Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Old Thread in Trash Can Archive.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Kgoan,
> How do the Paks ensure that it is "Make peace with Pakistanis" and not "kill all Pakistanis"?
I think Ashraf Jehangir Qazi simply has to walk up to the seat of US government and tell whoever is there.
"We don't know where the nuke that hit you came from, but it had nothing to do with us in Pakistan. Our nukes are safe as your own CIA, State department and Defence department will tell you. If you attempt to do anything to us - we will act in self-defense."
When confronted with the isotope signature, Qazi will simply shrug and say,
" It is possible that A Q Khan's private enterprise produced some of this material. The Pakistani government does not approve of his actions, nor of any downstream actions. It is possible that A Q Khan himself never wanted things to be this way - he only sold Uranium enrichment facilities and never sold any triggers or HMX shaped charges etc... This is clearly the work of a demented mind - as "insert famous American politicians name" once said, only a madman will contemplate using such a weapon. This is the work of madmen. Pakistan will offer full cooperation to find these madmen. Pakistani forces are hunting for Osama Bin Laden in Kashmir right now... Indian forces are killing Kashmiri women and children.. yada yada yada.. gibberish gibberish gibberish etc.. etc... "
And at that point the State Dept. diplo-drones will cut in and say obviously what the good Mr. Qazi said is correct, after all he has always supported the American position on Osama Bin Laden and Taliban and that Pakistanis in general are very good people who all wear Armani suits except for the small minority who wear shalwar kameez and grow beards but these people have never won more than 4-5% of the vote in Pakistan. When asked about options, the State Dept. people will say the Army is the last hope for Pakistan.
After that the Defence department will report that there is no way to guarentee that all other Jihadi Delivered Atomic Munitions already in the CONUS can be located and destroyed before they are therefore we must take Mr. Qazi at his word and accept his help to find those munitions. This will place a great burden on the existing defence budget and therefore a special grant must be approved for the same.
> The US could, without much effort, burn the place down to bedrock and, incidentally, bury any inconvenient stuff that may otherwise come up at a future date.
Yes, that is the point - the Pakistanis simply do not care about that. The choice before the Pakistanis right now is a very very stark one:
They can either die in 5-10 years time of hunger and thirst or they can perish in a nuclear holocaust at a time and place of their choosing.
The Pakistanis know there is absolutely no way to change this, and given the military mindset, and the Honor & Dignity syndrome in Pakistan, a nuclear holocaust with all its gotterdammerung type imagery must appeal to the Pakistanis.
Bear in mind that these are people who with a straight face have told Indians that they can bomb `Bombay, Delhi, etc... in 5 minutes'.
> So why wouldn't they? Also, if they don't, whats to stop N Korea or China sneaking a nuke to CONUS and playing the Pak game on a hyper level?
The Pakistanis have had unparalleled access to the US for the better part of twenty years now.
The Chinese and North Koreans will never be treated the same.
> How do the Paks ensure that it is "Make peace with Pakistanis" and not "kill all Pakistanis"?
I think Ashraf Jehangir Qazi simply has to walk up to the seat of US government and tell whoever is there.
"We don't know where the nuke that hit you came from, but it had nothing to do with us in Pakistan. Our nukes are safe as your own CIA, State department and Defence department will tell you. If you attempt to do anything to us - we will act in self-defense."
When confronted with the isotope signature, Qazi will simply shrug and say,
" It is possible that A Q Khan's private enterprise produced some of this material. The Pakistani government does not approve of his actions, nor of any downstream actions. It is possible that A Q Khan himself never wanted things to be this way - he only sold Uranium enrichment facilities and never sold any triggers or HMX shaped charges etc... This is clearly the work of a demented mind - as "insert famous American politicians name" once said, only a madman will contemplate using such a weapon. This is the work of madmen. Pakistan will offer full cooperation to find these madmen. Pakistani forces are hunting for Osama Bin Laden in Kashmir right now... Indian forces are killing Kashmiri women and children.. yada yada yada.. gibberish gibberish gibberish etc.. etc... "
And at that point the State Dept. diplo-drones will cut in and say obviously what the good Mr. Qazi said is correct, after all he has always supported the American position on Osama Bin Laden and Taliban and that Pakistanis in general are very good people who all wear Armani suits except for the small minority who wear shalwar kameez and grow beards but these people have never won more than 4-5% of the vote in Pakistan. When asked about options, the State Dept. people will say the Army is the last hope for Pakistan.
After that the Defence department will report that there is no way to guarentee that all other Jihadi Delivered Atomic Munitions already in the CONUS can be located and destroyed before they are therefore we must take Mr. Qazi at his word and accept his help to find those munitions. This will place a great burden on the existing defence budget and therefore a special grant must be approved for the same.
> The US could, without much effort, burn the place down to bedrock and, incidentally, bury any inconvenient stuff that may otherwise come up at a future date.
Yes, that is the point - the Pakistanis simply do not care about that. The choice before the Pakistanis right now is a very very stark one:
They can either die in 5-10 years time of hunger and thirst or they can perish in a nuclear holocaust at a time and place of their choosing.
The Pakistanis know there is absolutely no way to change this, and given the military mindset, and the Honor & Dignity syndrome in Pakistan, a nuclear holocaust with all its gotterdammerung type imagery must appeal to the Pakistanis.
Bear in mind that these are people who with a straight face have told Indians that they can bomb `Bombay, Delhi, etc... in 5 minutes'.
> So why wouldn't they? Also, if they don't, whats to stop N Korea or China sneaking a nuke to CONUS and playing the Pak game on a hyper level?
The Pakistanis have had unparalleled access to the US for the better part of twenty years now.
The Chinese and North Koreans will never be treated the same.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
YIP,
The Pakistanis are far better equipped to deal with the Americans than either the Soviets or the Facists.
The Pakistanis are far better equipped to deal with the Americans than either the Soviets or the Facists.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
In this scenario it makes sense why the Japanese are friendly with Pakistanis - it is the revenege, stupid!
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/Mar-2004/4/EDITOR/op2.asp
Juicy pickle
FARRUKH KHAN PITAFI
So Seymour M. Hersh is back with his goo-goo tales and inertia ridden intellect. Why didn’t his parent name him ‘See More O Harsh’? Mr Hersh in the second or third line of his article The Deal calls Musharraf a ‘former Army general’. And from here starts an interesting tale of suspense and thriller absolutely amusing just like the well-informed piece of information about the President just mentioned above. So far so good. Our make believe ‘genius’ leaves no stone unturned to give insecure Pakistanis stomach-ache. If journalism means terrorising people and allied governments alike no one is a better journalist than Mr Hersh.
In the article Mr Hersh has talked about an alleged ‘deal’ between Musharraf regime and Washington. As a result the US would overlook the official pardon granted to AQ Khan and Islamabad would let slip into Pakistani Tribal Areas a host of US elite units like Task Force 121 to capture the ghost of Osama. Now on the face of it, it may appear a small exercise in careful guesswork. But actually it appears a carefully crafted move to extract some hidden benefits. Hersh is good at serving mole of the US establishment.
What exactly is his recent piece focused at? If you take this as a sequel to the pieces published previously by the US papers about the US plans to operate inside Pakistani Tribal Areas during last one month it becomes clear that even if the report is not based on any truth it is essentially meant to pressure Islamabad to deliver more. In Islamabad the feeling is growing strength that a puzzled US administration is trying to negotiate through the media to extract maximum strategic mileage. While this feeling might be strong owing to the unpredictable policy outbursts of the US administration, this scribe does not subscribe to them.
The article interestingly also contains an added dimension. Criticism of Pakistan’s beleaguered ISI. In most of the previous pieces published in the western press you could hardly find any direct criticism of the ISI. It was either ‘Nuclear Proliferator In-chief’ A Q Khan or the Army. Now this sudden expansion of criticism from policy makers to policy implementers and information gatherers should not be found baffling. It is essentially a losing battle being waged by the US Neo-Cons like D i c K Cheney and George Tenet who find their career coming to a sudden end. It seems as if the ISI really has some proofs regarding these two wizards of the Pickle Factory being somehow involved in the 9/11 attacks. That is why this campaign of this scathing criticism is launched against ISI too so that its remaining credibility is quickly challenged to the effect that by the end of the day no body trusts at its provided proofs. If that is true it is a sad commentary at the hocus pocus vendor of the Company as well as the US VP. And then the formula as so simple. Buy some discredited sissies from Pakistan. Put words in their mouth and launch a debilitating offensive to rock the boat of your opponents. You have the media might with you.
To our information some moles of Cheney have even contacted Indian leaders to convince them not to really believe in Pakistan’s bid for peace. Why settle only with peace when you can have the entire Pakistani land as the piece of your empire? We are told that the Indian leaders are brave enough not to fall prey to such luring.
My favourite column Lexington in the Economist last week had presented a case for ditching Cheney and replacing him with Bill Owens, the capable governor of Colorado. While the choice of a right candidate for the post of VP is a prerogative of the American people, one question merits attention. Why not Colin Powell? Some say choose a black so why not Condi, some say choose a political vet so why not Juliani. But the fact remains that no American has influenced international opinion more than Mr Powell in the last few years.
There are lessons for our ISI too. While the world speaks of it as a real counterpart of CIA, it is a fact of no mean proportion that this agency has yet to prove its mettle in the world of opinion making. Please reform and improve yourself and focus on your professional matters avoiding politics. Then there is this serious requirement for the change of nomenclature. Why call it ISI when it can really operate as a ‘Conflict Resolution Research Wing’?
Our Indian friends are insisting that their RAW successfully preempted an attack on Musharraf. If that is true then it really is a commendable contribution. Both sides should look forward for cooperating further in all realms.
And now the lost and found section. We are searching for the lost Premier of the country. Have you seen or heard from Mr. Jamali lately. Please let us know if you get any information on him.
E-mail queries and comments to: fkp@nation.com.pk
Juicy pickle
FARRUKH KHAN PITAFI
So Seymour M. Hersh is back with his goo-goo tales and inertia ridden intellect. Why didn’t his parent name him ‘See More O Harsh’? Mr Hersh in the second or third line of his article The Deal calls Musharraf a ‘former Army general’. And from here starts an interesting tale of suspense and thriller absolutely amusing just like the well-informed piece of information about the President just mentioned above. So far so good. Our make believe ‘genius’ leaves no stone unturned to give insecure Pakistanis stomach-ache. If journalism means terrorising people and allied governments alike no one is a better journalist than Mr Hersh.
In the article Mr Hersh has talked about an alleged ‘deal’ between Musharraf regime and Washington. As a result the US would overlook the official pardon granted to AQ Khan and Islamabad would let slip into Pakistani Tribal Areas a host of US elite units like Task Force 121 to capture the ghost of Osama. Now on the face of it, it may appear a small exercise in careful guesswork. But actually it appears a carefully crafted move to extract some hidden benefits. Hersh is good at serving mole of the US establishment.
What exactly is his recent piece focused at? If you take this as a sequel to the pieces published previously by the US papers about the US plans to operate inside Pakistani Tribal Areas during last one month it becomes clear that even if the report is not based on any truth it is essentially meant to pressure Islamabad to deliver more. In Islamabad the feeling is growing strength that a puzzled US administration is trying to negotiate through the media to extract maximum strategic mileage. While this feeling might be strong owing to the unpredictable policy outbursts of the US administration, this scribe does not subscribe to them.
The article interestingly also contains an added dimension. Criticism of Pakistan’s beleaguered ISI. In most of the previous pieces published in the western press you could hardly find any direct criticism of the ISI. It was either ‘Nuclear Proliferator In-chief’ A Q Khan or the Army. Now this sudden expansion of criticism from policy makers to policy implementers and information gatherers should not be found baffling. It is essentially a losing battle being waged by the US Neo-Cons like D i c K Cheney and George Tenet who find their career coming to a sudden end. It seems as if the ISI really has some proofs regarding these two wizards of the Pickle Factory being somehow involved in the 9/11 attacks. That is why this campaign of this scathing criticism is launched against ISI too so that its remaining credibility is quickly challenged to the effect that by the end of the day no body trusts at its provided proofs. If that is true it is a sad commentary at the hocus pocus vendor of the Company as well as the US VP. And then the formula as so simple. Buy some discredited sissies from Pakistan. Put words in their mouth and launch a debilitating offensive to rock the boat of your opponents. You have the media might with you.
To our information some moles of Cheney have even contacted Indian leaders to convince them not to really believe in Pakistan’s bid for peace. Why settle only with peace when you can have the entire Pakistani land as the piece of your empire? We are told that the Indian leaders are brave enough not to fall prey to such luring.
