

What is the exact rationale behind this numbers game? Whose opinion is "correct"?

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 12 Apr 2017 21:28

shiv wrote: What is the exact rationale behind this numbers game? Whose opinion is "correct"?

Shiv ji: Deterrence as you have said many times is a mind game. For a nation that simply does not want nuclear war at any costs or is unable or unwilling to play this game will be out of contention from this game of power and out fast.

If you are looking for rationale based on data, where such and such scenarios exist and nuclear deterrence has broken or been met then you know there isn't much - except for MAD. If you are looking for data from other competing forces nuclear or conventional, where a combination of numerical and technological assets are arrayed against each other and how they "may" have contributed to deterrence, such is available in spades. But at a very basic level are you really questioning the very rationale of strength in numbers, strength in fire power as a basis for adversarial nations or just the 500 number in context of China?

I guess there is a reason why Pakistan keeps up with X squadrons and X regiments of tanks arrayed - based on Indian capabilities, beggaring themselves in the process. One can similarly argue why bother and not invest in SAM's and ATGM to counter? I guess the answer is in the idea that aggression pays, not defense. The USSR/Russia have not invested in carrier assets, their answer was defensive to invest in bombers instead to counter these carriers. But, it is the carriers that are the symbol of power in global waters and the world order arrayed as such.

At a certain level, if you really think and I doubt that you do that China is deterred by a few nuclear bombs - reason being they would like to avoid nuclear war at all costs then you have a case but a tall one to prove that China does indeed get deterred by a few bombs (in all situations) and strength will not have an effect on them. Karnad's 525 is an evolution from about 350 from about year 2000. China's numbers and asset mix has evolved since then conventional logic would dictate ours should also. You are free to put up a case for an alternate set of numbers that in your view would deter China.

Admiral Raja Menon had these high 300's number even before Pokhran 2.

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 12 Apr 2017 23:04

Gagan wrote:Nobody is going to use a N weapon really. Not India and not china.
It is a d$@k measuring contest which involves displaying scientific and military poweress.
Once a certain yield threshold is proofed, then scientifically we are at par.

Now the problem is, scaled and untested weapons which are deployed. They need backups with proofed heavy FBFs.
This has a bearing on missile range, on number of MIRVs carried. There is a reason why india missile ranges are so conservative, and their throw weights so large. 3000km with a 3 ton throw weight on a 2 staged 1.8 -2 m dia missile!
It is pretty frustrating sir.

But again deterrence is present, for china.

Nuclear weapon use does not consist of simply firing them on a city or armored column. They are used in complex geopolitical maneuvering shaping and constraining enemy responses. Consider, that the Pakistani weapon has already been used to murder nearly a hundred thousand Indians (a number similar to casualties from a 20KT weapon on a city) without ever being fired in anger! Similarly, the Chinese weapon has been used for a defacto land(sea) grab in the SCS, the LARGEST landgrab in the history of the world since WW 2 ! If Russians did not have nuclear weapons, their integration of Crimea would not have been tolerated by the world.

Indians unnecessarily hobble their thought process by only trying to address the minimal problem of deterring an Armageddon style exchange of weapons or an invasion. A minimal deterrent to solve a minimally defined problem. Yet, these weapons are being used every day against India..

A new India, newly connected by media of a thousand different varieties, but still bearing old fault lines is uniquely vulnerable to the new kinds of wars being waged. How do nuclear weapons shape the geopolitical and conflict spectrum landscape? Is there a lower cost way to deterring nuclear powers from sponsoring insurgencies instead of posting yet more guards armed with AKs (the new lathi! the very idea is as ridiculous as the lathi wielding cops of the 80s) at every nook and corner? If we are engaged in a NEW 4th gen war by a power that has a vastly bigger nuclear arsenal, what should be our response? Can our nuclear arsenal play a role in deterring such new age wars? Questions that are not even asked.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 15 Apr 2017 10:23

ShauryaT wrote: Deterrence as you have said many times is a mind game.
<snip>
But at a very basic level are you really questioning the very rationale of strength in numbers, strength in fire power as a basis for adversarial nations or just the 500 number in context of China?
<snip>
At a certain level, if you really think and I doubt that you do that China is deterred by a few nuclear bombs - reason being they would like to avoid nuclear war at all costs then you have a case but a tall one to prove that China does indeed get deterred by a few bombs (in all situations)

Yes it is a mind game and that is why:
1. The number of play-able scenarios is large
2. Many people "experts" and "others" have posted their thoughts about this game.

