‘India Has Tripled Its Troops Near LAC; Can Easily Cross Into China In A Few Hours’: Retired Chinese General Warns PLA
https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/indi ... -warns-pla
True, SSridhar, but my point is that the Chinese use their inscrutability as a weapon, or at least as a negotiating tactic. We see NoKo use this too, but they don't have the same economic cards to play.SSridhar wrote:Anoop, the Chinese are so opaque that the rest of the world are left to laboriously piece together tidbits and stitch together the intentions based on other factors including its history and culture. So, one's interpretation of Chinese actions are as good or as bad as another's.
We're pretty inscrutable for the Chinese too. All their social media posts and many columnists calls India irrational, unpredictable and crazy. They do not understand what we're up to. According to their logic, we should clearly see that we are inferior, give up and bow ourselves to their will. That we don't do so is incomprehensible. Also what happened at Galwan, bravery of Indian soldiers was quite a surprise and again incomprehensible.Anoop wrote:True, SSridhar, but my point is that the Chinese use their inscrutability as a weapon, or at least as a negotiating tactic. We see NoKo use this too, but they don't have the same economic cards to play.SSridhar wrote:Anoop, the Chinese are so opaque that the rest of the world are left to laboriously piece together tidbits and stitch together the intentions based on other factors including its history and culture. So, one's interpretation of Chinese actions are as good or as bad as another's.
My suggestion is that we change the public discourse on TV and social media to deny them that weapon.
We have just about 2 months left before the passes in Ladakh close, which means that it's most likely we will be forward deployed this winter. Let us make a virtue of this necessity and simply don't ask for or offer anything during the military or foreign minister or SR talks. Let the Chinese wonder what we are up to. There will be enormous pain for our soldiers, but short of starting a war, their actions so far in providing us a strong base for negotiations should not be squandered away. The Chinese must have a permanent mark on their face from this round that they will not resort to this miscalculation again.
In Aug:refrain from unilaterally changing the situation on the ground
https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.h ... ne_06_2020They should strictly respect and observe the Line of Actual Control and should not take any unilateral action to alter it.
Its common sense - it was clearly visible in the video and this post was for the knowledge of ppl on this forum. Don't worry about the Chinese - they know things much before any or our Journalists even get a whim of it.arshyam wrote:@mihir.mehta, please edit your post. When the article does not name the airbase, why the heck are you doing so?
mihir.mehta wrote:...
Common sense for whom? The article was carefully worded for a reason, and it's best to let it stay that way. They could have named the place had they wanted to, but didn't. Why do you have to come and show off your knawlidge on top of that? Anyway, if you want to double down after needlessly revealing operational details (looks like you've done that again), that's your choice. But don't put the forum in trouble.mihir.mehta wrote:Its common sense - it was clearly visible in the video and this post was for the knowledge of ppl on this forum. Don't worry about the Chinese - they know things much before any or our Journalists even get a whim of it.arshyam wrote:@mihir.mehta, please edit your post. When the article does not name the airbase, why the heck are you doing so?
RaviB, do you feel that this attitude of the Chinese people percolates to their establishment? One thing I couldn't really understand is the language of their diplomats - demanding India punish its soldiers for the Galwan incident, when we are actually honoring them. I thought at that time that it was again a negotiating tactic - pushing the envelope so far that any little concession after that would seem like they have kept their end of a bargain. Now, having read your many posts on the Chinese psyche, I am not sure. I think there is a deep sense of cognitive dissonance in their approach to international relations, especially their territorial claims.RaviB wrote:We're pretty inscrutable for the Chinese too. All their social media posts and many columnists calls India irrational, unpredictable and crazy. They do not understand what we're up to. According to their logic, we should clearly see that we are inferior, give up and bow ourselves to their will. That we don't do so is incomprehensible. Also what happened at Galwan, bravery of Indian soldiers was quite a surprise and again incomprehensible.
Global Times, i am enjoying. I am reading its tweets mainly for the replies. So good and creativeAnoop wrote:RaviB wrote:I think 2017 onwards, we are coming out of that shell and giving due emphasis to 1967, 1987, 2014 (Chumur) and 2017 in the public imagination. Nothing could hurt the Chinese ego as much as a laughter in the face of their threats in Global Times and PLA Daily.
I have to say with deep regret that this analysis is depressing and infuriating to read, in that it sounds clueless. It is not asking the right questions at all, missing the big picture entirely. (I know it's not yours SSridhar, and you are just sharing it).SSridhar wrote: ...
