MiG-21 Bison shoots down F-16 in Kashmir

[Aditya_V]

From ACM Dhanoa's comments, reading between the lines ...

. If it was a kill-all destroy-all mission, we would have used supersonic low level Brahmos missile, to which Pakistan did not have any answer./quote]

So, it's Brahmos next time

Hope not, thats expensive, hope our PGM's mu;multiply we are able to hit them hard that they know we have soo much ammo that they have no choice but to grin and bear it.

[ArjunPandit]

aditya ji, i would expect the PGM inventory to be less (as compared to requirements) than B'mos. We have bene making versions of B'mos for last 15 years at least...however PGM we have been importing mostly..sudarshan garuda garuthama production has not elapsed that long...
i would expect it to be a pinaka strike rather than b'mos..we would not tell what we'd do next time..not that they could do anything about it...apart from hiding like a mouse...

[Aditya_V]

I hope DRDO PGM's like SAAW tc do the job from our side of LOC/IB and are inducted in numbers. Brahmos will always be a bit expensive and is manufactured in limited numbers

[deejay]

That interview was excellent and explained to me why none of the SU30 MKI pilots got any recognition after the battle. None of the AIM missiles came even close to them for them to be able put into place any evasive measures. In other words a dud a damp squid or what ever else you call it. What were the F16 pilots aiming for? The round ball called earth?

Where on earth did you pick that up from? The article does not mention any of the conclusions you stated.

In fact he says:

Our air defence responded well. We used a lot of tricks but I can’t tell you those.

I saw these posts now. Just to be clear, the Su 30 MKI pilots have been recognised.

[ArjunPandit]

I hope DRDO PGM's like SAAW tc do the job from our side of LOC/IB and are inducted in numbers. Brahmos will always be a bit expensive and is manufactured in limited numbers

+1

[Vamsee]

^^^
We should develop SAAW launched using Pinaka with around 150 kms range (Similar to GL SDB). That will give us stand off capability without crossing the border or even using IAF.
Purchase of Excalibur also points to the same direction. We are slowly improving our stand off capability. Next surgical strike will be done without crossing the LOC/IB.

--Vamsee

[Jayram]

Where on earth did you pick that up from? The article does not mention any of the conclusions you stated.

In fact he says:

I saw these posts now. Just to be clear, the Su 30 MKI pilots have been recognised.

Can you point me to any links on that Deejay. Much appreciated.

[Haridas]

I thought we struck the same building in Balakot thrice.. The ACM says 3 buildings were struck. Joe sameer's OSINT analysis also pointed out 3 holes on the building.. what am I missing? Can someone kindly clarify? TIA

No one asked ACM on the other targets that indian press release said were hit by IAF in Muzaffarabad etc.

[ArjunPandit]

I thought we struck the same building in Balakot thrice.. The ACM says 3 buildings were struck. Joe sameer's OSINT analysis also pointed out 3 holes on the building.. what am I missing? Can someone kindly clarify? TIA

No one asked ACM on the other targets that indian press release said were hit by IAF in Muzaffarabad etc.

my CT on this is ..i think people might have ..but the response could have been to stay mum..not sure if that is feasible with anti-nationals..

[Haridas]

^^^ bcoz per our line we hit non-military targets ONLEEE. Mil tgts were collateral damage onlee ....

[Ankit Desai]

IIRC, 12 Mirage fighter jets flown that night, 4 hit balakot, rest ....

-Ankit

[yensoy]

Muzaffarabad targets and hits are still classified I believe.

[Aditya_V]

And Chakoti- Muzaffarabad and Chakoti hits were probably not Non-miltary so the MEA preferred to put a lid on it.

Regarding 27-Feb-19 morning looking at ACM Dhanoa statement and PAF video of H-4, looks like we jammed the H-4 bomb communication with the mother aircraft so the last stage the PAF could not manuver them to the targets, hence thier F-16 had to come close for a LGB shot.

[naird]

IIRC, 12 Mirage fighter jets flown that night, 4 hit balakot, rest ....

-Ankit

Doesnt make sense. Gafoora was so quick to tweet about Balakot and its crow effect. Yet no word from him on other so called hits. Imho only Balakot was hit.
Perhaps IAF fighters might have dashed to Muzaffarabad , chakoti to guage response timea, but did not engage in any action. That would explain silence from both sides

[Nikhil T]

IIRC, 12 Mirage fighter jets flown that night, 4 hit balakot, rest ....