In fact it is precisely a thought experiment/mind game I was aiming at.

Let us assume that India has 500 nuclear weapons and China has 800.

We have no idea how much damage China is willing to endure - but we must assume that 500 weapons is enough to make them cry.

But how many will stop us? Maybe I can make it easy by saying that we do not want any nukes to land on India but if we must get hit - maybe 10 weapons taking out 10 major cities will make us fold. So 10 is the maximum that we can endure.

Can we EVER stop the Chinese from hitting us with at least 10 weapons? The answer is no. Our 500 weapons do not give a guarantee that China cannot hit us with at least 10 nukes. Then what deterrence are we talking about? No matter what happens in a nuclear war - we will be hit beyond our endurance limit of 10 nukes.

Does this mean that we have NO deterrence despite having 500 nukes?

This is where everyone's personal thoughts can be posted to answer this question.

My thoughts tell me:
We have 500 nukes. If we dump all 500 on China they are sure to feel pain. But unless we launch first and dump 500 we cannot inflict that degree of pain on them. Failing that, how much pain can China withstand? It is another matter that we will simultaneously be punished beyond our endurance, but the aim of deterrence is to cause enough pain to make the other person cry.

"How much pain can China withstand" is crucial for deterrence. Will 10 bombs each on Beijing, Shanghai and say Chengdu cause China enough pain?

If 30 bombs to lay Beijing, Shanghai and Chengdu to waste is enough - what are we doing with the other 470 (out of 500 bombs)? Are we thinking that China will first devastate us with several hundred bombs and then we will have just 30 left that we can use?

The number of bombs India needs can only be calculated first by calculating the minimum number of bombs needed to make China AND Pakistan cry and augmenting that number by another number that we feel may be destroyed in a first strike.

What is the minimum number that will make China cry?

Vayutuvan · Post by **Vayutuvan** » 23 Apr 2017 02:33

Do people know about this site? It could be useful for what if scenario type of analysis.

NUKEMAP Classic

NUKEMAP CLASSIC (New - NUKEMAP2)

1. Drag the marker to wherever you'd like to target.
Or type in the name of a city:

2. Enter a yield (in kilotons):

3. Click the "Detonate" button below.
Detonate Clear Multiple Center ground zero
Note that you can drag the target marker after you have detonated the nuke.

Effects scaling equations taken from Carey Sublette's Nuclear Weapons FAQ.

NUKEMAP2 has launched!
Try it now! It has better effects calculations, radioactive fallout contours, and casualty estimates!

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 28 Apr 2017 22:17

The link below contains the full document of the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces released by the Chairman of the COSC on April 26, 2017. It's a 86 page document and I am posting it in this thread only as there are aspects mentioned in it which address the issue of nuclear deterrence. However it can also be cross posted in other threads in the Military Forums.

http://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploa ... Forces.pdf

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 29 Apr 2017 03:36

This week Jamee Woolsey the former CIA chief came on Fox news and started scaring people that NoKo will launch and test a nuke in space and knowk out all kinds of communication devices on Earth.

So NPR did some digging arounnd and an expert came on radio on Thursday and said that in Spetember 1962, US launched a nuke inot space and exploded it to see what the effects on ground were. All telephones and lights on the pacific coast were turned on. Except for some crackle on a few phones and a few streetlights in Hawaii, noting much happend for a bomb about 100 times what NoKo has last tested.
And now electronic devices have pulse detection circuits whih by pass the surge.

Somuch for fearmongering by experts.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 29 Apr 2017 18:52

http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/indias-2 ... takeaways/

The word minimum is gone. Nfu is there.

Imo we need a mix of 150x150kt for military or industrial targets and 150x400kt for cities...plus another 150 as insurance lic policy. Should be a light tn design with variable yield. That should enough not just to deter china but rest p4 also once we get enough delivery systems in place.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 29 Apr 2017 21:03

Singha wrote:http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/indias-2 ... takeaways/

The word minimum is gone. Nfu is there.

