India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 02 Sep 2020 07:15

Are we seeing a repeat of 1962 where the Indian Army deploys itself in a scattered manner on "policing actions" while the Chinese are massing behind? Part of the reason the IA was taken by surprise is because they scattered themselves into small groups trying to cover all border locations, and allowed the Chinese to slice through in force because no one location was strong enough to defend against the full might of a frontal assault.

Hopefully that thought is not lost amidst all this back-and-forth shoving matches.

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 02 Sep 2020 07:30

V_Raman wrote:
Anujan wrote:Thinking ahead to a long term solution, the situation is quite tricky.

Coming back to the original point. I am not sure this whole tamasha is because India intruded, I think it is far more strategic and sinister. I think China has decided that a permanently unstable JK/Ladakh is core to their security in Tibet/CPEC. Any moves to stabilize JK/Ladakh by altering statehood or building infra elicits a counter-reaction from them. If you look at their statements, first they objected to 370 abolition in JK (which is totally an internal issue, Jaishankar so far as went to cheen to tell them it has no bearing on status quo of the dispute with China). They are uneasy about DBSO road (totally on our side).
One way to break this will be to take over GB. have the Chinese pre-empted that option?

Imvho this is an eventuality. It's just the timing that one can't pinpoint. My guess is next summer/spring. Although it could be earlier or a year later although unlikely.

Guddu · Post by **Guddu** » 02 Sep 2020 07:50

Looks like China occupies Black top and helmet, per Nitin Gokhale

https://youtu.be/2hcH_oXOC94

chanakyaa · Post by **chanakyaa** » 02 Sep 2020 08:19

Bidu Maps: Chinese view of the LAC around south side of Pangong Tso and Finger 4

Not that it means anything. There is always a reference to Goog maps etc. I was wondering where Baidu, Tencent are drawing lines. I guess when you own your own software, it is easy to draw lines wherever you want.

arshyam · Post by **arshyam** » 02 Sep 2020 08:46

vivek_ahuja wrote:Are we seeing a repeat of 1962 where the Indian Army deploys itself in a scattered manner on "policing actions" while the Chinese are massing behind? Part of the reason the IA was taken by surprise is because they scattered themselves into small groups trying to cover all border locations, and allowed the Chinese to slice through in force because no one location was strong enough to defend against the full might of a frontal assault.

Hopefully that thought is not lost amidst all this back-and-forth shoving matches.

Not at all. I don't have to tell you this, given your extensive research for your books - the Army knows about logistics and have been careful about spreading too thin. These heights near Spanggur can be reinforced from the Chushul side if need be, so they won't be isolated pickets. Given the free hand they have been given, I am sure they have selected these sites after a careful study. But we have to consolidate and fortify our positions there as winter is coming and we need to be dug in.

As for '62, it is not true that the Army deployed itself in a scattered manner. It was ordered to do so, overruling protests from commanders throughout the chain. This is true from the company commander level all the way to the DMO level. It was at the level of the (eastern) Army command (Gen Sen) and above, including Chief of General Staff (Gen Kaul), vice-chief and COAS (Gen Thapar) that the military leadership succumbed to political pressure (the northern Army commander resisted this to an extent and so gave some leeway to the Brigade commander in eastern Ladakh, Brig Raina). This pressure was derived from the Director of IB, BN Mullick's policy of "defending the border right at the border" and Nehru's thunderous declaration of "we won't yield an inch of territory", so the die was cast. It was also derived from some confidence that the Chinese won't do anything in response. Brigadiers Dalvi and Palit have written extensively about how their protests about not being able to supply forward positions were overruled due to this thought process. In fact, ad-hoc decisions about post sitings were made in meetings with the then Defence Minister based on pins placed on political maps (not even contour maps - we didn't have any!). As to why placement of individual pickets needed to be decided in South Block, there was no good reason except to play "toy solider" due to the above convictions.