-Ankit

Doesnt make sense. Gafoora was so quick to tweet about Balakot and its crow effect. Yet no word from him on other so called hits. Imho only Balakot was hit.
Perhaps IAF fighters might have dashed to Muzaffarabad , chakoti to guage response timea, but did not engage in any action. That would explain silence from both sides

We’ve covered this in past pages of the thread extensively - I’m surprised this question keeps coming up. There were 6 Mirages in the pack that ingressed into Pak airspace to hit Balakot, not 4. The other two packs comprising of M2K and MKI were decoys that turned back from the border in an aim to draw out & confuse PAF air defence jets. Those two packs were sent along Jodhpur-Bahawalpur and Jammu-Sialkot paths.

[vikassh]

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... r-pulwama/

Lessons learnt A year after Pulwama
By Air Marshal Harish Masand
Issue: Net Edition | Date : 17 Feb , 2020

Almost a year after Pulwama on February 14, 2019, the following strike on Balakot on February 26 and the aerial engagement the day after that, I was happy to see that we seemed to have learned some lessons from these episodes. As has been widely debated and discussed in public forums, the basic intent and objective of the Balakot strike was to send a message to Pakistan that India is capable and determined to strike against terrorism wherever they may be under the shelter and support of the Pakistani deep state.
The strike, carried out beyond PoK in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa under a nuclear overhang, even prompted some to term it as crossing the Rubicon. The essential question that is being asked now, almost a year after the attack, is whether Pakistan got the message and has learnt the lesson of not crossing the so-called red line laid down by India.
Whether a clear red line has been laid through a formal and articulated national security policy and a follow-on strategy on counter-terrorism is another question that can be the topic of another debate.
The last air chief, BS “Tony” Dhanoa, in a detailed interview with Shekhar Gupta published in the Hindustan Times, New Delhi edition of February 11, 2020 entitled “Pak’s version a story, a façade”, stated that (if) “we had shot down four or five of their (meaning Pakistani) aircraft, the behavioral change would have taken place immediately”.
Having hit Balakot the previous day, and a retaliation being almost certain, it is to be assumed that all the national security agencies, including all arms of the armed forces were ready for a response and retaliation from Pakistan. The Pakistani PM, Imran Khan, himself immediately came on TV and stated that retaliation was certain.
Culturally, as well as politically, it would have been impossible for Pakistan not to retaliate in some way or another. That the retaliation came the very next day and, perhaps, in the form that was most likely through the Pakistan Air Force, should have been to our advantage due to our high alert status which could be expected to lower a bit with passage of time.
Taking the alert status of the Indian Air Force as a given then, the question that comes readily to mind is whether the IAF had planned for the likely retaliation and the desired end-state? If, as the Air Chief in command at that time, Dhanoa, now implies that the message would have gone better and the desired behavioral change in Pakistan would have come about immediately with a larger number of Pakistani aircraft being shot down, what prevented the IAF from achieving that end-state on that fateful day?
In this connection, the reader may recall the article, The F-16 Vs MiG-21 in the Indian Defence Review accessible at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... n-answers/ as well as “The Real Thing” in Vayu magazine II/2019 of March-April 2019 wherein this author had raised the issue of why the IAF did not respond to the Pakistani retaliation of February 27, 2019 in greater numbers to overwhelm the intruders and shoot down most of them, if not all.
Certainly, we had the assets and capability to achieve this, particularly when viewed in the context of the statements from Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa that despite its depleted strength, the IAF had a Plan B and the ability to fight a two-front war show-cased in Exercise Gagan Shakti of April 2018 reportedly generating about 11,000 sorties in three days. In such circumstances, it is somewhat strange that against a Pakistani force of 24-26 aircraft, we launched a meager force of six MiG-21 Bisons to supplement two Su-30s and two Mirage-2000 aircraft already on patrol. This becomes even more baffling when viewed in the context of our statements that the AMRAAM BVR missiles carried by the Pakistani F-16s had a range superior to the BVR missiles in our inventory.
Unfortunately in this context, Dhanoa also seems to link what should have been the desired end-state of shooting down four or five Pakistani aircraft to our future inductions of the S-400 missile system and the Rafale aircraft with a preface of “If we had”. Such a statement tends to deflect the analysis, and the adduced lessons, from what could have been done with the current assets as also from the doctrinal and strategy aspects affecting training and preparedness to tackle such large-force incursions and engagements.
BVR missile combat is fought not merely on comparative range of the missiles but also on utilization of electronics and maneuver along with numbers and positioning, all of which should have been possible with our emphasis on net-centric engagements under an Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS). Also, BVR missiles acquired today would continue to be outranged sometime or the other in this seesaw battle for superiority.
Further, if BVR missiles were the only winning factor in aerial combat, the Americans would not have abandoned the Phoenix missile with a 160 Km range on their F-14s and gone on a different path of development. Perhaps, if such an engagement was envisaged, the MiG-21 Bisons would have also carried the EW pod and we may not have lost Abhinandan’s MiG-21. That, with just six MiG-21s, reportedly without the EW pod, we could shoot down one Pakistani aircraft, an F-16 as claimed by us, should also make us think hard of the likely outcome with a much larger number of Su-30s, upgraded MiG-29s and Mirage-2000s launched along with the MiG-21s as the situational picture indicated a large force gathering on the other side.
Thus, the first issue that the IAF needs to address while analyzing the aerial engagement of February 27 is on the objectives and desired results. The next in sequence should naturally be on preparations and training for such results. As said earlier, one can only imagine the strength of the message if the IAF had shot down most, if not all, of the intruding Pakistani force.
So, was this an opportunity lost? As a matter of fact, one could also be thankful and deduce that the PAF also did not have clear objectives and end-state in mind or did not pursue these by shooting down a larger number of IAF aircraft despite having achieved local numerical superiority that day and/or pin-point attacks with dummy bombs on the chosen targets.

