ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

[Karan M]

A single S-400 battery will be hard pressed dealing with *one class* of target..

Who is saying that a single S-400 battery must defend against all these classes of targets and all volumes of the threat? I most certainly never said it. Air defense assets are deployed with three things in mind, Coverage, Density, and Threat types. You deploy your Air Defense units with these things in mind. If your main adversary has the ability to execute massive TBM and ABM raids then you need to address each of these three areas and that is exactly why I cited the explosion in magazine size that the US theater deployed systems have had to do in response to the ever growing capability of China and others to generate massive Raids. A gulf war Patriot battery had 36 missiles. A current forward deployed Patriot battery in Korea has more than 120.

Well this is what this post implied.
I noted
the problem is you can't have a radar dual-task for BMD and standard air breathing target, and the cruise missile threat all in one, especially when it is a large but still limited aperture PESA optimized for mobility.

and you noted:

Of course you can. PDB 6+ AN/MPQ-53 and Baseline 9.0+ AN/SPY-1's both do this as (probably) the S-400 too. MEADS technology demonstator end items have also demonstrated this back in the 2012 timeframe with Flight-Test -2 intercept of a TBM and Air Breathing target.

The issue is not whether a single battery can theoretically handle 3 different classes of threat in ideal conditions. Against the explosion of threats, volume, and mixes they can generate, a single battery will be overwhelmed pretty rapidly. I doubt it can handle them simultaneously either - the system architecture of a single panel AESA (check the elevation angles, and scan speeds horizontally) just doesn't support such multi-threat simultaneous coverage. The same radar can't track a steep dive IRBM and a cruise missile flying at 100 ft, simultaneously, not when one is coming at 9 o clock and the other at 12 o clock near vertical, and an AF strike package is at 4 o clock, each aircraft at different heights, all supported by EW (how much power can be allocated will itself move you beyond the standard battery control mobile radar).

[brar_w]

I think there may have been some confusion. I am not saying that a single battery must be able to handle a multi-vectored mass attack from Ballstic Missiles and Air breathing Missiles. Heck, there isn't a single battery of ground based air defense system in the world today that can handle a mass multi-vectored ballistic missile attack.

What I said was, that each battery must be able to defend against a diverse set of threats in the Defended Area it is assigned. Air Defense batteries are set up with overlapping coverage and each set of operators assigned a sector. An S-400 is a point defense asset for BMD, it will be responsible for defeating ballistic missiles 15-20 kms out (range) within its own sector. It must also be able to defeat other air breathing threats within that same sector. Similarly, other overlapping Air Defense assets will be assigned to do the same from other vectors and cover other defended areas.

Cruise Missile defense is a mission best left to either air based assets or point defense systems like the Spyder though the S-400 like all higher end systems will have capability to that end..For the CMD mission you don't need very big radars (they can fly under the horizon easily)..you need a whole lot of small, mobile and well dispersed radars unless of course the battery is itself a target.

Yes, and then you have to start deploying more units as well. Its not just what each system is *technically* capable of, you have to consider the practicalities of whether that system can actually handle a surge of attacks above and beyond what each battery/module can manage.

The battery and the air-defense system is designed around a certain set of requirements. In the examples I cited, this is specifically against raid scenarios i.e. the ability to launch interceptors quickly at multiple targets while still providing updates. Not only is a single raid scenario important but so is the ability to defend against waves of raids and this is what the example I cited does.

Diverse, and the problem is # number of threats and the sector limitations that accrue to each stand alone battery.

Sector Limitations and defended areas is why you have a level of desired system density against a particular threat.

Which is the point why we either add S-4XX batteries, OR use them to boost the local BMD system, but it would be a mistake to assume as some do that a single S-4XX battery can somehow take on a range of threats. It will get overwhelmed.

I don't think so at all. If a single S-400 battery is responsible for a particular defended area then it should be able to handle multiple types of threats originating from that defended area just like its peer systems in Russia and around the world. I'm not asking it to defend against threats that are originating from some other sector but it has to be able to defeat the threats it is responsible for in its DA. Other assets will be responsible for threats that originate in their area of concern.

[Karan M]

"An S-400 is a point defense asset for BMD, it will be responsible for defeating ballistic missiles 15-20 kms out (range) within its own sector. It must also be able to defeat other air breathing threats within that same sector. "

Which is the point, it can't do both against severe threats. Nobody can, in the kind of practical scenarios i pointed out above. For this to be allowed, you have to add more S-400 batteries each tasked to a threat profile or add even more specialized units (pure play BMD). Good part is if you dual task each squadron and add more radars, then at least you have 5 *high intensity threat* capable zones, given each squadron has 2x batteries, and each battery is independent.

Similarly, other overlapping Air Defense assets will be assigned to do the same from other vectors and cover other defended areas.

Very few if any AF (ironically apart from the PRC) have these kind of assets in play.
IAF has 8 Akash squadrons (16 batteries), 3 SpyDer (6 batteries), 9 Barak (18 batteries on order), 25 Pechora batteries (to be upgraded), 7 more Akash squadrons planned (14 batteries). Then a few OSA-AKM batteries. Then 5 S-400 Squadrons (10 batteries). Then the BMD units which have not yet been fully set up.

*Once* we get all these assets in place, then the theoretical overlap etc starts. Till then, we do have windows of vulnerability.

We can get that around by dispersing assets, but that has cons of limiting response time, no easy answers though the S-400 is a huge boost for sure.

I don't think so at all. If a single S-400 battery is responsible for a particular defended area then it should be able to handle multiple types of threats originating from that defended area just like its peer systems in Russia and around the world. I'm not asking it to defend against threats that are originating from some other sector but it has to be able to defeat the threats it is responsible for in its DA. Other assets will be responsible for threats that originate in their area of concern.

In the examples i pointed out, there is no system anywhere in the world that can handle the kind of threat mixes I detailed. So if you wish to bring in "other assets", then clearly it means either we restrict the single S-400s battery's AOR/threat profile or back it up with other batteries. Which was the original point.

[brar_w]

Which is the point, it can't do both against severe threats. Nobody can, in the kind of practical scenarios i pointed out above..

AD systems do that all the time i.e. defend against a diverse threat type that originates from the area the sectors they are responsible for. You introduce more assets to cover more vectors depending upon the three considerations I had mentioned earlier. This is how air-defense systems operate.

Saturation is always a concern, hence AD systems have also evolved to mitigate that vulnerability (example I've already cited) but saturation is almost never looked down to the unit level but almost always at the theater level i.e. do I have enough total density to defend against a saturation attack. Individual unit level capability is bolstered by having batteries that are more robust and better equipped to handle raids (magazine size, sensor capability and other TTPs) while overlapping coverage and overall density ensures all possible vectors are covered.

IAF has 8 Akash squadrons (16 batteries), 3 SpyDer (6 batteries), 9 Barak (18 batteries on order), 25 Pechora batteries (to be upgraded), 7 more Akash squadrons planned (14 batteries). Then a few OSA-AKM batteries. Then 5 S-400 Squadrons (10 batteries). Then the BMD units which have not yet been fully set up.

That only speaks to the need of fast tracking the Indigenous systems because they will be the gap/capability enhancers. But that doesn't take away from the capability side of things i.e. that these AD systems should be able to handle these diverse threats originating from the sectors they are looking into.

[Karan M]

Which is the point, it can't do both against severe threats. Nobody can, in the kind of practical scenarios i pointed out above..

AD systems do that all the time i.e. defend against a diverse threat type that originates from the area the sectors they are responsible for. You introduce more assets to cover more vectors depending upon the three considerations I had mentioned earlier. This is how air-defense systems operate.

So, then your original assertion was:
Of course you can. PDB 6+ AN/MPQ-53 and Baseline 9.0+ AN/SPY-1's both do this as (probably) the S-400 too. MEADS technology demonstator end items have also demonstrated this back in the 2012 timeframe with Flight-Test -2 intercept of a TBM and Air Breathing target.

whereas i was making the point:
the problem is you can't have a radar dual-task for BMD and standard air breathing target, and the cruise missile threat all in one, especially when it is a large but still limited aperture PESA optimized for mobility.

..you have to add more assets, Q.E.D.