My favourite column Lexington in the Economist last week had presented a case for ditching Cheney and replacing him with Bill Owens, the capable governor of Colorado. While the choice of a right candidate for the post of VP is a prerogative of the American people, one question merits attention. Why not Colin Powell? Some say choose a black so why not Condi, some say choose a political vet so why not Juliani. But the fact remains that no American has influenced international opinion more than Mr Powell in the last few years.
There are lessons for our ISI too. While the world speaks of it as a real counterpart of CIA, it is a fact of no mean proportion that this agency has yet to prove its mettle in the world of opinion making. Please reform and improve yourself and focus on your professional matters avoiding politics. Then there is this serious requirement for the change of nomenclature. Why call it ISI when it can really operate as a ‘Conflict Resolution Research Wing’?
Our Indian friends are insisting that their RAW successfully preempted an attack on Musharraf. If that is true then it really is a commendable contribution. Both sides should look forward for cooperating further in all realms.
And now the lost and found section. We are searching for the lost Premier of the country. Have you seen or heard from Mr. Jamali lately. Please let us know if you get any information on him.
E-mail queries and comments to: fkp@nation.com.pk
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Any ideas where the older thread is? Its not in the trash can archive.
Thanks, ramana
Thanks, ramana
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
It's HereOriginally posted by ramana:
Any ideas where the older thread is? Its not in the trash can archive.
Thanks, ramana
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
iirc remember the harrowing interview with the Pak brigadier ? his view is both India and Pak are suffering from poverty and a nuclear war is desirable to put people out of their misery and start anew. even had a photo of I'bad on wall with a bunch of missiles taking off towards india.
suicidal types do exist. but are the corps commanders of that vein ?
all the RAPE wealth stashed away abroad, all their rich kids enjoying life in NYC and sydney could be squeezed by Unkil....
suicidal types do exist. but are the corps commanders of that vein ?
all the RAPE wealth stashed away abroad, all their rich kids enjoying life in NYC and sydney could be squeezed by Unkil....
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Pitafi's article is interesting.
Clearly a warning shot. No, I'm not saying that Cheney or the CIA were involved, but the Paks are letting folk know that they do have cards to play. i.e. It sounds as if they're making an ambit claim.
Sunil, good points. But scary.
Clearly a warning shot. No, I'm not saying that Cheney or the CIA were involved, but the Paks are letting folk know that they do have cards to play. i.e. It sounds as if they're making an ambit claim.
Sunil, good points. But scary.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
As a hypothetical scenario, suppose Pakistan (army, ISI and Mushy) decide to come clean about everything. I mean everything - nuke acquirements, nuke proliferations, Taliban help, drug trade, jihad factory, BCCI, WTC conspiracy, the works. Guess who (all) will be facing treason charges in US ?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
"As a hypothetical scenario, suppose Pakistan (army, ISI and Mushy) decide to come clean about everything. I mean everything - nuke acquirements, nuke proliferations, Taliban help, drug trade, jihad factory, BCCI, WTC conspiracy, the works. Guess who (all) will be facing treason charges in US ?"
And then I wondered what Al-Paweel meant when he said that the US had "interests/assets" in TSP, just after 911 and before the US moved its current assets in there.............. :p
And then I wondered what Al-Paweel meant when he said that the US had "interests/assets" in TSP, just after 911 and before the US moved its current assets in there.............. :p
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
I loved Sunils posts - including the last one at the end of the old thread, and the one above.
But then again I cannot get myself to disagree with YIP in his last post that says:
I find the thoughts very interesting.
Is there such a thing as a "soft option" that the US could use faced with a rogue nuclear attack on the US? I mean a soft option like asking the nation to "give up" its nukes or else? hat sounds like Indian behavior to me.
I can think of only two reasons for the a US government to go soft on Pakistan in response to a rogue nuke attack.
a) The US will count the cost of taking Pakistan and say "Hey losing one city in the US is less expensive than taking Pakistan"
or
b) Too many influential groups in the US government have been involved in supporting and propping up Pakistan, and they would feel that their lives would be more at risk from exposure by Pakistani army/ISI/drug/proliferation lords than by another nuclear attack. The US city is gone now and cannot be brought back - so why martyr themselves and lose the good life they have built up
The second scenario would be treachery at the highest level. The word "dharma" encompasses a lot of things including personal integrity of the highest order. One of the reaosns why people of my father's generation were enamoured of the US scientific establishment was the presence of this unshakeable bedrock of integrity which seemed to pervade every sphere of US life.
But that intergity has gone. The scientists have lost it along with the government. Once that level of integrity goes, people start looking at saving their own a$$es before their nation. The Paki army has done it for decades. Are there influential groups in the US government who are doing that? Exposing key criminals in Pakistan will simultaneously expose key US collaborators who have ignored all signals in the US. After all India was howling "terrorism, terrorism, terrorism" for years and the US did not really give a fck till 9-11. And even after that it is half hearted. I see complicity here from key people within the US intel establishment probably.
Finally - I bet my testimonials that any rogue nuclear attack on the US will be a Pakistani design with Pakistani trained people - but will use stolen Plutonium from the former Soviet Union. How convenient for Pakistan and a$$ savers of the US.
But then again I cannot get myself to disagree with YIP in his last post that says:
Tim, incidentally said that in his opinion there could be one of two "grades" of US response to a nuclear attck on US territory with a Pakistani signature.Let me offer my understanding of the American response mechanism: US allied with Soviets to overcome fascism; then with islamic fundamentalists to overthrow Soviets; now they are fishing for allies to fight the fundoos. This mechanism is consistent even at smaller scales: Aristide is propped up to solve a problem; when he becomes a liability, he gets hustled out. Need I belabor this further by talking about Saddam, Noreiga et al?
So the general method is to use a solution that is most expedient for the problem at hand, without worrying about the long term "karmic" repercussions of the means to achieve the end. Read what Tim has just posted in this light, and think about Mush in terms of the august company listed here. This is certainly not how India or Indians approach problems, but then, different strokes for different folks.
I find the thoughts very interesting.
Is there such a thing as a "soft option" that the US could use faced with a rogue nuclear attack on the US? I mean a soft option like asking the nation to "give up" its nukes or else? hat sounds like Indian behavior to me.
I can think of only two reasons for the a US government to go soft on Pakistan in response to a rogue nuke attack.
a) The US will count the cost of taking Pakistan and say "Hey losing one city in the US is less expensive than taking Pakistan"
or
b) Too many influential groups in the US government have been involved in supporting and propping up Pakistan, and they would feel that their lives would be more at risk from exposure by Pakistani army/ISI/drug/proliferation lords than by another nuclear attack. The US city is gone now and cannot be brought back - so why martyr themselves and lose the good life they have built up
The second scenario would be treachery at the highest level. The word "dharma" encompasses a lot of things including personal integrity of the highest order. One of the reaosns why people of my father's generation were enamoured of the US scientific establishment was the presence of this unshakeable bedrock of integrity which seemed to pervade every sphere of US life.
But that intergity has gone. The scientists have lost it along with the government. Once that level of integrity goes, people start looking at saving their own a$$es before their nation. The Paki army has done it for decades. Are there influential groups in the US government who are doing that? Exposing key criminals in Pakistan will simultaneously expose key US collaborators who have ignored all signals in the US. After all India was howling "terrorism, terrorism, terrorism" for years and the US did not really give a fck till 9-11. And even after that it is half hearted. I see complicity here from key people within the US intel establishment probably.
Finally - I bet my testimonials that any rogue nuclear attack on the US will be a Pakistani design with Pakistani trained people - but will use stolen Plutonium from the former Soviet Union. How convenient for Pakistan and a$$ savers of the US.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Again, I simply have trouble grasping the assumptions in some of the posts. Genuine disagreements on this forum aren't rare, so it should come as no surprise.
My theory is based on the old Jim Croce song. You don't tug on Superman's cape. You don't spit into the wind. You don't pull the mask off the old Lone Ranger.
And the one really, really stupid thing you can do that modern history (150 years) has demonstrated time and time again - you don't do something that really p***es off the American public.
When we get mad, and go to war ugly, we rearrange entire countries. It's not something most Americans are comfortable with, but it's the default option if you poke us with a big stick. I'm not saying that with particular pride, or with imperialist ambition, or anything else in mind. I simply believe it is a fact. There's an impression of American casualty sensitivies and general strategic incoherence that paints us as a paper tiger, and there is some truth to that assertion - when the objective we're fighting for is of debatable value (an issue that may re-surface in Iraq).
But when the American public gets mad, we really do fight both ugly and very effectively. It doesn't happen often. But it has always been a bad idea.
If somebody blows a nuke off in the US, the gloves come off. I am in complete - but polite - disagreement with Sunil on this.
Tim
My theory is based on the old Jim Croce song. You don't tug on Superman's cape. You don't spit into the wind. You don't pull the mask off the old Lone Ranger.
And the one really, really stupid thing you can do that modern history (150 years) has demonstrated time and time again - you don't do something that really p***es off the American public.
When we get mad, and go to war ugly, we rearrange entire countries. It's not something most Americans are comfortable with, but it's the default option if you poke us with a big stick. I'm not saying that with particular pride, or with imperialist ambition, or anything else in mind. I simply believe it is a fact. There's an impression of American casualty sensitivies and general strategic incoherence that paints us as a paper tiger, and there is some truth to that assertion - when the objective we're fighting for is of debatable value (an issue that may re-surface in Iraq).
But when the American public gets mad, we really do fight both ugly and very effectively. It doesn't happen often. But it has always been a bad idea.
If somebody blows a nuke off in the US, the gloves come off. I am in complete - but polite - disagreement with Sunil on this.
Tim
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
I think Sunil has been reading Irving Wallace. 
As for American response to a WMD attack on a major city, lets see:
Prior to 9/11/2001, I would have said that the response would be swift, sure and devastating - and directed at those who attacked them.
Post-9/13/2001, I would say that the response would be swift, sure and devastating - and directed at those who are the easiest and most convenient targets. With brave assistance, of course from the FrontLyin' Al-Lie in Responding to Terror, the nuclear-proliferating, terrorist-directing, mass-murdering, drug-dealing, ar-causing, Dictator-of-the-day in Terrorist Pakistan.
In retrospect, what amazes me is that Woodrow Wilson didn't declare war on Grenada in retaliation for the sinking of the Lusitania...
... or Franklin Roosevelt on the Phillippines. I mean, there was enough navy left to invade the Phillippines, with help from the Frontline Al-Lie, Chief Executive Officer HiroHito who had already occupied Manila like Musharraf and his brutal Army had occupied Afghanistan???
And then, of course, why didn't Roosevelt and Adm. Nimitz use "Shahk-in-ah" with the help of a Dossier read out in such fine oratory by the Poodle Churchill to overthrow the brutal regime of Chief Mongo-Mongo of Tahiti before he launched those chemical-weapon canoes against America at 15 minutes' notice.
These would have been soooo much more cost-effective.. Strategically brilliant - I mean, a new world order, with Nippo-China and Nippo-Indo-Asia, all friendly with America???
General MacArthur could have said:
As for American response to a WMD attack on a major city, lets see:
Prior to 9/11/2001, I would have said that the response would be swift, sure and devastating - and directed at those who attacked them.
Post-9/13/2001, I would say that the response would be swift, sure and devastating - and directed at those who are the easiest and most convenient targets. With brave assistance, of course from the FrontLyin' Al-Lie in Responding to Terror, the nuclear-proliferating, terrorist-directing, mass-murdering, drug-dealing, ar-causing, Dictator-of-the-day in Terrorist Pakistan.
In retrospect, what amazes me is that Woodrow Wilson didn't declare war on Grenada in retaliation for the sinking of the Lusitania...
... or Franklin Roosevelt on the Phillippines. I mean, there was enough navy left to invade the Phillippines, with help from the Frontline Al-Lie, Chief Executive Officer HiroHito who had already occupied Manila like Musharraf and his brutal Army had occupied Afghanistan???
And then, of course, why didn't Roosevelt and Adm. Nimitz use "Shahk-in-ah" with the help of a Dossier read out in such fine oratory by the Poodle Churchill to overthrow the brutal regime of Chief Mongo-Mongo of Tahiti before he launched those chemical-weapon canoes against America at 15 minutes' notice.
These would have been soooo much more cost-effective.. Strategically brilliant - I mean, a new world order, with Nippo-China and Nippo-Indo-Asia, all friendly with America???