[SRajesh]

^^^^
As I had asked in the previous post:
1. There was a distinct lack of preparation about possible retaliation
2. The extent of response to Paki intrusion on 27th was 'Pusillanimous' to say the least.
3.Whether this was a result of lack of foresight at 'Defence forces' level or at 'Political' level is the most important question
all in all the whole episode was an unmitigated PR disaster for the country even though the election results proved otherwise!!

[Karan M]

Can folks do a bit more digging.

AM Masand's article is also not fully researched.

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ ... 488483.ece

“Owing to the bureaucratic delays, we could not develop blast pens for Su-30 MKIs near the Line of Control [LoC]. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) sanctioned the project only at the end of 2017,” the source said. Hence, the jets could not be forward deployed along the LoC, and they were scrambled from behind to intercept the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jets that tried to bomb Indian military installations, the official said, explaining why the MiG-21 jets were the first responders during the aerial combat a day after the Balakot air strike.

“The project will take three or four years to complete,” the official said, but declined to spell out the number of pens to be built or their cost.

On the morning of February 27, over 20 PAF jets, including F-16s, JF-17s and a few older Mirages, briefly crossed the LoC and attempted to drop H4 glide-bombs, but were intercepted by eight MiG-21 Bison jets. Mirage-2000s and Su-30MKIs were scrambled from bases around but MiG-21s were the closest and reached the location immediately and engaged the PAF jets. While an F-16 was shot down, the IAF lost a MiG-21.

IAF kept 4 aircraft on CAP and rotated them from bases from afar to protect them from cruise missile and ballistic missile strikes, with only a limited number of SAMs available for base protection and no large sized HAS for passive protection.

They deployed MiG-21s with their jackrabbit acceleration for ORP as the blast pens could handle them.

The IAF did what it could with what it had.

Deploying a huge number of Su-30s and MiG-29s would only have used up scarce munition hours (they have a limited number of take off cycles and flight hours available) and would have only ensured the PAF struck some other day.

[Larry Walker]

^^^^
As I had asked in the previous post:
1. There was a distinct lack of preparation about possible retaliation
2. The extent of response to Paki intrusion on 27th was 'Pusillanimous' to say the least.
3.Whether this was a result of lack of foresight at 'Defence forces' level or at 'Political' level is the most important question
all in all the whole episode was an unmitigated PR disaster for the country even though the election results proved otherwise!!

