In which case it is a single vendor situationIndranil wrote:Due process.srin wrote:Given that there is only one vendor to build LCA, and that vendor is also MoD run, what's really the point in issuing an RFP ?
I don't believe I'll ever understand the workings of the MoD !
Gagan wrote:Final edit:
We shall need sacks of anti depressants..enaiel wrote:So for all intents and purposes, Indranil was right. Only 40 Tejas Mk1 have actually been ordered. MoD/IAF have yet to order 83 Tejas Mk1A. Very depressing.
Karan M wrote:Guys - the IAF is stating it will order 83 MK1As. It will. Have faith in the CAS.
The aim should be to progress the Mk2. Not just cap the LCA at 123.
Not to worry Saar, there are still 11 steps to go through.Rishi_Tri wrote:We shall need sacks of anti depressants..
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 958656.cms
https://www.ada.gov.in/images/ADA-IND.pdfThere
are 358 LRU's (Components) in the Tejas aircraft, o
ut of which 53% of total LRU's are
indigenously developed with in India. In view to re
duce the remaining 47% of the import
LRU's, ADA has initiated the Indigenous development
programme for indigenization of the
import LRU's.
The level of indigenisation is at least to an extent of 65% currently. The entire structure along with majority of the aircraft systems like Fuel, Hydraulics, Environmental Control, Electrical, etc., of the aircraft is built in the country. Critical ‘’intelligent’ systems like the computers in Avionics, Weapons and Flight Control Systems (FCS), including hardware and software is indigenous. This is very critical and completely under our control and is considered a key enabler towards self-reliance. ADA has played a significant role for indigenous development of Line Replaceable Units (LRU’s) and advanced technologies along with development of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Programme. So far, 190 LRU’s out of 350 LRU’s in LCA have been indigenised and another 30-35 LRU’s are in various stages of development process. We will continue to play a major role for replacement of imported LRU’s by ab-initio design.
The way things are panning out there will likely be production gap occurring between Mk.1 and Mk.1A. Current orders of 20/40 Mk.1 orders are going to be completed by 2019/2020. That means Mk.1A needs to be ready for production within the next two years (or so). Given previous track record of underestimating R&D time-frames, it is very likely Mk.1A (AESA radar, Jammer and internal rearrangement) won't be ready for production in that short time span. That too just when full production @16/year has kicked in. Then followed by a likely production gap!Karan M wrote:Guys - the IAF is stating it will order 83 MK1As. It will. Have faith in the CAS.
The aim should be to progress the Mk2. Not just cap the LCA at 123.
damn. It looks like the Tejas could hang underwing and be launched mid air. ...that is some contrastThe haggling may be from HAL side or IAF side, we do not know. We do not know if there is any haggling at all.Kakkaji wrote:Vidur Ji:Vidur wrote:There is CNC stage - contract negotiation. HAL needs to agree to price and is well known to demand their pound of flesh. They have clout as well can certainly push as well. Beyond that I wont be able to comment.
I am confused
HAL is a company owned by the Govt of India. So, in buying from HAL, the money will only move from one pocket of GoI to another. So, why haggle so much with HAL and delay the production?
Being a GoI-owned company, all of HAL's accounts can be examined by GoI auditors and you can arrive at a cost + reasonable profit amount, instead of MoD haggling with HAL on price. So, why the whole RFP and contract-negotiation Tamasha?
'Jaldi sey order karo Saaheb. Ab der kya baat ki hai'?
Thanks for posting. I knew the data in the video was wrong. Roughly remembered the number ~200 for desi LRUs.Karan M wrote:The LRU information in the video is incorrect.
Now that would be making use of the “Light” attribute in the LCA.Cain Marko wrote:
This should explain the IAFs liking for small fighters.chola wrote:Going after a “light” fighter made things harder (albeit supposedly cheaper if defining cost by the ton.) I find no good reason why we needed a light fighter with all the bells and whistles to be perfectly honest.
I don't understand why no DM has the political will to just have the IAF order more Mk1As and also commit to a Mk2. Its likely the lack of domain experience and hence they just sign off on any import proposal.srai wrote:The way things are panning out there will likely be production gap occurring between Mk.1 and Mk.1A. Current orders of 20/40 Mk.1 orders are going to be completed by 2019/2020. That means Mk.1A needs to be ready for production within the next two years (or so). Given previous track record of underestimating R&D time-frames, it is very likely Mk.1A (AESA radar, Jammer and internal rearrangement) won't be ready for production in that short time span. That too just when full production @16/year has kicked in. Then followed by a likely production gap!Karan M wrote:Guys - the IAF is stating it will order 83 MK1As. It will. Have faith in the CAS.
