1. Seems to back the Army cheifs recent statement that IA is ready to cross the border even with baki tactical nukes in the play.
2. The plan seems to surround/enter a city like
Acharya San stopped posting, The The one of the founders of research group ORF is his friend and very interesting fellow.pankajs wrote:
Don't know this guy but is he is commenting on a forum he must have some kind of qualification but an interesting listen. He talks of some war-game simulation done in US.
Khan was probably been feed these tech to see where it is ending. This is the reason US was not serious about him.shiv wrote:Old gyan new article. Xerox Khan network
The Long Shadow of A.Q. Khan | Foreign Affairs
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles ... ow-aq-khan
Lop Nor is in Sinkiang.nam wrote:One question in mind. Did the Tibetan occupation happen because Chinese wanted a desolate test site? Which was not possible in Hanland?
Irrational game
That Pakistan has played the "irrational" game for so long by threatening a nuclear attack was something that clearly escaped this unnamed official. Since rationality is a subjective thing, irrationality is a game two can play. This became clear when even the Pakistani foreign minister, who along with other politicians has often bandied the nuclear threat at India, called Gen Rawat’s statement “very irresponsible”.
While the Pakistanis have dared India to try Pakistan’s resolve, they know that if what Gen Rawat said is now Indian policy, then it signals the end of deterrence as conceived by them. In the words of the Pakistan military spokesman, the only thing that had stopped India for so long was Pakistan's "credible nuclear deterrence". But if India no longer considers Pakistani nuclear threats credible, then what happens to Pakistan's deterrence doctrine?
The fact that India has already injected some ambiguity in its "no first use" posture with senior officials claiming in interviews and in their books that India would not allow Pakistan to strike first with nuclear weapons (which effectively means pre-empting Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons), certainly complicates Pakistan’s strategic calculus which has been built on bleeding India through proxy warfare from behind the safety of its nuclear shield.
It is possible that India is merely playing mind games with the Pakistanis. Even if this is the case, given that cross-LoC raids have been declared, coupled with the Modi government’s ability and capacity for taking risks, means that the Pakistanis will have to go back to the drawing board and re-think their strategic calculus. Not doing so could prove extremely expensive and dangerous for them.
Until Pakistan crumbles and/or B1/B2 bombers from Diego Garcia and snatch teams neutralize their nuclear capability, India isn't going to do sh*t. Simply sit tight and grow your economy and nuclear capability and wave at the Chinese/Taliban across the border who are gobbling up everything outside of the Punjab.ShauryaT wrote:Why India no longer cares about Pakistan's nuclear threats -- Sushant Sareen.Irrational game
That Pakistan has played the "irrational" game for so long by threatening a nuclear attack was something that clearly escaped this unnamed official. Since rationality is a subjective thing, irrationality is a game two can play. This became clear when even the Pakistani foreign minister, who along with other politicians has often bandied the nuclear threat at India, called Gen Rawat’s statement “very irresponsible”.
While the Pakistanis have dared India to try Pakistan’s resolve, they know that if what Gen Rawat said is now Indian policy, then it signals the end of deterrence as conceived by them. In the words of the Pakistan military spokesman, the only thing that had stopped India for so long was Pakistan's "credible nuclear deterrence". But if India no longer considers Pakistani nuclear threats credible, then what happens to Pakistan's deterrence doctrine?
The fact that India has already injected some ambiguity in its "no first use" posture with senior officials claiming in interviews and in their books that India would not allow Pakistan to strike first with nuclear weapons (which effectively means pre-empting Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons), certainly complicates Pakistan’s strategic calculus which has been built on bleeding India through proxy warfare from behind the safety of its nuclear shield.
It is possible that India is merely playing mind games with the Pakistanis. Even if this is the case, given that cross-LoC raids have been declared, coupled with the Modi government’s ability and capacity for taking risks, means that the Pakistanis will have to go back to the drawing board and re-think their strategic calculus. Not doing so could prove extremely expensive and dangerous for them.