As for the surprise element, Brig Dalvi has written about the Chinese build up that was visible even from their lower ground positions in NEFA, so they did not get caught by surprise. Even the Air Force supply missions noted the Chinese build up as it happened. But the ground troops just didn't get orders to relocate to defensible positions -- despite conveying this information up the chain and asking for a modification of orders. It is in fact a testament to the Army that they still went ahead and followed these orders, though they knew they'd be slaughtered if the balloon went up. As it turned out, that's exactly what happened. Senior officers like Brig Dalvi (7 Brigade) and Maj Gen Niranajan Prasad (4 Div), both in Kameng sector of NEFA (and perhaps Brig Raina in Ladakh) chose to stay with their troops in the forward positions due to this.

Compared to today, back then, there was no motorable road beyond Leh - at best, we had a jeepable track. That's it. Yet we went ahead and stationed troops beyond even today's positions, like Sirijap complex, Khurnak, etc. Same in Depsang, much east of DBO. But the only viable options to get to these places was to hike or air supply, most of the troops just hiked all the way. The NEFA picture was no better - the road ended at Bomdila itself, and a jeepable track was under construction up to (and only) Tawang. The border was still a good week's hike beyond, and air supply here was dicey due to the paucity of drop zones. The situation today is in much contrast, given roads connecting much of our present positions and more being built. So I'd say, as long as the Army is given a free hand in planning tactics based on military principles, we are okay. There are no indications of political meddling in operations that was the bugbear of '62.

Sorry for the ramble, but I feel it's important to draw the right conclusions from '62. Most analyses out there tend to stop at "ours but to do or die, but not reason why". While that was applicable to the Army of '62, we shouldn't stop there and continue dhoti shivering

- it's not the case today.

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 02 Sep 2020 09:09

vivek_ahuja wrote:Are we seeing a repeat of 1962 where the Indian Army deploys itself in a scattered manner on "policing actions" while the Chinese are massing behind? Part of the reason the IA was taken by surprise is because they scattered themselves into small groups trying to cover all border locations, and allowed the Chinese to slice through in force because no one location was strong enough to defend against the full might of a frontal assault.

Hopefully that thought is not lost amidst all this back-and-forth shoving matches.

Ahuja SIrji I was reading up on the Battle of Rezang La and one thing that was quite interesting was that the Indian deployments did not seek the mastery of the terrain. That plus the scattered nature spelt doom.

In this instance and over the years the IA has a very good idea of the corridors of action and by seeking to dominate the heights can pull in reinforcements very quickly.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 02 Sep 2020 09:22

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkeNqkiAn8g

Heartening news about the IA's winter stocking, infrastructure for the extra troops and physical & mental preparedness from Col. Dinny (R) around the 15-17 min. Around 26 min, he says that the PLA did not expect the resistance it faced in Galwan and here and it is prolonging the disengagement talks because it is looking for a way out. I am not sure about that and that's the feeling of the China analyst Atul Aneja too.

g.sarkar · Post by **g.sarkar** » 02 Sep 2020 09:24

https://news.yahoo.com/indian-special-f ... 01558.html
Indian special forces member killed in China border showdown
Aishwarya KUMAR, AFP• September 1, 2020
A Tibetan-origin soldier with India's special forces was killed in the latest border showdown with Chinese troops on their contested Himalayan border, a Tibetan representative said Tuesday.
The death is the first reported from two incidents in 48 hours on the border which has heightened tensions between the giant nations just two months after a battle that left at least 20 Indian soldiers dead.
India and China, which fought a border war in 1962, have accused each other of seeking to cross their unofficial frontier in the Ladakh region in a bid to gain territory on Saturday night, and then again on Monday.
Neither side has announced any casualties but Namghyal Dolkar Lhagyari, a member of the Tibetan parliament in exile, told AFP that the Tibetan-origin soldier was "martyred during the clash" on Saturday night.
She said another member of the Special Frontier Force that reportedly includes many ethnic Tibetans who oppose China's claim to their home region was wounded in the operation.
.....
Gautam
I hope that the details will come out soon. There must be a lot more to this story.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 02 Sep 2020 09:28

1. With today's ISR capabilities India should be able to detect the massing of forces that wold enable such a breaking through the Indian defensive lines.