This theoretical claim of "AD systems do that all the time" - I'd still like to see the specific all-in-one MEADS/BMD system that acts against a 10x CM threat at 40ft, 9 o clock, a 10x bunch of steep dive IR/MR/SRBMs at 12 o clock, and a 20 a/c fighter strike package coming in at 4 o clock. All "theoretically" coming in a single batteries AOR, with its 360 degree scan radar & so forth. Now tell me which practical real world system has countered *all the above* simultaneously? I am even limiting the numbers here. 2nd Arty /PLAAF can easily throw 4x the missile numbers I mentioned above for a near simultaneous TOT. Single battery. As that was the original context.

[brar_w]

No this is not what I am debating. I am debating FOR the notion that Air Defense systems (even those currently deployed) are more than capable of handling Ballistic Missile and AB threats concurrently. I gave you three examples of systems that do this concurrently. This is a basic requirement from most modern Air Defense Systems.

This does not automatically mean that each one of those AD systems are somehow going to go total ninja during a multi-vector multi system attack. This is not even remotely close to what I am saying. From my very initial posts, I tried to make it as clear as i possibly could that each Air Defense asset is defending a particular area and is looking into threats originating from a specific sector and it is WITHIN that sector that it must be able to quickly adapt and defeat a diverse set of threats for which it has been designed.

This theoretical claim of "AD systems do that all the time"

This is a fact. Currently forward deployed air-defense systems are doing this as we speak i.e. defending against a diverse threat set originating from the sector they are responsible for.

I'd still like to see the specific all-in-one MEADS/BMD system that acts against a 10x CM threat at 40ft, 9 o clock, a 10x bunch of steep dive IR/MR/SRBMs at 12 o clock, and a 20 a/c fighter strike package coming in at 4 o clock.

No one is going to be able to afford that as a demo, and because they do not deploy air-defense assets this way no one is going to ask for this sort of demonstration either. In reality you are defending against threats that are coming from a particular sector...even if you have the ability to cover all sectors you are primarily tasked with one sector as part of a larger Air Defense Unit (whatever that may be depending upon different force structure constructs).

I used MEADS because it was an interesting experiment with requirements originating in the late 90's. From memory, having spoken to one of its C2 developers, I believe the system was tasked at providing sectored BMD i.e. 90-120 degree threats and concurrent 360 degree Cruise Missile threats. All the battle elements were created and linked to serve that mission. But that was a system based on requirements from decades ago so I'm not sure what the Germans desire from it now...but this was just used for illustrating that systems no longer need to switch between roles as they needed to during Gulf War..

[Karan M]

No this is not what I am debating. I am debating FOR the notion that Air Defense systems (even those currently deployed) are more than capable of handling Ballistic Missile and AB threats concurrently.

Please demonstrate which system deployed today, handles the threats that i mentioned previously?
Single battery.

Statement:
This theoretical claim of "AD systems do that all the time" - I'd still like to see the specific all-in-one MEADS/BMD system that acts against a 10x CM threat at 40ft, 9 o clock, a 10x bunch of steep dive IR/MR/SRBMs at 12 o clock, and a 20 a/c fighter strike package coming in at 4 o clock. All "theoretically" coming in a single batteries AOR, with its 360 degree scan radar & so forth. Now tell me which practical real world system has countered *all the above* simultaneously? I am even limiting the numbers here. 2nd Arty /PLAAF can easily throw 4x the missile numbers I mentioned above for a near simultaneous TOT. Single battery. As that was the original context.

I gave you three examples of systems that do this concurrently. This is a basic requirement from most modern Air Defense Systems.

So if they can do it concurrently, and 3 systems do so today and this is a "basic requirement", the data should be easy to find no? Or they would have done it in tests.

This does not automatically mean that each one of those AD systems are somehow going to go total ninja during a multi-vector multi system attack. This is not even remotely close to what I am saying. From my very initial posts, I tried to make it as clear as i possibly could that each Air Defense asset is defending a particular area and is looking into threats originating from a specific sector and it is WITHIN that sector that it must be able to quickly adapt and defeat a diverse set of threats for which it has been designed.

The sector is a frontal 240 degree sector which is commonly assigned to every single battery, with its 360 degree scan, with the 120 degree behind area excluded (to make things even easier & per typical SOP).

Now, this is the threat profile.
A 10x CM threat at 40ft, 9 o clock, a 10x bunch of steep dive IR/MR/SRBMs at 12 o clock, and a 20 a/c fighter strike package coming in at 4 o clock. All "theoretically" coming in a single batteries AOR, with its 360 degree scan radar & so forth.I am even limiting the numbers here. 2nd Arty /PLAAF can easily throw 4x the missile numbers I mentioned above for a near simultaneous TOT.

Please show which 3 systems in the world today, can do so concurrently. If they could, you wouldn't have so many different AD types, with their multiple radar elevation angles, bands, power levels, missile types, etc etc. And if you tried putting all this into one SAM, bye-bye mobility, hello cost/price. The S-400 is a good balance, but even it can't do it all, in one battery at the same time.

[brar_w]

Please demonstrate which system deployed today, handles the threats that i mentioned previously?
Single battery.

The original discussion started because of this -

the problem is you can't have a radar dual-task for BMD and standard air breathing target, and the cruise missile threat all in one, especially when it is a large but still limited aperture PESA optimized for mobility.

All I said was that YES you can have a radar and Battle Management system dual tasked to handle a diverse set of threats. This was not possible for years because of physical hardware and software changes required on large PESA radars but it is possible now. There was nothing about *multi-vector threats* or anything to that end in your original post, only about a radar or a battery equipped with a PESA radar being able to handle BMD, ABT or CMD all at once. To this I responded by providing three systems that can do this NOW.

Later you added additional information of requiring the ability to defeat all threats from all vectors. This was not originally included in your post to which I had responded. Later, I clarified that I NEVER ASSERTED that these systems are capable of defeating all the threats from all possible vectors under all possible scenarios but all I was asserting was the fact that RADARS and C2 systems are more than capable of defending against multiple threats within their sector of responsibility as part of a larger IAMD unit.

So if they can do it concurrently, and 3 systems do so today and this is a "basic requirement", the data should be easy to find no? Or they would have done it in tests.

Again, I would direct you to your original post that started this debate.

Now, this is the threat profile.
A 10x CM threat at 40ft, 9 o clock, a 10x bunch of steep dive IR/MR/SRBMs at 12 o clock, and a 20 a/c fighter strike package coming in at 4 o clock. All "theoretically" coming in a single batteries AOR, with its 360 degree scan radar & so forth.I am even limiting the numbers here. 2nd Arty /PLAAF can easily throw 4x the missile numbers I mentioned above for a near simultaneous TOT.

This "Threat profile" was never provided and you most certainly did not mention it in the original post that started this track of discussion. Not ONCE did I ever claim that any system out there (let alone 3) are capable of meeting requirements against the threat profile that you made up. That was not the point of my original response, and most certainly your original post had no mention at all of this hypothetical threat profile.

[Karan M]

Just because a system is advertised to be multi-functional, does not always mean it is - the details matter. In a BMD role, most BMD radars function in fixed elevation & azimuth coverage. To compensate for low RCS, high speed BM targets, they operate in staring mode, and dwell times per beam are heavily increased. Signal processing is also different. When the radar is "locked" into that sector to optimize its performance, it cannot just be used for AD coverage. It should be obvious the battery cannot take on other classes of threats at the same time.

[Karan M]

All I said was that YES you can have a radar and Battle Management system dual tasked to handle a diverse set of threats. This was not possible for years because of physical hardware and software changes required on large PESA radars but it is possible now. There was nothing about *multi-vector threats* or anything to that end in your original post, only about a radar or a battery equipped with a PESA radar being able to handle BMD, ABT or CMD all at once. To this I responded by providing three systems that can do this NOW.

In short, you missed the context. There are no systems that can do it NOW practically. Because you keep claiming "multi-vector threats are all possible" but as of yet, there is not a single system that can do so!

Later you added additional information of requiring the ability to defeat all threats from all vectors. This was not originally included in your post to which I had responded. Later, I clarified that I NEVER ASSERTED that these systems are capable of defeating all the threats from all possible vectors under all possible scenarios but all I was asserting was the fact that RADARS and C2 systems are more than capable of defending against multiple threats within their sector of responsibility as part of a larger IAMD unit.

