Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

[Rakesh]

Old Thread in Trash Can Archive.

[arun]

Well, well, now fissile material and one more so far unadmitted shipment of centrifuge parts, all on General Musharraf’s watch.

Extract from the Malaysian Police press release :

13.1 Around 2001, the nuclear arms expert informed BSA TAHIR that a certain amount of UF6 (enriched uranium) was sent by air from PAKISTAN to LIBYA. BSA TAHIR could not remember the name of the Pakistan Airlines which transported the uranium;

13.2 Year 2001/2002. The nuclear arms expert informed BSA TAHIR that a certain number of centrifuge units were sent to LIBYA directly from PAKISTAN by air. There is a possibility that the design of the centrifuge units that were sent were of the P1 model, i.e. a DUTCH designed model;

Well worth a read.

Now if the CEO (AQK) can be pardoned and the Chairman and Board of Directors (Mushy and the GOP) remain not even investigated, any expectation of seeing action against the mere CFO (B.S.A. Tahir) is a non starter.

The Malaysian’s seem to be truly ****ed off with President Bush’s NDU speech and have lodged a diplomatic protest.

Resulting in some soothing noises from John Bolton.

Apparently not enough to mollify the Malaysian’s as from the first report they seem to be taking the line that “under Malaysian laws under the Atomic Energy Licensing Act (Act 304) there is no provision under the law for the control of such components that were seized.”

Looks as if the US Administration’s permissive line with Pakistan has some costs attached.

Further if the Malaysian insistence on a multilateral approach to the investigation to the AQK affair comes off, the US Administrations ability to spare the Pakistan's blushes, will be diminished.

I foresee much life yet for this topic.

[Sunil]

Lets see:

1) SAM btty deployed in I'bad.

2) Sudden trip to meet Ahsan Salim Hayat at V Corps HQ in Karachi.

3) Oped in the nation that says:

"Apart from diplomatic pressure, should their physical safety be in doubt in any way, our claim of having achieved deterrence looks pretty thin on the ground."

I wonder if V Corps Karachi is a node in their C4I2S2R network.

[shiv]

Originally posted by arun:
Well, well, now fissile material and one more so far unadmitted shipment of centrifuge parts, all on General Musharraf’s watch.

Extract from the Malaysian Police press release :

This is a good one boys.

Archive it separately

Also: (cross post)

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/20/international/asia/20STAN.html

[jrjrao]

Wash. Post edit today:

Iran's 'Serious Failures'

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56299-2004Feb19.html

[Leonard]

Pakistan and Proliferation:
Implications and Options for Indian Policy
Rajesh Rajagopalan and Arpit Rajain


Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation activities are out in the open with consequent implications for India and the international community. Pakistan’s attempts to buy and sell, and barter, nuclear technology and material, have never really been a secret. What is of even graver concern is the international community’s continuing blinkered approach towards Pakistan’s nuclear activities which have made world a far more dangerous place to live.

Will Pakistan Stop Proliferating ?

Possibly not.

Despite being caught red-handed, Pakistan’s proliferation activities might not cease. Other than a promise to curtail future Pakistan proliferation activities, Pakistan will offer nothing to the international community, and the international community (read Washington) will settle for this.



Hence, though Pakistan’s proliferation activities may be curtailed for a while, it could resume under the following conditions:

If Pakistan’s politics moves further rightward, and the religious fundamentalist parties should become more powerful in Islamabad, they might be tempted to restart such transfers

If Pakistan needs specific technologies for its strategic programme, it might be tempted to pay for such programmes with its nuclear technology.

If Pakistan faces a serious financial crunch, nuclear proliferation might provide a way to earn hard currency

Individual Pakistani scientists or small coteries may attempt to proliferate for reasons of money as well as ideology, or more likely both.

Though covert but official transfers have been the pattern until now, covert, unofficial transfers can take place in the future. Either individuals or small coteries within the Pakistan nuclear, intelligence and military establishments, might attempt such operations. They will be more difficult to detect and stop.


Will the US Stop Pakistan ?

No.
Grand Strategic imperatives, which made the US look away when Pakistan was stealing nuclear technology to build its weapons, and made it ignore China’s role in building up Pakistan missile delivery capability, will operate now to make the US forgive Pakistan’s past transgressions for promises of future good behaviour.



But Pakistan will be under no fear of severe or consequences, other than getting caught. Washington perceives real benefits of Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terror, sentiments strengthened by the real fear that all possible realistic alternatives to Musharraf will be much worse for US interest and the war on terror than he is. So, India should expect the US to do little to either punish Pakistan for its past or future transgressions. India’s policy should be to tread carefully, to use stridency for wresting other concessions from the international community rather than expecting any real action against Pakistan. Such US generosity will also encourage Pakistan to continue proliferation, but more carefully.

Consequences of Pakistan's Proliferation

One definite consequence of Pakistan’s activities will be a tightening of US and general international technology control regulations. President George Bush, in his speech on February 11, has already announced that he would seek tighter controls on nuclear and other sensitive high-technology exports. This will hamper the recent progress made by India and the US on technology transfers on areas of mutual interests such as civilian nuclear and space technology. American and Western non-proliferation activists are bound to demand greater vigilance on proliferation-related activities and greater controls and restrictions on technology flows.

One objective of Indian policy should be to resist efforts by the non-proliferation lobby to club India, with its relatively clean record on technology controls, with serial proliferators like Pakistan and treat efforts to club it with Pakistan with the contempt it deserves. India should emphasise its record and highlight the difficulties it will create in US-India relations if Washington succumbs to such moves.

In addition, the US will expect India, and other countries, to further tighten domestic regulations on technology export controls. This is already an issue in US-India bilateral discussions; its salience can now be expected to increase.

Indian export control regulations are fairly tight, and its record on export controls fairly good. India has little reason to resist stronger domestic export control legislation, but must ensure that such measures are not used to prevent India from competing for legitimate exports in the international market. Undertaking such measures has real benefits for India but India should also emphasise that these measures should be adequately and materially recognised by the US.

Modifying the NPT Regime

New Delhi should encourage NPT system to take a second look at admitting acknowledged nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan and Israel, into the NPT Treaty system as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). Such inclusion will require all three new nuclear powers to shoulder the responsibilities of the non-proliferation regime, and it would help get over the current anomaly of three of the world’s nuclear powers, living in very dangerous, and possibly unstable neighbourhoods, being outside the responsibilities and oversight of the regime. The non-proliferation fundamentalists in Washington who want India, Pakistan and Israel to join the NPT as non-nuclear states will surely oppose such a move, which they see as rewarding the proliferators. But if Pakistan had been under the NPT umbrella after 1998, even as a NWS, its proliferation would have violated its legal international obligations rather than just normative restraints.

One technical objection to adding to the count of NWS in the NPT is that the Treaty defines NWS as those who had nuclear weapons before 1967. But this can be easily resolved with an additional protocol to the NPT. As of now, the primary obstacle to the inclusion of the de-facto nuclear powers is political, not legal.

Conclusion

The Pakistan military has much to answer to the people of Pakistan and the world community. Though Pakistan’s proliferation activities have now been revealed, and India’s suspicions confirmed, the consequences of the revelations could be adverse for India also. Moreover, Pakistan’s proliferation activities might not end, but rather go deeper underground, requiring greater vigilance to uproot it.

http://www.orfonline.org/reports/py040219.htm

[AJay]

Tim

Thanks for the following references.

Avner Cohen's "Israel and the Bomb" is the single preeminent source on Israeli nuclear developments, 1948-1970.

Obviously the difference between a professional historian/humanities person and lay engineers like me is quite telling

[Leonard]

Pakistan and Proliferation
Issues after Confession

Garima Singh

Now that Pakistan has admitted that its scientists were involved in the transfer of nuclear technology,1 three major issues/questions need to be studied and analyzed. Is the problem over for General Musharraf or is it a new beginning of another round of problems? How will the Opposition react? What would be the US response?

Is the Problem over for Musharraf?

General Musharraf is making full use of the prevailing circumstances. Though he has acceded to the international community about the transfer of nuclear technology and material to different countries but was clever enough to draw a fine line between the State and the scientists accused of proliferation. In all probability, Musharraf seems to have struck a deal with A.Q Khan. If he took the entire blame on himself, as he eventually did, he would be pardoned. This would absolve the State from any responsibility and keep the Army out of the heat. The issue, however, is far from over. Not many (in Pakistan as well as the international community) are willing to accept that Pakistan military was not involved in the proliferation.

More ......... At

http://www.orfonline.org/analysis/A116.htm

[Leonard]

This is a Wilson John's slightly older article with a host of European and US Connection Details


Nuclear Blackmarket and Pakistan

Wilson John

The least reported link in the otherwise raging controversy over Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation happened on January 1, 2004, at the Denver International Airport. Asher Karni, 50, a Jewish businessman from South Africa, was snared in a sting operation launched by the US Commerce Department and other federal agencies. The allegation against him was that he was involved in selling 400 spark gaps to a firm in Pakistan run by an arms dealer. Spark gaps are electrical devices used in breaking kidney stones and in triggering nuclear detonations.

What had put the federal agencies on the trail of Karni was the elaborate subterfuge employed by him and the customer in camouflaging the deal. Karni owns Top-Cape Technology in Cape Town, South Africa, a firm dealing in military and aviation electronic equipment. Last year, he was contacted by Pakland PME (2nd Floor, Muhammadi Plaza, Jinnah Avenue, F-6/4, Blue Area, Islamabad) for buying spark gaps from PerkinElmer Optoelectronics, Salem, Massachusetts. A sales brochure of PerkinElmer describes spark gaps as useful ``for in-flight functions such as rocket ignition, warhead detonation and missile stage separation’’. But PerkinElmer told Karni that the sale would require a US licence. Karni decided to adopt a more devious method. He subcontracted the deal. He asked Giza Technologies of Secaucus (600 Meadowlands Parkway, Suite 19 Secaucus, NJ 07094, US A) to buy 200 spark gaps from PerkinElmer. He said the spark gaps were meant for a hospital in South Africa, Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital, Soweto. The spark gaps were received by Karni at South Africa who repackaged them and dispatched them to Pakland PME, Islamabad.

The deal wouldn’t have attracted the attention of the intelligence agencies but for the antecedents of the owner of Pakland PME. It is owned by businessman Humayun Khan, known to be a regular supplier of military hardware to Pakistan military. Some of the emails intercepted by the agencies only confirm his linkages with the military establishment in Pakistan. These mails, produced in the US District Court, Columbia, where Karni’s bail was decided early January, showed Khan discussing the possibility of buy infra-red sensors for jet fighters. The court affidavit said: ``This case represents one of the most serious types of export violations imaginable. Karni has exported goods that are capable of detonating nuclear weapons to a person he knows has ties to the Pakistani military.’’

