India Today executive editor Damayanti Datta is absolutely right when she points out that if a Doklam-like situation arises again, China may be in an advantageous position, 'simply because it is leading the AI research race.'
Besides, the chinese are still at the border in Doklam -- now that their "face has been saved" from humiliation. Like all things, it is a matter of managing the chinese at our borders until something precipitous happens at some point in the future. All logic exists in a framework...so one would have to understand the chinese mindset (as revealed in that other thread) to inveigle their rationale. But as Pratyush observes, the chinese seem to throw their weight around just because they can and pretend this is all great chinese sunsoo strategy...all they are doing is gaining more enemies in their neighbourhood and beyond..effing idiots.What's the logic behind Han thinking?
So you already see the logic in Chinese behavior, do you, and yet you pretend you do not understand chinese logic? What is this snake oil you seem to be selling?"draw lines on the map and pretend it is their territory", is a well thought out strategy, why it's illogical? That's how the imperials behave.
What I am saying is that there's logic behind improving road infrastructure from Lhasa to Doka Lam and Tawang. What is that logic is something that I am not able to decipher.periaswamy wrote:So you already see the logic in Chinese behavior, do you, and yet you pretend you do not understand chinese logic? What is this snake oil you seem to be selling?"draw lines on the map and pretend it is their territory", is a well thought out strategy, why it's illogical? That's how the imperials behave.
Isn't that obvious from the news items on this thread -- the chinese want to occupy Indian territory to provide them a military advantage at the Indo-Burmese border. They can build all the roads they want, but if India occupies the high points in the region, they can easily make the roads unusuable if the chinese want to push a conflict in that region. If they cannot defend the roads during war, what is the point of building them?What I am saying is that there's logic behind improving road infrastructure from Lhasa to Doka Lam and Tawang. What is that logic is something that I am not able to decipher.
TKiran wrote:What I am saying is that there's logic behind improving road infrastructure from Lhasa to Doka Lam and Tawang. What is that logic is something that I am not able to decipher.
Do even read what you type?That's exactly what I want to know. Militarily it makes no sense, or may be I am missing something. I don't know.periaswamy wrote:
If they cannot defend the roads during war, what is the point of building them?
It seems to play well into their tactic of creeping expansion, where they slowly take over the territory of other countries by extending these roads and then pretending that the territory was always theirs...sort of why Doklam became an issue in the first place, because India was not going to let them get away with this behavior this time around. Now the jokers have a camp within Tibetan territory and if they resume building roads, we will be back to the situation a month ago...it may well happen.That's exactly what I want to know.
May be true, tactically brilliant but strategic blunder. Over confidence may be. Can't rule out lack of foresite due to hubris.periaswamy wrote:It seems to play well into their tactic of creeping expansion, where they slowly take over the territory of other countries by extending these roads and then pretending that the territory was always theirs...sort of why Doklam became an issue in the first place, because India was not going to let them get away with this behavior this time around. Now the jokers have a camp within Tibetan territory and if they resume building roads, we will be back to the situation a month ago...it may well happen.That's exactly what I want to know.
Japanese prime minister says Japan and Russia reached historical agreement
06.09.2017 | Source: Pravda.Ru
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe described as "historic" recent talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Abe, when speaking on Russian television, stressed that effective negotiations could be conducted "only with the person whom you trust."
"Results can be achieved only if parties strictly follow their promises. Of course, each of us stands for the interests of our countries, and negotiations can be very difficult at times, but I treat President Putin with great respect as a partner in our dialogue," the Prime Minister of Japan said.
On September 7 Putin and Abe will meet in Vladivostok for the 19th time. The previous meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe resulted in the signing of a number of strategic documents on cooperation.
Japan disputes Russian islands of Shikotan, Iturup, Habomai and Kunashir, insisting that these islands should be delivered to Japan. The parties have not reached a final solution on the problem of disputed islands, but signed a number of agreements on "joint economic activities" on the islands in such areas as fishery, tourism, medicine and ecology.
