India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

[pankajs]

@VikramS - We trusted the army commanders and you see what we have. Commanders on the ground can make a lot of difference even without political backing. If Gen Sundarji had his way asking the army to vacate from Sumdorong Chu - we would have already lost Tawang by now.
The commander on the ground stood up asking for written orders to vacate(which obviously he never got) and we managed to save our territory.
https://caravanmagazine.in/interview/ge ... mahon-line

As things stand right now - its already free for the Chinese at least - where ever they see an empty place - they come an occupy it. Are we going to wait for them to now establish permanent posts and then it'll becomes fait accompli.

We can only hope the commanders in Depsang have a clear idea of what is acceptable and what is not and the limits they'll go to to secure our interests. That Y-Junction is just 7 Kms from our only road access. The Chinese are not comfortable with the IA getting even a whim of their G219 and we're okay with them right upto our neck.

THIS is exactly why IA has been careful around Depsang for the past 10+ years.

Just check the approach to y-junction from the Chinese side and the Indian side and then decide who will be able to "establish permanent posts and then it'll becomes fait accompli" IFFF push comes to shove and both make a dash for the area in question.

The Chinese have to travel 30 km from their nearest post and IA only 7 km BUT the moment the IA tries to push to establish ANY kind of control of the area, the Chinese will swoop down and create "fait accompli", the reason IA has not pushed in that area at least not for direct control. A close study of the area on GE will make that clear.

On the last point, the only way for the IA to get back control of the area is to give the Chinese a battle. Nothing less will work.

As things stand today, the situation there is on a knife's edge. The Chinese have an advantage up to y-junction in mobilization and deployment that India simply cannot match. THAT is the naked truth which we may or may not like. So till the Chinese don't try changing the status quo in terms of permanent structure the IA too plays along.

[mihir.mehta]

@VikramS - We trusted the army commanders and you see what we have. Commanders on the ground can make a lot of difference even without political backing. If Gen Sundarji had his way asking the army to vacate from Sumdorong Chu - we would have already lost Tawang by now.
The commander on the ground stood up asking for written orders to vacate(which obviously he never got) and we managed to save our territory.
https://caravanmagazine.in/interview/ge ... mahon-line

As things stand right now - its already free for the Chinese at least - where ever they see an empty place - they come an occupy it. Are we going to wait for them to now establish permanent posts and then it'll becomes fait accompli.

We can only hope the commanders in Depsang have a clear idea of what is acceptable and what is not and the limits they'll go to to secure our interests. That Y-Junction is just 7 Kms from our only road access. The Chinese are not comfortable with the IA getting even a whim of their G219 and we're okay with them right upto our neck.

THIS is exactly why IA has been careful around Depsang for the past 10+ years.

Just check the approach to y-junction from the Chinese side and the Indian side and then decide who will be able to "establish permanent posts and then it'll becomes fait accompli" IFFF push comes to shove and both make a dash for the area in question.

The Chinese have to travel 30 km from their nearest post and IA only 7 km BUT the moment the IA tries to push to establish ANY kind of control of the area, the Chinese will swoop down and create "fait accompli", the reason IA has not pushed in that area at least not for direct control. A close study of the area on GE will make that clear.

On the last point, the only way for the IA to get back control of the area is to give the Chinese a battle. Nothing less will work.

As things stand today, the situation there is on a knife's edge. The Chinese have an advantage up to y-junction in mobilization and deployment that India simply cannot match. THAT is the naked truth which we may or may not like. So till the Chinese don't try changing the status quo in terms of permanent structure the IA too plays along.

You've a point - agreed. But like you say - we're closer to that area - then we should push for the Chinese sooner or later will establish permanent positions (Then they won't be 30 kms from their nearest post) - if not for tactical advantage - just to maintain the pressure upon us, keep us tied down - like they do all the time. We need to get out of our 1962 hangover really.

[pankajs]

I wanted to make this point for a while now but kept forgetting ...

The FACT that the Chinese are able to intercept Indian troops @ y-junction simply means that they are *watching* our Burtse camp without doubt. There is simply no other way to detect, mobilize and move up to the y-junction 1st before the our troops arrive.

The Chinese have deployed camera/sensors that pick movement as soon as our troops leave Tac/Track HQ, Qizi langar, Burtse and Jeevan nala route to confront out patrols into the area. These are the 4 main path to the area in question.

