Long live Putin support to ISIS.Turkey accused of recruiting ex-Isis fighters in their thousands to attack Kurds in Syria
Levant crisis - III
Re: Levant crisis - III
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 99166.html
Re: Levant crisis - III
https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2017/11/ ... s-support/
Russian military cites game screenshot as “evidence” of US ISIS support.
Image from mobile AC-130 Gunship Simulator apparently came from a YouTube trailer.
Re: Levant crisis - III
the only way ypg can defend afrin is taking the offence, taking over multiple points on the highway skirting afrin in the north, create mayhem for turkkiye arty sites and logistic nodes in all areas there and bring the war to turkish land.
the border towns like killis are all kurd.
also hit azaz from all sides, its a den of the jihadis.
Re: Levant crisis - III
Nothing wrong with that. It depletes the strength of both ISIS and the Kurds - who are both anti Assad.Parasu wrote:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 99166.html
Long live Putin support to ISIS.Turkey accused of recruiting ex-Isis fighters in their thousands to attack Kurds in Syria
The US has Hobson's choice - does it arm their notional ally, the Kurds, against former ISIS and risk losing Turkey, or side with Turkey and (once
again) let down their only real ally left in Syria.
Re: Levant crisis - III
Fifteen Russians employed in Syria by a private security company have been killed after an explosion rocked an arms depot at their base in the country, according to a monitoring group.
The incident happened at the company’s weapons storage facility at Tabiya Jazira in the northeastern province of Deir Ezzor, said the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
Observatory directory Rami Abdel Rahman said the company in question was in charge of “protecting the oil and gas fields controlled by the Syrian regime”.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/ ... -explosion
The incident happened at the company’s weapons storage facility at Tabiya Jazira in the northeastern province of Deir Ezzor, said the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
Observatory directory Rami Abdel Rahman said the company in question was in charge of “protecting the oil and gas fields controlled by the Syrian regime”.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/ ... -explosion
Re: Levant crisis - III
US has another choice. Betray the Kurds like Pootin.Deans wrote:Nothing wrong with that. It depletes the strength of both ISIS and the Kurds - who are both anti Assad.Parasu wrote:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 99166.html
Long live Putin support to ISIS.
The US has Hobson's choice - does it arm their notional ally, the Kurds, against former ISIS and risk losing Turkey, or side with Turkey and (once
again) let down their only real ally left in Syria.
Join up with Turks and launch a joint operation till Abu Kamal. Joint operation against Raqqa was anyway suggested by Erdogan the Jihadi.
F@ck the Syrians and the Russians. Give northern Syria to Jihadi Erdogan in return for joint control of Syria-Iraq border. Let Russia and its allies rule over a rump Syrian state.
If only everyone was smart like Pootin the great chessplayer.
Re: Levant crisis - III
US wants to create a Kurdistan state to keep Turkey , Iraq and Syria under its control something all these countries oppose , that is their goal and not so hidden one , The Saudis and their clan are also for creation of Kurdistan state to keep Shiah state under check
The US is not arming the Kurds just to defend themself against IS their strategic goals far exceed that and more
The US is not arming the Kurds just to defend themself against IS their strategic goals far exceed that and more
Re: Levant crisis - III
Russia is not defending Syria only to keep the jihadis at bay. It wants to help Hezbollah attack civilians in Israel and kill the jews.Austin wrote:US wants to create a Kurdistan state to keep Turkey , Iraq and Syria under its control something all these countries oppose , that is their goal and not so hidden one , The Saudis and their clan are also for creation of Kurdistan state to keep Shiah state under check
The US is not arming the Kurds just to defend themself against IS their strategic goals far exceed that and more
Similar line of argument. No proof needed.
Re: Levant crisis - III
Afrin ypg asked saa to help
Saa said disarm first and fly syrian flag
Kurds said no can do
Saa said then fight turkiye wolves on your own
We will let you resupply via aleppo
But a track2 deal might be ongoing as sy deputy fm has called on all kurds and arabs to unite against turkiye in a sort of “great patriotic war”
I figure russis might be looking to sink the sultans credibility a bit in the swamp to cut him down to size. Its all a game of balancing competing vectors for each parties self interest
Lives are just cheap pawns in the great game
Saa said disarm first and fly syrian flag
Kurds said no can do
Saa said then fight turkiye wolves on your own
We will let you resupply via aleppo
But a track2 deal might be ongoing as sy deputy fm has called on all kurds and arabs to unite against turkiye in a sort of “great patriotic war”
I figure russis might be looking to sink the sultans credibility a bit in the swamp to cut him down to size. Its all a game of balancing competing vectors for each parties self interest
Lives are just cheap pawns in the great game
Re: Levant crisis - III
East ghouta has been shelling damascus core areas for weeks now and repelling all saa attempts
They got what they wanted, the tigers are after their juggler vein now
They got what they wanted, the tigers are after their juggler vein now
Re: Levant crisis - III
Russia and Israel enjoy good relation , Israel PM has been to Russia so many times in just last 1 year , Jews are well protected in Russia there is little reason why Russia would want that to happen .Parasu wrote:Russia is not defending Syria only to keep the jihadis at bay. It wants to help Hezbollah attack civilians in Israel and kill the jews.Austin wrote:US wants to create a Kurdistan state to keep Turkey , Iraq and Syria under its control something all these countries oppose , that is their goal and not so hidden one , The Saudis and their clan are also for creation of Kurdistan state to keep Shiah state under check
The US is not arming the Kurds just to defend themself against IS their strategic goals far exceed that and more
Similar line of argument. No proof needed.