In 1964, the USSR offered Japan both the peace treaty and the delivery of several Kuril Islands, but Japan declined the offer. Today, some believe that Vladimir Putin and Shinzo Abe have already reached a secret agreement on the ownership of the Kuril Islands. Indeed, the meeting in December 2016 in Shinzo Abe's hometown of Nagato marked a breakthrough in the Russian-Japanese relationship. Afterwards, all of a sudden, Japanese companies evinced great interest in investing in Russia.
TKiran wrote: I believe that roads and that too world class all-weather roads Doklam and Tawang from Lhasa is actually disadvantage for Han (as Han are worried about IA one day would liberate Tibet) as they would not be able to hold on to that if (when) IA decided to do a Bangladesh to Tibet. What's the logic behind Han thinking?
I can answer that. There is no logic because the statement is rubbish to start with.Cheese from the moon's surface is better than Cheddar cheese. What is the logic behind my thinking?
Have you seen my video linked below. If you have please say so and I will continue with an answer. It makes it easier to explain if you have watched the videoTKiran wrote: It was a deliberate decision by IA (not able to search the reference right now, as I am using mobile, but I read that in fact IA is against improving infrastructure on our side in Arunachal Pradesh) to keep the LAC the way it is right now. What advantage PLA gets apart from creeping encroachment of that almost no man lands and vacating the place in winter, again coming back.
ramana, my sense is that Xi, already elevated to the same pedestal as Mao either by himself or by a sycophant group, is purging without discrimination. His aim is simply consolidation of his power and rule beyond the normal two terms, That was why Sun Zhengcai was removed recently. This has removed the heir-apparent. Xi is clever because all his actions are under 'elimination of corruption' which appeals to people.ramana wrote:SSridhar, There are dark mutterings about the Hu Jin Tao followers are being purged from power. Watch the rumblings. Should clear by month ending.
China on Tuesday said that it cannot share the hydrological data of the Brahmaputra river with India for the time being as the data collection station in Tibet is being upgraded.
China, however, said it is ready to "keep communication" with India to reopen the Nathu La pass in Sikkim for the Indian pilgrims visiting Kailash and Manasarovar in Tibet, which it had suspended in mid-June over the Doklam standoff.
"For long time we have conducted cooperation on the river data with the Indian side. But to upgrade and renovate the relevant station in the Chinese side, we do not have the conditions now to collect the relevant statistics of the river," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told media here.
Asked when will China provide the data, which was reportedly suspended due to the Doklam standoff, he said, "We will later consider that."
Asked whether India has been informed about not sharing of the hydrological data, he said according to his information the Indian side is aware of it.
On August 18, the external affairs ministry spokesman Raveesh Kumar had said there is an existing expert-level mechanism, established in 2006, and there are two MoUs under which China is expected to share hydrological data on rivers Sutlej and Brahmaputra with India during the flood season of May 15 to June 15.
"For this year, we have not received hydrological data from the Chinese side," Kumar had said.
The sharing of data by upper riparian state, China, to lower riparian states, India and Bangladesh is essential every monsoon to allow anticipation of the flow of the water and take necessary measures to deal with flooding in India's northeastern states.
On the reopening of the Nathu La Pass for the Indian pilgrims visiting Kailash and Manasarovar in Tibet which was suspended over the Doklam standoff, Geng said China is ready to "keep communication" with the India.
"For a long China has made efforts against all odds to provide necessary convenience to the Indian pilgrims. According to the agreement reached between the two leaders and based on the fact that the western section of the India-China boundary has been recognised by the two sides, China opened the pass to the Indian pilgrims," he said, replying to a question when China will open the route to the Indian pilgrims as the Doklam standoff has been resolved.
The foreign ministry spokesman said the opening of the Nathu La pass was suspended as the Indian troops "illegally crossed the border leading to the tensions at the border".
"The Indian troops illegally crossed the border leading to the tensions at the border. So the opening of the pass was suspended," he said.
