Project 75I - It Begins

[Philip]

Subs,even legacy ones are becoming v.hard to come by.Russia is modernising all 4 Oscar class SSGNs to carry Kalibir missiles instead of Granit,for its pacific fleet.A few years ago,a Russian analysts suggested Russia leasing these subs to India to counter China.
http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/russias- ... -missiles/

Assuming by 2020 we possess all 9 Kilos which will last another decade+,modernised to fire Klub/Kalibir/Nirbhay and BMos-L in the future,at least 2 Akula-2/3 SSGNs,6 Scorpenes with Exocet and 4 upgraded U-boats with sub-Harpoon,we should have 18-20+ subs (not including Arihant SSBN subs) theoretically in service.Of the conventional boats,let's assume that 65% of them are operational at any given time.This will give us 12-16 boats including N-boats operational always. We have to deal with Pak's 8/12 AIP boats and at least 4-8 Chinese subs prowling in the IOR annually. The PLAN will ensure that at least one or two of its subs are in the IOR on a permanent basis,one on either coast .These subs would receive logistic support at Gwadar.A 3rd N-boat could also rotate on patrol in the IOR when required.

Given these numbers,the IN will be v.hard put to deal with the combined threat apart from carrying out our operational duties which would also inclue patrols in the Indo-China Sea.As an interim measure we must see whether we could get a couple more Akulas/N-boats on lease while we build at speed both N-boats and AIP subs locally using MDL,Vizag and the pvt. sector (L&T most likely). L&T are exploring collaborating with Ru yards and AIP tech. Let's ee what develops in the future. Even if the decision is taken early next year on the choice of the next conventional AIP line,it will take at least 4-5 years (2022+) before the first boat hits water.The number of subs that China will possess by 2020 is simply staggering,plus as earlier posted,its massive R&D campaign to master sub tech and overtake the USN has started to produce result (new prop. system)

[Philip]

India's decision to omit Oz from the Malabar naval exercises has created much angst in the US-led Asia-Pacific alliance ,who can't understand why Oz was not invited. I asked the same Q as well.Are we genuflecting too much in China's direction and allowing them a "free pass" when they care a hoot about our sensitivities as they intrude into POK,gobble up Gwadar,etc.,etc? The only reason why wqe are so deferent to the PRC is becos our mandarins feel we are vastly inferior militarily and will not be able to withstand a mil spat with the Sino-Pak JV. Our hope is that by 2020 at least we will have modernised sufficiently enough to deal exercise with whomsoever we choose and cock-a-snoop at China if it hyperventilates.

http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/why-is-i ... al-drills/

Why Is India Excluding Australia From Naval Drills?
A closer look at the reasons for New Delhi’s stance on the Malabar exercises

By Jeff M. Smith
June 01, 2017

Over the past quarter-century, the Malabar naval exercises have blossomed from a relatively mundane, low-level Indo-U.S. naval drill into a robust demonstration of geopolitical force joining the Indo-Pacific’s three most powerful democracies. The history and significance of Malabar, which Japan joined as a permanent participant in 2015, have received ample attention elsewhere. But let me focus this piece on the geopolitical context and significance of Australia’s request to join the 2017 Malabar exercises and India’s recent response.

Canberra has “regularly discussed” participating in Malabar with Delhi since at least 2015. Last month Defense Minister Marisa Payne publicly reaffirmed Canberra was “very interested” in quadrilateral engagement with India, the United States, and Japan. Apparently, Canberra’s private and public lobbying was for naught, with reports indicating India has declined Australia’s request to join Malabar 2017.

On the one hand, India’s decision tracks with its history of both its apprehensiveness toward geopolitical “alignment” broadly and quadrilateral demonstrations of force specifically as well as its traditional deference to Chinese sensitivities on related matters. On the other hand, recent changes in Indian foreign policy and the geopolitical landscape more broadly render Delhi’s decision somewhat surprising and—for those in Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra that have been lobbying for Australia’s inclusion in Malabar—lamentable.

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First, India’s decision breaks a trend of accelerating strategic engagement with Australia bilaterally, reinforced by a landmark nuclear cooperation deal reached in 2014 that ended a contentious legacy on nuclear-related matters. More recently, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull was welcomed to Delhi in April, where he insisted Australia was ready to begin uranium exports to India and reaffirmed Canberra’s support for Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Routine but hollow calls to deepen cooperation were replaced by meaningful advances in security ties: the two agreed to hold their first joint army exercises in 2018, establish a new “2+2” defense and foreign ministers dialogue, and enhance intelligence cooperation.

Not all the headlines were positive. Turnbull failed to advance a Logistics Support Agreement comparable to the one signed by Washington and Delhi last year. A Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement which has been six years in the making also witnessed little progress. Perhaps most significant, shortly after Turnbull departed Delhi, Canberra confirmed plans to scrap an employer-sponsored temporary work visa program (Indians account for more than one-quarter of the visas issued under the program each year).

Conspicuously announced just days after the visa program was canceled, India’s decision on Malabar may well have been related. Yet, it’s more likely India’s decision was influenced by a decision Australia made ten years ago, the first and last time it participated in a Malabar exercise.

In 2004, the navies of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States were thrust into a collaborate initiative by the most unfortunate of circumstances. Now largely forgotten in the West, in December 2004 a cataclysmic wave of tsunamis generated by an undersea megathrust earthquake off the coast of Indonesia claimed hundreds of thousands casualties across the Indo-Pacific. In response, the four democracies coordinated humanitarian relief efforts under the auspices of the ‘Regional Core Group.’

In the years to follow, the four capitals began flirting with greater quadrilateral strategic collaboration. In 2006 the Australia, Japan, and the United States formed their first trilateral security dialogue. In March 2007, Australia and Japan forged a bilateral security pact and India initiated its first strategic dialogue with Japan. The following month, India, Japan, and the United States conducted their first-ever trilateral naval exercise.

In May 2007, the four countries held the inaugural meeting of a new quadrilateral dialogue on the sidelines of an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting. “It is absolutely not new for Japan and the U.S. to sit down and plot conspiracies together but it is rather intriguing to get India involved,” noted the People’s Daily at the time. Six months later, Singapore joined the four navies in an unusually robust multilateral demonstration of naval power. Three aircraft carriers (two U.S., one Indian) led a special edition of the Malabar exercises that year, joined by a nuclear-powered submarine, and one dozen cruisers, frigates, and destroyers.

Within months the “Quad” met its untimely demise. A change in government in Australia prompted a shift in approach toward China and ultimately Canberra’s withdrawal from the initiative. While domestic politics in Japan and India were trending in similar directions, at a time when India was uneasily testing the boundaries of alignment, Australia’s about-face felt like a betrayal. Some version of “we stuck our neck out and Australia hung us out to dry” is still a common refrain heard in Delhi today.

