Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Exercise with tanks? It has to be near Aksai-Chin area. So they are sending message that in case of war they can open second front.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
http://www.firstpost.com/india/sikkim-s ... 83519.html
Sikkim standoff: China's desperate sabre-rattling shows firm reticence is working for India
'True power speaks softly, it has no reason to shout', goes the Gandhian principle. China's recent rhetorical belligerence against India, however, sits at odds with the oft-repeated dictum of statecraft. It raises tantalising possibilities about Beijing's motives as its border standoff with India in the Sikkim sector rolls towards a month.
Strained ties. AFP
Strained ties. AFP
The outlines of the standoff are well known by now. In a series of well-calibrated and intriguingly timed steps, Beijing has created a situation near India's most vulnerable military strategic location. The point of dispute is around the building of a Chinese highway at Doka La plateau near the China, Bhutan and India tri-junction. The plateau is recognised as Bhutanese territory by Bhutan and India but China has long claimed it as its own and has conducted 24 rounds of discussion with Bhutan to demark the border and has been engaged in at least one tense standoff with Indian Army (in 2006) over its control.
Under the veneer of discussions, China has repeatedly sought to change the ground realities by frequently employing PLA troops into the area. PLA soldiers steal into the plateau and draw back when challenged but not before incrementally gaining inches in the territory. Any confrontation results in China unleashing a torrent of ancient maps which are extremely flexible with truth and facts. It has employed this tactic almost as a rule while trying to undertake its neocolonialist adventures along the Himalayan frontiers and around South China Sea littoral.
The first key question is, why is this plateau so important? Doka La holds immense strategic significance for China, India and Bhutan. China controls the Chumbi valley which takes the shape of a dagger between Sikkim and Bhutan and in maps, appear to be aimed at the 'chicken's neck' — India's biggest strategic vulnerability which separates Indian mainland from the North East. However, by virtue of its positional superiority in Sikkim and Bhutan, India is well placed to stave off any military threat to the 'chicken's neck' arising from China-controlled Chumbi valley.
This is precisely why China seeks to add strategic depth to Chumbi Valley by widening it along the Doka La plateau and is busy building highways for operational convenience. Conversely, India cannot afford to let this happen because it risks losing positional advantage in the tri-junction and may find it difficult to defend the 'chicken's neck' from Chinese aggression.
Geostrategist and author Brahma Chellaney explains in Japan Times, "In recent years, China has been upgrading its military infrastructure and deployments in this highly strategic region so that, in the event of a war, its military blitzkrieg can cut off India from its northeast. Such an invasion would also leave Bhutan completely surrounded and at China’s mercy."
India feels justifiably worried with Chinese construction activities and has sought to come to an understanding with China while urging Bhutan to delineate the border. A final settlement is awaited but in 2012, Indian and Chinese special representatives reached a written understanding through a meeting that "the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries.
Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding", as detailed through a Ministry of External Affairs press note in response to the impasse.
The MEA release, issued on 30 June, also adds: "The Foreign Ministry of Bhutan has also issued a statement underlining that the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of the 1988 and 1998 agreements between Bhutan and China and affects the process of demarcating the boundary between these two countries. They have urged a return to the status quo as before 16 June 2017."
A second question now arises. Since there is an understanding in place, it is clear that China has tried to alter the status quo. If that is so, India and Bhutan should be the aggrieved parties. Why is China claiming victimhood and indulging in pantomime outrage instead?
China's strategy rests on two key points. One, the Sino-Bhutanese border is disputed in places and it is easy for China to ingress and claim large chunks of areas as its own based on convenient maps. Two, if Bhutan raises an issue (as it did this time by handing a demarche to Beijing via New Delhi) over instances of ingress, China can twist it to its advantage.
Centre for Policy Research senior fellow Srinath Raghavan explains this in Hindustan Times: "Bhutan does not directly negotiate with China and its stance on the disputed boundary has developed in close consultation with India. The Chinese can claim with a straight face that this is a bilateral problem between them and Bhutan. Similarly, when Indian troops support Bhutanese opposition to road construction in the disputed area, it is easy for Beijing to accuse New Delhi of violating an established international border."
This is clear. What isn't is the Chinese sabre-rattling. What explains its daily scaremongering against India around the construction of a road? It has appeared thoroughly impatient of India's stance and is behaving like a classic bully — escalating the conflict radar on a daily basis and lessening maneuvering space for diplomatic solutions. It is also showing a complete disregard for mechanisms that have been laid painstakingly over the years for maintaining peace and tranquility along the border region.