[Roop]

He points out a 9-12:1 ratio to dislodge a defender in the mountains. However, PGM from aircraft as was done in Kargil can make a significant difference.

IAF airstrikes (PGM) in Kargil were not directed at Paki infantry positions, they were directed at the Muntho Dalo supply depot. Once the supply depot was destroyed and Paks were unable to set it up again, the die was cast. Paki troops slowly starved to death over the next 6 weeks, or so. The bombardments of Paki dug-in infantry positions were conducted by arty, specifically the legendary Bofors gun in direct-fire mode.

All these things were the prelude to direct infantry assaults by the IA to clear out the heights finally.

If the PLA somehow managed to gain air superiority in the region it would be very problematic to keep troops at those heights.

[mihir.mehta]

Fishtail - 1 > 29° 6'57.48"N, 96°17'36.15"E
Fishtail - 2 > 28°37'9.23"N, 96°33'26.97"E

Thanks, can you also post the position of Asaphila - i've heard that name before but can't locate it anymore.

[pankajs]

You've a point - agreed. But like you say - we're closer to that area - then we should push for the Chinese sooner or later will establish permanent positions (Then they won't be 30 kms from their nearest post) - if not for tactical advantage - just to maintain the pressure upon us, keep us tied down - like they do all the time. We need to get out of our 1962 hangover really.

The Chinese will when they are ready and confident enough. Most likely the 1st move will be by the Chinese.

This is exactly what happened on the northern banks of Pangang tso between F4/8 just recently. The Chinese had easy access and infra right up to F4 while our access beyond F4 wasn't good. And one day the Chinese just swooped in.

Also, unlike the situation on the northern bank of Pangang tso where there are ridge-lines that can be used to dominate the area, there are no dominating features surrounding the Depsang plains that will afford a similar flanking opportunity.

India will have to make a decision on the Depsang plains sooner than later else the Chinese will move in.

[Prem Kumar]

Their aim was Jampei (Hope I have the spelling right) ridge at least. They did NOT get to it then or now.

OTOH, the Chinese were always on the plateau through they have built up that area after Doklam incident.

And this is where the narrative has to change (though we are not there yet). We seem content to say "Well, its Chinese territory and they can build whatever they want", while they complain loudly when our PM visits Arunachal Pradesh.

We need to have a worldview on what our territory is, what our neighbors' territory is and what's neutral territory. For those neighbors who respect a border, we can treat them likewise. For those who don't, we will treat their territory as fluidly as they treat ours. This means an abandonment of the One China policy, for starters

[Larry Walker]

Reading on twitter that India has cautioned China that IA will open fire if PLA tried to mob or run over Indian positions. So will this also apply to Y-Junction where PLA stops IA from moving ahead by mobbing??

[nam]

IAF airstrikes (PGM) in Kargil were not directed at Paki infantry positions, they were directed at the Muntho Dalo supply depot. Once the supply depot was destroyed and Paks were unable to set it up again, the die was cast. Paki troops slowly starved to death over the next 6 weeks, or so. The bombardments of Paki dug-in infantry positions were conducted by arty, specifically the legendary Bofors gun in direct-fire mode.

All these things were the prelude to direct infantry assaults by the IA to clear out the heights finally.

Current war in mountains will not be fought like Kargil. Kargil showed us, how unprepared we were. Thank god, we have powerful adversaries, otherwise if there was peace, the nation would have been over run in a war.

The key is air superiority. We loose control over the skies, we cannot hold the position. In Kargil, PGM was not easily available, as it is the case now. If LGB was easily available, IAF would have hit every infantry position with it. We were saving the PGM for a larger war.

Heights may not be easily captured by ground forces, but air power will turn the tide.

Our lack of dominating airpower is the biggest concern. The Chinese will built more runways and deploy more squadrons. Their manufacturing ecosystem will replace fighters faster than we can shoot down.

It doesn't matter if they don't have better jets. On the other side, we have HAL...

[mihir.mehta]

Reading on twitter that India has cautioned China that IA will open fire if PLA tried to mob or run over Indian positions. So will this also apply to Y-Junction where PLA stops IA from moving ahead by mobbing??

I think neither India or China have a permanent position at Y- Junction.