It’s possible India’s decision on Malabar 2017 was influenced by this experience. But it’s just as likely the product of prevailing concerns about China’s potential reaction to any new Quad initiative. In an environment of elevated Sino-Indian tensions, Indian analyst Abhijit Singh argues that inviting Australia to join Malabar would “almost certainly cross Beijing’s tolerance threshold, triggering a backlash that New Delhi might find hard to contain.” He says Indian policymakers fear Australia’s participation “could trigger a game of high-stakes brinkmanship with China, with damaging consequences.”

While Singh accurately summarizes lingering concerns in Delhi, they appear largely unfounded and incongruent with the strategic confidence India has adopted toward China as of late. To be sure, this elevated confidence is not new and can be traced to as far back as 2010. That year, Delhi suspended all bilateral military relations with China after it refused to grant a visa to the commanding Indian general of Northern Command in Kashmir. Soon thereafter, Delhi refused to endorse the One China Policy in a joint statement with China and has omitted the language ever since, insisting Beijing must first recognize a “One India” policy and Indian sovereignty over Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh.

Yet it is also true that this trend seems to have accelerated under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi. In just the last year this confidence manifest in Delhi’s unusually vocal support for a July 2016 UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal decision that invalidated China’s nine-dash line claim. It was evident in visits to the Chinese-claimed territory of Arunachal Pradesh by the U.S. Ambassador to India and the Dalai Lama. And it was perhaps most evident in Delhi’s unique opposition to President Xi Jinping’s signature One Belt One Road Initiative. India is, after all, the only major country that refused to send representatives to this month’s highly-touted Belt and Road Initiative summit.

This confidence also explains Delhi’s growing comfort with multilateral (and particularly trilateral) security initiatives. An India-Japan-Australia trilateral dialogue was initiated in 2015 to complement an older U.S.-India-Japan trilateral dialogue that’s since been upgraded to the foreign minister-level. It also explains why India relented to adding Japan as a permanent participant in the Malabar in 2015 following years of lobbying by Tokyo and Washington.

Why this trend was broken by Australia’s Malabar bid isn’t clear. Nor is it clear why some in Delhi believe Australia’s inclusion would represent a some sort of red line for China or cross Beijing’s threshold in some way. The 2007 multilateral exercises prompted no more than a diplomatic note of concern from Beijing and a hawkish editorial in the Global Times. It’s also hard to imagine how Australia’s inclusion in Malabar would be more provocative than stonewalling President Xi’s legacy OBOR initiative or refusing to endorse the One China Policy, as Delhi has done since 2010.

Of course, it’s also possible more trivial contemporary and historical irritants in Indo-Australia relations are to blame. The implications of the decision, however, are far from trivial, retarding the development of a strategically consequential assembly of the Indo-Pacific’s strongest democracies at a time the regional security order is under growing duress. Delhi would be well-served by communicating its specific concerns about Australia’s inclusion and China’s reaction to its partners in Tokyo and Washington, and conducting a holistic review of the long-term costs and benefits of Australian membership before we move closer to Malabar 2018.

[shiv]

OT for this thread but Indian "apprehensiveness" is not about China - it is about Aussies fearing China

.To avoid irking China, India wont include Australia in naval drills

Given the choice between waiting for information or shitting in our pants, Indian media invariably choose to shit in pants first and infect all readers with the same bug

It’s Not China, It’s You, India Seems to Tell Spurned Aussies

But former naval officers and analysts say the rejection more likely reflects New Delhi’s worries that Australia may not be an entirely reliable security partner.

“When it comes to formulation of a collective response to China, including in terms of ‘moderating’ Beijing’s assertive behavior, Australia does not particularly inspire confidence,” Indian Capt. Gurpreet Khurana, who also directs the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, told Foreign Policy.

That’s because the United States, India, Japan, and Australia have tried this before — only to see Australia walk away from four-way military exercises. In 2007, India, the United States, Japan, and Australia held naval exercises, along with Singapore. But China objected strongly, lodging diplomatic protests to each of the four main participants, as one goal of the quad was clearly a response to China’s own expanding maritime interests.

After Kevin Rudd became Australian Prime Minister, he held several meetings with Chinese officials, and in February 2008 Australia withdrew from the quad in a joint press conference with the Chinese foreign minister. “New Delhi hasn’t forgotten Canberra’s hasty capitulation a decade ago,” said Nitin A. Gokhale

[Karthik S]

OT for this thread but Indian "apprehensiveness" is not about China - it is about Aussies fearing China

.To avoid irking China, India wont include Australia in naval drills

Given the choice between waiting for information or shitting in our pants, Indian media invariably choose to shit in pants first and infect all readers with the same bug

It’s Not China, It’s You, India Seems to Tell Spurned Aussies

But former naval officers and analysts say the rejection more likely reflects New Delhi’s worries that Australia may not be an entirely reliable security partner.

“When it comes to formulation of a collective response to China, including in terms of ‘moderating’ Beijing’s assertive behavior, Australia does not particularly inspire confidence,” Indian Capt. Gurpreet Khurana, who also directs the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, told Foreign Policy.

That’s because the United States, India, Japan, and Australia have tried this before — only to see Australia walk away from four-way military exercises. In 2007, India, the United States, Japan, and Australia held naval exercises, along with Singapore. But China objected strongly, lodging diplomatic protests to each of the four main participants, as one goal of the quad was clearly a response to China’s own expanding maritime interests.

After Kevin Rudd became Australian Prime Minister, he held several meetings with Chinese officials, and in February 2008 Australia withdrew from the quad in a joint press conference with the Chinese foreign minister. “New Delhi hasn’t forgotten Canberra’s hasty capitulation a decade ago,” said Nitin A. Gokhale

Aussies punch way above their weight as well, IIRC, many years back, they boarded Indian merchant ship that was in international waters to perform "inspection".

[Prem]

Scorpene Sub leak came from Asurtalia .

[Philip]

Media today: No more Scorpenes!

Scorpenes are already a dated,delayed design ( leak must've also weighed heavily in the IN's minds),none come with AIP and the hope is that the last 2 will get a desi DRDO AIP system if ti is pefected in time. The IN wants something better than the Scorpenes. One can guess what it ants from the recent developments in sub-launched LRCMs,Kalibirs,Tomahawks,etc.,at land targets on the battlefield influencing the ground war.