A look at Chinese escalation strategy reveals a pattern. When the standoff first erupted, Beijing reacted by blocking Indian pilgrims from visiting Kailash Mansarovar through Nathu La. Since then, it has been raising the temperature rather quickly through military show off, daily press briefings via foreign office, incendiary rhetoric from state-controlled media and thinly disguised warning from its embassy in India. It has brandished its "most advanced battle tank" during a military drill in Tibet, sent more than a dozen warships, submarines and destroyers prowling in Indian Ocean, warned India through its media mouthpiece that it will be subjected to a fate worse than 1962, vowed to openly instigate trouble in Sikkim and Bhutan to release them from "Indian oppression", claimed that India has violated "Panchsheel principles" and in a quite extraordinary move, uploaded a video in YouTube (banned in China) where Political Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in India, Li Ya, tells New Delhi to "immediately and unconditionally withdraw all troops from Doklam plateau".
And in a fresh development on Thursday, it has indicated that President Xi Jinping will give Prime Minister Narendra Modi the 'royal snub' at Hamburg during the G20 meet.
So far, the Indian Army has maintained a studied silence, the Ministry of External Affairs has not gone beyond the communiqué, ministers and political leaders have held their fire and even the ever excitable Indian media has been admirably circumspect in their coverage.
Indian reticence has probably infuriated the Chinese even more. Scaling up of threats is a clear indication that China isn't getting the response it is looking for and our strategy is working.
India needs to be clear about two things. One, it must avoid getting provoked at all costs and resolutely ignore the daily insults. These abuses might become sharper with each passing day because China would want to rattle us into taking a brash step that they use to justify aggression.
Two, regardless of the amount of pressure, the daily dose of propaganda and psychological warfare, India must not budge from its position at Doka La plateau because any withdrawal will set a damaging precedent which might be used by China as a future template.
At the same time, India must be ready for the long haul — since this impasse may continue for months as China tests our red lines and resolve — and keep open all channels of diplomacy and communication. There is a possibility, as Raghavan writes in his piece, China might be using Doka La road construction as a bargaining chip to stop India from scaling up its infrastructure building around the Himalayan frontier.
It is interesting that despite blocking the pilgrims, China has kept the trade lines open through Nathu La. Therein lies the answer.
Sikkim standoff: China's desperate sabre-rattling shows firm reticence is working for India
'True power speaks softly, it has no reason to shout', goes the Gandhian principle. China's recent rhetorical belligerence against India, however, sits at odds with the oft-repeated dictum of statecraft. It raises tantalising possibilities about Beijing's motives as its border standoff with India in the Sikkim sector rolls towards a month.
Strained ties. AFP
Strained ties. AFP
The outlines of the standoff are well known by now. In a series of well-calibrated and intriguingly timed steps, Beijing has created a situation near India's most vulnerable military strategic location. The point of dispute is around the building of a Chinese highway at Doka La plateau near the China, Bhutan and India tri-junction. The plateau is recognised as Bhutanese territory by Bhutan and India but China has long claimed it as its own and has conducted 24 rounds of discussion with Bhutan to demark the border and has been engaged in at least one tense standoff with Indian Army (in 2006) over its control.
Under the veneer of discussions, China has repeatedly sought to change the ground realities by frequently employing PLA troops into the area. PLA soldiers steal into the plateau and draw back when challenged but not before incrementally gaining inches in the territory. Any confrontation results in China unleashing a torrent of ancient maps which are extremely flexible with truth and facts. It has employed this tactic almost as a rule while trying to undertake its neocolonialist adventures along the Himalayan frontiers and around South China Sea littoral.
The first key question is, why is this plateau so important? Doka La holds immense strategic significance for China, India and Bhutan. China controls the Chumbi valley which takes the shape of a dagger between Sikkim and Bhutan and in maps, appear to be aimed at the 'chicken's neck' — India's biggest strategic vulnerability which separates Indian mainland from the North East. However, by virtue of its positional superiority in Sikkim and Bhutan, India is well placed to stave off any military threat to the 'chicken's neck' arising from China-controlled Chumbi valley.
This is precisely why China seeks to add strategic depth to Chumbi Valley by widening it along the Doka La plateau and is busy building highways for operational convenience. Conversely, India cannot afford to let this happen because it risks losing positional advantage in the tri-junction and may find it difficult to defend the 'chicken's neck' from Chinese aggression.
Geostrategist and author Brahma Chellaney explains in Japan Times, "In recent years, China has been upgrading its military infrastructure and deployments in this highly strategic region so that, in the event of a war, its military blitzkrieg can cut off India from its northeast. Such an invasion would also leave Bhutan completely surrounded and at China’s mercy."
India feels justifiably worried with Chinese construction activities and has sought to come to an understanding with China while urging Bhutan to delineate the border. A final settlement is awaited but in 2012, Indian and Chinese special representatives reached a written understanding through a meeting that "the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries.
Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding", as detailed through a Ministry of External Affairs press note in response to the impasse.
The MEA release, issued on 30 June, also adds: "The Foreign Ministry of Bhutan has also issued a statement underlining that the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of the 1988 and 1998 agreements between Bhutan and China and affects the process of demarcating the boundary between these two countries. They have urged a return to the status quo as before 16 June 2017."