Chakoti and Muzaffarabad locations did not pop-up randomly, these locations were mentioned in MEA briefing initially. So it is possible that on 27Feb Pakis reacted to whatever we destroyed in these 2 locations which is still classified but they failed miserably. So in strategic terms it may be that we have upper hand in whatever damage we caused on 26th and Pakis retaliation on 27th fizzled out and hence not required that we hit them further. I believe if on 27th had they caused destruction disproportionate to what we hit on 26th, Modi would have gone all in.

[Rakesh]

The Armed Forces were given clear cut directions to go all out on Porkistan. Confirmed by all three chiefs at the time - General Rawat, Admiral Lanba and Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa.

[Ankit Desai]

...

Chakoti and Muzaffarabad locations did not pop-up randomly, these locations were mentioned in MEA briefing initially. So it is possible that on 27Feb Pakis reacted to whatever we destroyed in these 2 locations which is still classified but they failed miserably. So in strategic terms it may be that we have upper hand in whatever damage we caused on 26th and Pakis retaliation on 27th fizzled out and hence not required that we hit them further. I believe if on 27th had they caused destruction disproportionate to what we hit on 26th, Modi would have gone all in.

Even than DM Sitharaman did not deny it when asked during IIRC India Today Conclave. Rahul Kanwal was interviewing her and one ex colonel asked her to confirm Chakoti and Muzaffarabad were other targets.

-Ankit

[ritesh]

all in all the whole episode was an unmitigated PR disaster for the country even though the election results proved otherwise!!

Until and unless we give public jhappad and dismember this franistein monster they will keep doing their bit to inflict pain on us.

What have we got in return by doing such kind of benevolent behaviour? We released 93k PoWs and got proxy war in return.

God forbid if they overwhelm us along with the anti hindu peoples already in this country, will they be any better than the looters and rapists that were their ancestors.

We have a time bomb ticking within our mist whuch needs to be neturalised without delay or these 500 kashmirs will make life hell of common indians.

[vishvak]

God forbid if they overwhelm us along with the anti hindu peoples already in this country, will they be any better than the looters and rapists that were their ancestors.

We have a time bomb ticking within our mist whuch needs to be neturalised without delay or these 500 kashmirs will make life hell of common indians.

OT but no one stopped us from doing what we did in kashmir elsewhere.

Hopefully MiG 35s will be evaluated well considering MiG 21s performance. We don't have monies for Rafale or may be it's not coming anytime soon.

[SRajesh]

Chakoti and Muzaffarabad locations did not pop-up randomly, these locations were mentioned in MEA briefing initially. So it is possible that on 27Feb Pakis reacted to whatever we destroyed in these 2 locations which is still classified but they failed miserably. So in strategic terms it may be that we have upper hand in whatever damage we caused on 26th and Pakis retaliation on 27th fizzled out and hence not required that we hit them further. I believe if on 27th had they caused destruction disproportionate to what we hit on 26th, Modi would have gone all in.

Even than DM Sitharaman did not deny it when asked during IIRC India Today Conclave. Rahul Kanwal was interviewing her and one ex colonel asked her to confirm Chakoti and Muzaffarabad were other targets.

-Ankit

Ankitji
Perception is important in today's world and as that 'Lal Topi' keeps screaming of 5th gen warfare winning on all fronts is equally inmportant. I don't deny the fact of Chakoti and Muzzarafarabad!! These two spots definitely put the 'Bangalore Torpedo' up their Musharaff
Massod Azhar missing and untraceable?? Was he injured in the raid!! Imagine the publicity coup if that were true!!

[nam]

“Owing to the bureaucratic delays, we could not develop blast pens for Su-30 MKIs near the Line of Control [LoC]. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) sanctioned the project only at the end of 2017,” the source said. Hence, the jets could not be forward deployed along the LoC, and they were scrambled from behind to intercept the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jets that tried to bomb Indian military installations, the official said, explaining why the MiG-21 jets were the first responders during the aerial combat a day after the Balakot air strike.

Issue on Feb 27 is not that Mig21 were the first responder, instead of Mig29/M2k/Su30, but the first responder should have been a long range SAM.

Our lack of Barak8 or Akash in high density guarding the LoC is the major concern. Imagine the PAF RWR screaming at been painted by Barak8, as soon as the first PGM was fired by PAF.

