Tactics & military craft

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 21 Dec 2017 17:13

I met a Gurkha officer many years back. This was just before Kargil war.

He stated he had three huge issues to deal with. Punishment by asking extra run with load flopped with Gurkhas - they'd happily run all day with their combat load, and as an officer he'd have to run along with them, so who was punishing whom exactly?

Second, he and his peers were repeatedly told - learn the tactics down to the last bit, the Gurkhas like assault, all the fancy cover fire, this that is your problem. Bottomline, they assume complex tasks are often why officers exist & hence higher level delegation as in other units may not work. Again, this is from two decades back and a lot may have changed since then, because more and more educated troops from India and not Nepal may be in our units.

Third, he said many Gurkha troops had to have their rifle drills hammered into them, because they often in the heat of battle reverted back to the Khukhri especially at close range. He stated however the Indian Gorkha troops simply didnt come adapted to the Khukhri as the Nepalis did, so more and more the fighting skills with Khukri would have to be catalogued for posterity and then taught as a module to new comers.

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 21 Dec 2017 17:29

whilst i am sure that this does happen, but it seems to me to be impractical to assign tasks on the battlefield to troops based on their ethnicity rather than their training. all troops from all regiments must have the same standard training - and if they are required to perform specific actions then they must be trained for that - and deployed accordingly

tactics it seems to me should be a discussion about how to deploy your forces in a given terrain/battlespace in a manner that will overcome the adversary and is therefore highly specific to the situation in hand. there are standard techniques of cover, concealment, deployment, manoeuvre which can be taught as standard or specialised training, but then the tactical leaders at the appropriate level have to decide how to do it

e.g. the battalion's objectives are to secure the road junction so that the highway is clear to resupply forward positions
then company A objective might then be to secure the hill on the left of the village on the road junction to deny the fire position to the enemy and also support your own troops. company b objective might be to circle around the village and cut off the resupply and retreat for enemy forces by holding a farm house and environments. company c is tasked with taking the village - the first platoon takes up position on a small rise to provide cover fire, second platoon advances along the gully under natural cover whilst third platoon distracts the enemy by advancing clearly along a road in sight but out of accurate range... etc., etc.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 21 Dec 2017 20:53

Lalmohan wrote:whilst i am sure that this does happen, but it seems to me to be impractical to assign tasks on the battlefield to troops based on their ethnicity rather than their training. all troops from all regiments must have the same standard training - and if they are required to perform specific actions then they must be trained for that - and deployed accordingly

tactics it seems to me should be a discussion about how to deploy your forces in a given terrain/battlespace in a manner that will overcome the adversary and is therefore highly specific to the situation in hand. there are standard techniques of cover, concealment, deployment, manoeuvre which can be taught as standard or specialised training, but then the tactical leaders at the appropriate level have to decide how to do it

e.g. the battalion's objectives are to secure the road junction so that the highway is clear to resupply forward positions
then company A objective might then be to secure the hill on the left of the village on the road junction to deny the fire position to the enemy and also support your own troops. company b objective might be to circle around the village and cut off the resupply and retreat for enemy forces by holding a farm house and environments. company c is tasked with taking the village - the first platoon takes up position on a small rise to provide cover fire, second platoon advances along the gully under natural cover whilst third platoon distracts the enemy by advancing clearly along a road in sight but out of accurate range... etc., etc.

Quite right, battlefield tasks are NOT assigned based on anything but which units are available and what their experience is . 1/11 GR was tasked in Batalik sector because they were just returning from Siachen and were acclimatised. 2 MLI or 3 Madras would have been given that role if they had come from the galcier. But how they would have approached the day to day tasks in the glacier would have some slight differences.

If you notice my comment on the previous page I said these are 'second order issues'. First order is training and drill which is same for everyone but certain issues may need to be emphasised more for certain troops during training like Karan points out. Another area where these differences are important is in how command and control is excercised at the battalion and sub unit level. Bde Commander and Div Commander doesn't care about these things but CO, Coy CDR and other officers need to factor these things in. Like Karan says and I mentioned too Gorkha troops enjoy assault and may take some risks so command has to be exercised appropriately. I gave some exmaples on the previous page.

