Brar my dear fellowbrar_w wrote:Most AH-64 users including the US Army choose to operate both aircraft both with and without the radar.
isn't there an agreed upon ratio of longbows to non-longbow in a Unit.
Brar my dear fellowbrar_w wrote:Most AH-64 users including the US Army choose to operate both aircraft both with and without the radar.
I am not sure how that works in an operational context at this moment with the arrival of the Echo into front line US Army units. On the D variant they maintained a 3:5 ratio (Radar:No Radar) at the company level and three companies forming an attack recon. squadon consisting of 24 Apache's.isn't there an agreed upon ratio of longbows to non-longbow in a Unit.
Correct, even on the older D models (block II and below) they kept the ability to deploy the Longbow Hellfire on all variants even though the FCR and the RFI were missing.That was my understanding as well...that the Longbow Apaches guide the regular Apaches. I could be wrong in this assessment.
Trikaal wrote:If this is where we are going, what is your expertise to oppose such a claim? No one here has the power of decision making. We are all, at the end of the day, defense enthusiasts on a defence forum. If everyone here needs 'expertise' , it is going to be a very lonely forum very soonCybaru wrote:
Whats your expertise or basis for making such a claim?
Can the longbow apache guide other choppers as well? the lch perhaps?brar_w wrote:I am not sure how that works in an operational context at this moment with the arrival of the Echo into front line US Army units. On the D variant they maintained a 3:5 ratio (Radar:No Radar) at the company level and three companies forming an attack recon. squadon consisting of 24 Apache's.isn't there an agreed upon ratio of longbows to non-longbow in a Unit.
Correct, even on the older D models (block II and below) they kept the ability to deploy the Longbow Hellfire on all variants even though the FCR and the RFI were missing.That was my understanding as well...that the Longbow Apaches guide the regular Apaches. I could be wrong in this assessment.
Sure if an investment is made to network it with other assets as other operators have done. The US Army has brought in its own smaller non Link-16 waveforms into the system and the software defined architecture would allow similar efforts to be made to bring other user proprietary systems.Cain Marko wrote:
Can the longbow apache guide other choppers as well? the lch perhaps?
The ability to share a common operating picture, cooperatively engage targets and command UAVs to extend its own awareness are an added advantage of having the sensors and networking as part of the "attack helicopter" fire control suite. It is not an AWACS of helicopter but still a full fledged attack helicopter where battle space information from outside assets is received and processed autonomously, and similarly it transmits its own battle picture for others in the network.Singha wrote:but could that not be done more effectively and powerfully with a dedicated ASTOR type platform or even just a eyes like the french cougar with gmti sensor? but that would nullify the rationale of the IAF wanting a 1:1+ replacement for the Hinds.
we could mount such a domestic or israeli sensor under a Mi17 which we already build in large nos.
You have been warned for trolling. Don't make asinine and wanton claims.Trikaal wrote:Ok just wanted to clarify something. A lot of posters are talking about LCH giving more bang per buck ( or as Shiv sir doesn't like american idioms, 'more value for money'), I already agree with all of you. I AM NOT asking for buying more Apache. I am supporting developing a local Apache. If our scientists and engineers at HAL were able to develop a cost effective light combat helis, I expect them to develop a similarly cost effective heavy attack helicopter. Maybe the cost effectiveness of such a heavy attack helicopter will be even more pronounced since it won't have the requirement of performing high altitude roles. What I am against is being satisfied with LCH and using it in roles it is not developed for. Can LCH perform that role ? Yes. Will it be optimal ? No, a machine developed exclusively for that role will obviously be more optimal.
The platform is ALH.They have given out what all has to be integrated. Almost everything is desi, except some large ruggedized screens.The Lead System Integrator (LSI) identified has to carry out Procurement, Integration, Certification and Onboard Installation of Low Frequency Dunking Sonar (LFDS) system. Three units are to be produced – One for CEMILAC certification, the second unit for onboard installation and the third unit as standby.
We have made a naval version of KA-226T and we are ready to offer that to India
1 longbow radar can simultaneously track 256 targets.isn't there an agreed upon ratio of longbows to non-longbow in a Unit.
We have this guy..SBajwa wrote:Did we ever had a radar on helicopter? I have seen radar only helicopters that stay behind and at higher altitude supplying data to the fighters below and ahead.