[Philip]

Only L&T and Reliance (Pipavav) have been selected for the sub req. At first look,L&T should be the clear winners as Pip have built zilch,esp. subs while L&T have been involved with the ATV programme ,etc. The key factors are the AIP system, and the weaponry,BMos,etc.,that the subs must carry. Whether western subs will be able to do so given their smaller size remains to be seen ,as Germany's larger sub design,which failed to win the Oz tender,exists only on paper.A French boat is unlikely given that the Oz deal ensured that India would never be given equiv or superior sub tech to OZ! So much for the friendship of Oz.One can understand why the IN didn't want Oz to participate in the Malabar naval; exercises,if they were so suspicious of India.

http://www.financialexpress.com/india-n ... ek/708857/

Expression of interest for Rs 60,000 cr P-75i submarine programme likely this week
The Ministry of Defence is likely to issue expression of interest for Rs 60,000-crore P-75i submarine programme for the Indian Navy this week.
By: Huma Siddiqui | New Delhi | Updated: June 9, 2017 3:32 AM
According to sources, the MoD soon after the approval of the SP Model started seeking financial details of the companies which are going to get the EoI for the P 75i. (Reuters)

The Ministry of Defence is likely to issue expression of interest (EoI) for Rs 60,000-crore P-75i submarine programme for the Indian Navy this week. This is the first major programme to be launched by the MoD under the strategic partnership model that was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security on June 2. As reported by FE earlier, Larsen & Toubro’s (L&T’s) Katupalli yard and Reliance Defence & Offshore Engineering Company are the only two shipyards eligible to participate in the P-75 i Programme. Explaining the process, a senior officer said, “The MoD has set a very aggressive time line for this project. The plan is to complete the process of selection for the Indian strategic partner, and also to complete the process for the selection of the OEMs, so that in October the request for proposal (RfP) is issued. The plan is to get the long delayed P-75i programme on track by March 2018.” According to sources, the MoD soon after the approval of the SP Model started seeking financial details of the companies which are going to get the EoI for the P 75i.

The OEMs that are expected to get the EoI include DCNS of France, SAAB of Sweden, Rosoboronexport State Corporation of Russia and German ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. A high level committee headed by a senior Navy officer was designated to inspect both public and private shipyards to shortlist candidates to issue the RfP for the project (designated P-75i).
In its final presentation to the MoD, the committee down selected two private sector shipyards for building six conventional submarines– L&T and Pipavav Defence. This will be a ‘Buy and Make (India)’ tender, with an Indian shipyard taking the lead in responding to the tender. The committee with representatives from the Navy and the MoD conducted a survey of shipyards along both coasts including Garden Reach Shipbuilders, Hindustan Shipyard, Goa Shipyard, L&T, Mazgaon Docks, ABG Shipyard and Pipavav Shipyard.

'Make In India' For Defence Makes More Sense Than Buying Cheaper From Abroad: Ankur Gupta, EY
According to the government’s decision, all six submarines will be built in India on the lines of the predecessor P75 `Scorpene’ production line at Mazgaon Dock (MDL), Mumbai. Bids will be invited from Indian shipyards to build the six submarines using transferred technology from a foreign partner.

Due to long delays in the `Scorpene’ (project 75) at Mazgaon Dock Limited (Mumbai) which was intended to induct the vessels at the rate on one ship per year since 2012 has left the Submarine force well below requisite levels. Also, previously planned induction of five midget submarines, combined with the fresh impetus on the strategic submarine program constitute a work-load that is far beyond the capacity of existing public sector shipyards.
According to the Indian Navy, the new submarines will differ from the earlier lot since the qualitative requirements have been altered. The six new submarines in P-75i project will outline various critical parameters including the weight and design of the submarine. These submarines are expected to be bigger than the 1800-ton `Scorpene’ class being built for P-75 project.

[arvin]

Whether western subs will be able to do so given their smaller size remains to be seen ,as Germany's larger sub design,which failed to win the Oz tender,exists only on paper.

If you look Amur and kilo, the two contenders from Russian side, Amur is too thin on account of single hull and kilo is too fat on account of double hull.
Anyway since we have brahmos ER, it is better we fire them from our SSN.

[Philip]

I think that the IN want to leverage BMos o the max.Whether BMos-L/NG whatever the nomenclature is,the future lightweight version will be compatible with Ru origin subs.The trick is to be able to accommodate them on our western origin subs,or at least the Klub missile which is also a v.potent one with its M 3.0+ terminal homing warhead,and has land attack and anti-sub variants also.

Amur models have been shown for aeons with a BMos plug with 10 missiles. However,whether the Amur design meets all the IN's new specs is a moot point. Perhaps the latest new Ru AIP sub about to begin construction,the Kalina may suit us but nothing is known about the features of this sub.Russia building more Kilos for its own navy suggest that they are better all round boats than Amurs. We should've obtained a few more new boats after the SR tragedy to make up numbers and the lost sub,but the IN appeared to be in a state of paralysis not to mention the DM at the time! It would be far better for the IN to lease more N-boats instead to meet short and med. term needs until our own attack boat programme is running smoothly. N-boats with a 90 day patrol time will enable the IN to keep an eye on the PLAN in the ICS. German U-boats have been v.successful and our U-209s have served us very well too. However,the size of the current crop of U-boats may be too small for the IN.Let's see what is eventually on offer from all the builders shortlisted.

[Chinmay]

The U218s being built for Singapore are an interesting option as well. The design is in production, unlike the hypothetical Oz subs, with AIP and built for littoral combat as well. The sensor suite could be adapted and the IN has experience with the 209s. This option is far more mature than the unproven Amur or Saab's A26.

[Manish_Sharma]

Amur models have been shown for aeons with a BMos plug with 10 missiles. However,whether the Amur design meets all the IN's new specs is a moot point.

BRF Poster John has shown dozens of times that 1650 ton Amur can't have Brahmos.

Plus kilos are 75 days per year available. While German ones are 300 days available per year. So we better forget Russians.

[Philip]

Where do those figs come from? Kilos have around 45+ day patrol time availability,compared with German AIP boats upto 50-60 days.N-bats 90+ days.N-boats which do not need refuelling simply require a new crew and mostly victuals for their next 90-day patrol before sailing out again.V,fast turn around times.
Turn around time for a conventional sub depends upon restocking the sub with supplies and rectifying any minor problems during its patrol,refuelling.The statement that Kilos are capable of only 75 days on patrol/yr is simply ridiculous and I seriously doubt that a German u-boat has such a high availability as well.Kilos 636.3 have a 25% more range,quieter with increased quieting for machinery,slight bow shape redesign too,Russia has pefected the Lada/Amur but it remains to be seen whether they will build this sub in large numbers or leapfrog to the Kalina class.

As for poster John and non-BMos subs,Russia has sev. times said that they were willing to sell such a sub to us. They designed the sub,they should know the capabilities the best.It was offered as far back as 2012,see report.