Again, this is just semantics because that as things stand today, there is not a single system in place, of which a single firing unit that can defend against these classes of threats together!!!

In fact, I have only asked for a limited 240 degree AOR! If I were to bring in truly independent 360 degree AOR, what then??
Furthermore, you keep saying that "RADARS and C2 systems are more than capable of defending against multiple threats within their sector of responsibility " - where is the evidence? Where is the practicality? You can and should clearly see that a single system cannot handle the elevation and azimuth coverage or power levels required for all these classes of targets together!

Again, 240 degrees, 10x CM, 10x BM, 20x A/C, where is the evidence that ANY of your 3 systems have ever defeated even a single threat of this (moderate) magnitude?

All you have shown so far is one MEADS test with 1x TBM, 1x fighter, and that too in a not so realistic operational scenario!!

Again, I would direct you to your original post that started this debate.

The original post was quite clearly mentioning the need for practical concerns about what the IAF faces. Not whether theoretically the S-400 can handle x target and y target, and z target, so its automatically implied x,y,z can all be managed together.

They cant! That was the entire point of saying add 2x batteries!

[Karan M]

If your three systems can't meet the threat profile that we face, which our opponents "made up" to the detriment of the claimed capabilities of these so called three systems, then lets not even claim these three systems are capable of handling any of the three classes of threats you implied they were capable of meeting. Its all on paper onlee. You keep saying in the sector they can do this that, reality being though that so far you have evidence of only 1 TBM (what range pray?) and 1 fighter test, let alone of any heavy duty operational scenario.

This "Threat profile" was never provided and you most certainly did not mention it in the original post that started this track of discussion. Not ONCE did I ever claim that any system out there (let alone 3) are capable of meeting requirements against the threat profile that you made up. That was not the point of my original response, and most certainly your original post had no mention at all of this hypothetical threat profile.

Great work on the screenshot, but only if you had scrolled up earlier.

Now, what's in a battalion.
https://www.armyrecognition.com/russia_ ... ystem.html

Each battalion has a 55K6E command post, 1x central "Big Bird" radar for surveillance. A mobile mast is optional.
Fire control is provided by the "Grave Stone" Engagement radar, and upto 12 launchers can be added (we have 8x launchers). If this wants to be made more independent, we can have a 96L6E acquisition radar as a 3D search unit to back up the central Big Bird. In short, the 8x launchers can be split between 2x Grave Stones, each with a 96L6E and with the command post having the 55K6E + central Big Bird.

So lets assume IAF took a minimum option (just to conservatively see the figures) and we have:
5x regimental sets. 10x Battalions.

So that's 10x 55K6E command units, 10x Big Bird radars (with masts optional, which we will likely take, we even had them for our ST-68 U/M which too were S-3xx radars which we used independently as MPRs), 10x Gravestone radars, 80x launchers.

Considering each battalion as an independent firing unit, aka battery that's 10 firing units.

Now I dont think IAF will go for such a conservative loadout. You have 8 launchers per radar, each fire control radar can only scan/focus on one area if its set up for a BMD role. In effect, if you want to have BMD coverage + Air target coverage, and optimally utilize your launchers you can split up your battalions.

In which case, they would prefer to split each battalion into at least further 2 firing units for optimal flexibility, add a Grave stone radar per 4 launchers and give them a 96L6E for air search. In which case I wont be surprised if our order has:

10x Big Bird + 55K6E command post + 20x Grave stone radars, 10-20x 96L6E radars and 80 launchers. Missiles will be a mix of all types with max being the longer ranged ones.

It can't get clearer than that.

[brar_w]

In a BMD role, most BMD radars function in fixed elevation & azimuth coverage. To compensate for low RCS, high speed BM targets, they operate in staring mode, and dwell times per beam are heavily increased. Signal processing is also different. When the radar is "locked" into that sector to optimize its performance, it cannot just be used for AD coverage.

Radars are covering a sector and within that sector they are capable of defending against different threat types. Modern systems are able to do that i.e operate in concurrent modes or with full IAMD capability. Take a single face SPY-1 for example (to avoid complication assume only single sector performance), it can do both concurrently i.e. detect and direct an SM3 on an SRBM - IRBM while also providing targeting to an SM2/6 or ESSM against a cruise missile. IAMD flight tests have been demonstrated against live targets and it does not need to switch modes while prosecuting a different target type.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PM86hpV1YzU

S400 should be able to do this as well, as does the Patriot. Because these will be covering only a sector, their defended area will be smaller as would be the sectors they will cover but within that space they have to be able to cover these missions. All three are PESA radars. Prior to the baseline I mentioned, AEGIS was only capable of going after one type of threat at a time i.e. BMD configured AEGIS ships could only do BMD while AAW configured cruisers could only do AAW and also some terminal BMD at low altitudes.

In short, you missed the context. There are no systems that can do it NOW practically. Because you keep claiming "multi-vector threats are all possible" but as of yet, there is not a single system that can do so!

Can you please point me to your reference to your desired threat scenario or ANY mention of a multi-vector threat in your original post. There is no ground based system (on sea you have AEGIS BL 9.0 and above) that is required to do MULTI-VECTOR mulit-threat defense against TBM, AAW, ABM and for good reasons. But this DOES NOT mean that there aren't systems out there that can't perform these missions within the sectors they are responsible for. You have batteries deployed right now that are tasked with the entire spectrum of this threat over their assigned sector.

Great work on the screenshot, but only if you had scrolled up earlier.

I was responding to just one post. That is all I did i.e. point to radars and C2 systems right now that are tasked at defeating . If you were actually talking about the ability to do this in all sectors simultaneously, then yes we are in agreement because that capability does not come from a deployed AD battery but from a larger unit that that battery is a part of. From the very first few posts, I clarified that AD systems are defending a sector for the most part and the S-400 for most of its missions (outside of AAW) will also effectively do the same.

[Karan M]

Radars are covering a sector and within that sector they are capable of defending against different threat types. Modern systems are able to do that i.e operate in concurrent modes or with full IAMD capability. Take a single face SPY-1 for example (to avoid complication assume only single sector performance), it can do both concurrently i.e. detect and direct an SM3 on an MRBM or IRBM while also providing targeting to an SM6 against a cruise missile.

This is moot, as we are on mobile GBAD, not Naval radars with 4 panel PESA, AESA able to take advantage of the fact. Please have any vendor show a single mobile GBAD AD system capable of doing what I mentioned earlier. You have the threat profile. A fixed panel HPR set up can theoretically do this and will be blown to pieces with surge attack after surge attack. Its not a ship to relocate.

IAMD flight tests have been demonstrated against live targets and it does not need to switch modes while prosecuting a different target type. S400 should be able to do this as well, as does the Patriot. All three are PESA radars. Prior to the baseline I mentioned, AEGIS was only capable of going after one type of threat at a time i.e. BMD configured AEGIS ships could only do BMD while AAW configured cruisers could only do AAW and also some terminal BMD at low altitudes.

This is against practicality and has no bearing with real world ops unfortunately. Modes need to be changed for all ground based mobile radars, some need to be mast mounted, and have size restrictions. They lack the power footprint, the elevation coverage (to rapidly change between different classes of targets) and even the azimuth coverage (to rapidly track different targets). They cannot handle the practical threat profile i mentioned concurrently.

Again, the S-400 information has been provided, and I can bet Patriot is no better here. We are talking GBAD not ships. Aegis + 4-panel SPY is not going to be parked in Uttarakhand.

Can you please point me to your reference to your desired threat scenario or ANY mention of a multi-vector threat in your original post. There is no ground based system (on sea you have AEGIS BL 9.0 and above) that is required to do MULTI-VECTOR mulit-threat defense against TBM, AAW, ABM and for good reasons. But this DOES NOT mean that there aren't systems out there that can't perform these missions within the sectors they are responsible for. You have batteries deployed right now that are tasked with the entire spectrum of this threat over their assigned sector.

I have already posted my post above which had the context, which you missed.

Your second point does not logically flow from the first admission. Because there is no evidence from any vendor (let alone the physics/practicality is firmly against the fact), that there are no batteries deployed today that can meet the practical threat profile I detailed above.

Nada, zip, zilch. They can't. And if they can't claiming they are tasked with the "entire spectrum of threat" is the brochure bashing all these vendors put out, but which has no relation to real world reality.