[ArjunPandit]

Hopefully MiG 35s will be evaluated well considering MiG 21s performance. We don't have monies for Rafale or may be it's not coming anytime soon.

is that you phillip ji??

[shaun]

While we have targeted jehadi complex they have targeted our military installations , that itself is a provocation enough for us to retaliate. But we didn't. Now the information that's slowly trickling is neither do we have quantity nor quality in our equipments to counter such scenarios. Starting from absence of blast pans to accommodate MKIs to Long range SAMs . Now if we bring rafales in this scenario , without forward deployment , the result would have been same. Only LRSAMs can deter such shoot and scoot strategy of our Western neighbor. I am sure in an all out war IAF will whip their arse but such small scale localized skirmishes are real possibilities of future

[fanne]

We do not have luxury of 'secret' info and at least me, never flown a plane even on a desktop. Regardless, let me speculate (based on logic)

1. IAF was prepared for the retaliation. How many planes can it put on continuous cap?, We had around that time 150 SU30MKI (250 @60% availability), 36 M2k (50@75% availability), 30 Mig 29s (60 @50% availability - lower % accounting for upgrades-are these operational after upgrade?) and 60 Mig 21 (120 @50%), total of 276 fighters. I would discount 60 Mig 21 from CAP, owing to shorter leg, and most likely they were in ORP, forward deployed). So all in all 210 fighters available to counter TSP on Feb 27.
2. Not all will be, can be and should be forward deployed, you do not put all your eggs in one basket. They would have been distributed through out India. Making a guess, 1/3rd moved to western sector (not necessarily forward bases, lack of blast pen) - Fighter available for cap =70 (50 su30mki, 12 M2K, and 10 Mig 29).
3. Assuming 1 hour flight time for M2K and Mig 29 and 2 hours for SU 30 MKI, and a plane can take 3 sorties a day, For 24 hrs cap you need 4 SU30MKI (4 planes*2 hour* 3 shifts), and 8 Mig 29 and 8 M2K.
4. If you had to maintain 3 plane 24/7 cap you would need 20 planes (out of 70 available on spot). For 4 plane that we were maintaining, 24 planes out of 70 would have been used or 34% of the capacity.
5. At max they could have maintained a 3 times this cap = 12 planes, 6 SU 30 MKI and 6 mig 29/m2k and done a 24/7 cap.
6.Even if we used max and burned fuel and missile life (@4 planes, 24/7 cap, we would have 'used up' 40 BVR and 40 WVR daily- assuming each plane carried 2 BVR and 2 wvr, and after 3 sorties, these missiles have to be overhauled/replace). At this pace of 4 planes a day, we could have used major of our BVR stocks in 10-15 days. At max rate possible, we would have been missile nanga in 10 days without TSP firing a single shot. I believe this was the determining factor on how many planes were on cap and carried how many BVR/WVR missiles.
7.It may explain why we did not go on BVR shooting spree, we were carrying limited stock of it (as we did not know, when the attack will come and you cannot carry 6 BVR and 6 WVR every time, within days you will run out of BVR/WVR stocks)
8. If my reasoning is correct, 4 planes were deemed sufficient for CAP with some 60 Mig 21 on ORP at forward bases (and other planes in depth). Weather we had 4 planes or 10, TSP could have chosen time and could have bought 24 or 48 planes to the fight (they had the luxury of choosing the type, place and number of planes).
9. Did our strategy work? It did, we knew quite decently when TSPAF started forming for air attack (kudos to IACCS), we got 1 for 1, and if you want to disbelieve Indian claim, we lost a Mig 21, but none of TSP ground attack worked (unless you want to believe it was show of strength, and if it was, what was the purpose, they did not know before hand that they will shoot down a IAF plane, how would have they saved their H&D, by showing video of their bomb falling 100s of meter away from target and causing no damage.
10. More telling is reactions after the Feb 27th. TSP closed it's air space, India did not, we both scrambled planes, but IAF shot down many drones (and perhaps some TSP asset in one of their air bases, look up the report). There has not been terrorist attack since, certainly not before GE 2019 that could have been detrimental to Modi ji.
11. Hind sight is 2020, there is no meaning in this question, on Feb 27th why did not we have 30 planes, or did not fire BVR, or why were Mig 29 missing in action? Had we known before hand (say even few hours) that at that exact time 24 TSPAF planes will come, even with the planes that we had (Rafale would certainly help, but even otherwise), the result would have been very devastating for TSPAF.
12. IAF then did later pulled all stops and did 10,000 sorties in 3 days, turned availability to 90% (by using war time reserves) to show what it could do (and I guess we were prepared on 27th Feb, but not at war level). Unless we are in a 1971 like situation (or like ww1,ww2), where you know a war is 'imminent' within few months, you will not take your availability to 90%, it is economically not possible, plus you will EOL your planes/missiles very fast and gain nothing.
13. I would have imagined, apart from 4 armed cap, every now and then IAF should have flown unarmed planes in little rear at random times so that to increase the unpredictability. If every now and then, there were 10-12 IAF planes in the air (4 being minimum any given time). TSPAF would have hard time choosing a time to attack. Though they could have come with 40-60 planes (most of it decoys).
14. We need Astra in very high number, they can come in handy in this not hot nor cold war like situation. Being our baby I am hoping they will be less costly.
15. We need a quick reaction, small plane in huge numbers, in the front on ORP duties (that can be in the air within 2 minutes of being ordered). Mig 21 has served as well, I believe there is one plane that we have (Hint: It is not Rafale) which can fulfill this role....but for some reason, things are not moving fast enough for it