Why did PRC do this?But, there could be a different and more plausible reason for what had happened and that is the NWMA (Non-War Military Activities) doctrine of the PLA. This is to use coercive threats below the threshold of a war to achieve its very tactical objectives.
- Was it for territorial gain? Only 24 Sq Kms belies that. Depsang is not occupied by PLA though they stop patrolling. We have other means of doing patrolling there.
- Was it for emphasizing their 1959 Claim Line? Not true. They are already ahead of their claim line
- Chinese vulnerability? PLA doesn't feel vulnerable at all, they have enough buffer, we do not have much means of recapturing those areas. G219 interception is impossible
- A reaction to abolition of Art 370/35A? China knows we are not its threat in Ladakh. Even Pakistan has not moved its strike corps.
- Two-front war? PLA would not do that because it would be a dent on its image as a 'superpower' especially when engaged with the US on that score.
- Is it to threaten DSDBO road? Cannot be because they are not on the ridges at Galwan to do so. They have now even gone back from there.
- Was it to stop India-US proximity? PRC would have known that a military threat like this would only bring India-US even closer. Cannot be the reason
- Was it to convert LAC into the LoC as in our western front? India can easily take this cost though it is an unnecessary burden. In Siachen we spend Rs. 5 Crores a day. Neither India nor China can occupy the entire 800 Kms of ridge line, unlike in LoC. There is no terrorist infiltration unlike in LoC. If PLA occupies some heights, then we will do the same and the game is endless.
- Is it to show to the rest of the world that 'China has arrived'? May be, we may not know.
...
KLNMurthy wrote: I have to say with deep regret that this analysis is depressing and infuriating to read, in that it sounds clueless. It is not asking the right questions at all, missing the big picture entirely. (I know it's not yours SSridhar, and you are just sharing it).
The China Unscripted video with the Canadian lady guest reminded us that the Chinese will relentlessly pursue Mao's palm + 5 fingers goal across time, and from the Chinese perspective, these incidents should be seen as small incremental efforts that have some kind of rationale, which is irrelevant in the context of the big picture. The effort paid off to some extent, but failed in many other ways. No matter (in the Chinese view), because they will simply try something else, somewhere else, on some other front (like the BIF or TSP or Oli's Nepal or Bhutan or cyberwarfare or paid negative coverage in NYT, take your pick, possibilities are endless) till something(s) succeeds.
Any so-called analysis that devotes no time at all to this big picture, instead focussing solely on the minute details of what happened in this particular case and why, is worthless. It is nothing more than a list of head-scratchers like the quoted post had. What value does such a list add in itself, exactly, for the security of India, its people and civilization?
It is telling that an outside student of India-China, a nobody, a "mere" reporter, unlike all the heavyweight strategists on our side, is able to bring this essential clarity and coherence to the understanding of what is happening, while our people are scratching their heads, going "Bwhy they are doing this onlee? Whatta puzzle, no? Inscrutable Chinese, what, what?"
It's the Himalayan massif, stupid.
It is perfectly clear to me that nothing short of a long-term commitment on our part, lasting as long as the rest of Kaliyuga, to do to China what Lord Rama did to Ravana's Lanka Empire--break its back so that it won't stand up again, will keep us safe from the evil dragon.
KLN Murthy, of course the Chinese Strategy is well known. Col. Dinny wasn't clueless about all that. Those aspects were discussed also. But, he feels that this time, it was a very tactical "teach the IA a lesson" that went very awry for the PLAGF and it escalated quickly. He recalled incidents like this under his command too. That's his assessment.KLNMurthy wrote:I have to say with deep regret that this analysis is depressing and infuriating to read, in that it sounds clueless. It is not asking the right questions at all, missing the big picture entirely. (I know it's not yours SSridhar, and you are just sharing it).SSridhar wrote: ...
Why did PRC do this?
...
The LOC has sectors in high altitude, and in certain sub-sectors in super high altitude. Along the LOC there is precipitation, the existence of tree-line, snow fall and large retention of snow, reasonable roads-tracks infrastructure and comparatively healthy environment. Au contraire the LAC in Eastern Ladakh is a largely rain-shadow region, with steep barren ridges, deep valleys/ gorges, and snowfall that is minimal and retain minimally. There are serious infrastructural and access issues to Ladakh in winter months. The entire LAC in Eastern Ladakh requires at least a second stage acclimatisation. While areas closer to LOC are largely inhabited, LAC has populated villages far and few in-between.
.....