Imo we need a mix of 150x150kt for military or industrial targets and 150x400kt for cities...plus another 150 as insurance lic policy. Should be a light tn design with variable yield. That should enough not just to deter china but rest p4 also once we get enough delivery systems in place.

ldev has posted the document above.

The relevant portion is here. I will take it but not sure if "minimum" is dropped from doctrine. For the word to be truly dropped would we consider maintaining say double the strength of TSP/PRC combined? Probably not.

The defining issues for Nuclear C2 is to; maintain a credible deterrence; no first use; civilian authorization; and dispersed arsenal structure to ensure option to retaliate is availablexxv.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 30 Apr 2017 02:05

Bharat Karnad critique:

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Security Wise
Bharat Karnad – India's Foremost Conservative Strategist

Joint Forces Doctrine — passive, defensive inward-turned, and disappointing
This was not unexpected, but still it is surprising just how unventuresome, diffident, hesitant and, therefore, thoroughly fainthearted the ‘Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces’ really is. Issued by Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), Ministry of Defence, this document supposedly outlines the jointness mission for the military. As such, it is a fairly innocuous bit of paper indulging in banality-mongering to the max, taking extreme care to not touch on the practical aspects of integrating authority, military resources, and effort. It is a document that at best reflects an intent to realize jointness in the indeterminate future. Because, on the ground, the individual services still reign supreme and who regard IDS more as encumbrance than help.

However, IDS and its work is played up by the military brass whenever they sense movement by government to restructure the higher defence organization by replacing the existing order with a Chief of Defence Staff-system. When Manohar Parrikar was around there was real fear that one fine day he’d take it into his head to get on with the long pending job of major organizational reform and restructuring. Whence, this document was conceived as a way to postponing even an interim solution of a permanent 4-star post as Chairman, Chief of Staff Committee, recommended by the Committee headed by the arch bureaucrat, Naresh Chandra. Known to his 1956 IAS batchmates as “ustaad” for his ability to size up a situation, manage it, run circles around politicians and the lesser civil services, and generally maintain the status quo in which babus are top-dogs (especially in MOD), Chandra was not about to suggest anything radical. Sequentially chief secretary, Rajasthan, and at the centre, defence secretary, home secretary, and finally, cabinet secretary before beginning his unending post-retirement tenures in government, including being retained by Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Indian Ambassador to the United States, Chandra was one of the charter members of the bureaucratic clique that has pushed and pulled Indian policy towards close India-US ties at the expense of every thing else. He sided as cabsec, it may be recalled, with those in Delhi (K. Subrahmanyam, Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, et al) and keeping up the drumbeat from Washington where he was appointed ambassador in 1996 for India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. With Finance Minister Arun Jaitley back as part time defence minister, everybody who counts in the military hierarchy seems reassured that the pressure is off, and the incumbent raksha mantri does not have the time or inclination to do anything substantive. In that sense, this “doctrine’ is the military brass’ collective sigh of relief!

There’s much to question in this paper, but here’s my reaction to certain aspects of it (in no particular order of importance) stuck me as troubling.

1) In the sub-sections (pp 1-2) on “National Aim” and “National Interests”, for instance, there’s no mention anywhere about extending India’s influence in South Asia, Asia, and the world. In other words, the Indian armed forces are happy where they are and with the country where it is, namely, sidelined even in the extended region.

In this circumscribed sphere, the armed forces described as the “Military Instrument of National Power” (p. 6) their utility limited to being “a means of deterrence and conflict resolution”. While acknowledging their “coercive nature” the paper stresses the armed forces’ being “gainfully employed” in “non-conflict situations and natural disasters”, in short a uniformed version of Oxfam or similar social service agency.

2) Have railed in all my writings for some 30 years now about the wrong threat perceptions animating the Indian military. When one gets so basic a thing wrong, what can the armed forces get right? Anyway, here’s proof, albeit indirect, about just which threat our military is preoccupied with — Pakistan. In a section entitled “Strategic environment scan”, the document speaks (p. 7) of “the requirement to safeguard our territorial integrity” owing to the “disputed borders” and lists the Line of Control in the west first.

A related section (pp. 8-9) on “Security Threats and Challenges” rather than speaking straightforwardly about China, Pakistan, etc., talks obliquely about competition for resources, of “inherited faultlines” and “increasing blurring lines of traditional and nontraditional challenges”.

