Two and Half Front War Scenario

Rudradev · Post by **Rudradev** » 30 Jan 2018 04:55

Ramana, the problem is that they have different thresholds for nuke use, stated and unstated. If our strike corps have broken through to Rahim Yar Khan and divided Pakistan in two, and the PLA officers in overall command are saying "don't use nukes", are the Pakis going to listen? Can the Chinese be sure that the Pakis will listen?

Any way we look at it, "Chi-Pak" do not stand to lose equally in a two-front war. China's heartland is far away and beyond the reach of anything except Agnis. Pakistan's is not.

Even if we take nukes out of the equation (which to my mind is unrealistic), this condition still holds. It is a substantial impediment to any joint or cooperative planning. To quote Deans' example, in the Yom Kippur War both Egypt and Syria were equally at risk for Israeli retaliation on their core territories (and both got hit pretty hard on their home turf). This is not the case with China and Pakistan.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 30 Jan 2018 04:59

Yes PLA has to ensure nuke codes are with them in any joint war.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 30 Jan 2018 07:48

ramana wrote: One way Chi-Pak will function is under overall command of PLA officers.

Instead of my writing a Ramayana length post - let me keep it short and say "This won't happen". Willing to discuss at length if anyone is interested.

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 30 Jan 2018 10:11

Rudradev wrote: To quote Deans' example, in the Yom Kippur War both Egypt and Syria were equally at risk for Israeli retaliation on their core territories (and both got hit pretty hard on their home turf). This is not the case with China and Pakistan.

In Yom Kippur, once the initial Syrian attack on the Golan had been stopped, the Israeli counter attack took them within artillery range of
Damascus. The Egyptians OTOH had moved into defensive positions on the Israeli side of the Suez canal, after their successful crossing and retained significant armored reserves behind it - they could have got a ceasefire and claimed victory. The Syrians, facing regime collapse, pushed Egypt into moving their reserves across the canal and undertaking a hasty tank offensive against the waiting Israelis. The Egyptian tanks were decimated and that enabled the IDF to cross the canal, isolate 1 of the 2 Egyptian armies across the canal and threaten the heart of Egypt. Trying to help Syria, cost Egypt a possible victory.

In 1967, there was some joint command of Arab forces. The Jordanian army was forced to attack (against even the wishes of King Hussein) by the Egyptian general placed in command of Jordanian forces. Jordan ended up losing half its land (the West bank and Jerusalem).

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 30 Jan 2018 10:13

Nice tweet

https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/957678203744604160

The Pakistanis won't tell you this, but their confidence has got dented post-Doklam. And they & their 'taller than and deeper than' friends are a bit unsure about all this 2-front tag team action. They are in more negotiations with each other at the moment.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 30 Jan 2018 15:21

Re above tweet - this is all thanks to Modiji and Ajit Doval KC sir.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 30 Jan 2018 17:09

ramana wrote:Nice tweet

https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/957678203744604160

May be their confidence is dented. But, they will not give up. Each has its own strong reason not to.

In the case of Pakistan, they will never give up. In the case of China, the removal of Xi Jinping could delay their obnoxious haste to rule Asia.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 30 Jan 2018 17:41

I would take that Tweet as a personal opinion and not read too much into it. Undoubtedly lack of action against Pakistan would have encouraged them. I am sceptical about the bit that says "they are in talks". How would a lone journalist have inside info into what the Chinese and Pakis are doing? As regards Doklam - when I look at the map - I cannot imagine how the Chinese could have imagined that they could go further with that road without inviting Indian intervention. It was either stupidity or brinkmanship. Yes, it is true that 60 years ago Chinese troops had a free run in border areas and could build roads without seeing a soul. But with India increasing its border vigilance - there are going to be more and more Chinese probes and "encounters" between China and India. The story of a Chini sub surfacing near a Jap ship is the maritime equivalent of Doklam. They are expanding their provocations and will grab any territory that is not guarded. The question is will they fight to get territory that is not theirs to take?

