Artillery: News & Discussion

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raghava
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by raghava »

Really detailed analysis, ramana garu - pranams...
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Bala Vignesh »

OT
Ramana sir, can i get your email id?? Hoping to get your help with something.
Thanks.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by schinnas »

Hats off, Ramana garu. Impressive for a civilian with a different day job to be able to do such a deep analysis. Such efforts of people like you, Shiv, SSridhar inspire lazy goons like me to contribute something down the line.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by fanne »

Nice Work!! Hope it is useful where it is needed
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ramana »

Thanks to Akshay Kapoor

Confirms shell balloting

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/n ... 603192.ece
The Dhanush prototype suffered a barrel burst during firing trials at Pokhran in August last year, which has since been resolved.

An official with knowledge of the matter said. “It's true that the trial at Pokhran didn't go well. There was a barrel burst. However, it was later confirmed that the burst was not due to a defective barrel, rather the ammunition wobbled out-of-axis to exert additional pressure on the barrel, causing the accident”.

The official added that “the raw barrel was sent from the Metal & Steel factory, Ishapore, which is known amongst the ordnance factories for its quality barrel work”.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ks_sachin »

ramana wrote:Thanks to Akshay

Confirms shell balloting

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/n ... 603192.ece
Ramana that was a sweet analysis.

However does balloting explain all failures? The article talks about test in August last year.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ramana »

Yes please read my explanation again. It can explode inside or outside barrel and wobble to hit muzzle brake.

What it means is shell factory had to make very precise shells. 52 calibre will be even more important. A bad shell can wreck your expensive Titanium gun.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ramana »

Where are these shells made by OFB?
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ks_sachin »

ramana wrote:Yes please read my explanation again. It can explode inside or outside barrel and wobble to hit muzzle brake.

What it means is shell factory had to make very precise shells. 52 calibre will be even more important. A bad shell can wreck your expensive Titanium gun.
Thanks Ramana. Much appreciated.

Did not want to make assumptions so best to ask and be clear.

Regards
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Rakesh »

Ramana, your post is amazing. It needs to be preserved in the following;

viewtopic.php?f=24&t=5556
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ramana »

Thanks all.

I want to study artillery as a system of war.
here is one comparison of US and German artillery in WWII

https://armyhistory.org/u-s-and-german- ... omparison/
Nevertheless, evaluating an army’s artillery requires a good deal more than looking at the standard guns that it deploys. To be fully effective, an artillery arm must be well supplied with suitable ammunition. There must be a sufficient supply of standard guns so that the units being supported can know what fires they can expect. It must have a good means of identifying and accurately locating a target and needs well-schooled forward observers who are in close contact not only with the batteries, but with the troops they are working with. Effective artillery requires fire direction centers that can accurately place fires and rapidly shift them from one target to another. Those fire direction centers must be able to co-ordinate with other artillery units to mass fires as needed. The guns must have effective prime movers or be mounted on tracked vehicles. There must be a sufficient supply of all of the above to meet the needs of the maneuver units or other forces the batteries are supporting. Finally, the guns must be protected from counter-battery fire or other interdiction.

In other words, artillery is a system with a number of interacting components. The gun is the most visible part, but the whole system must work well to make the gun effective. Any analysis that does not examine all components of the system, and acknowledge that interference with any part of it can sharply reduce its effectiveness, is incomplete.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ramana »

Link: https://owlcation.com/humanities/ArtilleryBattalions

US Artillery in WWII

Lots of great pictures. Wish we could write simialr stuff on Indian Army now
Artillery Battalions in World War II
Updated on April 13, 2017
lions44 profile image
CJ Kelly more

Author of Red Legs of the Bulge: Artillerymen in the Battle of the Bulge. Always looking for great stories from any conflict.

Unparallelled Development


The use of artillery reached its zenith in World War II. The technical development between the world wars, particularly in the United States, created a system that was second to none. Time and time again in postwar interviews, German soldiers mentioned the fear that American artillery engendered along the front lines. They knew that as soon as an American spotter plane appeared over their positions, it would only take minutes before a massive barrage rained down death and destruction. There was no place to hide. The multitude of different caliber weapons combined with pre-configured firing tables meant no escape from its power. No matter how deep you tried to dig or how far you tried to run.

One of the keys to the success of the artillery branch in World War II lay in the structure of the battalion and its personnel. Whether it is within a division or as part of a Corps artillery group, the battalion was the primary unit structure for the artillery branch in World War II. Within those battalions were some of the most highly skilled personnel that the U.S. Army had throughout the war. Between the wars, there were important changes to the standard practices of the branch. Unit structure was evaluated, standard operating procedures were rewritten, and new technologies came on line. Regardless of the theater in which they operated, the branch was able to put all of these innovations into use.