If there is any body who is supporting ISIS it is Israel and US just to get rid of Assad
Re: Levant crisis - III
Chinese Armed UAV in Iraqi Army Aviation
Re: Levant crisis - III
Turkey and US enjoy good relations. In fact, they are NATO allies. Turkey and US talk to each other all the time. There is little reason for US to arm kurds against turkey.Austin wrote:Russia and Israel enjoy good relation , Israel PM has been to Russia so many times in just last 1 year , Jews are well protected in Russia there is little reason why Russia would want that to happen .Parasu wrote:
Russia is not defending Syria only to keep the jihadis at bay. It wants to help Hezbollah attack civilians in Israel and kill the jews.
Similar line of argument. No proof needed.
If there is any body who is supporting ISIS it is Israel and US just to get rid of Assad
If there is anybody which has a reason to harm both turkey and Israel, it is Russia. After all they are both American allies.
We can go on and on with this.
Re: Levant crisis - III
@markito0171
Feb 15
More
#Syria #Turkey army & #FSA took so far ~40 villages from #YPG in kurdish #Afrin district in 1 month of battles.
About 600 more villages left.
~400-500 dead from both forces & ~200 dead civilians
Feb 15
More
#Syria #Turkey army & #FSA took so far ~40 villages from #YPG in kurdish #Afrin district in 1 month of battles.
About 600 more villages left.
~400-500 dead from both forces & ~200 dead civilians
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 14045
- Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14
Re: Levant crisis - III
the syrians are making a all-out effort to clean out east ghouta once and for all
tiger forces are assigned to it and he is taking his time rather than rush into it under political diktats, moving all his heavy eqpt into position in long convoys.
tiger forces are assigned to it and he is taking his time rather than rush into it under political diktats, moving all his heavy eqpt into position in long convoys.
Re: Levant crisis - III
ypg has finally crossed the border and extracted some blood
Rojava Defense Units | YPG
@DefenseUnits
8h8 hours ago
More
Seven Turkish troops killed, many others wounded in the action against the operation command of so-called olive branch operation inside Kirikhan district of Hatay, Turkey. Details to follow.
Rojava Defense Units | YPG
@DefenseUnits
8h8 hours ago
More
Seven Turkish troops killed, many others wounded in the action against the operation command of so-called olive branch operation inside Kirikhan district of Hatay, Turkey. Details to follow.
Re: Levant crisis - III
al masdar
The Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) attacked a military camp on Turkish territory used by troops for preparing Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Kurdish-held Afrin, the SDF media center said on Saturday.
“Our forces carried out a specific military operation against the invaders and their operation desk in Qara Xaneh township in the Turkish state of Hatay, killing 7 terrorists including Turkish soldiers, in addition to a large number of wounded. Therefore, our forces call on civilians to stay away from the military points of the Turkish invasion army and Daesh/ Al-Nusra points, because all of the military points are legitimate targets for our forces,” the SDF statement read.
The Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) attacked a military camp on Turkish territory used by troops for preparing Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Kurdish-held Afrin, the SDF media center said on Saturday.
“Our forces carried out a specific military operation against the invaders and their operation desk in Qara Xaneh township in the Turkish state of Hatay, killing 7 terrorists including Turkish soldiers, in addition to a large number of wounded. Therefore, our forces call on civilians to stay away from the military points of the Turkish invasion army and Daesh/ Al-Nusra points, because all of the military points are legitimate targets for our forces,” the SDF statement read.
Re: Levant crisis - III
a decent article on the where israel stands today on options vs lebanon and syria
https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/ ... st-it.html
https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/ ... st-it.html
Re: Levant crisis - III
https://consortiumnews.com/2017/09/30/h ... s-mideast/
How Syria’s Victory Reshapes Mideast
September 30, 2017
The failure of the U.S.-Israeli-Saudi “regime change” project in Syria changes the future of the Mideast, possibly ushering in an era of greater secularism and tolerance, writes ex-British diplomat Alastair Crooke.
By Alastair Crooke
Plainly, Syria’s success – notwithstanding the caution of President Bashar al-Assad in saying that signs of success are not success itself – in resisting, against the odds, all attempts to fell the state suggest that a tipping point in the geopolitics of the region has occurred.