It does bother me really - exactly where have they put in their surveillance equipment that they know so the moment our patrols leave for the Bottleneck. Does the IA know the location of this equipment. Or is it some drone flying 24x7 that's live-streaming the route to their bases in the rear.

If its just the equipment without soldiers manning it - then there must be some power supply too.
+ I like to think the equipment - should be "ideally" outside of the rectangle (Raki Nala, Jeevan Nala & the patrol points)
If its close & the IA knows its location - it can destroy it or even avoid being detected.

Anybody has an idea?

[eklavya]

. Their manufacturing ecosystem will replace fighters faster than we can shoot down.
..

If PLAAF decides to tangle in the air, they will lose what 5 a day (assuming each Rafale eats one Chinese meal every day, and assuming the rest of the fighter fleet is dieting). They will have to build planes and fighter pilots (growing on trees?) faster than we can buy missiles.

[k prasad]

Not sure if this was posted earlier, but a very interesting video from Shekhar Gupta... interesting not so much for his explanations, which we've discussed here, but because he shows hand-drawn maps from Gen Panag, showing the LAC claim lines in the Demchok and Spanggur-Pangong sectors. Suggests that we view Black top as well within our LAC perception.



@mods... please feel free to delete this post if this vid has been posted earlier, or if, for any reason, its not okay to post this.

[mihir.mehta]

Gen Panag had corrected himself later on saying there was a mistake and put Black-Top back in Chinese territory. IT was there somewhere on twitter.

[LakshmanPST]

Not sure if this was posted earlier, but a very interesting video from Shekhar Gupta... interesting not so much for his explanations, which we've discussed here, but because he shows hand-drawn maps from Gen Panag, showing the LAC claim lines in the Demchok and Spanggur-Pangong sectors. Suggests that we view Black top as well within our LAC perception.

There was a classified Ops Room map leaked by TOI a couple of weeks back, which clearly shows Indian perception of LAC and it does not include Black Top and Helmet Top on Indian side of LAC...

Edit:- Looks like Lt. Gen. Panag corrected it later...

[LakshmanPST]

I wanted to make this point for a while now but kept forgetting ...

The FACT that the Chinese are able to intercept Indian troops @ y-junction simply means that they are *watching* our Burtse camp without doubt. There is simply no other way to detect, mobilize and move up to the y-junction 1st before the our troops arrive.

The Chinese have deployed camera/sensors that pick movement as soon as our troops leave Tac/Track HQ, Qizi langar, Burtse and Jeevan nala route to confront out patrols into the area. These are the 4 main path to the area in question.

The article says that Chinese are blocking Indian patrols near PP10, not at Y-Junction... PP10 is more than 20 km from Y-Junction as the crow flies... Actual distance on ground will be way longer...
So, I highly doubt they are observing our Burtse camp or have any high tech sensors...
They probably have a temporary camp near PP10 somewhere on Raki Nala and they come out in jeeps as soon as they see Indian troops...

[k prasad]

Not sure if this was posted earlier, but a very interesting video from Shekhar Gupta... interesting not so much for his explanations, which we've discussed here, but because he shows hand-drawn maps from Gen Panag, showing the LAC claim lines in the Demchok and Spanggur-Pangong sectors. Suggests that we view Black top as well within our LAC perception.

There was a classified Ops Room map leaked by TOI a couple of weeks back, which clearly shows Indian perception of LAC and it does not include Black Top and Helmet Top on Indian side of LAC...

Edit:- Looks like Lt. Gen. Panag corrected it later...

Interesting. So much confusion happening. At some point, one must wonder what is genuine confused reporting and what is possiible PsyOps/ disinfo.

[Vips]

Reading on twitter that India has cautioned China that IA will open fire if PLA tried to mob or run over Indian positions. So will this also apply to Y-Junction where PLA stops IA from moving ahead by mobbing??

Attempt to overrun troops will be met with fire: India to China.

India will re if there is any attempt to overrun or mob troops and there will no longer be any primitive ghting on the Line of Actual Control (LAC)
with batons or stones, China has been told, according to a top government official.

The Army has given clear instructions to troops at forward posts on the border that if they face hostile action like an attempt to overrun posts or a mass attack by PLA soldiers yielding batons, spears or other improvised weapons, they can shoot them.

“They have got the message that the pushing and shoving activities will no longer be tolerated. They have got the message that primitive weapons can no longer be used. This has been conveyed to them,” the oicial who did not wish to be identfied said.