A second question now arises. Since there is an understanding in place, it is clear that China has tried to alter the status quo. If that is so, India and Bhutan should be the aggrieved parties. Why is China claiming victimhood and indulging in pantomime outrage instead?
China's strategy rests on two key points. One, the Sino-Bhutanese border is disputed in places and it is easy for China to ingress and claim large chunks of areas as its own based on convenient maps. Two, if Bhutan raises an issue (as it did this time by handing a demarche to Beijing via New Delhi) over instances of ingress, China can twist it to its advantage.
Centre for Policy Research senior fellow Srinath Raghavan explains this in Hindustan Times: "Bhutan does not directly negotiate with China and its stance on the disputed boundary has developed in close consultation with India. The Chinese can claim with a straight face that this is a bilateral problem between them and Bhutan. Similarly, when Indian troops support Bhutanese opposition to road construction in the disputed area, it is easy for Beijing to accuse New Delhi of violating an established international border."
This is clear. What isn't is the Chinese sabre-rattling. What explains its daily scaremongering against India around the construction of a road? It has appeared thoroughly impatient of India's stance and is behaving like a classic bully — escalating the conflict radar on a daily basis and lessening maneuvering space for diplomatic solutions. It is also showing a complete disregard for mechanisms that have been laid painstakingly over the years for maintaining peace and tranquility along the border region.
A look at Chinese escalation strategy reveals a pattern. When the standoff first erupted, Beijing reacted by blocking Indian pilgrims from visiting Kailash Mansarovar through Nathu La. Since then, it has been raising the temperature rather quickly through military show off, daily press briefings via foreign office, incendiary rhetoric from state-controlled media and thinly disguised warning from its embassy in India. It has brandished its "most advanced battle tank" during a military drill in Tibet, sent more than a dozen warships, submarines and destroyers prowling in Indian Ocean, warned India through its media mouthpiece that it will be subjected to a fate worse than 1962, vowed to openly instigate trouble in Sikkim and Bhutan to release them from "Indian oppression", claimed that India has violated "Panchsheel principles" and in a quite extraordinary move, uploaded a video in YouTube (banned in China) where Political Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in India, Li Ya, tells New Delhi to "immediately and unconditionally withdraw all troops from Doklam plateau".
And in a fresh development on Thursday, it has indicated that President Xi Jinping will give Prime Minister Narendra Modi the 'royal snub' at Hamburg during the G20 meet.
So far, the Indian Army has maintained a studied silence, the Ministry of External Affairs has not gone beyond the communiqué, ministers and political leaders have held their fire and even the ever excitable Indian media has been admirably circumspect in their coverage.
Indian reticence has probably infuriated the Chinese even more. Scaling up of threats is a clear indication that China isn't getting the response it is looking for and our strategy is working.
India needs to be clear about two things. One, it must avoid getting provoked at all costs and resolutely ignore the daily insults. These abuses might become sharper with each passing day because China would want to rattle us into taking a brash step that they use to justify aggression.
Two, regardless of the amount of pressure, the daily dose of propaganda and psychological warfare, India must not budge from its position at Doka La plateau because any withdrawal will set a damaging precedent which might be used by China as a future template.
At the same time, India must be ready for the long haul — since this impasse may continue for months as China tests our red lines and resolve — and keep open all channels of diplomacy and communication. There is a possibility, as Raghavan writes in his piece, China might be using Doka La road construction as a bargaining chip to stop India from scaling up its infrastructure building around the Himalayan frontier.
It is interesting that despite blocking the pilgrims, China has kept the trade lines open through Nathu La. Therein lies the answer.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
If Pakistanis are unusually quiet, & china is making a big deal about military operations in Tibet region, then could these be the diversionary tactics for an eventual push coming from the east ?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Have we vacated the Baki border?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
If the NSG thing doesn't work out in the near future, we could ask the tibetan govt in exile to come to delhi and setup shop. Bring the dalai lama to come and do a bhoomi pooja , grihapravesam thing. And change position on Tibet itself. Enough dhoti shivering.Singha wrote:its time to correct such historical wrongs
also tibet must have a full consulate in delhi with the dalai lama as exiled head of state and india must formally renounce its one-china policy wrt tibet and xinjiang. we should invite the xinjiang uighurs to select a Khalifa from the ranks in turkey or idlib and send him over here with full diplomatic protocol accorded
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
But please don't post it out in the open. Nobody needs to knowSingha wrote:keep an eye if they return...hopefully headed east on posting.Iyersan wrote:Too many fighter jets taking to the skies over Pune
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RKumar
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
+100Prasad wrote:But please don't post it out in the open. Nobody needs to knowSingha wrote:
keep an eye if they return...hopefully headed east on posting.