Map of Syria.
We have written before how the Syria outcome dwarfs that of Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah, significant though the result of that war was, too.
Both events taken together have brought America’s unipolar moment in the Middle East to an end (though not globally, since the U.S. still retains its necklace of military bases across the region). The successes have corroded badly the reputation of the Gulf States and have discredited fired-up Sunni jihadism as a “go-to” political tool for Saudi Arabia and its Western backers.
But, aside from the geopolitics, the Syria outcome has created a physical connectivity and contiguity that has not existed for some years: the border between Iraq and Iran is open; the border between Syria and Iraq is opening; and the border between Lebanon and Syria, too, is open. This constitutes a critical mass both of land, resources and population of real weight.
The region will listen intently to what these victors will have to say about their future vision for the region – and for Islam. In particular, how Syria articulates the lessons for Middle Eastern societies in light of its war experience will have a profound import.
This discussion has barely begun in Syria, and has not reached a conclusion – and may not, for some time; but we can speculate a little.
At present, talk is divided between Levantism, which is based in the idea of cultural diversity, such as has existed – alongside periodic acute tensions – in Lebanon and Syria, and Arab nationalism. The framework for both concepts being understood to be a non-assertive secularism within a state structure, encompassing equality before the law.
Arab nationalism looks toward a wide Arab cultural unity, rooted primarily in the Arabic language. Levantism essentially was an Ottoman inheritance. Then (in Ottoman times), there was no “Syria” (in the sense of a nation–state), but viliyat (Ottoman provinces), which were more like city-states that were permitted a large quota of self-administration and discretion for diverse societies and sects to live in their own cultural and spiritual ways, including the right to speak their individual languages. (Syrian diversity historically represented the legacy of many foreign occupations, with each leaving behind something of their DNA, their cultures and religion).
Colonial Strategies
Under the subsequent French colonial rule, the colonizers first created separate mini-statelets of these Syrian minorities, but when that policy failed, they reversed into forced unification of Syria’s diverse parts (apart from Lebanon), through a stratagem of imposing the French language instead of Arabic; French law instead of the Ottoman law and mores; and of promoting Christianity in order to undercut Islam. Inevitably, this created the pushback that gave Syria its characteristic suspicion of foreign intervention and its determination to recover a vision of what it was to be Syrian. (The French “regime-changed” Damascus in 1920, 1925, 1926, and 1945, and imposed martial law during most of the pauses in between the coups).
French diplomat Francois George-Picot, who along with British colonial officer Mark Sykes drew lines across a Middle East map of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, carving out states with boundaries that are nearly the same as they are today.
But the nationalism, which the French repression had provoked into life, pulled in two different directions: the Muslim Brotherhood, the major Islamic movement, wanted to grasp Syria as a Sunni Islamic state, while, in contrast, the more Westernized urban élites wanted to “take” Syria – as not exactly a separate nation-state – but more a part of the whole Arab world, and to be domestically organized as a unified, secular, and at least partly Westernized state.
As Patrick Seale noted in The Struggle for Syria: “Above all, [for the secular nationalists], disunity had to be overcome. Their answer was to try to bridge the gaps between rich and poor through a modified version of socialism, and between Muslims and minorities through a modified concept of Islam. Islam, in their view, needed to be considered politically not as a religion but as a manifestation of the Arab nation.
“Thus, the society they wished to create, they proclaimed, should be modern (with, among other things, equality for women), secular (with faith relegated to personal affairs), and defined by a culture of ‘Arabism’ overriding the traditional concepts of ethnicity.”
In short, what they sought was the very antithesis of the objectives of the already strong and growing Muslim Brotherhood. And by 1973, in an attempt to square the circle between conservative, assertive Sunnism and the nationalist “soft” Islam, the fatwa (by a Shi’i cleric) asserting Hafez al-Assad to be Shi’i Muslim (rather than heretic as Sunnis viewed all Alawites to be), exploded the situation. (The French brokered constitution required that the head of state be “Muslim”).
A Cycle of Violence
The Muslim Brotherhood was beside itself in anger at the designation of then President Hafez Assad as Muslim, and thus began a cycle of bloody violence with organized terrorist attacks on the government, and on al-Assad’s inner circle – and retaliatory attacks by the government – which, in effect, is only now coming to a conclusion with the defeat of militant, jihadi Sunnism’s attempt to seize the state and to oust the “heretic” Alawite.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad before a poster of his late father, Hafez Assad.
The outcome of this iconic struggle has profound regional implications (even if we cannot, now, see how the deliberations about the vision for the future of the Levant will finally conclude).