Thanks Karan for the post. Re the second point basically all that the offr was saying was that command and control had to be exercised more directly in the assault role to ensure uneccesary risks are not taken. This doesn't mean that troops will not follow section tactics as this thread has explained, it just means that they would interpret need for cover slightly differently which needs to be factored in by the officers. For example, during fire and move towards the MMG post, they might select a cover which gives less protection and instead of doing the karyavahi in two hops as I explained they might do it in one.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 21 Dec 2017 21:04

Lalmohan wrote:
tactics it seems to me should be a discussion about how to deploy your forces in a given terrain/battlespace in a manner that will overcome the adversary and is therefore highly specific to the situation in hand. there are standard techniques of cover, concealment, deployment, manoeuvre which can be taught as standard or specialised training, but then the tactical leaders at the appropriate level have to decide how to do it

e.g. the battalion's objectives are to secure the road junction so that the highway is clear to resupply forward positions
then company A objective might then be to secure the hill on the left of the village on the road junction to deny the fire position to the enemy and also support your own troops. company b objective might be to circle around the village and cut off the resupply and retreat for enemy forces by holding a farm house and environments. company c is tasked with taking the village - the first platoon takes up position on a small rise to provide cover fire, second platoon advances along the gully under natural cover whilst third platoon distracts the enemy by advancing clearly along a road in sight but out of accurate range... etc., etc.

Well enunciated. Thats exactly what we are trying to do on this thread working up from section level. But I think the question asked KS_Sachin was quite interesting and helped make the tactics even more life like. It shows some real nitty gritty issues in exercising command and control during fire and move. In fact the best way to visualise the differences in troops (for those interested) is to use the framework of fire and move and the section tactics given here and visualise which aspects will be similar and which different in different units.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 21 Dec 2017 21:13

We have now explained section and platoon tactics enough and the most important take away is Fire and Move and the battle and field craft necessary for this. I think its time to move to company tactics. All readers on the thread, I again request that you read the excellent NCC handbook that Ramanaji linked. Focus on the pages on Fieldcraft and Battle Craft.

Lalmohan sir, it would be nice to have your inputs in company level tactics. I liked the example you listed above. If you have some time please help with that.

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 22 Dec 2017 01:23

Lalmohan wrote:whilst i am sure that this does happen, but it seems to me to be impractical to assign tasks on the battlefield to troops based on their ethnicity rather than their training. all troops from all regiments must have the same standard training - and if they are required to perform specific actions then they must be trained for that - and deployed accordingly

tactics it seems to me should be a discussion about how to deploy your forces in a given terrain/battlespace in a manner that will overcome the adversary and is therefore highly specific to the situation in hand. there are standard techniques of cover, concealment, deployment, manoeuvre which can be taught as standard or specialised training, but then the tactical leaders at the appropriate level have to decide how to do it

e.g. the battalion's objectives are to secure the road junction so that the highway is clear to resupply forward positions
then company A objective might then be to secure the hill on the left of the village on the road junction to deny the fire position to the enemy and also support your own troops. company b objective might be to circle around the village and cut off the resupply and retreat for enemy forces by holding a farm house and environments. company c is tasked with taking the village - the first platoon takes up position on a small rise to provide cover fire, second platoon advances along the gully under natural cover whilst third platoon distracts the enemy by advancing clearly along a road in sight but out of accurate range... etc., etc.

I did not imply that and you are right it is not the case.
But all things being equal a Copy Cdr or Bn Cdr may be discerning on who is tasked with what?

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 22 Dec 2017 01:25

Akshay Kapoor wrote:We have now explained section and platoon tactics enough and the most important take away is Fire and Move and the battle and field craft necessary for this. I think its time to move to company tactics. All readers on the thread, I again request that you read the excellent NCC handbook that Ramanaji linked. Focus on the pages on Fieldcraft and Battle Craft.