General MacArthur could have said:
Mysteries of Hysterie. Very confusing.I Shall Return. With $300M of debt relief for Frontlyin' Al-Lie HiroHito, to keep Japan from falling into the hands of Extremists. And throw in a few aircraft carriers to help Adm. Yamo bin Moto protect Japan from invasion by the brutal Chinese from the Disputed Territory of Nanking.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Let me just put this way for all of you sub genius strategists: If the US gets nuked and we reasonably think it came from Pakistan, you might want to get concerned if you are downwind from the prevailing weather patterns in Pakistan. And you know what? You guys think this is just yayhoo chest thumping. That's okay. The US doesn't have to prove anything in this regard. We'll just take our time. No rush. No need for any fancy ICBM missiles. Hey, we'll drop leaflets first. We'll let them have a running start. It'll make it more fun.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
My $0.02
Should a nuclear/dirty bomb type device explode in the US due to terrorist action, there will be hell to pay somewhere.
But who will pay is the question. Let's suppose a Paki connection is discerned. Should the US choose to give TSP a few days to do xyz or else face war, who is going to implement that policy? It's going to be the same South Asia Bureau of the State Department and the shady dealmakers there. They know very well that should military action be taken against Pakistan, the next step will be an expose of their past actions during the investigations into the events leading up to the JDAM act. An "about to be castrated" Pakistan may not be able to threaten the US physically but may decide to come clean about the past shady deals just to spite the US.
Given this, there is a more than reasonable chance that the administration might find some imaginary al-Q camp in Afghanistan or Waziristan and bomb the heck out of it. Of course, "stalwart ally" Pakistan would provide the US all support and a 1200% assurance that no nukes will leak again.
The South Asia mafia in the US is that entrenched, I'm afraid to say.
Should a nuclear/dirty bomb type device explode in the US due to terrorist action, there will be hell to pay somewhere.
But who will pay is the question. Let's suppose a Paki connection is discerned. Should the US choose to give TSP a few days to do xyz or else face war, who is going to implement that policy? It's going to be the same South Asia Bureau of the State Department and the shady dealmakers there. They know very well that should military action be taken against Pakistan, the next step will be an expose of their past actions during the investigations into the events leading up to the JDAM act. An "about to be castrated" Pakistan may not be able to threaten the US physically but may decide to come clean about the past shady deals just to spite the US.
Given this, there is a more than reasonable chance that the administration might find some imaginary al-Q camp in Afghanistan or Waziristan and bomb the heck out of it. Of course, "stalwart ally" Pakistan would provide the US all support and a 1200% assurance that no nukes will leak again.
The South Asia mafia in the US is that entrenched, I'm afraid to say.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
TSJ, the key words are 'and we are reasonably sure that it came from Pakistan' - We being who? The state dept? reasonably sure means what? KRL love letter to the POTUS ? Mohammad Atta received a wire transfer of 100k+ from the intelligence hocho of Pakistan - Atta went on killing 3000+ Americans. You think Feds crawling over Pakistan is good enough ? While the Feds were crawling all over Pakistan AQK still merrily went of spreading Nuke tech like confetti to all the bad guys. US did squat to him or to his masters. Getting a chance to hunt for OBL inside pakistan is good enough ?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Eagerly awaiting TSJs response to thisOriginally posted by Abhijit_ST:
TSJ, the key words are 'and we are reasonably sure that it came from Pakistan' - We being who? The state dept? reasonably sure means what? KRL love letter to the POTUS ? Mohammad Atta received a wire transfer of 100k+ from the intelligence hocho of Pakistan - Atta went on killing 3000+ Americans. You think Feds crawling over Pakistan is good enough ? While the Feds were crawling all over Pakistan AQK still merrily went of spreading Nuke tech like confetti to all the bad guys. US did squat to him or to his masters. Getting a chance to hunt for OBL inside pakistan is good enough ?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
I heard Seymour Hersh at 8:50 AM (Pecific Time) on NPR. He was being interviewd following his THE DEAL artcle in the New Yorker. And now it is evening time and did not see it being mentioned on this thread.
THE DEAL - The New Yorker
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Why is Washington going easy on Pakistan’s nuclear black marketers?
Issue of 2004-03-08
Posted 2004-03-01
On February 4th, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is revered in Pakistan as the father of the country’s nuclear bomb, appeared on a state-run television network in Islamabad and confessed that he had been solely responsible for operating an international black market in nuclear-weapons materials. His confession was accepted by a stony-faced Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s President, who is a former Army general, and who dressed for the occasion in commando fatigues. The next day, on television again, Musharraf, who claimed to be shocked by Khan’s misdeeds, nonetheless pardoned him, citing his service to Pakistan (he called Khan “my hero”). Musharraf told the Times that he had received a specific accounting of Khan’s activities in Iran, North Korea, and Malaysia from the United States only last October. “If they knew earlier, they should have told us,” he said. “Maybe a lot of things would not have happened.”
It was a make-believe performance in a make-believe capital. In interviews last month in Islamabad, a planned city built four decades ago, politicians, diplomats, and nuclear experts dismissed the Khan confession and the Musharraf pardon with expressions of scorn and disbelief. For two decades, journalists and American and European intelligence agencies have linked Khan and the Pakistani intelligence service, the I.S.I. (Inter-Service Intelligence), to nuclear-technology transfers, and it was hard to credit the idea that the government Khan served had been oblivious. “It is state propaganda,” Samina Ahmed, the director of the Islamabad office of the International Crisis Group, a nongovernmental organization that studies conflict resolution, told me. “ The deal is that Khan doesn’t tell what he knows. Everybody is lying. The tragedy of this whole affair is that it doesn’t serve anybody’s needs.” Mushahid Hussain Sayed, who is a member of the Pakistani senate, said with a laugh, “America needed an offering to the gods—blood on the floor. Musharraf told A.Q., ‘ Bend over for a *****king .’”
A Bush Administration intelligence officer with years of experience in nonproliferation issues told me last month, “One thing we do know is that this was not a rogue operation. Suppose Edward Teller had suddenly decided to spread nuclear technology and equipment around the world. Do you really think he could do that without the government knowing? How do you get missiles from North Korea to Pakistan? Do you think A.Q. shipped all the centrifuges by Federal Express? The military has to be involved, at high levels.” The intelligence officer went on, “ We had every opportunity to put a stop to the A. Q. Khan network fifteen years ago. Some of those involved today in the smuggling are the children of those we knew about in the eighties. It’s the second generation now. ”
In public, the Bush Administration accepted the pardon at face value. Within hours of Musharraf’s television appearance, Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, praised him as “the right man at the right time.” Armitage added that Pakistan had been “very forthright in the last several years with us about proliferation.” A White House spokesman said that the Administration valued Musharraf’s assurances that “Pakistan was not involved in any of the proliferation activity.” A State Department spokesman said that how to deal with Khan was “a matter for Pakistan to decide.”
Musharraf, who seized power in a coup d’état in 1999, has been a major ally of the Bush Administration in the war on terrorism. According to past and present military and intelligence officials, however, Washington’s support for the pardon of Khan was predicated on what Musharraf has agreed to do next: look the other way as the U.S. hunts for Osama bin Laden in a tribal area of northwest Pakistan dominated by the forbidding Hindu Kush mountain range, where he is believed to be operating. American commanders have been eager for permission to conduct major sweeps in the Hindu Kush for some time, and Musharraf has repeatedly refused them. Now, with Musharraf’s agreement, the Administration has authorized a major spring offensive that will involve the movement of thousands of American troops.
Musharraf has proffered other help as well. A former senior intelligence official said to me, “Musharraf told us, ‘We’ve got guys inside. The people who provide fresh fruits and vegetables and herd the goats’” for bin Laden and his Al Qaeda followers. “It’s a quid pro quo: we’re going to get our troops inside Pakistan in return for not forcing Musharraf to deal with Khan.”
The spring offensive could diminish the tempo of American operations in Iraq. “It’s going to be a full-court press,” one Pentagon planner said. Some of the most highly skilled Special Forces units, such as Task Force 121, will be shifted from Iraq to Pakistan. Special Forces personnel around the world have been briefed on their new assignments, one military adviser told me, and in some cases have been given “warning orders”—the stage before being sent into combat.
A large-scale American military presence in Pakistan could also create an uproar in the country and weaken Musharraf’s already tenuous hold on power. The operation represents a tremendous gamble for him personally (he narrowly survived two assassination attempts in December) and, by extension, for the Bush Administration—if he fell, his successor might be far less friendly to the United States. One of Musharraf’s most vocal critics inside Pakistan is retired Army Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, a fundamentalist Muslim who directed the I.S.I. from 1987 to 1989, at the height of the Afghan war with the Soviets. If American troops start operating from Pakistan, there will be “a rupture in the relationship,” Gul told me. “Americans think others are slaves to them.” Referring to the furor over A. Q. Khan, he added, “We may be in a jam, but we are a very honorable nation. We will not allow the American troops to come here. This will be the breaking point.” If Musharraf has made an agreement about letting American troops operate in Pakistan, Gul said, “he’s lying to you.”
The greatest risk may be not to Musharraf, or to the stability of South Asia, but to the ability of the international nuclear monitoring institutions to do their work. Many experts fear that, with Khan’s help, the world has moved closer to a nuclear tipping point. Husain Haqqani, who was a special assistant to three prime ministers before Musharraf came to power and is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted, with some pride, that his nation had managed to make the bomb despite American sanctions. But now, he told me, Khan and his colleagues have gone wholesale: “Once they had the bomb, they had a shopping list of what to buy and where. A. Q. Khan can bring a plain piece of paper and show me how to get it done—the countries, people, and telephone numbers. ‘ This is the guy in Russia who can get you small quantities of enriched uranium. You in Malaysia will manufacture the stuff. Here’s who will miniaturize the warhead. And then go to North Korea and get the damn missile.’” He added, “This is not a few scientists pocketing money and getting rich. It’s a state policy.”
Haqqani depicted Musharraf as truly “on the American side,” in terms of resisting Islamic extremism, but, he said, “he doesn’t know how to be on the American side. The same guys in the I.S.I. who have done this in the last twenty years he expects to be his partners. These are people who’ve done nothing but covert operations: One, screw India. Two, deceive America. Three, expand Pakistan’s influence in the Islamic community. And, four, continue to spread nuclear technology.” He paused. “Musharraf is trying to put out the fire with the help of the people who started the fire,” he said.
“Much of this has been known for decades to the American intelligence community,” Haqqani added. “Sometimes you know things and don’t want to do anything about it. Americans need to know that your government is not only downplaying this but covering it up. You go to bed with our I.S.I. They know how to suck up to you. You let us get away with everything. Why can’t you be more honest? There’s no harm in telling us the truth—‘Look, you’re an ally but a very disturbing ally.’ You have to nip some of these things in the bud.”
The former senior American intelligence official was equally blunt. He told me, “Khan was willing to sell blueprints, centrifuges, and the latest in weaponry. He was the worst nuclear-arms proliferator in the world and he’s pardoned—with not a squeak from the White House.”
The most recent revelations about the nuclear black market were triggered by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a now defunct opposition group that has served as the political wing of the People’s Mujahideen Khalq, a group that has been on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations since 1997. The National Council lobbied in Washington for decades, and offered information—not always accurate—about Iran. There had been suspicions about Iran’s nuclear intentions since the eighties, but the country’s religious rulers claimed that its nuclear facilities were intended for peaceful purposes only. In August of 2002, the National Council came up with something new: it announced at a news conference in Washington that it had evidence showing that Iran had secretly constructed two extensive nuclear-weapons facilities in the desert south of Tehran. The two plants were described with impressive specificity. One, near Natanz, had been depicted by Iranian officials as part of a desert-eradication program. The site, surrounded by barbed wire, was said to include two work areas buried twenty-five feet underground and ringed by concrete walls more than eight feet thick. The second plant, which was said to be producing heavy water for use in making weapons-grade plutonium, was situated in Arak and ostensibly operated as an energy company.
Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the organization that monitors nuclear proliferation, eventually followed up on the National Council’s information. And it checked out.
A building that I.A.E.A. inspectors were not able to gain full access to on a visit in March, 2003, was found on a subsequent trip to contain a centrifuge facility behind a wall made of boxes. Inspectors later determined that some of the centrifuges had been supplied by Pakistan. They also found traces of highly enriched uranium on centrifuge components manufactured in Iran and Pakistan. The I.A.E.A. has yet to determine whether the uranium originated in Pakistan: the enriched materials could have come from the black market, or from a nuclear proliferator yet to be discovered, or from the Iranians’ own production facilities.