Variety of Weapons

The size of the battalion depended on its main weapon. The bigger the gun, the more men you needed, though the basic battalion structure for both the 105mm M2A1 and 155mm M1 units was similar regardless of the gun. Each battalion had three firing batteries (4 guns each), a Headquarters battery (the CO and his staff along with the fire direction personnel, communications center, etc.), and a Service battery (ammunition, basic supplies, mechanics, etc.). Batteries were further subdivided into sections. Battalions were usually headed by a lieutenant colonel with an executive officer who was usually a major. Batteries were headed by a captain with an exec who was a lieutenant. A 105mm battalion contained just over 500 men. Each battery had about 100 men, which broke down into five officers and 95 enlisted of various rank. A 155mm battalion had approximately 550 enlisted men with 30 officers, with each battery having around 120 men. I use the word approximately because once combat operations began, it was rare for any unit (Division, Battalion, Regimental, etc.) to have a complete table of organization. There was a replacement system, but the exigencies of combat left all units in the combat arms (infantry, armor, engineer or artillery) short of men. The Battle of the Bulge in December 1944 caused such a manpower crisis in infantry units that even some artillery units ended up sending non-essential personnel to the infantry as replacements.


Best and Brightest


Within an infantry division, there were four artillery battalions, three M2A1 105mm howitzer battalions and one 155mm battalion. The three 105mm battalion were assigned to one of the three infantry regiments to support, forming a combat team. The assignments were made back in the States and continued upon deployment. The 155mm battalion supported the units or areas most in need at the discretion of the Division artillery commander (better known as Divarty). There were also units called cannon companies that used the M3 105mm, a lightweight, short-barreled version of the gun. In the first two years of the war, the 105mm self-propelled and 75mm howitzer were their main weapons. But they were part of the infantry regiment, and used at the discretion of the regimental CO. In theory it was supposed to provide supplemental firepower for the infantry companies. However in practice, they just never seemed to fit into the basic operations of the regiment and in many cases, ended up being used as perimeter defense. Using the vernacular of today, they could be described as a heavy weapons company on steroids. After the war, they were disbanded.

Besides the four firing battalions, an infantry division’s artillery complement contained a Division Headquarters component. It consisted of a battery headquarters, operations platoon, communication platoon, an air observation section and a maintenance section. Included in the operations platoon was an instrument and survey section along with a meteorological section. The communications platoon had the wire and radio section which was provided with over 30 miles of telephone wire and 4 radio sets. The supply and cooks sections rounded out the unit.

The jobs of the enlisted members of each firing battery varied depending on their training and circumstances with many personnel being cross-trained to do a variety of work. Each gun crew was considered a section and within each section there was a sergeant (Section Chief), a gunner corporal and assistant gunner (known as the #1), two other assistant gunners and three cannoneers. A driver and assistant driver rounded out the 105mm section, making for a total of nine men. Although requiring more personnel and having some technical differences (i.e. external powder bags), the duties of the 155mm crews were essentially the same.


Behind the safety plate, on the left side of the breech, the gunner corporal worked a telescopic sight known as the gunner’s quadrant (or gunner’s scope), containing an azimuth scale that measured horizontal deflection, which he set on orders from the firing officer. Officially, it was called the M12A2 panoramic telescope. It could be rotated manually 360 degrees. The sight had an alcohol bubble which he had to level prior to firing while using number wheel to traverse the tube left or right.

Red and white aiming posts were laid to the rear of the sight, almost in a straight line. One aiming stake was approximately 30 to 40 yards back while another was placed halfway between the gun sight and the other stake. The position of aiming posts could vary depending on the unit and terrain. Upon receiving the orders from the firing officer such as Command Left 10 or Right 20, the key task for the gunner was to get the aiming stakes and the gun sight lined up on the vertical crosshair in the scope. If the command was left 10, the head of the site would then be moved off of the aiming stakes by that many degrees. Then he would use a hand wheel to traverse the gun left. Looking through the sight once again to determine that he was still lined up with the aiming stakes, his last task would be to level the bubble, and shout ‘Ready!’ This told the Section Chief that the gun was ready to fire; he then held up his right arm as a signal to the gun crew.

Keeping the gun aligned properly was a difficult task when under the pressure of multiple fire missions, so the gunners had ways of cheating a little bit. Where possible, they could set the scope on a fixed target (e.g. Church steeple) and line up the angle on that. The wide dispersal of an exploding shell, which could be more than 50 yards, gave the gunners room to be off a little bit.