Lalmohan sir, it would be nice to have your inputs in company level tactics. I liked the example you listed above. If you have some time please help with that.

Sir I think we can flog this a bit more. What about defensive tactics?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Dec 2017 01:56

First read and tell us you have read it.

Defensive tactics are a whole lot. A good 40 man platoon can hold up a battalion.
At Longewala a company with BSF held up a Pakistani brigade.

Akshay would like you to keep emphasizing the skills a soldier has to make people understand how many facets are there to master. And then the skills go up the chain.

What you wrote there:

viewtopic.php?p=2238148#p2238148

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 22 Dec 2017 05:12

ramana wrote:First read and tell us you have read it.

Defensive tactics are a whole lot. A good 40 man platoon can hold up a battalion.
At Longewala a company with BSF held up a Pakistani brigade.

Akshay would like you to keep emphasizing the skills a soldier has to make people understand how many facets are there to master. And then the skills go up the chain.

What you wrote there:

viewtopic.php?p=2238148#p2238148

Ramana sir I will read definitely.

I ask these questions however more to steerr the conversation in a given direction and having some idea...I had and have good people to discuss these things with, though interacting with you and Akshay sir gives me other perspectives...

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 25 Dec 2017 03:02

Akshay Kapoor wrote:Re your examples of old operations and public though well known information I think it would be fine. In fact I am very intrigued by your suggested example. Please post.

The 9th and 10th Para Commandos in Sri Lanka: same mission, same enemy, same terrain... very different tactics. When the men of the 10th left their camp, the LTTE knew they were going hunting -- for good and for bad. Good because it caused chaos among lower-ranks and OGWs, thus generating actionable intel; bad because the higher-ranking cadres would slip away. When the men of the 9th sneaked out of their camp, often even other IPKF units in the same camp would remain unaware of their movements; the enemy just died or disappeared.

While both units had the same basic infantry and paratrooper training, they had been trained for very different terrain. The 9th had specialized in mountain warfare, and was trained to make use of cover and concealment. The 10th had specialized in desert warfare, where there is very little cover or concealment on the move (especially against an enemy with aerial observation capability); also they were expected to be the path-finders for fast-moving mechanized-columns, hence speed and aggressive exploitation of opportunities was of the highest importance. It was a classic example of training informing tactics.

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 25 Dec 2017 04:35

Anoop wrote:It is very interesting to hear how much reorientation is required when moving to a new location or from COIN to regular roles. I would think that the change is maximum for Armd and Arty and some for Mech Inf, but it looks like its substantial even for Inf.

If I understand it correctly, after an RR tour the troops go back to their parent units where the core arm's/service's skills and training are kept up-to-date. It is not like the entire unit was mothballed for the RR tour*.

*That actually used to happen in early-/mid-1990s, when COIN demands on the Army was so high that entire armored and artillery regiments were ordered to mothball their equipment and report to LIC training. It was also a time of limited budget for training and fuel, so getting them back into their original role was that much harder. The setup and expansion of the RR helped reduce a lot of those problems.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 25 Dec 2017 06:17

Dont they have a training unit for troops reporting for RR duty?

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 25 Dec 2017 07:30

ramana wrote:Dont they have a training unit for troops reporting for RR duty?

XV and XVI Corps Battle Schools.

I thought his question was about troops leaving RR and going back to their parent units?

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 25 Dec 2017 10:46

Sir,

Yes my question was indeed about troops going from RR assignment to parent units.

Reading the NCC handbook, I got some very interesting information on how to judge distance. One question on the assault:

(f) As the assault goes in, the LMG group will fire as long as possible and then switch its fire across the objective just in front of the rifle group.

Can someone please explain what the reasoning behind 'switching its fire across the objective just in front of the rifle group' is? Is it to ensure that the rifle group is protected from what might be concealed and entrenched enemy positions just before the objective? What does this mean for the angle at which the LMG position must be sited relative to the line of advance of the rifle group?