Karni is the latest link in the wide and expanding network of nuclear blackmarket which has been exploited by Pakistan over the years to develop its nuclear weapons development programme which, incidentally, has not really been as secretive as is being made out by the western media. It was the Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms For Peace Programme in 1958 which gave Pakistan the impetus to embark on a nuclear development programme. The first light water research nuclear reactor was, in fact, set up with the help of the US. Pakistan was given a grant of $3,50,000 for the reactor. Though not much is known about the progress Pakistan made in the development of its nuclear programme, there is clear evidence that Pakistan had already begun tapping the nuclear blackmarket. This became evident in a secret note prepared by the US State Department a decade later. The note (since declassified) titled Pakistan and the Non Proliferation Issue pointed out that Pakistan was negotiating with Belgians for a heavy water facility, with the Canadians for a fuel fabrication plant and with the French for a chemical separation plant. The note cautioned that these facilities would ``give Pakistan a virtually independent nuclear fuel cycle and the opportunity to separate a sufficient amount of plutonium to build a nuclear weapon.’’

There is irrefutable evidence that Pakistan either tapped the nuclear blackmarket or persuaded governments to make illegal deals Pakistan set up a number of shell companies, both within Pakistan and abroad, employed a network of agents and smugglers in Germany, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada and the United States to smuggle, steal and trans-ship dual purpose materials. Pakistan got a Canadian firm, Canadian General Electric Co., to complete the 137 MW CANDU power reactor for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant in 1971.

A British firm, British Nuclear Fuels, designed the plutonium separating facilities; a Belgian firm, Belgonucleaire and a French corporation, Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles, designed the pilot reprocessing facility called the New Labs at PINSTECH. In 1976, under a highly secretive project codenamed 706, Pakistan bought components for centrifuges from the Netherlands; orders for 6500 tubes of specially hardened steel were placed with Van Doome Transmissie. Other support components and subsystems were bought from Vakuum Apparat Technik (high vacuum valves) of Haag, Switzerland and Leybold Heraeus ( gas purification equipment), Hanan, Germany. A year later, the British subsidiary of Emerson Electric sold 30 high frequency inverters to Pakistan for controlling centrifuge speeds.


So extensive was Pakistan’s dealing with West German firms, for instance, that in1989, well known German magazine, Stern, wrote ``since the beginning of the eighties over 70 (West German) enterprises have supplied sensitive goods to enterprises which for years have been buying equipment for Pakistan’s ambitious nuclear weapons programme.’’ First the official deals.

The Federal Economics Office in Eschborn approved the export of an electronically controlled milling machine from a Munich firm, Friedric Deckel AG. The machine was used in the production of elements of a nuclear explosive system. The German government also approved the sale of special press to compact hard metal powder by Dieffenbacher GmbH, Eppingen in 1985. The Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center not only supplied a mass spectrometer, an equipment used in determining the degree of uranium enrichment, to PAEC but also trained Pakistani scientists.


It is no less important to know the story of Richard M. Barlow, a CIA career officer whose brief was to monitor Pakistan’s nuclear programme. In 1987, he discovered that US firms were not only involved in selling Pakistan dual-use equipment and materials, the government was not really keen on letting the US Congress know about the true picture. When he protested, he was forced to resign. He later joined as an analyst with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from where too he had to resign under pressure after he raised strong objections to the administration’s continued support to Pakistan’s nuclear purchases in the US.

However, fearing exposure, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) quietly began employing nuclear traders and agents to buy materials and equipment otherwise banned by the US and international conventions.

For instance, PAEC bought a tritium purification and production facility with a capacity to produce 10g of tritium daily in 1987 from a West German firm, NTG Nukleartechnik GmbH. Tritium can be used to produce a thermonuclear device. The deal was struck with the help of a known nuclear trader, Alfred Hempel. Interestingly, it was NTG which procured 7000kgs of fuel cladding material from India and shipped it to the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant via Germany falsely marking the consignment as ``stainless steel tubing``.Hempel, according to a German government report, had also negotiated with another firm, Ventron GmbH, to sell boron carbide, an absorber used in the construction of reactor, to the PAEC. The deal was struck on behalf of the PAEC by Pakland Corporation, a name intriguingly similar to the one owned by Humayun Khan who bought spark gaps from Karni in 2003.

Another agent employed by PAEC was a former Brigadier in the Pakistan Army, Inam ul –Haq, who was caught buying 30 metric tones of aluminium tubing for a firm in Lahore, Multinational Corporation. A third agent employed by PAEC was Sulfikar Ahmed Butt whose identity was discovered when he tried to obtain 50 Kryptons from EG &G Inc. Wellesley, Massachusetts. He was known as the chief buyer for the bomb makers in Pakistan. The Pakistan Ambassador posted at Bonn facilitated these deals.

Brigadier Haq was financed by the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) set up by a Pakistani financier, Agha Hasan Abedi, a known arms dealer. The BCCI, as investigations later proved, was a front organization floated by financiers, smugglers and intelligence agencies of various governments including the CIA to launder money, supply arms to terrorists, insurgents and rebels at different hotspots across the world. In a report prepared for the US Senate on the BCCI in December 1992, Senators John Kerry and Hank Brown said one of the areas that required deeper investigation was ``the extent of BCCI’s involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear program. There is good reason to conclude that BCCI did finance Pakistan’s nuclear programme through the BCCI Foundation in Pakistan as well as through BCCI-Canada’’.

Brigadier Haq was not the only agent to be financed by the BCCI. In 1987, the BCCI funded two Americans, Rita and Arnodl Mandel to buy $1 billion worth of oscilloscopes and computer equipment for Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The same year, the bank had paid a huge amount to Ashad Pervez, a Pakistani-born Canadian, to buy specialty steel and metal used to speed up nuclear explosions. The report said the BCCI gave $10 million to a private science and technology institute which was headed by Dr AQ Khan. There is ample evidence that Dr Khan too had employed agents and intermediaries to sell and procure nuclear materials and technology. A one-page memo from the Iraqi intelligence service (Mukhabarat) dated October 6, 1990, given to the US intelligence by Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law who defected in 1995, mentioned a meeting between intelligence officials and a representative of Dr Khan, Malik. Dr Khan, the memo said, offered to give Iraq project designs for a nuclear weapon. Khan quoted a price of $5 million. Similar evidence is available on Dr Khan’s deals in North Korea. It is now well known that Pakistan supplied nuclear technology and materials to North Korea for cash and against missile components and technology. An intelligence report in 2002 said ``tens of thousands of dollars `` were deposited into the personal bank accounts of Pakistani scientists working at the Khan Research Laboratory, Kahuta.

Following the Dr AQ Khan episode, several intelligence and security agencies have once again taken up the clues left uncovered by the US Senate Committee investigations in 1992. The investigators are examining the records of the bank to identify the Pakistani nuclear scientists who were on the payrolls of the bank. One of the persons the investigations are focusing is Mohammad Farooq, one of the nuclear scientists under investigation. Farooq was the contact person between Dr Khan and the Iranians. Farooq, on his part, used Allama Ariful Hussaini, chief of the Tehrik-I-Nifaz-I-Fiqa-I-Jafaeria Pakistan, the largest Shia organization in Pakistan. Farooq was a Director General (Foreign Procurement) at the Khan Research Laboratory when Dr Khan sold centrifuges and other equipment to Iran, once again, through a network of agents—three Germans, a Dutch national and two Muslim Sri Lankan nationals. Investigations have uncovered Dr Khan’s trail to Dubai, Turkey, Casablanca, South Africa and Malyasia. He traveled to these destinations on at least 41 occasions—he met North Korean scientists in Malaysia, Libyans in Casablanca and Iranians in Karachi.

In the third of week of January 2004, the US officials investigating the network air freighted a small box containing warhead designs that were sold to Libya by Dr Khan and his coterie. This was the first hard evidence of the extent of the nuclear blackmarket network operated by Dr Khan. The blueprint, investigators believe, would have fetched $50 million, part of which might have reached Pakistani scientists.

Dr Khan’s Dubai connection is still to be made public. Dubai is a known harbour of transnational criminal syndicates including Dawood Ibrahim. Most of the nuclear components, illegally sold to Libya, North Korea and Iran, were routed through shell companies in Dubai. Considering Dawood Ibrahim’s links with arms and drug smugglers, it is possible that his syndicate might have facilitated some of the nuclear shipments for Dr Khan.

However, it is the Malaysian link that could prove to be crucial in unraveling the global network of transnational criminal syndicates involved in smuggling nuclear materials and technology. According to reports, Khan had gone to Malaysia to attend the wedding of a Sri Lankan businessman, BSA Tahir. Tahir is a nuclear trader. Farooq had engaged Tahir to persuade a Malaysian oil and gas conglomerate to set up a centrifuges component factory in Selangor, Malaysia. The Malaysian factory, Scomi Precision Engineering, refurbished centrifuge components before exporting them to firms in Dubai and elsewhere. Investigators have so far discovered that the Malaysian firm had supplied nuclear components to a firm in Dubai between December 2002 and August 2003. Scomi is headed by Tan Sri Asmat Kalamudddin, a former chief of Malaysia’s International Trade Ministry. Incidentally, the largest shareholder in the company is Kamaluddin Abdullah, son of Malayasian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi.

http://www.orfonline.org/analysis/A109.htm

[SSridhar]

Fission Smokescreen - Outlook India.

Sources say the Bush administration has now asked the Pakistan government to debrief scientists at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the National Defence Complex (NDC), fearing Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan just might have been used as a decoy to divert the international community’s attention from these two bodies where substantial work on the country’s nuclear programme was undertaken...
The Pakistan government’s response to the US demand for the debriefing of PAEC and NDC scientists has been positive...
Yet, diplomatic sources say, the welter of information the US possesses shows that Pakistanis were assisting North Korea and Iran in accordance with officially vetted agreements for clandestine training of nuclear scientists and mutual exchange of the nuclear know-how. They say no such agreement could have been possible without the military leadership’s approval...
Sources say US intelligence sleuths stationed in Pakistan began to suspect North Korean involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme after Kim Sin-ae, wife of Kang Thae-yun, North Korean economic counsellor in Islamabad, was found murdered. It was Kang Thae who had brokered a deal with an unidentified Russian company to bring to Pakistan Maraging Steel, a key component of missile bodies and nosecones. He and his wife, Kim, were close to Khan. The US agents believe Kim was probably killed by her own government after she approached a British agent, wishing to defect in exchange for Pak and North Korean nuclear secrets. US sleuths were also told a prototype centrifuge was smuggled with her coffin on a special flight from Islamabad.