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DrRatnadip
- BRFite
- Posts: 604
- Joined: 31 Dec 2016 00:40
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
http://m.timesofindia.com/business/indi ... 478405.cms
Strategic move': Vietnam renews India oil deal in tense South China Sea
HANOI/NEW DELHI: Vietnam has extended an Indian oil concession in the South China Sea and begun drilling in another area it disputes with China in moves that could heighten tensions over who owns what in the vital maritime region.
The moves come at a delicate time in Beijing's relations with Vietnam, which claims parts of the sea, and India, which recently sent warships to monitor the Malacca Straits, through which most of China's energy supplies and trade passes.
Strategic move': Vietnam renews India oil deal in tense South China Sea
HANOI/NEW DELHI: Vietnam has extended an Indian oil concession in the South China Sea and begun drilling in another area it disputes with China in moves that could heighten tensions over who owns what in the vital maritime region.
The moves come at a delicate time in Beijing's relations with Vietnam, which claims parts of the sea, and India, which recently sent warships to monitor the Malacca Straits, through which most of China's energy supplies and trade passes.
-
DrRatnadip
- BRFite
- Posts: 604
- Joined: 31 Dec 2016 00:40
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1055271.shtml
India has more in common with China than with US
Following tensions on the border between China and India, all eyes are now on the G20 Summit in Hamburg, which will be attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other international leaders. China and India should engage with each other, and personally I believe the current trend of economic cooperation will not change direction even amid tension at the border, if Modi is a sensible politician.
Several days before the big bear hug that Modi gave US President Donald Trump in Washington on June 26, Indian border troops crossed the China-India boundary at the Sikkim section and entered Chinese territory. It sparked concerns that New Delhi may want to embrace the US and turn its back on China. However, I don't think Modi would do a stupid thing like that. The principles of non-alignment have been in the minds of Indian politicians since independence. Additionally, India dare not risk cutting its economic ties with China.
They are leaving no stone unturned..
India has more in common with China than with US
Following tensions on the border between China and India, all eyes are now on the G20 Summit in Hamburg, which will be attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other international leaders. China and India should engage with each other, and personally I believe the current trend of economic cooperation will not change direction even amid tension at the border, if Modi is a sensible politician.
Several days before the big bear hug that Modi gave US President Donald Trump in Washington on June 26, Indian border troops crossed the China-India boundary at the Sikkim section and entered Chinese territory. It sparked concerns that New Delhi may want to embrace the US and turn its back on China. However, I don't think Modi would do a stupid thing like that. The principles of non-alignment have been in the minds of Indian politicians since independence. Additionally, India dare not risk cutting its economic ties with China.
They are leaving no stone unturned..
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
The Tibet is flat, dusty and arid. PLA dumping supplies must be clearly visible. If we they are dumping in mountains, there must be caves from where hard top roads or heavy vehicle tracks should be visible. These caves cannot be build overnight, so the tracks/roads must already be there.
S300 or Chinese clones would be using powerful generators which would consume lot of fuel. So they must be either in an airbase or a army camp, where fuel supply can be guaranteed.
To sustain large numbers near the borders, the supplies has to come from Lhasa. The drones watching the plateau would notice supply trucks movements.
S300 or Chinese clones would be using powerful generators which would consume lot of fuel. So they must be either in an airbase or a army camp, where fuel supply can be guaranteed.
To sustain large numbers near the borders, the supplies has to come from Lhasa. The drones watching the plateau would notice supply trucks movements.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Very good stuff from Samir Saran - "In Armed Conflict With India, Why China Would Be Bigger Loser" - http://www.ndtv.com/opinion/3-messages- ... ?site=full
In case of an armed conflict, the bigger loser will be China. The very basis of its "Peaceful Rise" would be questioned and an aspiring world power would be recast as a neighbourhood bully, bogged down for the medium term in petty, regional quarrels with smaller countries. For India, a stalemate with a larger nuclear power will do it no harm and will change the terms of engagement with China dramatically.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Gautamhttp://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/dokl ... 95356.html
Doklam standoff: Chinese media says Beijing should back Sikkim independence
The editorial in the Global Times, a Party-run tabloid published by the official People's Daily aid China "should lead the international community in restoring Bhutan's diplomatic and defence sovereignty".
A hardline Chinese newspaper's editorial on Thursday called on Beijing to rethink its recognition of Sikkim as a part of India and to support "pro-independence appeals" as a punitive measure to India "to pay for its provocations" over the stand-off on the Doklam plateau in Bhutan.
The editorial in the Global Times, a Party-run tabloid published by the official People's Daily but known for its hawkish views, also said China "should lead the international community in restoring Bhutan's diplomatic and defence sovereignty".