Rubin Bureau Offers India Amur-1650 Sub Armed with Club or BrahMos Missiles
04/02/2012

Text: ARMS-TASS
Photo: Model of Amur-1650 submarine. armstass.su
Rubin Central Design Bureau is ready to offer Indian Navy non-nuclear submarine Amur-1650 armed with either Club or BrahMos missile systems, said the bureau's deputy director for foreign economic activity Andrei Baranov at the Defexpo India 2012 exhibition, reports ITAR-TASS.

"So far, Indian partners have not raised the question as to integrate BrahMos missile system into Amur-1650 submarine participating in the Indian Navy's tender", he said.

At present, Russian project of the sub is armed with Club cruise missiles launched by horizontal torpedo tubes; this system is well familiar to Indian Navy. However, if India wants the sub to be armed with vertically-launched BrahMos strike missiles, Rubin is ready to alter the project, explained A. Baranov.

"Amur is well compatible with BrahMos missiles. We have worked on the sub's architecture equipped with that missile system, so if Indian customers want the submarine to be armed with BrahMos it would consolidate positions of Rosoboronexport in the tender", he emphasized.

"We can easily mount BrahMos missiles on our subs, since there is a wide experience of underwater test launches. Moreover, BrahMos is a development of Onyx missile system used by Russian warships", Baranov specified.

Prospective non-nuclear submarine Amur-1650 with air-independent powerplant will be offered by Rosoboronexport to India's tender for procurement and license production of six conventional subs.

http://rusnavy.com/news/site/detail.php ... 50&print=Y

[Philip]

In continuation of the above,a think-tank on what the IN should aspire for.It is worth a serious read as the quote about Iran will be further examined in another post.Iran's small mini-subs of indigenous design are being built in v.large number to dominate the shallow waters of the Gulf.The IN has also planned for a 5-6 number of small mini/midget-subs as well.When smaller nations like Iran can invest so much in sub R&D,India must take a hard look at what it has achieved and draw lessons from it.

Time To Think Small, Distributed Lethality With Indigenous Small Submarine (S.sub) For Indian Navy Published June 20, 2016 SOURCE: Sairama V/ FOR MY TAKE / IDRW.ORG

Indian Navy (IN) undersea capabilities are reviving with the refit of Kilo Class (Sindhughosh class) submarine and the commissioning of Scorpene Class submarine before 2020. With the speculation of new order for 3 Scorpene Class or 2 Improved Kilo class or both, IN plan for strong undersea fleet is becoming a reality. Arihant Class SSBN, SSN Project along with Project 75I SSKs is going to boast the supremacy of Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean by the end of next decade. Indian Govt has announced the P75I will be the last order for foreign firms and P76 will be indigenous design. With all the submarines are expected to be commissioned by the end of next decade (before 2030), the need for Project 76 submarines doesn’t arise till 2050 unless India modifies the 24 submarine plan envisaged in 1999 owing to twin threat from China & Pakistan.
IN should focus on intermediate Small Submarine program (S.Sub) prior to P76 project as Joint Development Program with foreign submarine design organization. The technology of 2050 will be highly advanced and India need to develop industry for Design and R&D before Project 76.

Distributed Lethality The success of the Indo-Pak naval war of 1971 is attributed to the Osa Class missile boats. These missile boats was able to inflict major damage to Karachi/Pakistan Navy during the Operation Trident. In the current A2/AD environment, recreating the success of Operation Trident is very difficult. IN need to move towards distributed lethality with combination of submarine and missile boats. IN should have S.Sub of less than 1000 tons capable of launching Brahmos NG under affordable costs. S.Subs with its modular weaponry for specific mission of anti-surface, anti submarine, land attack and reconnaissance . S.Sub provide the stealth and Brahmos provide non defensible fire power to attack critical A2/AD systems of enemy. Fleet of S.Subs can be distributed to attack several targets at the same time. S.Sub can provide the first attack on critical infrastructure (Warships, Port Communication, A2/AD, Submarines) before full scale attack with Naval Fleet. Iran and North Korea has adopted distributed lethality with missile boat and midget submarines. In Syria, Russian Navy fired Kalibr cruise missile from Buyan Class corvette in Caspian sea.

Technological Advancements in Submarine Design INS Arihant has provided valuable experience in the design of submarines along with its sub systems. DRDO is set to test the Air Independent Propulsion System and Lithium Ion battery has been used by ISRO for space systems. India has integrated Vertical Launch System (VLS) from INS Arihant. Indian Shipyard has gained experience in building Submarines through Type 209 and Scorpene project. Joint Development/ Technological Collaboration The main designers of Diesel Electric submarines are HDW of Germany, Rubin Design Bureau of Russia and DCNS of France. Also Sweden, China, South Korea and Japan have expertise in submarine design. HDW Germany: Designer of Type 209 and 212 submarines. DCNS France: Designer of Scorpene Class submarine. Rubin Design Bureau Russia: Designer of Kilo class and Amur class submarines. Role of Small Submarine (S.Subs) Defense of coastal & maritime borders by clandestine patrols and reconnaissance mission. Destruction of surface ships and submarines. Setting minefields in contested environment. Land attack capabilities with Brahmos.

Specification of Small Submarine (S.Subs) Dimensions: Submarine of 500-1000 Tons with small dimensions with maximum endurance & range for the class. Diving depth should be enhanced with stronger Hull or coatings. Power: AIP and Lithium ion battery should form the back bone with diesel engine as standby. Crew: Crew size should be limited with focus on maximum automation. It should be capable of fully automatic reconnaissance mission. Armaments: S.Sub should be capable of launching Brahmos from either VLS or Torpedo tubes. Surveillance Systems, decoys and Torpedoes mounted externally. Modular: Both VLS or Torpedo tubes should be configured within short duration to launch Brahmos NG, Torpedo, mines and automatic reconnaissance unit with respect to the mission.

Small Submarine (S.Subs)Capability Type: Autonomous: S.Sub capable of working autonomously for attack and patrol operation. Submarine with carry enough fuel and armaments for the entire mission along with adequate crew comfort and surplus food supplies. Mainly works on Diesel engine in snorkeling mode except on missions of stealth which requires AIP & Batteries for submerged mode. Mother Ship: S.Sub will be the extension of mother ship for specific mission of reconnaissance, anti submarine and anti surface warfare. Mission should be of short duration limited by undersea endurance. Works mainly on Batteries & AIP. The needs for diesel engine doesn’t arise unless it also operates autonomously. Nuclear Submarine, Destroyers, LHD can act as mother ship. The fuel & armaments should be provided by mother ship for specific mission. Maximum automation for reduced crew size with limited crew comfort and food supplies. Mother ship in case of Nuclear Submarine should be able to drop the S.Subs at specified location at high submerged speed and recover after the mission.

