India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Tech focus: DRDO has created a Abhay ICV hull out of composites, which has given 40% weight savings over metal hull.
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Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
So we are going to have rail mobile Agni launchers too... of late the talk has only been about road mobile Agni.A Sharma wrote:DRDO Tech Focus Jan-Feb 2019
Radome Hood for Agni Missile System
The communication coach of Agni missile system consists of various types of communication equipment and satellite tracking antennae.This coach is a wagon similar to the wagons manufactured by Indian Railways with some modifications on the base platform. Canopy of the coach is designed such that it provides radar transparency to all installed communication systems. The composite radome hood was realized in four segments designed as per radio transmissibility requirement of the antennae. All segments are provided with water tight joints. Doors are provided at the end to facilitate maintenance of equipment placed inside.
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Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
DRDO report talks about Akash SRSAM is being Inducted by the ARMY? I thought they induscted couple of regiments/brigade already... also the vesion tested had an indigenous seeker? Wasn’t Akash a command guided missile with no seeker... did Army just kept pushing DRDO to improve and delay induction?
Last edited by Shrinivasan on 30 Dec 2018 20:27, edited 1 time in total.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
It is taking about the updated version of Akash which has a seeker. In the induction pipeline fo IA.
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Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
So did IA induct the original 2 regiments sanctioned and ordered... if Akash missile was not meant to have a seeker, that would have been based in some GSQR/ASQR... then why this thakleef about a seeker now...nam wrote:It is taking about the updated version of Akash which has a seeker. In the induction pipeline fo IA.
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Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
My bad. Corrected it.dinesha wrote:Induscted?
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
IA has inducted 2 regiments of Akash with command guidance as MR Sam, now being inducted as SR sam as well with active seeker.
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Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
How many units is IA planning to induct...Akash units moving along with armor and artillery would offer robust protection to these units in an IBG.Aditya_V wrote:IA has inducted 2 regiments of Akash with command guidance as MR Sam, now being inducted as SR sam as well with active seeker.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Shrinivasan wrote:How many units is IA planning to induct...Akash units moving along with armor and artillery would offer robust protection to these units in an IBG.Aditya_V wrote:IA has inducted 2 regiments of Akash with command guidance as MR Sam, now being inducted as SR sam as well with active seeker.
Two new regiments with Akash 1S.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Kumbh mela in chandipur
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
International Conference on Range Technology (ICORT)
15-17 Feb 2019 Chandipur, India
Organized by Integrated Test Range (DRDO) https://icort.in/
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International Conference on Range Technology (ICORT)
15-17 Feb 2019 Chandipur, India
Organized by Integrated Test Range (DRDO) https://icort.in/
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Manufacturing of defence aerospace, warship items to be covered by IDRA: DIPP
Manufacturing of items of defence aerospace and warships will now be covered by Industries (Development and Regulation) Act and will not require any licence from the the commerce and industry ministry, a government notification said Tuesday.
The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), under the ministry, has issued a notification clarifying the defence products' list requiring compulsory licence under Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951 (IDRA), and Arms Act 1959 in consultation with Ministry of Home Affairs and Department of Defence Production.
"Items of defence aerospace and warships now do not require licence under Arms Act. Such items shall now be covered by IDRA," the department said in a tweet.
In May 2017, the DIPP was allowed to process applications for grant of licence for manufacture of defence items. Earlier, the home ministry was carrying out this exercise.
The department, under the commerce and industry ministry, is mainly responsible for formulation of polices with regard to promotion of foreign investment and manufacturing industries.
Manufacturing of items of defence aerospace and warships will now be covered by Industries (Development and Regulation) Act and will not require any licence from the the commerce and industry ministry, a government notification said Tuesday.
The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), under the ministry, has issued a notification clarifying the defence products' list requiring compulsory licence under Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951 (IDRA), and Arms Act 1959 in consultation with Ministry of Home Affairs and Department of Defence Production.
"Items of defence aerospace and warships now do not require licence under Arms Act. Such items shall now be covered by IDRA," the department said in a tweet.
In May 2017, the DIPP was allowed to process applications for grant of licence for manufacture of defence items. Earlier, the home ministry was carrying out this exercise.