China, which is hugely sensitive about Tibet's status, insists on countries reiterating the "One China policy" at every summit to underline its position on Tibet and Taiwan. It is an especially sensitive issue with India. Despite China's concerns on Tibet, the Global Times, however, suggested Beijing should rethink its recognition of Sikkim as well as push for Bhutan to dilute its ties with India and establish formal diplomatic ties with China.
......
"In the past, China was wary of India playing the Dalai Lama card, but this card is already overplayed and will exert no additional effect on the Tibet question. But if Beijing adjusts its stance on India-sensitive issues, it could be a powerful card to deal with New Delhi," it said of Sikkim.
"With certain conditions, Bhutan and Sikkim will see strong anti-India movements, which will negatively affect India's already turbulent northeast area and rewrite southern Himalayan geopolitics."
The editorial said Beijing "should reconsider its stance over the Sikkim issue". Since 2005, Chinese maps have shown Sikkim as a part of India, while India in 2003, during then Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China, said officially that it recognises the Tibet Autonomous Region as a part of China.
"Although China recognised India's annexation of Sikkim in 2003, it can readjust its stance on the matter. There are those in Sikkim that cherish its history as a separate state, and they are sensitive to how the outside world views the Sikkim issue. As long as there are voices in Chinese society supporting Sikkim's independence, the voices will spread and fuel pro-independence appeals in Sikkim," the editorial said.
The paper said India had "severely jeopardised Bhutan's diplomatic sovereignty and controls its national defence" and had "imposed a similar coercive policy on Sikkim before".
"Unfair treaties between India and Bhutan that severely violate the will of the Bhutanese people should be abolished. China needs to put more efforts into establishing diplomatic ties with Bhutan at an earlier date as well," it said.
The Global Times said "New Delhi deposed the king of Sikkim in 1975 and manipulated the country's parliament into a referendum to make Sikkim a state of India. The annexation of Sikkim is like a nightmare haunting Bhutan, and the small kingdom is forced to be submissive to India's bullying."
"New Delhi's regional hegemony is swelling to a tipping point," the editorial concluded. "The country has to pay for its provocations."
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Ok folks enough data gathering. Lets move to next stage of BR Think Tank 2.0
What should India do?
1) De-Escalate: #MediaMujahids want this
2) Hold: Pragmatists want this
3) Escalate : Hawks want this
China can do the same.
So chose your options for India or China.
State your choice and reasons.
And must answer what this move will do to China.
E.g.
India should de-escalate. Avoids war and tensions.
China will gain.
What should India do?
1) De-Escalate: #MediaMujahids want this
2) Hold: Pragmatists want this
3) Escalate : Hawks want this
China can do the same.
So chose your options for India or China.
State your choice and reasons.
And must answer what this move will do to China.
E.g.
India should de-escalate. Avoids war and tensions.
China will gain.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
2) Hold: Pragmatists want this
We cannot cede anymore strategic depth to them, we have done that enough in the past.
We have enough trump cards to play as well starting with de-legitimizing Chinese occupation of Tibet.
If push comes to shove we should occupy Chumbi valley as well and hold on to it.
We cannot cede anymore strategic depth to them, we have done that enough in the past.
We have enough trump cards to play as well starting with de-legitimizing Chinese occupation of Tibet.
If push comes to shove we should occupy Chumbi valley as well and hold on to it.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Obvious choice is to give China a blood nose, occupy Chumbi valley and Dhokla plateau, because we are in a stronger position. For decades Kangressi/Nehruvian thinking has not worked. This will send a message to neighbours, including a salient one to bakis that sugar daddy will not come to their rescue. I read someone that US first term presidents support China before getting tired and moving towards India. Looks like Trump has already had enough of China's double speak, when they did not control N Korea. We have to start getting back the territories that China has nibbled away.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
3 Escalate very very subtly so that Cheen is forced to take a mistep in rage and give them a bloody nose.
Win for India in short term, assuming India can administer a public bloody nose and forces Cheen to withdraw. Take Akshai Chin back.
Win for India in short term, assuming India can administer a public bloody nose and forces Cheen to withdraw. Take Akshai Chin back.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
In a way true. China got "religion" from India. Until then they did not have very long lasting organized religions. They think and act like Indians onlee. Remove communism and authoritarian regime, they will be as good or as bad as India.DrRatnadip wrote:
India has more in common with China than with US
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Any WTO experts here who might be able to point out whether combatant parties might suspend adherence to rules in the event of hostilities? Great way to redress trade imbalance by banning Chinese goods. Hit the Han where it hurts.ramana wrote:Ok folks enough data gathering. Lets move to next stage of BR Think Tank 2.0
What should India do?
1) De-Escalate: #MediaMujahids want this
2) Hold: Pragmatists want this
3) Escalate : Hawks want this
China can do the same.
So chose your options for India or China.
State your choice and reasons.
And must answer what this move will do to China.
E.g.
India should de-escalate. Avoids war and tensions.