I was responding to just one post. That is all I did i.e. point to radars and C2 systems right now that are tasked at defeating . If you were actually talking about the ability to do this in a sector, then yes we are in agreement. From the very first few posts, I clarified that AD systems are defending a sector for the most part and the S-400 for most of its missions (outside of AAW) will also effectively do the same.

The point I was making is just because a system like Patriot can claim that if it can handle all classes of threats, does not mean it can do so in a practical fashion unless it is supplemented heavily.

The S-4XX is amazing in that it can be repurposed for many roles. But it can only do so much.

[brar_w]

This is moot, as we are on mobile GBAD, not Naval radars with 4 panel PESA,

Again, let's step back and lookn at the parameters that I've cited in my example.

In the part of my post you quoted, I've clearly mentioned that "Radars are covering a sector" and "within that sector". This I've specifically mentioned to get rid of the ambiguity of a four panel staring array. I even asked you to assume a single face SPY-1. It will be just as capable of getting an SM3 and SM2/6/ESSM on target as a 4 face SPY-1, but ONLY within the sector it is operating in just as I have said the other Ground based radars do. I think this is pretty clearly mentioned in what I've written.

Please show a single mobile GBAD AD system capable of doing what I mentioned earlier.

I have already said, now on multiple occasions, that no single GBAD system can accomplish your hypothetical scenario at the battery level. That scenario came later and I never objected to it. How much more clearer can I get? This was most definitly not the point I am or was disagreeing on. I am agreeing with you on this. My original post pointed to radar and C2 combinations that are more than capable of handing a diverse threat type within the sectors they are responsible for just as AEGIS does (but on a much broader and multi vector way).

y. Modes need to be changed for all ground based mobile radars, some need to be mast mounted, and have size restrictions. They lack the power footprint, the elevation coverage (to rapidly change between different classes of targets) and even the azimuth coverage (to rapidly track different targets). They cannot handle the practical threat profile i mentioned concurrently.

Of course they can't handle your hypothetical threat profile. You know what else they can't handle? 100 fighters coming straight at them. I am not arguing with you you on those points at all. All I am saying is that within the defended area and the sector they are looking into they are more than capable of defeating air-breathing, and ballistic missile targets. This is what modern systems are tasked and expected to do.

[Karan M]

Can you show a single system with a single panel SPY-1 able to handle the threat profile I mentioned? It won't be able to. Because then will need to be on a turntable, and rotate, and once its doing that it loses the ability to handle the wide spacing in azimuth coverage with the near instantaneous response, the 4 panel PESA had. Second, if its no longer on a ship, and has to be mobile, it loses the advantage of the ships native power generation powered by multiple gas turbines. Size of the antenna array goes down, so does its range and its ability to handle different threats including long range BMs or low RCS air breathers. Third, since its not on a ship, it loses its elevation advantage. Good luck in being able to handle low flying threats then.. the list goes on and on... in essence you have an American S-4XX. Same issues, same problems, same physical limits come into play.

[Karan M]

>>I have already said, now on multiple occasions, that no single GBAD system can accomplish your hypothetical scenario at the battery level. That scenario came later and I never objected to it.

That was the scenario from the very beginning. And which was the crux of my point that to accomplish this, the IAFs five squadrons of S-4XX can either be 5x AD+BMD squadrons or by adding more radars and reducing launchers/battery, they can be 10x AD+BMD squadrons (at 50% less target handling capacity per battery, but still much more flexible).

That was the point. Provided we go for it, afford it etc.

[brar_w]

Can you show a single system with a single panel SPY-1 able to handle the threat profile I mentioned?

Again the same threat profile. I am not arguing on the ability of any one system or a single panel SPY-1. I am saying that a single panel SPY-1 will be able to handle that diverse threat set as long as the threats reside in the sector it is defending i.e. if there is a simultaneous ballistic and cruise missile attack within its field of view it can get interceptors on target there. Or in other words the Radar and C2 can handle it as long it is within its sector.

It will not be able to do this if the threats either originate outside of its sector or the engagement needs to happen outside of it but I never said it would be able to do that, I don't say that any GBAD system will be able to do that against all threats. Even the MEADS battle element that I cited is only required to be able to take on Ballistic Missiles in a 90-120 degree sector with concurrent AAW and CMD in 360 degrees. Or in other words defeat aircraft and cruise missiles in 360 degrees (area defense against Aircraft, point defense against cruise missiles) and ballistic missiles in the sectors it is designated. It was created and designed to be able to do this with sensor workload distribution much like the AEGIS system is.

[Karan M]

>>>Of course they can't handle your hypothetical threat profile. You know what else they can't handle? 100 fighters coming straight at them. I am not arguing with you you on those points at all. All I am saying is that within the defended area and the sector they are looking into they are more than capable of defeating air-breathing, and ballistic missile targets. This is what modern systems are tasked and expected to do.

No, they can't because you haven't demonstrated this either. All you have is one test from MEADS against 1 fighter and 1 TBM. A 100 fighters straight them is unrealistic. My scenario of several BMs, CMs, fighters is far more relevant in comparison. Please show where a single battery has been tested against any of the classes of the threats you mentioned *simultaneously* and what was the test radar's azimuth and elevation coverage! I'll bet it was so limited that it could barely handle any target beyond that limited coverage!

What you have here is belief, not backed by any physical test evidence.

[Karan M]

Even the MEADS battle element that I cited is only required to be able to take on Ballistic Missiles in a 90-120 degree sector with concurrent AAW and CMD in 360 degrees. It was created and designed to be able to do this with sensor workload distribution much like the AEGIS system is.

90-120 degree sector, with what elevation coverage? That's 45 degrees side to side! Barely if any coverage to handle multiple classes of targets, since it can no longer turn or scan for more targets. Especially if any aircraft uses terrain masking or is able to get out of the primary zone and pop up closer, since as for TBM if as is essential, the elevation of the radar is locked into an upward tilt angle and a specific zone of "likely targets", good luck in taking on any non cooperative fighter which has a greater chance of coming in low or even around.

[brar_w]

No, they can't because you haven't demonstrated this either. All you have is one test from MEADS against 1 fighter and 1 TBM.

The FT-2 demonstration was a proof of concept of the radar, the C2 and the integrated battle elements's ability to handle off axis threats with different characteristics i.e. a TBD threat originating from a different vector and an aircraft threat originating from a different vector. This was the concept and capability that it was demonstrating. I could be wrong, but prior to FT-2 no other Air Defense system had gone out and demonstrated that capability in an end to end test using live targets. They did not borrow your hypothetical scenario and said that they would take it in. It was carefully and specifically designed to show that the elements individually and collectively can distribute tasks, prioritize and execute engagements. This was the mandate. Now do they need to demonstrate it against 1 TBM and 2 aircraft for it to be able to do that role? NO. How many maximum targets has the S-400 shot down in one end to end test. Does it mean that it is unable to shoot down any more targets than that test?

MEADS FT-2 was not a raid scenario test but just a proof of concept test to validate the system's ability to defeat two different threats at different vectors.

Even the MEADS battle element that I cited is only required to be able to take on Ballistic Missiles in a 90-120 degree sector with concurrent AAW and CMD in 360 degrees. It was created and designed to be able to do this with sensor workload distribution much like the AEGIS system is.

90-120 degree sector, with what elevation coverage? That's 45 degrees side to side! Barely if any coverage to handle multiple classes of targets, since it can no longer turn or scan for more targets, especially if any aircraft uses terrain masking or is able to get out of the primary zone and pop up closer, and for TBM if as is essential, the elevation of the radar is locked into a specific zone of "likely targets", good luck in taking on any non cooperative fighter.

Yes it can turn and scan. The MEADS battle element as originally designed included integrated sensors comprising of one 10,000 element X-band AESA staring at the BMD defended sector while the other FCR focused on the AAW and CMD mission and was rotating. The LFS provided burden sharing by taking over the Surveillance roles allowing the FCR's to focus their attention on fire control and missile communication. The use of X band FCR coupled with a Ku band active seeker interceptor meant really good debri mitigation, and much reduced PIP errors..

[Karan M]

What were these vectors and what was the load added to the "tests".

It was carefully and specifically designed to show that the elements individually and collectively can distribute tasks, prioritize and execute engagements. This was the mandate.