[Aditya_V]

Please also add which Army's Tanks broke away from thier barracks and started messing up with civilian roads. And note thier recent RAAD test they claim an improved communication system. Looks like thier H4 got jammed by IAF. Video evidence and subsequent deletions of videos which luckily some Indian sites archived show 2 different aircraft fell that day, plus Bell combat rescue helicopter. Multiple sources claiming pilot dying in military hospital Rawalpindi. It is clear a F16 went down. Pakis would have never released Wing Commander in 4 days unless thier hand was really weak.

[Cain Marko]

11. Hind sight is 2020, there is no meaning in this question, on Feb 27th why did not we have 30 planes, or did not fire BVR, or why were Mig 29 missing in action? Had we known before hand (say even few hours) that at that exact time 24 TSPAF planes will come, even with the planes that we had (Rafale would certainly help, but even otherwise), the result would have been very devastating for TSPAF.)

In hindsight, my biggest question is...
1. Why did IAF not use big dhamakawala mijjil instead of uber penetration warhead stuff?

This woulda really wanted up jingo hearts and demoralized paki awaam. Not to mention unfair and LM types.

[nachiket]

In hindsight, my biggest question is...
1. Why did IAF not use big dhamakawala mijjil instead of uber penetration warhead stuff?

This woulda really wanted up jingo hearts and demoralized paki awaam. Not to mention unfair and LM types.

Because they were only looking to kill the jihadis present there and not looking to fight or win a twitter "perception war", or warm up jingo hearts, as much as that might annoy us.

The only message they were trying to send was to the ISI - that the next time they send their pet jihadis to commit soosai in India, we can make their other pet jihadis commit unintentional soosai in their own beds in the middle of the night.

What people like unfair think or believe does not matter to the IAF.

[naird]

Because they were only looking to kill the jihadis present there and not looking to fight or win a twitter "perception war", or warm up jingo hearts, as much as that might annoy us.

The only message they were trying to send was to the ISI - that the next time they send their pet jihadis to commit soosai in India, we can make their other pet jihadis commit unintentional soosai in their own beds in the middle of the night.

What people like unfair think or believe does not matter to the IAF.

This mindset is a problem in this day and age. Interviews from BS Dhanoa clearly articulates / laments the fact that we did not blow up the building ! So whether we like it or not - information warefare is essential. Psy ops is extremely important in our context - and we are miserable at it. Information warefare has never been central to us - its an after thought to us. If we had then Balakot would have had multiple redundancy built in - and would not have depended on just one Cristal Maze to relay the video feed. Incase of PAK information warefare is core to their action plan.

Keep in mind - Pak armed forces are only able to survive due to perception. Actions of 27th clearly show their only objective was to placate domestic audience. The day PAK armed forces credibility is questioned and doubt creeps in is the day we will see 2nd breakup of that nation.