While the gunner corporal worked his sight, the assistant gunner, positioned on the right side of the breech, operated a hand wheel to set the elevation. During the relay of firing commands, included were terms such as Up 15 or Down 5, from the zero. Once the orders were received, he would spin his wheel to the correct angle. But his task did not end there; he also operated the breech block, set the primer and pulled the lanyard upon the order, Fire! Both he and the gunner corporal were also responsible for keeping the crew away from the tremendous recoil of the barrel which could kill or maim, especially in the 155mm. After firing, the breech was opened by the #1 and the shell casing would drop out automatically, where it was picked up one of the loaders to be tossed aside.


The two assistant gunners and three other cannoneers in the section were responsible for packing the shells with powder bags, setting the fuses according to the mission specifics and loading. Although the shells were shipped semi-fixed with the fuse already installed, it was the powder that provided the punch, so that had to be added to the shell. Each shell could take up to seven bags of powder, which were wrapped in silk and tied together. Maximum range for the 105mm was approximately seven miles (12,205 yds). The ammo men would disassemble the shell, pack the bags based on the firing orders, and reattach the fuse. Then the fuse had to be set using a special wrench. The majority of the shells expended during fire missions were usually high explosive (HE). There was a setting sleeve located at the base of each fuse. On an HE round, the ammunition crews could set it for either point detonating (PD) or time superquick (TSQ). This depended on how it was turned. For example, if the setting sleeve was turned parallel to the shell, it was set for superquick. Under the pressure of a fire mission, these tasks were hellish in the freezing, wet weather of Northern Europe. If your frostbitten hands were not already cut up from separating the silk powder bags with a knife, you got soaked kneeling down in the puddles and mud that formed around the gun pit.


The crews on the 155mm had different challenges. Extra men were needed just to carry the shells. The 95-pound shell required separate-loading bagged charges that were loaded with the shell according to the orders given by the firing officer. There were seven different propelling charges, with TNT being the most frequently used. It was the sheer weight and logistics involved with the operations of the 155mm ammo that was daunting. Shells were usually shipped in pallets, with eight shells per pallet. At the ammo dumps, these were broken down for shipment by truck to the batteries. A truck could carry between 50 and 60 shells per trip. The fuses were shipped in crates, about 25 per box. The shells had lifting rings attached at their nose during shipment, and they had to be removed to install the fuse. As with the 105mm, color markings were used to differentiate the type of shells. The setting sleeves also mirrored those on the 105mm ammo. Because of the separately loaded powder, it was vital that the powder chambers of the 155mm tubes be swabbed and inspected after each round was fired. If too much powder residue built up in the barrel, it could cause a catastrophic explosion when a round was fired. Amazingly, those incidents were relatively rare considering the near constant use that most of the weapons received.

Getting Technical

Other battery and battalion personnel included radiomen, wiremen, instrument operators (survey team), cooks, drivers, and mechanics. Many of the specialists were also grouped into sections and personnel from both the communications section and survey teams often were part of forward observation teams. Artillery batteries also had a fifth section, which was called the machine gun section. They were responsible for guarding the perimeter and hauling extra ammo.

One of the primary jobs of the instrument and survey section (also called the detail section) was to scout new positions for the battery, help lead the battery into and out of their firing positions, and lay in the guns. The skills of these men also translated into high quality artillery observers. They were also charged with conducting topographical surveys, which during combat operations were carried out rather infrequently. Upon arrival at a position, using such equipment as aiming circles, range finders, and other survey equipment like steel tapes and chains, the enlisted men of the section would lay in the guns to prepare them for aiming direction and elevation. Their officer would take a reading from the aiming circle so that the four guns of the battery would be aligned and shoot parallel with each other. The aiming circle was a small scope graduated with 6,400 mils as opposed to the usual 360 degrees (a mil is 1/6400 of a circle). It aids in laying in the guns by taking into account the Y Azimuth distance between true north and magnetic north. The reading was then given to each gunner while the howitzers were at zero deflection and a minimal elevation from level.


Many of the other non-firing battery assignments came with a multitude of dangers and nowhere was that more illustrated than for the men of the wire section of HQ Battery. Their job was to lay, repair and pick up telephone line. An artillery battalion communications net was its lifeline and monitoring its operation meant constant vigilance. The risk of being spotted by enemy observers was ever present. Running a spool of black telephone cord from HQ to an observation post could put one under fire from mortars, machine guns, snipers, shelling, both friendly and German, as well as enemy patrols. The black telephone cables were constantly shot up and there were up to several miles of cable laid out between an observation post and the FDC or battery. Dense woods, thick mud and snow made repairing the lines physically demanding work. Finding the break in a line required both skill and a little bit of luck. Usually, two men were sent out. They would follow a dead line some distance, usually to a place that had just been shelled. From there, they would splice into the line with their own EE8A telephone, and crank it to ring back to their starting place. If they received an answer, they had to keep moving and the procedure was repeated until they did not get an answer. This indicated that the break was somewhere between where they were and the location of the last “Okay” call.


