The world is seeing the rise of a new world order with economic interdependence and cooperation amongst different nations at a level unmatched at any other instance in history. The changing dynamics have not left the Asian Continent untouched, with new, increasingly complex and multilateral relations being formed between the nations every day. The last two decades have seen the spectacular rise of China as an economic powerhouse and, in a post-Cold War world, the emergence of a new geopolitical climate.
China’s engagement with all of the neighbouring countries with respect to power projections and foreign policy is well known. Be it in the form of hostilities for pending unresolved ‘issues’, state-sponsored and private economic investments, indirect proxy wars and trying to install governments which are under her direct/indirect control.
Over the last decade, there has been a marked increase in these activities and trying to wrest control over specific nations which China has identified as strategically important. These countries overtly represent the trade routes, oil supply and sea lines of communication but covertly also enable viable replenishment and supply base for her Military especially for the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy [1]). Through the direct and indirect investment of money, power, politics and military aid, China has created an astonishingly beautiful encirclement of India at various levels.
This analysis is meant to understand this encirclement (chakravyuh) and how India can fight this out. The views and opinion in this analysis are based on open sources and connecting the dots to build and analyse. Qualitatively looking at the chief issues and possible solutions let us to firmly believe that all is not lost in this big geopolitical game. The whole encirclement can be broken and restricted to what can be either a mutual benefit to India or to a position which will not threaten India over coming decades.
Chapter 1
Introduction
China has been making direct and indirect investments in Asia and African region from the early 2000s. However, in last 5 years, there has been marked an increase in its initiatives to make all these outward reaches into strategic geopolitical tools. The chief tool is shown in the picture below
Figure 1 – OBOR or One Belt, One Road initiative connecting Land and Maritime Silk roads [2]
OBOR has been represented as an economic tool [3]. It has been defined in many circles as the blueprint connecting over 60 countries accounting for 60% of the world’s population. Its collective GDP equivalent is approximated to be over one-third of the world’s wealth. The economic corridors OBOR proposes are as under
1. New Eurasian Land Bridge
2. China – Mongolia – Russia Corridor
3. China – Central Asia – West Asia Corridor
4. China – Indochina Peninsula Corridor
5. China – Pakistan Corridor
6. Bangladesh – China – India – Myanmar Corridor
These economic corridors effectively constitute the framework of the OBOR initiative beyond China’s borders
The location and structure of the corridors are shown in the map below, which also outlines the route of 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.
Figure 2 – The six economic corridors proposed under OBOR
Owing to Indian reservations and non-commitment, the whole initiative has not been fully successful. But the foundation of this whole initiative as a concept and realisation has progressed with multiple overt and covert investments in various domains.
The extent of Chinese investments has been well documented and in various fields especially infrastructure. The Figure below depicts such forecasted investments in our area of interest over next 5 years. Strikingly Beijing has been pushing its soft power status as much as possible opening up new routes of communication, access to markets and also enabling power play into the domestic political setup in most of these places.
Figure 3 Chinese Investments in 2017-21 [4]
With the above figure, the adjoining commentary [4] stated
In 14th May 2017, this year, Mr Xi pledged an additional $124 billion towards his $900 billion “Belt and Road” initiative, a global trade and infrastructure drive that he is promoting as a long-term “win-win” campaign for the 65 nations that have signed up to it. Most western leaders stayed away from a two-day summit highlighting Chinese ambition to secure greater influence, but the 28 heads of state present at what Mr Xi called “a gathering of great minds” included President Putin of Russia and President Erdogan of Turkey.
If the OBOR was just the threat owing to economic aid and strengthening China’s position by accessing more markets at reduced cost and secured lines, few analysts went ahead and declared another stratagem called String of Pearls [5]
In an article in The Washington Times dated January 17, 2005 [6], it was disclosed that
“China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China’s energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives,” said the report sponsored by the director, Net Assessment, who heads Mr. Rumsfeld’s office on future-oriented strategies.