[Leonard]

Who sold nukes ?
Wilson John


Drumbeats on Pakistan’s nuclear black-marketing are getting louder. The international community (read Washington) is alarmed and worried at the rapidly accumulating pile of evidence against Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist, Dr AQ Khan, and a few of his associates for selling nuclear technology and materials to nations that are considered "rogue". (China is not the target yet and hence do not qualify to be a rogue despite overwhelming evidence). The heat and dust being created by the "revelations", obviously made by muckracking journalists of influential western newspapers, begs the question: Why does the world get drawn into the carefully planned and orchestrated propaganda, year after year? First it was al Qaida, then WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and now a nuclear blackmarket racket. This is not intended to be a defence of AQ Khan or Pakistan. If Dr Khan and his associates in the military and nuclear establishment have indulged in buying and selling nuclear technology and materials for several years, they should be punished, that is if there is a punishment for a crime that qualifies to be categorized as crime against humanity. If the allegations currently being made in the media were true, a special court should be set up by the United Nations to try them. In fact, the first step towards that direction would be to institute an independent investigation and send UN Inspectors to Pakistan immediately. But the question is: who will be the judge?

Take the case of Pakistan. Pakistan decided to go nuclear after a humiliating defeat in the 1971 battlefield. Within weeks of surrender at Dhaka, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto called a secret meeting (January 24, 1972 at Multan) of nuclear and military officials and said he wanted a Bomb. A 125 MW heavy water reactor became operational near Karachi the same year. It was built with Canadian assistance. The US was not in the dark about these developments either. Three years after Mr Bhutto’s secret meeting, the State Department prepared a short note on Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation Issue (January 22, 1975) which said Pakistan was not only building more power reactors, it was also negotiating with the Belgians for a heavy water facility, with the Canadians for a fuel fabrication plant and with the French for a chemical separation plant.

"These facilities, "the note
(since declassified and available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB6/ipn20_1.htm)


said, "together with the heavy reactor, will give Pakistan a virtually independent nuclear fuel cycle and the opportunity to separate a sufficient amount of plutonium to build a nuclear weapon….the earliest the Pakistanis are likely to be able to produce a weapon would be 1980.’’ Just a year later, so clear was the evidence that Pakistan was buying nuclear technology and materials from European countries that the State Department issued a Demarche to Pakistan. On June 23, 1983, the State Department prepared a four-page note for the US President on "The Pakistani Nuclear Programme" which began on this ominous note". There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program."

Besides the declassified documents, the following findings have been pieced together from open sources that reveal the involvement of the United States and other western nations in helping Pakistan build the nuclear capability. Pakistan’s initiation into the nuclear club had begun in 1958 when it was invited to join the Atoms for Peace Programme launched by the Eisenhower administration. Two years later, Pakistan received a grant of $350,000 from the US to build its first research reactor. In 1962, US supplied a 5 MW light water research reactor known as the Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor (PARR-1). In 1971, the Canadian General Electric Co. completed a 137 MW CANDU power reactor for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. Plans for the plutonium separating facilities designed by the British Nuclear Fuels Limited were finalised the same year. A Belgian firm, Belgonucleaire and a French corporation, Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles, designed a pilot reprocessing facility called the New Labs at PINSTECH. In 1976, under a highly secretive project codenamed 706, Pakistan bought components for centrifuges from the Netherlands; orders for 6500 tubes of specially hardened steel were placed with Van Doome Transmissie. Other support components and subsystems were bought from Vakuum Apparat Technik (high vacuum valves) of Haag, Switzerland and Leybold Heraeus ( gas purification equipment), Hanan, Germany. A year later, the British subsidiary of Emerson Electric sold 30 high frequency inverters to Pakistan for controlling centrifuge speeds. In 1987, West Germany sells a tritium purification and production facility with a capacity to produce 10g of tritium daily. Tritium can be used to produce a thermonuclear device. In 1989, German magazine, Stern reported that ``since the beginning of the eighties over 70 (West German) enterprises have supplied sensitive goods to enterprises which for years have been buying equipment for Pakistan’s ambitious nuclear weapons programme.’’ There is more evidence, gathered from US sources, to show how the US blinks when it wants to.

The most basic is the CIA’s unclassified report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_jan_jun2000.html)


which, since 1999, have been religiously reporting Pakistan’s acquisition of "a considerable amount of nuclear-related and dual-use equipment and materials from various sources-principally in the FSU (former Soviet Union) and Western Europe" .

What the CIA would never report is the involvement of US administration and firms in helping Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons technology at a time when it was forcing the world to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other non-proliferation agreements. In May 1990, the intelligence agencies had gathered evidence that the US administration was allowing Pakistan to acquire restricted items for its nuclear arsenal from within US. Well-known investigative journalist, Seymour Hersh, writing in New Yorker, March 29, 1993, said ``many more nuclear-related goods were clandestinely bought inside the United States by Pakistan than by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.’’ The story of Richard M. Barlow is equally revealing. He was a CIA officer working on Pakistan’s nuclear programme. In 1987, he discovered what the State Department and his seniors were telling the Congress was not exactly what he and his colleagues were digging out on Pakistan’s expanding nuclear weapons development programme. He resigned a year later. He later joined as an analyst with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from where too he had to resign under pressure after he raised strong objections to the administration’s continued support to Pakistan’s nuclear purchases in the US.

The only conclusion one can draw from these findings is that the US was not only aware of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development programme from the beginning but was willingly assisting the latter to develop the capability, even brushing aside CIA’s intelligence reports on Pakistan’s purchases from the west. No one else had the technology to sell them anyway. So who, in the final analysis, should stand trial for nuclear proliferation ?

http://www.orfonline.org/analysis/A106.htm

Sunil S, thanks for the goldmine link in Paki Thread

[ramana]

FWIW from newsinsight.net......
US to safeguard Pak nukes
20 February 2004: While the United States has no intention to denuke Pakistan, it is pressing for installation of safeguard command-and-control systems in all its nuclear facilities, and president George W.Bush has approved a special grant for installations, equipment, salary, and other expenses.

Following a briefing by the senate intelligence committee last Thursday, several US senators wrote to president Bush about the urgent necessity to safeguard Pakistan’s nuclear equipment, and Bush then approved a $560-million grant, which will entirely go into the safeguard systems, their operation, and maintenance.

The command-and-control equipment will comprise locks, codes and software more sophisticated than what the UN has installed in North-Korean atomic installations, but no Pakistani or Muslim contractor would be engaged in putting the devices in place.

Diplomats said that over the last two weeks, Pakistan president Parvez Musharraf has produced a consensus among his corps commanders, the jihadi groups, and bureaucrats in favour of the safeguard equipment.

All the equipment will be controlled by satellite, and the US secretary of state, Collin Powell, has rejected a Pakistani plea to buy the software, locks and codes from Germany.

Because the US has no working relations with either Iran or Libya, the United States was compelled to remove their WMDs, but since America has a working relationship with Pakistan, this extreme step is being temporarily put off, diplomats said.

-----------
Lot of loaded info in this. Note the German ref again!

[Kati]

British Financial Times (www.ft.com) has been slicing and dicing pakistan in last few issues doggedly (unlike the US media). here is an assortment of articles:

1. Pakistan's Khan sold nuclear parts to Iran and Libya (feb 20, 2004)

http://search.ft.com/search/article.html?id=040220000464&query =Pakistan+Nuclear&vsc_appId=totalSearch&state=Form

2. ASIA-PACIFIC: Musharraf retains ties with N Korea despite nuclear scandal (Feb 19, 2004)

http://search.ft.com/search/article.html?id=040219000962&query =Pakistan+Nuclear&vsc_appId=totalSearch&state=Form

For a list of other articles please check:

Link

[Rangudu]

X-posted

Link

[quote]US, Pakistan discuss arms control and security issues

20/02/2004 at 13:46:31

Date line: ISLAMABAD

The United States and Pakistan held talks Friday on arms control and strategic and security issues in the region as part of an ongoing dialogue between the two allies, officials said.

A 10-member US delegation led by US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker held discussions with a Pakistani team headed by Tariq Usman Hyder, a foreign ministry statement said.

"These discussions are part of a broad on-going dialogue on strategic and security issues, including regional security," the statement said.

The two sides also discussed recent global developments in arms control, it said, without elaborating.

Rademaker "conveyed US views that <u>in certain circumstances missile defence could contribute to regional stability and the US was ready to further discuss this issue with Pakistan.</u> :o

[svinayak]

China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan - Statements and Developments


Early-mid 1980s: China reportedly stole information on a neutron bomb design from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and provided it to Pakistan. [Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9.]

This chronology includes statements and developments related to China's nuclear-related exports and assistance to Pakistan, including allegations of assistance, and US, Chinese, and Pakistani positions on the issue.

Also see Map of Chinese Nuclear and Missile Assistance to Pakistan.

Overview
Chinese nuclear exports and assistance to Pakistan were a major proliferation concern for many years, although these concerns have recently eased somewhat, particularly as the strategic importance of Pakistan changed and Chinese export controls strengthened. In general, most of China's nuclear exports and cooperative projects have been for non-weapons purposes (though concerns still exist given the Chinese refusal to accept full-scope safeguards and the dual-use nature of much nuclear technology). However, China allegedly provided direct assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the past, including supplying Pakistan with warhead designs and enough HEU (highly enriched uranium) for at least two nuclear bombs. China also provided assistance and transferred dual-use materials that could be applied in the development of nuclear weapons. Beijing insisted that China's assistance involved the provisions of peaceful technical information rather than weapons-related technologies or materials. China publicly adopted responsible nuclear export policies after joining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, and furthered its commitment by acceding to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. Beijing has formally enunciated three principles governing its nuclear exports: (1) acceptance of IAEA safeguards; (2) peaceful use only; and (3) no re-transfers to a third country without China's prior consent. In recent years, China has also promulgated domestic laws regulating nuclear and dual-use exports.