China will gain.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
"India has more in common with China than with US" ^^^
Must be true. I assume there are many more Indians in China than the 4MM diaspora in the US. Also we must be selling far more to them than they are to us.
Must be true. I assume there are many more Indians in China than the 4MM diaspora in the US. Also we must be selling far more to them than they are to us.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I am a bit confused with all these chini threads with similar agendas but differing titles. So, I hope this section below is not OT for this thread:
PLA's confusing capabilities and true abilities:
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NPH-_LVlxmc. 5 Reasons Why The Chinese Military Is WEAKER Than You Think
2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eGs_dcXt-3k. 10 Signs China's Military Is Weaker Than You Think
3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lu5VFxHrLi4. China may not be as strong as you think. This is a very informative video.
4. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YMTZMdWVG1Q. 5 Chinese Military Fails
5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTu5xkZhd6E. Chinese Admiral Discovers Weak Point of US Military
6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n_Hl63bQOuk. China's BIG Military Problem
PLA's confusing capabilities and true abilities:
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NPH-_LVlxmc. 5 Reasons Why The Chinese Military Is WEAKER Than You Think
2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eGs_dcXt-3k. 10 Signs China's Military Is Weaker Than You Think
3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lu5VFxHrLi4. China may not be as strong as you think. This is a very informative video.
4. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YMTZMdWVG1Q. 5 Chinese Military Fails
5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTu5xkZhd6E. Chinese Admiral Discovers Weak Point of US Military
6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n_Hl63bQOuk. China's BIG Military Problem
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China hidden genocide - 1.5 Million killed for their organs. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bIxE5kZXjsY
Source - http://www.chinaorganharvest.org/
Source - http://www.chinaorganharvest.org/
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I am thinking of shutting the other China threads for a couple of months to ensure focus.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Please do!
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Good idea. But keep the OBOR thread open and limit it to track ONLY News items.
OBOR news will not fit in a 'Chinese threat' thread.
China Watch thread is unnecessary at this point. The watch is happening here.
CPEC news could go into OBOR news.
OBOR news will not fit in a 'Chinese threat' thread.
China Watch thread is unnecessary at this point. The watch is happening here.
CPEC news could go into OBOR news.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
So, let us just give up. Let China draw the border, they are fair and will take care of our interest.https://thewire.in/154895/china-india-war-1962/
What China Means When It Says India Needs to ‘Remember the Lessons from History’
....
To sum up, the 1962 war was not a product of Chinese expansionism (if one rules out its annexation of Tibet). Nor was it a product of Nehru’s or India’s imperialism. It arose out of China’s attempt at consolidation. China tried repeatedly to nudge India towards a negotiated solution, but did not realise that no democracy could afford to negotiate from a position of weakness. On his part, Nehru was not the puffed-up peacock that his present-day critics make him out to be, but a visionary leader who failed to make his people accept his vision, fell foul of public opinion and lost his capacity to lead the country at a crucial time on a crucial issue. The crucial error that both countries made was not to perceive the visceral link between foreign and domestic policy. China never understood how public opinion could impede the search for a negotiated solution; Nehru did not have the faintest inkling of how much China’s natural aversion to conflict had been eroded by the failure of the Great Leap Forward.
The 1962 war was a product of these failures, but these are failures typical of young nations. Both countries have learned immensely valuable lessons from it. This became apparent in 2009, when after three years of increasing acrimony, renewed aggressive patrolling and frequent intrusions across the Line of Actual Control, and an unambiguous ultimatum by China to prevent the Dalai Lama from visiting Tawang, it was then premier Wen Jiabao who took the initiative to meet Manmohan in Thailand and arrest the drift towards a repeat of 1962.
What is even more significant, both governments realised that public opinion, inflamed by the international media, was the main impediment to peace and arrived at the brilliantly innovative decision to ban the international, and limit the local media’s presence, in Tawang, while allowing the Dalai Lama to continue his trip unimpeded.
When India is on the verge of a conflict that can destroy the status that has taken five decades to rebuild after 1962, it is imperative that the present policymakers take some time off to actually read the Brooks-Bhagat report and accept the damning indictment of the Indian government’s irresponsibility in 1962 that it contains.
They are coming out of the woodwork.
Gautam
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ArjunPandit
- BRF Oldie
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- Joined: 29 Mar 2017 06:37
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Why not a poll saar? Was thinking of the same type of poll (more on will we see some military action)ramana wrote:Ok folks enough data gathering. Lets move to next stage of BR Think Tank 2.0
What should India do?
1) De-Escalate: #MediaMujahids want this
2) Hold: Pragmatists want this
3) Escalate : Hawks want this
China can do the same.
So chose your options for India or China.
State your choice and reasons.
And must answer what this move will do to China.
E.g.
India should de-escalate. Avoids war and tensions.
China will gain.
Anyways, here is my opinion
Option: 2. Hold. Do not fall in their trap.