Thank you.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 25 Dec 2017 11:14

Regimental centers have reorientation training as normal process.

IA has hazar schools,

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 25 Dec 2017 19:11

ParGha wrote:
Anoop wrote:It is very interesting to hear how much reorientation is required when moving to a new location or from COIN to regular roles. I would think that the change is maximum for Armd and Arty and some for Mech Inf, but it looks like its substantial even for Inf.
If I understand it correctly, after an RR tour the troops go back to their parent units where the core arm's/service's skills and training are kept up-to-date. It is not like the entire unit was mothballed for the RR tour*.

*That actually used to happen in early-/mid-1990s, when COIN demands on the Army was so high that entire armored and artillery regiments were ordered to mothball their equipment and report to LIC training. It was also a time of limited budget for training and fuel, so getting them back into their original role was that much harder. The setup and expansion of the RR helped reduce a lot of those problems.

The first few years of the RRs was not smooth as well..RR was a step child no one wanted to touch...

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 25 Dec 2017 20:25

ramana wrote: At Longewala a company with BSF held up a Pakistani brigade.

Army not BSF

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 26 Dec 2017 02:31

https://twitter.com/Chopdasaab/status/9 ... 3600542720
Note the tactics in counter sniping. This is harder work.

Singha always extols Stalingrad and Afghanistan.

Read and think what was involved.

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 26 Dec 2017 04:52

ramana wrote:https://twitter.com/Chopdasaab/status/9 ... 3600542720
Note the tactics in counter sniping. This is harder work.

Singha always extols Stalingrad and Afghanistan.

Read and think what was involved.

Ramana sir,
Question that comes to mind is that sniper was observed and neutralised. However can that observation not be used for predicting "unprovoked firing". Or is it that the sniper took down four of our own before we neutralised him?
Where there any SOPs that were laxly followed?

BTW - reading the books you recommended. Thanks for that. Gives me a lot of context to the infantry command leadership discussions I have had over the years with dad.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 26 Dec 2017 04:58

I told this many time everything has a strategic and tactical point of view. Taking out the sniper is tactical which has the bigger effect, for now, snipers will be wary of doing that job again. And also your questions on this situation belong to the border thread.

Wile on reading, try to read the Opsrey books on Infantry tactics. Akshay didn't think its germane as that as Western doctrine but I think it is useful to know how similar organizations deal with battle situations.

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 26 Dec 2017 06:25

ramana wrote:I told this many time everything has a strategic and tactical point of view. Taking out the sniper is tactical which has the bigger effect, for now, snipers will be wary of doing that job again. And also your questions on this situation belong to the border thread.

Wile on reading, try to read the Opsrey books on Infantry tactics. Akshay didn't think its germane as that as Western doctrine but I think it is useful to know how similar organizations deal with battle situations.

Noted. Will read that as well. Btw can you give me your email. Want to discuss some photos and a book we just published.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 26 Dec 2017 07:17

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-in ... rs-2570576

suryag · Post by **suryag** » 26 Dec 2017 10:19

Akshay Sir - PVC award winner Sri Sanjay Kumar says a few things about the tactics in the patriot video below. He specifically says we had CI ops but not exercise which practised attack on bunker/sangar

republic patriot PVC awardee episode

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 26 Dec 2017 21:01

Guys apologies. Been AWOL. Sick report. About to take off on flight. Just glanced through. Good discussion and will comment tomorrow.

Par Gha. Those days there was just 1, 9, 10. 1 was high altitude , 10 desert. So naturally a difference in tactics. P

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 26 Dec 2017 21:04

Read your full post Pargha. Good observations. One more to challenge you a bit - read up on 10’s history and tell us what parts of that history and operations inform their tactics. Very interesting. In fact BR has an article on it. Amazing history.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 26 Dec 2017 21:09

ramana wrote:Regimental centers have reorientation training as normal process.