We can say, firstly, Islamism generally is the major loser in the struggle for the Levant. Both in Syria and Iraq, ordinary Levantine Sunnis have been sickened by intolerant, puritan Islam. This orientation of Islam (Wahhabism) that demanded (on pain of death) a linear singularity of meaning to Islam, which asserts its “truth” from the certainty conveyed from a mechanical, procedural, approach to validating selected “sayings” of the Prophet Mohammad (known as “scientific” Salafism), has failed.
Armed jihadism has failed to leverage this linear singularity as the “idea” with which to crush the polyvalent Levantine model and replace it with a rigid, monovalent literalism. Just to be clear, it is not just the non-Muslims and the minority Sunni and Shi’i sects who have had enough of it: Sunni Syrians and Iraqis, more generally, have too (especially after the experience of Raqa’a and Mosul).
The public reaction to the Wahhabi interventions in both nations is likely to push Sunni Islam firstly to embrace polyvalence in Islam more tightly (even to the extent, possibly, of looking to Iran and its “mode of being” as a possible model); and secondly, to embrace further the Arab secular “way,” too. In short, one “fallout” may be a more secular style of Islam, in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood’s emphasis on external, visible, exclusionary, identity politics.
But, if the Syrian and Iraqi nationalist Islamic impulse is over, what of the other “double aspect” to Syria — its legacy of Levantine diversity and polyvalence versus the secular nationalist perspective that diversity constitutes a primary cause of national weakness. And which sees its primary task as that of integrating the population into a single political and social structure.
Israel’s New Scheme
Well, much in this latter respect will hang on Washington: the French colonists leveraged the Syrian minorities against the Syrian majority (in the French interest). And now America seems intent – with Israel pushing hard from behind – to leverage the Kurds against the Syrian State (in the interest of limiting the extent of Iranian presence within Syria, and even to try to break the contiguity between Iraq and Syria).
President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu talk together prior to President Trump’s address, May 23, 2017, at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)
That latter prospect seems unlikely. The U.S.-Israeli Kurdish “project” in Syria may fail, as Kurds (much less concentrated in northeastern Syria than they are in northern Iraq), conclude that it would be better and wiser to come to terms with Moscow (and therefore find some modus vivendi with Damascus), rather than trusting to the constancy of American promises of autonomy – amid the almost universal regional hostility to this high-risk independence project. Ultimately, it must be obvious to the Kurds that it is Russia (and Iran) that represent the incoming tide into the northern tier states.
The Syrian Kurds never were in the Masoud Barzani camp and long have had working relations with the Syrian army and Russian forces (versus ISIS), during the conflict. It seems, in any event, that the U.S. main focus is shifting away from Syria to Iraq, as the locus in which they hope to push back against Iran. Again, the prospects there for the U.S. to achieve this aim are poor (Iran is well dug in) – and if mishandled, the Kurdish independence “project” easily could spin into violence and region-wide instability.
Barzani’s leadership is not secure (the Turks are livid at his double-cross of pretending that the referendum was only to strengthen his negotiating hand with Baghdad). And the risk of wider conflict, were Barzani to be removed from power, would be contingent on who ultimately succeeded to the leadership.
In sum, the U.S.-Israeli Kurdish “project” seems – paradoxically – more likely forcefully to strengthen the nationalist impulse across the Levant, Turkey and Iran and to make it more assertive – but not in the old way: there is no going back to the status quo ante in Syria. The processes of de-escalation and reconciliation facilitated by Russia – in and of themselves – will change fundamentally the politics of Syria.
A Shift Toward Diversity
If in the past, politics was top-down, it will now be bottom-up. This is where we see something of a synthesis taking place between Levantism and nationalism. The needs of local politics, in all its diversity, will be much more the future drivers of politics. One can see already that this shift to bottom-up politics is already becoming apparent in Iraq, too. (Again, it has been accelerated by the war against the extreme jihadism of ISIS, but now may become further energized by Kurdish claims to disputed Iraqi territories.)
A Russian orchestra performs a concert at Palmyra’s ancient Roman theater on May 5, 2016, after Syrian troops, backed by Russian air power, reclaimed the ancient city from the Islamic State. (Image from RT’s live-streaming of the event)
In some respects, the “ground” in Iraq – the mobilization of the people against these reactionary armed movements – is running ahead of, and away from the Iraqi political leadership, be it political or religious. The unrest may grow, and the government – any government – will have to bend to pressures from their base.
The Western leveraging of minorities against the state – now the Kurds – has already had a major geostrategic impact: that of bringing Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran into close political and military alliance in order to stop this “Kurdish project” from materializing and dissolving the outlines of major states, precisely at their most sensitive juncture.
Essentially, this represents another case where the interests of Israel do not coincide with those of Europe or America. The pursuit of this “Kurdish project” is empowering an alliance – including a major NATO state – that will be explicitly hostile to these American aims (though this does not imply any increase of hostility to the Kurds as a people – though that too may result). The alienation of these states would hardly seem to be in the Western interest, but nonetheless, this is what is occurring.