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 30 Jan 2018 18:30

shiv wrote:I would take that Tweet as a personal opinion and not read too much into it. Undoubtedly lack of action against Pakistan would have encouraged them. I am sceptical about the bit that says "they are in talks". How would a lone journalist have inside info into what the Chinese and Pakis are doing? As regards Doklam - when I look at the map - I cannot imagine how the Chinese could have imagined that they could go further with that road without inviting Indian intervention. It was either stupidity or brinkmanship. Yes, it is true that 60 years ago Chinese troops had a free run in border areas and could build roads without seeing a soul. But with India increasing its border vigilance - there are going to be more and more Chinese probes and "encounters" between China and India. The story of a Chini sub surfacing near a Jap ship is the maritime equivalent of Doklam. They are expanding their provocations and will grab any territory that is not guarded. The question is will they fight to get territory that is not theirs to take?

Agree, that he could not know these things for sure.

Re your second point - will they fight to get territory - it would be foolhardy to assume not.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 30 Jan 2018 20:18

I am glad that BRF has a separate military tactics thread because we have never ever managed to organize our discussions enough to reach the right balance of geopolitics and motivations for war along with the actual warfighting itself. Once again I am referring to the possibility of Joint Paki-Chinese actions.

For several years now we (on BRF) have pretty much dismissed the possibility that Pakistan will launch a massive military assault into Indian territory and do a land grab. Is this correct? Are we correct in assuming that "the boot is on the other foot" now and that if anything we are poised to make a deep probe into Pakistan if push comes to shove.

This has a bearing on "2 front war" where there is some sort of coordination between Pakistan and China - with the assumption that both Pakistan and China have agreed upon an end goal that is advantageous to them.

I have to make one assumption here. The assumption is that China will have to launch a significant enough attack on multiple fronts to put severe stress on the Indian defence forces - thus reducing an Indian incentive (and armed might) to make a deep thrust into Pakistan. This breaks the problem up into two parts as far as my thinking goes.

1. Which are the areas where Pakistan can launch a major attack and stress India? There are parts of the LoC - especially near Chhamb where Pakistan may have some tactical advantage. I think the Punjab border is dense with ditch cum bund defences making a Pakistani attack tedious for them (and us). How about Rajasthan or the Rann of Kutch. Tank country - flat land and the possibility of deep inroads a la Longewala? All this assumes that the Chinese have previously commenced a battle that puts us under sever stress giving Pakistan the opportunity to do a land grab.

2. Where can the Chinese create problems? The Dolkam area is one in which we already had some strength. But the Tawang region is where they could press into India in force, along with diversionary attacks in the far eastern corner of Arunachal Pradesh near Walong, In the Doklam area after entering into Bhutan and in the Aksai Chin area - making a "4 front war" to draw up and tie down Indian forces leaving Pakistan an opportunity to do a land grab.

This does not leave India helpless, but my thoughts are looking at 6 areas of conflict - with the Chinese encroaching on 4 fronts and Pakis on 2. We have to anticipate this and see what is needed to severy degrade and decimate any such misadventure.

JMT etc etc

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 30 Jan 2018 20:39

"Revision class"
1. Chinese Logistics Lines in the east (Arunachal Pradesh)

2. Chinese logistics lines to Aksai Chin

nam · Post by **nam** » 30 Jan 2018 21:19

On the topic on joint action between Pak & China, the integration required will be less of a burden, if China can fund a expansion of Pak forces. Pak has no shortage or volunteers to fight us, but they have shortage of money and material. China can easily fund another PA Armour division if required. If majority of the fighting can be delegated to the Pak forces, why would China worry about jointness.

PLAAF drops bombs in the wrong places and kills PA soldiers. Will China care?

Having a PLA unit in Pak, will provide a protection umbrella. This is similar to Russian presence in Syria. Ultimately the Syrian forces are the ones doing the dying.

Given that Pak claims whole of J&K, why would it let go of an chance to deploy in Aksi Chin to mount a offensive across Ladakh? China promises to let Pak keep part of Ladakh which it captures, if it can provides cannon fodder for a offensive across Ladakh.

The comparison with Arab Israel conflict is not a correct one. In those war Israel forces were in between Egypt and Syrian/Jordan forces. The prime objective was to met up. In China & Pak, we are not in between. They have a way to move troops in peace time between them. Moreover the size of the forces and the conflict area is much larger.

hnair · Post by **hnair** » 30 Jan 2018 21:51

The Karakoram highway is the only way they can move people and supplies between countries. A road that at the best of times has no need for Indian action to remain closed to traffic. If they stock up for war during peace time, then those dumps are prominent and juicy targets for IAF as well as various forms of artillery/missiles.