While there have been multiple rounds of ring on the north and south banks of the Pangong lake, these have been in the nature of warning shots with no reports of injuries. The oicial said that only small arms have been used and larger calibre weapons have not been activated.

The officials also said that the Galwan clash was unfortunate but for the rst time in decades Chinese side lost soldiers in combat. It was a clear signal to the PLA that “India will go to any cost to protect its border”. Sharing details, the official said that during diplomatic talks, the Chinese admitted to at least ve casualties in the clash including the PLA battalion commander. The actual number of PLA casualties, the oicial said, could be several times higher.

The decision not to increase troop deployments on the border during recent talks has been welcomed but the Indian side is not taking it on face value, given incidents of breach of trust. “We will not blindly believe in that. While the agreement is a good start, we are prepared and the words have to be matched with actions on the ground,” the official said.





Confrming that China has mobilised over 50,000 troops, tanks, artillery guns and other equipment along LAC, the official said that there has not been any intelligence failure as the PLA movement was tracked at every junction.

“They (the PLA) always had the capability but their intentions changed overnight. There was no intelligence failure as it is impossible to get the last minute intelligence of when a formation decides to move ahead. In such a case, the rst mover has the advantage,” the official said.

Explaining how the situation on the LAC turned sour, officials said on May 5, three incidents took place — clashes at Galwan and Pangong and a faceo at Nakula in Sikkim. At Pangong, officials said a normal standoff took place at Finger 4 that usually has 30-40 soldiers from each side.

However, in May, the PLA moved in over a 1,000 extra troops behind the rst line of 30-40 soldiers to Finger 4 to occupy the ridges. “We were having faceoffs every day at Finger 4 where some soldiers would come face to face and then retreat.

Then one day they came in much larger numbers. This could not have been predicted,” the official said.

On apprehensions that the coming weeks could see a peaking of tension, given the history of the border and the early winter month which is conducive to operations, the official said “we are prepared every year in the month of October as it is the campaigning season”.

[pankajs]

Reading on twitter that India has cautioned China that IA will open fire if PLA tried to mob or run over Indian positions. So will this also apply to Y-Junction where PLA stops IA from moving ahead by mobbing??

This will not apply to y-junction because as you yourself note, it applies to Indian positions. There is no Indian position at the y-junction. Y-junction is just a point on the regular patrol path.

[pankajs]

I wanted to make this point for a while now but kept forgetting ...

The FACT that the Chinese are able to intercept Indian troops @ y-junction simply means that they are *watching* our Burtse camp without doubt. There is simply no other way to detect, mobilize and move up to the y-junction 1st before the our troops arrive.

The Chinese have deployed camera/sensors that pick movement as soon as our troops leave Tac/Track HQ, Qizi langar, Burtse and Jeevan nala route to confront out patrols into the area. These are the 4 main path to the area in question.

The article says that Chinese are blocking Indian patrols near PP10, not at Y-Junction... PP10 is more than 20 km from Y-Junction as the crow flies... Actual distance on ground will be way longer...
So, I highly doubt they are observing our Burtse camp or have any high tech sensors...
They probably have a temporary camp near PP10 somewhere on Raki Nala and they come out in jeeps as soon as they see Indian troops...

There are multiple version but most state that the block is at y-junction/bottleneck.

IFF that is the case then the Chinese must see our soldiers leave Burtse camp or soon after that for them to beat us to the bottleneck/y-junction.

[Prem Kumar]

.....

There was no intelligence failure as it is impossible to get the last minute intelligence of when a formation decides to move ahead. In such a case, the rst mover has the advantage,” the official said.
.....

“We were having faceoffs every day at Finger 4 where some soldiers would come face to face and then retreat. Then one day they came in much larger numbers. This could not have been predicted,” the official said.

Well, that is intelligence failure. If they relied on satellite overpasses once every 24 hours and Russia's assurances that it was just a military drill, then shame on us. We let a Kargil happen to us again. For real-time intel, we needed assets like UAVs (if not AWACS), at least once troop-massing was detected. The fact that we didn't budget to have these assets, even 2 years post-Doklam, shows an utter lack of planning.

Just like Kargil, we have recovered due to the bravery of the GI grunts.

