Having Successful Military Industrial Complex (MIC)
I have been meaning to write this for a long time, but never really got around to it.
I have been thinking for a while, as to why has India not been able to develop a robust and world class MIC, in over 70 years, even though we inherited some weapons manufacturing capability from the British and even though we setup so many OFB factories and defence PSUs.
I will break this down into two parts. Part 1 will be the enabling factors that are present in other countries that have developed a good MIC and Part II will try to look at current situation in India and the problems thereof.
First up a disclaimer, that I have no military experience nor belong to a military family. In fact belong to a typically gujju business class family and as far as I know, no one in my known family history has ever come close to wielding any kind of weapons.
Part – I The Enabling factors for establishing a robust MIC
If we look at all the countries that have been successful in establishing a robust MIC, there are a few common threads that emerge. The first is that the country should see the military as a means of enforcing its national will and as an integral part of its foreign policy. The military is a part of national government setup and an extension of its foreign policy. This is true in the case of all the countries that have a successful MIC.
Even in democratic countries like the US, the military is consulted and is in the loop in many foreign policy initiatives and retired military officials are part of fairly influential think tanks, which guide US policy.
Unfortunately in India, it is not so. The military has always been kept at an arm’s length by the government and forget foreign policy, the military has not always been consulted even in military matters by the government. I shall cite examples for the same below.
IFS officer’s opinions would probably count for more, than that of service chiefs as things stand in the Indian government.
Even export of weapons systems forms as integral part of foreign policy of all countries that have a good MIC. Even the testimony to the senate arms services and foreign relations committee in the US to justify any kind of arms sales under FMS route, routinely mentions that it will further America’s foreign policy objectives and improve foreign relations!!
While it’s true that for a lot of the western countries this came about due to colonialism, where the colonies were always governed by Politico-Military leaders rather than civilians.
The other factor is that even the political leadership in most countries with a strong MIC has much better understanding of military matters and many have served in the military in the past. While many countries have had the government/countries led by ex-military leaders (from Eisenhower, to Charles De Gaul and many more), others have had military leaders take up fairly important roles in the government, post retirement. In India, this has been completely missing. Few retired military officers, have joined politics and have joined the government, but almost none have been given roles in the core decision making of the government. Nor do think tanks etc., have the same kind of influence on government policy in India, as we see in some other countries.
The few times that India used its military to fulfil national objective and enforce the nations will were the police actions in Hyderabad and the liberation of Goa. However, both of these were internal actions.
As I said above, the military has hardly been consulted in foreign policy matters and many times have not been fully consulted even in Military matters.
In 1948, Nehru did not consult the military while declaring a ceasefire and referring the matter to the UN. After capturing Zo-ji la pass, the offensive wasn’t pursued into Baltistan, as Nehru was told by Sheikh Abdulla, that he did not have influence in that region and could not guarantee loyalty to India.
The case of 1962 is too well known and apart from the military not being consulted, it was systematically hampered.
In 1965 also, the military was not part of the ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent otherwise, we would not have agreed to give back the Haji Pir pass, which links Poonch and Uri and offers an alternative to the Banihal pass to connect Jammu and Kashmir. Even the military itself failed in this case, as Gen Choudhary was reportedly consulted by LBS before declaring ceasefire, however, the good general had no idea about the inventory situation of our ammunition and possible situation of Pakistan regarding the same. For an army chief in war time, this is down right shameful.
In 1999, the government declared that India would fight only in its own controlled territory and would not cross the LoC. I doubt the military was consulted before making this announcement and if it was consulted, its objections were set aside, even though this should have been a purely military issue.
We celebrate Kargil as a victory, but I am not so sure. What exactly did we win? We did not gain anything in the conflict. At least post mid June, the self imposed moratorium on not crossing the LoC should have been dropped and we should have captured territory as the pakis were retreating. An area at least 50 Kms due west of the Saltoro ridge and 10-15 Kms west/north west of Turtuk should have been captured. This would have solved the Siachen issue for us, something which Musharaf was trying to do and also ensure that Pakistan would not be able to do a repeat of Kargil in the future. Except as the consequence of our victory, all we got was that we now have to patrol and man the Kargil heights throughout the year and as a consolation Pakistan lost face internationally and a few hundred of its uniformed cannon fodder were killed. The pakis don’t care about either and Mush recovered from the international loss of face pretty quickly.
Even the Indian military leadership perhaps doesn’t understand this aspect of their role, as the Indian military officers under the British were simply supposed to follow orders and only be concerned with the military operations. Whereas the top British officers were always Politico-Military leaders, who were also supposed to be involved with the administration and governing of the colonies. Indian civilian leadership has had absolutely no idea about military matters.
In countries like the UK, where the role of the military in shaping the national foreign policy and its role in the government has declined, it has also coincided with the decline of its MIC.
The other major enabling factor is the importance of strategic autonomy and appreciation of the military and war in the national psyche. Unfortunately in India, in spite of our over 6,000 year history, the country has never really experienced war. I mean Total War, where the entire country is involved in the national war effort. The only instance in Indian history that I can think of, when the whole country was involved in the war effort, was perhaps during Ashoka’s Kalinga campaign.
Even during the supposed 17 invasions of Ghazni, scorched earth type tactics were never employed. The enemy did not have to bother about trying to maintain their supply chains from Afghanistan or central Asia all to way to India’s heart land.
Even during the Delhi massacres carried out by Timur, Ghori and Nadir Shah, when supposedly hundred thousand civilians were butchered in Delhi, shouldn’t we have been able to kill close to 10,000 of their soldiers at the same time? A 1:10 ratio, but for an invading army, it would have still been significant.
Even for our independence, we have only been told that it was our non-violence that won us the independence. The INA, the threat of mutiny by the Royal Indian Navy, if the surrendered INA soldiers were punished, played no part. For the British the supposed threat posed by the retired or released Indian soldiers posed an even bigger risk. At the end of the 2nd world war, the British Indian Army, numbered almost 2.5 million. A vast majority of these were then relieved from service, as the British could not afford to keep them on the payroll, nor was there a need for such a large army.
These soldiers were trained to fight with modern weapons and fight a modern war. Many of them even managed to retain their weapons. Some of these retired soldiers and ex-INA soldiers, played a significant part in the first Kashmir War, from the Pakistani side.
The British were apprehensive, that eventually these large number of retired soldiers, with not a whole lot of income, would blame the British for any future financial woes and may turn against them. An military mutiny post the 2nd world war, was something that Britain most certainly would not have been able to deal with. But, none of these factors are ever taught in our history.
We are simply told, that kept turning the other cheek and our tormentor, finally just got tired of slapping us and left!!
Most other countries that have a successful MIC, have seen numerous wars, where the entire population is involved in the war effort and there is a much better understanding of and appreciation for strategic autonomy in these countries.
Even simple 1 line slogans like “Sevastopol Stand Strong” of “Keep Calm” still have resonance with the local populations even after so many years.
In countries like France, they do not mind spending large sums of money on defence R&D, just so that they can maintain their strategic and military autonomy. No politician or even the public will ever argue in France, that whey not just buy similar or in some cases better weapons, in most cases perhaps at a cheaper price from allies like the US, rather than spending large amounts on their own MIC. It will simply not happen. Even if some politician were to come up with such an idea, the people simply would not support, even it means lower taxes or more government dole outs etc.
The case of Japan is even stronger. Notwithstanding their post war pacifist constitution and a formal military alliance with the US with guarantee of nuclear safety, they never stopped investing in their own MIC. Often times the weapon systems developed were never deployed or similar foreign systems were bought instead, yet, the R&D in critical technologies and weapons systems has never stopped. No politician will ever cut down this spending and let their MIC wither away. Even the people will stand fully behind this strategy. In fact I would not be surprised if Japan secretly even has an active R&D program on nuclear weapons and fully developed technology for the same. Strategic insurance.
During the 20th century cold war, every military breakthrough was celebrated in all of the respective countries. No caveats or disparaging comments would be made as how the system was still inferior to those developed by others or deliberate running down of the systems with references to length of time taken to develop the same or the amount spent on it etc.
In India even the media doesn’t know how to report on defence matters.
Without the above enabling factors it’s difficult to develop a truly world class MIC.
India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
PART – II Problems in the current MIC setup in India.