China commanding paki legions is not going to happen, without noticeable changes in paki public attitudes. Pakjabis are yet to show anything other public contempt of China's military men, if those Sherdil pilots comments in Zhuhai is any indication. Pakjabi benchmark is still West Point or Sandhurst and it wont change, without some major push from a committed pro-cheen paki jernail. But if they manage to co-ordinate at anything beyond joint-excersizes, paki-cheeni bhai bhai will become prime targets for all sorts of freedom-fighters, since cheen troops will be dragged into paki internal security operations too. More than India, it will be a major blow for khan, to have cheen jernails being informed about planned coups etc, rather than pentagon ones

nam · Post by **nam** » 30 Jan 2018 22:11

hnair wrote:The Karakoram highway is the only way they can move people and supplies between countries. A road that at the best of times has no need for Indian action to remain closed to traffic. If they stock up for war during peace time, then those dumps are prominent and juicy targets for IAF as well as various forms of artillery/missiles.

Pak already uses Chinese jets, tanks, artillery, SAM etc. China is all practical purpose Pak's Ordnance factory.
So atleast on paper they just need to move troops, incase Pak is required to launch a offensive across Aksi Chin. All the arms can be deployed by China through Tibet.

Pak has more experienced mountain divisions than China. And the reward is capturing North J&K. So in return for China's deployment in Gwadar, Pak mountain divisions can move in to Aksi Chin. As I said it is Pakis are the ones do the dying and allows PLA to concentrate on other fronts.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 30 Jan 2018 22:14

shiv wrote:I am glad that BRF has a separate military tactics thread because we have never ever managed to organize our discussions enough to reach the right balance of geopolitics and motivations for war along with the actual warfighting itself. Once again I am referring to the possibility of Joint Paki-Chinese actions.

For several years now we (on BRF) have pretty much dismissed the possibility that Pakistan will launch a massive military assault into Indian territory and do a land grab. Is this correct? Are we correct in assuming that "the boot is on the other foot" now and that if anything we are poised to make a deep probe into Pakistan if push comes to shove.

This has a bearing on "2 front war" where there is some sort of coordination between Pakistan and China - with the assumption that both Pakistan and China have agreed upon an end goal that is advantageous to them.

I have to make one assumption here. The assumption is that China will have to launch a significant enough attack on multiple fronts to put severe stress on the Indian defence forces - thus reducing an Indian incentive (and armed might) to make a deep thrust into Pakistan. This breaks the problem up into two parts as far as my thinking goes.

1. Which are the areas where Pakistan can launch a major attack and stress India? There are parts of the LoC - especially near Chhamb where Pakistan may have some tactical advantage. I think the Punjab border is dense with ditch cum bund defences making a Pakistani attack tedious for them (and us). How about Rajasthan or the Rann of Kutch. Tank country - flat land and the possibility of deep inroads a la Longewala? All this assumes that the Chinese have previously commenced a battle that puts us under sever stress giving Pakistan the opportunity to do a land grab.

2. Where can the Chinese create problems? The Dolkam area is one in which we already had some strength. But the Tawang region is where they could press into India in force, along with diversionary attacks in the far eastern corner of Arunachal Pradesh near Walong, In the Doklam area after entering into Bhutan and in the Aksai Chin area - making a "4 front war" to draw up and tie down Indian forces leaving Pakistan an opportunity to do a land grab.

This does not leave India helpless, but my thoughts are looking at 6 areas of conflict - with the Chinese encroaching on 4 fronts and Pakis on 2. We have to anticipate this and see what is needed to severy degrade and decimate any such misadventure.

JMT etc etc

Sir do join us on the tactics thread once in a while.

Re Pak launching attacks - this certainly cannot be ruled out. They do think of themselves as 'brilliant offensive commanders', 'kick the hindu on the behind etc' and lets be honest their battle concepts have always been good though they have never been able to execute well. In fact they have been fighting a very clever offensive war against us since the late 90s tying down huge forces, bleeding us in officer and men casualties at pretty much no cost to themselves. So it will be unwise to think they won't launch attacks.