In short, they did the minimum necessary to claim a very limited set of capabilities with relatively cooperative targets which could fit in within the systems physical limitations, which limitations marketing did not release.

Now do they need to demonstrate it against 1 TBM and 2 aircraft for it to be able to do that role?

Most certainly. Otherwise its just a very very limited POC.

How many maximum targets has the S-400 shot down in one end to end test. Does it mean that it is unable to shoot down any more targets than that test?

The S-4XX guys don't claim they can handle multiple classes of targets together to the max. etc etc . They are very careful and specific in mentioning the different tested modes available & the limitations are also obvious. They also have a legacy of many many systems, S-300, then the PMU, PMU1, PMU2 and the S-400 (which is nothing but PMU3 in many ways).

Now what's the real capability of the MEADS, its different radar modes and coverage etc?
We know the S-4XX ones.

[Karan M]

Yes it can turn and scan. The MEADS battle element as originally designed included integrated sensors comprising of one 10,000 element X-band AESA staring at the BMD defended sector while the other FCR focused on the AAW and CMD mission and was rotating.

And this was the exact point I was making all throughout, about how the radar search/FCR function is best optimized for each role separately.

I think at this point we can "close" the debate, because nothing further really needs to be said.

[brar_w]

What were these vectors and what was the load added to the "tests".

The combined test? From the data that is available this was a North South engagement i.e. TBM approached from the North while the Aircraft target approached from the South. Again this is on open source data only. Keep in mind that this was a TMRR test in that they used developmental end items so was quite ambitious given where in its maturity life-cycle the product was at the time (tech. demonstrators).

In short, they did the minimum necessary to claim a very limited set of capabilities with relatively cooperative targets which could fit in within the systems physical limitations, which limitations marketing did not release.

What does this mean? The test was to validate that the system could successfully detect, track and engage a ballistic missile target and simultaneously also prosecute an air breathing target in the completely opposite direction using the same FCR. It did that successfully.

Developmental testing is objective based and here the demonstration was to simply show that a single MEADS battery can engage off axis threats as different from each other as an aircraft and a TBM.

Can you please direct me to another developmental test of which you have knowledge of that did things the way you like them and how it was different?

And this was the exact point I was making all throughout, about how the same radar cannot do both for roles.

Come on man. The same radar can do both roles and in fact in the FT-2 that i cited as an example, a SINGLE FCR engaged both targets. The entire reason i even brought up MEADS to state the fact that even with its expanded radar suite, it is still only designed to handle TBM in 90-120 sectors and only CMD and AAW in the 360 concurrently given how the US Army would have deployed it. To expand that employed sector, they added elements or radars.

The reason why MEADS FT-2 was an important test event was because it was able to demonstrate the successful end to end functioning of a single battery to engage threats originating from different aspects and with different profiles. Till that time no single battery level system (anywhere in the world, that I'm aware of) had done something like this though the Patriot had demonstrated concurrent TBM and Cruise missile intercept but only when the threats resided in the sector it was looking in (a key difference that I've tried to stress).

The Patriot (which doesn't have a rotator in its mix) can do this within its sectored coverage aginst TBM/AAW/CMD with MSE and GEM/T systems. It cannot defend against all threats in the 360 at the battery level but within the sectors it is focusing on ( can be both 90 degree or 120 degree depending on what the unit construct is) it is designed and equipped to do concurrent defense against those threat types. In fact, its main role is to protect (highly concentrated deployed troops in an Iran or North Korea scenario) from waves of raids of combined ballistic and cruise missiles hence it has the highest magazine depth of its peer group.

Now what's the real capability of the MEADS, its different radar modes and coverage etc?.

MEADS was a development program only, and I brought it up only to highlight the fact that even with its netted elements it too cannot do the scenario that you describe, and NO WHERE did I ever mention or claim that ANY GBAD system could. This is obviously very different from the fact that radars and C2 systems on deployed systems cannot prosecute TBMs and CMs together from the same battery over the sector they looking at. These two things are completely different which I am clearly not able to articulate in a manner that would stop us from going round and round in circles .

Now do they need to demonstrate it against 1 TBM and 2 aircraft for it to be able to do that role?

Most certainly. Otherwise its just a very very limited POC.

I hope you realize that this is not how systems are tested either during their developmental or operational test phase. What is the maximum number of cruise missiles (forget diverse targets) the S-400 has shot down in one single flight test? Same thing with other systems..Patriot to the best of my knowledge has shot down 2-3 ballistic missiles in one single end to end to end flight test and one ballistic missile and 1 or 2 cruise missile (don't remember exactly). Does it mean these systems can't engage any more than that because those tests did not verify that? Even the maximum number of targets AEGIS has shot down in one single test is 4 but no one considers that to be the upper limits of its capability.

[Karan M]

The combined test? From the data that is available this was a North South engagement i.e. TBM approached from the North while the Aircraft target approached from the South. Again this is on open source data only. Keep in mind that this was a TMRR test in that they used developmental end items so was quite ambitious given where in its maturity life-cycle the product was at the time (tech. demonstrators).

Again, without specifics around elevation angles etc, this information is pretty meaningless. Its just the kind of info that is released to drum up support for the system but without getting into details of what its possible limitations are. The Russians at least released specs of the S-4XX mode wise.

What does this mean? Could you please identify which targets could fit within the system's physical limitations? The test was to validate that the system could successfully detect, track and engage a ballistic missile target and simultaneously also prosecute an air breathing target in the completely opposite direction. It did that successfully. Developmental testing is objective based and here the demonstration was to simply show that a single MEADS battery can engage off axis threats as different from each other as an aircraft and a TBM.

Physical limitations are present in all these systems. I don't know why it is so hard for you to acknowledge this. A single one panel radar cannot look up, look sideways, look at two different axis at the same time until and unless there are severe constraints placed on the kind of targets it engages. The S-400 is a dual panel PESA, in its Big Bird but Gravestone FCR is a single panel unit and that's the hard stop. An example of the above is the fact that only 1 of each kind of target was engaged. What were the engagement zones? From which angle was the TBM incoming, from what height was the aircraft coming.. the answers here are self-evident. If the MEADS used two different radars for this test, then it makes more sense and is at least more credible.

Can you please direct me to another developmental test of which you have knowledge of that did things the way you like them and how it was different?

First, see he info above and see what it shows. You will have the answers there why these hobson-jobson claims of doing everything all at once fail until and unless the system has depth to handle two entirely different classes of targets.

And this was the exact point I was making all throughout, about how the same radar cannot do both for roles.

Come on man. The same radar can do both roles within its employed sector ONLY. This was the entire reason i even brought up MEADS to state the fact that even with its expanded radar suite, it still can only do TBM in 90-120 sectors and only CMD and AAW in the 360 concurrently. To expand that employed sector, they added elements or radars.

How can you not get this? Even in the "employed sector only", and with assets added it requires two radars!! It cannot even cross beyond TBM in the 90-120 arc, and CMD/AAW in 360. Can you begin to imagine how useless it would be if it was to try and do everything without two separate optimized radars? Its employed sector would become so small as to be meaningless.

The reason why MEADS FT-2 was an important test event was because it was able to demonstrate the succesfull end to end functioning of a single battery to engage threats originating from different aspects and with different profiles. Till that time no single battery level system had done something like this though the Patriot had demonstrated concurrent TBM and Cruise missile intercept but only when the threats resided in the sector it was looking in (a key difference that I've tried to stress).

Single battery with two different radars, mind, each for a separate target class.

The Patriot (which doesn't have a rotator in its mix) can do this within its sectored coverage aginst TBM/AAW/CMD with MSE and GEM/T systems. It cannot defend against all threats in the 360 at the battery level but within the sectors it is focusing on ( can be both 90 degree or 120 degree depending on what the unit construct is) it is designed and equipped to do concurrent defense against those threat types. In fact, its main role is to protect (highly concentrated deployed troops in an Iran or North Korea scenario) from waves of raids of combined ballistic and cruise missiles hence it has the highest magazine depth of its peer group.

Again, this is just marketing literature. Fact of the matter is if there is are waves of raids (actually even a single wave) of combined ballistic, cruise and aircraft targets, the radar will struggle to cope and will need additional radars to be deployed, purely because of physical limits.

Now what's the real capability of the MEADS, its different radar modes and coverage etc?.