1). Separate R&D and production agencies. DRDO is the main R&D organization in India, whereas the actual production of the weapons systems is handled by different entities. This is a unique setup, not existing in any other country. Even in the old Soviet Union, which is the closest to our OFB-DPSU based MIC, the same design bureaus were responsible for the design, development and production of the systems. DRDO has often complained that they want to have the final say about which company will produce the system that has been developed. Upto now that has not been the case. Two projects though stand out in the current system. The ATAGS gun and the Shivalik multi-mode grenade. ATAGS is being developed with private partnership, where companies involved in the development, will also be producing the system. Shivalik on the other hand, was given to the private company Solar systems, in a competitive bidding. This is a huge breakthrough, as in the past, the system would have been passed on to a OFB, without any other options being available.
These two are the examples to follow and the production agency, be it private of PSU, should be involved in the development cycle right from the post the prototype stage for major weapon systems and for small systems, the model followed for the Shivalik grenade should be followed. In the later model, the quality control and quality and performance guarantees should also be considered and not just the price offered by the production company.
1). Separate R&D and production agencies. DRDO is the main R&D organization in India, whereas the actual production of the weapons systems is handled by different entities. This is a unique setup, not existing in any other country. Even in the old Soviet Union, which is the closest to our OFB-DPSU based MIC, the same design bureaus were responsible for the design, development and production of the systems. DRDO has often complained that they want to have the final say about which company will produce the system that has been developed. Upto now that has not been the case. Two projects though stand out in the current system. The ATAGS gun and the Shivalik multi-mode grenade. ATAGS is being developed with private partnership, where companies involved in the development, will also be producing the system. Shivalik on the other hand, was given to the private company Solar systems, in a competitive bidding. This is a huge breakthrough, as in the past, the system would have been passed on to a OFB, without any other options being available.
These two are the examples to follow and the production agency, be it private of PSU, should be involved in the development cycle right from the post the prototype stage for major weapon systems and for small systems, the model followed for the Shivalik grenade should be followed. In the later model, the quality control and quality and performance guarantees should also be considered and not just the price offered by the production company.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
2). No ownership of the programs being taken by the defence services. Everywhere else in the world, it’s the military that is the real driver of weapons development. In India, it doesn’t seem to be the case. In most cases, the military has employed a hands off approach to weapons development and have not taken over the ownership of the programs.
There should be a formal position of Weapons Development Officer or a branch dedicated to weapons development in all the three services. A senior level officer should head this, with a tenure of at least 3 years. Dedicated officers should be assigned to be part of this branch and every major weapons program should have a dedicated officer assigned to it. Similar programs or programs of weapons systems all designed for similar purpose, could have a single officer, assigned to all of them. For example, all tactical air to ground weapons programs like NGARM, SAAW, PGHSLD, PG-Glide bombs etc. all could have a single officer monitoring the progress.
Likewise, for every other type weapons development from ship based armaments, ship and land based radars and sensors. Air based radars and sensors, EW and sensors, etc.
3). Long term planning, capability based requirement
Weapons development is a long term affair. Rome wasn’t built in a day and nor was any successful MIC, or individual weapons system. The country has to formulate a 10 year strategic plan, about the strategic challenges envisioned and capability that the military and the nation wants to acquire, to counter those challenges, as well as meet the objectives that the country wants to achieve.
The budget should also specify the amount being allocated for some of the major weapons development programs, if not in public document, then at least in the internal documents.
This would be similar to the system in the US, where a bi-partisan defence committee approves the budget for long running development programs. This way, even the politicians would not be able to kill the projects by slowing down the funding etc., without putting it on record.
All weapons development should be based on the capability that the country wants to have.
For example, Israel developed the Iron Dome system. No other country in the world, would use precision guided ammunition, to knock down cheap unguided short range rockets and mortar rounds. However, for Israel, these rockets are the most abundant and ain weapons used by its adversary in the Gaza strip. If it can negate the effectiveness of these rockets, then it can sustain its operations against the militants in Gaza, for a much longer time. If the rockets would be taking a steady toll, on life and economy in Israel, then the military would always be under pressure to halt its actions. Hence, for them, even if the system is expensive, the development of the same made sense for the capability that it gives them.
For us the cross border firing on the LoC, has posed a challenge for a long time. However, there are no programs that specifically lay out the weapons and sensors that we want to develop, which will allow us to dominate any kind of exchange on the LoC. The aim should be that any local CO on the paki side would be shitting bricks, when he gets the order to violate the ceasefire and fire at Indian positions or try and provide cover fire for terrorists trying to infiltrate, because he would know the kind of retaliation that would be come as a response.
The capability required and periodic strategic reviews, would also help us rationalize our inventory of older weapons systems and the approved holdings of the same.
An example would be the anti-personnel and anti-tank mines that we hold. The army has a sanctioned holding of literally hundreds of thousands of mines. Perhaps upto a million, all taken together. Do we really need so many? Storing all of these is regular expense and it takes a lot of effort to deploy and remove the mines in large numbers. Do we really need over 2,00,000 anti-tank mines anymore? Having a long term defence policy and periodic strategic reviews, will allow us to answer these type of questions.
The Navy has a program for 4 Landing Platform Docks (LPDs). These are supposed to be large, between 20K-30K ton vessels. What is the capability that we wish to have by procuring or building these. Keep in mind that the building and operating cost of such ships would be very high. Apart from the upfront construction cost, each of the ships is also envisioned to have 10-12 helicopters. This would mean also procuring upto 50 helicopters for the 4 ships. Such large ships would also require escort, just like CBGs. Hence we would need to dedicate some frigates and destroyers as escorts for these ships. 4 LPDs, along with the 4 LSTL ships that we have, would give us the capability to land a force of almost 2 brigades or 2 IBGs on a foreign shore. If we really want to have this capability, even the army would need to set aside two brigades, which would be tasked for this kind of role. We would have to carry out regular exercises of this force, for beach landing, capturing beachheads, setting up an air defence perimeter and then going further to capture whatever other objectives are envisioned. All of this would mean a large operational expense as well.
Now, unless we really envision capturing some island territories or landing our forces on the Makran cost to open a second front against the pakis or cutoff Baluchistan from Sindh or have the capacity to land 5-10 thousand troops somewhere in Africa or the Middle east, planning to acquire 4 LPDs does not really make any sense. Especially at a time, when we have many more pressing needs.
The capability required, can also be dictated by price considerations. Air to ground weapons like the JDAM, have been developed, keeping in the mind the cost factor. Cost can be a driver for weapons development. We have the Griffin-III and Paveway-2 kits with us. However, how many can be afford. Same with the Excalibur round. If the Army and Air force want to have the capability to hit a large number of targets using precision guided weapons or the Air force can have a vision, that over 10 years, between 50-70% of all its ammunition will be precision guided. This will obviously require lowering the cost of the system. A mandate can be given to say develop a replacement for Griffin-III kits, that will be almost just as effective, but cost about 50-60% of the imported system. For the same budget, the military would be able to afford twice the number of weapons.
There should be a formal position of Weapons Development Officer or a branch dedicated to weapons development in all the three services. A senior level officer should head this, with a tenure of at least 3 years. Dedicated officers should be assigned to be part of this branch and every major weapons program should have a dedicated officer assigned to it. Similar programs or programs of weapons systems all designed for similar purpose, could have a single officer, assigned to all of them. For example, all tactical air to ground weapons programs like NGARM, SAAW, PGHSLD, PG-Glide bombs etc. all could have a single officer monitoring the progress.
Likewise, for every other type weapons development from ship based armaments, ship and land based radars and sensors. Air based radars and sensors, EW and sensors, etc.
3). Long term planning, capability based requirement
Weapons development is a long term affair. Rome wasn’t built in a day and nor was any successful MIC, or individual weapons system. The country has to formulate a 10 year strategic plan, about the strategic challenges envisioned and capability that the military and the nation wants to acquire, to counter those challenges, as well as meet the objectives that the country wants to achieve.
The budget should also specify the amount being allocated for some of the major weapons development programs, if not in public document, then at least in the internal documents.
This would be similar to the system in the US, where a bi-partisan defence committee approves the budget for long running development programs. This way, even the politicians would not be able to kill the projects by slowing down the funding etc., without putting it on record.
All weapons development should be based on the capability that the country wants to have.
For example, Israel developed the Iron Dome system. No other country in the world, would use precision guided ammunition, to knock down cheap unguided short range rockets and mortar rounds. However, for Israel, these rockets are the most abundant and ain weapons used by its adversary in the Gaza strip. If it can negate the effectiveness of these rockets, then it can sustain its operations against the militants in Gaza, for a much longer time. If the rockets would be taking a steady toll, on life and economy in Israel, then the military would always be under pressure to halt its actions. Hence, for them, even if the system is expensive, the development of the same made sense for the capability that it gives them.