2. Major push of forces can happen only through major ingress routes, all of which are well defended.

https://twitter.com/ShivAroor/status/13 ... 6935784450

BREAKING: On this statement from @MEAIndia, just confirmed that a Chinese unit attempted to close in on Kaala Top/Helmet Top positions occupied by Indian forces even as Brigadiers were talking. The Chinese troops were spotted, floodlit & dissuaded by the Indian forces at the heights.

Confirmed by multiple sources.

While Nitin is the most reliable, he seems to have read/understood the Indian statement the Indian way where as India has started making statements that should be read the Chinese way.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 02 Sep 2020 09:30

ks_sachin wrote:
vivek_ahuja wrote:Are we seeing a repeat of 1962 where the Indian Army deploys itself in a scattered manner on "policing actions" while the Chinese are massing behind? Part of the reason the IA was taken by surprise is because they scattered themselves into small groups trying to cover all border locations, and allowed the Chinese to slice through in force because no one location was strong enough to defend against the full might of a frontal assault.

Hopefully that thought is not lost amidst all this back-and-forth shoving matches.
Ahuja SIrji I was reading up on the Battle of Rezang La and one thing that was quite interesting was that the Indian deployments did not seek the mastery of the terrain. That plus the scattered nature spelt doom.

In this instance and over the years the IA has a very good idea of the corridors of action and by seeking to dominate the heights can pull in reinforcements very quickly.

Coupled with the ISR capability India should be able to meet any massed attack with equal strength.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 02 Sep 2020 09:39

g.sarkar wrote:https://www.usnews.com/news/world-repor ... s-believes
China Provoked India in Latest Clash, U.S. Believes
...
American intelligence officials and local analysts remain puzzled about the timing of the latest clash, which comes as China seeks to cool tensions – or has given the appearance it wishes to do so – and improve ties with India amid fears the latest violence has pushed New Delhi into closer cooperation with the U.S.

China needs a win after Galwan and needs India to acknowledge the superiority of the Hans to settle matters neither of which India is willing to grant.

IF India has agreed to the the Chinese F4/8 Pangang tso gambit, China could have had its victory and withdrawn from the rest of places and gone back to their barracks. But without an agreement with India, any withdrawal would only result in India taking back what it considers its own.

Not only that but India seemed to increase preparation for the long haul which only increased the need for China to teach India another lesson. Hence the latest Chinese gambit.

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 02 Sep 2020 10:05

arshyam wrote:Not at all. I don't have to tell you this, given your extensive research for your books - the Army knows about logistics and have been careful about spreading too thin. These heights near Spanggur can be reinforced from the Chushul side if need be, so they won't be isolated pickets. Given the free hand they have been given, I am sure they have selected these sites after a careful study. But we have to consolidate and fortify our positions there as winter is coming and we need to be dug in.

...

Sorry for the ramble, but I feel it's important to draw the right conclusions from '62. Most analyses out there tend to stop at "ours but to do or die, but not reason why". While that was applicable to the Army of '62, we shouldn't stop there and continue dhoti shivering - it's not the case today.

That is a very exhaustive post! And I appreciate the effort involved.

Note that my point is not about dhoti shivering. In fact, my point is on the other end of the spectrum: overconfidence. My worry is that these early engagements are creating an aura similar to the bravado displayed by the IA during the 1950s prelude to the first war.

And yes, there were a lot of failure points in our execution of the 1962 war. You have summarized them nicely so I will not repeat them. I am simply advising that our bravado in these shoving matches must be matched with ISR inputs confirming that the Chinese are not poised to surge forward with heavy ground forces in a surprise move.

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 02 Sep 2020 10:06

ks_sachin wrote:
vivek_ahuja wrote:Are we seeing a repeat of 1962 where the Indian Army deploys itself in a scattered manner on "policing actions" while the Chinese are massing behind? Part of the reason the IA was taken by surprise is because they scattered themselves into small groups trying to cover all border locations, and allowed the Chinese to slice through in force because no one location was strong enough to defend against the full might of a frontal assault.