In spite of this disclosure, officially China never uses this terminology but its recent spate of actions indicate this stratagem being used from the South China Sea to Djibouti and in between CPEC project and Gwadar development, Hambantota development in Sri Lanka, Port construction in Myanmar, Container facility in Bangladesh and even overtures to open a path to Nepal. The map below gives an accurate idea of this aspect
Figure 4 – China’s String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean. (Map Courtesy CIMSEC)
The “string of pearls” concept is often viewed a military initiative, with the aim of providing China’s navy access to a series of ports stretching from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea. This has caused some consternation, particularly in India, which sees itself as being encircled. [7]
On July 12, 2017, when Chinese troops started moving into Djibouti for deployment into the 1st overseas base, this encirclement more or less became prominent. China’s Military and assets being deployed to secure their strategic investments causes a big headache for India from Political, Economic, Military and strategic perspectives. The game is set for a great rivalry between India and China with China already making the first move and entwining India into this chakravyuh. How India responds and what will be the best course of action going forward, this paper will analyse it in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 2
The String of Pearls
First, what is String of Pearls? The earliest definition that emerged is from July 2006 [7]
Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence. An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” A container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deepwater port in Sittwe, Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan.Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernization form the essence of China’s “String of Pearls.” The “pearls” extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. China is building strategic relationships and developing a capability to establish a forward presence along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle East
Figure – 5 – Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) for China
The whole ruse of economic development for friendly nation followed by protecting such investments via Military deployment is the outcome of this strategy. The overt need of finding market accessibility, the resolute case of demonstrating growing financial might and increasing the geopolitical influences seems to be the key motivating factors for the peaceful nature of these pearl formations. The pretext got further strengthened by the Somali pirates causing harm to the SLOCs.
Figure 6 – Somalian Piracy – Threat map – 2005-2010 [8]
Connecting the figure 6 with figure 4 now reveals how the anti-piracy and protecting the SLOCs became paramount to the military aspect of the strategy. Unfortunately, the dual use aspect of the infrastructure build-up may enable China to use her men, planes, ships and submarines with vital capabilities to choke the whole of Indian SLOCs as well.
The resulted base in Djibouti, Gwadar and many more places where a submarine can berth for supply replenishment is not just for anti-piracy measures but rather increasing the militarization aspect and controlling the rivals whom China considers as a threat for herself. These SLOCs common to both India and China also houses the largest route of Oil supply for the major part of the world. Busiest to the core, this corridor serves as nationally important aspect for multiple nations and this provide China with additional ammunition to either gain more geopolitical respect or to create choke points which can create issues and even cripple the adversaries. The usage of proxy elements as pirates to continuously harass a group of particular shipping lanes and countries dependent on it can become a big tool as well. Especially with the fact that China shares the highest number of border disputes and it has maintained an aggressive posture in claiming such disputed lands as their own and even going to the extent of putting military assets to protect the same.
Chapter 3
India’s geopolitical issues with String of Pearls
Rear Admiral K Raja Menon (Retd) has summed it up as the following areas of geopolitical concern for India wrt the string of pearls [9]
Figure 7 – Areas of geopolitical concern
If we see this figure, it is easier to understand that both India and China basically square off and have no advantage over the whole area of concern. For India one side its the high mountains in the East, Planes in the West and Sea in the South. Each of the places with distinct advantages and disadvantages. For China, the whole of IOR is a long distance away from mainland requiring a formidable Blue Water Fleet to actually protect it. The Tibetan region dispute is well known for both India and China and thus it remains a status quo. The movement if it happens deep inside Myanmar literally will also stretch their supply line. The Myanmar government in spite of Chinese overtures also wishes to be in good books with India for the road and connecting infrastructure enabling it to have land transit routes too. Thus all types of chess games as of now basically point to a draw status.