[Jarita]

Correct. Somehow the dictum “trust no one” has not become part of our dna despite decades of subterfuge and betrayal.
I sincerely believe that we have a few moles and traitors across the entire chain of operations and unless this clean up is done, we will continue having these issues.
It is simply not possible to have this scale of intel failure.

[Larry Walker]

This will not apply to y-junction because as you yourself note, it applies to Indian positions. There is no Indian position at the y-junction. Y-junction is just a point on the regular patrol path.

Isn't Y-Junction not on Indian side of LAC? Or has the LAC moved west beyond this point?? Why should it not apply to Indian patrol being physically stopped by Chinese on Indian side of LAC?

[pankajs]

This will not apply to y-junction because as you yourself note, it applies to Indian positions. There is no Indian position at the y-junction. Y-junction is just a point on the regular patrol path.

Isn't Y-Junction not on Indian side of LAC? Or has the LAC moved west beyond this point?? Why should it not apply to Indian patrol being physically stopped by Chinese on Indian side of LAC?

Y-junction is in the grey zone or rather on the boundary between the Clear India side and the grey zone similar to F4 on the northern bank of the Pangang tso.

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ ... 689131.ece
LAC standoff | If PLA comes close, Indian troops can fire: official

Shots have been fired in the air on multiple occasions on the north and south banks of Pangong Tso in eastern Ladakh recently, and the Chinese have been given a clear message that pushing back Indian soldiers physically will not work any more, a senior government official said on Thursday.

This is about "pushing back" the NEW Indian "position" on the north and south bank of Pangang tso. If this is not clear enough ...

On the situation in the Depsang plains, where Chinese troops continue to block Indian patrols to the Patrolling Points 10-13, the official said there were one or two Chinese vehicles near the Y-junction, which kept going back and forth. Beyond the Y-junction, Indian patrols had to go on foot, which were being blocked by Chinese vehicles, the official stated, adding that patrol parties followed protocols and returned. “We have not given up our claims. It has only been temporarily halted due to the circumstances,” the official said.

See nothing at y-junction because there are NO positions established by India on or near the y-junction. Indian has not pitched tents or established a camp at y-junction. Patrol is not the same as position.

[darshan]

Correct. Somehow the dictum “trust no one” has not become part of our dna despite decades of subterfuge and betrayal.
I sincerely believe that we have a few moles and traitors across the entire chain of operations and unless this clean up is done, we will continue having these issues.
It is simply not possible to have this scale of intel failure.

+1. Or, as I keep thinking that MAD had essentially rolled dice on this hoping that it won't come to this. It's just hard to believe that Modi and co would not have figured that chinese can't be trusted, chinese are behind everything and are aligned to islamists. End of the chinese are the reason for pukes to have nukes. Modi made some trades but doesn't look like that they worked out as he was hoping. Hard to make ground shattering decisions without knowing that BJP will have a long run in Delhi and sell outs won't be back in power to undo any actions taken. None the less, with chinese forcing his hand, nothing better than Modi looking at this everyday and analyzing the next rot to tackle. 370 and chinese problems were also bit intertwined. So one can't really say that modi didn't have chinese on radar.

[RKumar]

Pankajs as usual, you are making things too complex. For China, there is no border defined and they will keep pushing our green, grey and red - imaginary lines. It is unfortunate but I haven’t seen single statement from GoI that we have clear border as depicted in the Indian map. There are no colored lines.

[pankajs]

Pankajs as usual, you are making things too complex. For China, there is no border defined and they will keep pushing our green, grey and red - imaginary lines. It is unfortunate but I haven’t seen single statement from GoI that we have clear border as depicted in the Indian map. There are no colored lines.

I have just stated the GOI's position wrt the various line that exist on the map or if you like in GOI's minds.

Also note the GOI's advice for the IA troops out to patrol the Depsang sector to "return" back if stopped at y-junction by following protocols instead of trying to push forward and get into a melee and invoke the latest fire rule that seems to animate some members. That act of withdrawing creates a new line even if none existed before.