And finally, the “fallout” from the Syria conflict has prompted the northern tier states to “Look East” – as President Assad recently instructed his diplomats so to do. For Iran it may be primarily to China (as well as to Russia), but for Syria, it is more likely to be Russia in a predominantly cultural way, with China seeing Syria as an “important node” in its Belt & Road Initiative.
This represents a historic shift in the Middle East. Western officials may imagine that they have a hold over Syria by holding reconstruction funding hostage to having their way with Syria’s future: if this is so, they will as wrong about this as they have been on almost everything pertaining to Syria.
Alastair Crooke is a former British diplomat who was a senior figure in British intelligence and in European Union diplomacy. He is the founder and director of the Conflicts Forum.
How Syria’s Victory Reshapes Mideast
September 30, 2017
The failure of the U.S.-Israeli-Saudi “regime change” project in Syria changes the future of the Mideast, possibly ushering in an era of greater secularism and tolerance, writes ex-British diplomat Alastair Crooke.
By Alastair Crooke
Plainly, Syria’s success – notwithstanding the caution of President Bashar al-Assad in saying that signs of success are not success itself – in resisting, against the odds, all attempts to fell the state suggest that a tipping point in the geopolitics of the region has occurred.
Map of Syria.
We have written before how the Syria outcome dwarfs that of Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah, significant though the result of that war was, too.
Both events taken together have brought America’s unipolar moment in the Middle East to an end (though not globally, since the U.S. still retains its necklace of military bases across the region). The successes have corroded badly the reputation of the Gulf States and have discredited fired-up Sunni jihadism as a “go-to” political tool for Saudi Arabia and its Western backers.
But, aside from the geopolitics, the Syria outcome has created a physical connectivity and contiguity that has not existed for some years: the border between Iraq and Iran is open; the border between Syria and Iraq is opening; and the border between Lebanon and Syria, too, is open. This constitutes a critical mass both of land, resources and population of real weight.
The region will listen intently to what these victors will have to say about their future vision for the region – and for Islam. In particular, how Syria articulates the lessons for Middle Eastern societies in light of its war experience will have a profound import.
This discussion has barely begun in Syria, and has not reached a conclusion – and may not, for some time; but we can speculate a little.
At present, talk is divided between Levantism, which is based in the idea of cultural diversity, such as has existed – alongside periodic acute tensions – in Lebanon and Syria, and Arab nationalism. The framework for both concepts being understood to be a non-assertive secularism within a state structure, encompassing equality before the law.
Arab nationalism looks toward a wide Arab cultural unity, rooted primarily in the Arabic language. Levantism essentially was an Ottoman inheritance. Then (in Ottoman times), there was no “Syria” (in the sense of a nation–state), but viliyat (Ottoman provinces), which were more like city-states that were permitted a large quota of self-administration and discretion for diverse societies and sects to live in their own cultural and spiritual ways, including the right to speak their individual languages. (Syrian diversity historically represented the legacy of many foreign occupations, with each leaving behind something of their DNA, their cultures and religion).
Colonial Strategies
Under the subsequent French colonial rule, the colonizers first created separate mini-statelets of these Syrian minorities, but when that policy failed, they reversed into forced unification of Syria’s diverse parts (apart from Lebanon), through a stratagem of imposing the French language instead of Arabic; French law instead of the Ottoman law and mores; and of promoting Christianity in order to undercut Islam. Inevitably, this created the pushback that gave Syria its characteristic suspicion of foreign intervention and its determination to recover a vision of what it was to be Syrian. (The French “regime-changed” Damascus in 1920, 1925, 1926, and 1945, and imposed martial law during most of the pauses in between the coups).
French diplomat Francois George-Picot, who along with British colonial officer Mark Sykes drew lines across a Middle East map of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, carving out states with boundaries that are nearly the same as they are today.
But the nationalism, which the French repression had provoked into life, pulled in two different directions: the Muslim Brotherhood, the major Islamic movement, wanted to grasp Syria as a Sunni Islamic state, while, in contrast, the more Westernized urban élites wanted to “take” Syria – as not exactly a separate nation-state – but more a part of the whole Arab world, and to be domestically organized as a unified, secular, and at least partly Westernized state.
As Patrick Seale noted in The Struggle for Syria: “Above all, [for the secular nationalists], disunity had to be overcome. Their answer was to try to bridge the gaps between rich and poor through a modified version of socialism, and between Muslims and minorities through a modified concept of Islam. Islam, in their view, needed to be considered politically not as a religion but as a manifestation of the Arab nation.
“Thus, the society they wished to create, they proclaimed, should be modern (with, among other things, equality for women), secular (with faith relegated to personal affairs), and defined by a culture of ‘Arabism’ overriding the traditional concepts of ethnicity.”