Gone are the days of 'Beta kaam kar, phal ki chinta mat kar' - These days its American philosphy. Beta kaam bhi kar aur usko double promote bhi kar.

[naird]

11. Hind sight is 2020, there is no meaning in this question, on Feb 27th why did not we have 30 planes, or did not fire BVR, or why were Mig 29 missing in action? Had we known before hand (say even few hours) that at that exact time 24 TSPAF planes will come, even with the planes that we had (Rafale would certainly help, but even otherwise), the result would have been very devastating for TSPAF.

Hindsight is 20-20 but it also helps us to evaluate events of 27th critically. Strategically we achieved our objective ! Tactically on 27th there were shortcomings - these shortcomings essentially did not allow us to inflict behavioral change amongst Pakis. I think oppurtunities like these are extremely rare and hard to come by. We had the moment and we did not sieze it. Some of the shortcomings are clearly criminal ! Dont know if IAF is to blame Or GOI.

(a) Absence of long stick - Everyone including us folks at BRF clearly knew that our AtoA missiles will be outranged by Amraam C5; R77 is clearly not in the same league. While PAF might have employed poor BVR tactics of shooting at Dmax-1, they did put us on defensive. Our Su's - never had a firing solution. AIM C5 was brought way early - and yet our top brass relaxed and became complacent in the fact that hostilities will not break out. Dhanoa's and Modis- if we had Rafale(Meteor) comment essentially confirms this.
Someone should be held accountable. I sincerely hope Astra is inducted - as of now , no news.

(b) Jam prone communication - Clearly do not know our lax attitude when it comes to SDR and ODL. Pakis have their data link (link 17 i guess) operational from 2015 ; Yet we have a chalta hain attitude of slowly doing things. Only after 27th - some urgency was shown on SDR front; God knows whats happening on ODL front. We will never know - but if we had secure comms then Abhi might not have been shot down.

(c) Information as central to warfighting - i have ranted above.

These to me are the big takeways - rest all the points as to why we couldnt amass fighters and other tactics are decisions taken by tactical commanders - these can be improved.

[shaun]

Apart from targeting our military installations , paki's fired to our ACs also , how come we didnt retaliate in kind ? Reason given ( not by IAF) because of some mythical ROE that never exist in such time criticality , knowing very well that paki's will try to do some mischief. It's always the the raw courage of our warriors that save the day . Like in kargil war , our general said , "we will fight with what ever we have."

During balakot strike , raw footage of actual strike could not be achieved because of some technical reason , so the assumption that we didn't take into account PR perception is wrong. If the footage would have been available , GOI would have shown it to the world.

Apart from the deficiency of our equipment , our PR management is also not up to the standard .

Next time if the paki's are punished for any terrorist strike , GOI shouldn't announce it. Lets see how paki's play it.

[Aditya_V]

Lot of assumptions here,Amraam better than R77 , Pakis jammed our communication all buying some propaganda. Please read what has been put on this thread before. We hit them hard on 26 Feb and they failed on 27 feb. AAm range has a lot of factors like launch aircraft speed etc
Unfortunately we lost 1 aircraft and 1 helicopter. Pakis and some outside forces will believe thier propaganda since that's what they want to believe like listening to Hitler.

We have improvements to make and I am sure our forces are working on ot. Stuff like land based Ak 630 to shoot down incoming PGM and Artillery, bombs etc are happening. Let the criticism be logical and constructive not based Paki or other propoganda

[chetonzz]

Because they were only looking to kill the jihadis present there and not looking to fight or win a twitter "perception war", or warm up jingo hearts, as much as that might annoy us.

The only message they were trying to send was to the ISI - that the next time they send their pet jihadis to commit soosai in India, we can make their other pet jihadis commit unintentional soosai in their own beds in the middle of the night.

What people like unfair think or believe does not matter to the IAF.

This mindset is a problem in this day and age. Interviews from BS Dhanoa clearly articulates / laments the fact that we did not blow up the building ! So whether we like it or not - information warefare is essential. Psy ops is extremely important in our context - and we are miserable at it. Information warefare has never been central to us - its an after thought to us. If we had then Balakot would have had multiple redundancy built in - and would not have depended on just one Cristal Maze to relay the video feed. Incase of PAK information warefare is core to their action plan.