Officer Corps

The officers’ jobs within the battery varied. Despite the copious Army manuals and regulations that defined nearly every aspect of life, the Army still encouraged low-level decision making regarding daily operations of its combat units. Junior commanders were expected to use their own initiative. Although this concept was much more limited in the artillery branch than in other branches, in practice each battery’s CO had great autonomy on officer assignments. In many cases, the executive officer ran day-to-day operations and oversaw all firing sequences and missions. Just like the enlisted, the cross training of commissioned personnel was an essential element in every battalion. The other officers could be assigned to a variety of tasks, which included motor officer, daily maintenance, firing officer or forward observer.

Duty as an observer usually occurred on a rotating basis for the officers of each battery within the battalion. A lieutenant led the small team of 3 or 4 men to a forward outpost to spend up to several days manning a front line position. There was even an instance within the 106th ID when a battery commander was actually manning an observation outpost at the time of the initial attack during the Bulge. When the situation was more fluid, as was the case in the summer and fall of 1944, the observation team may stay with a particular infantry unit for an extended time.

The majority of the officers within the artillery branch were highly skilled. If not West Pointers, many were from military schools such as the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) or the Citadel. Others were graduates of rigorous artillery ROTC programs from around the country. The Ivy League schools supplied the artillery branch with hundreds of officers throughout the war. Many others were reserve officers with established professional careers in civilian life. Later in the war, field commissions for qualified noncoms became commonplace.

The Field Artillery OCS at Fort Sill (one of three during the war) produced 25,993 second lieutenants during the war years,which included over 3500 ROTC cadets who had completed between six and eight semesters of ROTC. Many of them had graduated from college, but had not completed the summer training after their junior year required for commissioning. To be commissioned those ROTC cadets had to attend OCS after going through basic training and AIT.

Adapting to the Mission

Another key feature of American artillery during the war was the role of non-divisional artillery battalions of all calibers. These battalions were directly under the command of their respective Corps which had its own commanders and staff to coordinate all its elements. Battalions were also formed into field artillery groups of various calibers. The groups began forming in 1943. The command element of the groups was structured very similarly to that of a divisional artillery HQ with such features as fire direction center, H&H battery and service battery. A group was usually assigned from two to six battalions. One or more of the battalions of a group might be attached for direct support to an individual division. Such was the case with many African American artillery battalions. All of these units, regardless of their group or assignment, were considered Corps artillery. In a postwar study, the Army noted that the group command structure was one of the keys to success during the war because it permitted the commanders to shift artillery battalions from army to army, corps to corps or even to support individual divisions. This way the additional fire support went where it was needed quickly. During the Bulge, many of these Corps units were on the move every 12 to 24 hours. The shift of several large caliber artillery units, particularly segregated African American battalions, to Bastogne during the first 48 hours of the battle helped save the city from capture.

There were 238 separate field artillery battalions operating in the ETO by war’s end, with 36 105mm and 71 155mm battalions. This included self-propelled units such as the 275th Armored Field Artillery, who were positioned just north of the 106th. The other calibers were the 8 inch, the 240mm, and the 4.5 inch gun. For the larger caliber units and the armored field artillery, the number of guns per battalion differed from those of the standard infantry division artillery. Armored field artillery battalions had the same command structure within their organic divisions as the infantry, but contained 18 self-propelled howitzers instead of the usual 12 for the towed variety. The 8 inch gun and 240mm howitzer battalions had a total of six guns per battalion.

After the war, change came again. Guns continued to be improved while others were phased out. By the Korean War, they had added six guns to the standard battery. Self-propelled artillery took on a greater role and of course, missile and rocket technology changed the branch forever. But it was the work those battalions did in World War II that set the stage for the rest of the 20th Century and beyond.

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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Singha »

thats a good article. puts the whole fetish over 52cal and 25ltr chambers in perspective.

other links in the chain would be GMTI sensors and UAVs to surveil targets in all weather and do BDA, roads, hiding places, counter battery radars, MLRS to protect the tube units with counter battery fires, ample supply of shells, mobile SAMs to protect from air threats.