The department, under the commerce and industry ministry, is mainly responsible for formulation of polices with regard to promotion of foreign investment and manufacturing industries.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
https://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/newsle ... jan_19.pdf
DRDO NEWSLETTER
January 2019 | volume 39 | issue 1
● drdo Successfully test-fires Nuclear Capable Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile Agni-V
● DFRLInked five LAToT with Industry
● CAIR Hands over SDPS Solutions to Cabinet Secretariat
DRDO NEWSLETTER
January 2019 | volume 39 | issue 1
● drdo Successfully test-fires Nuclear Capable Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile Agni-V
● DFRLInked five LAToT with Industry
● CAIR Hands over SDPS Solutions to Cabinet Secretariat
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
http://isc2019.org/index.php
106th Indian Science Congress
3rd January to 7th January, 2019
Program Schedule : > http://isc2019.org/pdf/programme-schedule.pdf
106th Indian Science Congress
3rd January to 7th January, 2019
Program Schedule : > http://isc2019.org/pdf/programme-schedule.pdf
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
http://www.crraoaimscs.org/
National Workshop on Wireless Communication (21-22 January 2019)
at
C.R.Rao Advanced Institute of Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science (AIMSCS)
University of Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad
National Workshop on Wireless Communication (21-22 January 2019)
at
C.R.Rao Advanced Institute of Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science (AIMSCS)
University of Hyderabad Campus, Hyderabad
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Indian Machine Tool Manufacturers' Association (IMTMA) is organizing the 19th edition of IMTEX 2019 and 20th edition of concurrent Tooltech 2019 from 24th to 30th January
at the Bangalore International Exhibition Centre (BIEC) in Bengaluru.
http://imtex.in/
at the Bangalore International Exhibition Centre (BIEC) in Bengaluru.
http://imtex.in/
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Seeds Of The IAF & Learning To Build Aircraft
https://battle-machines.org/2018/07/12/ ... -aircraft/
https://battle-machines.org/2018/07/12/ ... -aircraft/
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
http://www.ofb.gov.in/download/pr/ofbea ... y_2018.pdf
ofb news letter may-july 2018.
ofb news letter may-july 2018.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
kumbh mela in chennai
4th International Conference of The Robotics Society
Indian Institute of Technology Madras,
Chennai, 600036 India
02 - 06 July 2019
http://advancesinrobotics.com/2019/
4th International Conference of The Robotics Society
Indian Institute of Technology Madras,
Chennai, 600036 India
02 - 06 July 2019
http://advancesinrobotics.com/2019/
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
CSIO develops pilot display unit for IAF’s Hawk
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/natio ... 13272.html
By Vijay Mohan, Tribune News Service, Chandigarh, January 13th
An indigenous pilot display unit (PDU) has been developed for the IAF’s indigenously upgraded Hawk-i advanced jet trainer by the Central Scientific Instruments Organisation (CSIO) here. The instrument, akin to a head-up display unit, is installed above the cockpit’s instrument panel with its screen at the pilot’s eye level and superimposes vital flight and mission parameters on the pilot’s line of vision of the outside world. The Mission Combat Systems Research and Design Centre of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bangalore, had awarded this project to CSIO and the first prototype has been fabricated. It is expected to take to the skies in a few weeks. The British Hawk entered IAF service in 2008, with 24 aircraft received in fly-away condition and 42 being assembled by HAL. Another 57 Hawks, with some going to the Navy, were to be licence-produced by HAL along with upgrade of the fleet and incorporation of some Indian made components and sub-systems. The upgraded aircraft have been christened as Hawk-I. The PDU provides a comprehensive flight-symbology display along with ambient vision under all-weather conditions. It displays navigation inputs like altitude, airspeed, angle of attack and artificial horizon, take off and landing data as well as weapon aiming and delivery cues.
Since the pilot does not have to change his line of sight or visual accommodation by peering repeatedly at his instrument panel inside the cockpit, the PDU reduces his workload and reaction time, while enabling him to take split-second decisions and enhancing his weapon aiming capability. It is smaller and lighter than earlier head-up displays developed by CSIO for the light combat aircraft, HAL trainer aircraft and Jaguar. All modern combat aircraft as well as some transport aircraft are equipped with head-up displays. “The PDU can be operated in different modes that can be selected from a multifunction up-front control panel. In the ‘raster’ mode it displays the real time infrared camera video to the pilot for target seeking, while in the mixed mode, raster video is combined with other information for weapon aiming and target locking along with other flight critical information to the pilot,” Vipan Kumar, principal scientist overseeing the project, said. “In the eventuality of mission computer failure, PDU has dedicated information which can be displayed to the pilot in stand-by-sight mode,” he said.