Last October, the Iranian government, after nine months of denials and obfuscation—and increasingly productive inspections—formally acknowledged to the I.A.E.A. that it had secretly been producing small quantities of enriched uranium and plutonium, and had been operating a pilot heavy-water reactor program, all potentially in violation of its obligations under the nuclear-nonproliferation treaty. Some of the secret programs, Iran admitted, dated back eighteen years. At first, the country’s religious leadership claimed that its scientists had worked on their own, and not with the help of outside suppliers. The ayatollahs later admitted that this was not the case, but refused to say where the help had come from.
Iran’s leaders continued to insist that their goal was to produce nuclear energy, not nuclear weapons, and, in a public report last November, the I.A.E.A. stopped short of accusing them of building a bomb. Cautiously, it stated, “It is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations . . . with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use. . . . To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.”
Privately, however, senior proliferation experts were far less reserved. “I know what they did,” one official in Vienna told me, speaking of the Iranians. “They’ve been lying all the time and they’ve been cheating all the time.” Asked if he thought that Iran now has the bomb, the official said no. Asked if he thought that Iran had enough enriched uranium to make a bomb, he said, “I’m not sure.”
Musharraf has insisted that any dealings between A. Q. Khan and Iran were independent of, and unknown to, the Pakistani government. But there is evidence to contradict him. On a trip to the Middle East last month, I was told that a number of years ago the Israeli signals-intelligence agency, known as Unit 8200, broke a sophisticated Iranian code and began monitoring communications that included talk between Iran and Pakistan about Iran’s burgeoning nuclear-weapons program. The Israeli intelligence community has many covert contacts inside Iran, stemming from the strong ties it had there before the overthrow of the Shah, in 1979; some of these ties still exist. Israeli intelligence also maintained close contact with many Iranian opposition groups, such as the National Council. A connection was made—directly or indirectly—and the Israeli intelligence about Iran’s nuclear program reached the National Council. A senior I.A.E.A. official subsequently told me that he knew that the Council’s information had originated with Israeli intelligence, but he refused to say where he had learned that fact. (An Israeli diplomat in Washington, asked to comment, said, “Why would we work with a Mickey Mouse outlet like the Council?”)
The Israeli intercepts have been shared, in some form, with the United States intelligence community, according to the former senior intelligence official, and they show that high-level officials in Islamabad and Tehran had frequent conversations about the I.A.E.A. investigation and its implications. “The interpretation is the issue here,” the former official said. “If you set the buzzwords aside, the substance is that the Iranians were saying, ‘We’ve got to play with the I.A.E.A. We don’t want to blow our cover, but we have to show some movement. There’s no way we’re going against world public opinion—no way. We’ve got to show that we’re coöperating and get the Europeans on our side.’” (At the time, Iran was engaged in negotiations with the European Union on trade and other issues.) It’s clear from the intercepts, however, the former intelligence official said, that Iran did not want to give up its nuclear potential. The Pakistani response, he added, was “Don’t give away the whole ballgame and we’ll look out for you.” There was a further message from Pakistan, the former official said: “Look out for your own interests.”
In the official’s opinion, Pakistan and Iran have survived the crisis: “They both did what they said they’d do, and neither one has been hurt. No one has been damaged. The public story is still that Iran never really got there—which is bullshit.” And analysts throughout the American intelligence community, he said, are asking, “How could it be that Pakistan’s done all these things—developed a second generation of miniaturized and boosted weapons—and yet the investigation has been shorted to ground?”
A high-level intelligence officer who has access to the secret Iran-Pakistan exchanges told me that he understood that “the Pakistanis were very worried that the Iranians would give their name to the I.A.E.A.” The officer, interviewed in Tel Aviv, told me that Israel remains convinced that “the Iranians do not intend to give up the bomb. What Iran did was report to the I.A.E.A. the information that was already out in the open and which they cannot protect. There is much that is not exposed.” Israeli intelligence, he added, continues to see digging and other nuclear-related underground activity in Iran. A nonproliferation official based in Vienna later explained that Iran has bored two holes near a uranium-mining operation that are “deep enough to do a test”—as deep as two hundred metres. The design of the bomb that could be tested, he added, if Iran chose to do so, came from Libya, via Pakistan and A. Q. Khan.
Last December, President Bush and Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, jointly announced that Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, had decided to give up his nuclear-weapons program and would permit I.A.E.A. inspectors to enter his country. The surprise announcement, the culmination of nine months of secret talks, was followed immediately by a six-day inspection by the I.A.E.A., the first of many inspections, and the public unveiling, early this year, of the role of yet another country, Malaysia, in the nuclear black market. Libya had been able to purchase hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of nuclear parts, including advanced centrifuges designed in Pakistan, from a firm in Malaysia, with a free-trade zone in Dubai serving as the main shipping point. It was a new development in an old arms race: Malaysia, a high-tech nation with no indigenous nuclear ambitions, was retailing sophisticated nuclear gear, based on designs made available by Khan.
The centrifuge materials that the inspectors found in Libya had not been assembled—in most cases, in fact, the goods were still in their shipping cases. “I am not impressed by what I’ve seen,” a senior nonproliferation official told me. “It was not a well-developed program—not a serious research-and-development approach to make use of what they bought. It was useless. But I was absolutely struck by what the Libyans were able to buy. What’s on the market is absolutely horrendous. It’s a Mafia-type business, with corruption and secrecy.”
I.A.E.A. inspectors, to their dismay, even found in Libya precise blueprints for the design and construction of a half-ton nuclear weapon. “It’s a sweet little bomb, put together by engineers who know how to assemble a weapon,” an official in Vienna told me. “No question it’ll work. Just dig a hole and test it. It’s too big and too heavy for a Scud, but it’ll go into a family car. It’s a terrorist’s dream.”
In a speech on February 5th at Georgetown University, George Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, hailed the developments in Libya as an American intelligence coup. Tenet said, “We learned of all this through the powerful combination of technical intelligence, careful and painstaking analytic work, operational daring, and, yes, the classic kind of human intelligence that people have led you to believe we no longer have.” The C.I.A. unquestionably has many highly motivated and highly skilled agents. But interviews with former C.I.A. officials and with two men who worked closely with Libyan intelligence present a different story.
Qaddafi had been seeking a reconciliation with the West for years, with limited success. Then, a former C.I.A. operations officer told me, Musa Kusa, the longtime head of Libyan intelligence, urged Qaddafi to meet with Western intelligence agencies and open up his weapons arsenal to international inspection. The C.I.A. man quoted Kusa as explaining that, as the war with Iraq drew near, he had warned Qaddafi, “You are nuts if you think you can defeat the United States. Get out of it now. Surrender now and hope they accept your surrender.”
One Arab intelligence operative told me that Libyan intelligence, with Qaddafi’s approval, then quickly offered to give American and British intelligence details about a centrifuge deal that was already under way. The parts were due to be shipped aboard a German freighter, the B.B.C. China. In October, the freighter was seized, and the incident was proclaimed a major intelligence success. But, the operative said, it was “the Libyans who blew up the Pakistanis,” and who made the role of Khan’s black market known. The Americans, he said, asked “questions about those orders and Libya said it had them.” It was, in essence, a sting, and was perceived that way by Musharraf. He was enraged by what he called, in a nationally televised speech last month—delivered in Urdu, and not officially translated by the Pakistani government—the betrayal of Pakistan by his “Muslim brothers” in both Libya and Iran . There was little loyalty between seller and buyer. “The Pakistanis took a lot of Libya’s money and gave second-grade plans,” the Arab intelligence operative said. “It was halfhearted.”
The intelligence operative went on, “Qaddafi is very pragmatic and studied the timing. It was the right time. The United States wanted to have a success story, and he banked on that.”
Because of the ongoing investigation into Khan and his nuclear-proliferation activities, the I.A.E.A.’s visibility and credibility have grown.The key issue, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the I.A.E.A., told me, in an interview at the organization’s headquarters in Vienna, is non-state actors. “I have a nightmare that the spread of enriched uranium and nuclear material could result in the operation of a small enrichment facility in a place like northern Afghanistan,” he said. “Who knows? It’s not hard for a non-state to hide, especially if there is a state in collusion with it. Some of these non-state groups are very sophisticated.”
Many diplomats in Vienna expressed frustration at the I.A.E.A.’s inability, thanks to Musharraf’s pardon, to gain access to Khan. “It’s not going to happen,” one diplomat said. “We are getting some coöperation from Pakistan, but it’s the names we need to know. ‘Who got the stuff?’ We’re interested to know whether other nations that we’re supposed to supervise have the stuff.” The diplomat told me he believed that the United States was unwilling to publicly state the obvious: that there was no way the Pakistani government didn’t know about the transfers. He said, “Of course it looks awful, but Musharraf will be indebted to you.”
The I.A.E.A.’s authority to conduct inspections is limited. The nations that have signed the nonproliferation treaty are required to permit systematic I.A.E.A. inspections of their declared nuclear facilities for research and energy production. But there is no mechanism for the inspection of suspected nuclear-weapons sites, and many at the I.A.E.A. believe that the treaty must be modified. “There is a nuclear network of black-market centrifuges and weapons design that the world has yet to discover,” a diplomat in Vienna told me. In the past, he said, the I.A.E.A. had worked under the assumption that nations would cheat on the nonproliferation treaty “to produce and sell their own nuclear material.” He said, “What we have instead is a black-market network capable of producing usable nuclear materials and nuclear devices that is not limited to any one nation. We have nuclear dealers operating outside our front door, and we have no control over them—no matter how good we are in terms of verification.” There would be no need, in other words, for A. Q. Khan or anyone else in Pakistan to have a direct role in supplying nuclear technology. The most sensitive nuclear equipment would be available to any country—or any person or group, presumably—that had enough cash.
“This is a question of survival,” the diplomat said, with a caustic smile. He added, “Iraq is laughable in comparison with this issue. The Bush Administration was hunting the shadows instead of the prey.”
Another nonproliferation official depicted the challenge facing the I.A.E.A. inspection regime as “a seismic shift—the globalization of the nuclear world.” The official said, “We have to move from inspecting declared sites to ‘Where does this **** come from?’ If we stay focussed on the declared, we miss the nuclear supply matrix.” At this point, the international official asked me, in all seriousness, “Why hasn’t A. Q. Khan been taken out by Israel or the United States?”
After Pakistan’s role in providing nuclear aid to Iran and Libya was revealed, Musharraf insisted once again, this time at the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland, in January, that he would not permit American troops to search for Al Qaeda members inside Pakistan. “That is not a possibility at all,” he said. “It is a very sensitive issue. There is no room for any foreign elements coming and assisting us. We don’t need any assistance.”
Nonetheless, a senior Pentagon adviser told me in mid-February, the spring offensive is on. “We’re entering a huge period of transition in Iraq,” the adviser said, referring to the coming changeover of forces, with many of the experienced regular Army combat units being replaced by National Guard and Army Reserve units. “We will not be conducting a lot of ops, and so you redirect and exploit somewhere else.”
The operation, American officials said, is scheduled to involve the redeployment to South Asia of thousands of American soldiers, including members of Task Force 121. The logistical buildup began in mid-February, as more than a dozen American C-17 cargo planes began daily flights, hauling helicopters, vehicles, and other equipment to military bases in Pakistan. Small teams of American Special Forces units have been stationed at the Shahbaz airbase, in northwestern Pakistan, since the beginning of the Afghanistan war, in the fall of 2001.
The senior Pentagon adviser, like other military and intelligence officials I talked to, was cautious about the chances of getting what the White House wants—Osama bin Laden. “It’s anybody’s guess,” he said, adding that Ops Sec—operational security—for the planned offensive was poor. The former senior intelligence official similarly noted that there was concern inside the Joint Special Operations Command, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, over the reliability of intercepted Al Qaeda telephone calls. “What about deception?” he said. “These guys are not dumb, and once the logistical aircraft begin to appear”—the American C-17s landing every night at an airbase in Pakistan—“you know something is going on.”
“We’ve got to get Osama bin Laden, and we know where he is,” the former senior intelligence official said. Osama bin Laden is “communicating through sigint”—talking on satellite telephones and the like—“and his wings have been clipped. He’s in his own Alamo in northern Pakistan. It’s a natural progress—whittling down alternative locations and then targeting him. This is not, in theory, a ‘Let’s go and hope’ kind of thing. They’ve seen what they think is him.” But the former official added that there were reasons to be cautious about such reports, especially given that bin Laden hasn’t been seen for so long. Bin Laden would stand out because of his height; he is six feet five. But the target area is adjacent to Swat Valley, which is populated by a tribe of exceptionally tall people.