I dont think we are super good in any of these other line items. GMTI and MALE UAVs are a yawning gap

thats why even with non-tfta M109 SP guns the khan divisions are well set with a balanced posture. and they bring a lot of tubes into the fight.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ramana »

I want to look at Indian Artillery in 1965, 1971 and Kargil.

And modernization plans.

Can you help locate good descriptive articles on Soviets, Germans and British. Better than Wiki level.

I want some one to summarize all the fuzes available with India and comparable or better fuzes elsewhere.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ramana »

Artillery in Kargil

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... argil-war/
The Indian artillery fired over 2,50,000 shells, bombs and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately 5,000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars and MBRLs while 9,000 shells were fired the day Tiger Hill was regained. During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously. SSuch high rates of fire over long periods had not been witnessed anywhere in the world since the World War II. Even during the World War II, such sustained artillery firing was not common at all. The men at the guns had blisters on their hands from carrying and loading shells and cartridges. Very few of them got more than a couple of hours of sleep in every 24 hours cycle. They had no time for proper meals and were often themselves under enemy artillery fire. Yet, they carried on relentlessly ..



Read more at:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... argil-war/
http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/in ... 69140.html

PTI article.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by JayS »

ramana wrote:Artillery in Kargil

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... argil-war/
The Indian artillery fired over 2,50,000 shells, bombs and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately 5,000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars and MBRLs while 9,000 shells were fired the day Tiger Hill was regained. During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously. SSuch high rates of fire over long periods had not been witnessed anywhere in the world since the World War II. Even during the World War II, such sustained artillery firing was not common at all. The men at the guns had blisters on their hands from carrying and loading shells and cartridges. Very few of them got more than a couple of hours of sleep in every 24 hours cycle. They had no time for proper meals and were often themselves under enemy artillery fire. Yet, they carried on relentlessly ..



Read more at:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... argil-war/
http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/in ... 69140.html

PTI article.
Very impressive. Salute to the men who toiled so hard for the Nation. Its unimaginable for the aam abduls how hard the situations can be for soldiers, even in peacetime.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Yagnasri »

One can not pity the UniJihadis and UnUniJihadis( my words. no one else can use them) who received all these gifts from our forces. But imagine what will happen to the people who are on the receiving end of such a sustained attack. If I remember well many times these were fired in direct mode at specific areas.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Marten »

Sainik Samachar: Shell shocked in Kargil
The performance of the Artillery units which fought heroically at Kargil in 1999 during operation Vijay was splendid. The Indian Artillery fired over 250,000 shells, bombs and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately, 5,000 ordnance were fired daily from more then 300 guns, mortars and multi-barreled rocket launchers (MBRLs). During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each Artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously. Such high rate of fire over long periods had not been witnessed anywhere in the world since World War-II. The Gunners soon developed blisters on their hands from carrying and loading heavy shells and cartridges incessantly. Very few of them got more than a couple of hours� sleep in 24 hour-cycle.

After the pockets of enemy intrusion were discerned, it emerged that massive and sustained firepower would destroy the intruders� sangars (temporary fortifications made of rocks and boulders) and systematically break their will to fight through a process of attrition. Thus began a unique saga in the history of the employment of Artillery firepower in battle. Artillery fire reduced the enemy�s defences to rubble and gradually wore down the enemy�s resistance and ultimately broke his will to fight. Additional Artillery regiments were inducted into the Kargil sector to achieve a preponderance of firepower supremacy over the enemy. The Artillery units soon made and coordinated plans for high-intensity fire assaults with infantry battalion and brigade commanders. Counter bombardment (CB) and counter mortar (CM) plans were made and fine-tuned to silence the enemy�s guns. Maximum use was made of air photographs to accurately locate enemy gun positions and other key targets deep inside Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). These were then fired upon relentlessly and damage assessment was carried out through aerial reconnaissance. Meanwhile, the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops holding defences on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) were allowed no rest and were kept constantly on edge through continuous harassing fire.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Singha »

in wonder if arty regiments could make use of small forklift trucks that warehouses and construction sites use to move around pallets of ammo once they are dropped off by trucks. easier than doing it by hand imo and these forklifts are easily transportable incl by air and Mi17.
even construction sites have taken to using a crane fixed onto a truck to lift large pallets of the hollow cinder blocks used to make todays buildings

these puppies are cheap but useful and rugged

Image
Image
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Prasad »

Forklifts work on flat ground. Artillery terrain might not be as forgiving no?
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Singha »

tracked versions also exist. bigger ones seem to be into impossible places in blr into raja kaluve drains to clear debris and crawl back up again. even the wheeled ones are pretty tough cats on soft earth construction sites.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Pratyush »

The trucks have a load handling crane. So the load can be dropped exactly where required. No need to add to logistical burden by adding a forklift.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by nam »