Reason: At this stage our military build up is not complete. Even mighty brishit Chamberlain grovelled in front of hitler when he wasn't ready. Right now we neither have a formal ally nor have our build up complete.
Counterargument to mine would be: By the time we would be ready, chinese capabilities could be miles ahead of us.
What this move will do to china: Make them smug, GT will BS more in their editorial, perhaps make chinese more belligerent and the world will see them through and through (if they havent already).
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I find it very odd that Bhutan has not deployed their soldiers to protect their border. They got 16,000 of them and esp considering that the only "fighting" happening at the border is jostling why drag indian soldiers in to it ?. Also bhutanese official media is very quiet when their borders seems to be under attack. This makes Indian govt look very belligerent and aggressive and highly interfering. Not good for India. I vote for 1) de-escalate.
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ArjunPandit
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 4056
- Joined: 29 Mar 2017 06:37
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
In the tradition of BRF to dig up journalist (if we may chose to call him so). The following are some previous works of this pukesterg.sarkar wrote:https://thewire.in/154895/china-india-war-1962/
What China Means When It Says India Needs to ‘Remember the Lessons from History’
Gautam
1. Modi’s Beijing Policy Is Like Cutting Off India’s Nose to Spite China’s Face
2. China Will See the Dalai Lama’s Visit to Tawang as a Provocation
3. Modi’s Approach to Foreign Policy Has Disrupted India’s Ties With China
4. Modi’s Note Ban May Spell Catastrophe for the BJP
5. India’s Recent Moves are Bound to Provoke China
6. A Military Attack on Pakistan Will Lead to India’s Worst Nightmare (My fav)
7. India’s Secularism, Deeply Rooted, Now Hangs on a Precipice
8. The Basement Sale of India’s Sovereignty
9. How the Modi Government Spurned Friendly Overtures by China to Move Closer to the US
10. With Time Running Out, Delhi Can No Longer Afford to be Complacent in Kashmir
This guy has been active on wire since 2016, though he's quite old.
He has a wiki page too
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prem_Shankar_Jha
http://www.premshankarjha.com/cv/
Few things end the surprise and caught my attention
1. Oxford/Harvard
2. Tehalka/Hindu
3. Smooth talking/anti national trying to sound as a perfectly reasonable and logical person(looking at the comments and responses on his page). In other words he's the Dr Zola of Hydra. Although, it too follows from 1.
Has connections with Tehalka (Weren't they the one who broke the Kargil Coffin scam, which wasn't there)
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Definitely the Chinese will go to war. The conditions are damn near perfect militarily for them. However whether the outcome will be satisfactory for them short term or long term needs to be understood. I for one feel that a Chinese attack will jumpstart India's RMA.Vikas wrote:Why this assumption that Cheenis can not go to war with India. They might as well to prove a point and their dominance.
Again this assumption that PLA is competent enough to push IA back is again, wishful thinking. Who knows what dynamics War will bring out.
Thrusting a war to grab a small piece of Indian territory does not seem like a sane objective. If war happens, Chinese will try to grab whole of AP and some part of Sikkim for sure but then would Bharat be contend with defending or take this opportunity to take back Aksai chin. After all if its war then this might as well be a war worth fighting for.
Thinking from the Chinese side,
1) China opens a front on the JK side of the border by concerted/coordinated action via PA supported by Chinese advisors and war equipment moving down the KKH and the PLA in Ladakh.
2) A front in Sikkim where the initial trouble started is probably just a feint to fix the IA there, I hope our military is watchful
3) We should also consider the ability of China to cut through Myanmar to encircle IA in Arunachal Pradesh/NE in a war.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
The Chinese are still in Bhutanese territory, any compromise now will only mean shifting the status quo in their favour.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Why do you guys even read thewire (and quint)? It's as anti Indian as anyone can be. It's website of that US citizen a$$hole Siddharth varadrajan. That's enough to stay as far away from it as possible.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Arjunji,
No one writes like that on his own. Serious money has changed hands for this type of writings, and now he is paying his masters back.
Gautam
No one writes like that on his own. Serious money has changed hands for this type of writings, and now he is paying his masters back.
Gautam
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
True. Can we have a like buttonSriJoy wrote:^^
If the Chinese cut through Burma and feint at Arunachal, i say we let them. And nourish the soil of Arunachal with Chinese blood when winter comes, the Passes freeze over and we turn NE into a turkey shoot.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
My vote is for "Hold". India's current position in international affairs is good. India is taking care of its domestic problems one by one. So the status-quo benefits India. Holding without yielding to China tells China to back-off and inform China, South Asia and the World that India is not a push over.
Holding also displays will, might and ability to domestic trouble makers. Hold displays to the World that India is not a war mongering nation, not a trouble maker but if a fight erupts India will wage war for the right reasons.
Blood and territory et al meaningful only if say India manages to free Tibet. Otherwise winning a few hundred square meters not always beneficial.