Hopefully that thought is not lost amidst all this back-and-forth shoving matches.
Ahuja SIrji I was reading up on the Battle of Rezang La and one thing that was quite interesting was that the Indian deployments did not seek the mastery of the terrain. That plus the scattered nature spelt doom.

In this instance and over the years the IA has a very good idea of the corridors of action and by seeking to dominate the heights can pull in reinforcements very quickly.

Yes, they failed on that for exactly what I meant earlier: too busy on policing actions and not enough focus on the warfighting side.

With 1962 behind us, I doubt we will make the same mistake on the military side. Can we say the same about the GoI?

Prem Kumar · Post by **Prem Kumar** » 02 Sep 2020 10:10

From an ISR perspective, this standoff presents a unique problem with hardly any parallels in the world. Just like with Kargil & 26/11. How we tackle this will be studied by other militaries.

For starters: given the wide area of action, terrain and short time durations, satellite imageries will often be too late. Example: the detection of a detachment of 500 Chinese troops to occupy a strategic hilltop is not something a satellite can do in time & pass the information down to the unit level. I doubt even UAVs can help in such situations. We will need literally 100s, if not 1000s of UAVs which are long duration and patrolling 24x7 across an extremely wide front. And because of ridges/mountains, you could be covering one area and the enemy (being smart) might be trying an ambush via a less-observed axis.

This needs:

1) Humint (where scouts, SFF come in)
2) BFSRs
3) UAVs
4) Satellites
5) Data-fusion & data-delegation through the chain of command
6) A thorough understanding of the terrain, so that we cover the high-probability areas and leave the rest
7) War-gaming
8. Delegated decision-making
9) Smart officers on the ground

As many others have pointed out, the above factors make it plain that you cannot win a battle of pure-defense in these circumstances. Glad that the army's wargaming & execution have included offensive actions.

ISR, Special Forces action, maneuvers & wargaming at these Himalayan heights is something very unique. Enough to produce dozens of papers, which I hope our officers/jawans will write and teach!

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 02 Sep 2020 10:12

If on were to believe Baba Baneras ....

https://twitter.com/drapr007/status/1300822405338734593

#BREAKING : 27 Places along the Indo-China border from Arunachal Pradesh to UT Leh & Laddakh have been identified where unusual movement observed after Indian Army's action along LAC in Eastern Ladakh. PLA may initiate misadventure from these places in coming days. #IntelInput

We are watching their movements rather closely.

I guess our own capabilities are being boosted by help coming for the American system. We DO have gaps in our ISR capabilities that need to be filled. On reason why the last of the foundational agreements wit US is almost on the verge of signing.

In the long run though we need fully Indian sourced and controlled ISR capability that covers the entire spectrum.

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 02 Sep 2020 10:15

@Prem kumar: the weak points for the Indian side are the UAVs and Satellite coverage. The latter would be barely sufficient if ISRO sats are being roped in (which they would be, because why the hell not?). But we don't launch enough military satellites right now to provide regular and full coverage over such a wide region as Tibet.

Don't get me started on UAVs. Do we know if the Herons/Searchers can even operate from such high altitudes to be safely above the 15-20k ft. mountains?

What about Humint? Considering the near lock-down of Tibetans inside Han control, is there still human traffic able to move between the borders? My understanding was that this is minimal to say the least.

The rest of your list is correct: BFSRs and hand-held UAVs are a key tech addition that the IA is soaking up these days.

sajaym · Post by **sajaym** » 02 Sep 2020 10:23

vivek_ahuja wrote: Can we say the same about the GoI?

Vivek, I think the fact that PM Modi visited Ladakh on Jul 3 is proof enough of this govt's intention in righting the wrongs in this region. If not for it's actual understanding of the strategic implications, then at least they (BJP) will want to do it as part of their constant one-upmanship vis-à-vis the Kangis. Can the contrasts be any starker? One party is actively involved in protecting the nation while the other is actively involved in protecting...well, itself! My only worry is the Bureauc-RATS who might be remnants of the UPA-raj, who are currently favoring dialogue with china instead of action. All the departments should be immediately purged off such rats.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 02 Sep 2020 10:29

https://twitter.com/Cold_Peace_/status/ ... 9506777089

Jeff M. Smith @Cold_Peace_

Global Times: "The south bank of the Pangong Lake where the latest confrontation took place is under China's control. India is trying to turn it into a new disputed area as a bargaining chip in negotiations."