IA has hazar schools,

Sir 15 and 16 Corps Battle Schools are special. Pls see Mission Army episode 8 or 9 for some info on it. There are some other videos as well. These Corps Battle Schools are absolutely crucial in RR functioning so well. Sachin RR is no longer orphan. Very coveted now.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 27 Dec 2017 19:03

Anoop wrote:Sir,

Yes my question was indeed about troops going from RR assignment to parent units.

Reading the NCC handbook, I got some very interesting information on how to judge distance. One question on the assault:

(f) As the assault goes in, the LMG group will fire as long as possible and then switch its fire across the objective just in front of the rifle group.

Can someone please explain what the reasoning behind 'switching its fire across the objective just in front of the rifle group' is? Is it to ensure that the rifle group is protected from what might be concealed and entrenched enemy positions just before the objective? What does this mean for the angle at which the LMG position must be sited relative to the line of advance of the rifle group?

Thank you.

Good question. I don’t think this means that fire will move closer to troops as they go in for assault. Basically the LMG should never fire over the troops. It’s a flat trajectory weapon and with manual sights so obviously a slight miscalculation in range and sight can be lethal to troops even if it’s firing over the head of crawling troops. Also firing at a straight angle say (0 degrees) to objective means that only one bullet will hit the enemy at a time. So only a small frontage will be pinned down. So LMG should be sighted obliquely say at a 70 deg angle to the objective to suppress as much of the frontage of the objective as possible.

Maybe that’s what the handbook is saying. Fire should certainly not move close to the troops in my opinion. Happy to have other perspectives.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 27 Dec 2017 19:05

Also lets keep in mind that section is not fighting alone. It will be at the bare minimum part of a platoon attack if not company attack.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 27 Dec 2017 19:14

Thank you, Sir.

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 29 Dec 2017 18:39

COIN lessons.

One's planning can never be too detailed. Check out resettlement in distant states, sources & assets, sniper action and saving money for legal defence.

https://theprint.in/2017/12/29/remember ... jab-india/

Gill was never armed with more than his swagger stick. He said carrying a firearm was an admission of failure by a police officer. Yet, he always fought to win.

In his passing away, as in his life, Kanwar Pal Singh Gill continues to challenge your learning and established notions. For example, the first principle of a tribute to anybody who is no more, in any journalism school, is: Never be chronological. I don’t know how to keep to that writing about Mr Gill, or Gill sahab, as we would call him.

My first meeting with him is an abiding memory.

It was in early 1981 when I had just come to cover the Northeast, then mostly and aptly described as being “in flames”. He wasn’t D-G, Assam Police, yet, just one of its many I-Gs, but in charge of law and order. It was at his old-style “Assam type” bungalow along the Brahmaputra.

“So you are Shekhar Gupta?” he, in uniform, looked up from his desk, sort of sizing me up, and giving me the look that I still am not able to decipher as curious, or mocking. “Baithiye aap,” he said, “Suna hai bahut ghoomte hain aap apni Enfield bike par (please take a seat, I believe you really get around on your Enfield motorbike).”

Before I could even settle down, came the question with that wicked Gill stare I was to get used to over 36 years subsequently: “Licence hai?”

For a second, I was foxed, and then he laughed, with an obvious “gotcha”. It started a professional relationship as our careers ran parallel between troubled Assam and Punjab. Never mind that the year I was born, 1957, is when he passed his IPS examinations and joined the Assam cadre. He was always the “youngest”, fittest amongst us, and God knows I haven’t seen anybody else handle his alcohol like he could.

After he retired in 1995, it became more like a personal friendship. We often said good things to each other, and also fought over his leadership (in my view, hijack) of the Indian Hockey Federation, as I thought his method was destroying the game. Hockey has done much better after he lost control, but even when we met earlier this year, just two weeks before his death on 26 May 2017 to record a ‘Walk The Talk’, his last interview, he upbraided me for writing that our hockey was having a resurgence. He and I fought another friendly, sporty fight.