3) In pondering the “Nature War (sic) and character of conflict/war” (p. 10), the attributes of future wars are listed as “ambiguous, uncertain, short, swift, lethal, intense, precise, non-linear, unrestricted, unpredictable and hybrid”. Whew! Scrounging together all these adjectives, leaves the big Question open — so what’s India to prepare for??? Because the forces required to fight short, swift, lethal, intense, precise counter-force wars are surely quite distinct and different from those needed to engage in necessarily long duration conflicts that are ambiguous, uncertain, non-linear, unrestricted, unpredictable, and hybrid. When minds are not applied, vapid statements like this result.

It reminds me of Reagan’s jibe against Walter Mondale when the latter advanced a fairly inane proposal in the 1984 US presidential elections – “where’s the beef?”

4) Part of the problem — other than passing off the banal as profound — is with the language. In getting inventive in using the English language, the result is grating, to wit, (p. 12) — “There are four levels of of War; Political/Grand strategic , Military strategic, Operational and Tactical; each level being twisted to the other.” In this construction, “each level being twisted to the other” appears in italics — meaning what the authors themselves know the phrase makes zero sense, or that there’s a meaning the reader is not supposed easily to divine, what…?

Further in a slightly confused discussion on “Generations of War” (p. 13) — again the language and content problem emerges — there is a statement of war transiting quickly from 1st generation to 5th gen hybrid warfare of today which ends with this — “Simply put, it is a war in which one of the major participants is not a State but rather a violent non-state actor or non-state actor sponsored by a State”, thereby synthetically separating non-state actors from the patronage of the adversary state, which division carries little weight in the practical world.

In the section following on “India in Conflict/War” (p. 14), the paper refers to an “operationally adaptable force” almost as an imperative without anywhere explaining how the country is to obtain it. This harks back to my #3 above. Is such a force to be the all-purpose military capable of short intense wars as also long duration attrition conflicts? If so, it was all the more necessary IDS had at least sketched out how this is to be achieved and at what cost.

5) In the chapter on “Military — An Instrument of National Power” and section therein concerning “Functions of Military Power” that dilates on conventional offensive and defensive operations (p. 19), we have such gems as “offensive operations” to address “The adversary’s centre of gravity” by “attacking enemy’s criticalities….” etc. If this is a primer on the military, what is such stuff doing in a doctrine? This is succeeded by a para on offensive ops wherein is semi-detailed “A philosophy of pro-active defence” that the doucument claims is “most suited for India”, which is revealing of the Indian military’s attitude generally, perhaps, mirroring the Indian Government’s mindset. In trying to conform to NSA Ajit Doval’s fairly elementary rendition of “offensive defence”, this document — emphasizes “defensive operations” by “ensuring security of own forces, secur[ing] bases for launching forces and creat[ing] favourable conditions for offensive operations”.

In line with such thinking is the section on “International Defence Cooperation” (p.22) which talks of this pol-mil-diplomatic activity without once mentioning the absolute predicate for such military outreach and presence, namely, bases in the Indian Ocean Region and in the states on the landward periphery (such as in Central Asia). Staying and operating from homeland bases, the country is expected to “leverage” the achievement of “National Security Objectives”. This is like proposing to lift a tub while standing in it. Hard, in the event, to take much of this document seriously.

6) This unsophisticated, college sophomore-level paper rounds out by analyzing Jointness, observing correctly, for a change, that military integration is mandated by resource constraints and will make possible “centralized planning” and appropriate allocation of resources to obtain “the right mix [of forces] at the right time and place” and “a high level of cross-domain synergy”. (p. 39) But after saying all this about the urgent need for integrating the military and realizing that they had gone out on a limb with their masters, IDS quickly backtracks, reiterating on the very next page (p. 40) that all the preceding material notwithstanding, “It does not imply physical integration” of the three armed services.

7) This is almost a throwaway line, but on page 50, the document asserts, in the context of establishing a joint “Special Operations Division” the fact that “the possibility of a conventional war under a nuclear overhang recedes with attendant political and international compulsions” but stops short of saying that this is just the reason for a major overhaul of the extant military force structure, especially the rationalization of the three strike corps for exclusive use on the Pakistan front into a single composite corps that I have been advocating for nearly 25 years now, and transferring the materiel and human resources to form additional two offensive mountain corps for use against the Chinese PLA in Tibet. This would be the sort of force rejig that cries out to be implemented. Except the existing armed services are inclined to preserve and protect their autonomy at all cost, and even at the expense of the national interest.