For us the cross border firing on the LoC, has posed a challenge for a long time. However, there are no programs that specifically lay out the weapons and sensors that we want to develop, which will allow us to dominate any kind of exchange on the LoC. The aim should be that any local CO on the paki side would be shitting bricks, when he gets the order to violate the ceasefire and fire at Indian positions or try and provide cover fire for terrorists trying to infiltrate, because he would know the kind of retaliation that would be come as a response.
The capability required and periodic strategic reviews, would also help us rationalize our inventory of older weapons systems and the approved holdings of the same.
An example would be the anti-personnel and anti-tank mines that we hold. The army has a sanctioned holding of literally hundreds of thousands of mines. Perhaps upto a million, all taken together. Do we really need so many? Storing all of these is regular expense and it takes a lot of effort to deploy and remove the mines in large numbers. Do we really need over 2,00,000 anti-tank mines anymore? Having a long term defence policy and periodic strategic reviews, will allow us to answer these type of questions.
The Navy has a program for 4 Landing Platform Docks (LPDs). These are supposed to be large, between 20K-30K ton vessels. What is the capability that we wish to have by procuring or building these. Keep in mind that the building and operating cost of such ships would be very high. Apart from the upfront construction cost, each of the ships is also envisioned to have 10-12 helicopters. This would mean also procuring upto 50 helicopters for the 4 ships. Such large ships would also require escort, just like CBGs. Hence we would need to dedicate some frigates and destroyers as escorts for these ships. 4 LPDs, along with the 4 LSTL ships that we have, would give us the capability to land a force of almost 2 brigades or 2 IBGs on a foreign shore. If we really want to have this capability, even the army would need to set aside two brigades, which would be tasked for this kind of role. We would have to carry out regular exercises of this force, for beach landing, capturing beachheads, setting up an air defence perimeter and then going further to capture whatever other objectives are envisioned. All of this would mean a large operational expense as well.
Now, unless we really envision capturing some island territories or landing our forces on the Makran cost to open a second front against the pakis or cutoff Baluchistan from Sindh or have the capacity to land 5-10 thousand troops somewhere in Africa or the Middle east, planning to acquire 4 LPDs does not really make any sense. Especially at a time, when we have many more pressing needs.
The capability required, can also be dictated by price considerations. Air to ground weapons like the JDAM, have been developed, keeping in the mind the cost factor. Cost can be a driver for weapons development. We have the Griffin-III and Paveway-2 kits with us. However, how many can be afford. Same with the Excalibur round. If the Army and Air force want to have the capability to hit a large number of targets using precision guided weapons or the Air force can have a vision, that over 10 years, between 50-70% of all its ammunition will be precision guided. This will obviously require lowering the cost of the system. A mandate can be given to say develop a replacement for Griffin-III kits, that will be almost just as effective, but cost about 50-60% of the imported system. For the same budget, the military would be able to afford twice the number of weapons.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
4). Project planning, project management and understanding of critical technologies
The project planning and project management, are currently our weak points.
Most projects do not have any kind of set timelines. For some projects DRDO has given completely unrealistic timelines. For every major project, a definite project management team should be set up, comprising of the main development lead, the higher ups of the DRDO lab, under which the product is being developed, the military representative, the manager responsible for the eventual manufacture of the product, from the production company/agency and any other MoD official if required.
The critical technologies that are needed to develop the weapon system should first be identified as the successful development of these technologies would determine the success or failure of the system. Besides, identifying the technologies required and the roadmap to develop the same, will keep all the stake holders on the same page. Many a times it has happened that we have heard of tests carried out by DRDO< declared a success, but the military is far from convinced. Maybe the tests conducted was for developing some underlying critical technology. The system tested, would not look anywhere close to a deployable weapon system, but for the scientist involved, it would signal a critical breakthrough, whereas for the military, it would seem like just another science experiment.
Identifying the critical technologies that need to be developed and cannot be purchased by To Tot license manufacture or by any other means, also gives a better appreciation of the progress being made.
As an example, for a main battle tank, the armour, the main gun and associated ballistic computer, fire control software and ammunition and the mobility, are the three most crucial building blocks required. For modern composite armour, the technology is closed guarded and not shared even amongst allies. Likewise for the main gun. Russia did not part with the metallurgy of the T90 main gun, even though we had paid for the full ToT, we were already having the technology for the T72 main gun and had also developed our own for the Arjun!! Same with the source codes for the ballistic computer and the fire control software. Having developed these two most critical building blocks, required for any MBT, the country has to realize, that it has crossed the threshold required for fielding its own MBTs and these no need for any more imports. Developing better ammunition for the gun and developing the mobility part of the equation are the only things required. Even for the mobility, a world class suspension system has been developed.
No amount of ToT or Strategic Partnership (SP, just new fancier name for ToT), is ever going to teach us how to design and develop or give us the critical technologies, which are required for any weapon system.
Another example would be the Ka-226T helicopters, as LUH. They are being planned under a SP model, with almost 200 to be procured. But, even for a such a large quantity, more than what Russia itself, will ever build, we will not get the coaxial main rotor tech, which is the most crucial piece of technology that Kamov can offer, as part of the technology transfer. Even for the ALH, even though we funded the development of the Shakti engine, we do hold the IP for it, nor do we have the technology for the same. To develop another variant of the same for the LUH, we again had to pay a large amount.
So when the Navy argues that the NLUH project should be pursued through the SP model and it will somehow help develop the infrastructure for Helicopter development and production in India, it will not be the case. Building a 100 helicopters will not get us any new technologies. For helicopters, the main engine, the rotor design and the main gearbox are the critical building block technologies. Apart from the flight control software etc, offcourse. We have mastered all of these, except for the engine part. For any new program, we will still have to put in the hardwork, but atleast, we have the understanding and capability to develop the building blocks required and that the most crucial part.
The HTT-40 programs will do a whole lot more for the Aviation development in India, then any kind of ToT or SP project can ever do!!
Even the ATAGS program is an example. The gun being developed is world class and future proof and will give us one of the best guns in its class. Yet, we have hardly heard any good words about the program from any of the serving or retired military personnel. They say good things about the Dhanush project, even though only 114 have been ordered and they rave about the robustness and the low price of the Sharang, but now one talks about the successful development of a 25 litre chamber and very good other parts as well. The military has to understand and appreciate the critical technologies developed in the country.
Apart from this, as mentioned previously, the production company or the production agency, should be identified once the final prototype has been made should be made an integral part of the development project. This will ease the eventual manufacturing process and help speed up the project.
Also, the numbers required have to be specified and should be known to all, once the project enters the LSP stage. This way it will not require 1 year or more for the price negotiations etc.
As an example, 2 squadrons of Akash missile were ordered, once it became ready. This at a time, when 28 squadrons of Pechora SAMS were in service and Akash had been in development for a long time. This is just unacceptable. The services should have specified the numbers required a long time back, once the developmental trials were almost over. Once the developmental trails are almost over the quantity required should be specified, so that by the time the user trails are over, the production company is ready with the entire cost calculation, along with the plan for any kind of capital expenditure required start producing these systems.
The NAG missile project is another example of this. After 2 decades of development and even though the system is ready for production and deployment, the Army still does not know how many of these systems that require. Saying that the Army never had an analogous system in their inventory is a poor example. Also, everyone realized that the NAMICA wasn’t ready, only once the missile itself was almost ready for deployment. A completely unacceptable state of affairs.
The project planning and project management, are currently our weak points.
Most projects do not have any kind of set timelines. For some projects DRDO has given completely unrealistic timelines. For every major project, a definite project management team should be set up, comprising of the main development lead, the higher ups of the DRDO lab, under which the product is being developed, the military representative, the manager responsible for the eventual manufacture of the product, from the production company/agency and any other MoD official if required.
The critical technologies that are needed to develop the weapon system should first be identified as the successful development of these technologies would determine the success or failure of the system. Besides, identifying the technologies required and the roadmap to develop the same, will keep all the stake holders on the same page. Many a times it has happened that we have heard of tests carried out by DRDO< declared a success, but the military is far from convinced. Maybe the tests conducted was for developing some underlying critical technology. The system tested, would not look anywhere close to a deployable weapon system, but for the scientist involved, it would signal a critical breakthrough, whereas for the military, it would seem like just another science experiment.
Identifying the critical technologies that need to be developed and cannot be purchased by To Tot license manufacture or by any other means, also gives a better appreciation of the progress being made.