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/natio ... 13272.html
By Vijay Mohan, Tribune News Service, Chandigarh, January 13th
An indigenous pilot display unit (PDU) has been developed for the IAF’s indigenously upgraded Hawk-i advanced jet trainer by the Central Scientific Instruments Organisation (CSIO) here. The instrument, akin to a head-up display unit, is installed above the cockpit’s instrument panel with its screen at the pilot’s eye level and superimposes vital flight and mission parameters on the pilot’s line of vision of the outside world. The Mission Combat Systems Research and Design Centre of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bangalore, had awarded this project to CSIO and the first prototype has been fabricated. It is expected to take to the skies in a few weeks. The British Hawk entered IAF service in 2008, with 24 aircraft received in fly-away condition and 42 being assembled by HAL. Another 57 Hawks, with some going to the Navy, were to be licence-produced by HAL along with upgrade of the fleet and incorporation of some Indian made components and sub-systems. The upgraded aircraft have been christened as Hawk-I. The PDU provides a comprehensive flight-symbology display along with ambient vision under all-weather conditions. It displays navigation inputs like altitude, airspeed, angle of attack and artificial horizon, take off and landing data as well as weapon aiming and delivery cues.
Since the pilot does not have to change his line of sight or visual accommodation by peering repeatedly at his instrument panel inside the cockpit, the PDU reduces his workload and reaction time, while enabling him to take split-second decisions and enhancing his weapon aiming capability. It is smaller and lighter than earlier head-up displays developed by CSIO for the light combat aircraft, HAL trainer aircraft and Jaguar. All modern combat aircraft as well as some transport aircraft are equipped with head-up displays. “The PDU can be operated in different modes that can be selected from a multifunction up-front control panel. In the ‘raster’ mode it displays the real time infrared camera video to the pilot for target seeking, while in the mixed mode, raster video is combined with other information for weapon aiming and target locking along with other flight critical information to the pilot,” Vipan Kumar, principal scientist overseeing the project, said. “In the eventuality of mission computer failure, PDU has dedicated information which can be displayed to the pilot in stand-by-sight mode,” he said.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
jaysimha wrote:http://www.ofb.gov.in/download/pr/ofbea ... y_2018.pdf
ofb news letter may-july 2018.
jaysimha,
How did you get to this OF Beat downloads!!!!
Maybe other issues have some nuggets.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
http://ofbindia.gov.in/index.php?wh=journal&lang=enramana wrote:jaysimha wrote:http://www.ofb.gov.in/download/pr/ofbea ... y_2018.pdf
ofb news letter may-july 2018.
jaysimha,
How did you get to this OF Beat downloads!!!!
Maybe other issues have some nuggets.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
JayS,
Thanks.
Thanks.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
maha kumbh mela in gandhinagar
vibrant gujarat global trade show 2019 18-22 January 2019
huge representation from drdo and defence,
http://www.vggts2019.com/
vibrant gujarat global trade show 2019 18-22 January 2019
huge representation from drdo and defence,
http://www.vggts2019.com/
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
kumbh mela in pune http://www.coep.org.in/content146
One Day Seminar on Awareness about DRDO Research Projects & Opportunities
under ARMREB, a research board of DRDO
Date :- 25th Jan 2019, Friday
Time :- 10:00 am to 05:00 pm
Venue :- Academic Complex, Mini Auditorium, Near BC Canteen, College of Engineering Pune.
Eligibility :- Faculty Member of any Engineering Institutes and for first 100 registrations only.
Registration Link :- https://goo.gl/forms/OpjQ5uyf57FNxMBw2
http://www.coep.org.in/sites/default/fi ... 282%29.pdf
One Day Seminar on Awareness about DRDO Research Projects & Opportunities
under ARMREB, a research board of DRDO
Date :- 25th Jan 2019, Friday
Time :- 10:00 am to 05:00 pm
Venue :- Academic Complex, Mini Auditorium, Near BC Canteen, College of Engineering Pune.
Eligibility :- Faculty Member of any Engineering Institutes and for first 100 registrations only.
Registration Link :- https://goo.gl/forms/OpjQ5uyf57FNxMBw2
http://www.coep.org.in/sites/default/fi ... 282%29.pdf
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
http://svew.edu.in/NCAME.pdf
NCAME-2K18 National Conference on Advancements in Microwave Engineering
on 24th & 25th JANUARY-2019
Tirupati
NCAME-2K18 National Conference on Advancements in Microwave Engineering
on 24th & 25th JANUARY-2019
Tirupati
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
kumbh mela in chennai
4 Th International Conference of the robotic society
ADVANCES IN ROBOTICS (AIR 2019)
Venue: Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, 600036 India
2 - 6 July 2019
http://advancesinrobotics.com/2019/
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Kumbh mela in bangalore
digital revolution in aerospace & defence
19th feb 2019
https://www.saeindia.org/
digital revolution in aerospace & defence
19th feb 2019
https://www.saeindia.org/
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
http://ntro.gov.in/ntroWeb/loadRecruitmentsHome.do
ntro is hiring...
preference to BRFites.. good luck..
ntro is hiring...
preference to BRFites.. good luck..