[g.sarkar]

https://www.rediff.com/news/report/indi ... 200925.htm
India rejects China's push for 'selective disengagement'
Edited By: Utkarsh Mishra, September 25, 2020
At the recent military talks, the Chinese People's Liberation Army pushed for starting the disengagement process from the southern bank of Pangong lake but the Indian Army conveyed that steps to defuse the standoff in eastern Ladakh should simultaneously cover all the friction points, government sources said in New Delhi on Friday.
Though differences and contrasting views between the armies of India and China on the disengagement process marked the talks, both sides were on the same page that care should be taken to ensure that the overall situation in eastern Ladakh does not escalate, the sources said.
The Indian side also told the Chinese delegation that the talks on disengagement should include Depsang as well as all face-off sites, insisting that it should be a simultaneous process and not a selective one, they said.
It also conveyed to the Chinese side that as the standoff began in early May due to aggressive actions by the Chinese troops, they should take the lead in disengaging from the friction points.
The Indian side made it clear to the Chinese People's Liberation Army(PLA) that any misadventure or aggressive behaviour by it will be met with firmly as India was determined to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In the aftermath of the Galwan Valley clashes in mid-June, the government had given the Army the free hand to firmly deal with any Chinese action including use of firearms.
The Corps commander-level meeting on Monday took place in the backdrop of deteriorating situation in the Chushul sector following three incidents of shots being fired in the air by the PLA soldiers since the intervening night of August 29 and 30.
Following the incidents, India had occupied at least 20 strategic heights around southern and northern banks of Pangong lake.
It has been communicated to the Chinese side that the Indian Army will also not hesitate to resort to use of firearms in extreme circumstances to protect the country's territory in case Chinese troops resort to unacceptable level of aggression, the sources said.
......
Gautam

[Anoop]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_z6UKFGGE9Q

Interview with Lt. Gen. K.J. Singh (R) on the employment of tanks in HA areas. Some points I found interesting:

1. Recommends the adaptation of K-9 chassis with a 125 mm gun with good optronics instead of buying the Sprut.

2. Recommends a mix of light and heavy tank squadrons in a regiment in such areas.

3. Doesn't think much about the Chinese light tank, says it's quite heavy for a light tank at over 30 tons and with engine power derated by 20% at those altitudes, would give a P/W ratio of only 24 instead of 30 hp/ton and doesn't have much firepower.

4. Says the Russian tanks came standard with cold engine start that we had to remove to operate in the deserts (but our experience in 1990s show these were not sufficient).

4. Says we must have an agile tank capable of operating in riverine, marshy and high altitude areas. I don't quite understand this. For the LAC, investing in 3-4 regiments of tanks with specialized capabilities for HA (engine, special fuel, spares, firing grounds at altitude for range tables, night vision etc) should be well within India's budget and timelines, instead of going for a large scale development that requires a long time and budget.

Some other interesting politico-military suggestions also, but I don't think he addressed the REAL reason why Armed Forces are not included in policy making - nothing to do with fears of coups, rather to do with fears of Warrant of Precedence!

[SSridhar]

We had invited Col. Dinny for a presentation. This is what he said. Very comprehensive and good analysis too.

PRC's Gain

1. Gained some territory in North Bank of Pangong Tso. 8Kms between Finger 8 and Finger 4, avg. 3 Kms width. So, 24 Sq Kms. May be slightly reduced now if they have gone back to Finger 5
2. Changed the status-quo along the LAC all of a sudden with induction of troops and heavy weaponry. This wasn't expected by us
3. They have possibly dragged us into a prolonged employment
4. Inflicted casualties on us, 20 bravehearts.

Our Gain

1. The notion of India standing upto coercion by PLA is now widely acknowledged everywhere
2. We are occupying certain strategic heights on the Kailash Range which gives us tactical and strategic advantage
3. We have inflicted casualties on PLA
4. Some attempt at rectification of trade imbalance is going on even if not much, which wouldn't have been attemptedd otherwise
5. Border infrastructure is getting a sharper focus now as a result
6. There is a paradigm shift, even among ordinary people, from Pak-centric to China-centric
7. Some issues like Tibet or Quad which were taboo are getting more accepted
8. Our relationship with the US has got closer militarily

PRC's Losses

1. A permanent scar in its relationship with a big country like India. It is not going to be BAU henceforth. Our military has lost trust.
2. On the world stage, this is certainly a loss of face for China
3. PLA's Moldo Garrison is now being dominated by IA
4. Loss of PLA lives
5. Economic impact

Our Losses

1. Loss of some territory at Pangong Tso
2. Loss of precious lives of our soldiers
3. Troop mobilization leading to economic impact
4. Threat of a live LAC from now on {LoCisation of LAC}

Why did PRC do this?