In short, what they sought was the very antithesis of the objectives of the already strong and growing Muslim Brotherhood. And by 1973, in an attempt to square the circle between conservative, assertive Sunnism and the nationalist “soft” Islam, the fatwa (by a Shi’i cleric) asserting Hafez al-Assad to be Shi’i Muslim (rather than heretic as Sunnis viewed all Alawites to be), exploded the situation. (The French brokered constitution required that the head of state be “Muslim”).
A Cycle of Violence
The Muslim Brotherhood was beside itself in anger at the designation of then President Hafez Assad as Muslim, and thus began a cycle of bloody violence with organized terrorist attacks on the government, and on al-Assad’s inner circle – and retaliatory attacks by the government – which, in effect, is only now coming to a conclusion with the defeat of militant, jihadi Sunnism’s attempt to seize the state and to oust the “heretic” Alawite.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad before a poster of his late father, Hafez Assad.
The outcome of this iconic struggle has profound regional implications (even if we cannot, now, see how the deliberations about the vision for the future of the Levant will finally conclude).
We can say, firstly, Islamism generally is the major loser in the struggle for the Levant. Both in Syria and Iraq, ordinary Levantine Sunnis have been sickened by intolerant, puritan Islam. This orientation of Islam (Wahhabism) that demanded (on pain of death) a linear singularity of meaning to Islam, which asserts its “truth” from the certainty conveyed from a mechanical, procedural, approach to validating selected “sayings” of the Prophet Mohammad (known as “scientific” Salafism), has failed.
Armed jihadism has failed to leverage this linear singularity as the “idea” with which to crush the polyvalent Levantine model and replace it with a rigid, monovalent literalism. Just to be clear, it is not just the non-Muslims and the minority Sunni and Shi’i sects who have had enough of it: Sunni Syrians and Iraqis, more generally, have too (especially after the experience of Raqa’a and Mosul).
The public reaction to the Wahhabi interventions in both nations is likely to push Sunni Islam firstly to embrace polyvalence in Islam more tightly (even to the extent, possibly, of looking to Iran and its “mode of being” as a possible model); and secondly, to embrace further the Arab secular “way,” too. In short, one “fallout” may be a more secular style of Islam, in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood’s emphasis on external, visible, exclusionary, identity politics.
But, if the Syrian and Iraqi nationalist Islamic impulse is over, what of the other “double aspect” to Syria — its legacy of Levantine diversity and polyvalence versus the secular nationalist perspective that diversity constitutes a primary cause of national weakness. And which sees its primary task as that of integrating the population into a single political and social structure.
Israel’s New Scheme
Well, much in this latter respect will hang on Washington: the French colonists leveraged the Syrian minorities against the Syrian majority (in the French interest). And now America seems intent – with Israel pushing hard from behind – to leverage the Kurds against the Syrian State (in the interest of limiting the extent of Iranian presence within Syria, and even to try to break the contiguity between Iraq and Syria).
President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu talk together prior to President Trump’s address, May 23, 2017, at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)
That latter prospect seems unlikely. The U.S.-Israeli Kurdish “project” in Syria may fail, as Kurds (much less concentrated in northeastern Syria than they are in northern Iraq), conclude that it would be better and wiser to come to terms with Moscow (and therefore find some modus vivendi with Damascus), rather than trusting to the constancy of American promises of autonomy – amid the almost universal regional hostility to this high-risk independence project. Ultimately, it must be obvious to the Kurds that it is Russia (and Iran) that represent the incoming tide into the northern tier states.
The Syrian Kurds never were in the Masoud Barzani camp and long have had working relations with the Syrian army and Russian forces (versus ISIS), during the conflict. It seems, in any event, that the U.S. main focus is shifting away from Syria to Iraq, as the locus in which they hope to push back against Iran. Again, the prospects there for the U.S. to achieve this aim are poor (Iran is well dug in) – and if mishandled, the Kurdish independence “project” easily could spin into violence and region-wide instability.
Barzani’s leadership is not secure (the Turks are livid at his double-cross of pretending that the referendum was only to strengthen his negotiating hand with Baghdad). And the risk of wider conflict, were Barzani to be removed from power, would be contingent on who ultimately succeeded to the leadership.
In sum, the U.S.-Israeli Kurdish “project” seems – paradoxically – more likely forcefully to strengthen the nationalist impulse across the Levant, Turkey and Iran and to make it more assertive – but not in the old way: there is no going back to the status quo ante in Syria. The processes of de-escalation and reconciliation facilitated by Russia – in and of themselves – will change fundamentally the politics of Syria.
A Shift Toward Diversity
If in the past, politics was top-down, it will now be bottom-up. This is where we see something of a synthesis taking place between Levantism and nationalism. The needs of local politics, in all its diversity, will be much more the future drivers of politics. One can see already that this shift to bottom-up politics is already becoming apparent in Iraq, too. (Again, it has been accelerated by the war against the extreme jihadism of ISIS, but now may become further energized by Kurdish claims to disputed Iraqi territories.)