There were legends about him in Assam. Some good, many bad. He was charged with kicking to death Khargeswar Talukdar, an Assam agitator. Gill was later acquitted by the Delhi High Court, where the case was shifted as no lawyers or witnesses would come forward in the highly charged Assam of those years. Since not many senior lawyers were willing to defend him in Assam in those surcharged times, he brought in KTS Tulsi (now a Rajya Sabha member and TV talking head) from Chandigarh.

Over time, though, I discovered one key aspect of the KPS legend. He never personally used violence on anybody, never carried a firearm. Nothing more than his swagger stick.

That’s all he was armed with when we got our closest look at his calm fearlessness as well as art of crisis management. In the disastrous Assam elections of February 1983, the first ethnic massacre was reported in the sub-division of Mangaldai, about 70 km away, across the Brahmaputra from Guwahati. He was leading a review with the Army’s GoC (a major-general), and I, along with fellow reporter Seema Guha, landed up, defying the blockaded highway on that Enfield.

The sun sets early in Assam, and by the time the meeting finished, it was dusk. The GoC and Gill left with their escorts for Guwahati and we followed, until we were halted on the banks of a Himalayan river because the wooden bridge over it had been set on fire by the agitators. Outlines of a noisy mob became apparent in the dust on the other bank, their spears and swords gleaming in the setting sun. The general was furious for having such a small escort. Gill was calm, asking his troops and the general’s to take defensive positions, also site their only light machine gun. He had only the swagger stick.

Concerned, I asked him what the problem was. He smiled, again I can’t say if he was casual or mocking, and said, “The problem is that you two are here.” He refused to elaborate.

That adventure ended in a grossly understated drama. Gill looked at the smoking bridge closely, climbed into his jeep, asked his driver to go for it. They crossed it safely. The rest of us followed one by one, the general first, we last. We assembled later that evening at Gill’s home to exchange notes over his usual Old Monk rum, but he still wouldn’t tell me why he said our presence was the problem.

He told me this much later, when he was posted as CRPF I-G in Punjab and we met at the Amritsar circuit house. “I had an armed mob of thousands coming at us. All we had were about seven rifles and an LMG. If we had to open fire, killing scores, do you think I wanted to have two reporters watching?”

A few days ago, when we met for our ‘Walk The Talk’ interview, he was critical of the way the CRPF was handling stone-pelters in Kashmir. “You can’t fire at mobs throwing stones,” he said, adding one has to think innovatively, even defensively, sometimes. You can agree or argue, but the conventional method was never for him.

His critics accuse him of killing Sikhs indiscriminately. That wasn’t Gill’s style. In fact, he succeeded in that final battle in 1991-94 because he spared the foot soldiers and used them. He helped them take new identities and settle, often in trucking businesses in distant states—but as long as they helped his police catch their commanders. His police listed terrorists in categories A to D. He had then said to me (on the record, published in India Today), once a terrorist is convinced he won’t survive more than six months after making it to our ‘A’ category, terrorism will end. As it did.

A little side story to that period is that between 1984 and 1995, Gill had four comings in Punjab. Each time, he was moved away when politicians—by now in a deep nexus with terrorists—found him inconvenient. In 1988, Operation Black Thunder (where NSG’s Black Cats made their first appearance) led by him (and set up brilliantly by Ajit Doval) was a spectacular success. A key feature, unlike Operation Blue Star earlier, was that rather than banish the media, he allowed us, nearly a hundred at one point, to watch the entire action; you could even sit for hours next to the NSG snipers watching them pick out terrorists, one at a time, over three days. It was a spectacular success, and unlike Operation Blue Star, there were no dark and wild rumours.

As soon as V.P. Singh’s coalition (close to the Akalis) replaced Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi, Gill was moved out, only to be brought in by P.V. Narasimha Rao in 1992 as terrorism returned in its most virulent form yet. Khalistani bands ruled the state, even we reporters had the ignominy of being stopped in border districts at armed terrorists’ “check points” at night.