MEADS was a development program only, and I brought it up only to highlight the fact that even with its netted elements it too cannot do the scenario that you describe, and NO WHERE did I ever mention or claim that ANY GBAD system could. This is obviously very different from the fact that radars and C2 systems on deployed systems cannot prosecute TBMs and CMs together from the same battery over the sector they looking at. These two things are completely different which I am clearly not able to articulate in a manner that would stop us from going round and round in circles .

Look let me make this simple.

There is no radar possible with todays technology, which is light enough (to rotate super fast, to compensate for a single panel antenna) or with the compact modules necessary to make a huge array and yet which can be hoisted up on a mast (for line of sight), which allows it to be optimized for ALL 3 sets of targets in a standard frontal sector concurrently (forget 240 degrees, even the 60 degree to each side arc for an AESA, i.e. 120 degrees).

All three classes of targets require different radar capabilities in terms of physical limits. Height coverage (mast mounted) for low flying targets, high power capability (all 3 classes of targets), extreme beam width (wider arrays te better), and then the clincher - different elevation (a radar in a missile scan setting with its antenna tilted upwards, is not going to be able to overcome the laws of physics and have its beams look downwards, which means the low flying threat is now back, and can no longer be covered).

Then there is the final aspect. Mobility. You are limited to whatever your prime mover can carry, and on top of it what your logistics can sustain. Semi-static or static systems have an advantage over the S-400s or MEADS or te Patriots of the world. This fuel issue basically means that you can forget about LRTR style high power radars. Which basically means that now, to get the high power capability, you circle back, stop rotating, and start staring at each target, sector to pick up low RCS targets.

This automatically means you give up on the aircraft threat. You are limited to the aircraft which are kind enough to pop up from where you expect the BMs to come from.

So either you prep for a BMD or a AB threat, can't do both. You can claim that you are doing both, but the scan angle coverage is so limited as to be meaningless.

Now do they need to demonstrate it against 1 TBM and 2 aircraft for it to be able to do that role?

Most certainly. Otherwise its just a very very limited POC.

I hope you realize that this is not how systems are tested either during their developmental or operational test phase. What is the maximum number of cruise missiles (forget diverse targets) the S-400 has shot down in one single flight test? Same thing with other systems..Patriot to the best of my knowledge has shot down 2-3 ballistic missiles in one single end to end to end flight test and one ballistic missile and 1 or 2 cruise missile (don't remember exactly). Does it mean these systems can't engage any more than that because those tests did not verify that? Even the maximum number of targets AEGIS has shot down in one single test is 4 but no one considers that to be the upper limits of its capability.

The entire point here is that the architecture of the system unless its "2 radar designed for" (which you added to your post later re: MEADS) will never be able to pull it off. If the architecture is designed for it, they have to scale up rapidly and demo that. A single test with 1x unit at each envelope condition (and wasn't this done several years back?) will just not be sufficient to prove the concept. Also, given the fact the Euros are involved in it.. and their whimsical cost based decisions.. less said the better about how they end up cutting down test cases.

[brar_w]

Again, without specifics around elevation angles etc, this information is pretty meaningless. Its just the kind of info that is released to drum up support for the system but without getting into details of what its possible limitations are. The Russians at least released specs of the S-4XX mode wise.

Could you please provide me a link to any developmental (or even operational) test, anywhere in the world that includes that exact information and test parameters. The Russian specs for S-4XX are that of the operational system. MEADS in 2013 was a developmental system and does not exist in that form now. In its current form (TLSV) it is just a point defense system like a European Hawk.

I would love a link to an actual TBD or CMD flight test for S300 or S400 that describe the exact parameters you mention, and also reasons as to why I should believe that the S-400 has the capability of intercepting even one additional missile, aircraft or TBM over and above the maximum it has demonstrated in any one single dev. or ops flight test (and actually what is that? Do you know?).

All three classes of targets require different radar capabilities in terms of phsyical limits. Height coverage (mast mounted) for low flying targets, high power capability (all 3 classes of targets), extreme beam width (wider arrays te better), and then the clincher - different elevation (a radar in a missile scan setting with its antenna tilted upwards, is not going to be able to overcome the laws of physics and have its beams look downwards, which means the low flying threat is negated).

Same radars have been shooting down these different class of targets for years both on ground based and Naval systems. Israelis do it, the US does it, the Russians do it and the Europeans do it and the Indian systems will do it soon enough as well. CMD is a point defense mission and mast mounts work great for going over obstacles or when terrain so calls for it but if that is not a consideration it won't turn point defense capability to area defense against low flying cruise missiles. The only option there is either dedicated PD systems or CEC or ideally both.

Then there is the final aspect. Mobility. You are limited to whatever your prime mover can carry, and on top of it what your logistics can sustain.

All those systems mentioned are mobile so I don't understand the need to go over the systems engineering of AMD systems which I am familiar with as far as trades are concerned.

This automatically means you give up on the aircraft threat. You are limited to the aircraft which are kind enough to pop up from where you expect the BMs to come from.

Precisely what I have been saying. If your an air-defense battery assigned a sector as part of a larger unit you can very easily defend that battle space from all threats that are within that sector. This is what I said in my very first few posts. I don't understand why it is not getting across.

[Karan M]

The Russian specs are exactly the point. They mention the specific modes (and one can read between the lines to extrapolate the rest). You quoted the MEADS test as an example to state that this capability exists in 3 different systems - so, has it even been provided or does it even exist for those 3 different systems? Heck, just go apples to apples and compare the Russian specs to what the "3 systems and their radars" do in their operational variants. Now think about whether there is one super mode for any radar which is able to interleave "missile defence mode" (i.e. looks up antenna wise, stares away), "standard air target mode" (rotates 360 deg) and "cruise missile mode" (i.e. mast mounted, or looks down antenna wise and rotates 360 deg). If there is no such magical radar, you have your answer. Forget the tests etc!

[brar_w]

The Russian specs are exactly the point. They mention the specific modes (and one can read between the lines to extrapolate the rest).

I am not talking about the specs. I am talking about actual flight test data and parameters as specic as the ones you demand. You demand this from other systems and I have tried to provide you as much as is known on the FE-2 for MEADS or the dozens of other tests that have been done on Patriot and other Ground and naval air defense systems. I'm sure we can discuss the numerous Flight Tests that have been done on these systems as long as there is some, either limited or comprehensive, data to go by.

You quoted the MEADS test as an example to state that this capability exists in 3 different systems

MEADS was not one of the systems that I cited as part of the 3. I specifically pointed to Patriot, AEGIS BL9, and S-400. I cited MEADS as a potential fourth system but also qualified that by saying that it did so in a developmental test scenario using technology demonstrator end items. Like any system's early TMRR developmental test shot, it was a proof of concept.

Heck, just go apples to apples and compare the Russian specs to what the "3 systems and their radars" do in their operational variants.

All three can do this. This is what I'm saying. Patriot and AEGIS have both demonstrated the capability to shoot down ballistic and cruise missiles as part of one end-end flight test (both Operational test scenarios with non dev. test crews). With the former this was demonstrated within the limitations of its sectored sensor and with the latter the sectored limitations need not apply because it is a 360 degree system.

[Karan M]

I am not talking about the specs. I am talking about actual flight test data and parameters as specic as the ones you demand. You demand this from other systems and I have tried to provide you as much as is known on the FE-2 for MEADS or the dozens of other tests that have been done on Patriot and other Ground and naval air defense systems. I'm sure we can discuss the numerous Flight Tests that have been done on these systems as long as there is some, either limited or comprehensive, data to go by.

Because you dont have the specs on these western radars and modes which the S-4XX guys provide. If you did, then we wouldn't have to parse the tests. The tests are just an example of what you can clearly infer from the tech. data otherwise. What's really amazing is the Russians provide all this openly. If the same level of transparency was there in the western equivalents, you'd have your answers already.

MEADS was not one of the systems that I cited as part of the 3. I specifically pointed to Patriot, AEGIS BL9, and S-400. I cited MEADS as a potential fourth system but also qualified that by saying that it did so in a developmental test scenario using technology demonstrator end items. Like any system's early TMRR developmental test shot, it was a proof of concept.

You can scratch the Patriot and S-400 from that list already. While possessing capability against these different classes of targets, they aren't designed to do so concurrently. Physical limits of relying on a single radar for the kill chain (FCR work).