1. Was it for territorial gain? Only 24 Sq Kms belies that. Depsang is not occupied by PLA though they stop patrolling. We have other means of doing patrolling there.
2. Was it for emphasizing their 1959 Claim Line? Not true. They are already ahead of their claim line
3. Chinese vulnerability? PLA doesn't feel vulnerable at all, they have enough buffer, we do not have much means of recapturing those areas. G219 interception is impossible
4. A reaction to abolition of Art 370/35A? China knows we are not its threat in Ladakh. Even Pakistan has not moved its strike corps.
5. Two-front war? PLA would not do that because it would be a dent on its image as a 'superpower' especially when engaged with the US on that score.
6. Is it to threaten DSDBO road? Cannot be because they are not on the ridges at Galwan to do so. They have now even gone back from there.
7. Was it to stop India-US proximity? PRC would have known that a military threat like this would only bring India-US even closer. Cannot be the reason
8. Was it to convert LAC into the LoC as in our western front? India can easily take this cost though it is an unnecessary burden. In Siachen we spend Rs. 5 Crores a day. Neither India nor China can occupy the entire 800 Kms of ridge line, unlike in LoC. There is no terrorist infiltration unlike in LoC. If PLA occupies some heights, then we will do the same and the game is endless.
9. Is it to show to the rest of the world that 'China has arrived'? May be, we may not know.

But, there could be a different and more plausible reason for what had happened and that is the NWMA (Non-War Military Activities) doctrine of the PLA. This is to use coercive threats below the threshold of a war to achieve its very tactical objectives.

The May 5/6 clashes in the north bank of Pangong Tso were violent. Video footages showed the Indian troops capturing a PLA humvee and even a PLA soldier pinned to the ground, possibly died later on. Casualty on the PLA side possibly happened and they wanted to 'teach us a lesson'. So, they came in a big way into Pangong Tso with diversion/support tactics in Gogra & Galwan. The Galwan incident looks like it was unplanned. The non-removal of the tent there by the PLA for whatever reason and the resulting incidents ultimately changed the whole scenario. The Chinese never expected the quick Indian counter-attack in Galwan, mobilization and the international focus and reaction. They now want to give a 'strategic twist' to their 'tactical miscalculation' by referring to Article 370, UT etc. At the same time, they know it is a military matter between the two armies. {So, China both tactically & strategically stupid?}

We cannot rule out another Galwan-like incident as the armies are in close contact range. We may see newer areas of patrolling as a result of these events. The old CBMs have broken down and a new one is now needed.

As regards the Punjabi-songs, he said the IA also does psyops but in different ways. For example, the towering, well-built, mustachioed Rajput Regmt. soldiers give the Chinese a complex and they are employed deliberately to do so.

As for mining, he said that the mine that exploded and killed an SFF soldier was a 1962 vintage when retreating Indian troops threw mines and strewn them all over without planting them carefully. Wind & shifting gravel have taken them all over and these dangerous areas are marked.

[Anoop]

Thank you for the recap, SSridhar. Did Col. Dinny elaborate on the alternative ways to patrol in the Depsang area, bypassing the bottleneck?

Also, to be fair, the Chinese have never provided any rationale for their actions. It's only Indian commentators who are guessing at their reasons. So it would not be accurate to say that the Chinese are providing a strategic cover for their tactical lapses.

I would like to see Indian strategic thinkers stop articulating this question in public - "What does China want?" That implies that we are willing to consider their requests in return for their de-escalation. I would rather us project the idea - "It doesn't matter what China wants, they are not going to get it. De-escalation can happen or not happen on the Chinese side. We are staying put in the Chushul and Pangong Tso sectors and biding our time elsewhere."

[Kanson]

We had invited Col. Dinny for a presentation. This is what he said. Very comprehensive and good analysis too.


Why did PRC do this?