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH BOARD
invites proposals for sponsoring projects in the area of life science
https://drdo.gov.in/drdo/boards/lsrb/fplsrb.htm
Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO)
Directorate of Life Sciences
Room No. 347, ‘B’ Wing, DRDO Bhawan, Rajaji Marg
New Delhi-110 105, Tele: 23017752, Fax: 23017753
invites proposals for sponsoring projects in the area of life science
https://drdo.gov.in/drdo/boards/lsrb/fplsrb.htm
Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO)
Directorate of Life Sciences
Room No. 347, ‘B’ Wing, DRDO Bhawan, Rajaji Marg
New Delhi-110 105, Tele: 23017752, Fax: 23017753
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
kumbh mela in surat
National Workshop on Advances in Aerospace Research 11-12 FEB 2019
By Aerospace Resources Panel of Aeronautics Research & Development Board
at Sardar Vallabhbhai National Institute of Technology
http://www.svnit.ac.in/web/notice_event ... tsnseminar
National Workshop on Advances in Aerospace Research 11-12 FEB 2019
By Aerospace Resources Panel of Aeronautics Research & Development Board
at Sardar Vallabhbhai National Institute of Technology
http://www.svnit.ac.in/web/notice_event ... tsnseminar
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
DRDO news letter
FEBRUARY 2019 | volume 39 | issue 2
https://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/newsle ... feb_19.pdf
FEBRUARY 2019 | volume 39 | issue 2
https://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/newsle ... feb_19.pdf
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
9th international conference on materials processing and charecterisation
8th - 10th march hyderabad
http://www.icmpc.com/
8th - 10th march hyderabad
http://www.icmpc.com/
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
DRDO Sponsored National Seminar on
“Advances in Materials Research for Armaments Applications” – AMRA
15.02.2019 & 16.02.2019 Pollachi, coimbatore
http://mcet.in/?news=drdo-sponsored-nat ... ar-on-amra
http://mcet.in/wp-content/uploads/SH/MC ... 20S&H).pdf
“Advances in Materials Research for Armaments Applications” – AMRA
15.02.2019 & 16.02.2019 Pollachi, coimbatore
http://mcet.in/?news=drdo-sponsored-nat ... ar-on-amra
http://mcet.in/wp-content/uploads/SH/MC ... 20S&H).pdf
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
If someone can read through this article and confirm what Bharat Karnad has written, it would be appreciated.
This is Bharat Karnad after all.
HAL and IAF — made for each other
https://bharatkarnad.com/2019/01/26/hal ... ach-other/
On Republic Day, there’s no more serious matter to ponder than the negative synergy generated by the Combine of the military and DRDO-DPSU that’s pile-driving India into subservience, emphasizing its dependency on foreign armaments and strengthening its subordinate state status in the world. The political leaders across the ideological spectrum wax rhetorical about arms self-sufficiency being round the corner but neither have the interest nor intellect, leave alone any understanding of issues pertaining to national security, to implement anything remotely sensible and are quite happy to be led by their noses by military chiefs offering skewed “professional advice” and generalist bureaucrats with vested interest in the status quo. Hence, the god-awful system of defence production geared to military procurement from abroad flourishes.
Exactly around this time last year, Air Marshal Harish Masand (Retd) wrote Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman offering her some information about how Hindustan Aerospace Ltd. actually works and why this premier Defence Public Sector Unit (DPSU), one of MoD Department of Defence Production’s ‘navratnas’, is in so sad a state and in such disrepair that the Modi government has been forced to blame HAL’s weaknesses — its inability to even screwdriver various aircraft together from imported kits very efficiently, something it has done for most of the last 60-odd years, its low labour productivity, and dismal quality control — to justify buying 36 French Rafale combat aircraft off the Dassault Avions shelf.
Air Marshal Masand, for those who may not be aware, is a VrC and, until his retirement, was simply the best fighter pilot in the Indian Air Force, his aircraft of choice — the MiG-29, which he rates as the best fighter plane, ton for fighting ton. Indeed, in display flying, he repeatedly and abrasively showed up the French Mirage 2000 that his Service was sold on. In the process, he gained the ire of his seniors and compatriots, ensuring that despite the requisite seniority and a spectacularly good record in service that would have put him in the running for the Chief of Air Staff post, his career was sidelined.
In many respects, he is the Air Force analogue of the great General Hanut Singh in the army. Utter professionals and sticklers for doing the right thing, neither attained the heights their gallantry awards, seniority, honesty and proven competence should have guaranteed them. I recall CAS ACM SP Tyagi, who could have retrieved Masand’s career when he assumed office in late December 2004 but didn’t, telling me that Harish was “not a team man” — a phrase curiously used by Masand’s juniors who made it as AOCs-in-C. In the Indian military, it is necessary to fall in line with the pet peeves and projects of the Service and the Service Chief of the day and, most importantly, to be a team man or you are out. So, out went Hanut and Masand. But that’s par for the course. The best and the brightest in the armed forces rarely make it to 4-star rank. Comparing and contrasting them with the usual strategically dim-witted sort who do pretty much explains why the Indian armed forces find themselves in the sorry straits they are in now.