Pakistani thinking too!!!Proponents argue that incorporating more low-yield nuclear weapons into the force posture gives the United States the ability to respond to various forms of aggression with more calibrated responses on the so-called escalation ladder (and in theory, deter or defeat that aggression without escalation to the strategic nuclear level). In other words, the Trump administration hopes to generate options beyond “suicide or surrender.”
Parallels to India too!So why does the review call for additional low-yield options? In a word: Russia. The administration’s basic concern is that Russia may try to use a low-yield nuclear weapon on American or allied forces without the United States being able to successfully respond in kind. This forces America into the “suicide or surrender” dilemma of either not responding at all or escalating directly to the strategic thermonuclear level by retaliating against the adversary’s cities (or against all its nuclear forces directly)
I agree with this part, however the article fails to address one major reason why the TNW theory is attractive and it is due to the rationale of proportionality or IOW a step in the escalation ladder before climbing big stairs. The author also bases too much credence on actions based on grave assumptions.When it comes to waging a nuclear war, it is simply unrealistic to base a whole strategy on hoping that an adversary assumes the best-case scenario.
I agree. These are mainly aimed at emerging powers. Also, Russia has plenty of tactical nukes in its arsenal.shiv wrote:In my view these people simply do not understand how the US plans to spend its currency of power.
Comparing US low yield nukes with Pakistan completely misses the point and I have tried to make this point repeatedly. And it has absolutely NOTHING to do with Russia. It is now about NoKo and Iran. (Pakistan is our ally)
If you must wage nuclear war how best to wage it?
Use small (subkiloton) nukes with extremely accurate delivery systems to take out the most threatening targets - nuclear installations, underground missile sites, underground C&C centers etc. If that fails and still invites a retaliation - then the US sill has its mega weapons to wide out the enemy. But 250 low yield weapons (say 0-2 to 2 kilotons) delivered with deadly accuracy wil cause far less fallout and collateral damage than 200 large (100-200 kiloton) weapons.
Absolutely right. That is why I ask why people come up with scenarios in which a nuclear exchange takes place between India and Pakistan and one outcome would be the US and China nuking India. This assumes that the US or China have no concern about that psychological barrier and will willy-nilly use their nukes in a third party war and imagine that no other nation will take the cue and use nukes pre-emptively on them at some future date.ShauryaT wrote:A superpower breaking the threshold by using nuclear payloads against tinpot regimes invites the breaking of a psychological barrier, where other powers may use that logic to lower the threshold for use even further. At the end of the day, lowers the ability of a great power to use their hard power.
Technically I think that the "same goals" cannot be achieved using conventional weapons because most power and definitely rogue powers have shifted their strategic forces underground. There is no weapon other than a nuke that can achieve the overpressure effects to collapse underground facilities.ShauryaT wrote:I get the neat logic of efficient use of low yield devices with pinpoint targeting but the same goals can be achieved with maybe multiple missiles and soon with more powerful non-nuclear payloads, such as the prompt global strike. Not worth going nuclear for that extra super efficiency. If anything, the author gets one thing right, it is about the escalation dominance ladder, the difficulties of being able to carefully manage that ladder in the fog of war notwithstanding.
Officials with the Office of the Secretary of Defense confirmed to Warrior Maven that Mattis here is indeed referring to an emerging “nuclear variant” of the F-35. Multiple news reports, such as Business Insider, cite senior officials saying a nuclear-armed F-35 is slated to emerge in the early 2020s, if not sooner. The F-35 is equipped to carry the B-61 nuclear bomb, according to a report in Air Force Magazine.
It makes sense that the F-35 would increasingly be called upon to function as a key element of US nuclear deterrence strategy; in recent months, F-35s deployed to the Pacific theater to participate in military exercises over the Korean Peninsula. The weapons, ISR technolgoy and multi-role functions of the F-35 potentially provide a wide range of attack options should that be necessary in the region.
Utilizing speed, maneuverability and lower-altitude flight when compared to how a bomber such as a B-2 would operate, a nuclear-capable F-35 presents new threats to a potential adversary. In a tactical sense, it seems that a high-speed F-35, fortified by long-range sensors and targeting technologies, might be well positioned to identify and destroy mobile weapons launchers or other vital, yet slightly smaller on-the-move targets. As part of this equation, an F-35 might also be able to respond much more quickly, with low-yield nuclear weapons in the event that new intelligence information locating a new target emerges.