1. Was it for territorial gain? Only 24 Sq Kms belies that. Depsang is not occupied by PLA though they stop patrolling. We have other means of doing patrolling there.
2. Was it for emphasizing their 1959 Claim Line? Not true. They are already ahead of their claim line
3. Chinese vulnerability? PLA doesn't feel vulnerable at all, they have enough buffer, we do not have much means of recapturing those areas. G219 interception is impossible
4. A reaction to abolition of Art 370/35A? China knows we are not its threat in Ladakh. Even Pakistan has not moved its strike corps.
5. Two-front war? PLA would not do that because it would be a dent on its image as a 'superpower' especially when engaged with the US on that score.
6. Is it to threaten DSDBO road? Cannot be because they are not on the ridges at Galwan to do so. They have now even gone back from there.
7. Was it to stop India-US proximity? PRC would have known that a military threat like this would only bring India-US even closer. Cannot be the reason
8. Was it to convert LAC into the LoC as in our western front? India can easily take this cost though it is an unnecessary burden. In Siachen we spend Rs. 5 Crores a day. Neither India nor China can occupy the entire 800 Kms of ridge line, unlike in LoC. There is no terrorist infiltration unlike in LoC. If PLA occupies some heights, then we will do the same and the game is endless.
9. Is it to show to the rest of the world that 'China has arrived'? May be, we may not know.

But, there could be a different and more plausible reason for what had happened and that is the NWMA (Non-War Military Activities) doctrine of the PLA. This is to use coercive threats below the threshold of a war to achieve its very tactical objectives.

I believe, the only solution more plausible to explain their behaviour is:
Xi preempted the most powerful threat to his presidency in this difficult times by making sure his pla army is focused on external conflicts / war with foreign powers than turning its attention on internal strife.

The most powerful force, the pla army left idle can easily absorbed itself into internal power struggle/conflicts. By this, it could be used by various factions in the power hierarchy. Xi doesnt want any intervention, he is not willing to share power.

So the best way to keep them under control is by make them focussed on external enemies.

2. There is ofcourse a second reason (which i stated earlier) to their behaviour. As a bully, this the only way they know how to treat other small countries to an emerging international crisis, COVID19.
[Small in economy & power.]

[SSridhar]

Did Col. Dinny elaborate on the alternative ways to patrol in the Depsang area, bypassing the bottleneck?

Also, to be fair, the Chinese have never provided any rationale for their actions. It's only Indian commentators who are guessing at their reasons. So it would not be accurate to say that the Chinese are providing a strategic cover for their tactical lapses.

Anop, no, obviously he wouldn't say that and we also didn't ask. Anyway, his statement leaves some options for IA, no doubt.

Anoop, the Chinese are so opaque that the rest of the world are left to laboriously piece together tidbits and stitch together the intentions based on other factors including its history and culture. So, one's interpretation of Chinese actions are as good or as bad as another's.

[SSridhar]

Kanson, IMO, one more reason could be the upcoming 20th National Conference of the CCP in September (or thereabouts) 2022. The preparations would start by June/July 2021, if past events are to go by. Xi wants to appear as strong and winning amidst a lot of ruins, like COVID, international opprobrium, Trade War with the US, economy, huge issues with BRI etc.

[Kanson]

Yes possible. Everthing points to that one direction of keeping power all to himself.
He is most likely not to immerse his forces into full-fledged conflict. But will do everything just short of that to keep them busy. At the sametime wants to appear much stronger.
Dangerous concoction. He & his army very much want to show their bravado. So possibility of some swift sharp action to show themselves much stronger.

[Kanson]

As per talks around, by mahmallapuram episode, the perception & understanding between the two entities changed. I see that as reference to changed trajectory that china was adopting from that time.

Points to the fact that India is more vigilant.

[Paul]

No need to share Operational details. Please delete your post

[nam]

My personal opinion is PLA was just trying to stop us from creating the feeder roads, because they know the value of these roads. They already have it.

PLA tries to control our behavior using incursion. The incursion was within the grey area, places where they already had access, so as not to provoke us in to full fledged reaction. It went haywire with Galwan clash.

We used our media to muddle the whole thing up for the PLA.

[abhik]

At Nyoma, how the IAF turned a sandy surface into a smooth landing ground for its An-32
This is an account of the reactivation of Nyoma AGL back in 2009 (DBO and Fukche were also reactivated at the same time). One hopes this is black topped at the earliest, and our road infrastructure is now good enough now to handle all the construction materials required to build and then sustain these bases.

[arshyam]

@mihir.mehta, please edit your post. When the article does not name the airbase, why the heck are you doing so?

...

[Varoon Shekhar]

Is the town of Burtse fully within India( Ladakh)? Maps are not clear on this