Sino-US controversy over Chinese nuclear trade and cooperation with Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s stemmed from differences in Beijing and Washington's strategic, nonproliferation, and foreign policy considerations at the time. Prior to Pakistan's test firing of a nuclear device in 1998, US policy was aimed at preventing that country from achieving nuclear weapons capability. The US introduced specific legislation aimed at dissuading Pakistan from continuing its nuclear weapons programs by threatening to cut off economic and military aid and imposing sanctions. From China's perspective, Pakistan had long been a useful ally in its South Asia strategic calculations and Sino-Pak defense cooperation underlines this close relationship. The US had been concerned about the impact of South Asian nuclear weapons programs on the international nonproliferation regime; China, on the other hand, did not want to commit itself beyond its legal obligation to the NPT. At the same time, Beijing always insisted on the legitimate peaceful use of nuclear energy and opposed restrictions on nuclear transfers and assistance under the name of nonproliferation. While China made a formal pledge in May 1996 not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, the fact that China has not adopted IAEA full-scope safeguards contributed to US concerns about the potential of indirect Chinese transfers and assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs.

As China's participation in nonproliferation regimes increased, Beijing assistance to Pakistan appeared to decrease, at least with regards to direct transfers, although dual-use items continued to be transferred. After the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, China's commitment to not further assist the Pakistani program appeared to increase, and improved export controls were released which coincided with Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group control lists and guidelines. However, China continues to not abide by the NSG principal of "full-scope safeguards," which allows Chinese companies to continue to do business with Pakistan's civilian nuclear industry.

Background

In the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese nuclear exports were driven by economic considerations. The reform in defense industries that began in the early 1980s called for conversion to production of more civilian consumer goods. While other defense industrial sectors (e.g., defense electronics) registered marked progress in converting a significant bulk of their production into civilian consumer goods, the nuclear industry lagged behind and ranked the lowest. At the same time, transforming the industry from its originally defense-focused and nuclear-weapons-oriented R&D and production to one that could meet increasing energy demands required the importation of advanced Western technology and know-how, which in turn had to be funded using hard currency. It was not surprising, then, that the industry increasingly looked for foreign customers to generate the necessary funds.

China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation began in the early 1980s. The United States government and many Western analysts believe that China assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives prior to its accession to the NPT in 1992. In 1983, US intelligence agencies reported that China had transferred a complete nuclear weapon design to Pakistan, along with enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons. China also reportedly helped Pakistan operate its Kahuta uranium-enrichment plant.1 US concerns at this time were summarized in a 1985 declassified State Department assessment of Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation. In 1986, China concluded a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan. That same year, Chinese scientists began assisting Pakistan with the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium, and China also reportedly transferred tritium gas to Pakistan that could be used achieve fusion in hydrogen bombs and boost the yield of atomic bombs. According to media reports the amount transferred was enough for making 10 nuclear weapons.2 After that, China supplied Pakistan with a variety of nuclear products and services, ranging from uranium enrichment technology to research and power reactors. China allegedly involved Pakistani scientists in a nuclear test at its Lop Nur test site in 1989. On December 31, 1991, China signed a contract to build the Chashma 300-MW nuclear power reactor for Pakistan.3 As China pledged to only transfer materials to safeguarded facilities, Pakistan signed an IAEA safeguards (limited-scope) agreement for the reactor at Chashma.

China insisted that "the cooperation between China and Pakistan in the sphere of nuclear energy is entirely for peaceful purposes. The relevant agreements signed between the two countries contain specific provisions guaranteeing safety. Allegations that China has assisted Pakistan in the field of nuclear weapons -- allegations made by newspapers and journals of India and other countries have time and again -- are completely groundless and have ulterior motives." In 1993 China and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed an agreement to apply IAEA safeguards to a Chinese nuclear power station sold to Pakistan (INFCIRC/418). In 1994, China reportedly turned down a Pakistani request to "correct" Pakistan's nuclear weapons and to use the Chinese Lop Nur testing range.4 Despite these developments the United States expressed concerns that China was still providing equipment and technology that could contribute to the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, including Chinese assistance in the construction of a 40 MW reactor at Khushab that US officials feared could provide Pakistan with plutonium for its weapons program.5

A major proliferation controversy regarding Chinese nuclear trade with Pakistan includes the late-1995 export of about 5,000 specially designed ring magnets from the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) to an unsafeguarded Pakistani nuclear laboratory, which was allegedly involved in nuclear weapons work. China initially denied that the sale had taken place; a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called the reports "groundless" and warned the United States not to impose sanctions based on "rumors." Pakistan also denied that any transfer of sensitive nuclear technology had taken place.6 However, in talks with US officials, China eventually privately admitted that the sale had taken place, but argued that China should not be penalized for two reasons. First, China insisted that CNEIC had arranged the sale without the knowledge or consent of the central government. Second, China argued that the ring magnets were not magnetized, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List only covers ring magnets magnetized at a specific tolerance. Throughout the controversy, China publicly denied the sale and declared that it was a responsible state and did not support or encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The resolution of the conflict came on 10 May 1996, when the US State Department announced that it would not impose sanctions on China in exchange for a Chinese pledge not to provide nuclear assistance to unsafeguarded facilities, its reaffirmation of nonproliferation commitments, and its agreement to consult with the United States on export control and proliferation issues. On 11 May, China publicly made this pledge, and informally confirmed that its pledge covered the future transfer of ring magnets. However, the resolution of the ring magnet controversy did not end US concerns regarding the Sino-Pakistani nuclear connection. Concerns remain about Chinese assistance in the construction of the Khushab reactor, and in August-September 1996 it was further reported that China had agreed to sell a special industrial furnace and high-technology diagnostic equipment to a Pakistani nuclear facility, equipment which reportedly can be used in the construction of nuclear bombs.7 China denounced reports of the sale as "groundless," and US officials indicated that they were satisfied that China was making a real effort to comply with its 11 May 1996 pledge, and that there was not enough evidence to establish that China was in violation of that commitment.

A 1997 report by the Director of Central Intelligence stated that China "was the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to Pakistan" during the second half of 1996. Since then, the United States has urged China to end its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan entirely. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), in its 1997 and 1998 annual report on arms control compliance, stated that based on Beijing's long standing nuclear ties with Islamabad, it was unclear whether Beijing had broken off its contacts with elements associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. China and Pakistan have continued to argue that their nuclear cooperation is entirely legitimate and for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, US concerns about Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation have persisted throughout 1998 and into 2000.


Policy Issues

Chinese nuclear exports and assistance to Pakistan was a contentious issue in Sino-US relations over the years. There were significant differences between Washington and Beijing regarding nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. US post-Cold War foreign policy has focused on proliferation of WMD as a major threat to US interests and regional/global security and has undertaken specific measures, including strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and threatening/applying sanctions to punish/deter proliferation behavior. While China supported the principles of nuclear nonproliferation, it had also emphasized the importance of promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. China criticized the policies of industrialized countries that restrict and deny the legitimate demands of developing countries for peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology transfers for economic development under the pretext of preventing nuclear proliferation.

Following the India and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, new signs emerged that China had permanently curtailed its military nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. In remarks to a seminar in New Delhi on Sino-Indian relations, China's ambassador to India Zhou Gang reiterated that China had not assisted Pakistan's nuclear program, stating "non-existent is the issue of China's nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan" and that "all cooperation between China and Pakistan in the field of nuclear energy is under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards." Zhou acknowledged that China was aware of India's concerns regarding China's nuclear assistance to Pakistan and that Beijing had taken "a positive, flexible and pragmatic approach and made proper readjustment of certain policies concerned."8

Concerns remain over China's ability to enforce their nuclear commitments. China's refusal to adopt IAEA FSS has meant that the potential remains for transferred items to end up in unsafeguarded facilities. The 5,000 ring magnets episode also raises the issue of Chinese central government knowledge and ability to oversee activities of state-run companies with regard to effective export controls. Over the last few years, a number of decrees and regulations on nuclear and dual-use exports have been promulgated. Although most analysts agree that China has taken great steps recently in controlling the flow of sensitive nuclear materials, the implementation and effectiveness of these enforcement measures are still developing, and weaknesses are still present.

Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, Pakistan has been viewed by the United States as a strategic ally in the region. Most of China's current assistance to Pakistan appears to only cover civilian facilities that are under IAEA safeguards. Since 2001 and the change in U.S. - Pakistan relations, reactions in Washington of China's assistance to Islamabad have been muted.

New Developments

Pakistan's Chashma Nuclear Power Plant, which Chinese firms built, was commissioned began fuel loading in November 1999. The 300 MW power plant, modeled on the Chinese-design Qinshan-1, was the result of a 31 December 1991 agreement with China and is expected to be connected to the national power grid in the summer of 2000. Construction was begun in 1992 and will require annual shipments of one ton of low enriched uranium.9 On 27 September 2000, China National Nuclear Corporation formally handed over the Chashma nuclear power plant to the Pakistan Energy Commission. In March of 2003, China and Pakistan signed an MOU to construct phase 2 of the Chashma facility - a second 300 MW power plant.10 As of November 2003, the deal for this construction had not been finalized.

Notes:

1. Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9.

2. "Incidental Intelligence: China Emerging As Third World Weapons Supplier," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1991, p. 19; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs From Beijing: A Report On China's Nuclear And Missile Exports," May 1991, p. 17; The Risk Report, May 1995, p. 8; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar," Washington Post, 12 May 1991, pp. C1, C4.

3. "Pakistan Gets Confirmation on Chinese Reactor," Nuclear Engineering International, March 1992, p. 7; Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan,"Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9.

4. Aleksandr Sychev, Izvestiya (Moscow), 20 August 1994, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94-162, 22 August 1994, p.16.

5. R. Jeffrey Smith and Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post, 8 April 1995, p. A20

6. Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), 9 February 1996; in "PRC: Spokesman Denies Nuclear Technology Transfer To Pakistan," FBIS-CHI-96-028, 9 February 1996; Chen, Kathy, "Beijing Admits to Sale of Ring Magnets to Pakistan in Bid to Clear U.S. Tension," Wall Street Journal, 15 April 1996, p. B6.

7. Bill Gertz, "Beijing Flouts Nuke-Sales Ban," Washington Times, 9 October 1996, pp. A1, A9; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Sold Nuclear Items Before Vow," Washington Post, 10 October 1996, p. A38.

8. "PRC Envoy: China Hopes To Develop Good Bilateral Ties," The Hindustan Times, 26 February 1999 in FBIS 26 February 1999; and "Chinese Envoy: China Not 'Threat' to India," Deccan Herald, 27 February 1999.