Logistically, LOC and LAC are different as chalk and cheese. In Eastern Ladakh, the terrain and climatic challenges have effect on health, even after acclimatisation. Winter stocking, especially fuel for warming and cooking purposes, is imperative. An immense anxiety can be of potable water. However, the air-bridge established between mainland and Leh, and Leh to forward areas will greatly facilitate logistics round the year. In the current imbroglio, with defences on high ridges and passes and much higher numbers of units, the operational logistics will be an immense exercise.
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While attacking and capturing mutually defended localities held by Indian Army units will be no mean feat, occupying vacant or vacated passes and ridge lines will be exactly what will suit PLA’s cunningness and guile. There is hence prudence mandatory in ‘redeployment of troops to their regular posts’ without strong verifiable systems. After the experience of Kargil 1999, capturing PLA occupied areas by deliberate operations is plannable. However that decision will fall into political realm and the risk of escalation may become a dampener. Hence complete redeployment, even to obviate skirmish, will be detrimental, as it may be taken advantage off by the PLA.
Eastern Ladakh defences, as mentioned above, are largely above 16000feet. Though Indian Army is holding partial defences on the LOC, and wholly on AGPL in comparable heights, for Eastern Ladakh it will be a first. The units hence will be pushed to establish new defended line in Sub Sector North, in the Cheng-Chenmo Valley (Hot Springs – Gogra), North of Pangong Tso and on the Kailash Range. Similar concerns will also be in the Central Sector and Arunachal Pradesh (less West Kameng District). The time-tested teaching of troops to capture (or occupy herein) and troops to hold, mindful of appreciated threat per locality and availability/ time-distance matrix of employment of reserves, needs to be practised. This may facilitate some redeployment, and make the localities more winter-manageable.
....
The doctrine of preferring readjustment and reinforcement in mountains must give way to deliberate offensive planning, even in super high altitude. The occupation of Kailash Range on 29/30 August 2020 can be construed as the rightful measure vis-a-vis capture of transgressed areas. The extent of commensurate occupied areas (which both India and China claim as their own), is manifold larger. This entails adequacy of reserves, that are trained and positioned to turn the adversary’s plans and hence are proactive enough as credible deterrence. Loss of territory will be unacceptable to the adversary, and to recapture it will be Herculean! As a corollary, a forceful offensive territorial response to even non-kinetic or non-contact typology of warfare will prove internally disturbing to China.
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The prowess of sons-of-the-soil that hail from the high altitudes regions and their force-multiplier effect, like the Ladakh, Dogra, Garhwal, Kumaon, Sikkim, Arunachal Scouts and the Special Frontier Force will be most pronounced. Asymmetric warfare capabilities will be the best to challenge force asymmetry and cause major upheaval to any offensive–defensive designs of the adversary. It will be advantageous to re-examine the Scouts’ per se, create a separate identity, expand the LSRC into a Scouts Centre of Excellence, and enlarge the force by additional conversions of infantry units from Scouts’ parent Regiments.
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The management of satisfactoriness of peace tenures for large numbers of all arms units inducted along the Northern Borders (especially those not based upon Corps Roster postings, like infantry, artillery, engineers), will be severely hampered. Long haul, as has been stated, mandates these staff duty considerations, as in the long run there are social requirements too! However, it must be stated that units and troops are generally more contented to serve in difficult areas and on operational tasking.
...
While units on the ground will opine a threat pattern, and with bravado, zeal and enthusiasm and Regimental spirit, may even be resolute on status quo of current deployment, the situation demands a pragmatic appreciation and reassessment, well prior to the onset of winter. Being hardy, tough, experienced in high altitude warfare is correct, but being practical and realistic is as important. LOC-isation should remain what it is, a coinage!
Ok, thanks for clarifying that. I probably came across rather harsh, the relentlessness of the Chinese and our slowness to admit to ourselves that the only path forward is for us to be just as relentless in destroying the threat (not just stubborn and brave in defence) have been very much on my mind.SSridhar wrote:KLN Murthy, of course the Chinese Strategy is well known. Col. Dinny wasn't clueless about all that. Those aspects were discussed also. But, he feels that this time, it was a very tactical "teach the IA a lesson" that went very awry for the PLAGF and it escalated quickly. He recalled incidents like this under his command too. That's his assessment.KLNMurthy wrote: I have to say with deep regret that this analysis is depressing and infuriating to read, in that it sounds clueless. It is not asking the right questions at all, missing the big picture entirely. (I know it's not yours SSridhar, and you are just sharing it).