You are right. What is the best place for them to launch attacks - where we expect it least because we expect to attack there- South of Pakjab and in the desert. Our concept is to launch an attack in exactly that area (perhaps a little South) to drive wedge between ARN and ARS. We have 2 strike corps positioned for this. So as a Paki commander this is the area I will attack...maybe even around Gujarat. I would atatck close to built up areas to create panic. And yes Chamb area but doing it in force with the objective of drawing in forces from the valley and LC and the CI grid and at the same time attacking in strength across LC. Then having a insurrection in the valley using their standard proxies including Indian media.

So I think we should not have preconceptions that they will not attack in a certain area and keep a flexible mind and a flexible stance. You never really know and its dangerous to assume enemy will act according to your concept.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 30 Jan 2018 22:34

shiv wrote:"Revision class"
1. Chinese Logistics Lines in the east (Arunachal Pradesh)

2. Chinese logistics lines to Aksai Chin

Excellent videos. The infrastructure is actually very good on the Chinese side. I think estimates of number of troops that can be accommodated is on the lower side.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 30 Jan 2018 22:38

shiv wrote:
2. Where can the Chinese create problems? The Dolkam area is one in which we already had some strength. But the Tawang region is where they could press into India in force, along with diversionary attacks in the far eastern corner of Arunachal Pradesh near Walong, In the Doklam area after entering into Bhutan and in the Aksai Chin area - making a "4 front war" to draw up and tie down Indian forces leaving Pakistan an opportunity to do a land grab.

JMT etc etc

I agree. Should be read along with the videos. But what about the central and Western sectors.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 30 Jan 2018 23:23

In complexity everything is data. Why shoot the messenger?

Its the message.

And maybe he has sources or has foresight to think it could happen.

Right now this thread has many who think 2 front war will not happen.
The premise of this thread is it could happen.

Gen Rawat and ACM Dhanoa have said quite a few times they are preparing for a two front war.
If they saw all those videos they will go home.

Please get over this block.

I don't want data of why it wont happen. That can come later.

BTW except for AK none would pass the MHOW course.

nam · Post by **nam** » 31 Jan 2018 01:10

Gujarat GDP: 199 billion
Maharastra: 390
Punjab: 72
Rajasthan:115
Haryana: 95
Karnataka: 200

That's 1.07 trillion...

This is the value of our economic engine on the western region. In another 10 years, these could potentially double. It is well within Paki capability to cause at-least a 10% destruction.

We need to grow our eastern regions.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 31 Jan 2018 09:47

Akshay Kapoor wrote:
I agree. Should be read along with the videos. But what about the central and Western sectors.

I deliberately left out Central and Western - for simplicity - as an example.

I had done a Google Earth study of Chinese roads approaching Barahoti in Uttarakhand and to my untrained eye the logistics lines for the Chinese do not appear very promising. This is the 3-4 minute video I made about the Barahoti area.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J_BK5BhemOo

As regards the "Western sector" I club the Chinese presence in Aksai Chin along with the more souther parts of the western sector.

If you look at the Chinese highway leading north-west from Manasagangotri - it passes by the Barahoti region - though roads from here to the Uttarkhand border are not all weather roads and the distance is 200 km plus to the highway as indicated in the video. From the Uttarakhand area the Chinese highway moves northwest and passes by the Ngari airfield - a high altitude airfield on the Indus river bed just 50 km from the Indian border. A little northwest of this along the highway comes Ngari city. Ngari is a military garrison town with supposedly great weather. Ngari probably serves as a military hub that serves both the Barahoti region and the Pangong/Spangur area of Aksai Chin further northwest. The Ngari airfield is the most likely origin for the helicopters seen by ITBP troops in Barahoti

Incidentally there are other highways running through the center of Tibet that connect with Ngari - not just the G 219 border highway. Ngari again is quite close to the military positions on the western end of Pangong lake such as Rutog town which finds mention in the 1962 war histories. Ngari is a key town here.

I may be wrong but I got the impression that is push comes to shove India can mount an assault up the Indus river basin. Some details here including the Ngari airfield
https://youtu.be/UNqlLSUg5p8?t=230

In fact the western Chinese military installations I could see are summed up in the first 2 minutes of this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KtCb2P_KOgA

chola · Post by **chola** » 31 Jan 2018 10:17

And maybe he has sources or has foresight to think it could happen.