The longbow is mast mounted for a reason. Combat experience has been fairly good. Google for Afghanistan & Iraq usage.abhik wrote:There is an inherent contradiction here, the helicopter has to stay low for survivability but the radar needs to be at a high altitude for best possible unobscured view. Its one thing to say that the Longbow is an additional sensor that improves situational awareness, quite another to claim that it is a mini AWACS that will "quarterback" LCHs and Rudras.
BTW what is the actual combat experience of the longbow radar?
One does not need to have datalinks all the time for jugaad usage of Apaches with Longbows. Give some credit to Indian ingenuity as well. Indian pilots can very well use radios to call out targets of opportunity for non datalinked LCH & Rudra. Do you think IAF pilots using MiG-21s as radar pickets in 1971 had datalinks or the MiG-21s getting target cues from Su-30Ks in Cope India had datalinks?YashG wrote:Means that the deployment of Apache as the lead wolf in the pack is being on some kind of thin ice!Singha wrote:from what I understand out apache order of 22 is not all longbows. 12 is.
^^ it will need american radio modems on LCH/Rudra to get anything from the longbow radar. actually even the 10 non-longbow helis will also need it.
The elephant in the room is Kargil.Indranil wrote:
By the way Deejay, I agree with you that it doesn't matter who has command over the Apaches. The operations for the helicopters are set, and these operations will be carried out irrespective of the command. But, I disagree with you that there was/is no ego war between IA/IAF with retains command. I surely have far fewer friends than you in the forces, but I do have some . Afterall, if IA and IAF acquiring the helis were to be one and the same, why would both of them be acquiring them separately? IA could just tell IAF to go get more Apaches, and together they would have passed the requirement to GoI.
However, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis told Karan Thapar in an interview telecast on CNBC-TV18 that helicopters were used in the Kargil operations against his wishes but his differences with the then Army chief had no impact on the overall campaign to evict the Pakistan-backed intruders.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/demand-of-attack-helicopters-during-kargil-war-tipnis-justifies-his-action/story-8fstkY7knynzsi71X5IjvJ.htmlAsked what transpired at a meeting of the three services chiefs on May 24, 1999, ahead of the CCS meeting, from which Gen. Malik stormed out after having been refused helicopter support for evicting the intruders, he said: "Yes, he walked out. I went to the corridor and told him he can have the helicopters."
I think Army has decided to have organic air support to the troops under its command without requiring any permission from IAF.In his book, Malik wrote that on May 17, 1999, he advised Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar to seek assistance from the Air Force, particularly armed/ attack helicopters for further surveillance and detection of the intrusion in the Chief of Staff Committee (COSC) meeting next day. Malik was on foreign trip during that time.
On May 18, 1999, as Malik wrote Tipnis did not agree for additional support other than transport helicopters. “ The reason given were that attack helicopters could not operate at that altitude and that the use of air power would escalate and enlarge the dimensions of the conflict. The VCOAS had projected these aspects in the Cabinet Committee of Security (CCS) also but his viewpoints were rejected.”
On May 19, 1999, Tipnis wrote a long letter to Malik with a copy to Admiral Sushil Kumar stating that there was a “considerable misconception about the use of air power and its political and operational implications”. He wanted the COSC to discuss the issue again and then have a standard operating procedure prepared for the purpose. “ This letter was a bit upsetting and untimely, but I did not react to it,” wrote Malik.
On May 23, 1999, Malik met Sushil Kumar and told him that Tipnis might require some more convincing for the use of air power. After that a meeting took between the three chiefs and Tipnis reportedly agreed for it. The CCS then also agreed for it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iGngFSwNQqYSBajwa wrote:Did we ever had a radar on helicopter? I have seen radar only helicopters that stay behind and at higher altitude supplying data to the fighters below and ahead.
Didnt we acquire 10 or so, they operate from Vikram Aditya to ensure that low skimming Incoming missiles and AIrcraft, In fact we should develop Helicopter based UAV's with Radars to operate from all out ships.shiv wrote:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iGngFSwNQqYSBajwa wrote:Did we ever had a radar on helicopter? I have seen radar only helicopters that stay behind and at higher altitude supplying data to the fighters below and ahead.