More disarmingly, this IDS paper is upfront about needing to strike “a balance between indigenisation and foreign purchase essential to India’s military independence and modernization” (p. 54). This translates into continued reliance on imported armaments even though any level of foreign purchases is inimical to the country’s “military independence”.

9) And absent is any nod to the nuclear deterrent other than a wary affirmation of credible but minimum deterrence that reflects lack of deep insights and knowledge in the field. The doctrine refers to the need to shift force structuring from a threat-based template to a capability-based one. The Indian strategic deterrent too could do with a similar change in its fundamentals.

10) And, finally, there’s a pointed last page (61) reference to the perennial military-bureaucrat tension, saying “The functionaries in the MoD ought to be enablers” and facilitators of “free flowing communication” between the political class and the armed services, to make possible “critical and timely decision making” rather than being another variety of vested interests gumming up the works in the national security field.

——-

Taken in toto though, this paper is a lot of thin air masquerading as Joint Doctrine. Pity about this. Because serious thought is warranted regarding all aspects of the Indian military. Alas, this paper contains little of that.

Vayutuvan · Post by **Vayutuvan** » 30 Apr 2017 03:47

shiv wrote:Of course this entire argument is time-pass but I do think Karnad puts up timepass arguments A nation that does not want nuclear war will likely be deterred at the thought of just 10 bombs falling on their nation let alone 200 or 500. I have not understood the logic that says " I am not deterrred by 10 but I am deterred by 500"

The endless timepass comes from this numbers game
I am not deterred by 10 but am deterred by 500
I am not deterred by 20 but am deterred by 500
I am not deterred by 30 but am deterred by 500
[..]
I am not deterred by 200 but am deterred by 500
[..]
I am not deterred by 499 but am deterred by 500
What is the exact rationale behind this numbers game? Whose opinion is "correct"?

It has something to do with the marginal rate of deterrence. going from 2 to 4 the marginal dieterrence doesn't go up as steeply as going from say 256 to 512. But going from 512 to 1024 is not that important. If you can convince the enemy to be deterred that you have the capacity to go from 256 to 512 or already have (through the means like decoys and displaying empty red-light twinkling bombs a la SPECTRE which Bond gets to handle to save the world) mentioned by you, hakim ji, or really having done that and leak it through double agents), then the purpose is achieved.

Game theory is all mind games only after all - including stock markets, dating, a or poker.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 06 May 2017 17:25

Those who have read accounts of German bombing on Yingland cities and then accounts of British/US bombing of German cities using bombers in world war 2 will recall how bombers came night after night after night - later, for Germany it was day and night. Every day homes getting powdered and neighbourhoods getting smashed.

The same treatment was meted out to Hanoi and other Vietnamese cities. Similar love has been given to cities in Iraq and the Levant.

I ask you to place yourself in the situation of one of the citizens of such a city being bombed using conventional bombs. I will use the example of Bangalore Kerala. Imagine an adversary armed like the US with conventional weaponry. Across multiple cities in India people see what I relate below about Blr. On the first day a barrage of cruise missiles takes out all of Bangalore's airports, Yelahanka and Jakkur and lays HAL waste. Then ADA, IISc and the legislature buildings. Rly and bus stations. Then the BSF and Army Service corps areas are devastated and the houses of army personnel wrecked. Kendriya Viyalaya takes a hit. Power supplies and water supplies are hit by day 2. Then, one by one the IT areas are taken out. Whitefield. IT city. This is all done with "conventional weapons"

Would we as a nation, without the means to do this to an attacker, sit back and take this as Vietnam and Iraq did? I am sure that if the North Vietnamese had access to nukes they would have nuked some US asset. The same way - should we as a nation allow a future attacker to devastate our cities with "carpet bombing" using conventional weapons and not nuke the shit out of the attacker. Make him pay for the damage he is causing?

Is there anything is the rules spoken of in morality and humanity that will cause people to accept this sort of damage with conventional weapons and not hit back with nukes if you have them?

Have our nuclear planners thought of what would be done if a massive Chinese attack with conventional missiles laid 30 cities waste?

wig · Post by **wig** » 17 May 2017 17:23

http://www.outlookindia.com/website/sto ... led/298943
link to article on tunnels dug by Pakistan for secure storage of Nuclear weapons of Pakistan.