Artillery in Kargil

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... argil-war/
The Indian artillery fired over 2,50,000 shells, bombs and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately 5,000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars and MBRLs while 9,000 shells were fired the day Tiger Hill was regained. During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously. SSuch high rates of fire over long periods had not been witnessed anywhere in the world since the World War II. Even during the World War II, such sustained artillery firing was not common at all. The men at the guns had blisters on their hands from carrying and loading shells and cartridges. Very few of them got more than a couple of hours of sleep in every 24 hours cycle. They had no time for proper meals and were often themselves under enemy artillery fire. Yet, they carried on relentlessly ..
We need to forward this to Global times and other Chinese cronies.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Gagan »

Wonderful analysis Ramanaji.
Very deep insight!
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Gagan »

The arty gun is also a wheeled equipment. Whereever it goes, these small wheeled fork lifts can go too.
These small fork lifts can in addition be rigged to move the guns around, assist in digging small trenches & gun positions. A very useful piece of equipment, I agree

A few 3 Tonners can carry a few of these around with the unit. Infact these forklifts can latch themselves onto the back of a truck for transportation
Very apt low hanging fruit for Make In India too

PS: The battalion commanders can use these as golf carts while deployed in the field, on a slow day :wink:
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by vaibhav.n »

IA deploys skid steer loaders with its engineer units since 2000's. Its a Terex Heman 175. This is manufactured under JV by Vectra (of Tatra trucks fame) as SKD kits and resold to MoD.

Image

http://www.terex.in/en/cs/groups/webcon ... 115983.pdf

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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Singha »

small dozers whether self driving or carried in trucks proved their weight in gold in syria-iraq theater.
moment a unit halts the dozers get to work digging trenches and berms to protect from ISIS vbieds and raiding units.
the more well kitted units even lay minefields if the threat is high
metis and kornets are kept on warm standby

in more static fronts like deir azzor, the berms are height of 2 storey buildings to stop even large truck svbieds.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Gagan »

Speed of construction is the key here.
Need a TATA or Leyland type desi manufacturer to make these things and flood the army with these and other cheap force multipliers
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by abhik »

IIRC the Scania trucks that came with the Bofors had their own crane for moving ammo.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by abhik »

Nice long video (swedish) about the FH-77, probably from the 80's: https://youtu.be/Sr_D-8rBxYo?t=7m29s You can see the "forklift" in action at 7:30.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Singha »

We dont need the tatea skd scam on this, every changu mangu builder in blr has these so domestic sources both for forklift and the truck crane exist
We are probably paying 10x the market price for this gia the skd route
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Gagan »

The problem is that the changu-mangu manufacturers forklift made domestically, probably fails some outrageous QSR, which only the 10x expensive Tatra maal satisfies.
One wonders why the Tatra thingie was 10x expensive after all no?
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Singha »

Tatra has tfta split rear axle for very tough terrain.
But here not even a fig leaf to justify continued skd imports
Auto sector has come along a lot in 15 years

Voltas . Ace, godrej . Toyota. Jcb many are there

http://www.vicky.in/excavators/jcb-excavators-in-india/
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ramana »

coming back to the 155mm M107 shell and the balloting or wobble I am flummoxed how it happened,

We know balloting or wobble or side slap occurred.
Now to peel the onion layers as to why it happened?


Mil Handbook 756 gives the process for making the M107 shell casings.

The shells are deep drawn from steel billets and machined on a lathe to the right contour.
And lathe operation which is a spinning operation that means it has to spin true to its axis.

The QC checks are normal NDT testing and coupon tests for composition and strength
Rest is filling with explosives which are organic chemicals and would be homogenous with out high density inclusions

The fuzes are standard assemblies.

So where is the opportunity for off axis Center of Gravity which induces the wobble at high speed?

All I can think is due to the high muzzle velocity of the 45 and 52 calibers even small deviation cause instability.
And this high spin rate is happening early on in barrel travel.

Added later......

Two other sources for this phenomenon are

2) Barrel wear assuming nominal shell dimensions. However this wobble has happened in fairly new barrels some of which are just out of the factory. Some once again remote
3) The shell is machined too much. The shell contacts the barrel at two line contacts; Driving band and the bourrelet, which is the cylindrical portion of the shell. This is a possibility in a mass production environment.
An undersized bourrelet would have the gap that could induce the wobble when the shell is fired. Again function of the charge being high.

We need ARDE to perform balloting analysis as part of the inquiry to establish shell mass property limits.