Nice post indeed. Ego is definitely not the right word. I will go with disagreement henceforth.deejay wrote:Indranil and srin. Mi 35s from Pathankot could not cross Banihal and there was an emergency hot evacuation of aircrew by IA because of forced landing in a hostile area. This may have happened after Kargil, but IAF knew these challenges before hand. There was no question of going beyond Zozi La
This body of knowledge and capability of aviation assets does not reside with IA but IAF and it is hard to get across to IA guys and they do lose temper given that those boys are in the line of fire. Mi 17s are not exclusively transport but have 192 rocket store. A Mi 17 was eventually shot down and both IA and IAF understood the futility of the exercise. I will not comment on escalation due crossing LAC/ LOC as I am not sure of the reasoning. However, I think it was a GOI directive to stay within Indian Air Space.
The "ego" problem people refer too is primarily lack of appreciation of each others challenge. In my view it is more of operational disagreements and definitely not "ego" which is why Indranil, I think you are wrong to categorise it as one. There was no way Mi 25/35 could have operated in Kargil. Physics came in between and not intent.
As for why IAF is buying separtely and IA buying separately, I have already shared my thoughts. IAF will only spare budget for 22 and the rest comes from IA budget. All Apaches will finally operate for IA only. IAF has no dedicated use. The LCH with IAF will look after IAFs combat roles. And I say these, both with my understanding due to experiences past and Present and a little bit of insights that my friends occasionally share.
As an aside and a personal story, I was at a forward helipad with some senior IA pilots. We were there together and IA Chief had come hence IAF twin engine helicopter was reqd. This was before the Dhruv inductions. An infantry officer walked up to me and said - Young Man, you are all air no force. And he walked away. The IA pilots smiled at me. They go through this lack of understanding regularly but you cannot fault the infantry man. The soldier on the front line puts his life on line and does not cite limitations. On the other hand all of us with flying machines keep quoting limitations in almost all situations because it is our job to keep the machine serviceable - Temp too high, too windy, weather bad, only 04 passengers, no extra load, this is a load sortie - no passengers, cannot do it since SOP does not allow, not cleared to land on that helipad, my helicopter is under powered... etc, etc. If you are an Infantry Man, this will get under your skin. And it does. The Army Chief vs Air Chief has equivalent episodes at ground level too but it is limited to just that and this is not ego. By me understanding, almost 70% of all helicopter and transport flying by IAF is for Indian Army. The IA has defined tasks and these have to be completed in the given time. So far I have not heard of single IA complain or CAG report saying IAF did not carry out the IA task.
The problems of "ego" etc is how you folks and DDM may look at it but it is not. The argument between chief cited above was not ego but operational disagreements.
Brilliant post Deejay. Thanks for making that subtle distinction between ego and operational disagreement. This post is must read for everyone on BRF. I have to confess I was previously firmly with what Indranil was saying about inter-organisational egos, but I have changed my POV in recent times. The point you made about the Infantry men being in the line of Fire directly and them carrying out whatever is demanded from them even going beyond human limits sometimes, really hits home. Of coarse this is not to say that Navy or Airforce (and even perhaps Artillery and Armoured divisions of IA) soldiers are any less, but I suppose we need to understand the subtle differences here amongst the various perspectives (you very well brought out the point). That's the reason I am still undecided on the CDS issue, I cannot fathom completely why can't we simply bring in more synergy in existing command structure by making the Three services more sensitive to each others perspectives. There is no denying that there are inter-organisational strains at play in some scenarios (not specific to this Heli acquisition, generally speaking), which is not specific thing for AFs, its same for any field and a part of human nature. But with the kind of professionalism out AFs have, it should be possible to make them work in a better manner with each other. But that's a different discussion.deejay wrote:Indranil and srin. Mi 35s from Pathankot could not cross Banihal and there was an emergency hot evacuation of aircrew by IA because of forced landing in a hostile area. This may have happened after Kargil, but IAF knew these challenges before hand. There was no question of going beyond Zozi La
This body of knowledge and capability of aviation assets does not reside with IA but IAF and it is hard to get across to IA guys and they do lose temper given that those boys are in the line of fire. Mi 17s are not exclusively transport but have 192 rocket store. A Mi 17 was eventually shot down and both IA and IAF understood the futility of the exercise. I will not comment on escalation due crossing LAC/ LOC as I am not sure of the reasoning. However, I think it was a GOI directive to stay within Indian Air Space.
The "ego" problem people refer too is primarily lack of appreciation of each others challenge. In my view it is more of operational disagreements and definitely not "ego" which is why Indranil, I think you are wrong to categorise it as one. There was no way Mi 25/35 could have operated in Kargil. Physics came in between and not intent.