"So China stands ready to keep communication with the Indian side in regard to the opening of the pass and other issues relating to the pilgrims," he said.
The Sikkim route to Mansarovar was opened in 2015, enabling pilgrims to travel the 1500-km long route from Nathu La to Kailash by buses.
The Yatra was being organised by external affairs ministry since 1981 through Lipu Pass in Himalays connecting the Kumaon region of Uttarakhand in India with the old trading town of Taklakot in Tibet.
Russia has hailed the Xiamen Brics declaration+ and its naming of Pakistan-based terror groups as a victory for countries concerned about terrorism in the region.
Despite it being seen as defending Pakistan from pressure exerted on the latter by the US on the issue, Moscow's position on Islamabad has been quite nuanced as official sources here [New Delhi] confirmed Russia worked actively with Beijing to convince it to drop its opposition to name-checking Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohamed (JeM).
The naming of these terror groups was seen by Indian officials as a major diplomatic breakthrough in Xiaman+ as Beijing had stalled all such attempts by both Russia and India during last Brics summit in Goa.
"We see the declaration and the naming of terror groups as an important breakthrough for countries who share concerns on terrorism in the region and we expect it to lead to more concrete action against such terrorist organisations," said a top Russian diplomat here [New Delhi], Sergey Karmalito, to TOI.
After the naming of Jaish in the Brics declaration, which is an accused in both Pathankot and Uri terror attacks of 2016, the next logical step for India is to also get its chief Maulana Masod Azhar proscribed by the UN. China has continued to block all attempts to include Azhar in the UNSC sanctions list despite the fact that the organisation he continues to helm is blacklisted by the same Security Council.
Indian officials are now hoping that Moscow will be of help to India in convincing Beijing to give up its opposition to the ban on Azhar too. According to diplomatic sources, Moscow is of the view that on the limited issue of Azhar, China may in the near future come round to India's view that a ban on Azhar will indeed be a positive step in the fight against terrorism.
"Beijing knows it has limited bargaining power with Azhar. NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) and CPEC of course are different issues," said a source who did not wish to be quoted. {IMHO, only 'CPEC' could be considered as a 'different issue' by China}
India's foreign minister Sushma Swaraj had earlier this year publicly appealed to Russia to convince China to support India's NSG membership+ bid but Moscow is not hopeful of a breakthrough anytime soon. However, while there are concerns here about Moscow's attempts to engage Taliban in the Afghanistan peace process, Russia is also trying to involve India more in that process.
This is evident from the fact, as sources said, from a proposal by Moscow that President Vladimir Putin's special envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov visit India soon. The visit could take place as early as October this year.
Kabulov is not the most popular Russian figure in India with some of his comments on peace and stability in the region seen here as a sign of Russia's growing strategic embrace of Islamabad. After President Trump attacked Pakistan while announcing his new Afghanistan policy, Kabulov responded by saying that putting pressure on Pakistan would only further destabilise the region.
While Kabulov recently denied allegations by the US that Russia was supplying military aid to the Taliban, he also said that there was a stalemate in Kabul's conflict with Taliban and that in this situation it was necessary ``to make the most active efforts to search for ways to launch the intra-Afghan dialogue." With the Taliban now controlling almost 45 per cent of Afghan territory, Moscow believes it is impossible to keep them out of any dialogue for sustainable peace in the country.
SSridhar wrote:Can't share Brahmaputra data for now; ready for talks to reopen Nathu La pass: China - PTI China on Tuesday said that it cannot share the hydrological data of the Brahmaputra river with India for the time being as the data collection station in Tibet is being upgraded.
On the reopening of the Nathu La Pass for the Indian pilgrims visiting Kailash and Manasarovar in Tibet which was suspended over the Doklam standoff, Geng said China is ready to "keep communication" with the India.
"The Indian troops illegally crossed the border leading to the tensions at the border. So the opening of the pass was suspended," he said.