Right now this thread has many who think 2 front war will not happen.

deleted by mod. Either add to the discussion or keep quiet.

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 31 Jan 2018 11:38

nam wrote:Gujarat GDP: 199 billion
Maharastra: 390
Punjab: 72
Rajasthan:115
Haryana: 95
Karnataka: 200

That's 1.07 trillion...

This is the value of our economic engine on the western region. In another 10 years, these could potentially double. It is well within Paki capability to cause at-least a 10% destruction.

We need to grow our eastern regions.

Pakistan''s GDP is roughly the same as Gujarat. If both sides inflict similar damage and the Western states of India lose 10% of their GDP, it would send Pakistan's GDP into the medieval age.

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 31 Jan 2018 11:57

Shiv's earlier post (6 areas of conflict) is, in my view, a credible scenario for a 2 front war. I would however go with Akshay's assessment of where Pak is likely to attack. Chhamb is where they have a terrain advantage and meets their objective of (trying to) liberate Kashmir, apart from being close to our populated areas, facilitating an insurrection in the valley and creating panic among the media and intellectual classes.

I don't see Pakistan's 2 strike corps moving long distances to strike into Rajasthan/Kutch and take on our 3 strike corps. Pakistani doctrine is to use their strike formations to counter our thrusts, if we move in to Pak - typically in response to any escalation in Kashmir leading to war.
Punjab would represent a grinding battle of attrition. If we deploy faster and fight on Pak soil, even a modest advance into Punjab, of the depth of '65 or '71, would bring Lahore and Sialkot into artillery range, force Pak to commit their armour in a defensive battle and cause economic damage that would reduce their appetite to escalate further - yet staying under Pak's nuclear threshold.

nam · Post by **nam** » 31 Jan 2018 15:15

Deans wrote:
Pakistan''s GDP is roughly the same as Gujarat. If both sides inflict similar damage and the Western states of India lose 10% of their GDP, it would send Pakistan's GDP into the medieval age.

Our issue is it is already in medieval age and there is nothing worthwhile in Pakistan to destroy economically.

It is mercenary of a state.

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 31 Jan 2018 15:35

They are in the medieval age mentally, but have some way to go, before they descend to the economic level of Afghanistan for e.g.

The RAPE class and the Punjabi upper middle class have a comparable standard of living to their counterparts in India. Unlike India, they are the sole decision makers in the country and have hitherto been immune to the effects of war. This class includes the army officer corps, since rich Punjabi families send a son into the army, because that's a good way to get money and prestige (Unlike India, where business is a better option). They are also the people who will realise (before the aam abdul does) that they have got screwed by China, through the CPEC deal.

If a significant part of that community, concentrated in urban Punjab (the area between Lahore and Rawalpindi), find that within a few days of war, they have no power or water, their neighborhood is being shelled, wealth is being eroded (stock markets will crash), transport links broken etc they might reevaluate weather they want to continue a war at China's behest.

nam · Post by **nam** » 31 Jan 2018 18:20

I understand your point. I am assuming there will be Pakis ready for fight. So far I understand them, there seems to be no shortage of it. Even during kargil, there was no shortage of cannon fodder to climb those god forsaken mountains. Even after our hellish barrage, they were still fighting.

Regarding the RAPE class, I had a contact with one of them. During the 2001 standoff, he mentioned they were packing their bags to run off to Dubai!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 Feb 2018 08:33

Kashi · Post by **Kashi** » 01 Mar 2018 11:39

x-post

What's up with our senior officers calling for "dialogue" with Pakistan, including Pakistani military?

First it was General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army Training Command (ARTRAC), Lt Gen M M Naravane

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... e-5080953/

Lt Gen Naravane said that by virtue of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, China has ‘willy-nilly’ become a third party to the J&K dispute despite India’s objections.
..
Referring to the ongoing ceasefire violations on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army Training Command (ARTRAC), Lt Gen M M Naravane on Tuesday said that it will be difficult to restore peace on the border at tactical level, and that a lasting peace with Pakistan can only be found at the negotiating table.