As for why IAF is buying separtely and IA buying separately, I have already shared my thoughts. IAF will only spare budget for 22 and the rest comes from IA budget. All Apaches will finally operate for IA only. IAF has no dedicated use. The LCH with IAF will look after IAFs combat roles. And I say these, both with my understanding due to experiences past and Present and a little bit of insights that my friends occasionally share.
As an aside and a personal story, I was at a forward helipad with some senior IA pilots. We were there together and IA Chief had come hence IAF twin engine helicopter was reqd. This was before the Dhruv inductions. An infantry officer walked up to me and said - Young Man, you are all air no force. And he walked away. The IA pilots smiled at me. They go through this lack of understanding regularly but you cannot fault the infantry man. The soldier on the front line puts his life on line and does not cite limitations. On the other hand all of us with flying machines keep quoting limitations in almost all situations because it is our job to keep the machine serviceable - Temp too high, too windy, weather bad, only 04 passengers, no extra load, this is a load sortie - no passengers, cannot do it since SOP does not allow, not cleared to land on that helipad, my helicopter is under powered... etc, etc. If you are an Infantry Man, this will get under your skin. And it does. The Army Chief vs Air Chief has equivalent episodes at ground level too but it is limited to just that and this is not ego. By me understanding, almost 70% of all helicopter and transport flying by IAF is for Indian Army. The IA has defined tasks and these have to be completed in the given time. So far I have not heard of single IA complain or CAG report saying IAF did not carry out the IA task.
The problems of "ego" etc is how you folks and DDM may look at it but it is not. The argument between chief cited above was not ego but operational disagreements.
Thanks.Indranil wrote:JayS, Deejay, can you check your PMs?
Thats quite some experience. A quick clarification, Deejay Saar, is it SoP to have a twin engined helo for 4 star general and above?? Cause IIRC the 3 star and lower usually get the Chetak or cheetah.deejay wrote: As an aside and a personal story, I was at a forward helipad with some senior IA pilots. We were there together and IA Chief had come hence IAF twin engine helicopter was reqd. An infantry officer walked up to me and said - Young Man, you are all air no force. The IA pilots smiled at me. They go through this lack of understanding regularly but you cannot fault the infantry man. The soldier on the front line puts his life on line and does not cite limitations. On the other hand all of us with flying machines keep quoting limitations in almost all situations because it is our job to keep the machine serviceable. If you are an Infantry Man, this will get under your skin. And it does. The Army Chief vs Air Chief has equivalent episodes at ground level too but it is limited to just that and this is not ego. By me understanding, almost 70% of all helicopter and transport flying by IAF is for Indian Army.
Very lucidly put, sir. Like JayS even I was thinking it was an ego based issue, for the force not the respective Chiefs. But based on the above I have realised it is not ego, but ignorance, for a lack of a better word, on the technicalities and the limitations involved in each other's side.deejay wrote:The problems of "ego" etc is how you folks and DDM may look at it but it is not. The argument between chief cited above was not ego but operational disagreements.
Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) has issued requests for information pertaining to the Indian Multi-Role Helicopter (IMRH) that was first unveiled at Aero India 2017.
The RFIs relate to turboshaft engines, assistance with the development of a blade folding system, and external reviews of the 12t rotorcraft’s landing gear and transmission, according to an official. The duration of the design review period is six years.
The company is taking a cautious approach to its largest helicopter yet, and development timeframe for the IMRH can be realistically estimated at 8-10 years.
There is no formal requirement for a 10-12t indigenously-developed rotorcraft, but the official tells FlightGlobal that the IMRH is aimed at replacing India's older MiL Mi-17s after 2025.
The IMRH will include a dedicated ASW configuration for the Navy and a VIP/VVIP variant. HAL also plans to obtain civil certification.
The RFIs indicate that the IMRH will initially be powered by two imported turboshaft engines with dual channel full authority digital electronic control (FADEC).
HAL places a very high priority on the engine's high-altitude performance. The engines must be capable of air starts up to an altitude of 5.5 km. The Take-off Power rating (TOP) for use during take-off, climb and landing rating for a minimum period of five minutes is quoted as 1950kW at sea level, 1250kW at 4500m and 975kW at 6500m.
Total engine weight with all accessories and harnesses is to be within 250kg and engine time before overhaul (TBO) of 2000 hours or greater has been asked for.
Main and tail rotors are to be composite, and make use of radar absorbent/infrared resistant paints.