Keep in mind - Pak armed forces are only able to survive due to perception. Actions of 27th clearly show their only objective was to placate domestic audience. The day PAK armed forces credibility is questioned and doubt creeps in is the day we will see 2nd breakup of that nation.

Gone are the days of 'Beta kaam kar, phal ki chinta mat kar' - These days its American philosphy. Beta kaam bhi kar aur usko double promote bhi kar.

Sir, if 1971- losing half of their country does not shake their awaam to question TPA what else can...?

Even if on 27th last year we shot down 10 of f sholahs and paraded their pilots naked...still aam abdul would say...darpok yindoo baniya cant put a step on our soil due to iron man TPA

[chetonzz]

Lot of assumptions here,Amraam better than R77 , Pakis jammed our communication all buying some propaganda. Please read what has been put on this thread before. We hit them hard on 26 Feb and they failed on 27 feb. AAm range has a lot of factors like launch aircraft speed etc
Unfortunately we lost 1 aircraft and 1 helicopter. Pakis and some outside forces will believe thier propaganda since that's what they want to believe like listening to Hitler.

We have improvements to make and I am sure our forces are working on ot. Stuff like land based Ak 630 to shoot down incoming PGM and Artillery, bombs etc are happening. Let the criticism be logical and constructive not based Paki or other propoganda

+100 ...
When on 26th we had the initiative and element of surprise -IAF completed their mission with flying colors...

When on 27th they had the initiative and element of surprise -TPAF screwed up their mission real bad with fshola kissing dirt...only face saving came from coward dogs in hundreds capturing and beating lone WC


in T20 cricketing terms...

1st innings IND (26feb), 200 runs/ 0 wickets

2nd innings PAK (27feb), 20 runs/ 1 wickets

Match abandoned after one over

[Khalsa]

11. Hind sight is 2020, there is no meaning in this question, on Feb 27th why did not we have 30 planes, or did not fire BVR, or why were Mig 29 missing in action? Had we known before hand (say even few hours) that at that exact time 24 TSPAF planes will come, even with the planes that we had (Rafale would certainly help, but even otherwise), the result would have been very devastating for TSPAF.

Hindsight is 20-20 but it also helps us to evaluate events of 27th critically. Strategically we achieved our objective ! Tactically on 27th there were shortcomings - these shortcomings essentially did not allow us to inflict behavioral change amongst Pakis. I think oppurtunities like these are extremely rare and hard to come by. We had the moment and we did not sieze it. Some of the shortcomings are clearly criminal ! Dont know if IAF is to blame Or GOI.

(a) Absence of long stick - Everyone including us folks at BRF clearly knew that our AtoA missiles will be outranged by Amraam C5; R77 is clearly not in the same league. While PAF might have employed poor BVR tactics of shooting at Dmax-1, they did put us on defensive. Our Su's - never had a firing solution. AIM C5 was brought way early - and yet our top brass relaxed and became complacent in the fact that hostilities will not break out. Dhanoa's and Modis- if we had Rafale(Meteor) comment essentially confirms this.
Someone should be held accountable. I sincerely hope Astra is inducted - as of now , no news.

(b) Jam prone communication - Clearly do not know our lax attitude when it comes to SDR and ODL. Pakis have their data link (link 17 i guess) operational from 2015 ; Yet we have a chalta hain attitude of slowly doing things. Only after 27th - some urgency was shown on SDR front; God knows whats happening on ODL front. We will never know - but if we had secure comms then Abhi might not have been shot down.

(c) Information as central to warfighting - i have ranted above.

These to me are the big takeways - rest all the points as to why we couldnt amass fighters and other tactics are decisions taken by tactical commanders - these can be improved.

Thank you for your post.
I back you especially on points 1 & 2.

We were outranged and we had led our edge dither way over the last two decades.

[Aditya_V]

Thats cause it is the whole ecosystem, notice how the Govt of day did not protest AMRAAM sales and after that we did not plan to have something in Inventory to outrange it. The IAF came up with Metoer -Rafale combo but some politicians would not want it.

[nam]

How would IAF possibly out range C5, even if wanted to?

With what BVR?

Please don't meteor. It will never be fleet wide in IAF.