As an example, for a main battle tank, the armour, the main gun and associated ballistic computer, fire control software and ammunition and the mobility, are the three most crucial building blocks required. For modern composite armour, the technology is closed guarded and not shared even amongst allies. Likewise for the main gun. Russia did not part with the metallurgy of the T90 main gun, even though we had paid for the full ToT, we were already having the technology for the T72 main gun and had also developed our own for the Arjun!! Same with the source codes for the ballistic computer and the fire control software. Having developed these two most critical building blocks, required for any MBT, the country has to realize, that it has crossed the threshold required for fielding its own MBTs and these no need for any more imports. Developing better ammunition for the gun and developing the mobility part of the equation are the only things required. Even for the mobility, a world class suspension system has been developed.
No amount of ToT or Strategic Partnership (SP, just new fancier name for ToT), is ever going to teach us how to design and develop or give us the critical technologies, which are required for any weapon system.
Another example would be the Ka-226T helicopters, as LUH. They are being planned under a SP model, with almost 200 to be procured. But, even for a such a large quantity, more than what Russia itself, will ever build, we will not get the coaxial main rotor tech, which is the most crucial piece of technology that Kamov can offer, as part of the technology transfer. Even for the ALH, even though we funded the development of the Shakti engine, we do hold the IP for it, nor do we have the technology for the same. To develop another variant of the same for the LUH, we again had to pay a large amount.
So when the Navy argues that the NLUH project should be pursued through the SP model and it will somehow help develop the infrastructure for Helicopter development and production in India, it will not be the case. Building a 100 helicopters will not get us any new technologies. For helicopters, the main engine, the rotor design and the main gearbox are the critical building block technologies. Apart from the flight control software etc, offcourse. We have mastered all of these, except for the engine part. For any new program, we will still have to put in the hardwork, but atleast, we have the understanding and capability to develop the building blocks required and that the most crucial part.
The HTT-40 programs will do a whole lot more for the Aviation development in India, then any kind of ToT or SP project can ever do!!
Even the ATAGS program is an example. The gun being developed is world class and future proof and will give us one of the best guns in its class. Yet, we have hardly heard any good words about the program from any of the serving or retired military personnel. They say good things about the Dhanush project, even though only 114 have been ordered and they rave about the robustness and the low price of the Sharang, but now one talks about the successful development of a 25 litre chamber and very good other parts as well. The military has to understand and appreciate the critical technologies developed in the country.
Apart from this, as mentioned previously, the production company or the production agency, should be identified once the final prototype has been made should be made an integral part of the development project. This will ease the eventual manufacturing process and help speed up the project.
Also, the numbers required have to be specified and should be known to all, once the project enters the LSP stage. This way it will not require 1 year or more for the price negotiations etc.
As an example, 2 squadrons of Akash missile were ordered, once it became ready. This at a time, when 28 squadrons of Pechora SAMS were in service and Akash had been in development for a long time. This is just unacceptable. The services should have specified the numbers required a long time back, once the developmental trials were almost over. Once the developmental trails are almost over the quantity required should be specified, so that by the time the user trails are over, the production company is ready with the entire cost calculation, along with the plan for any kind of capital expenditure required start producing these systems.
The NAG missile project is another example of this. After 2 decades of development and even though the system is ready for production and deployment, the Army still does not know how many of these systems that require. Saying that the Army never had an analogous system in their inventory is a poor example. Also, everyone realized that the NAMICA wasn’t ready, only once the missile itself was almost ready for deployment. A completely unacceptable state of affairs.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
5). Responsibility
Currently no one in the entire defence establishment in India, is held responsible for anything. Right down from the Raksha Mantri, to the MoD babus to service personnel to OFBs and DPSUs or DRDO.
This is just unheard off in any other country.
Even in the old Soviet Union, which had the closest structure to our OFB-DPSU-DRDO heavy structure, if a weapon system failed or proved to be a dud, the design bureau associated with it, would be held responsible and would loose political patronage, funding and worst still some of the main scientists involved might get demoted or transferred to some far off God forsaken place.
In India, no one from the OFB or DPSU has ever been held responsible for anything. The RM is also not held responsible for failure of any development project or failure of any procurement program or for anything else. Babus and other government officials are generally always insulated, except for some corruption charges.
Even the services are never held responsible for formulating unachievable requirements, due to brochuritis or simply pining for imports. DRDO officials and scientists are also not held to account for failures to deliver on promises and no technical audit is ever carried out over what was promised and what was achieved and if anyone was being dishonest in promising what they did. Accounts audit is carried out by CAG etc., but these do not paint the complete picture and even in this, no one is really punished or held accountable.
There are many examples. The 120 mm mortar is one example, where the services formulated requirements which were impossible meet, the DRDO yet decided to take it up and the MoD sanctioned the project. It was only after the Israeli’s said that the specs required were impossible to meet, that everyone realized their folly.
The case of Multi Caliber Rifle is another example. The project is perhaps no longer required, yet the research and the work on the same continues. The services that formulated the requirement do not want to admit that they made a mistake and that it is no longer required and the that the project should be closed. The MoD babus that sanctioned the project, do not want to admit that it was a mistake and hence get castigated later for having been a part of wastage of tax payer money and the DRDO personnel working on the project, perhaps know it too, that it is not going to go anywhere, yet they are happy to continue with the project, as long as the allocated funds are flowing.
Everyone involved probably knows that the project is not going to go anywhere and that it will never be inducted.
6. An active and dedicated industrial espionage program.
All countries with a good MIC, also have a very active and dedicated espionage program, that tries to steal the best available defence technologies from around the world, even from friends and allies.
Even Israel spies on the US to try and steal technology. Unfortunately, we seem to be lacking in this. We have not been able to steal any significant breakthrough military technology (at least there is nothing known publically on this).
This should be a crucial part of quest for developing a robust and world class MIC and everything necessary for this should be done.
There are perhaps many more issues that I might have left out. Others can help and contribute.
Currently no one in the entire defence establishment in India, is held responsible for anything. Right down from the Raksha Mantri, to the MoD babus to service personnel to OFBs and DPSUs or DRDO.
This is just unheard off in any other country.
Even in the old Soviet Union, which had the closest structure to our OFB-DPSU-DRDO heavy structure, if a weapon system failed or proved to be a dud, the design bureau associated with it, would be held responsible and would loose political patronage, funding and worst still some of the main scientists involved might get demoted or transferred to some far off God forsaken place.
In India, no one from the OFB or DPSU has ever been held responsible for anything. The RM is also not held responsible for failure of any development project or failure of any procurement program or for anything else. Babus and other government officials are generally always insulated, except for some corruption charges.
Even the services are never held responsible for formulating unachievable requirements, due to brochuritis or simply pining for imports. DRDO officials and scientists are also not held to account for failures to deliver on promises and no technical audit is ever carried out over what was promised and what was achieved and if anyone was being dishonest in promising what they did. Accounts audit is carried out by CAG etc., but these do not paint the complete picture and even in this, no one is really punished or held accountable.
There are many examples. The 120 mm mortar is one example, where the services formulated requirements which were impossible meet, the DRDO yet decided to take it up and the MoD sanctioned the project. It was only after the Israeli’s said that the specs required were impossible to meet, that everyone realized their folly.
The case of Multi Caliber Rifle is another example. The project is perhaps no longer required, yet the research and the work on the same continues. The services that formulated the requirement do not want to admit that they made a mistake and that it is no longer required and the that the project should be closed. The MoD babus that sanctioned the project, do not want to admit that it was a mistake and hence get castigated later for having been a part of wastage of tax payer money and the DRDO personnel working on the project, perhaps know it too, that it is not going to go anywhere, yet they are happy to continue with the project, as long as the allocated funds are flowing.
Everyone involved probably knows that the project is not going to go anywhere and that it will never be inducted.
6. An active and dedicated industrial espionage program.
All countries with a good MIC, also have a very active and dedicated espionage program, that tries to steal the best available defence technologies from around the world, even from friends and allies.
Even Israel spies on the US to try and steal technology. Unfortunately, we seem to be lacking in this. We have not been able to steal any significant breakthrough military technology (at least there is nothing known publically on this).
This should be a crucial part of quest for developing a robust and world class MIC and everything necessary for this should be done.
There are perhaps many more issues that I might have left out. Others can help and contribute.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Very good post on what ails the MOD system
I would delete part 6 and get it published.
I would delete part 6 and get it published.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Mody Sir,
Permission to share this with the High Command....
Fantastic writing.
Regards
S
Permission to share this with the High Command....
Fantastic writing.
Regards
S
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Here is another example why we cannot have a world class MIC. MoD rolls out a invite to the private industries for ammo with pomp, then makes the number so less, that you cannot even laugh at it.
They want private industries to supply 30 Smerch rocket every year. You read it right. 30.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... 749080.cms
Everyone knows including the GoI knows why we don't have a MIC. It is about protecting the DPSU empire. As simple as that. But GoI will not change it.