The war was utterly one-sided (in favour of terrorists) by 1992, when the year’s toll was at least 5,000, more than a thousand of these policemen. In an exodus reminiscent of the Kashmiri Pandits two years earlier, millions of Hindu families—as well as prosperous Sikhs—were moving out of Punjab. But by 1993, the balance had dramatically shifted.

Unlike his times in distant Assam, Gill’s Punjab years are better documented. His essential doctrine was, only the local police can fight terror. Army, central forces, can help, but you can’t win in Punjab “unless good Jatts fight bad Jatts and my police is mostly Jatt”. He motivated them; the Rao government, through Rajesh Pilot (then minister of state for internal security) kept resources on tap. Gill resettled hundreds of “sources and assets” and also saved up some money for the legal defence of his key officers, who he knew would face human rights cases later.

He taught us the “condom” theory. “Dekho bhai, we are as useful to the government as condoms. Tossed, once the job is over,” he would say. He personally got into serious trouble as he was charged and convicted under Section 354 IPC (outraging the modesty of a woman) for inappropriate behaviour with an IAS officer at a drunken party.

Finally, the Supreme Court was forgiving with him, reducing his sentence to a fine, probation and a commitment not to drink at parties. Did he keep it? All I’d say is, if I was asked that question in a court under oath, I would have a dilemma. But then, I would recall Gill’s invocation, the first time he talked me into serious drinking: “All your doubts, fears, dilemmas will vanish once you say your favourite prayer and take a sip of buddha sant.” That last, you would’ve figured, was Gill-speak for Old Monk rum.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 30 Dec 2017 08:39

Sir welcome to this thread. Look forward to seeing you more here and hearing your insights on naval tactics.

Bishwa · Post by **Bishwa** » 30 Dec 2017 11:01

http://webarchive.loc.gov/legacy/200110 ... /batt.html

I wrote this article on the RR for the Bharat Rakshak Monitor 17 years ago. It has relevance to some of the discussions on RR and tactics that i see in this thread. Especially the growing up pains, why it was raised and how it evolved.

RR was the result of Gen B.C Joshi's efforts..

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 30 Dec 2017 11:45

Thanks. Good article sir, my compliments.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 30 Dec 2017 12:48

Bishwa wrote:http://webarchive.loc.gov/legacy/200110 ... /batt.html

I wrote this article on the RR for the Bharat Rakshak Monitor 17 years ago. It has relevance to some of the discussions on RR and tactics that i see in this thread. Especially the growing up pains, why it was raised and how it evolved.

RR was the result of Gen B.C Joshi's efforts..

Welcome back Bishwa!

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 31 Dec 2017 04:21

^So true the IA had been a pioneer of mechanized warfare tactics e.g: OP Duck but by OP Pawan the lessons seem to have been lost, at least in the initial stages. In the inglorious Jaffna university para drop operation, it was the mech forces that rescued the para-dropped Sikh LI. Our first lessons of a proper COIN, CQB were learnt there. There is a certain role for APC and even tanks in these environments, even if not the most effective tools, would like to know from folks here what are some of the tactics that work well for COIN. The RR grids are one but that is costly, with nearly 100 battalions. We did use gunships in Manipur once in the 80's and by the IPKF but do not want am not sure if not using these tactics is a political or a military decision thereafter?

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indi ... 28863.html

Added: Looks like Pargha has deleted his post but I think the point was an important one.

Bishwa · Post by **Bishwa** » 31 Dec 2017 07:31

One can learn some lessons from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20 ... ience.aspx

"The main battle tanks of the Soviet army were ineffective in the mountainous Afghan terrain due to the limited elevation capability of both the main tank gun and the coaxial machine gun. Used early as part of the large but unsuccessful sweeping operations. The Soviets learned quickly that, "the practice of massing a large number of regular forces against a small group of irregular forces to fight guerrilla war on rugged terrain was bankrupt."[20] As a result, Soviet tanks often became stationary pillboxes positioned at Soviet base camps.[21]

Greater emphasis was placed on the use of light armored, wheeled vehicles such as the Soviet family of BMDs. These vehicles proved to be well suited for Soviet operations in Afghanistan. They were twice as light, and shorter than the Soviet BMP. They were well armed with a 73mm cannon, a coaxial machine gun, and two bow-mount machine guns. They had a low silhouette, which enabled them to hide in terrain folds or behind rock formations. Their lightweight proved desirable in a war where there was a wide use of mines, and it allowed the vehicle to be air transportable by a variety of aircraft to include helicopters.