With military leadership lacking foresight, it is natural, because no real demands are made on them, for DPSUs-DRDO to also be short-sighted and show the same slack will and lassitude, and to be content with doing as little as possible for as much moolah as they can corner. Displaying minimal technological innovation, commercial sense and market logic, the DRDO-DPSU Complex moves hand-in-glove with the military to waste national resources on arms imports — the new means, incidentally, of transferring wealth from a poor country to rich countries, not unlike what India suffered during the hey day of colonialism.
The political leadership in the country is squarely to blame. No armed service’s Chief of Staff is ever dismissed for wrong advice to buy this, that, or the other that prolongs the country’s arms dependency and misery, and DRDO-DPSU heads are not hauled up for gross ineptitude of their organizations in ingesting technology, not developing advanced designs and products, and for failing to manage a labour force so unmotivated and with such bad work ethic as to be an economic liability. All this because there’s no accountability anywhere in the Indian government system.
It has made for an institutionalized business model built on wastefulness followed by the military-DPSU-DRDO Combine, and in the case of IAF, the HAL-DRDO Complex, that Masand described in his letter to Sitharaman and in a piece (“What ails HAL”) that he has just published in the Indian Defence Review (at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... -ails-hal/ ) thus: “If HAL can buy something for $10, it would rather pay $100, and if DRDO can do a job in on year, it would rather take ten.” Masand can speak authoritatively on HAL’s functioning because, as Wing Commander in the early 1980s, he was in-charge of the MiG-21 bis upgrade programme, whose original cost of $850 million in 1994 was, owing to financial crunch, pruned by MoD to $626 million (Rs 2,000 crores). However, Masand’s strict oversight brought the programme in on time and without cost over-runs. The $224 million that was cut proved in excess of need for the MiG bis programme, but it hints at the kind of built-in margins for loot that the armed services personnel and MoD officils in the procurement loop, and DRDO, and DPSU share in. With the screwdriver tech capability-ceiling of HAL (and Mazgaon, etc.) translating into cost (of CKD/SKD kits) plus 2% profit, the government can claim profitability for DPSUs and keep them going. Masand’s letter to the minister expressing his willingness to provide her the inside dope on how and why DRDO and DPSUs, in which the nation has invested heavily, regularly produce miserable results, of course, went unheeded.
For effect and show, the military/IAF will complain incessantly about DRDO and DPSUs/HAL being the great villains, whose consistent failures over decades in delivering the promised products in time has lost them the trust of the armed Services/IAF and compelled them, or so they claim, to import just about every major item in sight, reinforcing India’s shameful standing as the largest buyer of arms and imperiling the country’s security. However, the profligacy and R&D and industrial shortcomings of DRDO-DPSUs serves the military fine because it means a perennial rationale for importing stuff.
On the rare occasion when indigenous weapons system design and development projects do get off the ground and into production stage after overcoming every obstacle erected in their path, such as the Tejas LCA and the Arjuna Main Battle Tank, the armed services delay their induction and mass production using any and every ruse they can think of. Thus, despite Arjuna MBT besting the Russian T-90 in every test category, in every weather condition, in all terrains, the army has been reluctant to buy it in large numbers on the ground that it is too heavy and cumbersome to transport easily. The obvious solution for this problem would have been for the government, MoD, and the army to agree by consensus that the home-grown design — the most important aspect of any weapons systems in terms of production — needed a small tweaking to reduce the weight and size.
Likewise in the case of the Tejas. Because the design is an NAL-DRDO product, the intelligence on the plane, its source codes, etc are all entirely with India. This design can be upscaled and modified to obtain the Advanced Medium Combat aircraft, the proposed follow-on aircraft to Tejas, or miniaturized to realize a weapons-bearing, long endurance, war-drone. India can do whatever it wants with it and will finally free the country and the IAF of the importitis disease. But no, that’s not what has happened. Far from writing finis to buying foreign combat aircraft, IAF is compounding its logistics and operational problems by going in for yet another type of aircraft to make up the balance 126 MMRCA, even as the indigenous AMCA project is shunted out of sight. The excuse being the depleting squadrons, which the IAF frequently makes public through a compliant media and which the political leadership of the day, in order not to appear änti-national”, ends up funding. Whether manned combat aircraft anymore has relevance in the coming age of remotely-controlled drone swarms is never considered.