They want private industries to supply 30 Smerch rocket every year. You read it right. 30.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... 749080.cms
Everyone knows including the GoI knows why we don't have a MIC. It is about protecting the DPSU empire. As simple as that. But GoI will not change it.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
All i can do on reading this is:
and then go in the corner and cry about the future of our indigenisation dreams.
Guess we will forever be the cash cow that keeps on giving to all and sundry countries, right from tiny Israel to giant US
and then go in the corner and cry about the future of our indigenisation dreams.
Guess we will forever be the cash cow that keeps on giving to all and sundry countries, right from tiny Israel to giant US
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Mody ji i think you didnt spell about the attitude of inspection agencies like DGQA, DGAQA under MoD and CEMILAC (RCMA)under DRDO. As far as my experience is concerned we used to spend most of the time running around their offices begging ,cazoling them for hours/days , waiting for obtaining Airworthiness certificates.Most of these folks dont know ABCD of the systems as they dont have hands on practical experience and because their jobs are transferable. The moment we say indigenous, these ppl put thousand queries during the design reviews and during subsequent clearance , The queries mostly centered around usage of mil certified components in a mil system, application of relevant tests and omitting irrelevant ones.As you know, now, only industrial grade components and automotive grade are available and very few components with mil certification. This makes matters worse for the designers.First they have to prove the reliability of the components and its suitability for usage ,even-though it meets the requirements. They all get fat pay packets with full authority ,but no responsibility. Things have changed for the past 3-4 years ,but not enough. Most of the designer's time is wasted while going around these guys. As a result no designer is trying to do obsolescence mitigation for a two/three decade old products ,by replacing old components with better and advanced upgraded design.They same old components which have been used three decades ago are still being procured at exorbitant costs. Many times in reviews, i used to argue that why dont DPSUs also follow ISRO's QA and product approval procedures,,instead of depending on Mod and CEMILAC babus. I am not trying to down grade them, as they too have also contributed a lot for the success of LCA,ALH,LCH,LUH . A third party verification is always good ,but that should not be a lazy and no responsibility exercise. We need to follow the type of inspection and certification procedures followed by IAI,Thales,Lockheed martin,Boeing etc...our certification procedure is based on British MoD procedures laid during WW-II, 50 -60 tears ago. If we want our DPSUs to succeed its time to change the certification procedures adopted by HAL,BEL,RCIL..etc.The existing system of certification is a lazy,lethargic and dont care type, which is doing more damage to our MIC. DDPMAS 2002 is upgraded only recently i believe, which scares away indigenization ppl in the pvt and DPSUs!!!
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
By all means. No need to ask. There is a lot more that needs to be said, but have been really caught up with work over the past few weeks.ks_sachin wrote:Mody Sir,
Permission to share this with the High Command....
Fantastic writing.
Regards
S
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Sir I know that as well. We have worked with these inspectors and its a real pain to get anything done.rrao wrote:Mody ji i think you didnt spell about the attitude of inspection agencies like DGQA, DGAQA under MoD and CEMILAC (RCMA)under DRDO. As far as my experience is concerned we used to spend most of the time running around their offices begging ,cazoling them for hours/days , waiting for obtaining Airworthiness certificates.Most of these folks dont know ABCD of the systems as they dont have hands on practical experience and because their jobs are transferable. The moment we say indigenous, these ppl put thousand queries during the design reviews and during subsequent clearance , The queries mostly centered around usage of mil certified components in a mil system, application of relevant tests and omitting irrelevant ones.As you know, now, only industrial grade components and automotive grade are available and very few components with mil certification. This makes matters worse for the designers.First they have to prove the reliability of the components and its suitability for usage ,even-though it meets the requirements. They all get fat pay packets with full authority ,but no responsibility. Things have changed for the past 3-4 years ,but not enough. Most of the designer's time is wasted while going around these guys. As a result no designer is trying to do obsolescence mitigation for a two/three decade old products ,by replacing old components with better and advanced upgraded design.They same old components which have been used three decades ago are still being procured at exorbitant costs. Many times in reviews, i used to argue that why dont DPSUs also follow ISRO's QA and product approval procedures,,instead of depending on Mod and CEMILAC babus. I am not trying to down grade them, as they too have also contributed a lot for the success of LCA,ALH,LCH,LUH . A third party verification is always good ,but that should not be a lazy and no responsibility exercise. We need to follow the type of inspection and certification procedures followed by IAI,Thales,Lockheed martin,Boeing etc...our certification procedure is based on British MoD procedures laid during WW-II, 50 -60 tears ago. If we want our DPSUs to succeed its time to change the certification procedures adopted by HAL,BEL,RCIL..etc.The existing system of certification is a lazy,lethargic and dont care type, which is doing more damage to our MIC. DDPMAS 2002 is upgraded only recently i believe, which scares away indigenization ppl in the pvt and DPSUs!!!
the problem is that most people conducting these kind of inspections are not specialist and do know anything about the product and mostly do not know anything about what exactly they are supposed to check. Mostly if you can give them a ton of paperwork, they are happy at the end of the day.
Though in our case all our products are proprietory products and our own design, so at the end of the day, they can only raise querries regarding material TCs, caliberation of all kinds of instruments etc. I remember for P17 frigates, we supply a particular type of valves, for which we are the only manufacturers in India. The DGQA inspector at the end was only concerned about where we will store the material post the inspection, as the order specified that the material was to be stored in a bonded wearhouse, after the inspection, before the material could be dispatched to MDL!!
Unfortunately I have always said that we are a nation of clerks. Even in our education system, no one cares whether the student can perform the experiment and whether the student understands what they are going. As long as the journal is complete with multiple different coloured lines, how neat the handwriting are, our good the hand drawn diagrams look... etc. etc.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Another point that I have not written about is our general inferiority complex as compared to the white skinned Gods!!!
This is in almost all spheres of life and equally applicable to private and government companies.
The current negative list for imports of defense equipment is a step in the right direction. However, I fear that even in this, preference might be given to locally assembled foreign products as compared to locally designed, developed and produced items.
I hope I am wrong, but recent news about IA wanting to induct the Soltam-BF artillery gun, seemed like a step in the wrong direction. Similarly I am sure that IA would drop NAG and all its variants without a seconds thought, if Spike were to be assembled in India under Make In India program, with a promise to develop a newer more advanced variant in the future as a Strategic Partnership model. Although this is only a hypothetical example, this is the just the kind of program that I would dread. It would not give us any new technology and we would only be left doing screw driver jobs, albeit better screw driver assemblies then what the DPSU's and OFBs have been doing in the past.
The gist of my posts above was that for a strong MIC to emerge the entire strategic outlook in the country has to change. The military has to see themselves as being much more than just security guards of the nation. They have to see themselves as being pivotal in building a MIC. Sadly currently they says its not their job!! I wonder whose job it is then?
The political class has to see the military and MIC differently. Currently they see the military like a local security standing in our building societies, to salute the civilian political class and simply follow orders without question.
They have to see the military as the strong arm of the nation and the stick that the nation shows to the rest of the world to deter any ulterior plans against India and also as a stick that the country can use either by show or by wielding to enforce the will of the nation. They also have to see the military as being very much a part of the government, for all things concerning foreign affairs, external security and internal security. Unfortunately, upto now even the office of the service chiefs are not really part of the MoD and there is almost no inter working with the External Affairs ministry.
This disjoint is unique in India, as compared to all other major world powers, and is perhaps because of Nehru's shaping of the external affairs ministry.
Also, the capability based procurement, development and planning is most important. A periodic strategic review has to set these as national goals, that everyone works towards. Simply saying that the Indian Navy plans to dominate the Indian Ocean region from the Malacca Straight to the Persian Gulf, isn't going to accomplish the same. There has to be a white paper or a strategic policy document on this (Obviously not in public domain). The document should spell out all the challenges etc and also give the list of requirements and capabilities that the Navy would need to acquire, if it wishes to accomplish the said goals. It would also spell out possible alliances etc.
Currently as the things stand, it is China that is ready to counter the so called Malacca dilemma that so called experts in India keep talking about, with a Red Sea/Gulf of Aden dilemma and Gulf of Hormuz/Gulf of Oman dilemma, directed at us. They already have a military base in Djibouti that can control the access to the red sea and the gulf of Aden. They already have a base at Gwadar/Jiwani and with a possible alliance with Iran, they could also get control over Chabahar. More on this I have written in the new Cold war for the 21st Century thread.
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7817&hilit=cold+war
This is in almost all spheres of life and equally applicable to private and government companies.