Case for Joint Development with Rubin Design Bureau Russia Both VLS or Torpedo tubes should be configured within short duration to launch Brahmos NG, Torpedo, mines and automatic reconnRubin has been offering Improved Kilo class and Amur Class submarine. Kilo class has been nicknamed as Black hole for being quietest diesel electric submarine and Amur class is eight times quieter than Kilo class. Rubin has offered AIP and VLS for Brahmos in Amur class. Rubin has three different versions of less than 1000 tons. Amur 550, Amur 700 along with the fully developed Amur 950. IN has been a customer of Russian maritime systems for many decades with notable purchase of Submarine, Frigate and Aircraft carrier. Russia has helped Indian shipyard build nuclear submarine INS Arihant and Aircraft carrier INS Vikrant. India and Russia can jointly develop the indigenous submarine derived from Amur class similar to the Joint Venture of Russia & Italy for S1000 class submarine. Russian have experience in mother ship submarine with Delta class as mother ship for Paltus class sub. Amur Class submarine has anechoic tile coating on the exterior and quiet propeller. India can gain considerable knowledge in submarine design mainly in silencing and sub systems. Also India can cut short the research phase and focus on developing submarine without delays.

Existing Submarine of the Class Type 206, Amur 950, HDS-400 are the submarines available in the class. Type 206 has been out of production and Amur Class is yet to go into production. South Korea is currently producing HDS-400. HDS-400 Type 206A Amur 550 Amur 950 Length (m) 40 48.6 46 56.8 Weight (Tons) 400 450 550 950 Endurance (Days) 21 NA 20 30 Range (nmi) NA 4500 @ 5Knots 1500 4000 Speed (Knots) 15 17 18 20 Armaments 2x533mm & 4x324mm torpedo 8x533mm Torpedo 24 mines 8x400mm Torpedo/Mines 16x533mm Torpedo/Mines 10 VLS for Brahmos Affordability The cost of Amur 1650 is 450 million USD. S.Sub should be designed to cost a fraction of the Amur 1650 with sub systems specifically chosen for the missions. Modularity provides opportunity to reduce cost without the need for all the systems of large submarine. Trade off will be the range and endurance lower than large submarine. But some of the systems are irreplaceable and will form the fixed cost segment of any submarine. Brahmos NG designed for Air Launch will have smaller dimension and can fit into the torpedo tubes reducing the need for VLS system once available.

Basing Small Submarines in Andaman & Nicobar Island *(Have often mentioned this requirement)

Indian Navy needs a strong force under Andaman Nicobar Command (ANC). ANC is closest to Malacca Strait choke point. ANC command has 20 surface warships, but does not have submarine force. IN needs strong undersea fleet of attack submarines in Andaman Sea to track the Chinese submarines lurking in Indian Ocean. Basing S.Sub will be cost effective for reconnaissance and anti submarine operation. S.Sub range will be ideal for power projection in Andaman Sea and defense of Indian EEZ. Strong submarine force will deter any adventure of Chinese Navy in Indian Ocean and boast the moral of ASEAN member states. Export Potential Under Make in India India has received lot of interest for Brahmos cruise missile from different countries. S.Sub with capabilities to launch 6-8 Brahmos NG will be boast the potential of navies. Sub with AIP & Li-Ion will have the stealth for surprise and Brahmos NG will have the supersonic speed to deter any missile defense at affordable cost for small navies. Automation of submarine provides good scope of reconnaissance mission in contested waters. Since Brahmos export doesn’t come under MTCR regulation, India-Russia can market the S.Sub with Brahmos to ASEAN countries, Middle East, Latin America and Africa.

idrw.org . Read more at India No 1 Defence News Website http://idrw.org/time-think-small-distri ... dian-navy/ .

[Philip]

iranian small sub developments .Videoclip in the link of the Fateh.The degree of automation in subs today,esp Swedish subs ,is v.impressive.Crews have shrunk to around 30 and for a small sub,will be even more.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-bu ... 091?page=2

Iran Is Building Its Own Submarines (With Torpedoes the U.S. Navy Can't Match)
Sebastien Roblin
June 9, 2017

The Iranian military has long planned for a defensive naval war in the Persian Gulf, in which it would leverage its large fleet of fast attack boats toting antiship missiles to launch swarming hit-and-run attacks on adversaries in along Persian Gulf, with the ultimate goal of shutting down passage through the Straits of Hormuz.

Supporting this naval guerilla-warfare strategy are twenty-one indigenously produced Ghadir-class mini submarines, derived from the North Korean Yono class. The 120-ton vessels can poke around at eleven knots (thirteen miles per hour) and each carry two 533-millimeter torpedoes. All in all, shallow littoral waters are very favorable for mini-submarine operations, with interference from rocky shallows and loud surf reducing sonar detection ranges and giving mini submarines abundant opportunities to hide and wait in ambush. On the high end of the capability spectrum, Iran operates three much larger and more capable Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines purchased from Russia in the 1990s. These can comfortably hunt in the waters of the Indian Ocean.

Four years ago, Iran also launched its own domestically built Fateh-class submarine. The homemade vessel may lack modern features such as antiship missiles or quiet Air Independent Propulsion system, but it does seem to be the genuine article—not something one should take for granted with reports of new Iranian weapons.

Why would Iran invest considerable sums in building its own submarines instead of shelling out for off-the-shelf hardware in Russia or China?

The reason is doubtlessly related to Tehran’s jarring education in how shifting international alliances can throw defense planning askew. Prior to the Iranian Revolution, the government of the shah was lavished with large quantities of top-shelf U.S. weapons, which became rather difficult to maintain after that one little incident in the 1979 involving the American embassy. When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Tehran found itself on the outs with both America and the Soviet Union, and turned to the Chinese for arms—as well as backdoor dealings with Reagan administration officials.

This tumultuous history has created a tremendous impetus for military self-sufficiency in Iran, even if the results in the short term are nothing special compared to extant foreign weapon systems.

The “semi-heavy” Fateh (“Conqueror”) measures between forty and forty-eight meters long, and is claimed to displace about six hundred tons submerged—putting it in a similar weight class as the small German Type 205 and 206 coastal defense submarines launched in the 1960s and ’70s. It appears to be an elongated version of the Iranian-built Nahang, an unarmed prototype that may currently be serving as a special-operations submarine. Fateh has four bow torpedo tubes with likely access to six to eight reloads, with a circular sonar array situated under the tubes.

Fateh can operate up to two hundred meters below the surface—more than adequate for the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. Sources variously place its maximum speed while submerged at between fourteen and twenty-three knots (sixteen to twenty-six miles per hour), with the lower estimate seeming more likely. The Fars news agency claims that Fateh can also operate up to five weeks at sea at a range of up to 3,100 miles, giving it the endurance to venture further afield into the Arabian Sea. However, it’s less clear how long the diesel-electric submarine can sustainably swim underwater without surfacing or snorkeling to recharge batteries.