Design and development of the landing gear will also be undertaken by HAL's Rotary Wing Research Design Centre. The landing gear needs to be retractable, with an active steering system and self-centering feature.
Good insight. That is why I have come around to the view that operational experience is very important in policy making at RM.deejay wrote:Indranil and srin. Mi 35s from Pathankot could not cross Banihal and there was an emergency hot evacuation of aircrew by IA because of forced landing in a hostile area. This may have happened after Kargil, but IAF knew these challenges before hand. There was no question of going beyond Zozi La
This body of knowledge and capability of aviation assets does not reside with IA but IAF and it is hard to get across to IA guys and they do lose temper given that those boys are in the line of fire. Mi 17s are not exclusively transport but have 192 rocket store. A Mi 17 was eventually shot down and both IA and IAF understood the futility of the exercise. I will not comment on escalation due crossing LAC/ LOC as I am not sure of the reasoning. However, I think it was a GOI directive to stay within Indian Air Space.
The "ego" problem people refer too is primarily lack of appreciation of each others challenge. In my view it is more of operational disagreements and definitely not "ego" which is why Indranil, I think you are wrong to categorise it as one. There was no way Mi 25/35 could have operated in Kargil. Physics came in between and not intent.
As for why IAF is buying separtely and IA buying separately, I have already shared my thoughts. IAF will only spare budget for 22 and the rest comes from IA budget. All Apaches will finally operate for IA only. IAF has no dedicated use. The LCH with IAF will look after IAFs combat roles. And I say these, both with my understanding due to experiences past and Present and a little bit of insights that my friends occasionally share.
As an aside and a personal story, I was at a forward helipad with some senior IA pilots. We were there together and IA Chief had come hence IAF twin engine helicopter was reqd. This was before the Dhruv inductions. An infantry officer walked up to me and said - Young Man, you are all air no force. And he walked away. The IA pilots smiled at me. They go through this lack of understanding regularly but you cannot fault the infantry man. The soldier on the front line puts his life on line and does not cite limitations. On the other hand all of us with flying machines keep quoting limitations in almost all situations because it is our job to keep the machine serviceable - Temp too high, too windy, weather bad, only 04 passengers, no extra load, this is a load sortie - no passengers, cannot do it since SOP does not allow, not cleared to land on that helipad, my helicopter is under powered... etc, etc. If you are an Infantry Man, this will get under your skin. And it does. The Army Chief vs Air Chief has equivalent episodes at ground level too but it is limited to just that and this is not ego. By me understanding, almost 70% of all helicopter and transport flying by IAF is for Indian Army. The IA has defined tasks and these have to be completed in the given time. So far I have not heard of single IA complain or CAG report saying IAF did not carry out the IA task.
The problems of "ego" etc is how you folks and DDM may look at it but it is not. The argument between chief cited above was not ego but operational disagreements.
I have been inside the Ka-31 AEW so I can say this , It is a AEW chopper not an AWACS with Command and COntrol , The Pilot does see basic information from Radar ( there is large MFD in Front and Below ) plus additional space for 1 more big MFD that show that information but detailed processing is done on ships via information sent via Data Links to ships T and Vik and likely latter D class , One of the two pilots is also a radar operatorSingha wrote:afair the ka31 operates from the talwar ships also. these ships have some "control room" to downlink the picture and the helis may have a large screen MFD onboard. I am not sure how much if any air to air control takes place or everything is routed via the ship.
is there a unseed here radar officer behind the pilots with a dedicated console ?
http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-TVKFBxh1HWY/U ... ockpit.jpg
this is ka27 interior. ka31 is a bit wider. looks like there could be a side looking seat for a radar operator in place of the sonar guy in ka27
Its a radar picket helicopter and not an AEW or AWACS. Its a compact helicopter whose job is to lift the radar in the air and transmit whatever information gathered back to ship. It does no analysis itself.fanne wrote:And what can 1 man operator do in a AEW or AWACS - you need an army of very well trained people, plus a hierarchy to quickly decide what to do and not do.
The weight limits were reached before volume limits.Austin wrote:There is no 3rd Operator , its just 2 pilots the space behind it is like 40 % filled with Electronics and Hardware they looks all ruggedish and containerized for the radar nearly 50-60 % space is empty for future Hardware/Upgrade , More or less the space behind the pilot looked more empty than full so the potential to add more hardware in future is very much there. This information is now like more than 9 years old not sure latter on thing got changed and more things were added to it.