IFF you believe the Gobar times, India is trying to do to China what it did to India at Pangang tso.

Now with that in mind, did India cross the Chinese perception of the LAC or not? The Chinese wouldn't be so worked up if we did not. I would go to the extent of saying that we might even have crossed the India perception of the LAC at points. Remember, we are not talking border but line of "actual" control here.

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 02 Sep 2020 10:32

sajaym wrote:
vivek_ahuja wrote: Can we say the same about the GoI?
Vivek, I think the fact that PM Modi visited Ladakh on Jul 3 is proof enough of this govt's intention in righting the wrongs in this region.

Didn't Nehru also go to Ladakh several times for photo-ops and pose with senior IA officers pointing to the border with their batons?

My point is not supposed to be a clever-snip. I am simply saying that all political parties do certain things in public which are very predictable in such security situations. It is what they do behind the scenes that matters.

For example, if Modi has loosened the rules-of-engagement for the IA, then that is a policy action far more sweeping than him flying to Ladakh to get a in-person meeting.

The Balakot experience showed us that GoI is always in deescalation mode even before the dust from the scuffle has settled (which is not a bad thing for the country because it shows us to be responsible). But see how that turned out with restricted rules of engagement against the PAF. And how the PAF exploited it.

My concern is that the politicians (BJP included to some extend), do not understand military power projection at all. I am yet to be convinced that as a party, the BJP is more than the Modi personality. So yes, the middle-level civilian overseers of the Indian military worry me for their lack of stake and expertise.

ManuJ · Post by **ManuJ** » 02 Sep 2020 10:33

Anoop wrote: Those buildings at that location is most probably the Border Meeting Point for the IA and PLA. The airstrip is the same Indian ALG that was used to fly in the tanks during the 1962 war, but is inactive now.

Anoop, thanks, that makes sense and explains the road linking it to the Chinese base at Spanggur Tso. I'm assuming that this meeting point is controlled by the Indian Army?

arshyam · Post by **arshyam** » 02 Sep 2020 10:33

vivek_ahuja wrote:
arshyam wrote:Not at all. I don't have to tell you this, given your extensive research for your books - the Army knows about logistics and have been careful about spreading too thin. These heights near Spanggur can be reinforced from the Chushul side if need be, so they won't be isolated pickets. Given the free hand they have been given, I am sure they have selected these sites after a careful study. But we have to consolidate and fortify our positions there as winter is coming and we need to be dug in.

...

Sorry for the ramble, but I feel it's important to draw the right conclusions from '62. Most analyses out there tend to stop at "ours but to do or die, but not reason why". While that was applicable to the Army of '62, we shouldn't stop there and continue dhoti shivering - it's not the case today.
That is a very exhaustive post! And I appreciate the effort involved.

Note that my point is not about dhoti shivering. In fact, my point is on the other end of the spectrum: overconfidence. My worry is that these early engagements are creating an aura similar to the bravado displayed by the IA during the 1950s prelude to the first war.

And yes, there were a lot of failure points in our execution of the 1962 war. You have summarized them nicely so I will not repeat them. I am simply advising that our bravado in these shoving matches must be matched with ISR inputs confirming that the Chinese are not poised to surge forward with heavy ground forces in a surprise move.

Thanks for the kind words sir. To clarify, I didn't say you were dhoti shivering, but was commenting on the general desi tendency to look at the Chinese soldiers as 9-feet tall, which was reflected in most analyses till recently. I should have worded that line better, sorry about that.