Two former C.I.A. operatives with firsthand knowledge of the PakistanAfghanistan border areas said that the American assault, if it did take place, would confront enormous logistical problems. “It’s impenetrable,” said Robert Baer, who visited the Hindu Kush area in the early nineties, before he was assigned to lead the C.I.A.’s anti-Saddam operations in northern Iraq. “There are no roads, and you can’t get armor up there. This is where Alexander the Great lost an entire division. The Russians didn’t even bother to go up there. Everybody’s got a gun. That area is worse than Iraq.” Milton Bearden, who ran the C.I.A.’s operations in Afghanistan during the war with the Soviet Union, recounted, “I’ve been all through there. The Pashtun population in that belt has lived there longer than almost any other ethnic group has lived anywhere on earth.” He said, “Our intelligence has got to be better than it’s been. Anytime we go into something driven entirely by electoral politics, it doesn’t work out.”
One American intelligence consultant noted that American forces in Afghanistan have crossed into Pakistan in “hot pursuit” of Al Qaeda suspects in previous operations, with no complaints from the Pakistani leadership. If the American forces strike quickly and decisively against bin Laden from within Pakistan, he added, “Musharraf could say he gave no advance authorization. We can move in with so much force and firepower—with so much shock and awe—that we will be too fast for him.” The consultant said, “The question is, how deep into Pakistan can we pursue him?” He added, “Musharraf is in a very tough position.”
At home, Musharraf is in more danger than ever over his handling of the nuclear affair. “He’s opened up Pandora’s box, and he will never be able to manage it,” Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan, a former government minister who now heads an opposition party, said. “Pakistani public opinion feels that A.Q. has been made a scapegoat, and international opinion thinks he’s a threat. This is a no-win situation for Musharraf. The average man feels that there will be a nuclear rollback, and Pakistan’s immediate deterrent will be taken away. It comes down to an absolute disaster for Musharraf.”
Robert Gallucci, a former United Nations weapons inspector who is now dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, calls A. Q. Khan “the Johnny Appleseed” of the nuclear-arms race. Gallucci, who is a consultant to the C.I.A. on proliferation issues, told me, “Bad as it is with Iran, North Korea, and Libya having nuclear-weapons material, the worst part is that they could transfer it to a non-state group. That’s the biggest concern, and the scariest thing about all this—that Pakistan could work with the worst terrorist groups on earth to build nuclear weapons. There’s nothing more important than stopping terrorist groups from getting nuclear weapons. The most dangerous country for the United States now is Pakistan, and second is Iran.” Gallucci went on, “We haven’t been this vulnerable since the British burned Washington in 1814.”
THE DEAL - The New Yorker
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Why is Washington going easy on Pakistan’s nuclear black marketers?
Issue of 2004-03-08
Posted 2004-03-01
On February 4th, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is revered in Pakistan as the father of the country’s nuclear bomb, appeared on a state-run television network in Islamabad and confessed that he had been solely responsible for operating an international black market in nuclear-weapons materials. His confession was accepted by a stony-faced Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s President, who is a former Army general, and who dressed for the occasion in commando fatigues. The next day, on television again, Musharraf, who claimed to be shocked by Khan’s misdeeds, nonetheless pardoned him, citing his service to Pakistan (he called Khan “my hero”). Musharraf told the Times that he had received a specific accounting of Khan’s activities in Iran, North Korea, and Malaysia from the United States only last October. “If they knew earlier, they should have told us,” he said. “Maybe a lot of things would not have happened.”
It was a make-believe performance in a make-believe capital. In interviews last month in Islamabad, a planned city built four decades ago, politicians, diplomats, and nuclear experts dismissed the Khan confession and the Musharraf pardon with expressions of scorn and disbelief. For two decades, journalists and American and European intelligence agencies have linked Khan and the Pakistani intelligence service, the I.S.I. (Inter-Service Intelligence), to nuclear-technology transfers, and it was hard to credit the idea that the government Khan served had been oblivious. “It is state propaganda,” Samina Ahmed, the director of the Islamabad office of the International Crisis Group, a nongovernmental organization that studies conflict resolution, told me. “ The deal is that Khan doesn’t tell what he knows. Everybody is lying. The tragedy of this whole affair is that it doesn’t serve anybody’s needs.” Mushahid Hussain Sayed, who is a member of the Pakistani senate, said with a laugh, “America needed an offering to the gods—blood on the floor. Musharraf told A.Q., ‘ Bend over for a *****king .’”
A Bush Administration intelligence officer with years of experience in nonproliferation issues told me last month, “One thing we do know is that this was not a rogue operation. Suppose Edward Teller had suddenly decided to spread nuclear technology and equipment around the world. Do you really think he could do that without the government knowing? How do you get missiles from North Korea to Pakistan? Do you think A.Q. shipped all the centrifuges by Federal Express? The military has to be involved, at high levels.” The intelligence officer went on, “ We had every opportunity to put a stop to the A. Q. Khan network fifteen years ago. Some of those involved today in the smuggling are the children of those we knew about in the eighties. It’s the second generation now. ”
In public, the Bush Administration accepted the pardon at face value. Within hours of Musharraf’s television appearance, Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, praised him as “the right man at the right time.” Armitage added that Pakistan had been “very forthright in the last several years with us about proliferation.” A White House spokesman said that the Administration valued Musharraf’s assurances that “Pakistan was not involved in any of the proliferation activity.” A State Department spokesman said that how to deal with Khan was “a matter for Pakistan to decide.”
Musharraf, who seized power in a coup d’état in 1999, has been a major ally of the Bush Administration in the war on terrorism. According to past and present military and intelligence officials, however, Washington’s support for the pardon of Khan was predicated on what Musharraf has agreed to do next: look the other way as the U.S. hunts for Osama bin Laden in a tribal area of northwest Pakistan dominated by the forbidding Hindu Kush mountain range, where he is believed to be operating. American commanders have been eager for permission to conduct major sweeps in the Hindu Kush for some time, and Musharraf has repeatedly refused them. Now, with Musharraf’s agreement, the Administration has authorized a major spring offensive that will involve the movement of thousands of American troops.
Musharraf has proffered other help as well. A former senior intelligence official said to me, “Musharraf told us, ‘We’ve got guys inside. The people who provide fresh fruits and vegetables and herd the goats’” for bin Laden and his Al Qaeda followers. “It’s a quid pro quo: we’re going to get our troops inside Pakistan in return for not forcing Musharraf to deal with Khan.”
The spring offensive could diminish the tempo of American operations in Iraq. “It’s going to be a full-court press,” one Pentagon planner said. Some of the most highly skilled Special Forces units, such as Task Force 121, will be shifted from Iraq to Pakistan. Special Forces personnel around the world have been briefed on their new assignments, one military adviser told me, and in some cases have been given “warning orders”—the stage before being sent into combat.
A large-scale American military presence in Pakistan could also create an uproar in the country and weaken Musharraf’s already tenuous hold on power. The operation represents a tremendous gamble for him personally (he narrowly survived two assassination attempts in December) and, by extension, for the Bush Administration—if he fell, his successor might be far less friendly to the United States. One of Musharraf’s most vocal critics inside Pakistan is retired Army Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, a fundamentalist Muslim who directed the I.S.I. from 1987 to 1989, at the height of the Afghan war with the Soviets. If American troops start operating from Pakistan, there will be “a rupture in the relationship,” Gul told me. “Americans think others are slaves to them.” Referring to the furor over A. Q. Khan, he added, “We may be in a jam, but we are a very honorable nation. We will not allow the American troops to come here. This will be the breaking point.” If Musharraf has made an agreement about letting American troops operate in Pakistan, Gul said, “he’s lying to you.”
The greatest risk may be not to Musharraf, or to the stability of South Asia, but to the ability of the international nuclear monitoring institutions to do their work. Many experts fear that, with Khan’s help, the world has moved closer to a nuclear tipping point. Husain Haqqani, who was a special assistant to three prime ministers before Musharraf came to power and is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted, with some pride, that his nation had managed to make the bomb despite American sanctions. But now, he told me, Khan and his colleagues have gone wholesale: “Once they had the bomb, they had a shopping list of what to buy and where. A. Q. Khan can bring a plain piece of paper and show me how to get it done—the countries, people, and telephone numbers. ‘ This is the guy in Russia who can get you small quantities of enriched uranium. You in Malaysia will manufacture the stuff. Here’s who will miniaturize the warhead. And then go to North Korea and get the damn missile.’” He added, “This is not a few scientists pocketing money and getting rich. It’s a state policy.”
Haqqani depicted Musharraf as truly “on the American side,” in terms of resisting Islamic extremism, but, he said, “he doesn’t know how to be on the American side. The same guys in the I.S.I. who have done this in the last twenty years he expects to be his partners. These are people who’ve done nothing but covert operations: One, screw India. Two, deceive America. Three, expand Pakistan’s influence in the Islamic community. And, four, continue to spread nuclear technology.” He paused. “Musharraf is trying to put out the fire with the help of the people who started the fire,” he said.
“Much of this has been known for decades to the American intelligence community,” Haqqani added. “Sometimes you know things and don’t want to do anything about it. Americans need to know that your government is not only downplaying this but covering it up. You go to bed with our I.S.I. They know how to suck up to you. You let us get away with everything. Why can’t you be more honest? There’s no harm in telling us the truth—‘Look, you’re an ally but a very disturbing ally.’ You have to nip some of these things in the bud.”
The former senior American intelligence official was equally blunt. He told me, “Khan was willing to sell blueprints, centrifuges, and the latest in weaponry. He was the worst nuclear-arms proliferator in the world and he’s pardoned—with not a squeak from the White House.”
The most recent revelations about the nuclear black market were triggered by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a now defunct opposition group that has served as the political wing of the People’s Mujahideen Khalq, a group that has been on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations since 1997. The National Council lobbied in Washington for decades, and offered information—not always accurate—about Iran. There had been suspicions about Iran’s nuclear intentions since the eighties, but the country’s religious rulers claimed that its nuclear facilities were intended for peaceful purposes only. In August of 2002, the National Council came up with something new: it announced at a news conference in Washington that it had evidence showing that Iran had secretly constructed two extensive nuclear-weapons facilities in the desert south of Tehran. The two plants were described with impressive specificity. One, near Natanz, had been depicted by Iranian officials as part of a desert-eradication program. The site, surrounded by barbed wire, was said to include two work areas buried twenty-five feet underground and ringed by concrete walls more than eight feet thick. The second plant, which was said to be producing heavy water for use in making weapons-grade plutonium, was situated in Arak and ostensibly operated as an energy company.
Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the organization that monitors nuclear proliferation, eventually followed up on the National Council’s information. And it checked out.
A building that I.A.E.A. inspectors were not able to gain full access to on a visit in March, 2003, was found on a subsequent trip to contain a centrifuge facility behind a wall made of boxes. Inspectors later determined that some of the centrifuges had been supplied by Pakistan. They also found traces of highly enriched uranium on centrifuge components manufactured in Iran and Pakistan. The I.A.E.A. has yet to determine whether the uranium originated in Pakistan: the enriched materials could have come from the black market, or from a nuclear proliferator yet to be discovered, or from the Iranians’ own production facilities.
Last October, the Iranian government, after nine months of denials and obfuscation—and increasingly productive inspections—formally acknowledged to the I.A.E.A. that it had secretly been producing small quantities of enriched uranium and plutonium, and had been operating a pilot heavy-water reactor program, all potentially in violation of its obligations under the nuclear-nonproliferation treaty. Some of the secret programs, Iran admitted, dated back eighteen years. At first, the country’s religious leadership claimed that its scientists had worked on their own, and not with the help of outside suppliers. The ayatollahs later admitted that this was not the case, but refused to say where the help had come from.
Iran’s leaders continued to insist that their goal was to produce nuclear energy, not nuclear weapons, and, in a public report last November, the I.A.E.A. stopped short of accusing them of building a bomb. Cautiously, it stated, “It is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations . . . with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use. . . . To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.”
Privately, however, senior proliferation experts were far less reserved. “I know what they did,” one official in Vienna told me, speaking of the Iranians. “They’ve been lying all the time and they’ve been cheating all the time.” Asked if he thought that Iran now has the bomb, the official said no. Asked if he thought that Iran had enough enriched uranium to make a bomb, he said, “I’m not sure.”
Musharraf has insisted that any dealings between A. Q. Khan and Iran were independent of, and unknown to, the Pakistani government. But there is evidence to contradict him. On a trip to the Middle East last month, I was told that a number of years ago the Israeli signals-intelligence agency, known as Unit 8200, broke a sophisticated Iranian code and began monitoring communications that included talk between Iran and Pakistan about Iran’s burgeoning nuclear-weapons program. The Israeli intelligence community has many covert contacts inside Iran, stemming from the strong ties it had there before the overthrow of the Shah, in 1979; some of these ties still exist. Israeli intelligence also maintained close contact with many Iranian opposition groups, such as the National Council. A connection was made—directly or indirectly—and the Israeli intelligence about Iran’s nuclear program reached the National Council. A senior I.A.E.A. official subsequently told me that he knew that the Council’s information had originated with Israeli intelligence, but he refused to say where he had learned that fact. (An Israeli diplomat in Washington, asked to comment, said, “Why would we work with a Mickey Mouse outlet like the Council?”)