Lt Gen Naravane said 2017 was the worst year in ceasefire violations, and the first two months of 2018 were no better. “Peace on border is difficult to achieve at tactical level alone. Restoring ceasefire requires statesmanship, not brinkmanship,” he said.

Addressing a seminar on “Emerging geo-strategic manifestations in Pakistan — Implications for India” at Panjab University, the Army Commander said that both India and Pakistan have been aggressively pursuing a policy of unrelenting tit-for-tat for the last few years. “But we need to analyse what will be the end result of this approach,” he said. “Kashmir still remains far from normal despite the strategy of matching response being followed by both nations. Be that as it may, there is no shying away from the fact that a lasting peace can only be found at the negotiating table.”

On the way ahead, Lt Gen Naravane said India will have to continue to act with a sense of responsibility, expected of a regional power, while trying to achieve a unanimity of purpose with regard to the policy with Pakistan.
The Army Commander said that Pakistan is like a mirror on the wall. “We need to look at it and not make the same mistakes, particularly in light of growing radicalisation and intolerance within our own society over mundane issues,” he said.

And then we have Lt Gen Surinder Singh, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, almost echoing his statements

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... l-5082346/

"I think this can be worked out. If we can improve our relations with China, we can develop the best possible leverage with Pakistan in times to come,” Lt Gen Singh said.
Does Gen. sa'ab really believe that?

“It will also help us secure one side of the border. People keep talking about a two-front war. It is never a good idea, never a smart idea to fight a two-front war,” he said. He added that there were various options, including re-negotiating some treaties, to bring about some pressure on Pakistan.

“In Pakistan, military’s writ runs. Therefore, sooner or later, we have to talk to their military. I am convinced that on our side also, military diplomacy plays a very important role. Therefore, there has to be a greater role to military diplomacy so that the militaries of the two nations can work with each other and bring about greater confidence in each other and we can go forward,” he said.

Referring to China, the Army commander said the relations were manageable. “There is not that sort of enmity, from people to people or from entire polity on one side and the polity on the other side. There are differences on demarcation of borders. I think this can be worked out. If we can improve our relations with China, we can develop the best possible leverage with Pakistan in times to come,” Lt Gen Singh added. “Working with China will secure one side of border,” he said.

The general also emphasised that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence had reduced the window for conventional conflict.
“You can only push them conventionally to a limit and not beyond that. And no nuclear nation can be browbeaten beyond a particular stage. It is for that nation to lay down the red lines as to what is the limit of the punishment they will take,” he said.

Referring to the possibility of a conventional conflict with Pakistan, Lt Gen Singh said, “Sometimes, conventional conflict does not take place because you can achieve any great military objective but because at times you can get pushed into the conflict due to public opinion. Therefore, sometimes it becomes the case of tail wagging the dog.”

It seems the two senior generals are actually contradicting their COAS's previous statements about being prepared for a two-front war and calling Pakistan's bluff.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Mar 2018 09:37

No India doesnt choose to fight on two front war. This will be imposed.

During 1965 War, India worked very hard to ensure the war was confined to Punjab and Kashmir only.

They did not retaliate against East Pakistan despite provocations and kept quiet when China rattled sabres.

In 1971, timing was chosen to prevent Chinese intervention and East Pakistan business finished before US could intervene.
And POK was not taken back nor Pak forces in West destroyed.

So caution was used when possible.

I would like to read the full speeches.

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 04 Mar 2018 09:58

kashi.. a) i think Gen singh is talking sense..its never smart to fight a 2 front war ( even if u r prepared for it.. ur chances/odds of success are reduced against both the enemies). ..shivaji maharaj was similarly advised by his mother ..to fight one enemy at a time... even hitler paid for opening the russian front durin WWII eventhough they were prepared for it. How prepared we are for a 2 front war will really be revealed only if it happens b) the other general Naravane is also right... we can punish Pakis but it will not stop them from creating trouble. With a combination of military, economic, choking river waters, creating trouble inside pakistan etc we will have to finally make them beg for peace and bring them to negotiations. He is not saying stop punishing pakis on LOC but only saying that this alone will not restore peace.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 15 Mar 2018 22:00

Looks like we are not the only folks working on this 2.5 front war.
ORF has a series of papers that describe the for e ratio perespective.
Bottom line is India is not ready.

http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/ ... front-war/

But the way India deals with it, we are not ever ready. Both in 1965 or 1971 the force ratios were never good.
1965 war the time was not chosen by us and thrust on us with the fear of Chinese sweeping down the slopes ever present.
1971 war had some time leeway. But the Chinese threat was there even then.