Yes, I share your last concern as well, and tend to dismiss "reports" on Twitter that talk about p*** magazines, their troops crying/running away, abandoned their weapons, etc. No need to over-estimate their capabilities, but equally, no need to under-estimate either. Plan for the worst, and hope for the best - that's the motto we need to follow. In this case, the Army and GoI appear to have planned their moves well, going by infra buildup across the LAC (not just roads). So I am quite confident that '62 is well behind us.

vivek_ahuja wrote:
ks_sachin wrote:Ahuja SIrji I was reading up on the Battle of Rezang La and one thing that was quite interesting was that the Indian deployments did not seek the mastery of the terrain. That plus the scattered nature spelt doom.

In this instance and over the years the IA has a very good idea of the corridors of action and by seeking to dominate the heights can pull in reinforcements very quickly.
Yes, they failed on that for exactly what I meant earlier: too busy on policing actions and not enough focus on the warfighting side.

There is a history to this as well. Till 1959, the Army was not tasked with defending the Tibet border - it's role was to deter any paki aggression. The IB, of all agencies, was tasked to defend this border. Ridiculous as it sounds, they did create border police units (pre-cursor of the ITBP) organically and using Assam Rifles troops and stationed them at the border crossing points. Since their role was policing, their posts did not follow military logic and were sited right at the claim lines. For the same reason, their logistics footprints were tiny and it was sufficient to use mules to supply. When the Army was asked to take over, they were expected to start by manning such posts since this "infra" was already available. Since the Army hadn't deployed in these areas before, they were also unfamiliar with the terrain and had to rely on incomplete and hand-drawn maps provided by the border police staff. So they needed time to establish temporary camps and survey the areas of responsibility before making decisions about permanent defences, but the Forward Policy came just a year down the line (a year sounds like a lot, but we have to factor in the winter season during which no work was possible). When commanders like Brig Palit raised these concerns (he commanded 7 Brigade when it was ordered to move from Ambala (IIRC) to Kameng), the response was what I quoted from DIB BN Mullick earlier: we should defend the border at the border. The rest is history.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 02 Sep 2020 10:34

g.sarkar wrote:https://news.yahoo.com/indian-special-f ... 01558.html
Indian special forces member killed in China border showdown
I hope that the details will come out soon. There must be a lot more to this story.

What I read was it was an anti-personnel mine. Now, that is very intriguing.

g.sarkar · Post by **g.sarkar** » 02 Sep 2020 11:02

SSridhar wrote:
g.sarkar wrote:https://news.yahoo.com/indian-special-f ... 01558.html
Indian special forces member killed in China border showdown
I hope that the details will come out soon. There must be a lot more to this story.
What I read was it was an anti-personnel mine. Now, that is very intriguing.

I read that too. I thought the govt. policy was never to acknowledge the existence of Tibetans in our forces. Their participation came out decades after the fact. What happened? anti personnel mine is kind of unexciting, is this a message for the lizard? only time will tell.

habal · Post by **habal** » 02 Sep 2020 11:03

vivek_ahuja wrote:Are we seeing a repeat of 1962 where the Indian Army deploys itself in a scattered manner on "policing actions" while the Chinese are massing behind? Part of the reason the IA was taken by surprise is because they scattered themselves into small groups trying to cover all border locations, and allowed the Chinese to slice through in force because no one location was strong enough to defend against the full might of a frontal assault.

Hopefully that thought is not lost amidst all this back-and-forth shoving matches.

there were no 24 hr satellite surveillance in 1962. India is receiving uptodate sat intel from the americans and every twitch & turn China takes is noted & relayed from allies. It isn't possible to move entire columns in this day, age without getting noticed.

A Russian source on twitter was arguing with me when asked about Russian role in supporting India that he claimed that China was not a major issue for the moment because the Americans were supplying India with highly precise sat images on deployment and locations and the Indians just had to use french-supplied precision guided munitions to thwart any Chinese designs.

pushkar.bhat · Post by **pushkar.bhat** » 02 Sep 2020 11:36

ManuJ wrote:There is a Chinese base and an airstrip across the Spanggur Gap, inside what Google shows as Indian territory, right next to Chushul. This is connected to the main Chinese base at Spanggur Tso via a blacktop road.