A Russian orchestra performs a concert at Palmyra’s ancient Roman theater on May 5, 2016, after Syrian troops, backed by Russian air power, reclaimed the ancient city from the Islamic State. (Image from RT’s live-streaming of the event)
In some respects, the “ground” in Iraq – the mobilization of the people against these reactionary armed movements – is running ahead of, and away from the Iraqi political leadership, be it political or religious. The unrest may grow, and the government – any government – will have to bend to pressures from their base.
The Western leveraging of minorities against the state – now the Kurds – has already had a major geostrategic impact: that of bringing Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran into close political and military alliance in order to stop this “Kurdish project” from materializing and dissolving the outlines of major states, precisely at their most sensitive juncture.
Essentially, this represents another case where the interests of Israel do not coincide with those of Europe or America. The pursuit of this “Kurdish project” is empowering an alliance – including a major NATO state – that will be explicitly hostile to these American aims (though this does not imply any increase of hostility to the Kurds as a people – though that too may result). The alienation of these states would hardly seem to be in the Western interest, but nonetheless, this is what is occurring.
And finally, the “fallout” from the Syria conflict has prompted the northern tier states to “Look East” – as President Assad recently instructed his diplomats so to do. For Iran it may be primarily to China (as well as to Russia), but for Syria, it is more likely to be Russia in a predominantly cultural way, with China seeing Syria as an “important node” in its Belt & Road Initiative.
This represents a historic shift in the Middle East. Western officials may imagine that they have a hold over Syria by holding reconstruction funding hostage to having their way with Syria’s future: if this is so, they will as wrong about this as they have been on almost everything pertaining to Syria.
Alastair Crooke is a former British diplomat who was a senior figure in British intelligence and in European Union diplomacy. He is the founder and director of the Conflicts Forum.
Re: Levant crisis - III
the old stick of reconstruction funding (iraq has received a paltry amt of the $88b needed to rebuild after the US 'rebuilt' democracy...) is not going to work. Cheen will pump in $$ in exchange for OBOR nodes and take over some ports in a well oiled way.
Re: Levant crisis - III
18 km inside turkiyeSingha wrote:ypg has finally crossed the border and extracted some blood
Rojava Defense Units | YPG
@DefenseUnits
8h8 hours ago
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Seven Turkish troops killed, many others wounded in the action against the operation command of so-called olive branch operation inside Kirikhan district of Hatay, Turkey. Details to follow.
Re: Levant crisis - III
Gilgo
@agire_cudi
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13 turkish soldiers and jihadis killed in Afrin's Rajo district as a result of a successful operation by YPG.
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Replying to @agire_cudi
Slip in the shadows. Strike from behind. Fade away. Bleed the invaders. Leave IED as you leave. Fools rush in.
@agire_cudi
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13 turkish soldiers and jihadis killed in Afrin's Rajo district as a result of a successful operation by YPG.
More
Replying to @agire_cudi
Slip in the shadows. Strike from behind. Fade away. Bleed the invaders. Leave IED as you leave. Fools rush in.
Re: Levant crisis - III
erdogan promoting a free press
RSF_EECA
@RSF_EECA
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BREAKING: Aggravated life sentences for #AhmetAltan, #MehmetAltan & #NazlıIlıcak. The worst possible precedent for many other #journalists tried for alleged connection with 2016 coup attempt, whose trials are also drawing to a close. A black day for #pressfreedom in #Turkey.
RSF_EECA
@RSF_EECA
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BREAKING: Aggravated life sentences for #AhmetAltan, #MehmetAltan & #NazlıIlıcak. The worst possible precedent for many other #journalists tried for alleged connection with 2016 coup attempt, whose trials are also drawing to a close. A black day for #pressfreedom in #Turkey.
Re: Levant crisis - III
tigers shipping in heavy eqpt for east ghouta campaign incl this giant mortar
Re: Levant crisis - III
@MIG29_
24h24 hours ago
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Tiger forces Military reinforcements to East Gouta is the largest military convoy i have seen .
its 4 km of Tanks , Bmp , Artillery .. Etc
24h24 hours ago
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Tiger forces Military reinforcements to East Gouta is the largest military convoy i have seen .
its 4 km of Tanks , Bmp , Artillery .. Etc
Re: Levant crisis - III
the other formation involved will be the 4th republican guard mech division which is already there for some time.
they are the most battle ready of the non-tiger forces formations in saa.
they are the most battle ready of the non-tiger forces formations in saa.