The current negative list for imports of defense equipment is a step in the right direction. However, I fear that even in this, preference might be given to locally assembled foreign products as compared to locally designed, developed and produced items.
I hope I am wrong, but recent news about IA wanting to induct the Soltam-BF artillery gun, seemed like a step in the wrong direction. Similarly I am sure that IA would drop NAG and all its variants without a seconds thought, if Spike were to be assembled in India under Make In India program, with a promise to develop a newer more advanced variant in the future as a Strategic Partnership model. Although this is only a hypothetical example, this is the just the kind of program that I would dread. It would not give us any new technology and we would only be left doing screw driver jobs, albeit better screw driver assemblies then what the DPSU's and OFBs have been doing in the past.
The gist of my posts above was that for a strong MIC to emerge the entire strategic outlook in the country has to change. The military has to see themselves as being much more than just security guards of the nation. They have to see themselves as being pivotal in building a MIC. Sadly currently they says its not their job!! I wonder whose job it is then?
The political class has to see the military and MIC differently. Currently they see the military like a local security standing in our building societies, to salute the civilian political class and simply follow orders without question.
They have to see the military as the strong arm of the nation and the stick that the nation shows to the rest of the world to deter any ulterior plans against India and also as a stick that the country can use either by show or by wielding to enforce the will of the nation. They also have to see the military as being very much a part of the government, for all things concerning foreign affairs, external security and internal security. Unfortunately, upto now even the office of the service chiefs are not really part of the MoD and there is almost no inter working with the External Affairs ministry.
This disjoint is unique in India, as compared to all other major world powers, and is perhaps because of Nehru's shaping of the external affairs ministry.
Also, the capability based procurement, development and planning is most important. A periodic strategic review has to set these as national goals, that everyone works towards. Simply saying that the Indian Navy plans to dominate the Indian Ocean region from the Malacca Straight to the Persian Gulf, isn't going to accomplish the same. There has to be a white paper or a strategic policy document on this (Obviously not in public domain). The document should spell out all the challenges etc and also give the list of requirements and capabilities that the Navy would need to acquire, if it wishes to accomplish the said goals. It would also spell out possible alliances etc.
Currently as the things stand, it is China that is ready to counter the so called Malacca dilemma that so called experts in India keep talking about, with a Red Sea/Gulf of Aden dilemma and Gulf of Hormuz/Gulf of Oman dilemma, directed at us. They already have a military base in Djibouti that can control the access to the red sea and the gulf of Aden. They already have a base at Gwadar/Jiwani and with a possible alliance with Iran, they could also get control over Chabahar. More on this I have written in the new Cold war for the 21st Century thread.
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7817&hilit=cold+war
Last edited by mody on 26 Aug 2020 18:35, edited 2 times in total.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Ramana Garu, I hope you mean remove part 6 only from the public eye and not do away with the suggestion altogether!ramana wrote:Very good post on what ails the MOD system
I would delete part 6 and get it published.
There are too many modern weapons systems that have come about through the beg, borrow steal route then to even list out. All the way from nuclear weapons, to ballistic missile tech to jet engines etc. etc. etc.
Having a dedicated and focused military industrial espionage program, is almost a must for establishing a robust MIC and being on top of the game.
I am sure many external powers are actively involved in spying on us, if not to steal our technology (as in many fields, we are still don't offer anything advanced enough to steal), but to know just how far ahead we are and how to stymie our progress or kill our programs.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Yes just remove that part as it will appear you are suggesting industiral espiaonage wherre as you want a complete overhaul of the MoDP process. Critics will zero on that and throw out the whole exercise. I suggest deleting that and posting as extra para.
Once we do that can get it published at My Ind Makers or request Swarajya to publish it.
Once we do that can get it published at My Ind Makers or request Swarajya to publish it.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
One unstated underlying circumstance muddying the waters is the import mentality.
Politicians: good way to get bribes. The People of India get to pay the bribes for the foreign company will escalate the contract price. All those long years of contract negotiation is the modus vivendi as to who gets what and where. And the RM is a temproray tenure person who sits like Jabba the Hutt presiding ovr the rotten empire. Only YB Chavan. Manohar Parrikar, Nirmala Sitaraman, and Rajnath Singh have delivered what was expected of them.
Babus/Civilians: They get a cut in the contract and visas for family members study expenses like some scholarships of their choice in various foreign countries in Europe and US. The MMRCA deal enabled scholarships for a whole generation of children in the procurment loop without a single plane being boughtt. Understand the pain of receiving money without delivering performance.
Military Chain of Command: Please see above for they are the enablers sof the above mentality. GSQRs are drawn up with impossible requirements for DRDO to make. We know about the rifle caliber fiasco. And there is no concept of Mark 1, Mark 2 type of phased induction. It has to be perfect. And long drawn trials to fail the product and delay it to justify rush imports. Even G2G imports are padded with demands to integrate local products for cpmaptibility leading to delay due to redoing the flight qualification and schedule delays. A NATO approved aircraft needs extra stuff to be fitted as its not good enough to fight decrepit Pakistan. Even when GOI opens the purse and allows whatever is needed there are turf battles like in Apache. IAF doest want IA to get enough Apaches lest the IA helicopter wing gets powerful. So they put a kabash on the numbers IA can get. And IA too will order minimal numbers which jacks up prices due to small lot size.
Rafale buy was in the works since 2006. SPICE bomb was bought in 2017. Yet IAF did not require the French to integrate the SPICE on the Rafales even now!!! Have to purchase emergency small patakas (250 lbs) called Hammer. Sounds like a tack hammers.
DGQA These are the key cog in the system to stall local manufacture. Even wehn headed by a military officer these folks are continuing the British traidtion of ensuring that forces are undersupplied. All very sincerely done. Sabotage by rigorous following procedures. Net result is forces will be unnready at crucial times.
DRDO These are folks who contribute to the mess. They don't have a joint plan of what's needed by services to fight wars and work on their own. They have 'experts' in every field and rush to come up with propolsals to develop any wepaon as the need gets identified. And ask for the bare minimum funds to develop weapons. And when the milestone is passed seek extension again with minmal funds. Its more like a jobs program. No accountability for program completion. And the chiefs are chosen for success of strategic systems. And they dont have any insight or interest in non-strategic systems. And typically they choose the mildest, most sincere person to head a program and he is unable to enthuse the team or deliver the product. If does he gets fired as the Rustom-II guy.
If folks think I am being too harsh, a survey of the relatives of those in MoD procurment chain found 85% are settled abroad in US, UK, and Europe. Students, jobs, permanent work visas and citizenship.
Some cases the spouse is US citizen and husband is working in the procurement chain.
Politicians: good way to get bribes. The People of India get to pay the bribes for the foreign company will escalate the contract price. All those long years of contract negotiation is the modus vivendi as to who gets what and where. And the RM is a temproray tenure person who sits like Jabba the Hutt presiding ovr the rotten empire. Only YB Chavan. Manohar Parrikar, Nirmala Sitaraman, and Rajnath Singh have delivered what was expected of them.
Babus/Civilians: They get a cut in the contract and visas for family members study expenses like some scholarships of their choice in various foreign countries in Europe and US. The MMRCA deal enabled scholarships for a whole generation of children in the procurment loop without a single plane being boughtt. Understand the pain of receiving money without delivering performance.
Military Chain of Command: Please see above for they are the enablers sof the above mentality. GSQRs are drawn up with impossible requirements for DRDO to make. We know about the rifle caliber fiasco. And there is no concept of Mark 1, Mark 2 type of phased induction. It has to be perfect. And long drawn trials to fail the product and delay it to justify rush imports. Even G2G imports are padded with demands to integrate local products for cpmaptibility leading to delay due to redoing the flight qualification and schedule delays. A NATO approved aircraft needs extra stuff to be fitted as its not good enough to fight decrepit Pakistan. Even when GOI opens the purse and allows whatever is needed there are turf battles like in Apache. IAF doest want IA to get enough Apaches lest the IA helicopter wing gets powerful. So they put a kabash on the numbers IA can get. And IA too will order minimal numbers which jacks up prices due to small lot size.
Rafale buy was in the works since 2006. SPICE bomb was bought in 2017. Yet IAF did not require the French to integrate the SPICE on the Rafales even now!!! Have to purchase emergency small patakas (250 lbs) called Hammer. Sounds like a tack hammers.
DGQA These are the key cog in the system to stall local manufacture. Even wehn headed by a military officer these folks are continuing the British traidtion of ensuring that forces are undersupplied. All very sincerely done. Sabotage by rigorous following procedures. Net result is forces will be unnready at crucial times.