9. "Chasma Nuclear Power Plant," Pakistan In Urdu, 25 November 1999, p. 4. in FBIS, "Daily hails Commissioning of Chashma Nuclear Power Plant," 28 November 1999, FTS19991128000184; Abdul Rauf Siddiqi, "Pakistan's Chashma Loads Fuel, Plans Operation Early in 2000," Nucleonics Week, 2 December 1999. p. 5.

10. "China Hands Over Chashma Nuclear Power Plant to Pakistan," Islamabad Radio Pakistan in English, 27 September 2000, in FBIS SAP20000927000020.

Scope of Activities

http://www.nti.org/db/china/prcpak.pdf

[ramana]

Rudra Singha
Member
Member # 3011

posted 20 February 2004 12:07 PM
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Its quite possible credible proof of possession
of dirty bomb (like a small radioactive sample in
lead case) has been passed onto US diplomats in
Pak via courier.

Pak frontier areas and karachi are the last and
most secure bastion of the al-keeda. The message
is likely to have been "we are fighting each other but certain rules are being observed. if you come after us in Pak with US army, prepare to face dirty bomb attacks on your major cities"

Al-keeda cannot survive without atleast 1 secure
national region and state backing. If NWFP is cleaned up they would be homeless mendicants.
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IP: Logged

ramana
Member
Member # 356

posted 20 February 2004 12:27 PM
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GD said
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-keeda cannot survive without atleast 1 secure
national region and state backing. If NWFP is cleaned up they would be homeless mendicants.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

GD, you dont know how important this insight is in the history of radical Islam from the original forays from the desert to Ismailis Assasins to the defeat by the Mongols to modern Wahabis. They need one safe sanctuary and they will come back.
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IP: Logged

acharya
Member
Member # 289

posted 20 February 2004 01:13 PM
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not just AlQ but all jihad operatives need a sense of home and a secure base location. Without that it will be not sustainable. Pakistan was made such a base for the last 20 years.
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IP: Logged

[Kuttan]

Rangudu, ramana, shiv et al:

Rademaker "conveyed US views that in certain circumstances missile defence could contribute to regional stability and the US was ready to further discuss this issue with Pakistan.

I have now come around to the realization that we are all seeing events in delayed-action.

Mush is now talking in terms of "danger" to the deterrent, but how he is GOING to have a nuclear program. For once, he is telling the truth.

People all over the world are yelling for controls on Paki nukes - and aghast that the US "isn't doing enough".

Here is my reading:

1. The Paki nukes were taken out in 2002.

2. TSP has been screaming to get its balls back ever since.

3. The US has been insisting on certain clean-up BEFORE that can occur.

4. TSP resisted - tried upping attacks in Afghanistan even.

5. The bluff was called when PRC backed out (remember disastrous Mush-visit?)

6. TSP had to hand over Uighur terrorists before PRC agreed to some face-saving about nuke power plant.

7. US lost patience with the NoKo humiliation,

8. The break came when Libya was forced to surrender after the Lockerbie settlement.

8. Iran yielded to intense pressure.

9. US blew the lid off Libya-Iran and NoKo.

10. TSP's choice: sell out Abdul Xerox, have the entire nuke establishment "debriefed" and bent over - and a complete "enema" before any consideration of allowing TSP to even say the word "atom".

- OR forget about it, plus, the 101st Airborne is looking forward to some serious action. So many missiles - so few tanks and buildings left in Iraq and Afghanistan!

Mush as usual, sold out his best and brightest, to protect #1.

Now u see why mush is brightening up like a watered weed again, and there are US arms-control teams in TSP talking about selling them missile defense.

So - instead of "We are in danger of losing our bal*s!!!" the reality is:

"We HAVE LONG_SINCE lost our bal*s but are scrambling to do what it takes to get them back!"

Once again, this is the only scenario that fits ALL the KNOWN observed facts. The rest needs to be whittled away as propaganda and other garbage.

Come to think of it, this is the ONLY end-game to the nook-noodity that can result in mushbutt not hanging from Karachi lamppost. Beautiful poker strategy. Also explains why there is some pressure on India to negotiate.

Again, our critical interest is NOT to "DEMAND" that TSP be nook-nooded. That has happened, long since.

It is to blow the lid off the fact that they ARE NOOK-NOOD - and PREVENT the nukes being given back to them.

Foggy-bottom / DupleeCity / TubeLightabad are once again trying to RECREATE the indiapakistan equal-equal game. After removing what THEY THINK is the threat to their own but*s.

As usual, I expect to read that I am wacko, so let me save shankar etc. the trouble:

I AM WACKO!!!

[svinayak]

N3, Good scenario. We need to fill up the rest of the events to make it coherent.

[Calvin]

Repost from other thread with additional notes:

9/11/2001 - Attack on WTC/Pentagon
9/16 - 66 FBI/CIA agents land at I'bad, go to Quetta, Peshawar (Weekly Independent 35 (3) Feb 19-25, 2004)

9/25/2002 - Francis Taylor (Dir FBI) visit I'bad, cameras installed at 156 sensitive points in K'chi. FBI office set up at Midway House near K'chi Airport. FBI monitoring phones, faxes and intenret. In other cities, FBI reported to be using offices of Soft-Drink MNC and transportation of UN. By October 2002 reported to have 44 offices in Pak, and 12 in Afgh. (Weekly Independent 35 (3) Feb 19-25, 2004).
11/2002 - US issues proliferation concern regarding KRL

3/2003 - US Sanctions on KRL

5/2003 - Armitage visits to discuss sanctions on KRL

6/24/2003 - Musharraf meets Bush at Camp David.
6/2003 - Addressing a public rally while Musharraf is at Camp David, Gen. Aziz Khan says that people in uniform 'should not play politics'. Describes the US as the “no. 1 enemy of the Muslim world”. Goes on to say that resolving Kashmir would not lead to peace between India and Pakistan. ISPR attempts to supress the story, which is reported in the Washington Times.

7/2003 - Fazlur Rehman visits India.

8/2003: Musharraf's ceasefire proposal rejected by the Indian government.
8/2003: Laloo Prasad Yadav visits Pakistan
8/5 - 05-08-2003- Gen. Musharraf Visits IV Corps HQ and talks to Zarrar Azim about matters pertaining to state of preparedness, training, administration and welfare of the troops http://www.pakistanidefence.com/news/MonthlyNewsArchive/2003/August2003.htm
8/29 - Pakistan states no link with Iran program

9/3 - Pakistan to send troops to Saudi
9/4 - JF-17 flies at Chengdu, CAS Kaleem Saadat on hand.
9/5 - Pak China sign Def Assistance Protocol
9/5 - CJCSC Gen. Aziz to visit Bangladesh for 5 days
9/14 - CJSCC Gen. Aziz visiting Sri Lanka for 5-day visit
9/16 - Corps commanders meet at Lahore

10/1 - Armitage criticizes Pak support for resurget Taliban (in DC)
10/1 - Musharraf convenes JCSC meeting to brief chiefs on meeting with Bush
10/2 - Jamali meets Bush at DC
10/3 - Hatf III tested
10/4 - Two days earlier on the 4th of October, German charter freighter BBC China destined for Tripoli with an unlisted cargo of centrifuge parts loaded in Dubai was diverted to the Italian naval base of Taranto with the co-operation of the owners. The intelligence for the operation became available to the UK and US in September. The components had been acquired through AQ Khan's procurement network of international fixers, in this case largely from Malaysia, via a Muslim Sri Lankan middleman in Dubai.
10/5 - Pakistan launches "offensive" against Taliban
10/6 - Abizaid, Rocca and Armitage visit Musharraf (Army House), Provide CIA documents on AQK links to Iran/Libya
10/6 - Azam Tariq is gunned down
10/6 - Azam Tariq and 4 companions assassinated in his car in Islamabad. Some 70 protestors attempt to storm ISI headquarters but are turned away by SSG troops.
10/8 - Pakistan tests Shaheen I
10/8 - Pakistan launches "crackdown" on Zalikhel-Qarikhel tribe in South Waziristan
10/13 Chmn JCSC Gen. Aziz leaves UK for US on 6-day visit.
10/14 - Ariel Sharon declares once again that Libya may become the first Arab country to build the bomb, with the help of North Korea and Pakistan. Unlike his statements in September 2002, Iraq’s name is absent from the list of those providing assistance to Libya, and there is much greater certainty over Pakistan’s involvement.
10/15 - Hatf IV tested
10/15 US Admrl Vern Clark visits I'bad
10/16 - US declares Dawood Ibrahim a terrorist based in Pakistan
10/18 - Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah visits
10/18 - Borchgrave warns of Pak Nukes being moved to Saudi
10/18 - Pak-China naval exercise in Shanghai
10/20 - ARD President Javed Hashmi convenes a press conference to release a letter written by dissident PA officers. Army leadership is described as corrupt and incompetent, and Musharraf as a traitor to the cause of Islam for his assistance to the Coalition in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The letter urges parliamentarians to seek greater accountability for Kargil and other matters. Hashmi is arrested a week later.
10/20 - ACM Kareem Sadaat visits China for 7 day visit
10/22 - Jamali visits Iran reaches agreement on "defence cooperation" with Khatami
10/22 - India announces 12-step CBMs
10/22 - Indo-China border meeting in New Delhi
10/23 - Pakistan and Turkey reach agreement on "defence production"
10/29 - Javed Hashmi arrested
10/30 - Saudis announce extension of $1 billion "oil facility"
10/31 - Musharraf visits China
10/2002 - Special Investigation Group (SIG) set up to help FBI. 117 officers to be trained in US over next 3-4 months (Weekly Independent 35 (3) Feb 19-25, 2004)

11/1 - China agrees to help set up next phase of Chasma nuclear plant (CHASNUPP)
11/3 - Pak-China sign defense agreement.
11/5 - 5-6 NOV 2003: Pakistani Education Minister Zubaida Jalal visits Washington DC to meet NSA Rice, Dty Sec Def Wolfowitz, Asst. Sec State for South Asian Affairs Rocca and senior members of Congress to discuss reform and control of Pakistani madrassas.
11/5 - Dawood reportedly moves from Karachi to Islamabad following US tag of "global terrorist"
11/6 - Pakistan protests bugging of HC in London
11/8 - Iranian delegation led by a deputy foreign minister, Gholam Ali Khoshru, arrived in Islamabad, use "careful formulation" to say they had acquired components and designs in '87 from the black market -- they mentioned Dubai -- and said two of the individuals involved were of South Asian origin, though not from the same country. They hinted they were under scrutiny from the IAEA and would have to make these declarations" about who had supplied the technology. - One South Asian is Tahir (Sri Lankan), is the other AQK?
11/13 - Iran admits to enriched uranium
11/13 - Centcom chief Gen. Lance Smith calls on Musharraf.
11/14 - Pak says agrees with new US "strategy" on terrorism
11/15 - Pak receives CIA report on proliferation
11/16 - Pak re-bans 3 terrorist groups
11/20 - IAEA letter to Pakistan on proliferation
11/2? - Pak team visits Vienna (IAEA)
11/? - Pak team visits Iran
11/24 - Ceasefire offer