Here's what was planned for the S-500.
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-S-500-Triumfator-M.html

BMD...

Battle management and ABM acquisition will be performed by the 91N6A(M) Big Bird Acquisition and Battle Management Radar, an evolution of the 64N6E series, typically used to support multiple S-300P/S-400 batteries. In ABM mode this passive phased array radar is mechanically pointed to the threat, the antenna tilted back, and electronic beamsteering employed to search the target volume.

And in the S-400, even the Grave Stone will have to follow the same tilted antenna positioning for ABM Fire control.

Air breathing targets for the S-500..

The 96L6-TsP Acquisition Radar is a direct derivative of the 96L6-1 series used an a battery acquisition radar in the S-400. Its inclusion indicates that aerial targets will be part of the S-500 tasking, as this radar is not adaptable for ABM operations. This inference is further supported by the inclusion of the 40V6MT Universal Mobile Mast System in the S-500, a replacement for the 1970s developed Ukrainian built 40V6M/MD mast system used with the S-300P and S-400.

Its that straightforward, really. Russian, American, Israeli, Chinese, etc etc.
Green Pine, note the tilt.

Note the overall scan angle and sectoral positioning.

[brar_w]

You can scratch the Patriot and S-400 from that list already. While possessing capability against these different classes of targets, they aren't designed to do so concurrently. Physical limits of relying on a single radar for the kill chain (FCR work).

To repeat, the Patriot (and the S-400 too though we do not have access to it but it probably has) has intercepted ballistic missiles and cruise missile threats in a single end to end flight test, probably on multiple occasions and WITHIN the sectored coverage that it provides as a system (i've highlighted this part in the hope that we don't again begin discussing a hypothetical threat scenario, outside of the limits of what I've mentioned as its capability). Patriot has conducted over 30 Ballistic missile target intercepts and probably a even higher number of CM's and or aerial targets and between US MDA and US Army tests it is difficult to parse through each and every one to dig some of the combined tests out but here is one (look at OMELEK) from 2012 -



Another one was during the Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) phase of the most recent PDB 8 (development build) in 2017, where the system ripple fired two different interceptor types (PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM/T) to engage a TBM threat and then engaged a cruise missile target with a single PAC-3 MSE missile shot.The test event was Missile Flight Test (MFT) A1. There are probably more because this capability has been tested and fielded since at least the 2000's when the first Active seeker PAC-3 CRI round was fielded.

Its that straightforward, really. Russian, American, Israeli, Chinese, etc etc.
Green Pine, note the tilt.

Tilt is noted. Please also tell me why is this in the context that I am using it in? Did I ever say that the Green-Pine (don't know why it was even brought up) and the Patriot radar share the same range of targets? or support the same engagement envelopes?

Note the overall scan angle and sectoral positioning.

Why should I look at these aspects for the Arrow 2 system, a system that shares little, if any, overlap with the Patriot GBAD?

Here's what was planned for the S-500.

How is the S-500 relevant here? Or the TPY-2, or the SBX and other radars presented on that page?


Again to reiterate and clarify: The Patriot handles and is currently forward deployed to handle these diverse threats within its the sectors and coverage allotted to it. The US IAMD is a multi layer system and the Patriot is a lower tier of the two systems. It handles threats (SRBM-MRBM, Aircraft and Cruise Missiles) within that scope with the THAAD being the upper tier system for BMD and the Standard Missile (SM3) system being the Mid Course system. Each layer serves a purpose and operates within its engagement envelope so random photos showing the Green Pine tilt or the Arrow 2 engagement trajectories are not applicable unless of course you claim they offer the same envelope which they do not.

Patriot does not rely on its organic FCR for BMD surveillance when deployed (though it can if it has nothing else to fall back on, including the option of bringing in another radar to operate in forward surveillance mode only). It relies on many other data that feed into the common air and missile defense operating picture but two notable sources are the AN/TPY-2's which have a range and altitude which is many times greater than the Patriot's organic radar. When TPY-2's are not deployed (which will be a rarity because they are already forward present in virtually every theater) the FCR is often supported by the AN/TPS-59(V)3 radar that the Marines bring in and is linked up with AEGIS.

There are performance requirements placed on the patriot system because of its multi-role capability and requirement to defend the troops it is deployed with against all three threat types. The most notable being, separating and having a distinct upper tier ballistic missile defense system in the THAAD which is an area defense system (200 km against IRBM class targets with an engagement altitude of 45-150 km). Having a distinct upper and lower tier system (that are designed to have be connected/CEC) allows the Patriot to focus on the IAMD threat and farm out the long range TBM surveillance work to other dedicated BMD sensors. It also does not need to engage BM's at altitudes the Arrow system does because that is not its job. It is a lower tier system.

This is done to avoid a point that you tried to illustrate in that the engagement system's need to be constantly scanning the very upper reaches of the atmosphere and into space in order to engage TBM targets at very high altitudes. Something that will be in sharp contrast to having to look well inside the atmopshere for air breathing threats. The Lower tier system is meant to engage TBM's in their terminal phase well below the THAAD's minimum engagement altitude (PAC-3 around 20 km and PAC-2 around 26 km). This is by design as these systems operate in close proximity to one another and this allows Patriot to do both TBM and AAW/CMD concurrently because it need not bother about engaging ballistic missile threats above the 18-20 km altitude instead thereby optimizing it as a dedicated lower tier system. A vast majority of the TBM's the Patriot is designed to engage have apogees in the sub 150 km class with most likely in the 100 km class. The sensor, unlike the Arrow 2's sensor, or the AN/TPY-2, is not looking to begin tracking missiles from altitudes that are many many times that. Even then, the sensor is getting a composite track from the X-band TPY-2's that are around and is therefore spending the minimal amount of time to obtain a track and fire control solution on the threat, calculate the PIP and pass that information to the appropriate FCU for interceptor launch.

No one claims it to be an uber one radar do all system that can engage targets at both 100 km altitude and at sub 1000 ft altitudes. This is not its job. US Army IAMD comprises of an Upper and Lower tier system. Patriot's job is to defend against the 3 target types at lower altitudes while upper altitude ballistic missile threats are handled by a dedicated upper tier system. Both these are C-17 air-deployable and theater mobile unlike mid course systems like Aegis Ashore. Combined, they serve the purpose of protecting the US troops from waves of mass ballistic missile and cruise missile/UAS attacks (primary threats to US troops) hence as I said the massive growth in missile magazines, climbing from 36 missiles per engagement radar/battery in the Gulf War to between 90-120+ missiles per PAC-3 only battery or up to 170 missiles per combined Patriot and THAAD element deployment (one battery each of PAC-3 and THAAD).

PS - I have purposefully left out the CEC capability that is in advanced developmental testing for the Patriot because it would not be operational until late 2021/early 2022 even though multiple Any-Sensor-Any-Shooter intercepts have already been demonstrated. What I've mentioned above and in earlier posts is capability where the FCR bit is being done by the primary battery radar only which is not the case when you bring CEC/IFCN in where the FCR does not need to see the target in order to execute the intercept.
--

[srin]

Sorry guys, I tried to follow the discussion but got lost.

One question - my understanding is that the main radar (of S400 or our own BMD) isn't always on. They get switched on only when the early warning radars - which are on 24/7 - detect something. Are we going to have something similar to one of these PAVE PAWS ?

[Austin]

I am not sure if I got the gist of discussion but if the debate is can S-400 Radar track aircraft and BM at same time and attack it the answer would be yes and no , The Big Bird along MFCR of S-400 will be able to achieve both role but doing both for the radar wont be an optimum solution.

Most likely the S-400/PAD/AAD would be grided with Green Pine/LRTR and French Radar along with Big Bird and all the Radar Data would be sensor fused to provide a big picture , Green Pine would Provide the Early Warning and Quality Track to S-400 Radar which then either can use to fire say 40N6 or PAD or AAD or will just use the GP data to fire the interceptor. This will be a layered architecture with PAD providing top cover along with 40N6 and AAD tie the mid and low tier

Much similar to how Russia uses Nebo-M system for BM Tracking as well as AB targets integrate with S-400

Me think the BM system of S-400/PAD/AAD will be deployed in a different way and architecture compared to Air Breathing System of S-400/MRSAM/Akash will be different so will be the deployment but their sensor coverage will overlap.