So the Tejas has been held up with the IAF insisting that the LCA be delivered in battle-ready state with fully certification and all avionics, weapons, FCS, etc integrated and tested, which harsh conditions, incidentally, are NOT imposed on imported fighter planes! And in any case, such a deliberately elongated induction process is contrary to the practice of the far more advanced air forces who induct new aircraft into the fleet even as they are undergoing the various stages of certification for air worthiness, on-board weapons and avionics integration and testing, etc. This is the case, for instance, with the US Air Force which is flying the F-35 while going through the certification steps with the problems detected and corrected based on feedback from pilots. This has required design tinkering of the aircraft and of the on-board sub-systems by Lockeed, the aircraft supplier. In other words, improvements in the aircraft, whole and in parts, to make it fully operational proceed in parallel with the aircraft’s induction. System and sub-system rectifications and technical solutions are then retrofitted on to aircraft already in the fleet, as is happening with the F-35. It saves time and money even as it speeds up acceptance of the aircraft by the force’s fighter jock community.
Had this procedure been followed for the Tejas, its scaled-up production and induction, instead of being delayed for another 3-4 years, would have begun some five years back and the Tejas by now would have filled at least 2 squadrons even at HAL’s desultory annual production rate of some 8 aircraft. As things stand, IAF has still to sign a production contract and HAL, in turn, has still to activate its second production line, which would increase the rate to 18 Tejas per year. Given the paucity of fighter planes, why wouldn’t the government-MoD do the obvious thing and farm out the production of the Tejas to several private sector companies — L&T, Mahindra Aerospace, Tata Defence Systems, and even Reliance Defence, for surge production of the LCA as I have been advocating for many years? This will mandate NAL-DRDO transferring full technology to the private sector along with the source codes, operational algorithms, etc. This, of course, is being resisted because it will set up the private sector as a genuine and far more capable competitor to the DRDO-DPSU complex and possibly drive them out of the business or, as is equally likely, motivate HAL/DPSU -DRDO to become more efficient and effective, but who wants that?
HAL/DPSU-DRDO would rather have the present state of affairs continue in perpetuity with MoD facilitating custom for them with licensed production of imported goods. Periodic controversies, like the one attending on the purchase of 36 Rafales, is great and serves the purpose of keeping the situation in as-is condition forever. The IAF, in the event, couldn’t be happier. In this sense, the IAF and HAL and, in the larger context, the Indian military and DPSU-DRDO do, in fact, work well together!
This is Bharat Karnad after all.
HAL and IAF — made for each other
https://bharatkarnad.com/2019/01/26/hal ... ach-other/
On Republic Day, there’s no more serious matter to ponder than the negative synergy generated by the Combine of the military and DRDO-DPSU that’s pile-driving India into subservience, emphasizing its dependency on foreign armaments and strengthening its subordinate state status in the world. The political leaders across the ideological spectrum wax rhetorical about arms self-sufficiency being round the corner but neither have the interest nor intellect, leave alone any understanding of issues pertaining to national security, to implement anything remotely sensible and are quite happy to be led by their noses by military chiefs offering skewed “professional advice” and generalist bureaucrats with vested interest in the status quo. Hence, the god-awful system of defence production geared to military procurement from abroad flourishes.
Exactly around this time last year, Air Marshal Harish Masand (Retd) wrote Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman offering her some information about how Hindustan Aerospace Ltd. actually works and why this premier Defence Public Sector Unit (DPSU), one of MoD Department of Defence Production’s ‘navratnas’, is in so sad a state and in such disrepair that the Modi government has been forced to blame HAL’s weaknesses — its inability to even screwdriver various aircraft together from imported kits very efficiently, something it has done for most of the last 60-odd years, its low labour productivity, and dismal quality control — to justify buying 36 French Rafale combat aircraft off the Dassault Avions shelf.
Air Marshal Masand, for those who may not be aware, is a VrC and, until his retirement, was simply the best fighter pilot in the Indian Air Force, his aircraft of choice — the MiG-29, which he rates as the best fighter plane, ton for fighting ton. Indeed, in display flying, he repeatedly and abrasively showed up the French Mirage 2000 that his Service was sold on. In the process, he gained the ire of his seniors and compatriots, ensuring that despite the requisite seniority and a spectacularly good record in service that would have put him in the running for the Chief of Air Staff post, his career was sidelined.
In many respects, he is the Air Force analogue of the great General Hanut Singh in the army. Utter professionals and sticklers for doing the right thing, neither attained the heights their gallantry awards, seniority, honesty and proven competence should have guaranteed them. I recall CAS ACM SP Tyagi, who could have retrieved Masand’s career when he assumed office in late December 2004 but didn’t, telling me that Harish was “not a team man” — a phrase curiously used by Masand’s juniors who made it as AOCs-in-C. In the Indian military, it is necessary to fall in line with the pet peeves and projects of the Service and the Service Chief of the day and, most importantly, to be a team man or you are out. So, out went Hanut and Masand. But that’s par for the course. The best and the brightest in the armed forces rarely make it to 4-star rank. Comparing and contrasting them with the usual strategically dim-witted sort who do pretty much explains why the Indian armed forces find themselves in the sorry straits they are in now.