You can see some media footage of Fateh in the clip below, including what appear to be deck plans at the two-second mark and the interior of the vessel at thirteen seconds. The website Covert Shores also offers a detailed analysis of the imagery here.

Despite being launched from the Bostanu shipyards in 2013, Fateh still appears to be undergoing sea trials and has yet to be declared fully operational. Jane’s claimed a second Fateh-class submarine was spotted in satellite photos under construction at the Bandar Anzali naval base on the Caspian Sea, but its current status is unknown.

Also nebulous are Tehran’s plans to produce two sixty-meter-long Besat- or Qaem-class submarines displacing 1,200 to 1,300 tons, armed with six torpedo tubes. Other claimed specifications include a three-hundred-meter diving depth and a maximum speed of twenty-three miles per hour.

This new design was announced in 2008, and was to enter service in 2015. A distinct lack of follow-up reports or imagery since that announcement give the impression the project has either been abandoned or is beset by major delays.

However, an Office of Naval Intelligence report published in March 2017 treats the Besat class seriously, and claims it will enter service with the Iranian Navy with the capability of firing submarine-launched cruise missiles in the next five years. Theoretically, such weapons would significantly increase the striking range of Tehran’s submarine fleet. However, such technology might prove difficult for Iran to develop independently.A weapon that may be closer to entering service is the Hoot (“Whale”) supercavitating torpedo, which reportedly can attain speeds of over two hundred miles per hour—around four times faster than a typical modern torpedo. This is achieved by using rocket exhaust heat to vaporize water in the path of the torpedo, allowing it travel in a gas bubble with minimal drag resistance. The first Hoot tests were broadcast on Iranian TV back in 2006, and the weapon reportedly underwent new trials in 2015 and May 2017, though the outcome of those tests is unknown. Defense analysts believe the Hoot to be reverse engineered from the Russian Shkval torpedo.

Past experience demonstrates that Tehran routinely exaggerates and obfuscates the scale of its defense projects, and the timeline in which they will be completed. Nonetheless, the submarine Fateh is tangibly real and looks like it could usefully expand the medium-range capabilities of the Iranian submarine fleet. While the status of the Besat class is more difficult to assess, if it is ever deployed it would mark another capability improvement.

Though the new Iranian boats may remain far from the cutting edge of submarine design, they could still prove dangerous adversaries in the confined and shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. More importantly, the ongoing effort to domestically produce larger and more capable submarines and submarine-deployed weapons provides more evidence that Tehran is investing long-term efforts into becoming a self-sufficient military power.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

Image: Indian submarine INS Sindhurakshak. Wikimedia Commons/Creative Commons/Brian Burnell

[Philip]

Numbers matter very much in the IN context,where it has a massive amt. of ocean-IOR alone to sanitise.What the "Small Sub" agenda/concept represents is a sub equiv of the LCA.Small,lethal,cheap and the ability to produce it in large numbers quickly. Larger subs will carry out more extensive and onerous (extra range/endurance/weaponry ) missions farther afield,while N-subs will provide us with the long endurance/multi-strike mission capability. However,by mooting building small subs,it does not mean that we abandon the current crop of med. sized subs which we possess,but find an equitable way in which we possess the required numbers of conventional subs of varying size,with dispersed basing in the islands too,as well as the planned number of SSNs/SSGNs and SSBNs. Remember that the PLAN alone will possess 70-80 mainly new boats both nuclear and AIP subs round 2020.

If in the P-75! programme, the IN is trying to find a large conventional sub with enhanced capabilities closer to N-boats,it may prove to be v.expensive (at least $600m/sub),time-consuming to build and affordable in small numbers only.For the record,Vietnam's improved Kilo 636.3s just delivered,were obtained at a cost of around just $300M/boat.It would also costwise impinge upon the SSN requirement for at least 6 N-boats .WE would ultimately find it very difficult and expensive to acquire the planned number of 24 subs,which is in itself wholly inadequate.24 subs should be the number of conventional/AIP boats excluding -subs.

[Singha]

what is the role of P75I

at one end is the iranian model - defend inshore waters and be a general PITA - but limited endurance , teeth and range - a swarm of mongoose approach

in middle is the current scorpene/U209/kilo model of having enough time on station to patrol the arabian sea , sunda lombok straits and bay of bengal but no more than 1 month endurance - medium teeth . squad of dogs approach.

in high is the U216/soryu model of long patrol range and endurance (3 months), heavy teeth incl LACMs , but high cost and complexity for a SSK - and our SSN line is separately funded anyway. these can take the war to enemy shores in the east.
troop of elephants.

I suspect the P75I is in the middle. define what "better" we need in the P75I over the Scorpene or is the idea to match the scorpene using as much domestic design and eqpt as possible to start our own "Yuan" project and build scale. thats probably the best outcome we can hope for. perhaps stick in a 4 cell UVLS aft of the sail to take a variety of missiles (from 4x3 to 4x4) ... each 1000t addition like that has its impact on underwater speed and battery/diesel fuel consumption though. there are always tradeoffs since no battery or diesel plant will have the reserve power of a N-plant to muscle the sub through.

[Singha]

we should select a albacore single-hull design with the 1000t UVLS section designed in from day1 and its hydrodynamic math taken into account for powerplant sizing by the "bideshi consultant". rest we should attempt to manufacture every nut and bolt locally even if we can even if some of it would be just license making. we can progressively learn more and more if a good series like 9 subs are built.

stress can be on automation, lean crewing and hence more patrol time. unlike a warship its curtains for a sub if it sustains heavy damage, a lot of extra crew for damage control might not matter.

and a comprehensive suite of ELINT gear and provision to convert 2 of the UVLS for Marcos equipment storage (chariots, powerpods etc) and swimout chamber from day1.

[Gagan]

A conventional sub can be easily be MKIsed, by getting components from the western, russian and indian suppliers.
Indian navy and videshi consultants, design can be tested in NSTL (probably already is), tech demonstrator can be built at SBC vizag

easily doable.

Perhaps there is a secret project on, similar to the ATV project, to build a conventional sub, that has slipped under the Radar all these years. What we thought was no movement in the p75I, under the radar, there has been considerable work done already.

[Singha]

main things are hull form, design of powerplant and design for reliability and upkeep which cannot be MKIed. rest of stuff can be MLUed later or chosen from different sources. a reliable and long serving design like U209 is valuable.

people focus too much on headline grabbing weapons and speed. imo long endurance, stealth, sensors, flexibility via UVLS & marcos loadings, reliability, low opex, lean crewing, high uptime and easy repairing(not a strong suit of dense packed russian designs) should cover our backsides well. some of the smallish euro designs are quite nice in that aspect.