12/3 - Banned terror groups bank accounts frozen
12/6 - First four nuke scientists debriefed
12/8 - US launches "Operation Avalanche" in Afghanistan
12/8 - Amir Mir (journo) that broke the D-Company operations in Karachi warned, finds car burnt down by ISI agents.
12/14 - Assassination Attempt on Musharraf
12/14 - Saddam Captured
12/16 - Bhutan launches operations against ULFA
12/17 - Musharraf makes unscheduled visit to Lahore to meet outgoing Corps Commander Gen Shahid Aziz and new CC Zarrar Azeem. Also met Lt. Gen (R) Khalid Mqbool (Punjab Gov) and Punjab CM Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_19-12-2003_pg10_4
12/17 - India to resume flights
12/17 - Musharraf says Pakistan is "flexible on plebiscite on Kashmir" http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_19-12-2003_pg1_1
12/19 - Libya owns up to Nuke Program
12/19 - US Marine Corps Commander Mike Hagee visits I'bad.http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.as ... 003_pg10_4
12/20 Karachi and Gujranwala get new Corps Commanders. Tariq Waseem Ghazi (K'chi) moved to NDC commandant, replacing Javed Hassan who moves to Gujranwala replacing Khalid Munir who moves to QMG at GHQ replacing Ahsan Salim Hayat who moves to K'chi. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_21-12-2003_pg1_4
12/21 - Yusuf leaves for KSA and Egypt "to increase defence cooperation"
12/22 - AQK is questioned for the first time
12/26 - Assassination Attempt on Musharraf (Real one?)

1/2004 (date not clear) Omar Sheikh moved from Hyderbad jail to Rawalpindi, reportly in connection with Musharraf assassination investigations. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_27-2-2004_pg1_8
1/1 - Asher Karni arrested at Denver for selling 400 spark gaps to Pakistan - nuclear triggers also used in medical equipment
1/1 - Parliament Endorses Musharraf's presidency
1/4 - SAARC Summit ends
1/6 - India/Pak Agreement for dialogue
1/6 - US says Musharraf not involved in Libyan nukes
1/8 - Pak launches "offensive" on Afghan border
1/12 - Brajesh in China for Border Talks
1/13 - Bush announces strategic ties with India
1/13 - Hurriyat invited for talks on 1/22
1/17 - Abizaid meets Musharraf, and then Yusuf, departs Chaklala AFB
1/17 - Top Hizb commander killed in JK
1/17 - Eight more nuke scientists to be debriefed
1/18 - Gorshkov deal signed
1/21 - Sinha meets Bush, Powell discuss next steps on strategic path
1/21 - Powell says Musharraf is taking "right steps"
1/22 - Hurriyat agrees to a "durable" solution
1/23 - Musharraf meets Cheney at Davos "we will act over nukes"
1/24 - David Kay replaced
1/26 - New Afghan Constitution is signed into law
1/28 - US plans for "spring offensive" publicized
1/28 - Gen. Yousaf visits Shahid Aziz Siddiqui in Lahore and briefs him on on matters of preparedness, training, administration and troops welfare and morale (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp? ... 004_pg10_5)
1/29 - GHQ to be shifted to Islamabad
1/29 - AA missiles around Islamabad noted
1/29 - Pakistan Joint Chiefs meet
1/31 - AQK removed

2/1 - AQK admits guilt
2/5 - Tenet admits intel lapses in Iraq
2/5 - Musharraf pardon's AQK
2/6 - Kamran Khan discloses that CIA report was provided in October by US, revealing that profits from sales went back to Pakistani Authorities
2/8 - Musharraf says AQK can keep his money.
2/8 - Musharraf talks to Powell, Powell to visit Pak soon.
2/8 - Brajesh and Kasuri in Munich
2/8 - NYT says Pak weapons are implosion type similar to Nagasaki weapon - implies Pu device
2/8 - US says that Pak nukes under US Liaison Committee control, including launch codes and PALs.
2/9 - Pak says AQK not given "blanket" pardon - probably result of Powell conversation.
2/11 - Bush announces his policy against WMD.
2/11 - CIA team including Tenet in "Secret" visit to Islamabad via Chaklala base. Arrive at 7pm Wed night, leave on Thu afternoon.http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.as ... 2004_pg1_5; http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/13/top5.htm
2/12 - Musharraf, at National Defence College (Islamabad?), admits Pak forces launching attack into Afghanistan, must be stopped
2/12 - Musharraf makes unscheduled visit to Karachi amid tight security.
2/13 - Jamali also makes unscheduled visit to Karachi http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/feb2004-daily/21-02-2004/metro/k7.htm
2/13 De Villepin in ND meets with Shashank
2/13 - Rocca (Asst Secy State) meets Shashank and Arun Singh, key Indian negotiators ahead of Feb 16 I-P meeting. Nancy Powell said in ND on "private visit" will meet Pak HC Aziz Ahmed Khan. GAIL said to explore opportunities in Pak Gas.
2/13 Rumor that Home Ministry orders cricket tour of Pak cancelled. Aziz Ahmd Khan (Pak HC) calls Shashank to plead that the rapprochement would hit the skids if this happened. Khan calls Shashank 3-4 times till Shashank replies, being caught up in meetings with DeVillepin. Shashank talks to Sinha. Riaz Khokhar calls SS Menon in Karachi with same plea. Sinha talks to Vajpayee regarding this on 2/13 evening.
2/14 Vajpayee indicates that the tour is back on.
2/14 Musharraf in Karachi, meets Corps Commander, Lt-Gen. Ahsen Saleem Hayat and discuss matters relating to "operational preparedness, administration and welfare of the troops."
2/14 Pioneer reports that the Pak scientists who went to Myanmar are believed to be in China.
2/15 AQK suffers a heart attack
2/15 Dawood reported to have had facial reconstructive surgery
2/15 Pak officials meet Salaluddin of Hizb Muj, advise HM to press for ceasefire as jihad was not an option. The (Friday Times) weekly said Pakistan government also applied some psychological pressure on Salahuddin. "He was given the example of the seven Hijbul Mujahideen guerrillas who surrendered before the Director General of Police Gopal Sharma (in Srinagar) on February 14 and (was) told that India had acquired state-of-the-art satellite signal interception capability from Israel that had helped it reach Ghulam Rasool Dar and Abbas Rahi, the two key Hizb commanders who were killed by the Indian security forces last month."
2/16 Jamali to visit Tehran for D-8 summit, will talk about Iranian gas for India
2/16 Talks with India/Pakistan begin
2/17 Pakistan launches operations in S. Waziristan
2/17 Yasin Malik threatens agitation in AJK
2/17 Shashank transits through Karachi en route to I'bad
2/17 two Laskhar-e-jHangvi leaders arrested in Karachi
2/18 295 dead in train explosion in Mashad, Iran
2/18 Pakistan agrees to Indian fence construction? Schedule set for continuing meetings - Mar 9 (Muzz/Srinagar bus); May 2nd week (Nuclear CBMs); June '04 (drug trafficking); July '04 (Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, commercial cooperation); Aug '04 Foreign Minister level mtg
2/19 Indian intelligence reports (TOI) that the security cover provided to Dawood has been withdrawn by Pakistan.
2/19 Musharraf expresses apprehension of nuclear assets' vulnerability to foreign bombing raids - to a countrywide gathering of ulema at Islamabad. http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/Feb-2004/20/EDITOR/edi2.asp
2/20 Bush approved a $560-million grant, which will entirely go into the safeguard systems, their operation, and maintenance on Pak nuke installations. The command-and-control equipment will comprise locks, codes and software more sophisticated than what the UN has installed in North-Korean atomic installations, but no Pakistani or Muslim contractor would be engaged in putting the devices in place. Diplomats said that over the last two weeks, Pakistan president Parvez Musharraf has produced a consensus among his corps commanders, the jihadi groups, and bureaucrats in favour of the safeguard equipment. All the equipment will be controlled by satellite, and the US secretary of state, Collin Powell, has rejected a Pakistani plea to buy the software, locks and codes from Germany.
2/20 10-member US delegation led by Asst Secy State for ArmsCntrl (Steve Rademaker) met Tariq Osman Hyder (addnl secy) and Riaz Khokhar (Foreign Secy) to discuss non-prolif, regional nuke CBMs, Missile Defence and IAEA findings. "The Assistant Secretary conveyed US views that in certain circumstances, missile defence could contribute to regional stability and the US was ready to further discuss the issue with Pakistan" - suggesting that a nuke-nood Pakistan would have a US umbrella to protect against attack from India.
2/21 Musharraf formally inducts Hatf III (Ghaznavi) a 290-km nuke capable missile.
2/22 Sunday Telegraph reports Bin Laden sighted and boxed in.
2/22 Aziz leaves on 13 day visit to Egypt and Nigeria
2/22 Asia Times (Shahzad) reports "within the Pakistani army "to purge the elements allegedly sexed up with al-Qaeda and the Taliban"... follows the recent arrest of several militants of Uzbek origin, as well as an Arab named Waleed bin Azmi, in a raid in the eastern district of the Pakistani port city of Karachi. About a dozen militants managed to escape, while the captured ones were handed over to agents of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, who found during their interrogations that the operators had been besieged near Wana, South Waziristan, but they were given an escape route, allegedly by officers of the Pakistan armed forces. The operators fled to Karachi, but were rounded up thanks to the local police's intelligence network. The US presented these facts to Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf - not the first time such incidents have been reported, but this time with the demands that the officers be taken to task and that US officials be allowed to take part in the inquiries to understand better the nexus between Islamists and officers in the Pakistani army. Several officers are now expected to be arrested. - suggesting that Tenet's visit on 2/11 was related to this, and the subsequent operation in S. Waziristan may have been based on the Bin Laden information received
2/22 - FBI reported to have HQ at Jalalabad, regional offices at Lahore, I'bad, Karachi, F'bad, Pindi. $4billion worth of sensor eqpt, including NVRadar, UAV, Satellite d'base. Reported checking all immigration, passports, airport security, cyber crimes, and phone conversations. They are now working independently of Pak Intelligence (Weekly Independent 35 (3) Feb 19-25, 2004)
2/22 - US and Pak reject Sunday Express claim to have Bin Laden "boxed in"
2/22 - Task Force 21 (121?) moving to Afgh, from Iraq.http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/24/top3.htm
2/23 Rumsfeld visits Iraq, reported on unscheduled visit to other countries "in the region" - may include Pak
2/26 US lifts travel and commerce ban on Libya
2/26 Safdar Hussein named Corps Commander of Peshawar replaced Lt. Gen Orakzai who retires in April.
2/27 Osama Reported captured by Iran State Radio - Asheq Hossein (Dir Pushtun Servie) claims two sources, one Shamim Syed The Nations Peshwar bureau chief. Reports only in Pashto, not Farsi service.
2/27 NYT reports that Pak 1998 tests included a NK weapon, possibly Pu based, likely 6th test.
2/27 Mufti escapes attack when grenades thrown at him.
2/28 US confirms that Beg threatened in 1990 to give nukes to Iran if US did not cntinue assistance. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_28-2-2004_pg1_2
2/28 MULTAN: The Army has been called out in Multan to assist the local government and it was also called into sensitive areas of south Punjab like Khanewal, Bahawalpur, Lodhran, Jhang and Sahiwal.
2/28 Army called out at airports, Interior Min Faisal Saleh Hayat claims for Muharram. http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/29/top6.htm
2/29 New Yorker's Sey Hersh reports that US went soft on Pak to enable US forces in Pak to hunt OBL.
2/29 Straw to visit Pak regarding non-proliferation.