With military leadership lacking foresight, it is natural, because no real demands are made on them, for DPSUs-DRDO to also be short-sighted and show the same slack will and lassitude, and to be content with doing as little as possible for as much moolah as they can corner. Displaying minimal technological innovation, commercial sense and market logic, the DRDO-DPSU Complex moves hand-in-glove with the military to waste national resources on arms imports — the new means, incidentally, of transferring wealth from a poor country to rich countries, not unlike what India suffered during the hey day of colonialism.
The political leadership in the country is squarely to blame. No armed service’s Chief of Staff is ever dismissed for wrong advice to buy this, that, or the other that prolongs the country’s arms dependency and misery, and DRDO-DPSU heads are not hauled up for gross ineptitude of their organizations in ingesting technology, not developing advanced designs and products, and for failing to manage a labour force so unmotivated and with such bad work ethic as to be an economic liability. All this because there’s no accountability anywhere in the Indian government system.
It has made for an institutionalized business model built on wastefulness followed by the military-DPSU-DRDO Combine, and in the case of IAF, the HAL-DRDO Complex, that Masand described in his letter to Sitharaman and in a piece (“What ails HAL”) that he has just published in the Indian Defence Review (at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... -ails-hal/ ) thus: “If HAL can buy something for $10, it would rather pay $100, and if DRDO can do a job in on year, it would rather take ten.” Masand can speak authoritatively on HAL’s functioning because, as Wing Commander in the early 1980s, he was in-charge of the MiG-21 bis upgrade programme, whose original cost of $850 million in 1994 was, owing to financial crunch, pruned by MoD to $626 million (Rs 2,000 crores). However, Masand’s strict oversight brought the programme in on time and without cost over-runs. The $224 million that was cut proved in excess of need for the MiG bis programme, but it hints at the kind of built-in margins for loot that the armed services personnel and MoD officils in the procurement loop, and DRDO, and DPSU share in. With the screwdriver tech capability-ceiling of HAL (and Mazgaon, etc.) translating into cost (of CKD/SKD kits) plus 2% profit, the government can claim profitability for DPSUs and keep them going. Masand’s letter to the minister expressing his willingness to provide her the inside dope on how and why DRDO and DPSUs, in which the nation has invested heavily, regularly produce miserable results, of course, went unheeded.
For effect and show, the military/IAF will complain incessantly about DRDO and DPSUs/HAL being the great villains, whose consistent failures over decades in delivering the promised products in time has lost them the trust of the armed Services/IAF and compelled them, or so they claim, to import just about every major item in sight, reinforcing India’s shameful standing as the largest buyer of arms and imperiling the country’s security. However, the profligacy and R&D and industrial shortcomings of DRDO-DPSUs serves the military fine because it means a perennial rationale for importing stuff.
On the rare occasion when indigenous weapons system design and development projects do get off the ground and into production stage after overcoming every obstacle erected in their path, such as the Tejas LCA and the Arjuna Main Battle Tank, the armed services delay their induction and mass production using any and every ruse they can think of. Thus, despite Arjuna MBT besting the Russian T-90 in every test category, in every weather condition, in all terrains, the army has been reluctant to buy it in large numbers on the ground that it is too heavy and cumbersome to transport easily. The obvious solution for this problem would have been for the government, MoD, and the army to agree by consensus that the home-grown design — the most important aspect of any weapons systems in terms of production — needed a small tweaking to reduce the weight and size.
Likewise in the case of the Tejas. Because the design is an NAL-DRDO product, the intelligence on the plane, its source codes, etc are all entirely with India. This design can be upscaled and modified to obtain the Advanced Medium Combat aircraft, the proposed follow-on aircraft to Tejas, or miniaturized to realize a weapons-bearing, long endurance, war-drone. India can do whatever it wants with it and will finally free the country and the IAF of the importitis disease. But no, that’s not what has happened. Far from writing finis to buying foreign combat aircraft, IAF is compounding its logistics and operational problems by going in for yet another type of aircraft to make up the balance 126 MMRCA, even as the indigenous AMCA project is shunted out of sight. The excuse being the depleting squadrons, which the IAF frequently makes public through a compliant media and which the political leadership of the day, in order not to appear änti-national”, ends up funding. Whether manned combat aircraft anymore has relevance in the coming age of remotely-controlled drone swarms is never considered.