"So China stands ready to keep communication with the Indian side in regard to the opening of the pass and other issues relating to the pilgrims," he said.
Wow sir, that was very diligent effort. (Sorry for late response).shiv wrote:Have you seen my video linked below. If you have please say so and I will continue with an answer. It makes it easier to explain if you have watched the videoTKiran wrote: It was a deliberate decision by IA (not able to search the reference right now, as I am using mobile, but I read that in fact IA is against improving infrastructure on our side in Arunachal Pradesh) to keep the LAC the way it is right now. What advantage PLA gets apart from creeping encroachment of that almost no man lands and vacating the place in winter, again coming back.
A Noob question - are the chinis obligated to sharing data under any bilateral agreements with either India or BeeDee? If they are, then take 'em to court.yensoy wrote:^^^^ This is the time we tell Bangladesh that without Brahmaputra data we cannot help them from being submerged. Let the Banglas sort it out with the Chinese.
Tibet is a plateau. There are vast flat areas. Particularly flat are river valleys along the Tsangpo and Indus - which have very good highways running next to them. But even the highways S 202, 204 etc run along flat river beds . If you ignore the problem of high altitude, flat areas are great for long, straight highways.TKiran wrote:
So, S202 towards Tawang and S204 towards Doklam are good roads, but with limitations as with weather as well as actual narrow approach. Still the question is the same, "why roads towards LAC?". Doesn't it actually boost advantage for IA, when we decide to do Bangladesh to Tibet? Instead of a 16 day war, it may reduce to 7 day war.
It doesn't matter because the Chinese either largely violate international agreements & conventions with impunity or they will completely disregard any court ruling as we saw with UNCLOS recently.anupmisra wrote: . . . are the chinis obligated to sharing data under any bilateral agreements with either India or BeeDee? If they are, then take 'em to court.
Of course, as GoI's thinking on future High Speed Train projects seems to show. Already Abe is coming to inaugurate the first such project.UlanBatori wrote:I assume that Indian Baboon do not need instructions to know how to make the lizards regret these. Another $6B cut in imports... another tightening of the boycott..
More on this from our favourite Global Times:A_Gupta wrote:China facing religious extremism:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chin ... SKCN1BN09Y
Re the bolded part - China seems to have adopted the Rajiv Malhotra charter earlier than India has ! India can learn a thing or two from China in religious regulation and more so in scale of ambition for development and STEM.China has released revised regulations on religious affairs, banning religious-involved separatist activities and any practice that stirs religious conflict among citizens.
The State Council released the new Ordinance of Religious Affairs on Thursday, which will take effect on February 1, 2018.
The new ordinance stresses "self-management" of all types of religious groups to avoid being controlled by foreign powers, and makes it clear that religious groups on different government levels are allowed to send practitioners for overseas study.
Compared to the previous version, the latest regulations are more specific and stricter, which analysts say are aimed at solving the latest problems of China's religious affairs.
"The revision of the previous regulations is an important measure to fulfill and implement the spirit of Chinese President Xi Jinping's speech on religious affairs," the Xinhua News Agency reported on Thursday.
The revisions protect freedom of religious belief and stipulate provision on public services for religious groups, schools and venues. Religious communities can hold charity events in accordance with the law, and religious workers are entitled to social security rights, according to the revisions.
The new regulations highlight religious and social harmony and seek mutual respect between believers and nonbelievers, as well as between believers of different religions. Neither organizations nor individuals may incite conflict between different religions, within a religion or between believers and nonbelievers, the regulations said.
This is aimed at solving some of the problems which have cropped up in recent years, Liu Guopeng, an expert at the Institute of World Religion Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), told the Global Times on Monday. "China does have some problems like conflicts between different religions and the problem is getting serious."
"For instance, according to our research, Protestantism has been growing very quickly in recent years in the Chinese mainland, and the believers are more conservative than other Christians and they have frequently attacked some religions like Buddhism and Taoism, and also had conflicts with Islam," Liu said.