DRDO These are folks who contribute to the mess. They don't have a joint plan of what's needed by services to fight wars and work on their own. They have 'experts' in every field and rush to come up with propolsals to develop any wepaon as the need gets identified. And ask for the bare minimum funds to develop weapons. And when the milestone is passed seek extension again with minmal funds. Its more like a jobs program. No accountability for program completion. And the chiefs are chosen for success of strategic systems. And they dont have any insight or interest in non-strategic systems. And typically they choose the mildest, most sincere person to head a program and he is unable to enthuse the team or deliver the product. If does he gets fired as the Rustom-II guy.
If folks think I am being too harsh, a survey of the relatives of those in MoD procurment chain found 85% are settled abroad in US, UK, and Europe. Students, jobs, permanent work visas and citizenship.
Some cases the spouse is US citizen and husband is working in the procurement chain.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Look at this order to domestic industry. Which idiot will rush to make these low numbers which wont break even for decades!
http://www.economictimes.indiatimes.com ... 749080.cms
http://www.economictimes.indiatimes.com ... 749080.cms
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
There is a bloody war situation in Ladakh. During Kargil they emptied most of the 155mm shells.
Yet the IA is their wisdom wants small token mfg.
Yet the IA is their wisdom wants small token mfg.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Maybe time to throw out IAS from defence ministry and create a separate cadre called "Indian Defense Administrative Service", with one-year military training compulsory at induction, including two-month course in strategic thought. We have a separate Indian Forest Service that staffs the environment ministry. Why not for defense where need for specialization is much more
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dinesh_kimar
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Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
In the above tender, they have ordered Smerch rockets.
All 30 of them , when fired, will surely prove decisive.
All 30 of them , when fired, will surely prove decisive.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Saar... did you forget George Fernandes, or was the omission deliberate?ramana wrote:Politicians: good way to get bribes. The People of India get to pay the bribes for the foreign company will escalate the contract price. All those long years of contract negotiation is the modus vivendi as to who gets what and where. And the RM is a temproray tenure person who sits like Jabba the Hutt presiding ovr the rotten empire. Only YB Chavan. Manohar Parrikar, Nirmala Sitaraman, and Rajnath Singh have delivered what was expected of them.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Blaming IAS babus is an easy scrape goat, but that absolves everyone else in decision making process (both military and political). If I had to guess the natashas did their job behind the scenes and removed a zero from the initial numbers.sanjayc wrote:Maybe time to throw out IAS from defence ministry and create a separate cadre called "Indian Defense Administrative Service", with one-year military training compulsory at induction, including two-month course in strategic thought. We have a separate Indian Forest Service that staffs the environment ministry. Why not for defense where need for specialization is much more
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
I think it is a bit soon to say Rajnath Singh has delivered what was expected of him. There are a lot of announcements but we'll have to wait and see how much actually changes on the ground. If that latest report about the tiny orders to private suppliers is anything to go by I don't have much hope.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Surprised to see these 2 included, wondering what their achievement was (albeit they had short tenures) - or are we setting the bar so low for greatness.k prasad wrote:Saar... did you forget George Fernandes, or was the omission deliberate?ramana wrote:Politicians: good way to get bribes. The People of India get to pay the bribes for the foreign company will escalate the contract price. All those long years of contract negotiation is the modus vivendi as to who gets what and where. And the RM is a temproray tenure person who sits like Jabba the Hutt presiding ovr the rotten empire. Only YB Chavan. Manohar Parrikar, Nirmala Sitaraman, and Rajnath Singh have delivered what was expected of them.
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Dileep
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Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
DRDO identifies 108 Systems and Subsystems for industry to design, develop and manufacture towards achieving “Atmanirbhar Bharat”
When the 101 list of import embargo came out, I joked to my colleague that "they should have tried hard to reach the auspicious 108" and presto!! DRDO comes out with the magic number!!
When the 101 list of import embargo came out, I joked to my colleague that "they should have tried hard to reach the auspicious 108" and presto!! DRDO comes out with the magic number!!
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Second negative arms import list likely by year end
"The Department of Military Affairs is working with all the stakeholders including the three defence forces
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
DileepjiDileep wrote:DRDO identifies 108 Systems and Subsystems for industry to design, develop and manufacture towards achieving “Atmanirbhar Bharat”
When the 101 list of import embargo came out, I joked to my colleague that "they should have tried hard to reach the auspicious 108" and presto!! DRDO comes out with the magic number!!
Looking through the list I see: Multipurpose bridges/Tank transporters yada yada
I know it is wrong thread but will these be 'Arjun Compliant' or specifically made to be 'Non-Compliant' again.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Update from the IDEX DISC challenge for startups. Here are the terms and conditions.
1) You (the startup) must put in an equivalent amount of what we (Armed forces) are putting in, for development cost. For example if AF is giving Rs. 70 lakh you must put in 70 lakhs of your own as well.
2) You must create a separate account just for this product and money will be transferred there in installments. Only when you have spent your part of the installment we will transfer money to you.
3) No money can be spent on salaries unless you are working on this product and nothing else.
4) No guarantee that the product will be certified or purchased after development.
5) You can't export the product to other countries.
Which startup, or even small company in their right mind will accept such terms and conditions. These morons did not even do simple niceties like paying for travel expenses to attend their events.
Another great idea torpedoed by babooze and import lobby.
1) You (the startup) must put in an equivalent amount of what we (Armed forces) are putting in, for development cost. For example if AF is giving Rs. 70 lakh you must put in 70 lakhs of your own as well.
2) You must create a separate account just for this product and money will be transferred there in installments. Only when you have spent your part of the installment we will transfer money to you.
3) No money can be spent on salaries unless you are working on this product and nothing else.
4) No guarantee that the product will be certified or purchased after development.
5) You can't export the product to other countries.
Which startup, or even small company in their right mind will accept such terms and conditions. These morons did not even do simple niceties like paying for travel expenses to attend their events.
Another great idea torpedoed by babooze and import lobby.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
What if the product has been developed elsewhere and the IP owners start developing further in India to modify to suite Armed Forces/Defense Labs needs?5) You can't export the product to other countries.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
"The central government has set up an expert committee to redefine the role of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for the current and futuristic defence and battlefield scenarios.
It aims to reduce Indian military's dependence on imports, as India is the second-largest arms importer in the world after Saudi Arabia. Moreover, its also a move towards Prime minister Narendra Modi's vision of "Aatmanirbhar Bharat" in the defence sector.
On day one of his second innings as DRDO head, Dr G. Satheesh Reddy, who is also the secretary of the department of defence research and development (ministry of defence), constituted the five-member elite panel. Incidentally, the Cabinet’s Appointments Committee had on Monday approved a two-year extension of tenure for Reddy.
The committee is headed by professor V. Ramagopal Rao, Director of IIT, Delhi. Other members include S. Somnath, Director, Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre; Air Marshal Sandeep Singh, Deputy Chief of Air Staff; Dr. Samir V. Kamat, Director General-Naval Systems & Materials (NS & M) and Benjamin Lionel, Director, Instruments Research & Development Establishment of DRDO."
The terms of reference of the committee will be to study and review the charter of duties of all 52 laboratories of DRDO and to redefine the same for both current and futuristic defence and battlefield scenarios. Part of the panel’s tasks will be to minimise the overlap of technologies amongst the laboratories.
The committee has given a deadline of 45 days to submit its report and its chairman may co-opt subject specialists as invitees to specific meetings.
But, defence experts are apprehensive about the new panel, hoping it will not meet the fate of other expert committees, such as the P. Rama Rao Committee.
The committee headed by P. Rama Rao, former Secretary, Department of Science and Technology, had submitted its report in 2008. The report, DRDO’s first external review aimed at restructuring the defence R&D body, suggested that DRDO concentrate only on "core technologies" of "strategic importance" instead of venturing into making juices, mosquito repellents, titanium dental implants and so on. The committee had also suggested de-centralization of DRDO management and making it a leaner organization. Subsequently, on the Rama Rao panel’s suggestion, DRDO’s management was decentralised by merging its 52 labs to form seven clusters based on technology domains such as missiles, electronic warfare, radars, aerial vehicles and underwater weapons.
DRDO has often been criticised for delayed projects and missing repeated deadlines with huge cost overruns. And in absence of self-reliance in defence, Indian armed forces continue to be heavily dependent on imports with over 70 per cent of armed forces requirements are met from foreign firms.
On Monday, a delegation by DRDO made a detailed presentation before Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, identifying 108 military sub-systems and components for development by Indian (private) industry and the DRDO will provide support the process. DRDO claims that the design and development of these subsystems would be done over the next couple of years. This announcement follows the negative list of 101 military hardware from imports, which have to be domestically procured in a phased manner.
read more here:
https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2020/ ... ttles.html
was this already posted here? the committee gets 45 days to suggest recommendations.. thats WAYY too fast for our country. is thi just an eye wash to push something already decided?