The change in the strategic strength happens via fundamental instability of Pakistan and China’s huge investment in CPEC or China Pakistan Economic Corridor. [10] Over the last few years slowly the Chinese investments and buying of Stakes in Pakistani State Enterprise mean there is a dramatic increase in controlling form over Pakistan. With the further extent of military cooperation, assets being supplied with long-term loans and establishment of proxies to control state machinery, China’s control and changeover of Pakistan into its own province or vassal state is almost complete. The issue of proxy elements is already well known with the usage of terror proxies and aiding them with arms and financial aid in North East India. With the radicalised religion based proxies in Chinese hands, there seems a greater stability-instability paradox. On the side it keeps India engaged with constant de-stabilisation aspects and on the other side, the same radicalised elements can also cause a religion based extremism elemental increase in Chinese provinces closer to Pakistan. The extent of the fallout from such a situation is a worrisome factor and coupled with mainstreaming the terror elements into the political front to gain legitimacy and recognition points to a grave concern. On one side the Chinese investments and underlying security make its investments very much secured yet they further went ahead and ensured the income generated via this whole project, trade increase and even transport plus transit benefit China far greater than Pakistan. This implies over time, there will be a deep grudge built up which can be exploited by radicals and can unite all under the name of one religion to fight against this oppressive stance of China. This will throw the whole Western Border of India and the adjoining geopolitical concern into chaos and possibly lead to Syria 2.0 scenario all over again.
The other area of concern is the Middle East. The house of almost all problems exists as of today in spite of Oil being the largest resource allowing them to manipulate the whole world economy as per their whims. Yet there is Saudi Arabia Qatar issue, Iran hotbed, Syria- ISIS, Turkey NATO to and fro stances, Israel-Palestine, Hizbollah-Hamas, Nuclear Weapon and continuous quest for an Islamic Bomb under their control – the list is pretty long. The illegal trading and proliferation of Oil and changing the small guidelines to hurt Import dependent economy like India is a big risk. The challenge for India is that each side will insist on a mutually beneficial relationship with India but also insist on differentiating between their own friendly and enemy nations wrt to India’s relationship. As India is dependent on ME for Oil, our stance and our strategies have to be very careful of this aspect.
Other potential areas of concern include the identifying more such Pearls in
Bangladesh: A container port facility at Chittagong is coupled with extensive Naval and Commercial Access. Bangladesh reliance on Chinese military assets like submarines via soft loans is a step in that direction. In total for over 34 projects, a sum of USD 25 Billion has been committed by China. [11] The challenge for a growing economy like Bangladesh is soft loans help in creating less stress over any commercial loans which may have stringent terms and a higher rate of interest. Smartly, China has been trying to convert such loans into commercial loans and trying to make Bangladesh default like in the case of Sri Lanka, it wishes to use the secured assets as a way of consolidating its hold once the default occurs. Dhaka has been resisting this attempt knowing well the fate of Hambantota port and China taking it fully for failing to repay the debt and thereby buying it to square that loan off from its books.
Nepal: The India-Nepal relationship has seen several ups and downs but last few years have seen possibly multiple bottoms. With the sharing of culture and majority religion same like India, the differences emanating between Kathmandu and New Delhi are very surprising. Chiefly these issues have been taken advantage by lack of communication and strategic compromises to find a middle path to solve the challenging issues. China had made several in-roads into Nepal by taking advantage of these discomforts and had fuelled up the anti-India stance even more. The last few issues of rights of Madhesi people, access to fuel & Oil and basic transport routes, the communication and internet access for local Nepalese people had only created a bigger divide which China took full advantage by providing quick telecommunication and broadband coverage, maintaining neutral stance for ethnic group’s rights and even trying to open a new path for transport via Friendship Highway. This coupled with quick rehabilitation and aid when the earthquake struck Nepal helped China consolidate its position in the minds and heart of Nepalese people.