Re: Levant crisis - III
a deal between YPG and Damsacus is imminent it seems . SAA might enter Afrin tomorrow...under what terms is not revealed yet
https://muraselon.com/en/2018/02/breaki ... ypg-media/
https://muraselon.com/en/2018/02/breaki ... ypg-media/
Re: Levant crisis - III
@syria_true
18m18 minutes ago
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Replying to @GeromanAT @MilitaryMaps and 14 others
#SDF and SAA have reached an agreement:"Syrian Army will enter Afrin,on Monday",to protect the borders,according to an official from the #Syrian #Kurdish Democratic Unity Party (#PYD) Sheikho Bilo
0 replies 3 retweets 8 likes
18m18 minutes ago
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Replying to @GeromanAT @MilitaryMaps and 14 others
#SDF and SAA have reached an agreement:"Syrian Army will enter Afrin,on Monday",to protect the borders,according to an official from the #Syrian #Kurdish Democratic Unity Party (#PYD) Sheikho Bilo
0 replies 3 retweets 8 likes
Re: Levant crisis - III
russians have laid on a personal security detail for the Tiger because of the chances of treachery and double dealing as he enters the damascus battles for the first time
he has given a speech where he says will eradicate these limpets on the hull of the ship
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/pr ... sus-video/
he has given a speech where he says will eradicate these limpets on the hull of the ship
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/pr ... sus-video/
Re: Levant crisis - III
muraselon.com
The Syrian army has recently shift focus to the raging battleground of the besieged eastern Ghouta enclave where multiple of opposition factions led by HTS holed up in it.
According to military report, the Tiger Forces have just started bombarding the eastern Ghouta towns of Masraba, Beit Sawa, Ain Tarma that located in eastern Damascus.
“Over 100 rockets struck the rebel positions and their hideouts in preparation to storm them later” military source told Muraselon.
Yesterday, a huge convoy of Syrian troops and heavy equipment belonging to an elite forces of Syrian has begun to arrive in Damascus.
The Syrian army has recently shift focus to the raging battleground of the besieged eastern Ghouta enclave where multiple of opposition factions led by HTS holed up in it.
According to military report, the Tiger Forces have just started bombarding the eastern Ghouta towns of Masraba, Beit Sawa, Ain Tarma that located in eastern Damascus.
“Over 100 rockets struck the rebel positions and their hideouts in preparation to storm them later” military source told Muraselon.
Yesterday, a huge convoy of Syrian troops and heavy equipment belonging to an elite forces of Syrian has begun to arrive in Damascus.
Re: Levant crisis - III
it will be a battle among civilians and in some ways as complex as aleppo city.
Re: Levant crisis - III
another convoy video
https://twitter.com/IvanSidorenko1/stat ... 3236167681
tiger forces even have a portable HQ made of prefab containers with AC and other stuff
https://twitter.com/IvanSidorenko1/stat ... 8550453249
a truly self contained kabila
https://twitter.com/IvanSidorenko1/stat ... 3236167681
tiger forces even have a portable HQ made of prefab containers with AC and other stuff
https://twitter.com/IvanSidorenko1/stat ... 8550453249
a truly self contained kabila
Re: Levant crisis - III
Good analysis by AC.Tx. Singha. It is amazing how asinine US diplomacy in the region is.Look at the Japanese, how they've penetrated every nation through their automobiles, electronic goods, etc.The Germans too with their top line autos.If the US concentrated in selliing their tech. instead of starting conflicts to sell their arms , the world would be a far safer place and the US more popular too.
Re: Levant crisis - III
Peto Lucem
Peto Lucem
@PetoLucem
·
11h
Hundreds of rockets and artillery shells are raining down on insurgent positions in E- #Ghouta. Air force is also participating, turning night into day. #Damascus #Syria
Elijah J. Magnier
Elijah J. Magnier
@ejmalrai
·
9h
#Damascus offered an alternative for al-Ghouta militants to leave to #Idlib or #Daraa before the final assault. Still waiting for the final answer or the beginning of the attack #Damascus. #Russia is pushing the Syrian Government to clear Ghouta.
Peto Lucem
@PetoLucem
·
11h
Hundreds of rockets and artillery shells are raining down on insurgent positions in E- #Ghouta. Air force is also participating, turning night into day. #Damascus #Syria
Elijah J. Magnier
Elijah J. Magnier
@ejmalrai
·
9h
#Damascus offered an alternative for al-Ghouta militants to leave to #Idlib or #Daraa before the final assault. Still waiting for the final answer or the beginning of the attack #Damascus. #Russia is pushing the Syrian Government to clear Ghouta.
Re: Levant crisis - III
one way or another after years of nuisance and civilian shields , the saa will look for a outcome this time.
Re: Levant crisis - III
tribal auxiliary of sheikh turki bouhamad also participating...
looks like after east ghouta is fixed, other areas like daraa and yarmouk camp would be in pipeline.
yarmouk camp like east ghouta is in mortar range from the central core of damascus.
looks like after east ghouta is fixed, other areas like daraa and yarmouk camp would be in pipeline.
yarmouk camp like east ghouta is in mortar range from the central core of damascus.
Re: Levant crisis - III
todays take home worksheet - familiarize with these names.