We dont have a NMD system but we will be protecting key cities and infra/crtitical asset like BARC /Nuclear Reactors etc from BM along with other AB targets. I am sure DRDO/IAF would have worked out the complex puzzle on how to meet some what conflicting requirement of BMD along with AD.

[brar_w]

Austin, the S-400 with the now in service (since September 2018) 40N6 (40N6E for export) gets its first active seeker missile and should be able to handle multiple types of threats in the sector of the air space it is observing or controlling. The patriot began doing this as soon as the PAC-3 CRI came on board and the systems deployed during OIF were tasked with the same (the ones that had the new launchers, missiles and appropriate development build anyways). There is always overlapping coverage because this is how AMD units are deployed doctrinally but individual batteries are not compartmentalized on whether they are doing the BMD or IAMD mission unless there are other limitations (like legacy Patriot units deploying with PDB 8 or later units for example). With patriot they chose to focus on high velocity interceptors and within a narrow lower-tier space so that it could concentrate on providing that capability without adding the upper tier role to its workload.

Hence the THAAD was fielded and combined they are what the US Army deploys to theater for the purpose of providing point and area defense against ballistic missiles and other threats.

They may be two different systems developed by two different OEM's but their concept of operations is together as an AIAMD unit and their respective sensors and battle management systems are able to generate, share and use composite tracks from each other for both expanding the battlefield view but also for fire control duties.

A PAC-3 MSE upgraded battery no longer has any Semi Active or TVM missiles in its launchers (though there are still mixed batteries as they are still building up inventories and modifying launchers and build software and hardware). They are all active missiles allowing the radar to and fire control station to calculate the PIP, provide that information to the the fire control unit and launch either CRI or MSE. Though a PIP update may be provided, depending upon when in the engagement the fire control loop was completed, it is not necessary and is not the norm in BM intercepts.

Once closer to the PIP, the CRI/MSE's Ku band seeker refines the targeting and selects aim-point and does both of these things organically and not based on any input from the fire-control radar. The choice to go with a Ku band seeker and the ability to use the the ACM's (in addition to aerodynamic surfaces) was driven by a need to provide high degree of organic discrimination and to have enough agility to compensate for PIP and aim-point error during the end-game, even post motor burnout (you can see this in action during various PAC-3 or MSE intercept videos where the ACMs are being used to compensate for PIP errors and to make sure the missile gets to the selected aim-point which is selected based on its LE warhead.). Being able to manage salvo shots and raid scenarios was what drove the requirements towards that end and before developing these missiles the used the ERINT program and its demonstrations as a proof of concept.

Both the S-400, and the Patriot offer point defense BMD capability with the 40N6E being able to knock out these missiles at around 15-20 km while the PAC-3 and the PAC-3 MSE do the same at around 20 and 30 km's respectively but within their altitude envelopes (40N6 has an altitude of 35+ km, while PAC-3 has it at around 18 km with PAC-3 MSE at around 24 km or around 20km on average for the battery). 40N6 claims to be able to hit longer ranged ballistic missiles but for the Patriot the focus was on SRBM for PAC-2 and PAC-3, with the MSE expanding that to the MRBM level as it will eventually be integrated into THAAD launchers as well (dual purpose) allowing THAAD to then concentrate its 48 deployed interceptors per battery on the longer ranged and faster threats (like longer ranged MRBMS or IRBMs).

Of course it goes without saying that both these systems are connected to a larger command center and receive data from other sources. This has been the case for decades as far as an operating picture and situational awareness are concerned. Now with very low latency, high frequency data links, and computing there is a possibility of actual fire-control level connectivity between unrelated systems and that is where everyone is heading.

I've purposely kept out Fire Control Level connectivity that the patriot is getting via IFCN out of this discussion because as I said, CEC makes the process much easier to execute and allows them to engage way more targets than what they could otherwise. It also, perhaps for the first time, gives the ability to perform Area defense against cruise missiles. Plus it won't be till 2022 till that capability is fielded.

[AdityaM]

One question - my understanding is that the main radar (of S400 or our own BMD) isn't always on. They get switched on only when the early warning radars - which are on 24/7 - detect something.

How long does a sophisticated radar take to switch on or come online.

My experience with everyday use home electronic items tells me there is always a lag from switching on to start working. So how does a radar work in emergency if it has to be booted on and there are infinitely more subsystem involved in it.

[brar_w]

^ There is a difference between "not always being on" and "not always emitting".

[Austin]

Both the S-400, and the Patriot offer point defense BMD capability with the 40N6E being able to knock out these missiles at around 15-20 km while the PAC-3 and the PAC-3 MSE do the same at around 20 and 30 km's respectively but within their altitude envelopes

Even the older 48N6 can intercept BM target at ranges up to 60 km at max target speed of 4.8 km/sec

Technical characteristics
target detection range - up to 600 km;
aerodynamic target kill range - from 3 to 250 km;
tactical ballistic missile destruction range - from 5 to 60 km;
target destruction altitude - from 2 to 27 km;
engageable target velocity - up to 17,300 km/h;
the number of targets engaged at a time - up to 36 (up to six with one air defense missile complex);
the number of simultaneously guided missiles - 72;
the time of the system’s deployment from its march position - 5-10 min, the time of making the system combat ready from the deployed position - 3 min;
the operational service life of ground-based systems - no less than 20 years, air defense missiles - no less than 15 years;


40N6 has outerspace interception capability ( above karmanline of 100 km )

Russian Aerospace Force Deputy Commander-in-Chief Viktor Gumyonny said on April 8, 2017 that missiles capable of "destroying targets in outer space, at long distances and large speeds" had started arriving for S-400 systems.

More:
http://tass.com/defense/1024655

[Austin]

Live S-400 Radar Track in Syria

[Aditya_V]

Are those Israeli F-16's?

[Austin]

Are those Israeli F-16's?

Yes Israel F-16

This is a snapshot from S-400 radar when Il-20 was shot by Syrian S-200 when F-16 took the cover of IL-20 during intrusion into Syrian Airspace.

[brar_w]

40N6 has outerspace interception capability ( above karmanline of 100 km )

Russian Aerospace Force Deputy Commander-in-Chief Viktor Gumyonny said on April 8, 2017 that missiles capable of "destroying targets in outer space, at long distances and large speeds" had started arriving for S-400 systems.

More:
http://tass.com/defense/1024655

Same Source - October, 2018 -

The 40N6 [E] is a surface-to-air very long-range missile designed to strike early warning and electronic warfare aircraft, airborne command posts, strategic bombers and hypersonic cruise and ballistic missiles.

According to official data, the missile’s destruction range is up to 380 km for aerodynamic targets and up to 15km for ballistic weapons at an altitude ranging from 10 m to 35 km.

More:
http://tass.com/defense/1026630

Different Source - From August, 2018

According to a presentation slide published by bmpd, a popular Russian defense blog, the latest missile weighs around 1,893 kg (4,173 lbs), or about 2,600 kg (5732 lbs) when stored inside its sealed transport/launch container. When launched, the missile flies at an average speed of 1,190 meters per second (2,662 mph).

The interceptor can hit targets flying as low as 10 m (33 ft) and as high as 30 km (19 miles), disproving rumors that it was designed with a built-in anti-satellite capabilities. It can engage targets at a range of at least 5 km (3 miles). The maximum range for targeting aircraft with the 40N6E is 380 km (236 miles). The range for ballistic missiles is up to 15 km, according to the presentation.

More: https://www.rt.com/news/436927-russian- ... -revealed/

Another Source from August, 2018 -

Almaz-Antey, during this month’s 2018 Army Forum, an annual event organized by the Russian Ministry of Defense to showcase Russian-made military hardware, for the first time released official figures of the export variant of the 40N6. According to the information provided at the event, the 40N6E, with a maximum altitude of 30 kilometers, is not capable of exo-atmospheric interception of intermediate-range ballistic missile warheads in their terminal phase or satellites.

More - https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/russia- ... o-service/

Jane's confirms this as well in its most recent and quite comprehensive article on the S-400 and S-500 authored by Jon Hawkes and Oscar Widlund with contribution from Sean O'Connor.

[Aditya_V]

This seems more of long range SAM against aircraft while PDV and AAD do the anti ballistic missile work