The aim should be to progress the Mk2. Not just cap the LCA at 123.
To me, this whole stacked order with nonviable production quantities (20 Mk.1 IOC2 + 20 Mk.1 FOC + 83 Mk.1A) is a setup for failure. No extra margin for R&D (and potential delays) and qualification. Give it two years, blame games will be thrown around making a case for import justification.
This is more or less what the 5 year defence plan is supposed to. That is how proposals reach DAC and then CCS.Karan M wrote:For instance, has anyone in the MOD or the DM sought an IAF explanation on the detailed specifications achieved by the LCA & how they compare vis a vis to the existing fleet. Next, why can't the MOD seek out independent, unbiased contractors under non-disclosure norms from private industry or academia, to then decide on how many LCA can be ordered by the IAF vis a vis the existing adversary force levels. And if say LCAs cannot do all tasks, then what is the quantum of additional assets required (whether MMRCA or FGFA), do a cost-analysis of the same. Look at the projected benefits of local manufacture, local industry vis a vis an imported supply chain. Look at investing some of the savings into force multipliers on the LCA eg advanced sensors, EW etc and then take the final figure. Have ADA/HAL audit the figures along with specific IAF folks independently deputed to the MOD to ensure the final LCA version chosen for these compares is in synch with what IAF wants.
This is the result of the 5 year defence plan after CCS approval but real sanction has to come from annual budget. I have written at least 3 times before that that regardless of CCS approval, 5 year plan ultimately everything comes down to annual budget. All of the above work is worthless. It has no consequence, it is ink on paper, wasted trees. The article I posted on the 13th Five Year Defence Plan illustrates this. I have requested you all to read it. I have even posted the DPP process and explained several times where the problems are but I don't think anyone has bothered to read them.Karan M wrote: Run that with the IAF, come to a conclusion that MOD will support a finalized structure that ensures IAF capability will not be below the original war fighting requirement, after LCA induction & any deep strike or specific requirement can be met via upgrades or selected force accretions elsewhere.
In my opinion this is because of a general lack of expertise on defense technology in the political and administrative class and lack of faith in AFs towards RnD establishment for whatever reason. To take decisions which need long term hard work on a large scale to make it a right decision, one needs conviction. Conviction comes with understanding and faith in the decision. Even if some RM is there who is willing to be bold, if he has no personal expertise he depends on the advice given by administrative staff or AFs. Since there is a general lack of empathy towards desi programs and everyone considers it a safe bet to simply import, the bulk of the advices given would not be favouring desi programs (remember how the then IAF Chief was advised not to attend LCA's first flight, lest it will be seen that IAF is favourable to LCA..?). No one wants to take responsibility of failures. And this is applicable when there is an RM who deserves to be an RM to some extent, like MP. We generally have RM post allotted based on political reasons not because of anyone's suitability to the post. Nothing of substance can be expected from politicians like Mulayam. Even under current government we see far more eagerness towards importing things rather than working with improving desi setup. True that there has been a good push for low hanging fruits but not much is being done to structurally change the things in long term. Thankfully though with focus on short term goals our defense preparedness is improving. But we still are yet to start on tomorrow's problems. We can't work serially on these matters.Karan M wrote:
I don't understand why no DM has the political will to just have the IAF order more Mk1As and also commit to a Mk2. Its likely the lack of domain experience and hence they just sign off on any import proposal.
Political will does not mean they ride rough shod over the IAF but explain the LCA is a national program, and with its capabilities it will add more to the IAF and the IAF need not worry that spending on the LCA means no money for fancy force multipliers or Rafales etc which will still be funded by GOI even so.
So this is the basic summary of the above, MOD talks with services and comes up with a budget. Takes it to MOF, gets stalled. Now thinking of taking it to CCS to ensure the budget is actually funded as versus being a planning project.It is not known whether the MoF was asked about the possible level of funding before commencing the planning process. In any case, meeting the projected requirement will require the MoF to revisit its Midterm Fiscal Policy of 2016-17, which estimated the defence expenditure, including its capital component, to be about 1.6 per cent of GDP in both 2017-18 and 2018-19.2 It will also have to make serious efforts to raise more revenue in the coming years to be able to meet the requirement.