Light infantry formations such as the elite Soviet air assault, airborne and special forces units proved to be the most effective against the guerrilla tactics of the Mujahideen operating in the rugged Afghan terrain. Typically, the tactical operations of these units were the raid, blocking positions and search, and ambush. Since these formations executed the bulk of Soviet offensive operations, these formations often received the best weapons, equipment and training."

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 04 Jan 2018 08:49

Akshay Kapoor wrote:
ramana wrote:Regimental centers have reorientation training as normal process.

IA has hazar schools,
Sir 15 and 16 Corps Battle Schools are special. Pls see Mission Army episode 8 or 9 for some info on it. There are some other videos as well. These Corps Battle Schools are absolutely crucial in RR functioning so well. Sachin RR is no longer orphan. Very coveted now.

Sir,

I know much coveted now. But much like the initial days of the IPKF a nightmare. I had a batchmate on deputation to the valley in the mid nineties. But things evolve and improve...

Question sir - Is the composition now completely infantry i.e. 11RR is Dogras would that be completely Dogra or have some troops from non-infantry? That was the case initially.

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 04 Jan 2018 08:52

Actually sir tactically speaking the evolution of the CI grid system would not be amiss in this thread yes?
If yes who were the tought leaders on that - ARTRAC or .....

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 04 Jan 2018 10:32

ks_sachin wrote:Actually sir tactically speaking the evolution of the CI grid system would not be amiss in this thread yes?
If yes who were the tought leaders on that - ARTRAC or .....

CI Grid system is best discussed on the CI Ops and also border watch threads. If you have any general questions on that Im very happy to discuss there. If you have questions on very specific tactics and linking those to the previous discussion on section, platoon , coy tactics yes by all means we can discuss it here. But ask thsoe questions visualising a specific operational environment and link it to what has already been discussed on this thread.

Re who was thought leader I’m not sure which HQ ‘originally’ came up with it. We do have a long experience of CI Ops so there must have been a strong element of evolution and organic learning which was institutionalised.

Basically for all issues LC, Valley Ops some good writers are Gen Hasnain, Gen GD Bakshi, Gen Patankar (videos), Gen Katoch. But Gen Hasnain gets into the tactical aspects the best. Required reading before questions.

Also for all serious perusers of this thread ‘Infantry in India’ by Gen VS Raghavan is required reading.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 04 Jan 2018 10:41

ks_sachin wrote:
Akshay Kapoor wrote:
Sir 15 and 16 Corps Battle Schools are special. Pls see Mission Army episode 8 or 9 for some info on it. There are some other videos as well. These Corps Battle Schools are absolutely crucial in RR functioning so well. Sachin RR is no longer orphan. Very coveted now.
Sir,

I know much coveted now. But much like the initial days of the IPKF a nightmare. I had a batchmate on deputation to the valley in the mid nineties. But things evolve and improve...

Question sir - Is the composition now completely infantry i.e. 11RR is Dogras would that be completely Dogra or have some troops from non-infantry? That was the case initially.

This is a study in regimental spirit and also building up and conserving local operational experience. No composition is about 50-55 pct the parent infantry Regt , 30-35 pct another arm (Engrs, Arty, Armd) and the balance would be services. Bayonet strength would be provided by Inf and the other arm. Services would provide logistics. There would also be an engr platoon in every RR unit (even where ENGRS provide 30 pct of bayonet strength) for IED clearance , bombs disposa, demolitions etc and also for helping build schools and other Op Sadbhavana related things.