[Rak]

Pakistani Said to Have Given Libya Uranium

[shiv]

Originally posted by leonard:
Pakistan and Proliferation:
Implications and Options for Indian Policy
Rajesh Rajagopalan and Arpit Rajain

http://www.orfonline.org/reports/py040219.htm

What I find irritating about this optonline analysis is this constant handwringing, nailbiting anxiety about how "teacher USA" will punish "good boy India" vs "bad boy Pakistan"

I sense a naivete in the analysis because if the "new system" allows Pakistan to proliferate by hook or by crook - it means that the new system will be as faulty and dirty as the old system and India will be able to get what it wants just like everyone else including Pak land and NoKo were able to get what the wanted all these years. It will be a "tongue in cheek", "wink and nod" non proliferation regime that allows Pakistan to get away and it will also be Indian stupidity and naivete and needless satyameva jayate if India cannot get all sorts of things using a faulty system.

If, however, the system is really good - then only the top notch nations - and I am certain India is among them - will get whatever they want, along with genuine non-proliferator nations.

However, if you ask my personal opinion - any new NPT will be like everyone pi$$ing in a sieve in your car and and everyone cheerfully pretending that nothing has happened. New NPT regimes will only raise prices and create new rich men in the shadowy world of proliferation. if is doesn't affect Pakistan, it ill not affect India and I can't see why people should be hopping about anxiously that good boy India will somehow suffer.

It is up to good boy India to grab every advantage and make Pakland suffer rather than wiorry that unkil will say "bad boy, you"

[jrjrao]

Nuclear fallout for Pakistan
By Pervez Hoodbhoy

For over 15 years Pakistan had repeatedly assured the world that it was a responsible nuclear power whose nuclear weapons were solely aimed at deterring nuclear India.

It rejected accusations of having proliferated nuclear weapon technologies. These angry denials coincided, as we now know, with the surreptitious activities of our bomb-makers.

In other words, we were all taken for a ride. The enormous credibility gap this creates will surely be a handicap for all leaders of Pakistan, present and future.

The transfers to North Korea are relatively prosaic. Having developed the bomb, Pakistan needed missiles to deliver them. North Korea was willing to supply them, for a price. Like the URENCO centrifuges, all Kahuta had to do was put them together and stick a star and crescent on them.

From the inception of the bomb programme, the Pakistani establishment sought to turn its nuclear successes into larger gains.

One recalls that two years ago highly placed members of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission wanted to play their role in the jihad against America. In a fit of Islamic solidarity they went to Afghanistan and met Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. It is difficult to believe that they were the only ones so inclined.

This could have horrific consequences. Imagine, for example, the situation arising from an atomic explosion in some American city. A superpower, blinded with grief and rage, would be sure to exact a terrible price.

Mere suspicion might form the basis of action. It is quite possible that the Americans would bomb Pakistan first - perhaps with nuclear weapons - and look later for justifications.

http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/21/fea.htm#1

[jrjrao]

Fun continues. Front page of the NY Times:

Pakistani Said to Have Given Libya Uranium

The network led by the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan shipped partly enriched uranium directly to Libya aboard a Pakistani airplane in 2001, providing the fuel stock in addition to the designs and technology to make a nuclear bomb, according to a report by Malaysian investigators released Friday.

Mr. Tahir said he could not remember the name of the "Pakistani airline" that carried the shipment, and the report does not make clear whether it was a civilian or military aircraft.

Pakistan's information secretary, Syed Anwar Mahmood, declined to comment on the allegations in the Malaysian report.

The report confirms that a number of complete centrifuges were also flown to Libya direct from Pakistan in the year after the uranium shipment. It said the centrifuges were "possibly" P-1 models.

[kgoan]

JRJ's link on Hoodbuoy's article has an interesting line in it:

Libya reportedly bankrolled Pakistan and may even have supplied raw uranium.

.
The reason I find this interesting is that I've spent some time looking for the quid-pro-quo in Pak's proliferation activities.

I don't think it's safe for us to assume that the usual "Islamic-solidarity" is the sole, or even major, motivating factor here - because if it may blind us to other factors that are just as important.

In which case, the obvious thing is to go looking for what the Paks got in return from the countries mentioned.

Money from the Arabs, undoubtedly, but what else? N Korea gave them missiles and now there's a suggestion that Libya "gave" or perhaps helped the Paks get uranium.

Of course, we'd need more than Hoodbuoy's article as corroboration, but it might be worth keeping an eye out for anything else that tells us what the Paks got in return. i.e. Anything that gives us any more info on Paks motivation.

Naturally, with the "tactically brilliant", it's really hard to ignore the "motivation=just plain stupid" factor. But I think we need to know if their motivation is sheer home grown Paki maliciousness/stupidity or if it's driven by something else.

[Kuttan]

kgoan:

Given what we know about HoodBhoy, the question to ask is: "Why did he write this article?"

[shiv]

Originally posted by narayanan:
kgoan:

Given what we know about HoodBhoy, the question to ask is: "Why did he write this article?"

I suppose this is as good a time as any to say it.

Note the following passage:

Editorials and articles published in influential US newspapers suggest that intense pressure will surely be applied by the US government. The demands would likely include on-site inspection and monitoring of Pakistani fissile material production at the enrichment facility at Kahuta and elsewhere, the plutonium production reactor at Khushab, and all centres where nuclear materials are processed and stored.

Pakistan is certain to strongly resist this demand and, for the moment, may even partially succeed. However, as a compromise between allowing some transparency and avoiding the accusation of having sold out to the Americans, it is possible that the government may secretly allow the installation of cameras and various sensing devices in nuclear installations and an audit of fissile materials.

In the longer term one can expect more direct pressures. This could include economic sanctions - or even military action - if the political situation changes dramatically.

This could happen if Pakistan's cooperation with the US in fighting Al Qaeda falters, or if an Islamic group is successful in eliminating General Musharraf and his replacement is considered to be an Islamic radical. One must then expect a determined effort to put Pakistan's nuclear weapons under international (read: United States) control.

Hoodbhoy met a person who is known to me through someone else at a conference. When he was asked about Pakistani nukes - he said "They are under US security" Exact words here. "US security". The source asked a second time and got the same words.

I am not kidding. The story is at least 2 months old. My source would not bluff. But the question is, would Hoodbhoy bluff?

[kgoan]

N, good question.

Hoodbhoy, (like Ayaz Amir, Sherry rehman, Najam Sethi etc. - but not Asma Jehangir), are all part and parcel of the RAPE/Army establishment.

But they play an important role - they articulate a viewpoint that strikes a very real chord in the liberal west. The "they're one of us" routine that plays so well.

Hoodbhoy is difficult to place a finger on - precisely because his liberal views (which resonate so well) and yet contradict what one would take to be his past (?) role in the Pak nuke system.

It's impossible to say why he wrote that of course, but at a guess, I suspect he's letting "people" know ("people"=non-Pakees, but which audience he's aiming at would be *really* interesting to know) that there are elements in the heart of the Pak establishment whose views are consonant with said "peoples" views.

[kgoan]

Shiv, now that's interesting.

So Hoodbhoy's going around telling one and all that "you have nothing to worry about, us Pakees are harmless now"?

How very Musharraf-like of him.

Of course, he's a Pak RAPE - so it's hard to tell if that's his view, if he's a sock-puppet for the Pak Army, or if he's just pinched and "massaged" N's thesis.

[Sridhar]

What was Hoodbhoy's past role in Pakistan's nuclear system?

[Anantha]

From TFT letters

An intelligent Indian Questions Ejaz Haider
Sir,

Ejaz Haider in his article “Legitimise the nuclear capability of Pakistan, India and Israel” (TFT Feb 13-19) suggests that Pakistan join hands with India and Israel when pressurised to roll back its nuclear programme. But given that the Islamic bomb was developed in opposition to these two countries, why should India and Israel cooperate with Pakistan?

Ashis Chakravartty,
Abuja.

and listen to the joker
Ejaz Haider replies:

I didn’t think I’d have to respond to any letters again. Perhaps there is need to write a column looking at the thinking of Indian readers who write letters to TFT. Fortunately for all concerned, the governments of India and Israel are not run by people as simplistic as the two gentlemen in question. The issue is not about India and Israel doing a favour to Pakistan but getting together with the latter to push their own interests. States would sup with the devil if it advanced their interests and India is no exception. The Indian moral position is a sham begotten of realpolitik: keep putting Pakistan down by presenting India as the best thing that has happened to mankind. C’mon, sirs, give us a break.
-------------------

Thanks a lot Mr. Haider, Thank you for the great help towards India. We in India have been waiting desperately for help from your great Paki nation to save our Nukes from being taken over by International community.
We also think Israel will also be greatly honored to receive such help from the Paks, as America wants to take out Israeli nukes right away.