[Cain Marko]

what is the role of P75I

at one end is the iranian model - defend inshore waters and be a general PITA - but limited endurance , teeth and range - a swarm of mongoose approach

in middle is the current scorpene/U209/kilo model of having enough time on station to patrol the arabian sea , sunda lombok straits and bay of bengal but no more than 1 month endurance - medium teeth . squad of dogs approach.

in high is the U216/soryu model of long patrol range and endurance (3 months), heavy teeth incl LACMs , but high cost and complexity for a SSK - and our SSN line is separately funded anyway. these can take the war to enemy shores in the east.
troop of elephants.

I suspect the P75I is in the middle. define what "better" we need in the P75I over the Scorpene or is the idea to match the scorpene using as much domestic design and eqpt as possible to start our own "Yuan" project and build scale. thats probably the best outcome we can hope for. perhaps stick in a 4 cell UVLS aft of the sail to take a variety of missiles (from 4x3 to 4x4) ... each 1000t addition like that has its impact on underwater speed and battery/diesel fuel consumption though. there are always tradeoffs since no battery or diesel plant will have the reserve power of a N-plant to muscle the sub through.

Based on earlier reports, I'll try to dig something up, that required the subs to be ocean going, I would say option 3 is what IN is looking for. Soryu or smx ocean type. That also explains the huge budget allocated.

[Gagan]

I feel that DRDO, must build and operate a Tech demonstrator conventional sub, built like this.
Jointly operated by a IN and DRDO crew. Use it to test out the Indian AIP module too

[krishna_krishna]

What better use of sindhirakshak hull, plug in desi AIP, boos vl plug and you will have new MKI version of kilo. If you want to challenge yourself try to get French/ riskier with pump jet install. (There is one kilo with pumpjet in rusi service) call it TD

[srin]

To me, the biggest stumbling block is our quest to put Brahmos on everything. For instance, the Amur 1650's height per Wiki is just 6.4m. Now you need to put in 8.4m missile in a VLS plug (presumably next to the conning tower) and redesign it to keep it quiet.
If you want land attack, use SSN derivative of Arihant.
A brahmos-M (which would be ready long before our subs) that can be launched from a 533mm torpedo tube would be far more standard and better for our DE subs.

[Manish_Sharma]

https://youtu.be/MtwKJyK6BQA

This kind of littoral sub with all Swadeshi materials powerplant AIP torpedo missiles pods can be DRDO project. It can be 4000 tons. Maximum speed 9 - 10 knots. From arab ki khadi to Hind Mahasaagar. It can roam slowly gather intelligence. Meet other Subs like Arihant take message give fresh instructions.

This can be separate from P 75i

[chola]

A random thought, seeing as the Arihant and our SSN/SSBN project is in advance of the local SSK (Kalvari/Scorpene) one them why not look at the US model of an all-nook sub fleet?

It feels backward to spend time and effort looking for phoren partners in the less powerful platform while we are far more along (and I hope, indigenized) in the nuke project.

[JTull]

A random thought, seeing as the Arihant and our SSN/SSBN project is in advance of the local SSK (Kalvari/Scorpene) one them why not look at the US model of an all-nook sub fleet?

It feels backward to spend time and effort looking for phoren partners in the less powerful platform while we are far more along (and I hope, indigenized) in the nuke project.

We need smaller and quieter boats for littoral warfare in our neighbourhood. Nuclear subs will be either for deterrence (SSBNs) or to keep major powers from meddling in our neighbourhood (SSNs).

We also need quantity and nuclear subs are not an affordable way to acquire the nos. we need.

[chetak]

I feel that DRDO, must build and operate a Tech demonstrator conventional sub, built like this.
Jointly operated by a IN and DRDO crew. Use it to test out the Indian AIP module too

joint crew!!

They refuse to sail even on surface ships most of the time.

[srai]

^^^

The IN's plan over the next 20 years seems to be this:

• 4 x SSBN
• 6 x SSN
• 12 x SSK (6 P75 + 6 P75I)

[Gagan]

What better use of sindhirakshak hull, plug in desi AIP, boos vl plug and you will have new MKI version of kilo. If you want to challenge yourself try to get French/ riskier with pump jet install. (There is one kilo with pumpjet in rusi service) call it TD

What a great idea !
When life gives you a lemon, you make nimbu-pani out of it!

INS Sindhurakshak can be made a test bed for so many things, the AIP for one!

[JTull]

Re; Sindhurakshak.

Strip every component and copy it...with desi AIP!

[Gagan]

JTull ji,
They already did, with the Sindhukirti.
They took 10+ years, while the first boat of the ATV class was being built. It was parked in a drydock right next to the covered dock at SBC. They probably tested components that were to go into the Arihant class, on it. Then HSL refurbished it in a year or two, once the Arihant was in the water.

But they should use the Sindhurakshak to test the AIP, Indiginous equipment - engine/gearbox/pumps etc.
An ecosystem to design and build submarines already exists within India - the ATV and the Scorpenes are currently being built, with suppliers from videsh and desh.
It will be a big let down, if the 75I turns out to be screwdivergiri of a videshi design !

[Gagan]

This news item about HSL building a Strategic Operations Vessel from 2015

Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) will build a Strategic Operations Vessel (SOV), a sort of mini-submarine at an estimated cost of Rs.3,000 crore. Building the mini submarine would help the yard in acquiring technologies and gaining the expertise in building larger submarines in future, Rear Admiral (retd.) N.K Mishra, Chairman and Managing Director of HSL said.

He handed over the submarine INS Sindhukirti after refit to the Indian Navy at HSL here on Friday. “The expertise gained in building the mini submarine would help the yard to emerge as the second one in the country after Mazagon Docks Limited to have the capacity to build submarines in future”, Rear Admiral (Retd.) Mishra told the media on the sidelines of the handing over ceremony.

HSL is probably building such a tech demonstrator as the one we are talking about.

[Philip]

The SR is to be decommissioned .The hull will not be in perfect condition to be reused as a test platform,but could be used for trg. purposes,target practice (Four years after massive fire: Sindhurakshak decommissioned, will be sunk or used as target
Both BoIs suggested decommissioning of the vessel as it was not “seaworthy and hence not fit to sail again). )http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... t-4701156/

A new sub/subs for research must be started.It's the only way in which we can develop sub tech to suit our needs. We don't even have deep diving bathyscapes for maritime research given our huge EEZ.Look at the French and Cousteau.Magnificent pioneering work for mankind.
What should've been done was for the IN to have handed over an old Kilo to the DRDO for installation of a BMos plug.We could've v.easily got a replacement/s from Russia,but according to old DRDO reports,the IN said "nyet". The IN appears to be so desirous of installing BMos on all its available platforms is becos tx fo MTCR membership,the range of BMos has been at least doubled openly,not clandestinely! Imagine the difference it would make to attacking Paki ports and land targets. No need for another Trident/Python attack using towed missile craft. Our missile corvettes can "let go" from safe distances.