Shivji et al -shiv wrote:
All expensive research, or expensive systems to ensure accurate delivery of non nuclear weapons (such as Kinetic energy weapons) onto targets that previously called for nuclear weapons are simply an attempt to keep war winnable against (minor?) nuclear powers without going nuclear. That means if a big P5 power was to fight against a nuclear armed pipsqueak - then the idea is that "We can take out your nukes even without using nukes"
But no sensible planner can rely on this - so there is, in parallel, the development of low-yield and accurately deliverable nukes "just in case"yield or even accurate nukes?
Not in full, will do so on an upcoming trip. Thanks.ramana wrote:ShauryaT have you read the new NPR 2018?
Please do read.
Aap key charan kahan hain, Gyani ji !Amber G. wrote:(Added later: 27230 Joules/gm is about 6.5 Calories/gm)
While China has opposed the recently announced US Nuclear Posture Review of 2018 it has not been remiss in developing its nuclear arsenal both quantitatively and qualitatively. Towards the end of January China tested a DF-5C intercontinental ballistic missile equipped with 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). This was a quantum jump from the three warheads of the earlier version DF-5B missile.
Earlier in November China conducted two flight tests of a new missile DF-17 that was attached to a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). China has been the first to conduct such tests even though the US and Russia have been working on the same. The HGV can reach a speed of Mach 5 plus speeds thus capable of delivering nuclear warheads at the target in a matter of minutes.
While this has implications for the US it would also impact India’s evolving nuclear deterrence capabilities that are being built around boosting its missile defence and strike capabilities.
Towards the end of 2017 India conducted its third interceptor missile test to enhance its Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capabilities. On January 18, this was further supplemented by India successfully conducting a pre-induction test of Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile which has a range of 5000 kilometers. Both tests were designed to develop and strengthen the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent.
The BMD test was part of phase two of the ongoing development of India’s two layered BMD system wherein Advanced Air Defence interceptor missile takes on the incoming ballistic missiles in the endo-atmosphere up to low altitudes of 20 to 40 kilometers. The phase one included testing and development of Prithvi Air Defence Missile (PAD) Interceptor and Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) designed for intercepting enemy missiles at exo-atmospheric high altitudes of 50–150 kilometers. Phase 2 is intended to give India capabilities in the class of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD).
The second phase was to be completed by 2016 giving India the technical capability to take on ICBMs with ranges over 5000 kilometers. Apparently, the programme has been somewhat delayed.
There has been considerable debate on the value and worth of BMD systems given that such systems can be penetrated by attacking missiles by a variety of means. The missiles are armed with MIRVed warheads enhances the quality of the attack. Similarly, HGVs would be able to confound the BMD systems. Further, low flying Cruise missiles can also penetrate the missile defences though they have limitations of having short ranges.
India’s No First Use Doctrine is also a compelling factor to strengthen missile defence capabilities in order to enhance the survivability of its nuclear arsenal. Though there has been some debate on the question of India jettisoning its NFU to overcome the nuclear challenges from Pakistan.
China’s evolving BMD capabilities as also technological upgradation of its offensive missiles degrade the value of India’s strategic deterrent against China. While Beijing might avow that their BMD is meant for the U.S. arsenal yet, equally it erodes the value of New Delhi’s nuclear deterrent.
If India has to maintain the credibility of minimal nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis China or for that matter Pakistan then besides strengthening the missile defence India needs to upgrade its strike capabilities. Developing ICBM like AGNI VI with MIRVed warheads is inescapable. While DRDO has been working on developing hypersonic vehicle there have been reports that it may take ten years to conduct a test. Other qualitative improvements of our missiles to beat the adversary’s BMD systems is also an imperative.