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Ramana garu, that would great, if you can help with getting this published. I can add a couple of paragraphs and cleanup the piece a little and email it to you. Let me know.ramana wrote:Yes just remove that part as it will appear you are suggesting industiral espiaonage wherre as you want a complete overhaul of the MoDP process. Critics will zero on that and throw out the whole exercise. I suggest deleting that and posting as extra para.
Once we do that can get it published at My Ind Makers or request Swarajya to publish it.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
As the video shows, all GoI has to do is give out large orders to the private sector. They will get the required technology and deliver on time
GoI knows this very well. But doesn't want to do, just to protect the DPSU empire.
Instead, they spend thousands of hours creating unwanted procedures, to show they are doing something.. without doing the real thing.
GoI knows this very well. But doesn't want to do, just to protect the DPSU empire.
Instead, they spend thousands of hours creating unwanted procedures, to show they are doing something.. without doing the real thing.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
DRDO Newsletter Sept 2020
Anti-tank Guided Missile Dhruvastra tested Successfully
Navy Inducts Indigenously Developed Torpedo Decoy System
LASTEC systems deployed at red fort for independence day security
Anti-tank Guided Missile Dhruvastra tested Successfully
Navy Inducts Indigenously Developed Torpedo Decoy System
LASTEC systems deployed at red fort for independence day security
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
https://twitter.com/Nambitiger1/status/ ... 72032?s=20 ---> Comparison between DRDO and Defence Services by a DRDO employee......
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Major deal for private sector: Defence Ministry inks Rs 5,000 cr project with L&T, Tata.
In a major boost for the private industry, the defence ministry is inking an estimated Rs 5,000 crore deal to manufacture indigenous Pinaka multi barrel rocket launchers for the Army that is likely to generate several hundred jobs in the coming months.
The contract, which has been in the making since 2017, will go to private sector companies Larsen & Toubro and Tata Aerospace and Defence, with a significant portion of work also falling into public sector unit BEML, which supplies the trucks for the rocket launchers.
The Pinaka program has been a home grown success story, with two regiments already in service and technology transfer successfully executed by DRDO to the private sector for manufacturing the systems as well as ammunition.
Out of the six new regiments, L&T has been awarded the contract to manufacture four while the balance two will be made by Tata Aerospace and Defence. This would be one of the largest orders placed on the private sector in India from the Army. ET had reported in May that the Pinaka program had been identfied to be fast tracked, both to boost the private industry during the coronavirus crisis and the utilise money saved from delays in delivery of weapon systems currently being imported.
As reported by ET, the first ever rockets fully manufactured by the private sector have also been successfully test fired by the Army this month. The Pinaka rockets were tested at a ring range in Pokharan and achieved the desired results by accurately hitting targets. The rockets have been manufactured by Economic Explosives Limited (EEL) and are the rest munition of its kind made by the private sector in India. They are also a success story for DRDO that has been engaging with the private sector to transfer manufacturing technology for home developed systems.
DRDO has also successfully tested an extended range guided Pinaka rocket that can hit targets at a distance of 75 km, a signicant boost from the current range of 40 km. The Pinaka was developed by DRDO to replace imports from Russia for the BM 21 Grad multi barrel rocket launchers
In a major boost for the private industry, the defence ministry is inking an estimated Rs 5,000 crore deal to manufacture indigenous Pinaka multi barrel rocket launchers for the Army that is likely to generate several hundred jobs in the coming months.
The contract, which has been in the making since 2017, will go to private sector companies Larsen & Toubro and Tata Aerospace and Defence, with a significant portion of work also falling into public sector unit BEML, which supplies the trucks for the rocket launchers.
The Pinaka program has been a home grown success story, with two regiments already in service and technology transfer successfully executed by DRDO to the private sector for manufacturing the systems as well as ammunition.
Out of the six new regiments, L&T has been awarded the contract to manufacture four while the balance two will be made by Tata Aerospace and Defence. This would be one of the largest orders placed on the private sector in India from the Army. ET had reported in May that the Pinaka program had been identfied to be fast tracked, both to boost the private industry during the coronavirus crisis and the utilise money saved from delays in delivery of weapon systems currently being imported.
As reported by ET, the first ever rockets fully manufactured by the private sector have also been successfully test fired by the Army this month. The Pinaka rockets were tested at a ring range in Pokharan and achieved the desired results by accurately hitting targets. The rockets have been manufactured by Economic Explosives Limited (EEL) and are the rest munition of its kind made by the private sector in India. They are also a success story for DRDO that has been engaging with the private sector to transfer manufacturing technology for home developed systems.
DRDO has also successfully tested an extended range guided Pinaka rocket that can hit targets at a distance of 75 km, a signicant boost from the current range of 40 km. The Pinaka was developed by DRDO to replace imports from Russia for the BM 21 Grad multi barrel rocket launchers
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
Bharat Forge 2020
Technology absorption
Design and development of Hovercraft.
Design and development of 40 Kg Jet Engine.
Design and development of Unmanned Ground vehicle (6*6)- A Multi-terrain vehicle.
Design and Development Roll, Yaw, Pitch simulator for Stabilization testing of Weapon stations.
Design and development of ring rolling process for nickel based alloy to be used in critical application of aerospace sector.
Design and development of closed die forging process for Waspaloy (Ni based alloy) to be used in critical application of aero engine.
Design and development of closed die forging process for aircraft wheel disc made from 2XXX series aluminum alloy.
In case of imported technology
Electromagnetic Railgun - Imported in 2018 Design of 1st prototype has been developed and improvements in design are in progress.
Technology absorption
Design and development of Hovercraft.
Design and development of 40 Kg Jet Engine.
Design and development of Unmanned Ground vehicle (6*6)- A Multi-terrain vehicle.
Design and Development Roll, Yaw, Pitch simulator for Stabilization testing of Weapon stations.
Design and development of ring rolling process for nickel based alloy to be used in critical application of aerospace sector.
Design and development of closed die forging process for Waspaloy (Ni based alloy) to be used in critical application of aero engine.
Design and development of closed die forging process for aircraft wheel disc made from 2XXX series aluminum alloy.
In case of imported technology
Electromagnetic Railgun - Imported in 2018 Design of 1st prototype has been developed and improvements in design are in progress.
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
This report summarises some of the activities of drdo
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DRDO-Industry Collaboration: Leveraging Military Manufacturing Eco-System to Next Level
August 27, 2020; By: Ravi Shankar
https://bharatshakti.in/drdo-industry-c ... ext-level/
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DRDO-Industry Collaboration: Leveraging Military Manufacturing Eco-System to Next Level
August 27, 2020; By: Ravi Shankar
https://bharatshakti.in/drdo-industry-c ... ext-level/
Re: India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector
It is for the first time in India’s defence history, that Pinaka Rockets fully manufactured by a private organization have been successfully test-fired.
SATYANARAYAN NUWAL, CHAIRMAN,
SOLAR INDUSTRIES INDIA LIMITED
Annual Report
https://solargroup.com/defence/#home
https://solargroup.com/wp-content/uploa ... 019-20.pdf
Some milestones
☻ Received TOT for mass production
of Crucial Solid Propellant Booster
of BrahMos missiles
☻ToT received from DRDO for
BrahMos Propellant
☻ToT received from DRDO
Multi Mode Hand Grenade
☻Setup facilities to manufacture
Warhead Filling, Propellant,
Pyros, Igniters for PINAKA
☻ ToT received from DRDO for
Propellant / Igniters of PINAKA
Rocket (MK-I / MK-II)
☻ Entered into the
Business of Propulsion system
for space application by
partnering with ISRO
SATYANARAYAN NUWAL, CHAIRMAN,
SOLAR INDUSTRIES INDIA LIMITED
Annual Report
https://solargroup.com/defence/#home
https://solargroup.com/wp-content/uploa ... 019-20.pdf
Some milestones
☻ Received TOT for mass production
of Crucial Solid Propellant Booster
of BrahMos missiles
☻ToT received from DRDO for
BrahMos Propellant
☻ToT received from DRDO
Multi Mode Hand Grenade
☻Setup facilities to manufacture
Warhead Filling, Propellant,
Pyros, Igniters for PINAKA
☻ ToT received from DRDO for
Propellant / Igniters of PINAKA
Rocket (MK-I / MK-II)
☻ Entered into the
Business of Propulsion system
for space application by
partnering with ISRO