VKumar · Post by **VKumar** » 15 Mar 2018 22:30

The safer tactic would be to hold off the stronger enemy whilst swiftly overcoming the weaker one, leaving you with only one to fight, at which stage the enemy will most likely sue for peace.

brvarsh · Post by **brvarsh** » 15 Mar 2018 23:38

Two front war is as detrimental for Pakistan as Chi-Pak are believing it would be for India. Equation is simple - If India is imposed such a scenario, India will have no option but to punish Pakistan to an extent of no return. China would never stop Pakistan to not use Nukes, in fact it will encourage Pakistan to use it so that India could not use it against Chinese target. China would impose a two front war on India with a viable option for them to sacrifice Pakistan to begin with. Two front war is more existential catastrophic for Pakistan than it will be for India.

nam · Post by **nam** » 16 Mar 2018 00:05

If Pak nukes india, we will nuke China. As simple as that.

The Chinese know it very well.

Avtar Singh · Post by **Avtar Singh** » 16 Mar 2018 02:47

^^
Good to hear, I sincerely hope so. Needs to be a pavlovs dog type reaction.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Mar 2018 05:03

Akshay, I did not want to lose this file in the PLA thread.

Lessons of History: PLA at 75 years

Its a US Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publication and has chapter 9 on 1962 war.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Mar 2018 09:58

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 31 Mar 2018 02:26

Ramana:
In the 2.5 front war I asked what is the Center of Gravity of Pakistan? I ment the following:

The term ‘Centre of Gravity’ means something very particular in modern doctrinal terminology, but let’s take the concept more broadly, and apply the original Clausewitzian definition: ‘The hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.’ It becomes somewhat easier to identify and debate what the centre of gravity of any power, of any military, fighting at any point in history.
---'
Rawalpindi is the CG. Just like Dacca for East Pakistan.

anupmisra · Post by **anupmisra** » 31 Mar 2018 18:47

ramana wrote:Akshay, I did not want to lose this file in the PLA thread.

Lessons of History: PLA at 75 years

Its a US Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publication and has chapter 9 on 1962 war.

From that chapter, I quote a few select subsections which need to be reviewed against the current tactics adopted by the PLA at Doklam:

China’s overwhelming victory can be attributed to strong political leadership and proper use of military strategy, or campaign art (zhanyi zhudong quan). PLA records show that some 160 small unit leaders were cited for heroism while the much-maligned commissar system did not seem to adversely affect leadership hierarchy or overall morale. Furthermore, in what it characterizes as the “Counterattack in Self Defense on the China-India Border,” the PLA exhibited brilliant strategic and tactical decision-making. The PLA deployed a strong force decisively, concentrating strength at critical points with the ultimate objective of encirclement. They also utilized the element of surprise whenever possible and took better advantage of the weather and terrain, establishing better lines of transport and communication.

The PLA is quite proud of its record in the war, especially since it suffered such heavy losses in combat in the Korean War. China’s military historians have attributed this success to a combination of audacious action on the battlefield, good leadership, taking advantage of the terrain, good logistics, and strong ideological preparation. By “audacious action” PLA leaders mean the use of initiative and a vigorous offense. On the whole, China’s victory was characterized as an example of good strategy and strong initiative in campaign art (zhanyi zhudong quan). PLA theorists and historians point to Mao Zedong’s discussion of the need to “create local superiority in the campaign” by concentrating strength at decisive points as the inspiration for the conduct of the campaign against India.

If one were to believe this report, the author seems to lay most of the blame on Indian (lack of) strategy, early incursions, claims of land routes beyond McMahon line...

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 05 Jun 2018 19:16

Ravi Rikhye has just written a book (just released on kindle 392 pages) titled `Analysis of India''s ability to fight a 2 front war - 2018'. I've just started reading and it promises to be interesting. Rikhye seems a bit alarmist (a 2 front war will be an unmitigated disaster, unless we significantly increase the size of the army and not just defence spend). Despite his age, his depth and quality of analysis on this subject is unmatched.