There have also been incidents between Muslims and other people in some parts of China. An alleged brawl involving Muslim minorities at a local highway toll station in Tangshan, North China's Hebei Province, in early September was the latest prominent conflict, which triggered a massive outcry on Chinese social media.
China’s inroads into South Asia since the mid-2000s have eroded India’s traditional primacy in the region, from Afghanistan to Myanmar and also in the Indian Ocean. As Beijing deploys its formidable financial resources and develops its strategic clout across the subcontinent, New Delhi faces capacity challenges to stem Chinese offensive in its own strategic backyard.
Prime Minister Modi’s new ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy, unveiled in 2014, has consequently focused on reaching out to other states to develop partnerships across the region. This balancing strategy marks a departure from India’s unsustainable efforts to insulate South Asia as its exclusive sphere of influence and deny space to any extra-regional actors.
Officially, these unprecedented outreach efforts are implicitly referred to as a partnership with “like-minded” countries. According to Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar, in its quest for more “people-centric” connectivity projects and a “cooperative regional architecture,” India is “working closely with a number of other international players whose approach is similar.”
New South Asian partners
A range of examples speak volumes about this new strategy. With the US, India now conducts close consultations on smaller states such as Nepal, Bangladesh, or Sri Lanka. In 2015, following Japan’s permanent inclusion into the Malabar naval exercises, Tokyo and New Delhi developed a joint “Vision 2025” plan promising to “seek synergy... by closely coordinating, bilaterally and with other partners, for better regional integration and improved connectivity,” especially in the Bay of Bengal region. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, announced in 2016, further highlights India’s willingness to work with Japan to develop alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
In 2014, India and Russia signed an unprecedented agreement to cooperate on developing nuclear power in third countries, with a focus on Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Year 2015 saw the first Australia-India Maritime Exercise (AUSINDEX) off India’s Eastern coast. And with the UK, India signed a statement of intent on “partnership for cooperation in third countries” with a focus on development assistance in South Asia, and held its first formal dialogue on regional affairs in 2016.
With Brussels, Paris, and Berlin, New Delhi has engaged in dialogues about maritime security and the Indian Ocean region, and shared intelligence to bolster regional counter-terrorism efforts. Finally, contrasting with its past reluctance to involve multilateral organisations, India has enthusiastically endorsed the Asian Development Bank’s South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) operational programme for 2016-25, focused on improving connectivity between the subcontinent and Southeast Asia.
Expanding partnerships
While many of these partnerships are still nascent, there are measures that will allow their expansion across three sequential levels. First, to increase mutual consultation, New Delhi and extra-regional powers must invest in creating institutional mechanisms dedicated to sharing assessments on South Asia.
Under existing consultations, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or broader Asian strategic issues frequently overshadow Nepal or Sri Lanka. This must give way to specific bilateral dialogues on three specific regional vectors: political and strategic issues, with a focus on China, counter-terrorism, and maritime security; economic issues, with a focus on connectivity, trade, and investment initiatives; and developmental issues, with a focus on aid projects and other economic assistance initiatives.
Second, to increase the prospects for coordination, India and partners can identify bilateral areas for policy coordination across South Asia, agreeing to a division of labour that maximises each side’s advantage. In Bangladesh, for example, India has focused on political and capacity-building objectives, while Japan is concentrating its financial might in infrastructure projects. Similarly, there are also indications that India and the US have successfully coordinated their political postures on the Maldives, with a “good cop, bad cop” dynamic leveraging “carrots and sticks” to shape Male’s behaviour.
At the third and highest level, in order to contain China and advance concrete cooperation across South Asia, India and its extra-regional partners should aspire to integrate efforts and implement joint projects. This will require expanding bilateral dialogues to include third countries, on the model of the India-US-Afghanistan trilateral. Such partnerships could focus on a variety of specific sectors to strengthen third countries in the region, including joint disbursement, implementation and monitoring of development assistance; establishment of dedicated funds to facilitate infrastructure development or acquisition of military equipment; capacity-building training for administrative and security personnel; democracy assistance to strengthen good governance and the rule of law; and joint military exercises, focusing on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.