Point about large BMos true,but the missile is our force multiplier,which will be manufactured in even larger qty. judging from media reports.The IAF alone will need over 500+ air-launched ones and IN will have sev. hundred anti-ship versions ,air-launched BMos-NG/L as well as sub-launched land attack versions. Once BMos-H arrives,there will be a rush to field it on all naval platforms.

A fully nuclear sub fleet is out of the Q for us.Too expensive.Moreover,in the littorals,shallow waters,etc.,conventional subs are better than N-boats.Look at the last Indo-US exercise where one of our Kilos reportedly bested an LA class SSN.

[darshhan]

what is the role of P75I

at one end is the iranian model - defend inshore waters and be a general PITA - but limited endurance , teeth and range - a swarm of mongoose approach

in middle is the current scorpene/U209/kilo model of having enough time on station to patrol the arabian sea , sunda lombok straits and bay of bengal but no more than 1 month endurance - medium teeth . squad of dogs approach.

in high is the U216/soryu model of long patrol range and endurance (3 months), heavy teeth incl LACMs , but high cost and complexity for a SSK - and our SSN line is separately funded anyway. these can take the war to enemy shores in the east.
troop of elephants.

I suspect the P75I is in the middle. define what "better" we need in the P75I over the Scorpene or is the idea to match the scorpene using as much domestic design and eqpt as possible to start our own "Yuan" project and build scale. thats probably the best outcome we can hope for. perhaps stick in a 4 cell UVLS aft of the sail to take a variety of missiles (from 4x3 to 4x4) ... each 1000t addition like that has its impact on underwater speed and battery/diesel fuel consumption though. there are always tradeoffs since no battery or diesel plant will have the reserve power of a N-plant to muscle the sub through.

UUVs should be able to perform the small sub based iranian model objectives within few years. Manufacture in numbers. half a dozen torpedos or missiles. Relatively expendable. Relatively less rigorous testing regimen in terms of time frame which enables these to be inducted faster. very less impact in terms of training time period(crew if any will be onshore coordinating multiple UUVs). Ability to work up a swarm(software is much more important here). I think this is the best way to correct the asymmetry wrt Chinese/US Navy in Bay of Bengal and Arabian sea. Parts of Indian ocean can also be covered. And if we can provide refuelling facilites in high seas, then you have practically unlimited endurance

[chola]

A random thought, seeing as the Arihant and our SSN/SSBN project is in advance of the local SSK (Kalvari/Scorpene) one them why not look at the US model of an all-nook sub fleet?

It feels backward to spend time and effort looking for phoren partners in the less powerful platform while we are far more along (and I hope, indigenized) in the nuke project.

We need smaller and quieter boats for littoral warfare in our neighbourhood. Nuclear subs will be either for deterrence (SSBNs) or to keep major powers from meddling in our neighbourhood (SSNs).

We also need quantity and nuclear subs are not an affordable way to acquire the nos. we need.

Our littoral is full of pipsqueak powers that don't require subs to be perfectly honest. What they need are visible FFGs and DDGs to cow them. Smaller, quieter boats are for weaker powers needing to hide from superior forces, IMHO.

From what I read, the IN had always envisioned around 20 odd subs in total -- including a 30-year plan proposed in 1999 that called for 24.

With that small number, why not have them all nooks just like the US?

Now if we are building 60 plus subs like the PRC then the SSKs are a must. But then again the PRC is trapped against its coastline by an exceptionally powerful US fleet and needs these smaller, weaker boats to simply survive as a threat in being.

We don't face that kind of threat (unless we get on the wrong side of Unkil.) We have free access to blue ocean so the preferably scenario should have us meet any possible threat with high endurance SSNs in far waters rather than wait for them with SSKs in our coastal waters.

[Philip]

An N-sub will cost around $1.5B easily. We could instead acquire 4-5 Kilos,latest variety for the same price.Amurs are supposed to be slightly cheaper from prev. Ru touting. They would be more useful in dealing with the Pakis in the Arabian Sea/IOR,than single N-boat.If we wanted a western boat instead,we could get around 3 for the same price.

[Manish_P]

We don't face that kind of threat (unless we get on the wrong side of Unkil.)

If we stay the course and develop in the next 2-3 decades, we will be looked on as a significant threat by Unkil.

Nothing personal of course, Unkil looks on everyone either as a threat, or a lackey.

[Pratyush]

In 30 years if india continues to grow then the us will look to play the role that uk played before and during the ww2.

In 50 years they will be in the same place where uk was in 90s in relation to us.

[Manish_P]

<OT> I was thinking on the lines of having the appropriate sticks for not just the ba&^%#d child/children but also for the 3.5 fathers (is Turkey a 0.25 father yet?). If building our own (different sized) sticks are going to take about the same time as it takes for us to be that significant power, then it makes sense to start building them concurrently now. </OT>

[Singha]

as I mentioned in another thread, UK is what it is and was in industrial revolution due to nearly *1000* years of no invasions and massacres of intellectuals . sure there were internal game of thrones but even that was generally a settled matter barring the odd beheading or two.

you dont have Rathgar the Wild trooping in from Jutland in 1500 burning and pillaging oxford and cambridge and declaring himself the satrap or Ibrahim the Moor leading his legions up from the south in 1700AD and building a pyramid of skulls in london.

Dutch were very mercantile (invented the stock holding co and many financial stuff) and never a threat to the chalk cliffs.

the spanish and french were soundly defeated a couple of time and slunk bank south, tails between legs.

Amrika bahadur after the civil war of 1860 has had 180 years of peace and prosperity to seek its place in the world.

we started off 70 years ago with 10% literacy , 90% poverty and only vague memories of a old civilization buried under the british rule and sultanates of the last 1000 years!!

it is nothing short of a miracle, given Banditji and his regime + collusion with commies to fan the flames of mediocrity that some vestiges of the old "gene memory" asserted itself and from 90s onward indians have "found a bit of themselves" albeit we have not our full punishing stride length yet.

think long term, well beyond our own lives and into the old age of our children and their children.....unless we all believe in making india rise again to its rightful place and STICK TO THE PLAN over 100s of years its not gonna happen. 5 yr plans are like dust in the time continuum.

believe in a dharmic civilization and knowledge accumulation, not just mercantile gathering of gold coins for obscene consumption and selfish hoarding sacrificing the long term . all of us are going to inevitably die and will not be able to take a SINGLE gold coin to our next life. all we will take is our deeds and our soul. so earn enough for yourself and to give the kids a good start but beyond that we cannot control. they will write their own legends.