Holding also displays will, might and ability to domestic trouble makers. Hold displays to the World that India is not a war mongering nation, not a trouble maker but if a fight erupts India will wage war for the right reasons.
Blood and territory et al meaningful only if say India manages to free Tibet. Otherwise winning a few hundred square meters not always beneficial.
Last edited by SwamyG on 07 Jul 2017 18:21, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
The real and enduring solution for Chickens neck would be to develop NE to such a point that cutting off Chickens neck should do nothing to the status quo. NE citizens should feel (as many of them already do) strongly as an integral part of India, the economy should be self-sustaining, they should be independent in terms of power and foodgrains, medical facilities and education. At that point only an idiot will try to separate them from India because the backlash will be furious and powerful by NE citizens themselves (together with, of course, the armed-to-the-teeth Indian Army units stationed there). In case of prolonged conflict, we will lease/overrun Chittagong and resupply over water.
As long as we continue to route essentials to NE over Chickens neck, this area is in threat.
As long as we continue to route essentials to NE over Chickens neck, this area is in threat.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
there is already a massive IAF presence in bagdogra and hashimara. and I am sure a chain of IA camps as well.
hashimara now has Mig27 but will get rafale when it comes. bagdogra has long been a mig21 base from before I was born.
kalaikunda and panagarh are major bases in WB.
guwahati is at present kept only as a Mi17 and an32 type transport base but has plenty of resources and room to become a major fighter base if desired. but only crimp will be it has a lot of civilian flights - maybe thats the reason its not a fighter base.
it has to be mentioned however that investment into bases in eastern india have been much less than the major bases in the west and the level of infra is lacking vs say gwalior or jodhpur. we need to step up and bring all the eastern and central sector bases to par.
hashimara now has Mig27 but will get rafale when it comes. bagdogra has long been a mig21 base from before I was born.
kalaikunda and panagarh are major bases in WB.
guwahati is at present kept only as a Mi17 and an32 type transport base but has plenty of resources and room to become a major fighter base if desired. but only crimp will be it has a lot of civilian flights - maybe thats the reason its not a fighter base.
it has to be mentioned however that investment into bases in eastern india have been much less than the major bases in the west and the level of infra is lacking vs say gwalior or jodhpur. we need to step up and bring all the eastern and central sector bases to par.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
The trajectory for this confrontation has been apparent for some time. Recent Chinese actions stem from it's belief that it's time has arrived and other countries must be subservient to China. Chinese economic and military growth over the past decade means that China believes that it longer needs to grant primacy to India in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
Chinese actions in disputed territories has been to alter the ground reality by physical construction of roads, ports, airstrips etc. In the South China sea the Chinese have built up entire fortified islands and there really has been no significant challenge from any nation in the area to this action. Even the US does a "freedom of navigation" sailing by one of it's warships periodically, but that is about it. Emboldened by the lack of reaction from other countries in the South China Sea, China attempted to alter the ground reality in Bhutan and in the Doklam plateau. But this time it has run into India and has been physically stopped and hence the squeals of rage.
Now that the Chinese move has been stopped in the tracks, the most important thing for China is a face saving way out of this mess. I think there is a People's Congress slated to be held in October of this year. Xi Jinping will stand to be relected by the congress delegates for another term as General Secretary. And so he cannot afford to be humiliated. At the same time, this could be Narendra Modi's first real test as PM.
Chinese actions in disputed territories has been to alter the ground reality by physical construction of roads, ports, airstrips etc. In the South China sea the Chinese have built up entire fortified islands and there really has been no significant challenge from any nation in the area to this action. Even the US does a "freedom of navigation" sailing by one of it's warships periodically, but that is about it. Emboldened by the lack of reaction from other countries in the South China Sea, China attempted to alter the ground reality in Bhutan and in the Doklam plateau. But this time it has run into India and has been physically stopped and hence the squeals of rage.
Now that the Chinese move has been stopped in the tracks, the most important thing for China is a face saving way out of this mess. I think there is a People's Congress slated to be held in October of this year. Xi Jinping will stand to be relected by the congress delegates for another term as General Secretary. And so he cannot afford to be humiliated. At the same time, this could be Narendra Modi's first real test as PM.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
^^ just before that would be a ideal time to humiliate Xi and spoil his party.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
An Indian leader needs to stand up and state that the nations resolves to take back all Indian lands and territory that are under enemy occupation , however long it takes , even if it takes decades or centuries
Somehow there is a perception that once we lose territory we do not make an effort to regain it ( be it POK or Aksai Chin or whatever )
Somehow there is a perception that once we lose territory we do not make an effort to regain it ( be it POK or Aksai Chin or whatever )
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
^^ only Modi Ji should do it on red-fort on 15th Aug or President of India on 25th January eve in the address to the nation, to have a historical value..