Challenges ahead
While India and its extra-regional partners develop efforts to consult, coordinate, and cooperate across South Asia, they will also have to prepare for a variety of challenges. First, extra-regional partners will have to continue to recognise India’s predominant role in the region and defer to its security concerns, whether real or imagined.
For example, by allowing India to “take the lead” and consolidate its role as a “first responder” to regional crises in recent years (such as the Nepal earthquake), the US has earned much goodwill in New Delhi. Second, as the region’s small states play an increasingly sophisticated balancing game, seeking to play off India and its partners against China, closer consultation and coordination will be key.
Finally, when it comes to the normative dimension of democracy and human rights, New Delhi and its like-minded friends will also face occasional tensions given their different priorities. For India, the focus is naturally on the short-term, with economic and security interests incentivising the pragmatic engagement of any regime type in its neighbourhood. While the West’s liberal interventionist impulse has receded, the US and European partners will, however, continue to privilege a value-based and long-term approach that emphasises pressure on authoritarian regimes.
This last challenge is currently playing out in Myanmar, with clashing Indian and Western positions on the importance of the Rohingya refugee issue. As former Indian diplomat Shiv Shankar Menon presciently noted in the late 2000s, “the desire for sanctions” is always “directly proportional to the distance from Myanmar of the country demanding it.”
Under rising international pressure, Naypyidaw is tilting back to China for support, further complicating India’s connectivity plans across the Bay of Bengal. Similar balancing dynamics can be observed in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives, which further highlight how critical India’s global outreach efforts are to its quest to remain influential in its own region.
Building roads everywhere is the same as putting stakes in the ground. Territory becomes yours de facto because your roads, your stuff are there. Unless someone force them into a war to stop this, they'll continue. It is an insidious but brilliant strategy because 99.9% of the time nations don't break peace, especially since Cheen's industrial complex backs up those roads (or artificial islands at sea) with a menacing weight of civil and military hardware.periaswamy wrote:" Till that, it's logical, but improving road infrastructure to Doklam and Tawang sounds illogical"
These are the same guys who randomly draw lines on the map and pretend it is their territory, whether on land or in the sea. Expecting logic from the actions of the CCP/PLA oiseaules maybe asking for too much. They are predators who need to be put in their place.
The settlement of the Doklam standoff was "one of the best possible results" and war must be avoided, as peace is the best outcome, says a senior Chinese military strategist. These words written in an opinion piece for China's state run media, Global Times, indicate a marked difference from the earlier string of articles in the Chinese media demanding strong action and even threatening war during the stand-off.
The author, Qiao Liang, who is a Major General in the People's Liberation Army says, "The reason why so many Chinese people paid attention to the China-India border standoff in the Doklam area is that they are unfamiliar with China's strategic positioning. If they had a clear understanding of China's strategic positioning, they would know that the settlement of the Doklam standoff was one of the best results possible."
Indian and Chinese troops were engaged in a tense border stand-off for more than two months in the area of Doklam, seriously straining their relations.
Liang adds that, "China and India are both neighbors and competitors, but not all competitors must be treated in the toughest way."
He explains that it is not the appropriate time for China to continue constructing the road it was building in the Doklam plateau. "Many people would say that the road construction in China's territory was none of India's business. Is this belief right? It is reasonable to some extent because road construction in this area is not a matter of right and wrong, but we need to understand that it is not always right to do something right at any time. Only doing the right thing at the right time is correct. {Isn't this what exactly India was indirectly saying?} "
The author also writes that war should be avoided. "Many people think that China has a powerful national strength, including a strong military power, thus only war can demonstrate China's power. But resorting to war is irresponsible for the country and its future as war has always been the last resort to solve problems. Whenever there may be a way to solve a conflict without war, war should be avoided."