I get your point.Anoop wrote:Ok, I read this rant and am still "head-scratching". Cleo Pascal says that the Indian reaction to Chinese hegemony, is in many respects, ahead of the rest of the world. She particularly singles out 3 Indian think-tanks by name and recommends that people go to the source directly since these participation in those erstwhile closed groups is now open in the Covid-19 world. Does this suggest that Indian strategic thinkers, for whom you have shown such disdain in this post, are clueless?
Secondly, the fundamental conclusion from Col. Dinny's analysis, as recapped here, was that the Chinese were doing exactly what you attributed to Cleo Pascal's insight - pushing claims as much as they could, short of war. In Cleo's words, this is their strategy to show progress on a numerical ranking system for the benefit of the CPC. He arrived at this conclusion using a rhetorical device that used sub-themes to reject those hypotheses. What's so hard to understand?
Very well made point KLMN ji. Especially the part bolded is something we need to work against. Being aware of it enables us to rectify.KLNMurthy wrote: ....
I get your point.
However......
I say that because, we should understand that the Chinese goal with respect to India is to secure their southern, Himalayan border for all time to their satisfaction, at our eternal expense. “Teaching us our place” is a psychological stratagem to that end. It is also an integral component of the outcome that the Chinese desire: deep material domination of India, made durable and permanent by the psychological element.
We Indians are a proud people, we react angrily to a foreign power “putting us in our place.” That is a good thing, but depressingly inadequate. It is inadequate because we focus our fighting on assuaging the injury to our egos, and neglect the material aspect. That means we are handing the enemy a powerful tool to control us: massage or wound our egos as the occasion requires. All the while, they remain focused on accumulating what is ours: territory, economic levers, political autonomy.
It is depressing because it is basically colonialism, we have seen this movie multiple times, and should have learned by now. The British flattered when they had to, crushed our spirits when they could, and took over what is ours. Before them the Mughals held off the mighty and fearsome warriors of India by tossing a few ego-flattering crumbs their way, and proceeded to plunder and hollow out India at their leisure, utilising a newly-created class of happy collaborators for the purpose. As did the British. (Both classes of collaborators are still very much with us, and flourishing, eating away at India.)
Cleo Paskal was introducing the Indian strategic community to a largely-ignorant podcast audience. She should not be expected to rant like me on BRF. She is a third-party observer & reporter. She has no skin in the actual game between India and China, her “game” is information-vending only.
.... Her crediting the Indian strategic community for their contribution to *her* game doesn’t mean that the community is doing a good-enough job of contributing to *our* game. .......
Thank you KLN Murthy, for elaborating, without any defensiveness or rancour. It's clear to me now and I appreciate you taking the time to spell out your reasoning patiently.KLNMurthy wrote:
I get your point.
However.
Guddu wrote:Yes we now have an edge in the Chushul sector, we command the heights. But if we are forced to occupy the heights indefinitely, thats an almost unbearable extra cost imposed on the IA, while the Chinese sit in their warm tents. I am not sure if we should be celebrating the extra cost imposed on us. We might be better off taking kinetic action in that area, drive them away, gain territory and impose cost on the Chinese. So far, I do not see that we have imposed any territorial costs on the Chinese. To prevent future salami slicing, we must do our own salami slicing and impose territorial costs.
Murthyji, Perhaps we need our own simple Anti Mao strategy wrt China to handle this menace? Let not the last 70 yr situation turn into a nightmare for our future generations as some of the past have allowed with complacency. We need to have a longer term view. Tactics will automatically flow with a goal. As Vishy Anand said, even a poorly devised plan is better than no plan.KLNMurthy wrote: ... the Chinese will relentlessly pursue Mao's palm + 5 fingers goal across time, and from the Chinese perspective, these incidents should be seen as small incremental efforts that have some kind of rationale, which is irrelevant in the context of the big picture. The effort paid off to some extent, but failed in many other ways. No matter (in the Chinese view), because they will simply try something else, somewhere else, on some other front (like the BIF or TSP or Oli's Nepal or Bhutan or cyberwarfare or paid negative coverage in NYT, take your pick, possibilities are endless) till something(s) succeeds.
Any so-called analysis that devotes no time at all to this big picture, instead focussing solely on the minute details of what happened
It is perfectly clear to me that nothing short of a long-term commitment on our part, lasting as long as the rest of Kaliyuga, to do to China what Lord Rama did to Ravana's Lanka Empire--break its back so that it won't stand up again, will keep us safe from the evil dragon.