The Israeli intercepts have been shared, in some form, with the United States intelligence community, according to the former senior intelligence official, and they show that high-level officials in Islamabad and Tehran had frequent conversations about the I.A.E.A. investigation and its implications. “The interpretation is the issue here,” the former official said. “If you set the buzzwords aside, the substance is that the Iranians were saying, ‘We’ve got to play with the I.A.E.A. We don’t want to blow our cover, but we have to show some movement. There’s no way we’re going against world public opinion—no way. We’ve got to show that we’re coöperating and get the Europeans on our side.’” (At the time, Iran was engaged in negotiations with the European Union on trade and other issues.) It’s clear from the intercepts, however, the former intelligence official said, that Iran did not want to give up its nuclear potential. The Pakistani response, he added, was “Don’t give away the whole ballgame and we’ll look out for you.” There was a further message from Pakistan, the former official said: “Look out for your own interests.”
In the official’s opinion, Pakistan and Iran have survived the crisis: “They both did what they said they’d do, and neither one has been hurt. No one has been damaged. The public story is still that Iran never really got there—which is bullshit.” And analysts throughout the American intelligence community, he said, are asking, “How could it be that Pakistan’s done all these things—developed a second generation of miniaturized and boosted weapons—and yet the investigation has been shorted to ground?”
A high-level intelligence officer who has access to the secret Iran-Pakistan exchanges told me that he understood that “the Pakistanis were very worried that the Iranians would give their name to the I.A.E.A.” The officer, interviewed in Tel Aviv, told me that Israel remains convinced that “the Iranians do not intend to give up the bomb. What Iran did was report to the I.A.E.A. the information that was already out in the open and which they cannot protect. There is much that is not exposed.” Israeli intelligence, he added, continues to see digging and other nuclear-related underground activity in Iran. A nonproliferation official based in Vienna later explained that Iran has bored two holes near a uranium-mining operation that are “deep enough to do a test”—as deep as two hundred metres. The design of the bomb that could be tested, he added, if Iran chose to do so, came from Libya, via Pakistan and A. Q. Khan.
Last December, President Bush and Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, jointly announced that Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, had decided to give up his nuclear-weapons program and would permit I.A.E.A. inspectors to enter his country. The surprise announcement, the culmination of nine months of secret talks, was followed immediately by a six-day inspection by the I.A.E.A., the first of many inspections, and the public unveiling, early this year, of the role of yet another country, Malaysia, in the nuclear black market. Libya had been able to purchase hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of nuclear parts, including advanced centrifuges designed in Pakistan, from a firm in Malaysia, with a free-trade zone in Dubai serving as the main shipping point. It was a new development in an old arms race: Malaysia, a high-tech nation with no indigenous nuclear ambitions, was retailing sophisticated nuclear gear, based on designs made available by Khan.
The centrifuge materials that the inspectors found in Libya had not been assembled—in most cases, in fact, the goods were still in their shipping cases. “I am not impressed by what I’ve seen,” a senior nonproliferation official told me. “It was not a well-developed program—not a serious research-and-development approach to make use of what they bought. It was useless. But I was absolutely struck by what the Libyans were able to buy. What’s on the market is absolutely horrendous. It’s a Mafia-type business, with corruption and secrecy.”
I.A.E.A. inspectors, to their dismay, even found in Libya precise blueprints for the design and construction of a half-ton nuclear weapon. “It’s a sweet little bomb, put together by engineers who know how to assemble a weapon,” an official in Vienna told me. “No question it’ll work. Just dig a hole and test it. It’s too big and too heavy for a Scud, but it’ll go into a family car. It’s a terrorist’s dream.”
In a speech on February 5th at Georgetown University, George Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, hailed the developments in Libya as an American intelligence coup. Tenet said, “We learned of all this through the powerful combination of technical intelligence, careful and painstaking analytic work, operational daring, and, yes, the classic kind of human intelligence that people have led you to believe we no longer have.” The C.I.A. unquestionably has many highly motivated and highly skilled agents. But interviews with former C.I.A. officials and with two men who worked closely with Libyan intelligence present a different story.
Qaddafi had been seeking a reconciliation with the West for years, with limited success. Then, a former C.I.A. operations officer told me, Musa Kusa, the longtime head of Libyan intelligence, urged Qaddafi to meet with Western intelligence agencies and open up his weapons arsenal to international inspection. The C.I.A. man quoted Kusa as explaining that, as the war with Iraq drew near, he had warned Qaddafi, “You are nuts if you think you can defeat the United States. Get out of it now. Surrender now and hope they accept your surrender.”
One Arab intelligence operative told me that Libyan intelligence, with Qaddafi’s approval, then quickly offered to give American and British intelligence details about a centrifuge deal that was already under way. The parts were due to be shipped aboard a German freighter, the B.B.C. China. In October, the freighter was seized, and the incident was proclaimed a major intelligence success. But, the operative said, it was “the Libyans who blew up the Pakistanis,” and who made the role of Khan’s black market known. The Americans, he said, asked “questions about those orders and Libya said it had them.” It was, in essence, a sting, and was perceived that way by Musharraf. He was enraged by what he called, in a nationally televised speech last month—delivered in Urdu, and not officially translated by the Pakistani government—the betrayal of Pakistan by his “Muslim brothers” in both Libya and Iran . There was little loyalty between seller and buyer. “The Pakistanis took a lot of Libya’s money and gave second-grade plans,” the Arab intelligence operative said. “It was halfhearted.”
The intelligence operative went on, “Qaddafi is very pragmatic and studied the timing. It was the right time. The United States wanted to have a success story, and he banked on that.”
Because of the ongoing investigation into Khan and his nuclear-proliferation activities, the I.A.E.A.’s visibility and credibility have grown.The key issue, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the I.A.E.A., told me, in an interview at the organization’s headquarters in Vienna, is non-state actors. “I have a nightmare that the spread of enriched uranium and nuclear material could result in the operation of a small enrichment facility in a place like northern Afghanistan,” he said. “Who knows? It’s not hard for a non-state to hide, especially if there is a state in collusion with it. Some of these non-state groups are very sophisticated.”
Many diplomats in Vienna expressed frustration at the I.A.E.A.’s inability, thanks to Musharraf’s pardon, to gain access to Khan. “It’s not going to happen,” one diplomat said. “We are getting some coöperation from Pakistan, but it’s the names we need to know. ‘Who got the stuff?’ We’re interested to know whether other nations that we’re supposed to supervise have the stuff.” The diplomat told me he believed that the United States was unwilling to publicly state the obvious: that there was no way the Pakistani government didn’t know about the transfers. He said, “Of course it looks awful, but Musharraf will be indebted to you.”
The I.A.E.A.’s authority to conduct inspections is limited. The nations that have signed the nonproliferation treaty are required to permit systematic I.A.E.A. inspections of their declared nuclear facilities for research and energy production. But there is no mechanism for the inspection of suspected nuclear-weapons sites, and many at the I.A.E.A. believe that the treaty must be modified. “There is a nuclear network of black-market centrifuges and weapons design that the world has yet to discover,” a diplomat in Vienna told me. In the past, he said, the I.A.E.A. had worked under the assumption that nations would cheat on the nonproliferation treaty “to produce and sell their own nuclear material.” He said, “What we have instead is a black-market network capable of producing usable nuclear materials and nuclear devices that is not limited to any one nation. We have nuclear dealers operating outside our front door, and we have no control over them—no matter how good we are in terms of verification.” There would be no need, in other words, for A. Q. Khan or anyone else in Pakistan to have a direct role in supplying nuclear technology. The most sensitive nuclear equipment would be available to any country—or any person or group, presumably—that had enough cash.
“This is a question of survival,” the diplomat said, with a caustic smile. He added, “Iraq is laughable in comparison with this issue. The Bush Administration was hunting the shadows instead of the prey.”
Another nonproliferation official depicted the challenge facing the I.A.E.A. inspection regime as “a seismic shift—the globalization of the nuclear world.” The official said, “We have to move from inspecting declared sites to ‘Where does this **** come from?’ If we stay focussed on the declared, we miss the nuclear supply matrix.” At this point, the international official asked me, in all seriousness, “Why hasn’t A. Q. Khan been taken out by Israel or the United States?”
After Pakistan’s role in providing nuclear aid to Iran and Libya was revealed, Musharraf insisted once again, this time at the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland, in January, that he would not permit American troops to search for Al Qaeda members inside Pakistan. “That is not a possibility at all,” he said. “It is a very sensitive issue. There is no room for any foreign elements coming and assisting us. We don’t need any assistance.”
Nonetheless, a senior Pentagon adviser told me in mid-February, the spring offensive is on. “We’re entering a huge period of transition in Iraq,” the adviser said, referring to the coming changeover of forces, with many of the experienced regular Army combat units being replaced by National Guard and Army Reserve units. “We will not be conducting a lot of ops, and so you redirect and exploit somewhere else.”
The operation, American officials said, is scheduled to involve the redeployment to South Asia of thousands of American soldiers, including members of Task Force 121. The logistical buildup began in mid-February, as more than a dozen American C-17 cargo planes began daily flights, hauling helicopters, vehicles, and other equipment to military bases in Pakistan. Small teams of American Special Forces units have been stationed at the Shahbaz airbase, in northwestern Pakistan, since the beginning of the Afghanistan war, in the fall of 2001.
The senior Pentagon adviser, like other military and intelligence officials I talked to, was cautious about the chances of getting what the White House wants—Osama bin Laden. “It’s anybody’s guess,” he said, adding that Ops Sec—operational security—for the planned offensive was poor. The former senior intelligence official similarly noted that there was concern inside the Joint Special Operations Command, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, over the reliability of intercepted Al Qaeda telephone calls. “What about deception?” he said. “These guys are not dumb, and once the logistical aircraft begin to appear”—the American C-17s landing every night at an airbase in Pakistan—“you know something is going on.”
“We’ve got to get Osama bin Laden, and we know where he is,” the former senior intelligence official said. Osama bin Laden is “communicating through sigint”—talking on satellite telephones and the like—“and his wings have been clipped. He’s in his own Alamo in northern Pakistan. It’s a natural progress—whittling down alternative locations and then targeting him. This is not, in theory, a ‘Let’s go and hope’ kind of thing. They’ve seen what they think is him.” But the former official added that there were reasons to be cautious about such reports, especially given that bin Laden hasn’t been seen for so long. Bin Laden would stand out because of his height; he is six feet five. But the target area is adjacent to Swat Valley, which is populated by a tribe of exceptionally tall people.
Two former C.I.A. operatives with firsthand knowledge of the PakistanAfghanistan border areas said that the American assault, if it did take place, would confront enormous logistical problems. “It’s impenetrable,” said Robert Baer, who visited the Hindu Kush area in the early nineties, before he was assigned to lead the C.I.A.’s anti-Saddam operations in northern Iraq. “There are no roads, and you can’t get armor up there. This is where Alexander the Great lost an entire division. The Russians didn’t even bother to go up there. Everybody’s got a gun. That area is worse than Iraq.” Milton Bearden, who ran the C.I.A.’s operations in Afghanistan during the war with the Soviet Union, recounted, “I’ve been all through there. The Pashtun population in that belt has lived there longer than almost any other ethnic group has lived anywhere on earth.” He said, “Our intelligence has got to be better than it’s been. Anytime we go into something driven entirely by electoral politics, it doesn’t work out.”
One American intelligence consultant noted that American forces in Afghanistan have crossed into Pakistan in “hot pursuit” of Al Qaeda suspects in previous operations, with no complaints from the Pakistani leadership. If the American forces strike quickly and decisively against bin Laden from within Pakistan, he added, “Musharraf could say he gave no advance authorization. We can move in with so much force and firepower—with so much shock and awe—that we will be too fast for him.” The consultant said, “The question is, how deep into Pakistan can we pursue him?” He added, “Musharraf is in a very tough position.”
At home, Musharraf is in more danger than ever over his handling of the nuclear affair. “He’s opened up Pandora’s box, and he will never be able to manage it,” Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan, a former government minister who now heads an opposition party, said. “Pakistani public opinion feels that A.Q. has been made a scapegoat, and international opinion thinks he’s a threat. This is a no-win situation for Musharraf. The average man feels that there will be a nuclear rollback, and Pakistan’s immediate deterrent will be taken away. It comes down to an absolute disaster for Musharraf.”