Pakistan has built a nuclear weapons storage facility, till now unknown, at the foot of Peer Than Mountain near Haripur in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Evidences suggest Pakistan would have deployed its nuclear missiles of Shaheen series in the facility, posing a grave threat to the whole of India.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 17 May 2017 18:46

One wonders why two mosques? One must be Shia and other Sunni.

The two tunnels are in a direct line of sight and face north-west. Very possible given the Brahmos' accuracy, that it can dive right into the entrances.
There is a possible tunnel facing north east, at the very tip, near the 1st tunnel, which might be difficult to reach.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 22 May 2017 05:21

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the ... gram-18673

Evolution of Indias Nuclear doctrine from the 1960s

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 21 Jun 2017 06:01

X-Post...

Prasant wrote:Not sure if this has been discussed before, but here it is:
India’s Nuclear Exceptionalism
In this Project on Managing the Atom Discussion Paper, Mansoor Ahmed examines India’s fissile material production capacity and the military potential of its unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle and energy program. The paper details India’s existing nuclear arsenal and its potential for expansion, with a focus on three key areas, namely:

The principles governing the separation of India’s civil and military fuel cycle facilities;

The size and weapons potential of India’s existing unsafeguarded stocks of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and plutonium as well as its unsafeguarded stockpile of reactor-grade plutonium (maintained as a “strategic reserve” and as fuel for India’s fast breeder program); and

The fissile material production capacity of its reactor fleet, its existing and planned reprocessing facilities, and growing uranium enrichment program.

The paper suggests that India’s existing and future nuclear capability fuels regional security anxieties with Pakistan and impedes progress on the early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Dr. Ahmed offers policy recommendations for managing the South Asian fissile material conundrum and calls for a transparent and verifiable separation of civil and military fuel cycle and reactor programs in India and beyond.
The author estimates that India's current stockpile is sufficient for ~2200 to 2600 warheads, while Pakistan's is sufficient for 207. Paki author, so to be taken with a pinch of salt.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 13 Jul 2017 09:54

Indian nuclear forces, 2017 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris

India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, with at least four new weapon systems nowunder development to complement or replace existing nuclear-capable aircraft, land-baseddelivery systems, and sea-based systems. India is estimated to have produced enough plutoniumfor 150–200 nuclear warheads but has likely produced only 120–130. Nonetheless, additionalplutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and Indiais reportedly building two new plutonium production facilities. India’s nuclear strategy, which hastraditionally focused on Pakistan, now appears to place increased emphasis on China.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 13 Jul 2017 12:07

Yusuf Unjhawala@YusufDFI wrote:Ayatollahs Kristensen & Norris keep estimating Indian nukes at lower numbers with the hope of getting rebuttal from India. Won't happen

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 13 Jul 2017 13:04

The tactic is to *force* GOI to respond. You low ball the estimate and throw it out with the hope that mangos & GOI , feeling insulted, will respond and give out some detail rather any detail which they then will use to refine their understanding.

OTOH, the baki keep shouting from the roof top about India's high and growing PU stockpile.

Sometimes it feels that they are part of the same team. Might be an alliance of convenience with different objectives but together on this one project.

panduranghari · Post by **panduranghari** » 15 Jul 2017 14:53

Vayutuvan wrote: Game theory is all mind games only after all - including stock markets, dating, a or poker.

I agree. To be more specific its like Prisoners Dilemma. Only difference here is the US wants to create this equal=equal between India and Bakistan. But this positioning is merely to ensure India-Bakistan achieve the MAD and permit China to be the other pole of G2.

Indian No First use was followed by American inspired Bakistan using TNW on their own territory which was countered by Indian punitive response to Bakistan.

Now the question is what will US do so that MAD happens? I think they will work with China to make this end goal.

Look at this graphic.

The G2 are aging and so are many others in the US camp.