SPECTACULAR post there, sir. You echo something I've repeatedly tried to state and even apply as a moderation approach here - stop thinking and reacting emotionally. This is a tendency seen across everyone from posters here to the country's leaders. If one is easily emotionally manipulated, one is easy to manipulate. The east Asian 'inscrutability' in part helps them avoid expressing those feeling immediately.KLNMurthy wrote:I get your point.
...
We Indians are a proud people, we react angrily to a foreign power “putting us in our place.” That is a good thing, but depressingly inadequate. It is inadequate because we focus our fighting on assuaging the injury to our egos, and neglect the material aspect. That means we are handing the enemy a powerful tool to control us: massage or wound our egos as the occasion requires. All the while, they remain focused on accumulating what is ours: territory, economic levers, political autonomy.
It is depressing because it is basically colonialism, we have seen this movie multiple times, and should have learned by now. The British flattered when they had to, crushed our spirits when they could, and took over what is ours. Before them the Mughals held off the mighty and fearsome warriors of India by tossing a few ego-flattering crumbs their way, and proceeded to plunder and hollow out India at their leisure, utilising a newly-created class of happy collaborators for the purpose. As did the British. (Both classes of collaborators are still very much with us, and flourishing, eating away at India.)
...
The "readjustment" was a good opening gambit, and strengthened our defensive position against any future action from them. However if we were expecting it to change the equation at a strategic level, then I'd say good luck with that. Talks with the Chinese have not worked in the last ~70 years, at best what we can get them to agree to will be a two steps forward and one step back deal, even that will only be honour till they try it again. And those will surely come with reversal of (to some extent of the economic measures). But I doubt we have any real plans beyond more talks, reading articles like the below (from former Lt Gens) convinces even more of that.Guddu wrote:Yes we now have an edge in the Chushul sector, we command the heights. But if we are forced to occupy the heights indefinitely, thats an almost unbearable extra cost imposed on the IA, while the Chinese sit in their warm tents. I am not sure if we should be celebrating the extra cost imposed on us. We might be better off taking kinetic action in that area, drive them away, gain territory and impose cost on the Chinese. So far, I do not see that we have imposed any territorial costs on the Chinese. To prevent future salami slicing, we must do our own salami slicing and impose territorial costs.
BRF had a directive from its prehistoric days: “make the world a better place. Destroy Pakistan.” (Oldies can correct me as to the exact wording.)Aditya_V wrote:That is how BIF and Pakis do to us,look at this thread. Pakis have equally bad intentions towards as, but just because they have not caused a major terror attack recently we are back to chakras hai attitude towards them. I can bet they are planning something sinister, but how many Indians understand that we cannot have strategic safety if do not break Pakis into smaller parts and keep working at it.
[mods, excuse the OT]Anoop wrote:Thank you KLN Murthy, for elaborating, without any defensiveness or rancour. It's clear to me now and I appreciate you taking the time to spell out your reasoning patiently.KLNMurthy wrote:
I get your point.
However.
I will admit that the Chinese actions grate on me equally. We are all in this together and though we may be late to the party as a nation, we will stare the CPC down. They are upstarts, johnnies come lately. Time for us ro put them in their place.
Officials admit the construction of the Shinku La tunnel alone is more viable in comparison to construction of at least tunnels beneath the Baralacha (16,020 feet), Lachlungla (16,620 feet) and Tanglangla (17,480 feet) passes that lie on the operational Manali-Leh link.
On completion of the Shinku La tunnel, the Manali-Kargil highway will remain open throughout the year, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways said in a statement last week.
door swings both ways sir, our learning is not steep, we have been doign this for ages..it will be a bigger lesson for china...i prefer the show down now than later as china will have their logistics sorted out ...but in any case a showdown is inevitable between India and China in this decade...LakshmanPST wrote:In a way I feel this Winter deployment is good for us in the long run...
Even if things don't go kinetic, we will gain valuable experience of maintaining war time force in those heights during winter in Ladakh...
It will help us fix all loopholes in terms of weapons, equipment and logistics, in case of a future war...
Remember that it is not WE who have to stay on those peeks for the winter, in those hellish conditions. Imagine living in a freezebox, where you have to boil water to drink it. A freezer "only" is -18. The chaps at the peeks could face -35 and strong winds. Without helicopters it will be a near impossible task to hold those peeks in the winter.LakshmanPST wrote:In a way I feel this Winter deployment is good for us in the long run...
Even if things don't go kinetic, we will gain valuable experience of maintaining war time force in those heights during winter in Ladakh...
It will help us fix all loopholes in terms of weapons, equipment and logistics, in case of a future war...