Figure 8 – Map of the Friendship Highway – Kathmandu to Lhasa [12]
With China in Nov 2017 taking the cross-border railway plan very seriously [13], this implies Nepal will rely greater on China and any adverse relationship impact is easily offset by Nepal Chinese communication and accessibility. Nepal thus gains a route via OBOR easily and looks at OBOR for its own survival and directly plays into the hands of the waiting China who will use Nepal then easily to open another front wrt India. In Nepal investment summit 2017 held in Kathmandu, India committed USD 317 million while China proposed to invest USD 8.3 billion. Such is the stark difference in the financial aid that Indian strategy in Nepal needs urgent attention and smart play to maintain some control and protect India’s interest.
Bhutan: India and Bhutan share a special relationship over decades. Here also China has attempted to try its level best to meddle in some manner. With the redrafted 2007 India-Bhutan friendship treaty, Bhutan has slowly got the right to follow an independent foreign policy. China has tried to showcase its economic muscle here also with an open carrot of a huge economic package in case Bhutan agrees to settle all disputes bilaterally with China and not involve India with whom Bhutan is committed via Friendship treaty. The recent Doklam crisis was a tussle due to these overtures only with China-Bhutan border disputes in 3 different pockets out of which Doklam is strategically most important from India’s perspective. China has offered to relinquish its claim over two pockets in northern Bhutan in exchange for the Doklam pocket in the western Bhutan, where Indian and Chinese armies were engaged in eyeball encounter. India is the security provider for Bhutan had to step in to safeguard both Bhutan’s sovereignty and India’s security. The flared up issue had been solved by the peaceful climb down from both China and India but this dispute, in reality, is far from being solved. This will be a potential point of crisis over time and will need adequate attention from India’s perspective.
Myanmar: India-Myanmar relationship has been healthy for a long time but the government has always been closer to China than India. In spite of turning democratic, the elections have not been fair and elected candidates always are by the support of China overtly or covertly. Primarily a commodity resource-rich country, China has invested huge sums in Myanmar in infrastructure and mining in last 3 decades. One of the controversial projects is the port development of Kyauk Pyu port in Bay of Bengal with an estimated Chinese investment of USD 7.3 billion. With China having, by all means, a controlling stake of over 75%, this is a very big threat to India. With Chinese arms and military assets, Myanmar is dependent completely on China for its survival. This port will see subsequently berthing of Chinese nuclear submarines and with electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal and near the Strait of Malacca, this makes it a grave risk for India.
Sri Lanka: The island nation had been in a stable relationship with India until the IPKF movement and subsequent Tamil Eelam issues which ate up almost decades of time and gave an opportunity for outside nations to use Sri Lanka as a political tool to counter India. Sri Lanka owes almost USD 8 bn to China and that is estimated to be approximately 12%+ of its overall debt. These loans are commercial in nature and hence attract a significant rate of interest. These loan based projects and the port opened for commercial purpose 7 years ago had generated limited revenues and hence Sri Lanka has struggled to repay its due. In 2016, Sri made a deal to sell an 80 percent stake in the port to the state-controlled China Merchants Port Holdings. With vociferous protests from all sides, in July 2017, the deal was amended to give Chinese company 70 percent stake in a joint venture with Sri Lanka Ports Authority owned by Sri Lankan government.
Figure 9 – Hambantota location on a map
This December Sri Lanka has formally handed over its southern port of Hambantota to China on a 99-year lease, which government critics have denounced as an erosion of the country’s sovereignty. [14] The Sri Lankan government has given assurances that the port will not be used for military ends. Despite Sri Lankan assurances, Indian observers express concerns that Beijing could operationalize Hambantota as a resupply node for the People’s Liberation Army-Navy in the future. [15]
Maldives: India-Maldives shared a healthy relationship for a good amount of time till there was a change in regime which is very much pro-China. China via way of economic subsidies for tourism market has controlled the local government’s major source of revenue. With the cancellation of GMR building the infrastructure project and giving it out finally to a Chinese company, the shift was more or less made public. Last year, China acquired an uninhabited island near Maldives capital Male on a 50-year-lease at the cost of USD 4 million. Some reports claimed that Chinese will build a military infrastructure
More at :
http://www.strategicfront.org/chinas-st ... hakravyuh/