(Vinod Anand is Senior Fellow with Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi)
This is fantastic. I will make it into a table and save for sharing..Amber G. wrote:[
Like for radiation I used BED (Banana Equivalent Dose) I compare these things I use the unit ADG ( Energy in Asli Deshi Ghee per unit gram).. which is 27230 Joules/gm with this -
Bullet - (muzzle velocity about speed of sound) = .0015 ADG
TNT = 0.1 ADG (Yes, by weight Ghee (or butter) has 10x more chemical energy)
PETN (Modern Explosives) = 0.16 ADG
Gasoline = 1.5 ADG
KE Weapons (Mach 25) = 1 (which is still 10x TNT so no need to use any additional explosives on a KE weapon)
Asteroids (30 Km/sec) = 16 ADG
U235 = 3,000,000 ADG!
So when all is said and done, nuclear weapons are in a class in itself.
KE Weapons are good but energy supplied in them per unit mass of consumption is comparable to a Jawan with a sledge hammer given a ration of asli deshi ghee ..
(Added later: 27230 Joules/gm is about 6.5 Calories/gm)
For KE weapons use the basic physics formula KE = (1/2) mV^2
Shiv ji you will lose all credibility when you accept the following hook & sinker :shiv wrote:This is fantastic. I will make it into a table and save for sharing..Amber G. wrote:[
Like for radiation I used BED (Banana Equivalent Dose) I compare these things I use the unit ADG ( Energy in Asli Deshi Ghee per unit gram).. which is 27230 Joules/gm with this -
Bullet - (muzzle velocity about speed of sound) = .0015 ADG
TNT = 0.1 ADG (Yes, by weight Ghee (or butter) has 10x more chemical energy)
PETN (Modern Explosives) = 0.16 ADG
Gasoline = 1.5 ADG
KE Weapons (Mach 25) = 1 (which is still 10x TNT so no need to use any additional explosives on a KE weapon)
Asteroids (30 Km/sec) = 16 ADG
U235 = 3,000,000 ADG!
So when all is said and done, nuclear weapons are in a class in itself.
KE Weapons are good but energy supplied in them per unit mass of consumption is comparable to a Jawan with a sledge hammer given a ration of asli deshi ghee ..
(Added later: 27230 Joules/gm is about 6.5 Calories/gm)
For KE weapons use the basic physics formula KE = (1/2) mV^2
I love the Asli Dsi Ghee Unit - it is just as expressive and iconic as "BTU"
Added later: 27230 Joules/gm is about 6.5 Calories/gm
In Medical circles calories are KiloCalories and that figure is correct. The human requirement of 2000 "calories" per day is actually 2000 kCal per dayHaridas wrote:Added later: 27230 Joules/gm is about 6.5 Calories/gm
Haridasji -Haridas wrote:Shiv ji you will lose all credibility when you accept the following hook & sinker :shiv wrote: This is fantastic. I will make it into a table and save for sharing..
I love the Asli Dsi Ghee Unit - it is just as expressive and iconic as "BTU"Added later: 27230 Joules/gm is about 6.5 Calories/gm
R.Chidambram finally drummed out of his chair. Finally a person on the seat who is not incapacitated. Don't know what happened his famous bums from simulation?RoyG wrote:This doesn't make sense to me considering Russia, France, and England all signed and ratified. If India didn't feel comfortable for whatever reason it could've easily signed but not ratified like Israel. It would have been at least one more checkmark in a long list, however insignificant, for NSG membership. Instead we instituted voluntary moratorium aligning ourselves w/ the treaty in question instead of simply signing.
Something doesn't sit right w/ me -> Impose a voluntary moratorium essentially aligning ourselves w/ the treaty in question but don't sign and ratify (despite 3 P5 members doing it), chuck the second thermonuke awaiting testing in 1998 (why have it to begin with?), and keep that 81 yo geezer R Chidambaram chugging along occupying special advisory chair well after retirement.
Strange...
The Shakti series of underground tests 20 years ago were the last, stifled, hurrah of the Indian nuclear weapons programme. Stifled because the thermonuclear device tested on May 11, 1998 was a dud, and the last hurrah because the weapons unit at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, thereafter, went into eclipse, its best and brightest abandoning it. After all what scientific and technological challenge is there when there are no advanced fission, fusion and tailored-yield armaments to design and develop? Worse, official Indian thinking on deterrence is contradictory. Mired in minimalism, it has relied on threats of “massive retaliation”. This mandates the use of a large number of nuclear bombs to dissuade Pakistan from nuclear “first use” and, therefore, an extensive nuclear armoury of our own. So, the nuclear deterrent cannot be “minimum”.