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 17 Jul 2017 13:20

Speaking of deterrence, I like to remind the forum of the late Varsha Bhosle now and then. She was the original jingo, a lurker on BRF (didn't have the stomach to participate believe it or not) and a very close friend of mine for years. She wrote this below, in 1997 a few months before Shakthi II, and this article is shot through with paragraphs, sentences and phrases I had written into it for her (of course, she credits me in her own mad way, and I gave here a "virtual slap" on the butt for that).

http://news.rediff.com/news/oct/10varsha.htm

Despite her firebrand image, she was a soft vulnerable creature inside, very self-conscious and delicate to the point of fragility. A deeply troubled person, contributed in no small measure by an abnormal childhood in a complicated celebrity world at the time, she eventually came to a difficult pass in her life: Her wonderful mind did not want her body or this world, and she let them go. I still mourn and miss her utterly irreverent, mischievous and sharp mind, and her deep sense of civilisation in the here and now that only an Indian woman can have as a daughter of Mother India.

kumarn · Post by **kumarn** » 17 Jul 2017 16:19

Wow! Jingo of jingoes! What she advocates for missiles and nukes also applies for Tejas and jet engines!

DrRatnadip · Post by **DrRatnadip** » 27 Jul 2017 18:56

http://m.economictimes.com/news/defence ... 789364.cms

Musharraf planned to use nukes against India after 2001 attack, claims report

Pakistan's former military dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf says he mulled the use of nuclear weapons against India amid tensions following the 2001 terror attack on the Indian Parliament, but decided against doing so out of fear of retaliation, according to a media report.
Musharraf, 73, also recalled that he had many sleepless nights, asking himself whether he would or could deploy nuclear weapons, the Japanese daily 'Mainichi Shimbun' said.
The former president disclosed that amid tensions between India and Pakistan following the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, he contemplated the use of nuclear weapons, but decided against doing so out of fear of retaliation

Karthik S · Post by **Karthik S** » 27 Jul 2017 19:00

They are planning for gazwa e hind, but are deciding against out of fear of retaliation. What's so special about this news.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Jul 2017 21:05

DrRatnadip wrote:http://m.economictimes.com/news/defence ... 789364.cms

Musharraf planned to use nukes against India after 2001 attack, claims report

Pakistan's former military dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf says he mulled the use of nuclear weapons against India amid tensions following the 2001 terror attack on the Indian Parliament, but decided against doing so out of fear of retaliation, according to a media report.
Musharraf, 73, also recalled that he had many sleepless nights, asking himself whether he would or could deploy nuclear weapons, the Japanese daily 'Mainichi Shimbun' said.
The former president disclosed that amid tensions between India and Pakistan following the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, he contemplated the use of nuclear weapons, but decided against doing so out of fear of retaliation

What a scurrilous story by Economic Times. They act as if some Djinns attack the Indian Lok Sabha.

What Mushy is saying is he wanted to do a double whammy .
if the LeT terrorists succeeded in killing the parliamentarians' in the confusion he wanted to launch nukes.

By Dec 13 he would not have lived.
Nor Pakistan.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 29 Aug 2017 01:50

X-Post...

partha wrote:Nice tool to visualize missile range and area of destruction.

http://nuclearsecrecy.com/missilemap/#

Select a missile preset (for example, Agni 3) and select an area of impact (for example, GHQ, Rawalpindi) and zoom in to the target.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 03 Sep 2017 18:49

The 6th test by N. Korea claimed to be a hydrogen test are opportunities wasted by India to build a credible deterrent through its own series of tests. Under the yoke of the IUSNCA and US led regimes, we compromise our security as the PRC, TSP and DPRK collude to build their capabilities, threatening Indian interests.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 03 Sep 2017 19:13

Does Korea have a deterrent?

Yes I think so.

Would they use the deterrent? Ironically a deterrent stops being a deterrent when the use it. OK they drop a nuke on Japan, Guam and the US. What will happen? Will the US tuck its tail between its legs and curl up to die?

My guess is that NoKo is toast if they "use" their deterrent

The same old argument. Once they have a deterrent, using it makes it fail.

But there is a more serious side which I have brought up from time to time but no one has taken the bait. I don't blame people for that because every time the discussion has involved India on one side.

Now here is a good opportunity to leave India out and ask, "Suppose a small nuclear war occurs. Nuke on Guam and maybe Japan. Then the US pulverizes NoKo with mostly conventional nukes and maybe some small yield nukes for hardened targets." Let's suppose the war ends there with NoKo devastated.

What will be the new world order?

Hey - it occurs to me that this could be a new thread. Maybe I will start one soon..