From now on, the discourse on the 13th defence plan will follow a familiar course. To begin with, there is bound to be clamour for an early ‘approval’ of the plan. Though there is no procedural or statutory requirement of seeking the approval of any authority outside the MoD, the expectation will be that the plan will be brought before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for immediate approval.
For the record, only three of the 12 five-year plans so far have been approved by a cabinet committee. The sixth and seventh plans for the periods 1980-85 and 1985-90 were approved by the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA), and the ninth plan for the period 1997-2002 was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
Stung by protracted deliberations with the MoF on the size of the 11th defence plan which led nowhere and forced it to abandon the idea of seeking CCS approval, the MoD decided to let matters rest after the 12th five year plan was approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) within the ministry on April 2, 2012.
But the view that defence plans must be approved by the CCS continues to find strong support in the public discourse, although hardly any information is available on the impact of such approvals on the achievement of the intended outcomes of the plans in the past or, conversely, the impact of non-approval on defence preparedness. The general view is that CCS approval would make it binding on the government to make the projected funds available for spending during the plan period.
The clamour for seeking CCS approval, with strong prodding from Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence (SCoD), may force the MoD to abandon the precedent set in 2012 and actually seek CCS approval. This will lead to the re-emergence of the problem which had led the MoD in the first place to abandon the idea of seeking CCS approval for the 11th plan and instead deciding to approve it within the ministry.
According to the laid down procedure, MoD will need to first consult the MoF on putting up the 13th defence plan for CCS approval. The expectation implicit in this process is that the government will ‘commit’ itself to the projected level of funding, irrespective of any other developments which may have a bearing on its ability to generate additional revenues to meet the commitment. While nothing is impossible, this seems improbable and, consequently, so does the possibility of obtaining CCS approval any time soon, causing disappointment all around.
It is a dysfunctional system and frankly its a miracle when something positive happens.Karan M wrote:I am sorry but this just reiterates to the average citizen how dysfunctional our system really is Vidur ji (not blaming the messenger, but merely noting the below):
.
Oh, we are very good at iterations. Its called a file noting. There are 11 steps in procurement and 10 drops of ink at any stage by event a Under secretary can set back a nationally critical project by years if not decades. Even the honble judicary helps. They were kind enough to set back MAFI by 3 years on the basis of a foreign company's plea.Karan M wrote:And iterate back and forth.
And to you sir.Vidur wrote:Am going to take a break for a few days. Happy Diwali to all of you.
Checked with someone in the business. It would cost may be 2000 bucks for table top model with decent finish, if only one piece is to be printed. For order of 100, it could be 1200 per piece. Economy of scale works here too.shiv wrote:Please visit me before looking at available models so I can prescribe a powerful anti-puking agent.Vivek K wrote: nah Hakim ji! Who will buy it?
There is huge demand for modelling
A bad model is any day preferable than no model.Rishi_Tri wrote:Absolutely. Whatever scale models were there at AI'17 of Tejas were not even a patch on projects that school students would do.ArjunPandit wrote: If priced right, there will be many buyers (yours truly included)
You should have seen the model that was with one of the Sq-45 pilot I ran into once. It looked like very badly made clay model. If I had my own printer I would print nice models and gift to those Sq-45 pilots (but when you fly LCA, you perhaps don't care much about toys.ArjunPandit wrote:A bad model is any day preferable than no model.Rishi_Tri wrote:
Absolutely. Whatever scale models were there at AI'17 of Tejas were not even a patch on projects that school students would do.
). HAL is really terrible in marketing. Any other company would have given away nice shiny models to people like IAF pilots and many more.In last to last DefExpo, I asked the HAL guy about it. He mentioned about the scaled die cast models and he said to me in Malyali accented hindi (no offense)JayS wrote:You should have seen the model that was with one of the Sq-45 pilot I ran into once. It looked like very badly made clay model. If I had my own printer I would print nice models and gift to those Sq-45 pilots (but when you fly LCA, you perhaps don't care much about toys.ArjunPandit wrote: A bad model is any day preferable than no model.
Pretty nice. It is a good start IMHO. To be perfectly honest the complete lack of models really does the LCA a disservice in the global aviation community where there are many crossovers between veteran groups, researchers, enthusiasts and modelling.JayS wrote:GrabCAD has LCA Navy CAD model. Nice renders. Though the model looks not so accurate to me.
https://grabcad.com/library/lca-tejas-navy-1