It's hard to understand why India would allow it to be built in the first place, but now it should undo the intrusion and take control of the base and the airstrip.

Coordinates: 33°33'26.66"N, 78°43'53.54"E

That is our Chushul ALG.

sanjayc · Post by **sanjayc** » 02 Sep 2020 11:49

g.sarkar wrote:
SSridhar wrote: What I read was it was an anti-personnel mine. Now, that is very intriguing.
I read that too. I thought the govt. policy was never to acknowledge the existence of Tibetans in our forces. Their participation came out decades after the fact. What happened? anti personnel mine is kind of unexciting, is this a message for the lizard? only time will tell.

Apparently the mine was a leftover from 1962 which got dislodged from its original position

k prasad · Post by **k prasad** » 02 Sep 2020 11:52

sanjayc wrote:
g.sarkar wrote: I read that too. I thought the govt. policy was never to acknowledge the existence of Tibetans in our forces. Their participation came out decades after the fact. What happened? anti personnel mine is kind of unexciting, is this a message for the lizard? only time will tell.

Apparently the mine was a leftover from 1962 which got dislodged from its original position

where was this info culled from, Sanjayji?

sanjayc · Post by **sanjayc** » 02 Sep 2020 12:07

Saurav Jha
@SJha1618

Sep 1
As far as the minefield story is concerned:
Sources say that it is not a new minefield. Rather, there has been a casualty due to an old mine leftover from 1962 (yes, that is correct), which sort of slid down as a result of avalanche activity and got in the way.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 02 Sep 2020 12:23

Thanks, Sanjayc. That explains.

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 02 Sep 2020 12:43

vivek_ahuja wrote:Are we seeing a repeat of 1962 where the Indian Army deploys itself in a scattered manner on "policing actions" while the Chinese are massing behind? Part of the reason the IA was taken by surprise is because they scattered themselves into small groups trying to cover all border locations, and allowed the Chinese to slice through in force because no one location was strong enough to defend against the full might of a frontal assault.

Hopefully that thought is not lost amidst all this back-and-forth shoving matches.

(Not intended for Vivek ji, but the newbies..) There's two big differences in manning vs. 1962
In Arunachal for e.g. where we had 2 under strength brigades in 1962, we can now deploy 4 or 5 divisions (from IV and III corps).
In Ladakh, where we had a single brigade, which was badly deployed, we are now likely to have 2 strong divisions, supported by elements of 2 more. The PLA does not outnumber us anywhere along the LAC, though if they choose the time and place of their attack and we don't react fast enough, they can get local superiority in the Demchok and Depsang area, which are the only 2 places that support mechanised warfare.

Also in 1962, our formations had had no combat experience, or experience of being deployed in Ladakh. The PLA officers on the other hand were
battle hardened survivors of the Korean war - winter and hilly conditions being similar to NEFA. Currently, its the IA which has unsurpassed experience in mountain and high altitude warfare, with almost all officers above the rank of Capt having combat experience, either on the LOC or RR. We have division level formations deployed in the region for decades - unlike the 2 PLA divisions currently present, which have moved from Xinjiang and their only experience has been in internal security, against unarmed Ughyurs.

Lisa · Post by **Lisa** » 02 Sep 2020 13:35

Not fair at all.

“Discipline and control” frontline troops

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 880847.cms

Its just a copy and paste of

‘Strictly discipline frontline troops’: China again provokes India, its FM blames Indian Army for Galwan clash

https://www.timesnownews.com/india/arti ... ash/636872

Absolutely no originality. I am appalled!!!

g.sarkar · Post by **g.sarkar** » 02 Sep 2020 13:40

SSridhar wrote:Thanks, Sanjayc. That explains.

Thanks Boss.

yensoy · Post by **yensoy** » 02 Sep 2020 13:51

This is not a repeat of 1962.

This is a repeat of 1967, 1989 and 2017 when we looked into the eyes of the bully and told him to back off.

Unfortunately, the bully will keep trying to push us around and won't learn his lesson until publicly humiliated. It will happen one day, but that day is not today.