So the Tejas has been held up with the IAF insisting that the LCA be delivered in battle-ready state with fully certification and all avionics, weapons, FCS, etc integrated and tested, which harsh conditions, incidentally, are NOT imposed on imported fighter planes! And in any case, such a deliberately elongated induction process is contrary to the practice of the far more advanced air forces who induct new aircraft into the fleet even as they are undergoing the various stages of certification for air worthiness, on-board weapons and avionics integration and testing, etc. This is the case, for instance, with the US Air Force which is flying the F-35 while going through the certification steps with the problems detected and corrected based on feedback from pilots. This has required design tinkering of the aircraft and of the on-board sub-systems by Lockeed, the aircraft supplier. In other words, improvements in the aircraft, whole and in parts, to make it fully operational proceed in parallel with the aircraft’s induction. System and sub-system rectifications and technical solutions are then retrofitted on to aircraft already in the fleet, as is happening with the F-35. It saves time and money even as it speeds up acceptance of the aircraft by the force’s fighter jock community.
Had this procedure been followed for the Tejas, its scaled-up production and induction, instead of being delayed for another 3-4 years, would have begun some five years back and the Tejas by now would have filled at least 2 squadrons even at HAL’s desultory annual production rate of some 8 aircraft. As things stand, IAF has still to sign a production contract and HAL, in turn, has still to activate its second production line, which would increase the rate to 18 Tejas per year. Given the paucity of fighter planes, why wouldn’t the government-MoD do the obvious thing and farm out the production of the Tejas to several private sector companies — L&T, Mahindra Aerospace, Tata Defence Systems, and even Reliance Defence, for surge production of the LCA as I have been advocating for many years? This will mandate NAL-DRDO transferring full technology to the private sector along with the source codes, operational algorithms, etc. This, of course, is being resisted because it will set up the private sector as a genuine and far more capable competitor to the DRDO-DPSU complex and possibly drive them out of the business or, as is equally likely, motivate HAL/DPSU -DRDO to become more efficient and effective, but who wants that?
HAL/DPSU-DRDO would rather have the present state of affairs continue in perpetuity with MoD facilitating custom for them with licensed production of imported goods. Periodic controversies, like the one attending on the purchase of 36 Rafales, is great and serves the purpose of keeping the situation in as-is condition forever. The IAF, in the event, couldn’t be happier. In this sense, the IAF and HAL and, in the larger context, the Indian military and DPSU-DRDO do, in fact, work well together!
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
saurabh,csaurabh wrote:My grievance request for IDEX was closed with the following reasons: With regards to application submission, no specific acknowledgement is sent out to the applicants. If after pressing the submit button, application code is generated and is displayed to the applicant, it means that the application has been submitted.Kakarat wrote:
I suggested this because I had once made a suggestion to the air force and after some time i got a mail from a air force ID if I was happy with the response if not asking me to reply to the mail. Hope yours also gets good response and keep checking through the link you get through mail
Also in the FAQs on their website: The exact timelines for the result announcement will be announced by the Ministry after the close of the application period.
Babus being babus..
did this go anywhere? I just saw this tweet from Ajaykumar https://twitter.com/drajaykumar_ias/sta ... 3463756802
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
I 'feel' that Karnads observations about HAL and higher leadership sounds about right. About DRDO, the DRDO engineers I have had the good fortune to work with have been sharp as a thumb-tack. They are much better than the avg. IT-Vity types. Perhaps program/project management, risk management needs to be an added stream for greater discipline and sticking to timelines. Other than that, I feel DRDO, ISRO, DAE/BARC are the only organizations that are doing any R&D that is worth the name.
One problem I can see is, we dont try anything new when it comes to projects. Why not give management of an HAL program to the Airforce to run by itself? Perhaps there will be greater cooperation and understanding of each others issues. Same for OFB.. I dont see any reason why one of the artillery programs 130mm upgunning/Sarang, Dhanush 45 Cal or ... can not be managed by the Army itself? Either it will succeed, or it will spectacularly fail. In both cases, we would have learnt something. Right now, we have been having the same debate for the past 20 years. There is literally nothing new in what Karnad is saying, and I am not trying to blame Karnad, just the situation at hand.
One problem I can see is, we dont try anything new when it comes to projects. Why not give management of an HAL program to the Airforce to run by itself? Perhaps there will be greater cooperation and understanding of each others issues. Same for OFB.. I dont see any reason why one of the artillery programs 130mm upgunning/Sarang, Dhanush 45 Cal or ... can not be managed by the Army itself? Either it will succeed, or it will spectacularly fail. In both cases, we would have learnt something. Right now, we have been having the same debate for the past 20 years. There is literally nothing new in what Karnad is saying, and I am not trying to blame Karnad, just the situation at hand.