An idea of the probability can be derived from the recent trials
1) Development trials 2000 rounds were fired. Wiki on Dhanush
2) User Trials. Same 2000. Let us assume total and not each gun
3) User exploitation trial 300 rounds per gun. Total 6 guns in a battery. Works out to 1800 rounds

We have 4 instances of bad outcomes out of a total (2000+2000+1800) = 5800 or 7800 if 2) was each gun
Probability is 4/5800 to 4/7800 = 0.0007 to 0.0005
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by jamwal »

JCB has started production in one of the biggest manufacturing plants of it's kind in Gujarat. Tata and a few more are already manufacturing these in India for some time. These dozers and other utility vehicles need not be imported anymore.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by jamwal »

ramana wrote:coming back to the 155mm M107 shell and the balloting or wobble I am flummoxed how it happened,


The fuzes are standard assemblies.
So where is the opportunity for off axis Center of gravity?

All I can think is due to the high muzzle velocity of the 45 and 52 calibers even small deviation cause instability.
And this high spin rate is happening early on in barrel travel.

We need ARDE to perform balloting analysis as part of the inquiry to establish shell mass property limits.
Isn't the barrel too short for such issues ? I suppose there must be some tolerances built in.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by Singha »

jamwal wrote:JCB has started production in one of the biggest manufacturing plants of it's kind in Gujarat. Tata and a few more are already manufacturing these in India for some time. These dozers and other utility vehicles need not be imported anymore.
it seems Terex too has a plant in india, and the model pictured above might be MII now atleast
http://www.terex.in/en/products/new-equ ... /index.htm
http://www.terex.in/en/products/new-equ ... /index.htm

beefier kit is also there for large civil works like protective sites for artillery
http://www.terex.in/en/products/new-equ ... /index.htm

@JCB jaipur plant just an example

Image

volvo has some meaty gear too
https://www.volvoce.com/india/en-in/pro ... ers/large/
they offer custom solns too if desired https://www.volvoce.com/india/en-in/pro ... solutions/

so I hope we are leveraging our internal ecosystems and suppliers and moved out of assembling tatra SKD kids on fat padded margins for BDL now

in general i truly love such rugged mechanical kit and nice to see tfta fit and finish gear rolling of desi assembly lines and components now.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by JTull »

Just looks like the cart used to collect balls at my local driving range. I've been guilty of aiming for the cage. :twisted:
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ramana »

The 155mm M107 shell and PD M572 Fuze are great for regular 39 caliber barrels.

When same combination is fired from 45 caliber barrels has vulnerabilities.

What Fuze is being used for the BAE M777 52 caliber gun?

If it's different then there is something to understand.
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Re: Artillery Discussion Thread

Post by ramana »

Artillery Fuzes GPS guided rounds

https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htart ... 70723.aspx
July 23, 2017: While the GPS guided Excalibur 155mm artillery shell revolutionized the use of artillery when it appeared in 2005, it is being displaced by a smaller, less capable but much cheaper alternative; M1156 PGK (Projectile Guidance Kit) fuze. In mid-2017 the U.S. Army ordered another 5,600 PGK fuzes for 155mm artillery shells. A year earlier M1156 was cleared for mass production. Up until mid-2016 4,800 PGKs has been produced under a limited production arrangement. But because of growing export orders and the fact that PGK costs 85 percent less than the slightly more accurate competition the U.S. Army has decided to stock up on the PGK in a big way.

With PGK the army has two GPS guided artillery shells; the older, more accurate and expensive M982 Excalibur and the new M1156 PGK. The advantage PGK has is that the GPS guidance is not built into a shell but instead it is a slightly heavier (about 1.4 kg/3 pounds) and larger fuze that screws into the front of a 155mm. This PGK fuze contains a GPS and small fins to guide the shell to a precision hit. Normally the fuze just controls how the shell will explode or when (using a timer or small radar). No one had been able to put a GPS guidance in such a small package but many have been trying for several decades.

The original (2009) version of PGK was much less precise than Excalibur and could only ensure that the shell landed within 50 meters (160 feet) of the target. If it did not hit within 150 meters, PGK deactivated and the shell dose not explode. In original version of PGK was subsequently tweaked so that by 2012 it landed within 32 meters (100 feet). By 2012 PGK was been further improved to put a guided shell within 19 meters (60 feet). By 2015 accuracy was improved to 10 meters or less and the reliability problems largely eliminated as the PGK was now over 90 percent reliable.

Meanwhile early users noted that the less accurate PGK was often adequate for most missions requiring a guided shell. Potential export customers were particularly eager because they had plenty of 155mm shells and word of the PGK accuracy and reliability improvements had gotten around, especially “customer satisfaction” comments from troops who called in PGK fire during combat. The lower cost was a big deal because it meant units could have a lot more access to GPS guided artillery fire when using PGK fuzes.
Excalibur was so expensive that it was made available in limited quantities.