[kgoan]

Sridhar,

*IMO*, central.

The Quaid-e-Azam University's Physics Dept is *the* place for Physics in Pak land.

Pak scientists/engineers have to be trained somewhere. Sure, they go abroad, but there has to be a nodal point in pak land - and only QeA really qualifies. (Position, geography, ideology, resources, etc.)

Hoodbhoy's position and status make the other conclusions inevitable. He is, in my view, an "outsider" who is very much on the inside - kinda like Ayaz Amir is to Pak journalism. In my opinion, I think he's trying to play at being Paks Sakharov.

[Calvin]

Sunil and others - could the sudden visit to Karachi have to do with the 2/20 report on $500MM being allocated to for C&C on Pak nuke installations?

Also, why did Shashank stopover in Karachi at the airport? Did it have to do with Dawood? Is it related to the arrest of the Uzbeks and the impending purge in teh Pak army?

Is it possible that Hoodbhoy's article is a message from the UNITED STATES to the hardliners in the army as well as on the political spectrum?

The information divulged (Libya may have provided uranium, nuke facilities may be secretly policed by US) may be intended to be an element of the "intense pressure ... applied by the US government." Additionally, the list of [US?]demands and threats are interesting:

DEMANDS
1. To end the effort "promote an Islamic bomb" even though "pan-Islamists and those who work in the country's nuclear establishment seem incapable of realizing this" since "there is little doubt that some non-state actors are more enthusiastic"

2. "It is time to give up the fantasy of a Bomb for the ummah, and time to rein in Pakistan's bomb-makers. "

3. "Pakistan's cooperation with the US in fighting Al Qaeda"

4. "The demands would likely include on-site inspection and monitoring of Pakistani fissile material production at the enrichment facility at Kahuta and elsewhere, the plutonium production reactor at Khushab, and all centres where nuclear materials are processed and stored. "

5. "a compromise between allowing some transparency and avoiding the accusation of having sold out to the Americans, it is possible that the government may secretly allow the installation of cameras and various sensing devices in nuclear installations and an audit of fissile materials. "

THREATS
1. "the efforts of some Pakistani bomb-makers to peddle nuclear secrets appear to have been stymied. But merely by having tried to do so, and invoking solidarity with the ummah, they have put Pakistan in mortal danger. This could have horrific consequences. Imagine, for example, the situation arising from an atomic explosion in some American city. A superpower, blinded with grief and rage, would be sure to exact a terrible price. Mere suspicion might form the basis of action. It is quite possible that the Americans would bomb Pakistan first - perhaps with nuclear weapons - and look later for justifications. "

2. PAEC will be targetted - "One recalls that two years ago highly placed members of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission wanted to play their role in the jihad against America. In a fit of Islamic solidarity they went to Afghanistan and met Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. It is difficult to believe that they were the only ones so inclined."

3. "one can expect more direct pressures. This could include economic sanctions - or even military action - if the political situation changes dramatically. This could happen if Pakistan's cooperation with the US in fighting Al Qaeda falters"

4. "One must then expect a determined effort to put Pakistan's nuclear weapons under international (read: United States) control."

5. Reveal the Pakistani State involvement - why else would the Libya sold Pakistan Uranium be brought out?

<hr>
Of course, there is the possibility that this is a rebuttal by the religious wing to Musharraf - sort of a "we know what is going on." But the recommendations ("to promote an Islamic bomb in the post-9/11 world is both military folly and a political suicide") and Hoodbhoy's previous record suggest this is unlikely.

[Rangudu]

FWIW, this same piece by Hoodbhoy appeared in the Straits Times paer in Singapore as well as the Seoul based Korea Herald.

Is that a hint of his audience?

[Sridhar]

Originally posted by kgoan:
Pak scientists/engineers have to be trained somewhere. Sure, they go abroad, but there has to be a nodal point in pak land - and only QeA really qualifies. (Position, geography, ideology, resources, etc.)

I always thought PINSTECH played that central role (or at least for core activities in the nuclear program). But yes, even if PINSTECH played that central role, QeA would have played an important role, particularly for the first generation of nuclear physicists (AFAIK, QeA's physics dept. is much older than PINSTECH).

Or is it still true that QeA plays that central role? Other than Hoodbhoy and Nayyar, are there any other physicists of any renown at QeA (Hoodbhoy has written about the dubious academic standards there).

[Calvin]

My read on the Rademaker visit (2/20) coming on the heels of Bush's $500 million grant (2/20) and Hoodbhoy's article (2/20) is that the US actually has control of the Pakistani nukes, but is currently engaged in negotiations for its nuclear facilities to prevent proliferation and dirty-bomb material making its way to the Ummah/AlQ.

Rademaker's offer of BMD to Pakistan may be intended to allay Pakistani fears of an Indian nuclear attack. Now, we know that Pakistan has nothing to fear from an Indian attack (due to NFU), so the US offer effectively denukes Pakistan's sub-threshold proxy activities. There may even be the element of a US "nuclear umbrella" being offered in return for a complete end to the nuclear program and weaponry.

The second option being offered is in Hoodbhoy's article. The US is really only interested in preventing Proliferation to the Ummah and associated non-state actors, and is giving Pakistan an "out" in that regard as well, if they shut that operation down. However, in that regard the US needs verifiability and that requires intrusive sensor-based inspection capability.

Rangudu - might one read the multiple outlets as a measure of who is pushing the message?

[Vivek_A]

Insider Tells Of Nuclear Deals, Cash

Pakistani Scientist Netted $3 Million
By Ellen Nakashima and Alan Sipress
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, February 21, 2004; Page A01

JAKARTA, Indonesia, Feb. 20 -- The Sri Lankan businessman who was an associate of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan has told Malaysian police how Khan shipped components to Libya and Iran for their nuclear weapons programs and received two briefcases with a $3 million payment from Iran, a Malaysian police report disclosed Friday.

Khan told Tahir that he had also flown uranium hexafluoride to Libya on a Pakistani airliner as part of a secret program he had worked out with the Libyans during the previous four years at meetings in Istanbul; Casablanca, Morocco; and Dubai, according to the document.

Pakistani airliner = PAF?

[kgoan]

Calvin, I don't thin Hoodbhoy's part of the religious wing. I think he's part of the RAPE who see themselves as the true "inheritors" of Jinnah's legacy.

They all follow the exclusivist ideology of Jinnah, but this lot are a bit more sophisticated in how they couch their intolerance. I have yet to see a single article from *any* of these folk repudiating the core of hatred inherent in the Two Nation Theory.

It may be possible of course, but it seems to me to be unlikely that Hoodbhoy is acting on the US' behalf. From what I understand, all segments of the RAPE seem to think that the US need for Pakistan today n the GOAT, and tomorrow as a check on India, is sufficient for permanent US leeway on a variety of things.

It's just that the Hoodbhoy types seem to have a more realistic grasp about what the US will tolerate and what is good for Pak then other segments of the RAPE power elite do.

The Hoodbhoy/Sethi types don't see the US/west as the *primary* enemy, which is what makes them so valuable to the US/west - compared to the other lot who see all the kafir as an enemy.

Sridhar,

Yes. But the point is about the role of Hoodbhoy as a "dissident". I seriously doubt the Paks can maintain QeA and a weapons establishment as *completely* separate in the way that weapons centres in the west are for example. They don't have the resources for it.

We won't know the exact relationship of course, but my guess, based on the "status" of QeA is that QeA could not maintain it's place without an being "in" with the weapons business.

[Calvin]

Has Hoodbhoy spent any time at US universities? What is his bio?

http://pawss.hampshire.edu/indepth/hoodbhoy.pdf

Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy received his bachelor's degrees in electrical engineering andmathematics, master's in solid state physics, and Ph.D in nuclear physics, all from theMassachusetts Institute of Technology. He has been a faculty member at the Departmentof Physics, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad since 1973. In 1984 he received theAbdus Salam Prize for mathematics and, earlier, the Baker Award for Electronics. He ischairman of Mashal, a non-profit organization that publishes books in Urdu on women'srights, education, environmental issues, philosophy, and modern thought.Dr. Hoodbhoy has written and spoken extensively on topics ranging from science inIslam to education issues in Pakistan and nuclear disarmament. He produced a 13-partdocumentary series in Urdu for Pakistan Television on critical issues in education, andtwo other major television series aimed at popularizing science. He is author of ?Islamand Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality?, now in 5 languages.His writings have appeared in Dawn, The News, Frontier Post, Muslim, Newsline,Herald, Jang, and overseas in Le Monde, Japan Times, Washington Post, Asahi, SeattleTimes, Post-Intelligencer, Frontline, The Hindu, and Chowk Magazine. He has been anengaged speaker at more than twenty US campuses including MIT, Princeton, Univ. ofMaryland, and Johns Hopkins University. He has appeared on several TV and radionetworks (BBC, CNN, ABC, NBC, PBS, NPR, Fox) to analyze political developments inSouth Asia.

The man is netting some serious money for these speaking engagements.

http://www.dawn.com/events/century/sci0.htm

I had just finished my PhD in nuclear physics and was visiting the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Salams proud creation

BS/MS/PhD all from MIT, graduating in 1972 with PhD in nuclear physics. ALso, these speaking engagements, from a rough review of google, indicate that these are not for his scientific accomplishments. I wonder if anyone can do a SCI-index search on what his publications are in physics.

Most recently (2/5) he gave a speech at Princeton sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson school on "Pakistan's Bomb-For God, Country and Profit."

http://webserv03.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/team/webevent.cgi?

[svinayak]

Originally posted by kgoan:
Sridhar,

*IMO*, central.

The Quaid-e-Azam University's Physics Dept is *the* place for Physics in Pak land.

Pak scientists/engineers have to be trained somewhere. Sure, they go abroad, but there has to be a nodal point in pak land - and only QeA really qualifies. (Position, geography, ideology, resources, etc.)

Hoodbhoy's position and status make the other conclusions inevitable. He is, in my view, an "outsider" who is very much on the inside - kinda like Ayaz Amir is to Pak journalism. In my opinion, I think he's trying to play at being Paks Sakharov.

I think even he was given the position in QeA on the advice of the western powers to monitor the next generation of physicists so as to cultivate them and mould them with a western connection.
So he acts as a liason between the internal pool and the external probing agencies.

[kgoan]

Calvin, R:

Hoodbhoy may be syndicated, in which case he may not have a say in where the article ends up.

But Calvins point is interesting given the Korean paper - would be virtually confirmed if it turns up in a Japanese paper.