Robert Gallucci, a former United Nations weapons inspector who is now dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, calls A. Q. Khan “the Johnny Appleseed” of the nuclear-arms race. Gallucci, who is a consultant to the C.I.A. on proliferation issues, told me, “Bad as it is with Iran, North Korea, and Libya having nuclear-weapons material, the worst part is that they could transfer it to a non-state group. That’s the biggest concern, and the scariest thing about all this—that Pakistan could work with the worst terrorist groups on earth to build nuclear weapons. There’s nothing more important than stopping terrorist groups from getting nuclear weapons. The most dangerous country for the United States now is Pakistan, and second is Iran.” Gallucci went on, “We haven’t been this vulnerable since the British burned Washington in 1814.”
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Rangudu,
Again, with due respect, I would disagree. The South Asia mafia (however one may choose to define it) is simply not very influential.
That's because South Asia remains a much lower policy priority for the US government than other region - Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. These are my perceptions, but I think they're largely correct.
In the list of US policy priorities, I would rank South Asia somewhere in the vicinity of Southeast Asia or Latin America, and more important than Subsaharan Africa or Micronesia.
If and when US policy focus swings to South Asia as a major policy priority, which only happens very rarely and tends to be temporary, the opinions of established experts and part-time hacks (I'd include myself in the latter category ) is sometimes sought, due to a lack of institutional or high level expertise - but decisions will largely be made by the highest level policy makers, who have little or no understanding of the region or its history. It will be dealt with primarily from a position of short-term pragmatism by professionals, not experts.
That's not a complete explanation of US policy, but it helps explain a lot of things. When a crisis occurs in South Asia, policymakers focus on the short-term priority - prevent nuclear war. That's why we intervene and make crisis-management noises so quickly in crisis these days.
When there isn't a crisis, decisions revert to established bureaucracies, which do reflect entrenched views (although I think those have evolved in the US, as well as in India, over the last fifteen years).
But if a bomb goes off, nuanced discussions of South Asian history and politics will not be persuasive. Decisions will get made by the Rumsfelds or the Wolfowitzes in the context of the deaths of tens of thousands of American citizens.
I honestly do not believe under those circumstances that business as usual, however defined, will remotely apply.
I'm going to stop flogging this horse now, though. This is deeply hypothetical, and improbable, and frankly a bit depressing. I would just state again that it's easy to underestimate American will, and perhaps American savagery, when our security is genuinely threatened. I suspect that TSJ may be far closer to correct in assessing the American response than I am - I would suspect at least some effort at restraint, or at least giving our enemies some chance to surrender (remember we left Iraq various loopholes, however improbable, in 1991 and 2003 - but they were loopholes that would have by and large removed the major threats). That may simply reflect my tendency to overintellectualize everything.
I think TSJ does have one important point, though. If the US were attacked with a nuclear weapon, that would change all the rules - much more dramatically than 9-11 did (which dramatically widened the options available for the US to respond to both terrorism and Iraq). Those rule changes would have very serious security implications for India.
Tim
Again, with due respect, I would disagree. The South Asia mafia (however one may choose to define it) is simply not very influential.
That's because South Asia remains a much lower policy priority for the US government than other region - Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. These are my perceptions, but I think they're largely correct.
In the list of US policy priorities, I would rank South Asia somewhere in the vicinity of Southeast Asia or Latin America, and more important than Subsaharan Africa or Micronesia.
If and when US policy focus swings to South Asia as a major policy priority, which only happens very rarely and tends to be temporary, the opinions of established experts and part-time hacks (I'd include myself in the latter category
) is sometimes sought, due to a lack of institutional or high level expertise - but decisions will largely be made by the highest level policy makers, who have little or no understanding of the region or its history. It will be dealt with primarily from a position of short-term pragmatism by professionals, not experts.That's not a complete explanation of US policy, but it helps explain a lot of things. When a crisis occurs in South Asia, policymakers focus on the short-term priority - prevent nuclear war. That's why we intervene and make crisis-management noises so quickly in crisis these days.
When there isn't a crisis, decisions revert to established bureaucracies, which do reflect entrenched views (although I think those have evolved in the US, as well as in India, over the last fifteen years).
But if a bomb goes off, nuanced discussions of South Asian history and politics will not be persuasive. Decisions will get made by the Rumsfelds or the Wolfowitzes in the context of the deaths of tens of thousands of American citizens.
I honestly do not believe under those circumstances that business as usual, however defined, will remotely apply.
I'm going to stop flogging this horse now, though. This is deeply hypothetical, and improbable, and frankly a bit depressing. I would just state again that it's easy to underestimate American will, and perhaps American savagery, when our security is genuinely threatened. I suspect that TSJ may be far closer to correct in assessing the American response than I am - I would suspect at least some effort at restraint, or at least giving our enemies some chance to surrender (remember we left Iraq various loopholes, however improbable, in 1991 and 2003 - but they were loopholes that would have by and large removed the major threats). That may simply reflect my tendency to overintellectualize everything.
I think TSJ does have one important point, though. If the US were attacked with a nuclear weapon, that would change all the rules - much more dramatically than 9-11 did (which dramatically widened the options available for the US to respond to both terrorism and Iraq). Those rule changes would have very serious security implications for India.
Tim
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
I agree with this statement. But let me state the nagging worry that I have in my mind.Originally posted by Tim:
And the one really, really stupid thing you can do that modern history (150 years) has demonstrated time and time again - you don't do something that really p***es off the American public.
...
But when the American public gets mad, we really do fight both ugly and very effectively. It doesn't happen often. But it has alway
I worry about sections in the highest levels of US government. These people are not stupid. They have been responsible for many of the US's successes in the last 20-30 years. They helped sort out the Soviet Union and guided economic policy to make the US the greatest nation ever.
But in doing these things - thay had to make what seemed to be minor compromises. Such compromises have probably been made in many areas (Iran contra/drugs etc) - but I am specifically referring to Pakistan,
With the overwhelming need to win against Russia, "minor" problems like Paki/Afghan Heroin that found its way to the US using US supplied trucks operated by the "National Logistics Cell" of the Pakistan army was ignored. The Heroin provided money against the Soviets - much of it from addicts in the US. Also ignored was evidence that a nuclear p[rogram was going on full swing in Pakistan, with Chinese assistance. China of course was part of the US's success story, diplonatically and economically.
There may well be powerful people within the US government whose positions wil lbe at risk if their earlier, undoubtedly patriotic activities are exposed to reveal all that they did for "Freedom and Democracy". The chickens are coming home to roost takes on a new meaning here. Such people may be tempted to cover up to save themselves and if they control the US media, they will also control what the US public thinks.
Hasn't anyone in the US noticed that a lot of people outside the US accuse US media of toeing the US government line all the time and every time? There is something nocticeable here. The US public can probably be manipulated by powerful lobbies within the US government.
My worry is:
If there are people trying to hide and save their skins in powerful positions in the US, and if they control the media, and therefore control how the US people react, the US public will not react as they should. That is a real worry for me.
The US really should be reacting more strongly against what is happening. And they are not - or they are reacting in what seems to be an inapropriate manner.
I think alot lot of people on this forum feel genuinely friendly towards the US. The US is barking up the wrong trees and will get kicked when it least expects it. That will not be the fault of the average Joe on the street. It will be the fault of a lot of people in high positions in the US.
Call me paranoid.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
At the conclusion of the KQED/NPR program, Seymore mentioned that mid-level TSP army officers say " Musharraf is a walking dead man".
You can hear the "Morning Edition" audio at http://www.npr.org/rundowns/rundown.php?prgId=3&prgDate=3-Mar-2004
and fastforward few clips to get to this clip of 4 minute, 22 seconds. Title: Report: U.S.-Pakistan Struck Deal on Bin Laden - Morning Edition - Wednesday, March 3, 2004
Mush is in a Lose-Lose situation,
1. The nation (read terrorist nation) will not forgive Mush for allowing US forced to enter TSP terrority to Hunt down Osama Bin Laden, and
2. US will in lieu of being blind to AQ(X)Khan episode (i.e. US not able to interview AXK)will have it's way and force its body parts into Paksitan to get the head of OBL.
Talk of stewing in its own brew.
You can hear the "Morning Edition" audio at http://www.npr.org/rundowns/rundown.php?prgId=3&prgDate=3-Mar-2004
and fastforward few clips to get to this clip of 4 minute, 22 seconds. Title: Report: U.S.-Pakistan Struck Deal on Bin Laden - Morning Edition - Wednesday, March 3, 2004
Mush is in a Lose-Lose situation,
1. The nation (read terrorist nation) will not forgive Mush for allowing US forced to enter TSP terrority to Hunt down Osama Bin Laden, and
2. US will in lieu of being blind to AQ(X)Khan episode (i.e. US not able to interview AXK)will have it's way and force its body parts into Paksitan to get the head of OBL.
Talk of stewing in its own brew.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Something I found on my HDD while searching for something else:
http://www.tao.ca/~mayworks/911/1/pakistan.shtml
http://www.tao.ca/~mayworks/911/1/pakistan.shtml
The Taliban's Pakistan connection
Excerpts from a Sept. 15 article by Tariq Ali, in The Independent (UK)
..
To this day, the former US Secretary of State Zbigniew Brezinski remains unrepentant: "What was more important in the world view of history?" he asks with more than a touch of irritation, "the Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?"
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James Bund
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
" If the US were attacked with a nuclear weapon, that would change all the rules - much more dramatically than 9-11 did (which dramatically widened the options available for the US to respond to both terrorism and Iraq). Those rule changes would have very serious security implications for India."
If India feels that the artificial state of Pakistan continues to be suported by the US to the detriment of its security, it may possibly align its nuclear doctrine more to the Pakistani position of nuvlear promiscuity. Those rule changes would have very serious security implications for the US.
Don't forgot the Islamic bomb is America's baby.You ha dample opportunity to abort it in the 1980s, you all but gave the benediction.Face up to the truth, however repugnant.
If India feels that the artificial state of Pakistan continues to be suported by the US to the detriment of its security, it may possibly align its nuclear doctrine more to the Pakistani position of nuvlear promiscuity. Those rule changes would have very serious security implications for the US.
Don't forgot the Islamic bomb is America's baby.You ha dample opportunity to abort it in the 1980s, you all but gave the benediction.Face up to the truth, however repugnant.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Making a nuke weapon is not assimple as outsourcing the components.
The game was to have bogus enrichment facility via TSP and get real working weapons from China.
Guys lets not get carried away. In the end truth shall prevail. ,In Telugu 'chere moorkuni manasu ranjimpa radu; pemmaya singhdi mani'
The game was to have bogus enrichment facility via TSP and get real working weapons from China.
Guys lets not get carried away. In the end truth shall prevail. ,In Telugu 'chere moorkuni manasu ranjimpa radu; pemmaya singhdi mani'
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Imtiaz Ahmed
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Not sure if this is relevant. As always, please feel free to delete.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/536038.cms
Publication: TOI Internet edition dated Thursday, March 4th 2004.
Article Title: Pak offers nuclear power to Nigerian armed forces.
Original News Source: Associated Press
Excerpts
ABUJA: Pakistan's top military official has offered to share unspecified military assistance and "nuclear power" with Nigeria's armed forces, the defence ministry said.
Gen. Muhammad Aziz Khan, chairman of Pakistan's joint chiefs of staff, told Nigerian defence minister Rabiu Kwankwaso that Pakistan was " working out the dynamics " to help Nigeria's armed forces "to strengthen its military capability and to acquire nuclear power," Nigeria's defence ministry said in a statement issued on Wednesday.
Khan, who was in Nigeria's capital Abuja on a scheduled visit, explained to his counterparts that "Pakistan had to take its destiny into its own hands to become a nuclear state because of the regular threats posed by hostile neighbours," the statement said.
The communiqué did not elaborate and officials of Nigeria's presidency and defence ministry did not answer their phones.
The announcement came less than two months after Nigeria's vice presidency announced that North Korea agreed to share missile technology with Nigeria, an offer that was subsequently denied by North Korean officials and downplayed by a spokeswoman
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My Take: Perhaps a plant to ease Aziz out.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/536038.cms
Publication: TOI Internet edition dated Thursday, March 4th 2004.
Article Title: Pak offers nuclear power to Nigerian armed forces.
Original News Source: Associated Press
Excerpts
ABUJA: Pakistan's top military official has offered to share unspecified military assistance and "nuclear power" with Nigeria's armed forces, the defence ministry said.