Troops who had a choice still preferred Excalibur but in combat they found it didn’t make any difference most of the time and with PGK the artillery unit supporting the combat troops was likely to have more PGK fuzes than Excalibur shells. Moreover PGK continues to get cheaper while Excalibur is down to $70,000 per shell and seems to be stuck at that price.

Both Excalibur and PGK have revolutionized the use of artillery. An unguided shell will normally land within 267 meters of where it is aimed at maximum howitzer range (18 kilometers). An Excalibur shell always landed within 10 meters of the target (and often closer) but PGK was a lot cheaper, got to be nearly as accurate and turned any unguided shell into a GPS guided one. The U.S. Army sent the first PGKs to Afghanistan in 2013, after successful testing in the United States. The big question was how important would the troops find the accuracy and reliability differences between Excalibur and PGK. Initially the army bought 2,400 PGKs and the U.S. Marine Corps got 700. There is one export customer. Australia has ordered 4,000 PGKs and it was the Australians and other export customers who made PGK the preferred solution for GPS guided shells. The Australians had used Excalibur and were even more discouraged by the high price. But PGK was a bargain and more flexible in comparison to Excalibur.

By 2015 the U.S. Army was thinking of buying over 20,000 PGKs, but thought that would take a lot longer with the increasing budget cuts. The success of PGK in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan plus growing demand from allies threatened by Russia or North Korea has made PGK a much more popular solution for those wanting GPS guided artillery shells and shrinking ammo budgets turned into demands that stockpiles be replenished and expanded.

When artillery units had used both they still preferred the more accurate and reliable Excalibur over PGK. But they also found PGK could do the job just as well as Excalibur simply by firing two PGK shells to ensure the target was hit. This was still cheaper (by more than half) compared to Excalibur

The manufacturer of Excalibur tried to cope by developing a dual mode version that all allows for use of a laser designator. This provides even more accuracy, usually putting the shell within a meter or two (less than seven feet) of the aiming point. Excalibur is often called in when precision is the main requirement and this dual mode version provides the greatest accuracy available with any guided munition. But this level of accuracy is rarely needed from 155mm artillery and the infantry often have guided missiles or helicopters armed with Hellfire to take care of the targets that required laser accuracy. Most of the time having PGK guided shells was good enough and often a lifesaver.

The Excalibur shell cost reached $70,000 each by 2014, which is down from $150,000 each when Excalibur first entered service in 2007. Ultimately the price was to get down to $50,000, which some say has already been achieved if you don’t count development costs. But as a practical matter the much cheaper and almost as accurate PGK means less demand for Excalibur and less likelihood that the per-shell price will come down. Meanwhile development work continues. In addition to the laser guidance option Excalibur shells had range increased from 25 to 40 kilometers. Because Excalibur uses a lot of Swedish technology the Swedes will continue development if the United States drops out. The U.S. Army spent billions to develop the highly accurate M982 Excalibur GPS/laser guided 155mm artillery shell. But because so many other weapons have shown up with the same kind of accuracy, Excalibur was not called on nearly as much as originally believed. Excalibur was less frequently used than anticipated and orders for these weapons had to be reduced. So far the army has bought or plans (thru 2016) to buy only 6,876 Excalibur shells.

There was less demand for Excalibur shells largely because other precision munitions often take out targets before Excalibur gets a chance to. There’s a growing number of other GPS (or laser) guided weapons available. The GPS guided MLRS (GMLRS) rocket has been especially popular. And the army uses a lot of laser guided Hellfire missiles, fired from AH-64 helicopter gunships or UAVs. In addition to the reduction in Excalibur production, the army cut orders for GPS guided 120mm mortar shells (introduced in 2011) after a year of use.

The army wants to build up its stockpile of Excalibur and PGK, but because Excalibur got into service first and proved more accurate and reliable than the later PGK the army is stocking up on Excalibur first, and then the cheaper (and improving) PGK. Ultimately items like PGK will replace Excalibur, but for now Excalibur is the more mature and effective technology. But if there is a major war, the cheaper and easier to produce PGK will be the more practical choice because production can be increased more quickly and cheaply and the PGK is a lot easier and cheaper to store and transport.
I think India should develop or buy these PGK fuzes for improving effectiveness in mountain warfare for 105mm, 155mm and 81 and 120 mm mortar.

Especially 10m accuracy is a great enabler.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1156_Pre ... idance_Kit

buy them as part of M777 howitzer accessory
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