The confused nuclear milieu has been obtained by the Indian government under three Prime Ministers – Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Narendra Modi. With the ‘no testing’ pre-condition of the 2008 nuclear deal with the United States in mind, it has decided that, the country’s strategic arsenal is perfectly adequate now and in the future with just the 20 kiloton (KT) weapon/warhead, the only tested and proven weapon in the inventory. Also, under American pressure, the Indian government has put the brakes on the 12,000km-range inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) project and the testing of the indigenous MIRV (multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles) technology to launch several warheads from a single missile that’s been available for the last 15 years.
In this period, countries who prize their strategic security accelerated their capability build-up. North Korea shrugged off US pressure, answered American bullying with brinksmanship of its own, successfully tested a two-stage 250-350 KT hydrogen bomb, for good measure acquired the Hwasong ICBMs able to hit US cities, and silenced President Donald Trump. Nearer home, Pakistan, ahead of India with 130 nuclear weapons/warheads and counting, boasts of the most rapidly growing nuclear arsenal. It has four 50MW weapon-grade plutonium (WgPu) producing reactors operating in Khushab. Meanwhile, India has yet to build the second 100MW Dhruva WgPu reactor sanctioned in the mid-Nineties. North Korea and Pakistan are where they are courtesy the active “rogue nuclear triad” run by China which guarantees that Islamabad too will brandish thermonuclear weapons of Chinese provenance.
Delhi eschews anything similarly disruptive (like nuclear missile-arming Vietnam) because Indian leaders are more intent on polishing the country’s reputation as “responsible power” and winning plaudits from the US for showing “restraint” than in advancing national interest. So the country’s strategic options end up being hostage to the interests of foreign powers. India’s do-nothing policy has eroded its relative security, and its stature in Asia and the world as a strategically autonomous and independent-minded country.
India can recover its strategic policy freedom by taking several steps. It should fast forward the second Dhruva military reactor and ICBM development, and test-fire MIRV-ed Agni-5s. In lieu of nuclear testing, which Indian Prime Ministers have lacked the guts to resume, two things need to be done to configure and laboratory-test sophisticated thermonuclear weapons designs. The laser inertial confinement fusion facility at the Centre for Advanced Technology, Indore, needs to be refurbished on a war-footing, and a dual-axis radiographic hydrodynamic test facility constructed.
As regards the software of hard nuclear power, the nuclear doctrine has to be revised – something promised in the Bharatiya Janata Party’s 2014 election manifesto but so far ignored by the Modi regime. Without much ado the newly founded Defence Planning Committee should re-work the doctrine to stress flexible response, with ambiguity enhanced by publicizing the fact of doctrinal revision and the jettisoning of the “No First Use” principle, but nothing else. India will thus join the rest of the nuclear weapons crowd in keeping every aspect of its nuclear policy, doctrine and strategy opaque. There are good reasons why, other than in India, there’s no enthusiasm for nuclear “transparency”.
In keeping, moreover, with the passive-defensive mindset of the government and expressly to throttle aggression by a militarily superior China, technologically simple, easy-to-produce, atomic demolition munitions have to be quickly developed for placement in the Himalayan passes that the Chinese Liberation Army is likely to use, backed by forward-deployed canisterised Agni-5 missiles for launch on warning. The onus for India’s nuclear first use will thus rest entirely with China.
In India everything takes another +20 years + babu pace of progress to see the light of the day. The sub program was semi-launched in 1978, IGMDP in 1982, but by even those standards POK-I was 1974!! Maybe that was a false start and the true launch date is POK-II. So, have some hope we will see advances in another 20 years. Patience easy for me to say, sitting pretty on a keyboard.Arima wrote:so much have happened in 20 years in armed forces particularly nuclear reactor for submarine, missiles etc. but what about advancement in nuclear weapons arena?