Gen. Muhammad Aziz Khan, chairman of Pakistan's joint chiefs of staff, told Nigerian defence minister Rabiu Kwankwaso that Pakistan was " working out the dynamics " to help Nigeria's armed forces "to strengthen its military capability and to acquire nuclear power," Nigeria's defence ministry said in a statement issued on Wednesday.
Khan, who was in Nigeria's capital Abuja on a scheduled visit, explained to his counterparts that "Pakistan had to take its destiny into its own hands to become a nuclear state because of the regular threats posed by hostile neighbours," the statement said.
The communiqué did not elaborate and officials of Nigeria's presidency and defence ministry did not answer their phones.
The announcement came less than two months after Nigeria's vice presidency announced that North Korea agreed to share missile technology with Nigeria, an offer that was subsequently denied by North Korean officials and downplayed by a spokeswoman
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My Take: Perhaps a plant to ease Aziz out.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
This Nigeria thing reminds me about the post Sunil S made a while back about his friends in college. The guys who found a way to get laid regularly had a different demeanor than the others. TSP seems to have the same airs.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Unfriggin -believable.Originally posted by Imtiaz Ahmed:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/536038.cms
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My Take: Perhaps a plant to ease Aziz out.
I am not sure that Pakistanis would use this type of "Western" route to ease Aziz out. If Pakistani wanted him out they have a time tested mechanism of reaching agreement within their own ranks of easing people out without humiliation. Dishonor means serious enmity - so nobody is dishonored within the ranks of the Paki establishment.
If the US is planting this info - the Pakis will laugh at it.
So the story is a real mystery unless Aziz were thumbing his nose at the the world in a manner that Pakis have become accustomed to doing.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
three things:
1. I concur with TSJ's take on American response to a JDAM attack. there will be an annihilation of whoever was responsible by america the vengeful. However, it will be swiftly followed by $$$$ of aid and help to rebuild the shattered remains and show the caring sharing side of america the just. i humbly submit to honourable forum members that assuming that america can take the hit and not go ape is naive. the military party option is viable in my opinion - who remembers the film "12 days in may" with lancaster/douglas?; similarly if TSP thinks that it can pull this one off on the US, they would be seriously mistaken
2. the long article quoted above seems to throw some light on the Libyan sting hypothesis, not conclusive I agree, but interesting never the less. makes a lot of sense to me - gadaffi knows that TSP is a lost cause, he doesn't really need nukes, wants to be pals with Silvio again, win-win
3. the Nigerian leak is another sting in the making? 9hypothesis) at first read, i thought that it might be one of the chain letter scams! i.e.: "i have a nuke that i want to export, please send me $1000 for legal fees and I can send you the Nuke parts next week... etc., etc."
the interesting thing to note is that the report is from the Nigerian Defence Ministry - and whilst weapons are not directly mentioned, they are strongly hinted at... why would Nigeria (an important African and Muslim nation) want to shop TSP? What's in it for them?
Did Aziz spite anyone in the Nigerian military during one of the UN peace keeping ops? Has Aziz gone bonkers? Is Mush using Amriki tactics to remove Aziz?
enquiring minds want to know
1. I concur with TSJ's take on American response to a JDAM attack. there will be an annihilation of whoever was responsible by america the vengeful. However, it will be swiftly followed by $$$$ of aid and help to rebuild the shattered remains and show the caring sharing side of america the just. i humbly submit to honourable forum members that assuming that america can take the hit and not go ape is naive. the military party option is viable in my opinion - who remembers the film "12 days in may" with lancaster/douglas?; similarly if TSP thinks that it can pull this one off on the US, they would be seriously mistaken
2. the long article quoted above seems to throw some light on the Libyan sting hypothesis, not conclusive I agree, but interesting never the less. makes a lot of sense to me - gadaffi knows that TSP is a lost cause, he doesn't really need nukes, wants to be pals with Silvio again, win-win
3. the Nigerian leak is another sting in the making? 9hypothesis) at first read, i thought that it might be one of the chain letter scams! i.e.: "i have a nuke that i want to export, please send me $1000 for legal fees and I can send you the Nuke parts next week... etc., etc."
the interesting thing to note is that the report is from the Nigerian Defence Ministry - and whilst weapons are not directly mentioned, they are strongly hinted at... why would Nigeria (an important African and Muslim nation) want to shop TSP? What's in it for them?
Did Aziz spite anyone in the Nigerian military during one of the UN peace keeping ops? Has Aziz gone bonkers? Is Mush using Amriki tactics to remove Aziz?
enquiring minds want to know
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
The problem is, you guys think we aren't doing anything with our boyfriends in Pakistan but going on shopping tours at the mall looking for princess outfits.
Well, let me tell you something, Pakistan is under threat from military action by the US *right now*. Pakistan is playing a very fine game here. One mis-step and they are gonna lose it all. The US will take action in Pakistan if no results are produced. Mushy has a limited amount of time. Either we get Osama's head on a pike or there will be US action in Pakistan. And for you guys information, it ain't over about Pakistan's proliferation. It ain't over until we say it's over. The US had nothing to do with their proliferation and we're certainly not happy about what they did. We've only just begun to tighten the screws down.
India had plenty to do with Pakistan's nukes by rushing to test it's bombs. India tested *first*. Let's not forget that.
Well, let me tell you something, Pakistan is under threat from military action by the US *right now*. Pakistan is playing a very fine game here. One mis-step and they are gonna lose it all. The US will take action in Pakistan if no results are produced. Mushy has a limited amount of time. Either we get Osama's head on a pike or there will be US action in Pakistan. And for you guys information, it ain't over about Pakistan's proliferation. It ain't over until we say it's over. The US had nothing to do with their proliferation and we're certainly not happy about what they did. We've only just begun to tighten the screws down.
India had plenty to do with Pakistan's nukes by rushing to test it's bombs. India tested *first*. Let's not forget that.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
That is absurd. Typical state dept and non proliferation crowd equal-equal talk. India is an independent country and built its weapons for protection against the Chinese. The Pakis built up their technology by using western components and chinese designs. How is India involved? Whether India tested or not, Pakistan would have still had a nuclear device. The fact remains that the US looked the other way while Pakistan built the bomb with Chinese, European and US (Reagan era) input, in exchange for their cooperation against the Soviet Union. If you want to carry your line of argument, the Pakistan bomb is a reaction to the Indian one, which is a reaction to the Chinese one which is a reaction the US one. So the US is ultimately responsible for the Paki bomb.India had plenty to do with Pakistan's nukes by rushing to test it's bombs. India tested *first*. Let's not forget that.
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Tom A Hawwk
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Well TSJ, lets not forget that it is the USA which tested first and even used the nukes first!!!
But let bygones be bygones, eh?
Let us talk about the clear and present danger, now.
Would the US have kept silent if Canada had been the first to develop nukes, and had tried to proliferate them to Cuba and Mexico?
Read China for Canada, Pakistan for Cuba, and you will see what I mean.
The point is this -- India faces threat not just from Pakistan, but mainly from China, which is the godfather of them all.
India tested its nukes in 1998 as a deterrent to not only Pakistan, but also to China.
So stop thinking about India purely in terms of Pakistan.
They did what was good for their security.
The question is, is the US doing what should be done for its security regarding Pakistani proliferation?
Or is it the US stand that proliferation by its oillies is okay?
But let bygones be bygones, eh?
Let us talk about the clear and present danger, now.
Would the US have kept silent if Canada had been the first to develop nukes, and had tried to proliferate them to Cuba and Mexico?
Read China for Canada, Pakistan for Cuba, and you will see what I mean.
The point is this -- India faces threat not just from Pakistan, but mainly from China, which is the godfather of them all.
India tested its nukes in 1998 as a deterrent to not only Pakistan, but also to China.
So stop thinking about India purely in terms of Pakistan.
They did what was good for their security.
The question is, is the US doing what should be done for its security regarding Pakistani proliferation?
Or is it the US stand that proliferation by its oillies is okay?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Associated Press via Guardian:
From AFP via Khaleej Times, the Pakistani denial and some more details:Pakistan's military chief of staff, Gen. Muhammad Aziz Khan, said in Nigeria that Pakistan is determining how it ``can assist Nigeria's armed forces to strengthen its military capability and to acquire nuclear power ,'' the Nigerian defense ministry said in a statement.
The statement did not elaborate and it wasn't clear what was meant by ``nuclear power.''……..
A bit of private enterprise on the part of Aziz Khan to look out for his retirement which was misinterpreted by Nigerian hosts as a frame up attempt with a ratting out, such as Pakistan has been doing to its nuclear buyers and sellers?Nigeria’s defence ministry has accused the chairman of Pakistan’s joint chiefs of staff General Muhammad Aziz Khan of offering to “strengthen (Nigeria’s) military capability and acquire nuclear power.”
In a statement it said Khan made the offer during talks on Wednesday with Nigeria’s Defence Minister Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso in Abuja.
According to the Nigerian account of the meeting, General Khan said, “his country is working out the dynamics of how it can assist Nigeria’s armed forces to strengthen its military capability and to acquire nuclear power .
Pakistan is known to have a range of nuclear missiles.
Nothing in the statement indicated whether Nigeria was keen to develop its own nuclear capability, but Nigeria’s chief of staff General Alexander Ogomudia praised Pakistan’s programme.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Agreed.Originally posted by TSJones:
The problem is, you guys think we aren't doing anything with our boyfriends in Pakistan but going on shopping tours at the mall looking for princess outfits.
Well, let me tell you something, Pakistan is under threat from military action by the US *right now*. Pakistan is playing a very fine game here. One mis-step and they are gonna lose it all. The US will take action in Pakistan if no results are produced. Mushy has a limited amount of time. Either we get Osama's head on a pike or there will be US action in Pakistan. And for you guys information, it ain't over about Pakistan's proliferation. It ain't over until we say it's over. The US had nothing to do with their proliferation and we're certainly not happy about what they did. We've only just begun to tighten the screws down.
correction: Pakistan's ideology, their "victim" mentality, their "fort of Islam" psyche are the culprits, not India.
India had plenty to do with Pakistan's nukes by rushing to test it's bombs. India tested *first*. Let's not forget that.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Nigeria just tried to purchase SCUDs or other SRBMs. I think that story broke last week.
Tim
Tim
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
> We've only just begun to tighten the screws down.
with $700 mil aid, 40 free AH-1F gunships, new 3D radars and other modes of punishment....
with $700 mil aid, 40 free AH-1F gunships, new 3D radars and other modes of punishment....
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
As TSJ says,India had plenty to do with Pakistan's nukes by rushing to test it's bombs. India tested *first*. Let's not forget that.
..that this is STILL what passes for a "mindset" in Tubelightabad. Enough said.Let's not forget that
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
on the other hand mushy's new combat camoflagued princess dress looks mighty cute...Originally posted by Rudra Singha:
> We've only just begun to tighten the screws down.
with $700 mil aid, 40 free AH-1F gunships, new 3D radars and other modes of punishment....
unless the bases in tajikistan are a bridgehead for TSP ops, I see no evidence of credible force being directed against anyone there, unless four carrier battle groups intend to move slightly eastward along the Indian-Western-Sea (formerly known as the Arabian Sea)
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Psychedelic man! Absa-friggin-lootely psychedelic!Originally posted by Rudra Singha:
> We've only just begun to tighten the screws down.
with $700 mil aid, 40 free AH-1F gunships, new 3D radars and other modes of punishment....
No need for LSD then... or listening to The Doors..
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 02 Mar 2004
Nigeria dominates Western African and other sub-saharan nations except South Africa militarily already, so they might want scuds for fun, but definitely do not need nukes. re-reading the report, aziz does not suggest weapons - he probably meant electrical power, however the manner of the report suggests that the Nigerians have taken umbrage and tried to embarrass him.Originally posted by Tim:
Nigeria just tried to purchase SCUDs or other SRBMs. I think that story broke last week.
Tim
options:
1. the great 'arab' aziz has insulted the barbarian rulers of 'zanj' and the nigerians are upset
2. nigeria has been morally outraged by the unsolicited offer (lets discount that for now)
3. someone has asked the nigerians to be upset in exchange for favours
3.a. the US in order to weaken aziz in exchange for a clear nigerian role in UN peace keeping in Africa and/or oil purchases?
3.b. factions within saudi, under orders to distance themselves from the bad old days? in exchange for cash
4. Nigeria sees this as a chance for leverage against Niger and others in the proliferation chain (wild hypothesis)
p.s. with the increasing spread of the pak proliferation spider web, i wouldn't be surprised to soon find a south american connection!! After all, Zia coined the name for Operation Tupac (Amaru)? freudian slip??