RKumar · Post by **RKumar** » 02 Sep 2020 13:52

Mods, will it make sense to have Indo-Sino official statements thread - zero discussion only but collections of verified statements and counter statements from important political, economic and military guys.

What do you think? It could be a gold mine for the future analysis ...

nam · Post by **nam** » 02 Sep 2020 13:58

PLA cannot repeat the "hidden" 62 concentration of forces in specific sector. A mass required to attack a position will be large enough to be detected. Moreover PLA cannot create large forces in multiple areas.

Even if for some reason a surprise offensive happens, this time the first responder will be IAF. PLA got away with 62, because there was really no fire support for the frontline troops. Even if IA is not able to place large forces in all along the LAC, it would have made sure to provide artillery support, even if a place is manned by a platoon.

If any of our area is overwhelmed, we will overwhelm their positions. As I mentioned earlier, this is Ops Barbarossa level 3400KM frontline... Neither of the side can defend all of it..

RKumar · Post by **RKumar** » 02 Sep 2020 14:03

Border not demarcated, dispute will recur: China

TNN | Sep 2, 2020, 02:47 IST

NEW DELHI: As the military standoff on the LAC intensifies, Chinese foreign minister and state councillor Wang Yi told an international audience in Paris that there will always be problems with India of the kind witnessed in eastern Ladakh because the boundary wasn't demarcated yet even as he claimed China wouldn’t be the first to escalate the situation and was committed to managing all issues through dialogue.

....

"The boundary between China and India has not yet been demarcated, so there will always be problems of this kind. We are ready to manage all kinds of issues through dialogue with the Indian side," Wang said in a statement apparently made on Sunday but the transcript for which was released on Tuesday.

.....

Wang, who is on a tour of Europe, made the remarks during an interaction at the French Institute of International Relations in Paris on Monday. China's diplomatic offensive continued here with its embassy claiming India’s action at Pangong Tso, which the Indian government has described as defensive, had "grossly violated China's territorial sovereignty, seriously violated relevant agreements, protocols and important consensus reached between the two countries, and severely damaged peace and tranquillity along the China-India border areas".

It also urged the Indian side to "strictly control and restrain its frontline troops, earnestly honour its commitments, immediately stop all provocative actions, immediately withdraw its troops illegally trespassing the Line of Actual Control and immediately stop any actions leading to escalation and complication of the situation".

nam · Post by **nam** » 02 Sep 2020 14:03

The biggest issue I am now seeing, is the "no fire" rule. I think this is already broken, both sides are not making it public. SFF casualty is been reported as gun shots by the Tibetians.

Due to this no fire rule, the Chinis are reported to have come very close to our position. This would happen anywhere on LAC and it is good & bad for the PLA.

If they go on offensive, they are very close to our position, gives them a very good chance. Bad, if we are smart enough to provide good fire support like close in mortar, we could knock them down. Moreover PLA cannot rely on artillery support due to the proximity.

The border meetings are not going anywhere. We are probably sliding in to a war...

V_Raman · Post by **V_Raman** » 02 Sep 2020 14:07

What if this chinese gambit is to force a border settlement in somewhat favorable terms to them? Do they think this is their last chance? Will India oblige? I can see that this will appeal to NaMo - he has already said that he will be the PM only for 2 terms and will forever change India and address its core problems. If the chinese start now - we might sign an agreement by 2024?

RKumar · Post by **RKumar** » 02 Sep 2020 14:10

No meeting with Chinese counterpart in defence minister Rajnath Singh's schedule. He is leaving for Moscow today to attend Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defence Ministers’ meeting: ANI quoting sources

RKumar · Post by **RKumar** » 02 Sep 2020 14:12

V_Raman wrote:What if this chinese gambit is to force a border settlement in somewhat favorable terms to them? Do they think this is their last chance? Will India oblige? I can see that this will appeal to NaMo - he has already said that he will be the PM only for 2 terms and will forever change India and address its core problems. If the chinese start now - we might sign an agreement by 2024?

If I am sure of only one thing - China will not settle border while NaMo is ruling India.